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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems VI: The (SEN) Assumptions and the Average Cost Optimality InequalityTextbook

Motivation

Queueing control problems (admission control, routing, service-rate selection, flow control) are naturally posed as Markov decision chains with a denumerably infinite state space, such as the number of customers in a buffer, and are usually judged by their long-run average cost per unit time. When the state space is finite, Chapter 6 of Sennott's book shows that an average cost optimal stationary policy always exists. On a countable state space this fails: Section 7.1 of the book gives examples in which no average cost optimal policy exists, and one in which no stationary policy comes within a given distance of the minimum average cost. The question addressed by this mission is under which verifiable conditions on the discounted value functions a countable-state model has a constant minimum average cost and an optimal stationary policy.

Timeline, following the book's bibliographic notes (p. 163). The book names Taylor (1965) and Derman (1966) as earlier pivotal work and Ross (1968), and his 1983 textbook, as the direct predecessor. Sennott (1989, Operations Research 37) weakened Ross's assumptions to cover models with unbounded costs, and proved the main result of Section 7.2; the (SEN) assumptions of Chapter 7 are the cleaner version of Sennott (1993). Cavazos-Cadena (1991) gave the example, adapted as Example 7.3.1 of the book, showing that under these assumptions the optimality inequality can be strict. The weaker (H*) assumptions of Section 7.7 appear, in a slightly different form, in Sennott (1995). Part (iv) of Theorem 7.2.3 is new in the book.

Setting

A Markov decision chain (MDC) Δ\DeltaΔ has a countable state space SSS, for each state iii a finite nonempty action set AiA_iAi​, a nonnegative finite cost C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a), and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) with ∑jPij(a)=1\sum_j P_{ij}(a) = 1∑j​Pij​(a)=1. A policy θ\thetaθ chooses the action at time nnn at random according to a distribution that may depend on the whole history (X0,A0,…,Xn)(X_0, A_0, \dots, X_n)(X0​,A0​,…,Xn​); a stationary policy fff always chooses f(i)∈Aif(i) \in A_if(i)∈Ai​ in state iii.

For an initial state iii, the nnn-horizon cost is vθ,n(i)=∑t=0n−1Eθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]v_{\theta,n}(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{n-1} E_\theta[C(X_t,A_t) \mid X_0 = i]vθ,n​(i)=∑t=0n−1​Eθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i], the average cost is Jθ(i)=lim sup⁡nvθ,n(i)/nJ_\theta(i) = \limsup_{n} v_{\theta,n}(i)/nJθ​(i)=limsupn​vθ,n​(i)/n, and the minimum average cost is J(i)=inf⁡θJθ(i)J(i) = \inf_\theta J_\theta(i)J(i)=infθ​Jθ​(i) over all policies. A policy is average cost optimal if Jθ≡JJ_\theta \equiv JJθ​≡J. For α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) the discounted value function is Vα(i)=inf⁡θ∑t≥0αtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]V_\alpha(i) = \inf_\theta \sum_{t \ge 0} \alpha^t E_\theta[C(X_t,A_t) \mid X_0 = i]Vα​(i)=infθ​∑t≥0​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i]. All these quantities lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

Fix a distinguished state zzz and put hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z)h_\alpha(i) = V_\alpha(i) - V_\alpha(z)hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z). The (SEN) assumptions are:

  • (SEN1) (1−α)Vα(z)(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(z)(1−α)Vα​(z) is bounded for α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1);
  • (SEN2) there is a nonnegative finite function MMM with hα(i)≤M(i)h_\alpha(i) \le M(i)hα​(i)≤M(i) for all iii and α\alphaα;
  • (SEN3) there is a nonnegative finite constant LLL with −L≤hα(i)-L \le h_\alpha(i)−L≤hα​(i) for all iii and α\alphaα.

A limit function hhh is a pointwise limit of hβnh_{\beta_n}hβn​​ along some sequence βn→1−\beta_n \to 1^-βn​→1−. If fαf_\alphafα​ is a stationary policy realizing the discount optimality equation Vα(i)=min⁡a{C(i,a)+α∑jPij(a)Vα(j)}V_\alpha(i) = \min_a \{C(i,a) + \alpha\sum_j P_{ij}(a)V_\alpha(j)\}Vα​(i)=mina​{C(i,a)+α∑j​Pij​(a)Vα​(j)}, a limit point fff is a stationary policy with fβn(i)=f(i)f_{\beta_n}(i) = f(i)fβn​​(i)=f(i) for large nnn, for each iii, along some βn→1−\beta_n \to 1^-βn​→1−.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.2.3

Under (SEN), there is a finite constant J=lim⁡α→1−(1−α)Vα(i)J = \lim_{\alpha\to1^-}(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(i)J=limα→1−​(1−α)Vα​(i) independent of iii; limit functions exist, satisfy −L≤h≤M-L \le h \le M−L≤h≤M and the average cost optimality inequality (ACOI)

J+h(i)≥min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+∑jPij(a)h(j)},i∈S;J + h(i) \ge \min_{a \in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a) + \sum_j P_{ij}(a)h(j)\Big\}, \qquad i \in S;J+h(i)≥a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+j∑​Pij​(a)h(j)},i∈S;

every stationary policy realizing the minimum is average cost optimal with Je≡JJ_e \equiv JJe​≡J and Ee[h(Xn)]/n→0E_e[h(X_n)]/n \to 0Ee​[h(Xn​)]/n→0; every limit point of discount optimal stationary policies is average cost optimal and satisfies the corresponding inequality for an associated limit function; and the average cost of any optimal policy is a limit, not only a limit supremum.

Milestones

  • Proposition 7.1.1: finitely many initial transitions with finite cost do not change JθJ_\thetaJθ​.
  • Lemma 7.2.1: a bounded-below solution (J,h)(J,h)(J,h) of the ACOI inequality for a stationary eee gives Je≤JJ_e \le JJe​≤J.
  • Proposition B.6: a sequence of functions squeezed between −L-L−L and MMM on a countable set has a pointwise convergent subsequence.
  • Proposition 7.2.4: (SEN) does not depend on the choice of zzz.
  • Proposition 7.7.1: (SEN) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (H*) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (H).
  • Proposition 7.7.2: the conclusions of Theorem 7.2.3 hold under (H), with a state-dependent lower bound L(i)L(i)L(i).

Significance

Theorem 7.2.3 is the existence theorem the rest of Chapter 7 builds on (p. 128): the ACOE results of Section 7.4, the (BOR) and (CAV) sufficient conditions of Section 7.5, and the worked queueing models of Section 7.6 all work under (SEN) and invoke it. It justifies computing an average cost optimal policy for a queueing model as a limit of discount optimal policies, and it shows that the minimum average cost is the Abelian limit of the normalized discounted value.

The results are proved in the book and in Sennott (1989, 1993, 1995), but none of them has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has no Markov decision processes, and the platform's average cost results concern finite state spaces or Borel models with different assumptions. The formalization produces a general-policy, countable-state MDC development with extended-real values, reusable by the later missions of this series.

Difficulty

On a finite state space the relative value functions are bounded and the Abelian limit (1−α)Vα(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(1−α)Vα​ can be controlled directly. Here hαh_\alphahα​ is bounded above only by a function MMM that may be unbounded, so passing to the limit in the discounted optimality equation ∑jPij(a)hα(j)\sum_j P_{ij}(a)h_\alpha(j)∑j​Pij​(a)hα​(j) cannot use dominated convergence, and in general only an inequality survives in the limit; Example 7.3.1 shows that the inequality in the ACOI can be strict. Showing that a policy realizing the ACOI is optimal requires control of Ee[h(Xn)]/nE_e[h(X_n)]/nEe​[h(Xn​)]/n for a function hhh that is unbounded above, and part (iv) requires comparing the limit inferior and limit superior of Cesàro averages for an arbitrary, possibly history-dependent optimal policy.

Formalization scope

The state space is any countable type ([Countable S]); actions form a type with finite nonempty Finset action sets; costs are ℝ≥0; transition probabilities, costs over time and value functions are ℝ≥0∞. Policies are general: randomized and history dependent, with histories encoded as finite state and action sequences and the process law built by an explicit recursive product. Finite horizon costs have terminal cost 000, as the chapter prescribes.

The relative value hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z)h_\alpha(i) = V_\alpha(i) - V_\alpha(z)hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z) is computed in EReal, never through a truncated real subtraction: a state with Vα(i)=∞V_\alpha(i) = \inftyVα​(i)=∞ gives hα(i)=+∞h_\alpha(i) = +\inftyhα​(i)=+∞, so (SEN2) cannot hold through a junk value, and (SEN1) is a bound by a finite constant that itself forces Vα(z)<∞V_\alpha(z) < \inftyVα​(z)<∞. Sums ∑jPij(a)h(j)\sum_j P_{ij}(a)h(j)∑j​Pij​(a)h(j) and expectations E[h(Xn)]E[h(X_n)]E[h(Xn​)] of real functions are extended reals, computed as positive part minus negative part; they are never Bochner integrals and never default to 000 when not summable. The limit α→1−\alpha \to 1^-α→1− is the filter 𝓝[<] 1. Limit functions and limit points follow Definition 7.2.2 literally, over arbitrary sequences αn→1−\alpha_n \to 1^-αn​→1− in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and the (SEN), (H), (H*) sets are predicates carrying their witnesses MMM and LLL.

A development that bounds only hαh_\alphahα​ as a free function, rather than the one built from the infimum over all policies, or that quantifies only over stationary policies in J(i)J(i)J(i), proves a different and weaker theorem and does not count.

Needed infrastructure: the law of the controlled process under a general policy, monotone and Fatou-type limit interchanges for countable sums, the Abelian inequality lim sup⁡(1−α)∑αtct≤lim sup⁡1n∑t<nct\limsup(1-\alpha)\sum\alpha^t c_t \le \limsup \frac1n\sum_{t<n}c_tlimsup(1−α)∑αtct​≤limsupn1​∑t<n​ct​ (Proposition 6.1.1 of the book), and the existence and optimality of discount optimal stationary policies (Theorem 4.1.4). The MDC layer and these two results are shared with other missions of the series; contributions to them are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999, Chapter 7 (pp. 127–166) and Appendix B. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • L. I. Sennott, Average cost optimal stationary policies in infinite state Markov decision processes with unbounded costs, Operations Research 37 (1989) 626–633. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.4.626
  • L. I. Sennott, The average cost optimality equation and critical number policies, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences 7 (1993). (Cited in the book's bibliography, p. 321.)
  • L. I. Sennott, Another set of conditions for average optimality in Markov control processes, Systems & Control Letters 24 (1995) 147–151. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • R. Cavazos-Cadena, A counterexample on the optimality equation in Markov decision chains with the average cost criterion, Systems & Control Letters 16 (1991) 387–392. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • S. M. Ross, Non-discounted denumerable Markovian decision models, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 39 (1968) 412–423. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • H. M. Taylor, Markovian sequential replacement processes, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36 (1965) 1677–1694. (Cited in the book's bibliography.)
  • E. A. Feinberg and Y. Liang, On the optimality equation for average cost Markov decision processes and its validity for inventory control; formalized on Prove2Me in the mission of the same name (Borel state spaces, a different model).
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems VII: The (BOR) Assumptions and Positive Recurrence of Optimal PoliciesTextbook

Motivation

Queueing control problems (admission control, routing, service rate selection) are naturally modelled as Markov decision chains with a countably infinite state space and unbounded costs, for instance a holding cost that grows with the queue length. For such models the long-run average cost criterion is often the relevant one, and the central question is whether an optimal stationary policy exists and can be computed from an average cost optimality equation (ACOE). Chapter 7 of Linn I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems (Wiley, 1999, doi:10.1002/9780470317037) develops a verifiable set of conditions, the (SEN) assumptions, under which an average cost optimality inequality (ACOI) holds and yields an optimal stationary policy. The inequality may be strict (Example 7.3.1), and an optimal policy may induce a Markov chain without positive recurrent states.

Sections 7.4 and 7.5 answer two practical questions: when is the ACOI in fact an equation, and how can (SEN) be checked in a concrete model? The answer culminates in the (BOR) assumptions, which require only one well-behaved stationary policy and the finiteness of a set of low-cost states.

According to the book's bibliographic notes (p. 163): the (BOR) assumptions modify a line of development due to Borkar (SIAM J. Control Optim. 22, 1984, and 27, 1989; monograph 1991) and are weaker than his original conditions; the proof that (BOR) implies (SEN) is from Cavazos-Cadena and Sennott (Oper. Res. Letters 11, 1992), and the version of (BOR) used here is from Sennott (Prob. Eng. Inform. Sci. 7, 1993). Proposition 7.5.5 and the (CAV*) assumptions go back to Cavazos-Cadena (Kybernetika 25, 1989); Proposition 7.5.3 and Corollary 7.5.4 to Sennott (Oper. Res. 37, 1989).

Setting

A Markov decision chain consists of a countable state space SSS, finite nonempty action sets AiA_iAi​, nonnegative finite costs C(i,a)C(i,a)C(i,a) and transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a). A policy θ\thetaθ may use the whole history and randomize. For α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) the discount value function is Vα(i)=inf⁡θVθ,α(i)V_\alpha(i)=\inf_\theta V_{\theta,\alpha}(i)Vα​(i)=infθ​Vθ,α​(i), the infimum of ∑tαtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]\sum_t\alpha^tE_\theta[C(X_t,A_t)\mid X_0=i]∑t​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i]; the average cost of θ\thetaθ is Jθ(i)=lim sup⁡n1nEθ[∑t<nC(Xt,At)∣X0=i]J_\theta(i)=\limsup_n\frac1nE_\theta[\sum_{t<n}C(X_t,A_t)\mid X_0=i]Jθ​(i)=limsupn​n1​Eθ​[∑t<n​C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i] and the minimum average cost is J(i)=inf⁡θJθ(i)J(i)=\inf_\theta J_\theta(i)J(i)=infθ​Jθ​(i). All of these lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

For a distinguished state zzz the relative value is hα(i)=Vα(i)−Vα(z)h_\alpha(i)=V_\alpha(i)-V_\alpha(z)hα​(i)=Vα​(i)−Vα​(z). The (SEN) assumptions are: (SEN1) (1−α)Vα(z)(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(z)(1−α)Vα​(z) is bounded on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); (SEN2) hα≤Mh_\alpha\le Mhα​≤M for a finite function M≥0M\ge0M≥0; (SEN3) hα≥−Lh_\alpha\ge-Lhα​≥−L for a finite constant L≥0L\ge0L≥0. Under (SEN), J=lim⁡α→1−(1−α)Vα(i)J=\lim_{\alpha\to1^-}(1-\alpha)V_\alpha(i)J=limα→1−​(1−α)Vα​(i) is a finite constant, and a limit function hhh is a pointwise limit of hβnh_{\beta_n}hβn​​ along some βn→1−\beta_n\to1^-βn​→1−. The ACOI and ACOE read

J+h(i) ≥ (resp. =) min⁡a∈Ai{C(i,a)+∑jPij(a)h(j)},i∈S.J+h(i)\ \ge\ (\text{resp. }=)\ \min_{a\in A_i}\Big\{C(i,a)+\sum_jP_{ij}(a)h(j)\Big\},\qquad i\in S.J+h(i) ≥ (resp. =) a∈Ai​min​{C(i,a)+j∑​Pij​(a)h(j)},i∈S.

For a nonempty set GGG the first passage time is T=min⁡{n≥1:Xn∈G}T=\min\{n\ge1:X_n\in G\}T=min{n≥1:Xn​∈G}. The class ℜ(i,G)\Re(i,G)ℜ(i,G) consists of the policies that, from iii, enter GGG with probability one in finite expected time miG(θ)m_{iG}(\theta)miG​(θ); ℜ∗(i,G)\Re^*(i,G)ℜ∗(i,G) adds a finite expected first passage cost ciG(θ)=Eθ[∑t<TC(Xt,At)]c_{iG}(\theta)=E_\theta[\sum_{t<T}C(X_t,A_t)]ciG​(θ)=Eθ​[∑t<T​C(Xt​,At​)]. A (randomized) stationary policy ddd is zzz standard if the Markov chain it induces has miz<∞m_{iz}<\inftymiz​<∞ and ciz<∞c_{iz}<\inftyciz​<∞ for every iii; it then has a single positive recurrent class Rd∋zR_d\ni zRd​∋z and a finite constant average cost JdJ_dJd​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.5.6

Assume (BOR): (BOR1) a zzz standard policy ddd exists; (BOR2) for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 the set D={i:C(i,a)≤Jd+ε for some a}D=\{i: C(i,a)\le J_d+\varepsilon\text{ for some }a\}D={i:C(i,a)≤Jd​+ε for some a} is finite; (BOR3) every i∈D−Rdi\in D-R_di∈D−Rd​ can be reached from zzz by some θi∈ℜ∗(z,i)\theta_i\in\Re^*(z,i)θi​∈ℜ∗(z,i). Then (SEN) holds and every limit function satisfies the ACOE; every average cost optimal stationary policy eee has a positive recurrent state in

D(e)={i:C(i,e)≤J+ε},D(e)=\{i: C(i,e)\le J+\varepsilon\},D(e)={i:C(i,e)≤J+ε},

at most ∣D(e)∣|D(e)|∣D(e)∣ positive recurrent classes and no null recurrent class; and a policy realizing the minimum in the ACOE satisfies e∈ℜ∗(i,D(e)∩R(e))e\in\Re^*(i,D(e)\cap R(e))e∈ℜ∗(i,D(e)∩R(e)) for every iii.

Milestones

  • Lemma 7.4.1: hα(i)≤ciz(θi)h_\alpha(i)\le c_{iz}(\theta_i)hα​(i)≤ciz​(θi​) for θi∈ℜ∗(i,z)\theta_i\in\Re^*(i,z)θi​∈ℜ∗(i,z), hence (SEN2).
  • Lemma 7.4.2: h(i)≤ciG(θ)−JmiG(θ)+Eθ[h(XT)]h(i)\le c_{iG}(\theta)-Jm_{iG}(\theta)+E_\theta[h(X_T)]h(i)≤ciG​(θ)−JmiG​(θ)+Eθ​[h(XT​)] for θ∈ℜ(i,G)\theta\in\Re(i,G)θ∈ℜ(i,G) under an integrability condition.
  • Theorem 7.4.3: four sufficient conditions for equality in the ACOI at a state.
  • Lemma 7.5.2: Jd=(1−α)∑i∈Rπi(d)Vd,α(i)J_d=(1-\alpha)\sum_{i\in R}\pi_i(d)V_{d,\alpha}(i)Jd​=(1−α)∑i∈R​πi​(d)Vd,α​(i) for a zzz standard ddd.
  • Proposition 7.5.3: a zzz standard policy gives (SEN1–2).
  • Corollary 7.5.4: on S={0,1,… }S=\{0,1,\dots\}S={0,1,…}, increasing VαV_\alphaVα​ plus a 000 standard policy gives (SEN), with nonnegative increasing limit functions.
  • Proposition 7.5.5: an optimal stationary policy has a positive recurrent state of cost at most J+εJ+\varepsilonJ+ε, reachable from iii, when (7.33) holds.
  • Corollaries 7.5.9 and 7.5.10: the (CAV) and (CAV*) conditions imply (BOR).

Significance

Theorem 7.5.6 reduces the verification of the ACOE for a queueing model to three checks that do not involve the discount value function: exhibit one stationary policy with finite mean return times and costs to a fixed state (typically a stable "serve at maximal rate" policy), check that low costs occur on a finite set (automatic when the holding cost grows without bound, Corollaries 7.5.9–7.5.10), and check reachability of finitely many states. Its conclusions go beyond existence: optimal stationary policies induce chains with positive recurrent classes located in a known finite set, and ACOE-realizing policies reach them in finite expected time and cost. This is what makes value iteration and approximating-sequence methods in later chapters of the book applicable to these models.

The results are proved in the book. The present mission produces machine-checked statements of the first passage calculus for general (history-dependent, randomized) policies, of (SEN) and limit functions, and of the chain of implications from (CAV*) to the ACOE. No machine-checked version of these statements is known.

Difficulty

The obvious approach to the ACOE is to pass to the limit α→1−\alpha\to1^-α→1− in the discount optimality equation. Exchanging this limit with ∑jPij(a)hα(j)\sum_jP_{ij}(a)h_\alpha(j)∑j​Pij​(a)hα​(j) requires a dominating function, and (SEN2) only gives a pointwise bound MMM whose expectation may be infinite; Fatou's lemma then yields only the inequality. Obtaining equality requires tracking first passages to sets and showing that the discrepancy Φ\PhiΦ vanishes along them, which in turn needs finiteness of ciGc_{iG}ciG​ that is not assumed but has to be derived. On the recurrence side, the average cost criterion is a limit superior of Cesàro averages over a countable state space, and mass can escape to infinity; the finiteness of the set DDD is what prevents an optimal policy from spending its time in transient or null recurrent states, and turning that into positive recurrence requires the renewal-type identities of Appendix C.

Formalization scope

States form a countable type SSS; action sets are nonempty Finsets; costs are in ℝ≥0; transition probabilities are ℝ≥0∞-valued with row sums one on admissible actions. Policies are general: a history is a state sequence and an action sequence, and all probabilities and expectations (hitting probabilities, miGm_{iG}miG​, ciGc_{iG}ciG​, Pθ(XT=j)P_\theta(X_T=j)Pθ​(XT​=j), Qij(n)Q^{(n)}_{ij}Qij(n)​) are computed from the history probabilities of the process. VαV_\alphaVα​, JθJ_\thetaJθ​, miGm_{iG}miG​ and ciGc_{iG}ciG​ take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; miG=∞m_{iG}=\inftymiG​=∞ when GGG is missed with positive probability; the first passage time satisfies T≥1T\ge1T≥1. hαh_\alphahα​ and ∑jPij(a)h(j)\sum_jP_{ij}(a)h(j)∑j​Pij​(a)h(j) are in the extended reals, with the book's convention that a function bounded below has an expectation in (−∞,+∞](-\infty,+\infty](−∞,+∞]. Limit functions are real valued. Positive recurrence, communicating classes and steady state probabilities πj=(mjj)−1\pi_j=(m_{jj})^{-1}πj​=(mjj​)−1 are the notions for the chain induced by a (randomized) stationary policy. JdJ_dJd​ is the average cost of ddd from zzz.

A formalization in which the ACOE is asserted for some convenient function instead of every limit function, or in which ∣D(e)∣|D(e)|∣D(e)∣ is a natural-number cardinality that vanishes on infinite sets, would trivialize part of the goal; the statements quantify over all limit functions and use Set.encard.

A complete development needs: history-dependent policies and their path laws on countable spaces; first passage decompositions (strong Markov property at TTT); Abelian limits of ∑tαtP(T=t)\sum_t\alpha^tP(T=t)∑t​αtP(T=t); Fatou and dominated convergence for series; and the renewal reward theorem for positive recurrent classes (Appendix C of the book). The first passage and Markov chain layer is reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, and sharper statements of the Appendix C facts they use, are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, John Wiley & Sons, 1999. doi:10.1002/9780470317037
  • V. S. Borkar, "On minimum cost per unit time control of Markov chains", SIAM J. Control Optim. 22 (1984), 965–978.
  • V. S. Borkar, "Control of Markov chains with long-run average cost criterion: the dynamic programming equations", SIAM J. Control Optim. 27 (1989), 642–657.
  • V. S. Borkar, Topics in Controlled Markov Chains, Pitman Research Notes in Mathematics 240, Longman, 1991.
  • R. Cavazos-Cadena, "Weak conditions for the existence of optimal stationary policies in average Markov decision chains with unbounded costs", Kybernetika 25 (1989), 145–156.
  • R. Cavazos-Cadena and L. I. Sennott, "Comparing recent assumptions for the existence of average optimal stationary policies", Oper. Res. Letters 11 (1992), 33–37.
  • L. I. Sennott, "The average cost optimality equation and critical number policies", Prob. Eng. Inform. Sci. 7 (1993).
  • L. I. Sennott, "Average cost optimal stationary policies in infinite state Markov decision processes with unbounded costs", Operations Research 37 (1989), 626–633. doi:10.1287/opre.37.4.626
  • K. L. Chung, Markov Chains with Stationary Transition Probabilities, 2nd ed., Springer, 1967.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions IV: Linear Convergence of the Subgradient Method under Level-Set Shape ConditionsTextbook

Motivation

The subgradient method minimizes a convex function fff on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn that need not be differentiable, by stepping against an arbitrary subgradient. With stepsizes hk→0h_k \to 0hk​→0, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞ it converges (Shor, Theorem 2.2), but in general only slowly: no stepsize rule that ignores the structure of fff gives a geometric rate. Section 2.3 of N. Z. Shor's Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions (Springer 1985) identifies geometric conditions on fff under which a simple geometric stepsize rule does give linear convergence — convergence with the speed of a geometric progression — and computes the rate explicitly.

The results are the origin of what is now studied as sharpness or error-bound conditions for nonsmooth optimization. Their practical content is that nonsmooth problems whose level sets are not too elongated near the minimum (piecewise-linear functions, maxima of finitely many well-conditioned pieces, positive definite quadratics) can be solved by the subgradient method at a linear rate, with a stepsize rule that needs only one or two scalar parameters.

Timeline. Shor proposed the subgradient method in 1962. The book presents the geometric stepsize rule under an angle condition (Theorem 2.7) and its level-surface form (Theorem 2.8), and attributes the block-halving rule of Theorem 2.9 to its reference [94]. Goffin (Math. Programming 13, 1977) gave the sharp rate in terms of a condition number of the level sets. The book compares the quadratic case with L. V. Kantorovich's rate for steepest descent.

Setting

Let EnE_nEn​ be the nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) and f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R convex. A vector ggg is a subgradient of fff at xxx if f(y)−f(x)≥(g,y−x)f(y) - f(x) \ge (g, y - x)f(y)−f(x)≥(g,y−x) for all yyy; gf(x)g_f(x)gf​(x) denotes an arbitrary subgradient at xxx, chosen once for each xxx. Let M∗M^*M∗ be the set of minimum points of fff, assumed nonempty; for x∈Enx \in E_nx∈En​, x∗(x)x^*(x)x∗(x) is the point of M∗M^*M∗ nearest to xxx.

Given a starting point x0x_0x0​ and positive stepsizes h1,h2,…h_1, h_2, \dotsh1​,h2​,…, the normalized subgradient method is

xk+1=xk−hk+1gf(xk)∥gf(xk)∥,k=0,1,2,…,x_{k+1} = x_k - h_{k+1}\frac{g_f(x_k)}{\|g_f(x_k)\|}, \qquad k = 0, 1, 2, \dots,xk+1​=xk​−hk+1​∥gf​(xk​)∥gf​(xk​)​,k=0,1,2,…,

stopped when gf(xk)=0g_f(x_k) = 0gf​(xk​)=0 (then xk∈M∗x_k \in M^*xk​∈M∗).

Two shape conditions are used. The angle condition (2.12) with angle 0≤φ<π/20 \le \varphi < \pi/20≤φ<π/2 asks that every subgradient make an angle at most φ\varphiφ with the direction to the nearest minimum point:

(gf(x),x−x∗(x))≥cos⁡φ ∥gf(x)∥ ∥x−x∗(x)∥.(g_f(x), x - x^*(x)) \ge \cos\varphi\,\|g_f(x)\|\,\|x - x^*(x)\|.(gf​(x),x−x∗(x))≥cosφ∥gf​(x)∥∥x−x∗(x)∥.

The level-surface ratio condition (2.20), for a function with unique minimum point x∗x^*x∗, asks that on a ball YYY around x∗x^*x∗ any two points x,zx, zx,z on a common level surface f(x)=f(z)≠f(x∗)f(x) = f(z) \ne f(x^*)f(x)=f(z)=f(x∗) satisfy ∥x−x∗∥≤σ∥z−x∗∥\|x - x^*\| \le \sigma\|z - x^*\|∥x−x∗∥≤σ∥z−x∗∥.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.8 (p. 32)

If fff has a unique minimum point x∗x^*x∗, σ≥2\sigma \ge \sqrt2σ≥2​, h1≥∥x0−x∗∥/σh_1 \ge \|x_0 - x^*\|/\sigmah1​≥∥x0​−x∗∥/σ, and (2.20) holds on Y={y:∥y−x∗∥≤σh1}Y = \{y : \|y - x^*\| \le \sigma h_1\}Y={y:∥y−x∗∥≤σh1​}, then with hk+1=hkσ2−1/σh_{k+1} = h_k\sqrt{\sigma^2-1}/\sigmahk+1​=hk​σ2−1​/σ

∥xk−x∗∥≤hk+1 σ,k=0,1,2,…\|x_k - x^*\| \le h_{k+1}\,\sigma, \qquad k = 0, 1, 2, \dots∥xk​−x∗∥≤hk+1​σ,k=0,1,2,…

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.7 (pp. 30–31): under (2.12) and the geometric rule hk+1=hkr(φ)h_{k+1} = h_k r(\varphi)hk+1​=hk​r(φ) with r(φ)=sin⁡φr(\varphi) = \sin\varphir(φ)=sinφ for φ≥π/4\varphi \ge \pi/4φ≥π/4 and r(φ)=1/(2cos⁡φ)r(\varphi) = 1/(2\cos\varphi)r(φ)=1/(2cosφ) for φ<π/4\varphi < \pi/4φ<π/4,
∥xk−x∗(xk)∥≤hk+1/cos⁡φresp.2hk+1cos⁡φ.\|x_k - x^*(x_k)\| \le h_{k+1}/\cos\varphi \quad\text{resp.}\quad 2h_{k+1}\cos\varphi .∥xk​−x∗(xk​)∥≤hk+1​/cosφresp.2hk+1​cosφ.
  1. Remark after Theorem 2.7 (p. 32): the same conclusion when (2.12) holds only at the iterates.
  2. Inequality (2.22) (p. 33): (2.20) on YYY implies (g,x−x∗)≥σ−1∥g∥ ∥x−x∗∥(g, x - x^*) \ge \sigma^{-1}\|g\|\,\|x - x^*\|(g,x−x∗)≥σ−1∥g∥∥x−x∗∥ for every x∈Yx \in Yx∈Y and every subgradient ggg at xxx.
  3. Example (p. 33): for AAA symmetric positive definite with extreme eigenvalues λ≤μ\lambda \le \muλ≤μ,
min⁡x≠0(Ax,x)∥Ax∥ ∥x∥=2λμλ+μ,\min_{x \ne 0}\frac{(Ax, x)}{\|Ax\|\,\|x\|} = \frac{2\sqrt{\lambda\mu}}{\lambda + \mu},x=0min​∥Ax∥∥x∥(Ax,x)​=λ+μ2λμ​​,

attained at x=μ/(λ+μ) s1+λ/(λ+μ) s2x = \sqrt{\mu/(\lambda+\mu)}\,s_1 + \sqrt{\lambda/(\lambda+\mu)}\,s_2x=μ/(λ+μ)​s1​+λ/(λ+μ)​s2​. 5. Theorem 2.9 (p. 34): under the assumptions of Theorem 2.8 with σ≥2\sigma \ge 2σ≥2, the rule hk+1=h02−[(k+1)/N]h_{k+1} = h_0 2^{-[(k+1)/N]}hk+1​=h0​2−[(k+1)/N] with N≥3σ2+1N \ge 3\sigma^2 + 1N≥3σ2+1 gives ∥xk−x∗∥≤2σhk+1\|x_k - x^*\| \le 2\sigma h_{k+1}∥xk​−x∗∥≤2σhk+1​.

Significance

The results. Theorem 2.7 shows that the subgradient method, often dismissed as sublinear, converges linearly once the geometry of fff is controlled and the stepsizes decrease geometrically at the right ratio; the rate r(φ)r(\varphi)r(φ) depends only on the angle. Theorem 2.8 restates the hypothesis in terms of the shape of level surfaces, a condition that can be checked for concrete functions, and gives rate σ2−1/σ\sqrt{\sigma^2-1}/\sigmaσ2−1​/σ. The Example computes the angle for positive definite quadratics, yielding rate (ϱ−1)/(ϱ+1)(\varrho - 1)/(\varrho + 1)(ϱ−1)/(ϱ+1) with ϱ=μ/λ\varrho = \mu/\lambdaϱ=μ/λ the condition number — the same rate as steepest descent with exact line search in Kantorovich's analysis, obtained with less storage. Theorem 2.9 removes the need to know σ\sigmaσ exactly in the stepsize ratio.

Formalizing them. All five results are proved in the book; none is formalized, and no linear-rate result for a nonsmooth first-order method is on the platform. The formalization pins the constants (2.13)–(2.19), the stepsize indexing, and the treatment of the stopped iteration; the Example is a Kantorovich-type inequality for symmetric operators that is reusable beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The obvious one-step estimate ∥xk+1−x∗∥2=∥xk−x∗∥2−2hk+1(g,xk−x∗)/∥g∥+hk+12\|x_{k+1} - x^*\|^2 = \|x_k - x^*\|^2 - 2h_{k+1}(g, x_k - x^*)/\|g\| + h_{k+1}^2∥xk+1​−x∗∥2=∥xk​−x∗∥2−2hk+1​(g,xk​−x∗)/∥g∥+hk+12​ alone does not contract: the step length is fixed in advance and does not shrink with the distance, so a step may overshoot the minimum. The rate argument has to track the ratio between the current distance and the current stepsize, and the admissible ratio of stepsizes is dictated by the worst case of this quadratic in the distance; in the two regimes φ≥π/4\varphi \ge \pi/4φ≥π/4 and φ<π/4\varphi < \pi/4φ<π/4 the worst case sits at different ends. For Theorem 2.8, the shape condition is only assumed on the ball YYY, so the iterates must be shown to stay in YYY, and the passage from level surfaces to subgradients needs the distance from x∗x^*x∗ to a level surface, which is not a quantity the iteration computes. Theorem 2.9's constant stepsize blocks are not monotone in distance at all, and the count 3σ2+13\sigma^2 + 13σ2+1 must be matched against a worst-case phase.

Formalization scope

The space EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); fff is real-valued and ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ. A subgradient selection is an arbitrary function g with g x a subgradient at every x, quantified universally. Stepsizes are h : ℕ → ℝ with h (k+1) used at step k; the recursions hk+1=hkrh_{k+1} = h_k rhk+1​=hk​r are imposed for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, h1h_1h1​ being the chosen initial step (the book's "k=0,1,2,…k = 0, 1, 2, \dotsk=0,1,2,…" in Theorem 2.8 is read this way). The iteration stops at gf(xk)=0g_f(x_k) = 0gf​(xk​)=0 by an explicit branch that repeats xkx_kxk​, never through x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0; the bounds are asserted for every kkk, which implies the book's "either the method stops or …" form. x∗(x)x^*(x)x∗(x) is a definition (the nearest point of the set of minima), and the set of minima is assumed nonempty. Unique minimum is stated as M∗={x∗}M^* = \{x^*\}M∗={x∗}. The ball YYY is closed, and (2.20) is assumed only for pairs in YYY with a common value different from f(x∗)f(x^*)f(x∗). In (2.16) the ratio is 1/(2cos⁡φ)1/(2\cos\varphi)1/(2cosφ), as the proof requires, where the page prints "1/2 cos φ". In Theorem 2.9, "the assumptions of Theorem 2.8" are taken with h1=h0h_1 = h_0h1​=h0​, which fixes h0≥∥x0−x∗∥/σh_0 \ge \|x_0 - x^*\|/\sigmah0​≥∥x0​−x∗∥/σ and YYY of radius σh0\sigma h_0σh0​. In the Example, the extreme eigenvalues are pinned by λ∥x∥2≤(Ax,x)≤μ∥x∥2\lambda\|x\|^2 \le (Ax,x) \le \mu\|x\|^2λ∥x∥2≤(Ax,x)≤μ∥x∥2 together with unit eigenvectors, and the minimum is stated with IsLeast.

A statement in which the stepsizes or the bound constants could be chosen after the iterates, or in which the shape condition quantified over an empty set of pairs, would be trivially true; here every constant is fixed by the hypotheses before the sequence is generated, and the conditions are the book's.

Needed infrastructure: the subgradient inequality, continuity of convex functions on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, nearest points of closed convex sets, and elementary trigonometry. The nearest-point map and the stepsize ratio are defined within the mission; the subgradient inequality, the set of minima and the iteration come from the series' shared definitions. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a reusable Kantorovich-type cosine bound for symmetric positive definite operators.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer 1985, §2.3, pp. 30–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • J.-L. Goffin, On convergence rates of subgradient optimization methods, Mathematical Programming 13 (1977) 329–347. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584346
  • L. V. Kantorovich, Functional analysis and applied mathematics, Uspekhi Mat. Nauk 3 (1948) 89–185 (steepest descent rate for quadratics, cited by Shor as [45]).
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Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions V: Polyak's Stepsize and Fejér-Type ApproximationsTextbook

Motivation

The subgradient method for a convex function fff moves from xkx_kxk​ against a subgradient gf(xk)g_f(x_k)gf​(xk​), and everything hinges on the step length. Divergent-series stepsizes guarantee convergence but are slow and need no information about fff. When the optimal value f∗f^*f∗, or any level ccc that is known to be attainable, is available, B. T. Polyak proposed in 1969 the step

xk+1=xk−γ [f(xk)−c]∥gf(xk)∥2 gf(xk),x_{k+1} = x_k - \frac{\gamma\,[f(x_k) - c]}{\|g_f(x_k)\|^2}\, g_f(x_k),xk+1​=xk​−∥gf​(xk​)∥2γ[f(xk​)−c]​gf​(xk​),

which uses the current gap f(xk)−cf(x_k) - cf(xk​)−c to scale the move. This Polyak stepsize is still the reference adaptive rule in nonsmooth convex optimization, in the solution of convex feasibility problems, and in the Lagrangian relaxation heuristics of integer programming (Held–Wolfe–Crowder, Camerini–Fratta–Maffioli), where it is known under the name "relaxation step".

Section 2.4 of N. Z. Shor's Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions (Springer 1985) places Polyak's rule in the framework of Fejér-type approximations developed by I. I. Eremin: an iteration whose map strictly decreases the distance to every point of a target set. It then proves convergence of the rule, linear rates under growth conditions, its behaviour when the level is set too low, and a property of the conjugate-subgradient direction of Camerini, Fratta and Maffioli (1975).

Timeline:

  • 1965–1969: Eremin introduces Fejér mappings for systems of convex inequalities.
  • 1969: Polyak, Minimization of unsmooth functionals, proposes the step with the known optimal value and proves convergence and a linear rate under a sharp-minimum condition.
  • 1975: Camerini, Fratta and Maffioli combine the Polyak step with a conjugate direction for Lagrangian relaxation.
  • 1985: Shor's book collects these results in Section 2.4 (Theorems 2.10–2.16).

Setting

EnE_nEn​ is the nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. A vector ggg is a subgradient of f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R at x0x_0x0​ if f(x)−f(x0)≥(g,x−x0)f(x) - f(x_0) \ge (g, x - x_0)f(x)−f(x0​)≥(g,x−x0​) for all xxx. A subgradient selection is a map gfg_fgf​ with gf(x)g_f(x)gf​(x) a subgradient at every xxx; nothing else is assumed about it, in particular not continuity.

For a nonempty set M⊆EnM \subseteq E_nM⊆En​, a map φ:En→En\varphi : E_n \to E_nφ:En​→En​ is MMM-Fejér if φ(y)=y\varphi(y) = yφ(y)=y and ∥φ(x)−y∥<∥x−y∥\|\varphi(x) - y\| < \|x - y\|∥φ(x)−y∥<∥x−y∥ for all y∈My \in My∈M and x∉Mx \notin Mx∈/M.

For a convex fff with f∗=inf⁡ff^* = \inf ff∗=inff and a level c≥f∗c \ge f^*c≥f∗, let M(c)={x:f(x)≤c}M(c) = \{x : f(x) \le c\}M(c)={x:f(x)≤c}. Polyak's method (2.32) is the iteration xk+1=φc(xk)x_{k+1} = \varphi_c(x_k)xk+1​=φc​(xk​) with the map displayed above for x∉M(c)x \notin M(c)x∈/M(c) and φc(y)=y\varphi_c(y) = yφc​(y)=y on M(c)M(c)M(c); the factor γ\gammaγ is fixed in (0,2)(0, 2)(0,2).

The conjugate-subgradient procedure (2.38), for a convex fff with minimum point x∗x^*x∗ and f∗=f(x∗)f^* = f(x^*)f∗=f(x∗), is

xk+1=xk−hksk,hk=[f(xk)−f∗]γk∥sk∥2,s0=gf(x0),sk=gf(xk)+βksk−1.x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k s_k, \quad h_k = \frac{[f(x_k) - f^*]\gamma_k}{\|s_k\|^2}, \qquad s_0 = g_f(x_0),\quad s_k = g_f(x_k) + \beta_k s_{k-1}.xk+1​=xk​−hk​sk​,hk​=∥sk​∥2[f(xk​)−f∗]γk​​,s0​=gf​(x0​),sk​=gf​(xk​)+βk​sk−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.11

If 0<γ<20 < \gamma < 20<γ<2 and M(c)≠∅M(c) \neq \emptysetM(c)=∅, then for any x0∈Enx_0 \in E_nx0​∈En​

∃k∗:xk∗∈M(c)orlim⁡k→∞xk exists and lies in M(c).\exists k^* : x_{k^*} \in M(c) \qquad \text{or} \qquad \lim_{k \to \infty} x_k \text{ exists and lies in } M(c).∃k∗:xk∗​∈M(c)ork→∞lim​xk​ exists and lies in M(c).

The goal fixes no constant and no rate; it asserts only that the method finds a point of the level set, in finite time or in the limit.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.10. Iterates of a continuous MMM-Fejér map converge to a point of MMM.
  2. Inequality (2.33). For xk∉M(c)x_k \notin M(c)xk​∈/M(c) and y∈M(c)y \in M(c)y∈M(c),
∥xk+1−y∥2≤∥xk−y∥2−γ(2−γ)[f(xk)−c]2∥gf(xk)∥2<∥xk−y∥2.\|x_{k+1} - y\|^2 \le \|x_k - y\|^2 - \gamma(2-\gamma)\frac{[f(x_k) - c]^2}{\|g_f(x_k)\|^2} < \|x_k - y\|^2 .∥xk+1​−y∥2≤∥xk​−y∥2−γ(2−γ)∥gf​(xk​)∥2[f(xk​)−c]2​<∥xk​−y∥2.
  1. Theorem 2.12. Under f(x)−f∗≥m∥x−x∗∥2f(x) - f^* \ge m\|x - x^*\|^2f(x)−f∗≥m∥x−x∗∥2 and an LLL-Lipschitz gradient near x∗x^*x∗, with c=f∗c = f^*c=f∗: ∥xk−x∗∥≤qk∥x0−x∗∥\|x_k - x^*\| \le q^k \|x_0 - x^*\|∥xk​−x∗∥≤qk∥x0​−x∗∥, q=(1−γ(2−γ)m2/L2)1/2<1q = (1 - \gamma(2-\gamma)m^2/L^2)^{1/2} < 1q=(1−γ(2−γ)m2/L2)1/2<1.
  2. Theorem 2.13. Under the sharp-minimum condition f(x)−f(x∗)≥m∥x−x∗∥f(x) - f(x^*) \ge m\|x - x^*\|f(x)−f(x∗)≥m∥x−x∗∥ and subgradients bounded by LLL near x∗x^*x∗, with c=f(x∗)c = f(x^*)c=f(x∗): ∥xk+1−x∗∥≤q∥xk−x∗∥\|x_{k+1} - x^*\| \le q\|x_k - x^*\|∥xk+1​−x∗∥≤q∥xk​−x∗∥.
  3. Theorem 2.14. If min⁡ψ=d>0\min \psi = d > 0minψ=d>0 and the method runs with c=0c = 0c=0, then lim⁡kmin⁡0≤i≤kψ(xi)≤2d/(2−γ)\lim_k \min_{0 \le i \le k} \psi(x_i) \le 2d/(2-\gamma)limk​min0≤i≤k​ψ(xi​)≤2d/(2−γ).
  4. Theorem 2.15. For (2.38) with 0<γk≤10 < \gamma_k \le 10<γk​≤1, βk≥0\beta_k \ge 0βk​≥0: (xk−x∗,sk)≥(xk−x∗,gf(xk))(x_k - x^*, s_k) \ge (x_k - x^*, g_f(x_k))(xk​−x∗,sk​)≥(xk​−x∗,gf​(xk​)).
  5. Theorem 2.16. With the Camerini–Fratta–Maffioli coefficient βk\beta_kβk​ and 0≤αk≤20 \le \alpha_k \le 20≤αk​≤2: (xk−x∗,sk)/∥sk∥≥(xk−x∗,gf(xk))/∥gf(xk)∥(x_k - x^*, s_k)/\|s_k\| \ge (x_k - x^*, g_f(x_k))/\|g_f(x_k)\|(xk​−x∗,sk​)/∥sk​∥≥(xk​−x∗,gf​(xk​))/∥gf​(xk​)∥.

Significance

Theorem 2.11 is the convergence guarantee of the most widely used adaptive step rule for nonsmooth convex problems. With c=f∗c = f^*c=f∗ it yields a minimizer; with c>f∗c > f^*c>f∗ it solves the convex inequality f(x)≤cf(x) \le cf(x)≤c, and applied to ψ=max⁡ifi+\psi = \max_i f_i^+ψ=maxi​fi+​ it solves consistent systems of convex inequalities. The linear rates of Theorems 2.12–2.13 are the prototype of the "sharpness implies linear convergence" results of modern first-order methods, and Theorem 2.14 quantifies the loss when the level is underestimated, which is the situation of every practical variant that estimates f∗f^*f∗ on the fly. Theorems 2.15–2.16 are the justification of the conjugate-subgradient directions used in Lagrangian relaxation.

All results are classical and proved on paper. None of them is formalized on Prove2Me: the platform has a smooth, strongly convex Polyak gradient-descent bound (a different theorem) and Fejér-monotonicity statements for polyhedral relaxation methods, but no Polyak subgradient step, no MMM-Fejér map and no conjugate-subgradient procedure. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the whole section, with the page's misprints corrected where the proof and the statement disagree.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the goal is to observe that φc\varphi_cφc​ is M(c)M(c)M(c)-Fejér, by (2.33), and invoke Theorem 2.10. That argument fails: Theorem 2.10 needs a continuous map, and φc\varphi_cφc​ depends on an arbitrary subgradient selection, which is discontinuous wherever fff is not differentiable. The book says so explicitly. Fejér monotonicity gives boundedness and a limit of each distance ∥xk−y∥\|x_k - y\|∥xk​−y∥, but convergence of the whole sequence to a single point of M(c)M(c)M(c), and the fact that an accumulation point cannot lie outside M(c)M(c)M(c), have to be obtained without continuity of the map.

For Theorem 2.14 the level c=0c = 0c=0 lies strictly below the minimum, so M(0)=∅M(0) = \emptysetM(0)=∅, the target set of the iteration as run is empty, no Fejér property is available for it, and the theorem controls only the best value found, not the iterates.

Formalization scope

  • EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); fff is real-valued on all of EnE_nEn​ and ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ f.
  • The subgradient selection is universally quantified; no theorem assumes continuity of it.
  • Iterations are sequences x : ℕ → E_n with the recursion as a hypothesis; the first term is arbitrary.
  • Polyak's step map is defined piecewise: it returns xxx on M(c)M(c)M(c) (as the book sets φc(y)=y\varphi_c(y) = yφc​(y)=y) and at gf(x)=0g_f(x) = 0gf​(x)=0. No statement relies on Lean's convention x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0. The same holds for hkh_khk​ when sk=0s_k = 0sk​=0.
  • M(c)≠∅M(c) \neq \emptysetM(c)=∅ is a hypothesis of the goal: the book's proof picks y∈M(c)y \in M(c)y∈M(c), and for c=f∗c = f^*c=f∗ not attained the conclusion is false (for f=exf = e^xf=ex, c=0c = 0c=0, the method moves by γ\gammaγ each step and diverges).
  • "lim⁡xk∈M(c)\lim x_k \in M(c)limxk​∈M(c)" is the existence of a limit in M(c)M(c)M(c), not a statement about cluster points.
  • γ∈(0,2)\gamma \in (0, 2)γ∈(0,2) is stated in every theorem on Polyak's method; the book fixes this range at Theorem 2.11.
  • Theorem 2.12's "strongly convex" is used through its displayed growth condition only; the statement is made for convex fff satisfying it, with L>0L > 0L>0 and qqq computed with Real.sqrt.
  • Theorem 2.13 assumes the bound ∥g∥≤L\|g\| \le L∥g∥≤L on subgradients in the ball, which is what the proof uses; a Lipschitz constant on the closed ball alone does not give it, and the printed statement fails without it.
  • Theorem 2.14 is stated with "≤2d/(2−γ)\le 2d/(2-\gamma)≤2d/(2−γ)"; the printed "===" is false in general.
  • Theorem 2.16's inequality is stated at indices where sk≠0s_k \neq 0sk​=0 and gf(xk)≠0g_f(x_k) \neq 0gf​(xk​)=0.

A formalization in which M(c)M(c)M(c) may be empty, the selection is assumed continuous, or the step divides by zero through Lean's conventions would be a different theorem; these are ruled out above.

Needed infrastructure: Fejér monotone sequences in finite dimensions (bounded, with convergent distances), the subgradient inequality, and the fact that a zero subgradient characterizes a minimum. These are reusable for every subgradient-type method. Contributions of general lemmas on Fejér-monotone sequences are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985, §2.4, pp. 36–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • B. T. Polyak, Minimization of unsmooth functionals, USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics 9(3), 1969, 14–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/0041-5553(69)90061-5
  • I. I. Eremin, The relaxation method of solving systems of inequalities with convex functions on the left-hand side, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 6, 1965, 219–222.
  • P. M. Camerini, L. Fratta, F. Maffioli, On improving relaxation methods by modified gradient techniques, Mathematical Programming Study 3, 1975, 26–34.
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Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions VI: Almost-Sure Convergence of the Stochastic Subgradient MethodTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization problems in operations research are posed on an expectation: a two-stage or multistage stochastic program minimizes f(x)=E F(x,ξ)f(x) = E\,F(x,\xi)f(x)=EF(x,ξ), where F(⋅,ξ)F(\cdot,\xi)F(⋅,ξ) is convex but nonsmooth and the expectation cannot be computed exactly. What can be computed is a stochastic subgradient, a random vector whose mean is a subgradient of fff. The stochastic subgradient method replaces the exact subgradient in the classical method by such a random vector. It was introduced by Yu. M. Ermoliev and N. Z. Shor in 1968 and developed by Ermoliev, Nurminski and others into a standard tool of stochastic programming; the same scheme, under the name stochastic (sub)gradient descent, underlies most of large-scale machine learning.

This mission formalizes Section 2.6 of N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions (Springer 1985): the almost-sure convergence theorem for the stochastic subgradient method (Theorem 2.19), together with two deterministic results of the same section on perturbed and restarted variants of the subgradient method (Theorems 2.18 and 2.20).

Timeline, as recorded in the book:

  • 1968, Ermoliev and Shor: the notion of a stochastic subgradient, introduced for a random search method for two-stage stochastic programs; the convergence theorem reproduced as Theorem 2.19.
  • 1972, Bazhenov: convergence of a subgradient method with restarts for almost differentiable (in general nonconvex) functions, Theorem 2.18.
  • 1976, Shepilov: stability of the subgradient method with respect to errors in the point where the subgradient is computed, Theorem 2.20.

Setting

EnE_nEn​ is nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x,y)(x,y). A vector ggg is a subgradient of f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R at x0x_0x0​ if f(x)−f(x0)≥(g,x−x0)f(x) - f(x_0) \ge (g, x - x_0)f(x)−f(x0​)≥(g,x−x0​) for all xxx; M∗M^*M∗ is the set of minimum points of fff.

Stochastic subgradient method. Fix a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P) with a filtration (Fk)k≥0(\mathcal F_k)_{k \ge 0}(Fk​)k≥0​, a deterministic starting point x0x_0x0​, stepsize rules hk:En→Rh_k : E_n \to \mathbb{R}hk​:En​→R and random vectors gk:Ω→Eng_k : \Omega \to E_ngk​:Ω→En​. The iterates are

xk+1=xk−hk(xk) gk,k=0,1,…x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k(x_k)\, g_k, \qquad k = 0,1,\dotsxk+1​=xk​−hk​(xk​)gk​,k=0,1,…

In the book's notation gk=gω(xk)g_k = g_\omega(x_k)gk​=gω​(xk​): a random vector whose expectation, given the state at step kkk, is a subgradient of fff at xkx_kxk​. In the Lean development the iterates are stochIter h G x₀ k ω.

Perturbed subgradient method (Shepilov). Given a subgradient selection gfg_fgf​, points x~k\tilde x_kx~k​ with ∥x~k−xk∥≤δk\|\tilde x_k - x_k\| \le \delta_k∥x~k​−xk​∥≤δk​, and steps hk>0h_k > 0hk​>0: xk+1=xk−hk gf(x~k)/∥gf(x~k)∥x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k\, g_f(\tilde x_k)/\|g_f(\tilde x_k)\|xk+1​=xk​−hk​gf​(x~k​)/∥gf​(x~k​)∥.

Restarted method (Bazhenov). For a function fff that is almost differentiable (Lipschitz on bounded sets, differentiable almost everywhere, with gradient continuous where it exists) and a selection gf(x)g_f(x)gf​(x) of almost-gradients (limit points of gradients at nearby points of differentiability), with Sr={x:∥x−x∗∥≤r}S_r = \{x : \|x - x^*\| \le r\}Sr​={x:∥x−x∗∥≤r}: take the normalized step xˉk+1=xk−hk gf(xk)/∥gf(xk)∥\bar x_{k+1} = x_k - h_k\, g_f(x_k)/\|g_f(x_k)\|xˉk+1​=xk​−hk​gf​(xk​)/∥gf​(xk​)∥ and restart from x0x_0x0​ whenever xˉk+1\bar x_{k+1}xˉk+1​ leaves SrS_rSr​ (resetIter).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.19 (p. 46)

Let fff be convex with a unique minimum point x∗x^*x∗. Suppose E{gk∣Fk}E\{g_k \mid \mathcal F_k\}E{gk​∣Fk​} is a subgradient of fff at xkx_kxk​, E{∥gk∥2∣Fk}≤cE\{\|g_k\|^2 \mid \mathcal F_k\} \le cE{∥gk​∥2∣Fk​}≤c, and almost surely hk(xk)>0h_k(x_k) > 0hk​(xk​)>0, ∑khk(xk)=+∞\sum_k h_k(x_k) = +\infty∑k​hk​(xk​)=+∞, ∑khk2(xk)<∞\sum_k h_k^2(x_k) < \infty∑k​hk2​(xk​)<∞. Then

P(lim⁡k→∞∥xk−x∗∥=0)=1.P\Big(\lim_{k\to\infty} \|x_k - x^*\| = 0\Big) = 1 .P(k→∞lim​∥xk​−x∗∥=0)=1.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (2.42), the conditional one-step inequality
E{∥xk+1−x∗∥2∣Fk}≤∥xk−x∗∥2+c hk2(xk).E\{\|x_{k+1} - x^*\|^2 \mid \mathcal F_k\} \le \|x_k - x^*\|^2 + c\,h_k^2(x_k).E{∥xk+1​−x∗∥2∣Fk​}≤∥xk​−x∗∥2+chk2​(xk​).
  1. Proof of Theorem 2.19, pp. 46–47: with probability one ∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk​−x∗∥2 converges to a finite limit (no divergence condition on the steps).
  2. Theorem 2.20 (Shepilov): under δk→0\delta_k \to 0δk​→0, ∑hkδk<∞\sum h_k\delta_k < \infty∑hk​δk​<∞, ∑hk2<∞\sum h_k^2 < \infty∑hk2​<∞, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞, the perturbed method converges to a point of M∗M^*M∗.
  3. Theorem 2.18 (Bazhenov): if f(x∗)=min⁡Srff(x^*) = \min_{S_r} ff(x∗)=minSr​​f and inf⁡Sr∖Sε(gf(x),x−x∗)>0\inf_{S_r\setminus S_\varepsilon} (g_f(x), x - x^*) > 0infSr​∖Sε​​(gf​(x),x−x∗)>0 for every 0<ε<r0 < \varepsilon < r0<ε<r, the restarted method with hk→0h_k \to 0hk​→0, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞ converges to x∗x^*x∗ from any x0∈Srx_0 \in S_rx0​∈Sr​.

Significance

Theorem 2.19 is the basic justification of stochastic subgradient methods: without computing fff or any exact subgradient, the method reaches the minimizer with probability one, under stepsize conditions that are met by hk=1/(k+1)h_k = 1/(k+1)hk​=1/(k+1). It is the nonsmooth convex counterpart of the Robbins–Monro theorem and the prototype of the almost-sure convergence results for stochastic quasi-gradient methods used in stochastic programming. Theorem 2.20 shows that the deterministic method tolerates summable errors in the point where the subgradient is evaluated, which is what allows subgradients to be approximated by finite differences (Section 1.3). Theorem 2.18 extends the convergence of the normalized method to local minima of a class of nonconvex functions.

All four results are proved in the literature. To the best of the platform search (September 2026), none is machine-checked: the platform has almost-sure convergence theorems for smooth stochastic approximation under ODE-type hypotheses (Borkar–Meyn) and in-expectation bounds for stochastic gradient descent, neither of which covers this recursion. A formal proof of the goal would give a reusable almost-sure convergence argument for nonsmooth stochastic methods on top of Mathlib's martingale theory.

Difficulty

The deterministic proof of convergence of the subgradient method compares ∥xk+1−x∗∥2\|x_{k+1}-x^*\|^2∥xk+1​−x∗∥2 with ∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk​−x∗∥2 along the whole trajectory. With random directions this comparison holds only in conditional expectation, and the term hk(gk−E{gk∣Fk},xk−x∗)h_k(g_k - E\{g_k\mid\mathcal F_k\}, x_k - x^*)hk​(gk​−E{gk​∣Fk​},xk​−x∗) is not controlled pathwise. Taking expectations of the one-step inequality and summing gives only bounds on E∥xk−x∗∥2E\|x_k - x^*\|^2E∥xk​−x∗∥2, which do not yield almost-sure convergence. Moreover the stepsize hk(xk)h_k(x_k)hk​(xk​) depends on the random iterate, so the conditions ∑hk2(xk)<∞\sum h_k^2(x_k) < \infty∑hk2​(xk​)<∞ and ∑hk(xk)=∞\sum h_k(x_k) = \infty∑hk​(xk​)=∞ hold only almost surely, not uniformly, and the iterates need not be square-integrable. Identifying the almost-sure limit as 000 requires using the uniqueness of the minimizer to bound (E{gk∣Fk},xk−x∗)(E\{g_k\mid\mathcal F_k\}, x_k - x^*)(E{gk​∣Fk​},xk​−x∗) away from zero outside a neighbourhood of x∗x^*x∗.

In Theorems 2.18 and 2.20 the difficulty is that the distance to x∗x^*x∗ is not monotone: steps taken near the solution, or with a perturbed subgradient, can increase it, and a restart can move the iterate far away.

Formalization scope

  • EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); fff is real-valued (finite everywhere); convexity is ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ f; uniqueness of x∗x^*x∗ is a separate hypothesis.
  • Probabilistic model. The book assumes the distribution of gω(xk)g_\omega(x_k)gω​(xk​) is determined by xkx_kxk​ and independent of the past, and remarks this is inessential. The formalization uses a filtration: gkg_kgk​ is Fk+1\mathcal F_{k+1}Fk+1​-measurable, each hkh_khk​ is Borel measurable, x0x_0x0​ is deterministic, and the hypotheses are on conditional expectations given Fk\mathcal F_kFk​. This contains the book's model.
  • Condition (iii) is printed as E∥gω(xk)∥2≤cE\|g_\omega(x_k)\|^2 \le cE∥gω​(xk​)∥2≤c; the proof uses the conditional bound in (2.42), and the formalization assumes the conditional bound E{∥gk∥2∣Fk}≤cE\{\|g_k\|^2\mid\mathcal F_k\} \le cE{∥gk​∥2∣Fk​}≤c almost surely.
  • Every expectation carries an integrability hypothesis (gkg_kgk​ and ∥gk∥2\|g_k\|^2∥gk​∥2 integrable), so no conditional expectation defaults to Lean's junk value 000. The one-step milestone assumes ∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk​−x∗∥2 integrable and a bounded stepsize rule at that step, and concludes integrability of ∥xk+1−x∗∥2\|x_{k+1}-x^*\|^2∥xk+1​−x∗∥2.
  • Conditions (i)–(ii) on the random stepsizes are required almost surely. "With probability one lim⁡∥xk−x∗∥=0\lim\|x_k - x^*\| = 0lim∥xk​−x∗∥=0" is ∀ᵐ ω ∂μ, Tendsto (fun k => ‖x k ω - x*‖) atTop (𝓝 0).
  • Division by zero. In Theorems 2.18 and 2.20 the normalized step is undefined when the subgradient vanishes; the formalization skips the step (the iterate is repeated) by an explicit branch, not through Lean's convention x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0. When the subgradient never vanishes the sequences are exactly the book's.
  • The printed display (2.42) has xkx_kxk​ where xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​ is meant on its left-hand side; the corrected inequality is stated.
  • A trivializing formalization, for instance dropping the integrability hypotheses so that the conditional expectations vanish, or quantifying the stepsize conditions so that they cannot hold, is excluded by the hypotheses above; the hypotheses are satisfiable (deterministic subgradients of f(x)=∥x∥f(x) = \|x\|f(x)=∥x∥ with hk=1/(k+1)h_k = 1/(k+1)hk​=1/(k+1)).
  • Mathlib supplies conditional expectation (MeasureTheory.condExp), filtrations, and almost-sure convergence of L1L^1L1-bounded (sub/super)martingales; the supermartingale convergence theorem the book cites from Doob is used from Mathlib, not restated. A Robbins–Siegmund-type lemma for nonnegative almost-supermartingales would be the natural reusable contribution. The almost-differentiability and subgradient definitions duplicate drafts of other missions in this series.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985, Section 2.6, pp. 44–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev and N. Z. Shor, A random search method for two-stage problems of stochastic programming and its generalization, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 1, 90–92, 1968.
  • L. G. Bazhenov, On the conditions for convergence of methods for minimizing almost differentiable functions, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 4, 71–72, 1972.
  • M. A. Shepilov, On a method of generalized gradient for finding the absolute minimum of a convex function, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 4, 52–57, 1976.
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev, Methods of Stochastic Programming, Nauka, Moscow, 1976.
  • H. Robbins and D. Siegmund, A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications, in Optimizing Methods in Statistics, Academic Press, 1971, pp. 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
  • J. L. Doob, Stochastic Processes, Wiley, New York, 1953 (supermartingale convergence theorem).
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Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions VIII: Quadratic Convergence of the Gradient Orthogonalization Method for Nonlinear EquationsTextbook

Motivation

Solving a square system of nonlinear equations ψi(x)=0\psi_i(x) = 0ψi​(x)=0, i=1,…,ni = 1, \dots, ni=1,…,n, x∈Rnx \in \mathbb{R}^nx∈Rn, is one of the oldest tasks of numerical analysis. It appears whenever optimality conditions, equilibrium conditions or discretized differential equations have to be solved. N. Z. Shor's Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions (Springer 1985, translated by K. C. Kiwiel and A. Ruszczyński) treats such a system as the nonsmooth minimization problem

min⁡x∈Enf(x),f(x)=max⁡1≤i≤n∣ψi(x)∣,\min_{x \in E_n} f(x), \qquad f(x) = \max_{1 \le i \le n} |\psi_i(x)|,x∈En​min​f(x),f(x)=1≤i≤nmax​∣ψi​(x)∣,

whose optimal value is 000 exactly when the system is consistent. Section 3.5 of the book applies the subgradient method with space dilation to this problem. At each iteration that method needs the gradient of one of the ψi\psi_iψi​, not all nnn of them. Taking the dilation coefficient to its extreme value (β=0\beta = 0β=0) turns the method into a gradient orthogonalization method. The book shows that this method converges at a quadratic rate near a regular solution, like Newton's method, although it never forms or factorizes the Jacobian.

This mission is the eighth in a series formalizing Shor's book. It covers Sections 3.5–3.6 (printed pp. 62–71).

Setting

EnE_nEn​ is the nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. The data are functions ψ1,…,ψn:En→R\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n : E_n \to \mathbb{R}ψ1​,…,ψn​:En​→R with gradients gψi(x)g_{\psi_i}(x)gψi​​(x), and the max-residual function is f(x)=max⁡i∣ψi(x)∣f(x) = \max_i |\psi_i(x)|f(x)=maxi​∣ψi​(x)∣ (3.24). The Jacobian is the matrix J(x)={∂ψi/∂tj}i,j=1nJ(x) = \{\partial\psi_i/\partial t_j\}_{i,j=1}^nJ(x)={∂ψi​/∂tj​}i,j=1n​ of partial derivatives with respect to the coordinates x={t1,…,tn}x = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\}x={t1​,…,tn​}.

An almost-gradient of a function fff at x0x_0x0​ is an accumulation point of a sequence of gradients ∇f(xk)\nabla f(x_k)∇f(xk​), where xk→x0x_k \to x_0xk​→x0​ and fff is differentiable at every xkx_kxk​ (p. 18).

The regular case (p. 63) is the situation in which f∗=min⁡f=0f^* = \min f = 0f∗=minf=0 is attained at a point x∗x^*x∗, the ψi\psi_iψi​ are continuously differentiable near x∗x^*x∗, and J(x∗)J(x^*)J(x∗) is nonsingular.

The gradient orthogonalization method (3.27) runs in stages of nnn steps. A stage starting at x0x_0x0​ produces x1,…,xnx_1, \dots, x_nx1​,…,xn​ as follows. At step k+1k+1k+1, 0≤k<n0 \le k < n0≤k<n, the gradient gψk+1(xk)g_{\psi_{k+1}}(x_k)gψk+1​​(xk​) is projected on the subspace orthogonal to the gradients gψ1(x0),…,gψk(xk−1)g_{\psi_1}(x_0), \dots, g_{\psi_k}(x_{k-1})gψ1​​(x0​),…,gψk​​(xk−1​) used earlier in the stage. Call the result φk+1\varphi_{k+1}φk+1​. The step is

xk+1=xk−ψk+1(xk)∥φk+1∥2 φk+1.x_{k+1} = x_k - \frac{\psi_{k+1}(x_k)}{\|\varphi_{k+1}\|^2}\, \varphi_{k+1}.xk+1​=xk​−∥φk+1​∥2ψk+1​(xk​)​φk+1​.

For k=0k = 0k=0 there is nothing to project, so φ1=gψ1(x0)\varphi_1 = g_{\psi_1}(x_0)φ1​=gψ1​​(x0​). The next stage starts at xnx_nxn​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.9, one stage squares the error

Let x∗=0x^* = 0x∗=0 solve the system, let the ψi\psi_iψi​ be continuously differentiable with gradients Lipschitz with constant LLL on a ball Sδ={x:∥x∥<δ}S_\delta = \{x : \|x\| < \delta\}Sδ​={x:∥x∥<δ} (3.28), and let gψ1(0),…,gψn(0)g_{\psi_1}(0), \dots, g_{\psi_n}(0)gψ1​​(0),…,gψn​​(0) be linearly independent. Then there exist ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 and c>0c > 0c>0 such that every stage with ∥x0∥≤ε\|x_0\| \le \varepsilon∥x0​∥≤ε satisfies

∥xn∥≤c ∥x0∥2.\|x_n\| \le c\, \|x_0\|^2 .∥xn​∥≤c∥x0​∥2.

Milestones inside the proof

The proof of Theorem 3.9 passes through these displayed results, stated here in attack order:

  • Eq. (3.29): near the solution, the orthogonalized gradients satisfy ∥φk+1∥>b>0\|\varphi_{k+1}\| > b > 0∥φk+1​∥>b>0, with bbb uniform over stages.
  • Eq. (3.33): after step k+1k+1k+1, ∣ψk+1(xk+1)∣≤(L/b2) ψk+12(xk)|\psi_{k+1}(x_{k+1})| \le (L/b^2)\, \psi_{k+1}^2(x_k)∣ψk+1​(xk+1​)∣≤(L/b2)ψk+12​(xk​).
  • Lemma 3.1: a step of length hhh in a unit direction orthogonal to gψi(x1)g_{\psi_i}(x_1)gψi​​(x1​) changes ψi\psi_iψi​ by at most Lh(h+∥x1−x2∥)L h (h + \|x_1 - x_2\|)Lh(h+∥x1​−x2​∥).
  • Eqs. (3.36)–(3.37): within a stage, max⁡k∥xk∥≤c1∥x0∥\max_k \|x_k\| \le c_1 \|x_0\|maxk​∥xk​∥≤c1​∥x0​∥, and at the end point f(xn)≥c2∥xn∥f(x_n) \ge c_2 \|x_n\|f(xn​)≥c2​∥xn​∥.

Companion result: Theorem 3.8

In the regular case, for every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 there is a neighborhood of x∗x^*x∗ in which every almost-gradient satisfies

(1−δ)f(x)≤(gf(x),x−x∗)≤(1+δ)f(x).(1-\delta) f(x) \le (g_f(x), x - x^*) \le (1+\delta) f(x).(1−δ)f(x)≤(gf​(x),x−x∗)≤(1+δ)f(x).

Significance

Theorem 3.9 says that a method which evaluates one equation and one gradient per step, and never solves a linear system, has the local quadratic rate of Newton's method on a regular system. The stages combine: once one stage starts close enough to the solution, the errors of later stages satisfy ∥x0(r+1)∥≤c∥x0(r)∥2\|x_0^{(r+1)}\| \le c\|x_0^{(r)}\|^2∥x0(r+1)​∥≤c∥x0(r)​∥2. Theorem 3.8 describes the geometry of fff near a regular solution. The ratio of (gf(x),x−x∗)(g_f(x), x - x^*)(gf​(x),x−x∗) to f(x)f(x)f(x) tends to 111, which is what allows the dilation parameters of the book's Theorem 3.3 to approach their extreme values near the solution. Both results connect the nonsmooth space-dilation methods of Chapter 3 to classical Newton-type theory.

All results of this mission are proved in the book. None of them has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof: the platform has local quadratic convergence results for cubic-regularized Newton, proximal Newton and semismooth Newton, but not for this method. The work is formalizing Shor's proof. This includes building the Gram-determinant argument behind (3.29) and the second-order estimates, which are reusable for other projection-based solvers of Kaczmarz type.

Difficulty

A naive argument analyses each step as a Newton step for one equation and stops there. That shows each equation ψk+1\psi_{k+1}ψk+1​ is small right after its own step, but the theorem needs all equations to be small at the end of the stage. Later steps move the point and can undo the progress on earlier equations. The step directions are orthogonal to the earlier gradients, but those gradients were taken at earlier points, not at the current one. Controlling this drift needs Lemma 3.1 together with the bound (3.36), which says that the whole stage stays within a multiple of ∥x0∥\|x_0\|∥x0​∥.

A second difficulty is that the method is only defined near the solution. The step divides by ∥φk+1∥2\|\varphi_{k+1}\|^2∥φk+1​∥2, and a uniform positive lower bound on these norms comes from the nonvanishing of a Gram determinant evaluated at nnn different points. The final passage from small residuals to a small error needs the growth bound (3.37), which uses the nonsingularity of the Jacobian once more.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The equations are a family ψ : Fin n → E_n → ℝ indexed from 000, so ψ k is the book's ψk+1\psi_{k+1}ψk+1​. Gradients are Mathlib's gradient, and SδS_\deltaSδ​ is the open ball Metric.ball 0 δ. Continuous differentiability is ContDiff ℝ 1; in Theorem 3.8 it is ContDiffOn ℝ 1 on a neighborhood of x∗x^*x∗.
  • The stage. A stage is a predicate IsOrthStage ψ x on a sequence x:N→Enx : \mathbb{N} \to E_nx:N→En​, which fixes x1,…,xnx_1, \dots, x_nx1​,…,xn​ from x0x_0x0​. The projection is starProjection onto the orthogonal complement of the span of the earlier gradients.
  • Corrected misprint. The printed Step 1, (3.27a), divides by ∥gψ1(x0)∥\|g_{\psi_1}(x_0)\|∥gψ1​​(x0​)∥ rather than its square. The formalization uses the square, which is what (3.27b) and the proof's (3.31)–(3.33) require at k=0k = 0k=0.
  • Division by zero. The book gives no rule for φk+1=0\varphi_{k+1} = 0φk+1​=0; Lean's t/0=0t/0 = 0t/0=0 would leave the point unchanged. All statements apply the method only near the solution, where (3.29) bounds ∥φk+1∥\|\varphi_{k+1}\|∥φk+1​∥ away from zero.
  • Quantifier order. In Theorem 3.9 and in (3.29), (3.36)–(3.37), the constants (ε\varepsilonε, ccc, δ′\delta'δ′, bbb, ε0\varepsilon_0ε0​, c1c_1c1​, c2c_2c2​) are existentials placed before the stage. They depend only on the data ψ,δ,L\psi, \delta, Lψ,δ,L. A statement with ccc chosen after x0x_0x0​ would be trivial, with c=∥xn∥/∥x0∥2c = \|x_n\|/\|x_0\|^2c=∥xn​∥/∥x0​∥2, and is ruled out.
  • Nonsingularity. In Theorem 3.9 it is the linear independence of gψi(0)g_{\psi_i}(0)gψi​​(0), the book's primary hypothesis. In Theorem 3.8 it is det⁡J(x∗)≠0\det J(x^*) \ne 0detJ(x∗)=0, with JJJ defined by coordinate partial derivatives.
  • Almost-gradients. They are quantified universally: Theorem 3.8 holds for every almost-gradient, not for one chosen one.

Not formalized: Theorem 3.10 (pp. 70–71), the nnn-step quadratic convergence of the β=0\beta = 0β=0 r-algorithm with resetting. Its directional minimization rule is not pinned down on the page. The algorithm says "determined by minimizing", while the proof uses "the smallest positive root" of a stationarity equation. A contribution that fixes this rule and states the theorem is welcome as a follow-up.

Contributions of any of the five milestones are welcome independently. The Gram-determinant lower bound (3.29) and Lemma 3.1 are general facts about orthogonalization and Lipschitz gradients, and are useful beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985, §§3.5–3.6, pp. 62–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • J. M. Ortega and W. C. Rheinboldt, Iterative Solution of Nonlinear Equations in Several Variables, Academic Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898719468
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions VI: The Homogeneous Self-Dual Predictor–Corrector MethodTextbook

Motivation

Interior-point methods are the standard polynomial-time algorithms for linear programming, and the path-following method that practitioners implement (Chapter 18 of Vanderbei's Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions) comes without a complete convergence proof. Chapter 22 of the same book presents a closely related algorithm for which a complete analysis can be written down: the homogeneous self-dual predictor–corrector method. It combines two ideas. The first is the self-dual embedding of Ye, Todd and Mizuno (1994), which folds a linear program and its dual into one auxiliary problem that always has feasible solutions, so no feasible starting point is needed. The second is the predictor–corrector scheme of Mizuno, Todd and Ye (1993), which alternates an affine-scaling step with a centering step while keeping the iterates in a neighbourhood of the central path, and reduces the duality measure by a factor 1−1/(2n)1 - 1/(2\sqrt n)1−1/(2n​) every two iterations. The result is an O(n L)O(\sqrt n\,L)O(n​L) iteration bound, the best known for interior-point methods on linear programs.

Setting

Let AAA be a real n×nn \times nn×n matrix with n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 that is skew symmetric, A=−ATA = -A^TA=−AT. The homogeneous self-dual problem (22.4) is

maximize 0subject to Ax+z=0,x,z≥0.\text{maximize } 0 \quad \text{subject to } Ax + z = 0,\quad x, z \ge 0.maximize 0subject to Ax+z=0,x,z≥0.

For x,z∈Rnx, z \in \mathbb{R}^nx,z∈Rn write X,ZX, ZX,Z for the diagonal matrices with the entries of x,zx, zx,z on the diagonal and eee for the vector of ones. The infeasibility is ρ(x,z)=Ax+z\rho(x, z) = Ax + zρ(x,z)=Ax+z and the noncomplementarity is μ(x,z)=1nxTz\mu(x, z) = \frac1n x^T zμ(x,z)=n1​xTz. For a centering parameter 0≤δ≤10 \le \delta \le 10≤δ≤1, step directions (Δx,Δz)(\Delta x, \Delta z)(Δx,Δz) solve the linear system

AΔx+Δz=−(1−δ)ρ(x,z),ZΔx+XΔz=δμ(x,z)e−XZe.(22.5)–(22.6)A\Delta x + \Delta z = -(1 - \delta)\rho(x, z), \qquad Z\Delta x + X\Delta z = \delta\mu(x, z)e - XZe. \qquad (22.5)\text{–}(22.6)AΔx+Δz=−(1−δ)ρ(x,z),ZΔx+XΔz=δμ(x,z)e−XZe.(22.5)–(22.6)

For 0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1 the neighbourhood is

N(β)={(x,z)>0:∥XZe−μ(x,z)e∥≤βμ(x,z)},\mathcal N(\beta) = \{(x, z) > 0 : \|XZe - \mu(x, z)e\| \le \beta\mu(x, z)\},N(β)={(x,z)>0:∥XZe−μ(x,z)e∥≤βμ(x,z)},

with ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ the Euclidean norm and (x,z)>0(x, z) > 0(x,z)>0 meaning that every component is strictly positive. The algorithm starts at x(0)=z(0)=ex^{(0)} = z^{(0)} = ex(0)=z(0)=e and alternates two steps. A predictor step starts from (x,z)∈N(1/4)(x, z) \in \mathcal N(1/4)(x,z)∈N(1/4), uses δ=0\delta = 0δ=0, and takes the step length (22.10) θ=max⁡{t:(x+tΔx,z+tΔz)∈N(1/2)}\theta = \max\{t : (x + t\Delta x, z + t\Delta z) \in \mathcal N(1/2)\}θ=max{t:(x+tΔx,z+tΔz)∈N(1/2)}. A corrector step starts from (x,z)∈N(1/2)(x, z) \in \mathcal N(1/2)(x,z)∈N(1/2), uses δ=1\delta = 1δ=1 and θ=1\theta = 1θ=1.

A general linear program (22.1), max⁡cTx\max c^TxmaxcTx subject to Ax≤bAx \le bAx≤b, x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 with AAA now m×nm \times nm×n, and its dual (22.2), min⁡bTy\min b^TyminbTy subject to ATy≥cA^Ty \ge cATy≥c, y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, are embedded in the homogeneous self-dual problem (22.21):

−ATy+cϕ+z=0,Ax−bϕ+w=0,−cTx+bTy+ψ=0,x,y,ϕ,z,w,ψ≥0.-A^Ty + c\phi + z = 0,\quad Ax - b\phi + w = 0,\quad -c^Tx + b^Ty + \psi = 0,\quad x, y, \phi, z, w, \psi \ge 0.−ATy+cϕ+z=0,Ax−bϕ+w=0,−cTx+bTy+ψ=0,x,y,ϕ,z,w,ψ≥0.

A feasible solution of (22.21) is strictly complementary if xj+zj>0x_j + z_j > 0xj​+zj​>0, yi+wi>0y_i + w_i > 0yi​+wi​>0 and ϕ+ψ>0\phi + \psi > 0ϕ+ψ>0 for all i,ji, ji,j.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 22.5 (p. 330)

In each predictor step, starting from (x,z)∈N(1/4)(x, z) \in \mathcal N(1/4)(x,z)∈N(1/4) with any solution (Δx,Δz)(\Delta x, \Delta z)(Δx,Δz) of (22.5)–(22.6) at δ=0\delta = 0δ=0,

θ≥12n.\theta \ge \frac{1}{2\sqrt n}.θ≥2n​1​.

The formal statement asserts that every t∈[0,1/(2n)]t \in [0, 1/(2\sqrt n)]t∈[0,1/(2n​)] keeps (x+tΔx,z+tΔz)(x + t\Delta x, z + t\Delta z)(x+tΔx,z+tΔz) in N(1/2)\mathcal N(1/2)N(1/2), and that the supremum of the admissible step lengths is at least 1/(2n)1/(2\sqrt n)1/(2n​).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 22.1: (22.4) is feasible, every feasible point is optimal, and zTx=0z^Tx = 0zTx=0 on the feasible set.
  2. Theorem 22.2: ΔzTΔx=0\Delta z^T\Delta x = 0ΔzTΔx=0, ρˉ=(1−θ+θδ)ρ\bar\rho = (1 - \theta + \theta\delta)\rhoρˉ​=(1−θ+θδ)ρ, μˉ=(1−θ+θδ)μ\bar\mu = (1 - \theta + \theta\delta)\muμˉ​=(1−θ+θδ)μ, and XˉZˉe−μˉe=(1−θ)(XZe−μe)+θ2ΔXΔZe\bar X\bar Ze - \bar\mu e = (1 - \theta)(XZe - \mu e) + \theta^2\Delta X\Delta ZeXˉZˉe−μˉ​e=(1−θ)(XZe−μe)+θ2ΔXΔZe.
  3. Lemma 22.4: ∥PQe∥≤12∥r∥2\|PQe\| \le \frac12\|r\|^2∥PQe∥≤21​∥r∥2 for the scaled directions p=X−1/2Z1/2Δxp = X^{-1/2}Z^{1/2}\Delta xp=X−1/2Z1/2Δx, q=X1/2Z−1/2Δzq = X^{1/2}Z^{-1/2}\Delta zq=X1/2Z−1/2Δz, r=p+qr = p + qr=p+q; ∥r∥2=nμ\|r\|^2 = n\mu∥r∥2=nμ when δ=0\delta = 0δ=0; ∥r∥2≤β2μ/(1−β)\|r\|^2 \le \beta^2\mu/(1 - \beta)∥r∥2≤β2μ/(1−β) when δ=1\delta = 1δ=1 and (x,z)∈N(β)(x, z) \in \mathcal N(\beta)(x,z)∈N(β).
  4. Theorem 22.3: a predictor step lands in N(1/2)\mathcal N(1/2)N(1/2) with μˉ=(1−θ)μ\bar\mu = (1 - \theta)\muμˉ​=(1−θ)μ; a corrector step lands in N(1/4)\mathcal N(1/4)N(1/4) with μˉ=μ\bar\mu = \muμˉ​=μ.
  5. Theorem 22.7: there are constants cj>0c_j > 0cj​>0 with xj+zj≥cjx_j + z_j \ge c_jxj​+zj​≥cj​ for every iterate (x,z)∈N(β)(x, z) \in \mathcal N(\beta)(x,z)∈N(β).
  6. Theorem 22.8: a strictly complementary solution of (22.21) with ϕˉ>0\bar\phi > 0ϕˉ​>0 yields optimal solutions xˉ/ϕˉ\bar x/\bar\phixˉ/ϕˉ​, yˉ/ϕˉ\bar y/\bar\phiyˉ​/ϕˉ​ of (22.1)–(22.2); with ϕˉ=0\bar\phi = 0ϕˉ​=0 it certifies that the primal or the dual is infeasible.

Significance

Theorem 22.5 is the quantitative core of the method. Combined with Theorem 22.3 it gives μ(2k)≤(1−12n)k\mu^{(2k)} \le (1 - \frac{1}{2\sqrt n})^kμ(2k)≤(1−2n​1​)k along the iterates, and therefore at most 4Ln4L\sqrt n4Ln​ iterations to bring μ\muμ below 2−L2^{-L}2−L (§22.2.4). Since the infeasibility tracks the noncomplementarity, ρ(k)=μ(k)ρ(0)\rho^{(k)} = \mu^{(k)}\rho^{(0)}ρ(k)=μ(k)ρ(0), both go to zero at that rate. Theorem 22.8 then converts the output into an answer for the original linear program: optimal primal and dual solutions, or a certificate that one of them is infeasible. Theorem 22.7 is the mechanism behind strict complementarity of the limit (Theorem 22.6, stated in the book without proof).

All results are classical and proved in the book. The mission formalizes those proofs. To the best of the curator's knowledge there is no machine-checked convergence analysis of an interior-point method for linear programming in Mathlib or on this platform; the existing platform material on interior-point methods covers a different, short-step path-following method in equality form.

Difficulty

The algebra of Theorem 22.2 is the first obstacle: the orthogonality ΔzTΔx=0\Delta z^T\Delta x = 0ΔzTΔx=0 is not a consequence of (22.5) alone but of skew symmetry combined with both step equations and the definition of μ\muμ, and parts (3)–(4) depend on it. The second is that the book's step length (22.10) is a maximum that need not exist, so a statement about θ\thetaθ must be phrased about the admissible set of step lengths, and membership in N(1/2)\mathcal N(1/2)N(1/2) requires strict positivity of every component along the whole segment, not only the norm bound at its end. The norm bound alone does not control positivity; an argument that ignores this proves membership in a larger set than N(1/2)\mathcal N(1/2)N(1/2). Theorem 22.7 needs a strictly complementary feasible solution of (22.4), whose existence (Theorem 10.6 in the book, the Goldman–Tucker theorem) is itself a substantial result not available in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions Fin n → ℝ (and Fin m → ℝ), matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and all declarations sit in the namespace VanderbeiLP.SelfDual. The committed conventions are:

  • The Euclidean norm is defined explicitly (euclidNorm); Mathlib's default norm on Fin n → ℝ is the sup norm and is not used.
  • μ(x,z)=1nxTz\mu(x, z) = \frac1n x^Tzμ(x,z)=n1​xTz with n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, the standing assumption of §22.2, carried as a hypothesis by every theorem about (22.4) together with AT=−AA^T = -AAT=−A.
  • Step directions are any solution of (22.5)–(22.6); existence and uniqueness of the solution are neither assumed nor claimed.
  • The predictor step length is the supremum of {t∈R:(x+tΔx,z+tΔz)∈N(1/2)}\{t \in \mathbb{R} : (x + t\Delta x, z + t\Delta z) \in \mathcal N(1/2)\}{t∈R:(x+tΔx,z+tΔz)∈N(1/2)}. This set contains 000 and is bounded above by 111 along a predictor direction, so the supremum is never a default value. Theorem 22.3(1) is stated under the hypothesis that the maximum exists, as (22.10) presumes.
  • Theorem 22.7 is stated for points of N(β)\mathcal N(\beta)N(β) with 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1 satisfying ρ(x,z)=μ(x,z)ρ(e,e)\rho(x, z) = \mu(x, z)\rho(e, e)ρ(x,z)=μ(x,z)ρ(e,e), the relation all iterates satisfy. The constants cjc_jcj​ are quantified before (x,z)(x, z)(x,z) and depend only on AAA and β\betaβ. The existence of a strictly complementary solution of (22.4) is not a hypothesis.
  • Theorem 22.8 is for arbitrary m,nm, nm,n and data (A,b,c)(A, b, c)(A,b,c); "optimal" means feasible and attaining the best objective value among feasible points.
  • No explicit constants beyond those printed in the statements (1/41/41/4, 1/21/21/2, 1/(2n)1/(2\sqrt n)1/(2n​), β2/(1−β)\beta^2/(1-\beta)β2/(1−β)) occur; the book leaves no constant implicit in the formalized results.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the step length is not a default-valued supremum, N(β)\mathcal N(\beta)N(β) requires strict positivity and uses the Euclidean norm, and the goal is also stated as the segment property its proof establishes.

Theorem 22.6 (convergence of the iterates to a strictly complementary solution) is stated without proof in the book and is not part of this mission; the 4Ln4L\sqrt n4Ln​ iteration count of §22.2.4 is an unnumbered corollary. Both are welcome as follow-up work, as is a proof of Theorem 10.6 for skew-symmetric systems, which Theorem 22.7 needs.

Selected references

  • R. J. Vanderbei, Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions, 4th ed., International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 196, Springer, 2014, Chapter 22. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7630-6
  • S. Mizuno, M. J. Todd, Y. Ye, On adaptive-step primal–dual interior-point algorithms for linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 18(4), 964–981, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.964
  • Y. Ye, M. J. Todd, S. Mizuno, An O(nL)O(\sqrt n L)O(n​L)-iteration homogeneous and self-dual linear programming algorithm, Mathematics of Operations Research 19(1), 53–67, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.19.1.53
  • A. J. Goldman, A. W. Tucker, Theory of linear programming, in Linear Inequalities and Related Systems, Annals of Mathematics Studies 38, Princeton University Press, 1956, 53–97. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881987-005
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming I: Existence and Uniqueness for the Multi-Stage Allocation EquationTextbook

Motivation

Chapter I of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957) opens the book with a multi-stage allocation process: a resource is divided, stage after stage, between two activities, each of which yields an immediate return and leaves behind a depleted remainder that is re-divided at the next stage. The chapter uses this process as its prototype for "a number of multi-stage processes, of diverse origin, but similar analytic structure" (§ 8, p. 11), and the techniques it introduces here — the functional equation of the infinite process, successive approximations, approximation in policy space, transfer of convexity and concavity through the recurrence, and a stability estimate — reappear throughout the book and in the later theory of Markov decision processes.

When the number of stages is large, Bellman replaces the finite sequence of recurrences by a single equation for the infinite process. As the book stresses (p. 11), this replacement is only useful once one knows that the equation has a solution and possesses "no extraneous solutions". This mission formalizes that existence and uniqueness theorem and the chapter's main structural results that rest on it.

Setting

A quantity x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 is split into y∈[0,x]y \in [0,x]y∈[0,x], assigned to a first activity with return g(y)g(y)g(y), and x−yx - yx−y, assigned to a second activity with return h(x−y)h(x-y)h(x−y). After the stage the first allocation has been reduced to ayayay and the second to b(x−y)b(x-y)b(x−y), and the process continues with the quantity ay+b(x−y)ay + b(x-y)ay+b(x−y). Writing

T(f,y)=g(y)+h(x−y)+f(ay+b(x−y)),T(f,y) = g(y) + h(x-y) + f\big(ay + b(x-y)\big),T(f,y)=g(y)+h(x−y)+f(ay+b(x−y)),

the total return f(x)f(x)f(x) of the infinite process satisfies the allocation equation (Bellman's (8.1))

f(x)=max⁡0≤y≤xT(f,y),x≥0.f(x) = \max_{0 \le y \le x} T(f,y), \qquad x \ge 0.f(x)=0≤y≤xmax​T(f,y),x≥0.

The standing hypotheses of Chapter I, Theorem 1 are:

  1. ggg and hhh are continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and g(0)=h(0)=0g(0) = h(0) = 0g(0)=h(0)=0;
  2. with m(x)=max⁡0≤y≤xmax⁡(∣g(y)∣,∣h(y)∣)m(x) = \max_{0 \le y \le x} \max(|g(y)|, |h(y)|)m(x)=max0≤y≤x​max(∣g(y)∣,∣h(y)∣) and c=max⁡(a,b)c = \max(a,b)c=max(a,b), the series ∑n=0∞m(cnx)\sum_{n=0}^\infty m(c^n x)∑n=0∞​m(cnx) converges for every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0;
  3. 0≤a<10 \le a < 10≤a<1 and 0≤b<10 \le b < 10≤b<1.

The successive approximations from an initial function f0f_0f0​ are fN+1(x)=max⁡0≤y≤xT(fN,y)f_{N+1}(x) = \max_{0 \le y \le x} T(f_N, y)fN+1​(x)=max0≤y≤x​T(fN​,y). A policy is a function y0(x)y_0(x)y0​(x) with 0≤y0(x)≤x0 \le y_0(x) \le x0≤y0​(x)≤x; its return is the total of the stage returns obtained by using y0y_0y0​ at every stage.

In Lean all objects live in the namespace BellmanDP.Allocation: allocT is TTT, allocM is mmm, AllocationHyp g h a b bundles the three hypotheses, IsAllocationSolution g h a b f is the equation with the maximum attained, allocIter is the sequence fNf_NfN​, and policyReturn is the return of a policy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter I, Theorem 1

Under the three hypotheses, there is a function fff with

f(x)=max⁡0≤y≤x[g(y)+h(x−y)+f(ay+b(x−y))](x≥0),f(0)=0, f continuous at 0,f(x) = \max_{0 \le y \le x}\big[g(y) + h(x-y) + f(ay + b(x-y))\big] \quad (x \ge 0), \qquad f(0) = 0,\ f \text{ continuous at } 0,f(x)=0≤y≤xmax​[g(y)+h(x−y)+f(ay+b(x−y))](x≥0),f(0)=0, f continuous at 0,

this fff is continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and every solution continuous at 000 with value 000 there coincides with fff on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2 — from any f0f_0f0​ continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with f0(0)=0f_0(0) = 0f0​(0)=0, the successive approximations converge to fff uniformly on every finite interval.
  2. Theorem 3 — started from the return of a continuous policy, the successive approximations increase monotonically and converge to fff uniformly on every finite interval.
  3. Lemma 1 — if G(x,y)G(x,y)G(x,y) is jointly concave on x,y≥0x,y \ge 0x,y≥0, then x↦max⁡0≤y≤xG(x,y)x \mapsto \max_{0 \le y \le x} G(x,y)x↦max0≤y≤x​G(x,y) is concave.
  4. Theorem 4 — if ggg and hhh are convex, fff is convex and for each xxx the maximum is attained at y=0y = 0y=0 or y=xy = xy=x.
  5. Theorem 5 — if ggg and hhh are strictly concave, fff is strictly concave and the maximizing yyy is unique for every xxx.
  6. Theorem 9 — for the general equation f(x)=max⁡0≤y≤x[u(x,y)+f(ay+b(x−y))]f(x) = \max_{0\le y\le x}[u(x,y) + f(ay+b(x-y))]f(x)=max0≤y≤x​[u(x,y)+f(ay+b(x−y))], the continuous solutions for returns uuu and vvv satisfy ∣f(x)−F(x)∣≤∑n≥0D(cnx)|f(x) - F(x)| \le \sum_{n \ge 0} D(c^n x)∣f(x)−F(x)∣≤∑n≥0​D(cnx), where D(z)D(z)D(z) is the maximum of ∣u−v∣|u - v|∣u−v∣ over 0≤y≤x≤z0 \le y \le x \le z0≤y≤x≤z.

Significance

Theorem 1 is what gives meaning to "the solution" of the allocation equation, which every later result of the chapter refers to. Without the side condition at 000 uniqueness fails: when g=h=0g = h = 0g=h=0, every constant function and the indicator of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) solve the equation. Theorems 2 and 3 turn the existence proof into computational procedures (value iteration and policy improvement), and Theorem 3's monotonicity is the prototype of the policy-improvement property. Theorems 4 and 5 are the first structural results on optimal policies — all-or-nothing allocation under convex returns, a unique interior-or-boundary allocation under strictly concave returns — and Theorem 9 bounds the error made by replacing a return function with a simpler approximation.

These are classical results with published proofs in the book. No machine-checked version of any of them is known to this mission; the work is to formalize the proofs, building reusable infrastructure for functional equations of the form f(x)=max⁡y∈D(x)[r(x,y)+f(τ(x,y))]f(x) = \max_{y \in D(x)}[r(x,y) + f(\tau(x,y))]f(x)=maxy∈D(x)​[r(x,y)+f(τ(x,y))] with a contracting transition τ\tauτ.

Difficulty

The equation is not a contraction in the supremum norm on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞): ggg and hhh may be unbounded, so no global Banach fixed-point argument applies. Control comes instead from the shrinking of the argument, ay+b(x−y)≤cxay + b(x-y) \le cxay+b(x−y)≤cx, which propagates a local estimate near 000 out to every finite interval, and the summability hypothesis (1b) is what makes the resulting series converge uniformly on bounded sets. Uniqueness cannot come from a norm estimate either; it rests on continuity at 000 alone. The maximum in the equation must be shown to be attained, which requires continuity of the limit function; the book notes (p. 13) that the monotone argument for nonnegative g,hg,hg,h gives only a supremum. For Theorems 4 and 5, convexity and concavity must be carried through each approximation and preserved in the limit, and strict concavity must be recovered for the limit, where a pointwise limit of strictly concave functions is only concave.

Formalization scope

  • Functions are ℝ → ℝ; only their values on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) enter any hypothesis or conclusion. Continuity at 000 is one-sided (ContinuousWithinAt f (Set.Ici 0) 0), and uniqueness is equality on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).
  • The maximum in the equation is encoded as IsGreatest of {T(f,y):0≤y≤x}\{T(f,y) : 0 \le y \le x\}{T(f,y):0≤y≤x}, so a solution attains its maximum at every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The maxima inside definitions (mmm, fN+1f_{N+1}fN+1​, the triangle maximum of Theorem 9) are real suprema (sSup) of images of compact nonempty sets of continuous functions, which equal the book's maxima under the stated hypotheses.
  • The later theorems refer to "the solution" of Theorem 1 by quantifying over solutions that are continuous at 000 and vanish there; they never quantify over arbitrary solutions of the equation, for which the conclusions are false.
  • Theorem 3's "converges uniformly" is stated uniformly on every finite interval [0,R][0,R][0,R], the sense in which Theorem 2 and the series (11.10) used in its proof converge. Its initial function is defined explicitly as the series of stage returns along the trajectory of the policy.
  • Theorem 4's "yyy will equal 000 or xxx" is stated as: an endpoint is a maximizer. It does not say every maximizer is an endpoint, which fails for g=h=0g = h = 0g=h=0.
  • Each theorem carries its own parameter range as printed: 0≤a,b<10 \le a, b < 10≤a,b<1 for Theorems 1–5, 0<a,b<10 < a, b < 10<a,b<1 for Theorem 9.
  • Not included: Theorem 6 (the policy structure under strict concavity, which uses f′f'f′ without a hypothesis making fff differentiable), Theorems 7 and 8 (explicit solutions), Theorem 10 (the multi-dimensional process), and Theorems 11–12 on Fibonacci search, which form a separate mission.

Welcome contributions: a general existence-and-uniqueness theorem for equations f(x)=sup⁡y∈D(x)[r(x,y)+f(τ(x,y))]f(x) = \sup_{y \in D(x)}[r(x,y) + f(\tau(x,y))]f(x)=supy∈D(x)​[r(x,y)+f(τ(x,y))] with ∥τ(x,y)∥≤c∥x∥\|\tau(x,y)\| \le c\|x\|∥τ(x,y)∥≤c∥x∥, and a lemma that parametric maxima over [0,x][0,x][0,x] of continuous functions are continuous in xxx.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics edition, 2010. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f — Chapter I, §§ 8–14 and 18, pp. 11–29.
  • R. Bellman, "On the theory of dynamic programming", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38 (1952), 716–719. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.38.8.716
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming II: Fibonacci Search for the Maximum of a Unimodal FunctionTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization routines contain an inner step that maximizes a function of one variable whose values are expensive to compute: a line search inside a multivariate method, a tuning parameter chosen by simulation, a stage of a dynamic program in which each evaluation requires solving a subproblem. When the only structural information is that the function has a single peak, the natural question is how to place the evaluations so that the peak is pinned down as tightly as possible with a fixed budget. Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (1957) takes up this question in Chapter I, § 22, as an illustration of the functional-equation method, and answers it with the Fibonacci numbers.

Timeline.

  • 1953. J. Kiefer, Sequential minimax search for a maximum (Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 4, 502–506), proves that Fibonacci search is minimax optimal among sequential procedures for a unimodal function on an interval. doi:10.1090/S0002-9939-1953-0055639-3
  • 1957. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Chapter I, § 22 (pp. 34–36), recasts the result in the language of the principle of optimality: Theorem 11 for the continuous problem and Theorem 12 for its discrete version.

Setting

Let L>0L > 0L>0. A function f:[0,L]→Rf : [0, L] \to \mathbb Rf:[0,L]→R is strictly unimodal with maximum at m∈[0,L]m \in [0, L]m∈[0,L] if fff is strictly increasing on [0,m][0, m][0,m] and strictly decreasing on [m,L][m, L][m,L]. No continuity is assumed, and the peak may sit at an endpoint. The point mmm is then the unique maximizer of fff.

A search procedure is a finite decision tree. At each internal node it names a point xxx at which fff is evaluated and moves to a subtree chosen by the observed value f(x)f(x)f(x); at a leaf it announces a closed interval [a,b][a, b][a,b]. The kkk-th evaluation point may depend on all values seen so far, but on nothing else about fff. The cost of the procedure on fff is the number of evaluations along the path that fff determines.

The procedure locates the maximum on [0,L][0, L][0,L] within unit length using at most nnn values if, for every strictly unimodal fff on [0,L][0, L][0,L] with maximum at mmm, it evaluates fff at most nnn times and announces [a,b][a, b][a,b] with b−a≤1b - a \le 1b−a≤1 and m∈[a,b]m \in [a, b]m∈[a,b]. Write Ln\mathcal L_nLn​ for the set of lengths L>0L > 0L>0 for which such a procedure exists, and following Bellman's Eq. (22.1),

Fn=sup⁡Ln.F_n = \sup \mathcal L_n .Fn​=supLn​.

The book's Fibonacci numbers are F0=F1=1F_0 = F_1 = 1F0​=F1​=1, Fn=Fn−1+Fn−2F_n = F_{n-1} + F_{n-2}Fn​=Fn−1​+Fn−2​ for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 (in Lean, bookFib).

In the discrete version, fff is defined on the points 0,1,…,N−10, 1, \dots, N-10,1,…,N−1, strictly increasing up to its maximizer mmm and strictly decreasing after it. KnK_nKn​ is the largest NNN for which some procedure evaluates at most nnn values and then names mmm exactly, for every such fff.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter I, Theorem 11

sup⁡Ln=Fnfor every n≥0.\sup \mathcal L_n = F_n \qquad \text{for every } n \ge 0 .supLn​=Fn​for every n≥0.

The supremum is not attained once n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 (with two evaluations every length 2−ε2 - \varepsilon2−ε is searchable, the length 222 is not), which is why the statement is about the supremum rather than a maximum.

Milestones

  1. sup⁡L1=1\sup \mathcal L_1 = 1supL1​=1: one value carries no information (proof of Theorem 11, p. 34).
  2. sup⁡L2=2\sup \mathcal L_2 = 2supL2​=2 (p. 35).
  3. Eq. (22.3): for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 every L∈LnL \in \mathcal L_nL∈Ln​ satisfies L<Fn−1+Fn−2L < F_{n-1} + F_{n-2}L<Fn−1​+Fn−2​.
  4. For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 every 0<L<Fn−1+Fn−20 < L < F_{n-1} + F_{n-2}0<L<Fn−1​+Fn−2​ lies in Ln\mathcal L_nLn​ (p. 36).
  5. Eq. (22.4): F20>10,000F_{20} > 10{,}000F20​>10,000, hence for every L>0L > 0L>0 twenty evaluations locate the maximum within an interval of length 10−4L10^{-4} L10−4L.
  6. Eqs. (22.5)–(22.6): with r1,2=(1±5)/2r_{1,2} = (1 \pm \sqrt5)/2r1,2​=(1±5​)/2,
Fn=r2−1r2−r1r1 n+1−r1r2−r1r2 n,Fn+1Fn→r1.F_n = \frac{r_2 - 1}{r_2 - r_1} r_1^{\,n} + \frac{1 - r_1}{r_2 - r_1} r_2^{\,n}, \qquad \frac{F_{n+1}}{F_n} \to r_1 .Fn​=r2​−r1​r2​−1​r1n​+r2​−r1​1−r1​​r2n​,Fn​Fn+1​​→r1​.
  1. Theorem 12, corrected: K0=K1=1K_0 = K_1 = 1K0​=K1​=1, K2=2K_2 = 2K2​=2, K3=4K_3 = 4K3​=4, and
Kn=Fn+1−1(n≥3).K_n = F_{n+1} - 1 \qquad (n \ge 3).Kn​=Fn+1​−1(n≥3).

Significance

The result. Theorem 11 is an exact minimax statement: nnn evaluations shrink the interval of uncertainty for the peak of a unimodal function by a factor of at most Fn≈r1 n/5F_n \approx r_1^{\,n}/\sqrt5Fn​≈r1n​/5​, and no adaptive rule, however clever, does better. It certifies Fibonacci search as optimal and golden-section search as asymptotically optimal, which is the reason these methods are the default line searches when derivatives are unavailable. Eq. (22.4) quantifies the rate: twenty evaluations give four decimal digits.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1953; the work here is a machine-checked proof of the full minimax statement over all adaptive procedures, including the lower bound. That half is a statement about every decision tree and requires an adversary argument, which is exactly the kind of reasoning that is informal in the book and easy to get wrong. The discrete Theorem 12 is misprinted in the book (see below), so a formal proof also settles the correct values. We are not aware of an existing formalization of the optimality of Fibonacci search in Lean or another proof assistant. The Binet formula and the ratio limit are in Mathlib for Mathlib's indexing (Real.coe_fib_eq, tendsto_fib_succ_div_fib_atTop); milestone 6 only transfers them to the book's indexing.

Difficulty

The upper bound L<Fn−1+Fn−2L < F_{n-1} + F_{n-2}L<Fn−1​+Fn−2​ must hold for every procedure, not only for procedures that follow the "compare two points, discard a piece, keep the surviving point" pattern of the book's figures. A procedure may place its second point depending on the first value, may re-evaluate points, may evaluate outside [0,L][0, L][0,L], and may branch on the exact values rather than on their order. The book's argument tacitly restricts to that pattern, so the lower bound has to be established for arbitrary trees, where the information carried by exact values, repeated or wasted evaluations and branch-dependent placements all have to be accounted for. The bookkeeping is delicate because the surviving sets are half-open or open intervals, and whether the endpoints are included decides that the supremum is not attained.

The naive attempt of proving a bound only for "one new point per step inside the current bracket" procedures does not prove the goal: the goal quantifies over all decision trees.

Formalization scope

  • Model fixed. Deterministic adaptive procedures (decision trees branching on the exact real value observed), exact function values, cost equal to the number of evaluations; this is one of the models that Bellman's footnote 8 alludes to ("It is actually not easy to specify precisely what we mean by an optimal search procedure"). Functions are ℝ → ℝ, constrained only on [0,L][0, L][0,L]; evaluations outside [0,L][0, L][0,L] are allowed and useless.
  • Output. A closed interval [a,b][a, b][a,b] with a≤ba \le ba≤b, b−a≤1b - a \le 1b−a≤1 containing the maximizer. It need not lie inside [0,L][0, L][0,L] or have length exactly one; for L≥1L \ge 1L≥1 this is equivalent to Bellman's "sub-interval of unit length".
  • Indexing. The book's FnF_nFn​ is a separate definition bookFib with F0=F1=1F_0 = F_1 = 1F0​=F1​=1; in Mathlib's indexing FnF_nFn​ is Nat.fib (n + 1). The goal is stated for every n≥0n \ge 0n≥0; the book calls F0F_0F0​ a convention, and in this model sup⁡L0=1\sup \mathcal L_0 = 1supL0​=1 agrees with it.
  • Sup, not max. Theorem 11 is stated with IsLUB, never as "a procedure exists for L=FnL = F_nL=Fn​", which is false for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. Theorem 12 is stated with IsGreatest, which asserts that the maximum exists.
  • Implicit ranges. Eq. (22.3) is stated unconditionally for all n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 (the book proves it under the induction hypothesis). "Within 10−410^{-4}10−4 of the original interval length" is read as an interval of length at most 10−4L10^{-4} L10−4L.
  • Misprint corrected. Theorem 12 prints Kn=1+FnK_n = 1 + F_nKn​=1+Fn​ for n≥3n \ge 3n≥3. On seven points, four evaluations suffice: evaluate points 3 and 5; if f(3)>f(5)f(3) > f(5)f(3)>f(5) the peak is among points 1–4 with f(3)f(3)f(3) known, and evaluating point 2 and then point 1 or 4 finds it; the case f(5)>f(3)f(5) > f(3)f(5)>f(3) is symmetric, and f(3)=f(5)f(3) = f(5)f(3)=f(5) forces the peak at point 4. So K4≥7>6=1+F4K_4 \ge 7 > 6 = 1 + F_4K4​≥7>6=1+F4​. The mission states Kn=Fn+1−1K_n = F_{n+1} - 1Kn​=Fn+1​−1 for n≥3n \ge 3n≥3, which agrees with the printed K3=4K_3 = 4K3​=4 and keeps all printed initial values. The printed text is kept verbatim in the milestone.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The procedure never sees fff except through the values it requests, and it must succeed for every strictly unimodal fff with one fixed tree; "some interval of length one contains the maximizer" with no procedure, or a procedure allowed to depend on fff, would make the problem trivial and is not what is stated.
  • Contributions welcome. A reusable decision-tree framework for query-complexity lower bounds, lemmas about which finite sets of observed values are consistent with a strictly unimodal function, and the Fibonacci search tree itself as a construction.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics ed., 2010, Chapter I, § 22, pp. 34–36. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • J. Kiefer, Sequential minimax search for a maximum, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 4 (1953), 502–506. doi:10.1090/S0002-9939-1953-0055639-3
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming III: Index Rules for the Stochastic Gold-Mining ProcessTextbook

Motivation

Chapter II of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957) treats the stochastic gold-mining process, the first stochastic multi-stage decision process of the book whose optimal policy can be written down in closed form. There Bellman introduces decision regions, the sets of states at which a given first choice is optimal, and where he obtains an index rule: at every state, compute one number per alternative and choose the largest. The same kind of rule was later developed in general form as the Gittins index for multi-armed bandits (Gittins 1979), and the gold-mining process is an early instance of what that literature calls a deteriorating bandit, in which each alternative's index can only decrease when it is used.

Bellman first described the process in his 1954 survey The theory of dynamic programming, with the two-mine index rule stated as Eq. (8.3), and it appears on Prove2Me in a mission on that paper. The book gives the full chapter: existence and uniqueness, the rule for two mines, its extension to several outcomes per use and to any number of mines, the finite-horizon process, and a stability estimate.

Setting

Two mines, Anaconda and Bonanza, hold amounts of gold x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and y≥0y \ge 0y≥0. A single machine is used in one mine at a time. Used in Anaconda, it mines the fraction r1r_1r1​ of the gold there and stays in working order with probability p1p_1p1​, or is destroyed without mining anything with probability 1−p11 - p_11−p1​. Bonanza has the corresponding data p2p_2p2​ and r2r_2r2​. Before each use the operator chooses a mine (choice A or B), and the process stops when the machine is destroyed. The aim is to maximize the expected total amount of gold mined.

The expected return f(x,y)f(x, y)f(x,y) under an optimal policy satisfies the functional equation

f(x,y)=max⁡[ Af(x,y),  Bf(x,y) ],x,y≥0,(5.1)f(x,y) = \max\Big[\,A_f(x,y),\; B_f(x,y)\,\Big], \qquad x, y \ge 0, \tag{5.1}f(x,y)=max[Af​(x,y),Bf​(x,y)],x,y≥0,(5.1)

where Af(x,y)=p1[r1x+f((1−r1)x, y)]A_f(x,y) = p_1\big[r_1x + f((1-r_1)x,\,y)\big]Af​(x,y)=p1​[r1​x+f((1−r1​)x,y)] is the return of an A-choice followed by optimal continuation and Bf(x,y)=p2[r2y+f(x, (1−r2)y)]B_f(x,y) = p_2\big[r_2y + f(x,\,(1-r_2)y)\big]Bf​(x,y)=p2​[r2​y+f(x,(1−r2​)y)] that of a B-choice. The NNN-stage returns are f1(x,y)=max⁡(p1r1x, p2r2y)f_1(x,y) = \max(p_1r_1x,\ p_2r_2y)f1​(x,y)=max(p1​r1​x, p2​r2​y) and fN+1=max⁡(AfN,BfN)f_{N+1} = \max(A_{f_N}, B_{f_N})fN+1​=max(AfN​​,BfN​​). The A-region of a value function is the set of points of the closed quadrant where the A-branch attains the maximum; the B-region is defined in the same way.

In the generalization, a use of mine iii has KKK outcomes: outcome kkk occurs with probability pikp_{ik}pik​, yields cikxic_{ik}x_icik​xi​ and leaves cik′xi=(1−cik)xic'_{ik}x_i = (1-c_{ik})x_icik′​xi​=(1−cik​)xi​ in the mine, and 1−∑kpik1 - \sum_k p_{ik}1−∑k​pik​ is the probability that the machine is destroyed. With nnn mines the equation is

f(x1,…,xn)=max⁡i∑k=1Kpik[cikxi+f(x1,…,cik′xi,…,xn)].(4)f(x_1,\dots,x_n) = \max_i \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_{ik}\big[c_{ik}x_i + f(x_1,\dots,c'_{ik}x_i,\dots,x_n)\big]. \tag{4}f(x1​,…,xn​)=imax​k=1∑K​pik​[cik​xi​+f(x1​,…,cik′​xi​,…,xn​)].(4)

"The solution" of an equation always means its unique solution in the class of functions bounded in every rectangle 0≤x≤Xˉ0 \le x \le \bar X0≤x≤Xˉ, 0≤y≤Yˉ0 \le y \le \bar Y0≤y≤Yˉ (or every box 0≤xi≤Xˉi0 \le x_i \le \bar X_i0≤xi​≤Xˉi​), per Bellman's footnote 7.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter II, Theorem 4 (the index rule for nnn mines)

Under pik≥0p_{ik} \ge 0pik​≥0, ∑kpik<1\sum_k p_{ik} < 1∑k​pik​<1, 0≤cik≤10 \le c_{ik} \le 10≤cik​≤1, cik+cik′=1c_{ik} + c'_{ik} = 1cik​+cik′​=1, equation (4) has a unique solution bounded on boxes, and at every state xxx any index maximizing

Di(x)=∑kpikcik1−∑kpik  xiD_i(x) = \frac{\sum_{k} p_{ik}c_{ik}}{1-\sum_{k} p_{ik}}\;x_iDi​(x)=1−∑k​pik​∑k​pik​cik​​xi​

attains the maximum in (4). Ties among the maximizers may be broken arbitrarily.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1: for ∣pi∣<1|p_i| < 1∣pi​∣<1 and 0≤ri<10 \le r_i < 10≤ri​<1, (5.1) has a unique solution bounded in every rectangle, and it is continuous on the closed quadrant.
  2. Theorem 2: for 0≤pi<10 \le p_i < 10≤pi​<1, 0≤ri≤10 \le r_i \le 10≤ri​≤1, the solution takes the A-branch when p1r1x/(1−p1)>p2r2y/(1−p2)p_1r_1x/(1-p_1) > p_2r_2y/(1-p_2)p1​r1​x/(1−p1​)>p2​r2​y/(1−p2​), the B-branch when the reverse inequality holds, and both on equality.
  3. Theorem 3: the same rule for two mines with KKK outcomes per use.
  4. Theorem 5: for each NNN, the NNN-stage process has exactly two decision regions: a sector along the xxx-axis where A is optimal and a sector along the yyy-axis where B is optimal, separated by a ray through the origin.
  5. Theorem 6: as NNN grows, the regions of fNf_NfN​ move monotonically, and from some N0N_0N0​ on they coincide with those of fff.
  6. Theorem 7: if ggg solves (5.1) with an added term hhh, then ∣f−g∣≤max⁡R∣h∣/q|f - g| \le \max_R|h|/q∣f−g∣≤maxR​∣h∣/q on every rectangle RRR, where q=min⁡(1−p1,1−p2)q = \min(1-p_1, 1-p_2)q=min(1−p1​,1−p2​).

Significance

The index rule reduces the choice among nnn mines to computing nnn numbers. Each one depends only on its own mine, as the ratio of immediate expected gain to immediate expected loss. Without the theorem, an optimal policy for the NNN-stage process is a word in nnn letters whose number of candidates grows like nNn^NnN. The finite-horizon theorems show that the same rule is exactly optimal for every horizon beyond a finite N0N_0N0​, and the stability theorem bounds how much the solution moves when the equation is perturbed.

Theorem 2's content is also the target of the 1954-paper mission, where it is stated for the supremum of expected returns over choice sequences. Those statements (BellmanTheoryDP.GoldMining.gold_mining_decision_rule, …optimal_return_functional_equation) are included here as reference items. They concern a different object: the book's theorems are about the unique bounded solution of (5.1), and the two coincide once (5.1) is known to characterize the optimal return. None of the chapter's results has a machine-checked proof on the platform yet. The nnn-mine rule (Theorem 4) and the finite-horizon results (Theorems 5 and 6) are not stated anywhere on the platform.

Difficulty

The equation for the boundary between the regions involves the unknown function fff, so equating the two branches of (5.1) does not by itself locate the boundary. Comparing the orders "A then B" and "B then A" determines the index line, but only on the assumption that there are just two regions. Bellman's Figure 1 shows why that assumption carries real content: homogeneity alone only makes the regions unions of sectors, which could alternate. The assumption is not automatic either. In § 13 a third, compromise choice is added, and a counterexample shows that the three-choice problem need not have the analogous three-sector structure. For the finite-horizon process the boundary ray of fNf_NfN​ generally differs from the index line, and Theorems 5 and 6 are statements about how it differs.

Formalization scope

Namespace BellmanDP.GoldMining. Values are real functions ℝ → ℝ → ℝ (two mines) or (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ (n mines); equations are imposed only on the closed quadrant or orthant, and uniqueness means agreement there. Mines are Fin n with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 added (with no mine the maximum in (4) is empty). Outcomes are Fin K (Theorem 3's NNN). A maximum over two branches is max, and a maximum over mines is encoded as "every alternative is at most f(x)f(x)f(x) and one equals it". The class "bounded in any rectangle" is BoundedOnRectangles, and for nnn mines it is BoundedOnBoxes. The NNN-stage returns are goldIter N, with goldIter 0 = 0 so that goldIter 1 is the book's f1f_1f1​.

Choices made explicit:

  • Theorem 1 keeps the book's signed range ∣pi∣<1|p_i| < 1∣pi​∣<1 (footnote 2), while Theorems 2, 5, 6 and 7 use the range of § 8 and Theorem 2, 0≤pi<10 \le p_i < 10≤pi​<1, 0≤ri≤10 \le r_i \le 10≤ri​≤1.
  • The goal asserts existence and uniqueness of the bounded solution of (4) together with the index rule. This is how "the solution" is meant in the book; the extension of Theorem 1 to (4) is not a separate numbered result.
  • The goal's conclusion is the book's: a maximizer of DDD is optimal. It does not also assert that the other indices are suboptimal.
  • Theorem 5's printed statement is only "there are two decision regions". It is formalized as the ray-separation statement its proof establishes, and is titled as the precise reading. Theorem 6's "converge in a monotone fashion" is formalized as monotonicity of the regions as sets, in one of the two directions.
  • Theorem 7 adds the hypothesis that hhh is bounded in every rectangle, which is what gives the perturbed equation a solution in the class. max⁡R∣h∣\max_R|h|maxR​∣h∣ is expressed through any bound MMM of ∣h∣|h|∣h∣ on RRR.

A statement of the index rule that assumes the index policy's return satisfies (5.1) and calls it "the solution" without the bounded-class uniqueness would prove nothing about optimality. Here every theorem is about solutions in the bounded class, whose uniqueness is Theorem 1 (and part of the goal).

Contraction estimates on rectangles (Theorems 1 and 7) are reusable across the other functional-equation chapters of this series. Proofs of the goal via general index theory are welcome, provided they discharge the statements as written.

Selected references

  • Richard Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics ed., 2010, Chapter II, pp. 61–80. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • Richard Bellman, The theory of dynamic programming, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 60 (1954), 503–515. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1954-09848-8
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming IV: Existence and Uniqueness for Functional Equations of Types One, Two and ThreeTextbook

Motivation

A multi-stage decision process is summarized by its optimal return function fff, which satisfies a functional equation. In Chapters I and II of Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957), Richard Bellman proves existence and uniqueness for particular processes: allocation of resources, gold mining. Chapter IV abstracts these arguments into theorems about whole classes of equations. The same scheme reappears in later chapters (multi-stage games, the calculus of variations) and in every later treatment of dynamic programming.

Two points explain why the chapter is still worth formalizing. First, uniqueness is always claimed within a stated function class, and the choice of class is part of the theorem: an equation of this kind can have many solutions, and only one of them lies in the class that the process singles out. Second, the chapter covers equations that are not contractions in the supremum norm, in particular Type One, where the shrinking happens in the state rather than in the function values.

Setting

Let D⊆RND \subseteq \mathbb{R}^ND⊆RN carry the Euclidean norm ∥p∥\|p\|∥p∥, let SSS be a nonempty set of decisions, and let g,h:D×S→Rg, h : D \times S \to \mathbb{R}g,h:D×S→R and T:D×S→DT : D \times S \to DT:D×S→D. The general equation (1.1) is

f(p)=sup⁡q∈S[g(p,q)+h(p,q) f(T(p,q))].f(p) = \sup_{q \in S}\big[g(p,q) + h(p,q)\,f(T(p,q))\big].f(p)=q∈Ssup​[g(p,q)+h(p,q)f(T(p,q))].

Here ggg is the one-stage return, T(p,q)T(p,q)T(p,q) the next state and h(p,q)h(p,q)h(p,q) a multiplier: a discount factor or a survival probability.

An equation is of Type One with constant 0≤a<10 \le a < 10≤a<1 under the following conditions. DDD contains the null vector θ\thetaθ. ggg is bounded on bounded parts of DDD, uniformly in qqq, and g(θ,q)=0g(\theta, q) = 0g(θ,q)=0. ∣h∣≤1|h| \le 1∣h∣≤1. ∥T(p,q)∥≤a∥p∥\|T(p,q)\| \le a\|p\|∥T(p,q)∥≤a∥p∥. Finally, with v(c)=sup⁡∥p∥≤csup⁡q∣g(p,q)∣v(c) = \sup_{\|p\| \le c}\sup_q |g(p,q)|v(c)=sup∥p∥≤c​supq​∣g(p,q)∣, the series ∑n≥0v(anc)\sum_{n \ge 0} v(a^n c)∑n≥0​v(anc) converges for every ccc.

It is of Type Two under the following conditions. ggg is bounded on bounded parts of DDD. On each bounded part, ∣h∣≤a<1|h| \le a < 1∣h∣≤a<1 for some aaa. TTT maps DDD into DDD, and either ∥T(p,q)∥≤∥p∥\|T(p,q)\| \le \|p\|∥T(p,q)∥≤∥p∥ or DDD is bounded.

The successive approximations are f0(p)=sup⁡qg(p,q)f_0(p) = \sup_q g(p,q)f0​(p)=supq​g(p,q) and fn+1(p)=sup⁡q[g(p,q)+h(p,q)fn(T(p,q))]f_{n+1}(p) = \sup_q[g(p,q) + h(p,q) f_n(T(p,q))]fn+1​(p)=supq​[g(p,q)+h(p,q)fn​(T(p,q))].

The equation of the third type of § 8 lives on the probability simplex Δ\DeltaΔ of distributions p=(p0,…,pn)p = (p_0, \dots, p_n)p=(p0​,…,pn​), with vertices xkx_kxk​. It reads

f(p)=min⁡[ 1+∑k=0npkf(xk), min⁡1≤l≤M[1+f(Tlp)]](p≠x0),f(x0)=0.f(p) = \min\Big[\,1 + \sum_{k=0}^{n} p_k f(x_k),\ \min_{1 \le l \le M}\big[1 + f(T_l p)\big]\Big] \quad (p \ne x_0), \qquad f(x_0) = 0.f(p)=min[1+k=0∑n​pk​f(xk​), 1≤l≤Mmin​[1+f(Tl​p)]](p=x0​),f(x0​)=0.

Each TlT_lTl​ maps Δ\DeltaΔ into itself, and the 000-th coordinate of TlpT_l pTl​p is never 111. f(p)f(p)f(p) is the minimal expected time to drive a system into state 000 with certainty, by observing the state (cost 111, then continuing from the observed vertex) or by applying one of the operations TlT_lTl​ (cost 111).

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter IV, Theorem 1

For a Type One equation there is exactly one solution on DDD, among functions continuous at θ\thetaθ and zero there, of

f(p)=sup⁡q∈S[g(p,q)+h(p,q) f(T(p,q))] (p≠θ),f(θ)=0.f(p) = \sup_{q \in S}\big[g(p,q) + h(p,q)\,f(T(p,q))\big] \ (p \ne \theta), \qquad f(\theta) = 0.f(p)=q∈Ssup​[g(p,q)+h(p,q)f(T(p,q))] (p=θ),f(θ)=0.

It is the pointwise limit of the successive approximations from f0=sup⁡qgf_0 = \sup_q gf0​=supq​g, and also from any f0f_0f0​ that is continuous and zero at θ\thetaθ and bounded on bounded parts of DDD. If ggg, hhh and TTT are continuous in ppp on bounded portions of DDD, uniformly in qqq, the solution is continuous on every bounded portion of DDD.

Milestones

  • Lemma 1 (the fundamental inequality): for nonnegative measures dGdGdG,
∣f2(p)−F2(p)∣≤sup⁡q[ ∣g−h∣+∫D∣f1−F1∣ dG].|f_2(p) - F_2(p)| \le \sup_q\Big[\,|g - h| + \int_{D} |f_1 - F_1|\,dG\Big].∣f2​(p)−F2​(p)∣≤qsup​[∣g−h∣+∫D​∣f1​−F1​∣dG].
  • Theorem 2: a Type Two equation has a unique solution bounded in every finite part of DDD, obtained by successive approximations and continuous under the same conditions as in Theorem 1.
  • Theorem 3 (stability, Type One): sup⁡∥p∥≤c∣F−f∣≤∑n≥0u(anc)\sup_{\|p\| \le c} |F - f| \le \sum_{n \ge 0} u(a^n c)sup∥p∥≤c​∣F−f∣≤∑n≥0​u(anc), where u(c)=sup⁡∥p∥≤csup⁡q∣G−g∣u(c) = \sup_{\|p\| \le c}\sup_q |G - g|u(c)=sup∥p∥≤c​supq​∣G−g∣.
  • Theorem 4 (stability, Type Two, corrected): sup⁡∥p∥≤c∣F−f∣≤u(c)/(1−a)\sup_{\|p\| \le c} |F - f| \le u(c)/(1-a)sup∥p∥≤c​∣F−f∣≤u(c)/(1−a).
  • Lemma 2: two bounded solutions of the third-type equation satisfy sup⁡p∣f(p)−g(p)∣=max⁡k∣f(xk)−g(xk)∣\sup_{p} |f(p) - g(p)| = \max_k |f(x_k) - g(x_k)|supp​∣f(p)−g(p)∣=maxk​∣f(xk​)−g(xk​)∣.
  • Theorem 5: if ∑k=1n(Tlp)k≤c1<1\sum_{k=1}^n (T_l p)_k \le c_1 < 1∑k=1n​(Tl​p)k​≤c1​<1 for every lll and ppp, the third-type equation has a unique bounded solution, and it is positive off x0x_0x0​.

Significance

Theorem 1 guarantees that the optimal return of a process whose decisions shrink the state is well defined and computable by iteration. It applies without assuming that the supremum over decisions is attained and without regularity of the maximizing decision. Theorems 3 and 4 give quantitative continuous dependence of the solution on the reward. This is what justifies approximating a process by a simpler one. Theorem 5 is a uniqueness result for an undiscounted minimum-time problem, where no contraction in the supremum norm is available.

All of these results are classical and proved in the book. None is formalized: the platform's related statements treat finite state spaces with a fixed policy (FoundationsML.ReinforcementLearning.bellman_equations_unique_solution), or Karlin's compact-decision-set setting with nonnegative rewards and an explicit vanishing-tail hypothesis (KarlinDP.Deterministic.unique_solution_of_vanishing_tail), or finite-state stochastic shortest paths (BertsekasDP.ssp_main_theorem). This mission adds machine-checked versions over a continuum of states and an arbitrary decision set, with the function classes stated exactly.

Difficulty

For Type One, the natural idea is to apply the Banach fixed-point theorem in the space of bounded functions. That fails: ∣h∣≤1|h| \le 1∣h∣≤1 allows no contraction in the supremum norm, and the solution need not be bounded on DDD. Contraction happens only along trajectories, ∥T(p,q)∥≤a∥p∥\|T(p,q)\| \le a\|p\|∥T(p,q)∥≤a∥p∥, so every estimate must be localized to balls ∥p∥≤c\|p\| \le c∥p∥≤c and summed along radii anca^n canc. Uniqueness then rests on continuity at θ\thetaθ rather than on a global norm.

The suprema over an arbitrary, possibly infinite, decision set are not attained in general, so no argument may select a maximizing decision. For the third-type equation, neither a contraction nor a shrinking of the state is available: the operations TlT_lTl​ need not move ppp towards x0x_0x0​. Uniqueness among bounded solutions requires controlling how long a solution can keep choosing an operation other than observation.

Formalization scope

The state space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin N), DDD is a Set, the decision set is a nonempty type S, and functions are total, EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin N) → ℝ. Only their values on DDD matter, and uniqueness is asserted on DDD. The equation is encoded with IsLUB, so the supremum is genuine and has no junk value. The successive approximations and the radii v(c)v(c)v(c), u(c)u(c)u(c) use real iSup/sSup, evaluated only where the book's boundedness conditions hold. "Continuous at θ\thetaθ" is continuity within DDD.

Conventions and corrections:

  • In Type One the book writes "for some a<1a < 1a<1". The formalization takes 0≤a<10 \le a < 10≤a<1, which loses no generality.
  • Condition (1a) of both types is read for every radius c1c_1c1​.
  • "Continuous in ppp in any bounded portion of DDD, uniformly for all qqq" is read as uniform equicontinuity on each {p∈D:∥p∥≤c}\{p \in D : \|p\| \le c\}{p∈D:∥p∥≤c}. For closed DDD this is the pointwise reading.
  • Theorem 4 is printed with "∣F(p)−(p)∣|F(p) - (p)|∣F(p)−(p)∣", a misprint for ∣F(p)−f(p)∣|F(p) - f(p)|∣F(p)−f(p)∣. As printed, it is also false under the bounded-domain alternative of Type Two. Take N=1N = 1N=1, D=[−2,2]D = [-2,2]D=[−2,2], T≡2T \equiv 2T≡2, h≡12h \equiv \tfrac12h≡21​, g≡0g \equiv 0g≡0, and G=1G = 1G=1 at p=2p = 2p=2, G=0G = 0G=0 elsewhere. Then ∣F(0)−f(0)∣=1|F(0) - f(0)| = 1∣F(0)−f(0)∣=1 while u(1)/(1−a)=0u(1)/(1-a) = 0u(1)/(1−a)=0. The formal statement adds that TTT maps {p∈D:∥p∥≤c}\{p \in D : \|p\| \le c\}{p∈D:∥p∥≤c} into the ball of radius ccc. This holds for every ccc under the first alternative, where the statement is the book's.
  • Lemma 1 is stated for nonnegative measures dG(p,q,⋅)dG(p,q,\cdot)dG(p,q,⋅) on RN\mathbb{R}^NRN, integrated over DDD. The right-hand supremum may be infinite, so it is expressed through its real upper bounds.
  • In § 8 the number of states is written both N+1N+1N+1 and n+1n+1n+1; the formalization uses n+1n+1n+1, with M≥1M \ge 1M≥1 transformations indexed by Fin M.

A trivializing formalization would state uniqueness among all solutions of the equation, which is false because constants solve it when g=0g = 0g=0 and h=1h = 1h=1. Equally trivializing would be to encode the supremum with a junk-valued sSup, so that unbounded return sets pass for solutions. Both are excluded: the class is part of each statement, and the equation is an IsLUB.

Theorem 6 of the chapter (the optimal inventory equation) is not part of this mission; it is treated in the inventory mission of the series. Welcome contributions include a reusable library for localized successive approximations and the equicontinuity lemmas that the continuity statements need.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics edition, 2010, Chapter IV. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • S. Karlin, "The structure of dynamic programming models", Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2 (1955), 285–294. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020408
  • D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, "An analysis of stochastic shortest path problems", Mathematics of Operations Research 16 (1991), 580–595. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.3.580
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming V: Optimality of a Constant Stock Level for the Optimal Inventory EquationTextbook

Motivation

The optimal inventory problem asks how much of an item to stock when demand is random, ordering costs money, and running short costs more. Arrow, Harris and Marschak formulated it as a sequential decision problem in 1951 (Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19), and Dvoretzky, Kiefer and Wolfowitz studied its structure in 1952–53. Chapter V of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (1957) treats the problem through a single functional equation for the minimal expected discounted cost. It shows that when ordering and shortage costs are proportional to quantity, the optimal policy is described by one number, a constant stock level xˉ\bar xxˉ, computed from the demand distribution alone.

This result is an early form of the base-stock (order-up-to) policy. Base-stock policies are the standard structure in periodic-review inventory theory: Karlin (1958), Scarf's (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) theorem (1960) and Veinott (1965) extend it. Chapter V is also a worked example of a point the book makes throughout: the method of successive approximations determines the shape of an optimal policy, and not only its existence.

Setting

A single item is stocked over an unbounded sequence of periods. At the start of a period the stock is x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The decision maker orders up to a level y≥xy \ge xy≥x, at cost k(y−x)k(y-x)k(y−x) with k>0k > 0k>0. A demand s≥0s \ge 0s≥0 then arrives, with probability density φ\varphiφ: φ(s)>0\varphi(s) > 0φ(s)>0 for s>0s > 0s>0, ∫0∞φ(s) ds=1\int_0^\infty \varphi(s)\,ds = 1∫0∞​φ(s)ds=1, and ∫0∞s φ(s) ds<∞\int_0^\infty s\,\varphi(s)\,ds < \infty∫0∞​sφ(s)ds<∞. If s≤ys \le ys≤y, the next period starts with stock y−sy - sy−s. If s>ys > ys>y, the excess s−ys - ys−y is bought at the penalty rate p>0p > 0p>0 and the next period starts with stock 000. Costs one period ahead are multiplied by a discount factor 0<a<10 < a < 10<a<1.

Write f(x)f(x)f(x) for the minimal expected discounted cost from stock xxx. Enumerating the cases gives Bellman's equation (5.1):

f(x)=min⁡y≥xT(y,x,f),f(x) = \min_{y \ge x} T(y,x,f),f(x)=y≥xmin​T(y,x,f), T(y,x,f)=k(y−x)+a[∫y∞p(s−y)φ(s) ds+f(0)∫y∞φ(s) ds+∫0yf(y−s)φ(s) ds].T(y,x,f) = k(y-x) + a\Big[\int_y^\infty p(s-y)\varphi(s)\,ds + f(0)\int_y^\infty \varphi(s)\,ds + \int_0^y f(y-s)\varphi(s)\,ds\Big].T(y,x,f)=k(y−x)+a[∫y∞​p(s−y)φ(s)ds+f(0)∫y∞​φ(s)ds+∫0y​f(y−s)φ(s)ds].

A policy assigns an order-up-to level y(x)≥xy(x) \ge xy(x)≥x to each stock xxx. It is optimal when y(x)y(x)y(x) attains the minimum. The mission takes the equation itself as the model; no stochastic process is built.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter V, Theorem 1 (with (4b) corrected)

The equation has exactly one solution fff among measurable functions bounded on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). If ap>kap > kap>k, the equation

k=ap∫xˉ∞φ(s) ds+ak∫0xˉφ(s) dsk = ap\int_{\bar x}^\infty \varphi(s)\,ds + ak\int_0^{\bar x}\varphi(s)\,dsk=ap∫xˉ∞​φ(s)ds+ak∫0xˉ​φ(s)ds

has exactly one root xˉ≥0\bar x \ge 0xˉ≥0, and for every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 the minimum is attained at

y(x)=max⁡(x,xˉ).y(x) = \max(x, \bar x).y(x)=max(x,xˉ).

If ap≤kap \le kap≤k, the minimum is attained at y(x)=xy(x) = xy(x)=x: never order.

Milestones

  1. Chapter IV, Theorem 6 (proportional costs): existence and uniqueness of a solution bounded on every finite interval, its continuity, and convergence of fn+1(x)=min⁡y≥xT(y,x,fn)f_{n+1}(x) = \min_{y\ge x} T(y,x,f_n)fn+1​(x)=miny≥x​T(y,x,fn​) from any non-negative continuous f0f_0f0​.
  2. Eq. (5.8): xˉ\bar xxˉ is the unique root of ∫0yφ(s) ds=(ap−k)/a(p−k)\int_0^{y}\varphi(s)\,ds = (ap-k)/a(p-k)∫0y​φ(s)ds=(ap−k)/a(p−k).
  3. Appendix, Theorem 9: the renewal equation u(x)=f(x)+∫0xu(x−s)φ(s) dsu(x) = f(x) + \int_0^x u(x-s)\varphi(s)\,dsu(x)=f(x)+∫0x​u(x−s)φ(s)ds with ∫0∞∣φ∣<1\int_0^\infty|\varphi| < 1∫0∞​∣φ∣<1 has a unique locally bounded solution. The solution is the limit of successive approximations, satisfies a derivative identity, and is non-negative when f,φ≥0f, \varphi \ge 0f,φ≥0.
  4. Theorem 3: in the undiscounted nnn-stage process with p>kp > kp>k, the optimal policy at each horizon is a constant stock level xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​, and xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​ increases with nnn.
  5. Theorem 4: with a fixed stock-out charge qqq added to the penalty, the constant-stock-level policy is still optimal when the last minimum of
ψ(y)=ky+a[∫y∞[p(s−y)+q]φ(s) ds−k∫0y(y−s)φ(s) ds]\psi(y) = ky + a\Big[\int_y^\infty [p(s-y)+q]\varphi(s)\,ds - k\int_0^y (y-s)\varphi(s)\,ds\Big]ψ(y)=ky+a[∫y∞​[p(s−y)+q]φ(s)ds−k∫0y​(y−s)φ(s)ds]

is its absolute minimum.

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-horizon stochastic control problem to a scalar equation. Rewriting it as ∫0xˉφ=(ap−k)/a(p−k)\int_0^{\bar x}\varphi = (ap-k)/a(p-k)∫0xˉ​φ=(ap−k)/a(p−k) gives the critical-fractile form familiar from the newsvendor problem, with the discount factor entering the fractile. The level depends on the demand law only through its distribution function, and the policy does not depend on the current stock except through max⁡(x,xˉ)\max(x,\bar x)max(x,xˉ). This is what makes the policy implementable and its parameters estimable from data, the point Bellman makes in § 1. Theorem 3 shows the same structure over a finite horizon, with levels that rise as more periods remain. Theorem 4 marks where the structure starts to depend on the demand density.

As far as a search of the platform shows (queries recorded in the mission files), none of these results has a machine-checked proof. Base-stock theorems on the platform, Veinott's multi-product theorem and Gallego–Özer's advance-demand model, use discrete periods, different excess-demand conventions and different state spaces. They do not cover a continuous-demand, lost-sales-at-penalty, discounted functional equation. Formalizing Chapter V would produce an explicit solution of a nonlinear integral equation of renewal type, a uniqueness theorem for that equation, and a Lean treatment of the renewal equation that other applied-probability missions can reuse.

Difficulty

Two steps resist the obvious argument. First, the minimization is over the unbounded set y≥xy \ge xy≥x, and the unknown fff enters through a convolution with φ\varphiφ. The operator f↦min⁡y≥xT(y,x,f)f \mapsto \min_{y\ge x}T(y,x,f)f↦miny≥x​T(y,x,f) is a contraction on bounded functions, which settles uniqueness in the bounded class. Uniqueness among functions bounded only on finite intervals (Chapter IV's class) is not a contraction statement, because the minimization reaches arbitrarily far to the right. Second, optimality of max⁡(x,xˉ)\max(x,\bar x)max(x,xˉ) for x>xˉx > \bar xx>xˉ requires f(y)+kyf(y) + kyf(y)+ky to be nondecreasing on [xˉ,∞)[\bar x,\infty)[xˉ,∞). There fff is defined only implicitly, as the solution of a renewal-type equation, and this monotonicity is a positivity statement about that solution, not a consequence of the first-order condition. Checking that the first-order condition holds at xˉ\bar xxˉ is not enough, and neither is checking that the candidate function satisfies the equation at the single level xˉ\bar xxˉ.

Formalization scope

Functions are ℝ → ℝ; only their values on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) enter. Integrals over (y,∞)(y,\infty)(y,∞) are Lebesgue integrals and ∫0y\int_0^y∫0y​ are interval integrals. The equation is stated with an infimum (IsGLB), as Chapter IV writes it, and every policy statement asserts that the minimum is attained (IsLeast) at the stated level. Uniqueness is asserted on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Set.EqOn … (Set.Ici 0)). Solution classes require measurability. This is the standing convention that makes ∫0yf(y−s)φ(s) ds\int_0^y f(y-s)\varphi(s)\,ds∫0y​f(y−s)φ(s)ds meaningful; without it a non-measurable function would make the integral default to 000. "φ(s)>0\varphi(s) > 0φ(s)>0" is read as positivity on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

Conventions and corrections, each stated in the items:

  • Theorem 1, (4b) is printed "for x≥xˉx \ge \bar xx≥xˉ, y=xˉy = \bar xy=xˉ". Read literally, a stock x>xˉx > \bar xx>xˉ would be "ordered down" to xˉ<x\bar x < xxˉ<x, which violates y≥xy \ge xy≥x. The proof (p. 163, "the minimum occurs at y=xy = xy=x") and Theorem 4's (7) give y=xy = xy=x, which is what the goal states. The printed text reads: "(4) a. for 0 ≤ x ≤ x̄, y = x̄, b. for x ≥ x̄, y = x̄."
  • The goal's uniqueness class is "uniformly bounded functions over x≥0x \ge 0x≥0" (p. 164). Chapter IV, Theorem 6 is stated in its own larger class.
  • Theorem 4 gives no range for qqq; q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 is assumed. Its phrase "the last minimum of ψ\psiψ is the absolute minimum" is read as: xˉ\bar xxˉ minimizes ψ\psiψ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and ψ\psiψ is nondecreasing on [xˉ,∞)[\bar x,\infty)[xˉ,∞). The bracket of (6), unbalanced in print, is closed at the end.
  • Theorem 3 assumes "p>kp > kp>k"; k>0k > 0k>0 and the density conditions of Theorem 1 are carried over.
  • Theorem 9's derivative clause assumes fff continuously differentiable, where the book says "differentiable". The derivative identity is asserted for x>0x > 0x>0.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out. The goal does not assume the stated policy is optimal, does not assume fff is given, and does not take xˉ\bar xxˉ as a hypothesis. It asserts the existence of the root, the existence and uniqueness of the solution, and attainment of the minimum at max⁡(x,xˉ)\max(x,\bar x)max(x,xˉ) for every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0.

Theorems 2 (two items, joint density), 5 (one-period delivery lag) and 6 (strictly convex ordering cost) are not part of this mission. Theorem 2 is printed with a sign error in (6) and garbled marginals. Theorem 5 states no hypotheses. Theorem 6's (9b) contradicts itself at x=xˉx = \bar xx=xˉ. Welcome contributions include a Lean library for the renewal equation (existence by successive approximation, positivity, differentiation under the convolution), which Theorem 9 needs and which is independent of inventory theory, and the contraction estimate for min⁡y≥xT(y,x,⋅)\min_{y\ge x}T(y,x,\cdot)miny≥x​T(y,x,⋅) on bounded measurable functions.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics ed., 2010, Chapter V and Chapter IV § 9. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg, O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906813
  • A. Dvoretzky, J. Kiefer, J. Wolfowitz, The inventory problem: I. Case of known distributions of demand, Econometrica 20(2), 1952, 187–222. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907847
  • A. F. Veinott, Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming VI: Optimal Policies for the Continuous Gold-Mining ProcessTextbook

Motivation

Chapter II of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957) solves a discrete gold-mining process: a single machine can be used in one of two mines, each use extracts a fixed fraction of the gold remaining in that mine, and each use carries a fixed risk of destroying the machine. Maximizing the expected total gold leads to an index rule: work the mine whose ratio of expected yield to risk is larger. Chapter VIII, A Continuous Stochastic Decision Process, passes to continuous time. Decisions are taken at every instant, and effort may be divided between the mines. The optimal policy is characterized by first-order conditions on switching functions, the objects of Pontryagin's later maximum principle.

It is also an early continuous-time index policy of the kind later central to bandit theory. Chapter VIII treats two mines, then a third decision that works both mines at once.

Setting

Mine A holds x0≥0x_0 \ge 0x0​≥0 units of gold and mine B holds y0≥0y_0 \ge 0y0​≥0. At time ttt a proportion φ1(t)∈[0,1]\varphi_1(t) \in [0,1]φ1​(t)∈[0,1] of the machine's effort goes to A and φ2(t)=1−φ1(t)\varphi_2(t) = 1 - \varphi_1(t)φ2​(t)=1−φ1​(t) to B (Eq. (7.3)). With x(t),y(t)x(t), y(t)x(t),y(t) the gold remaining, p(t)p(t)p(t) the probability that the machine still works and f(t)f(t)f(t) the expected gold mined, the process is defined by Eq. (7.2):

dxdt=−φ1r1x,dydt=−φ2r2y,dpdt=−p (φ1q1+φ2q2),dfdt=p (φ1r1x+φ2r2y),\frac{dx}{dt} = -\varphi_1 r_1 x,\qquad \frac{dy}{dt} = -\varphi_2 r_2 y,\qquad \frac{dp}{dt} = -p\,(\varphi_1 q_1 + \varphi_2 q_2),\qquad \frac{df}{dt} = p\,(\varphi_1 r_1 x + \varphi_2 r_2 y),dtdx​=−φ1​r1​x,dtdy​=−φ2​r2​y,dtdp​=−p(φ1​q1​+φ2​q2​),dtdf​=p(φ1​r1​x+φ2​r2​y),

with x(0)=x0x(0) = x_0x(0)=x0​, y(0)=y0y(0) = y_0y(0)=y0​, p(0)=1p(0) = 1p(0)=1, f(0)=0f(0) = 0f(0)=0. The mining rates r1,r2r_1, r_2r1​,r2​ and the failure rates q1,q2q_1, q_2q1​,q2​ are positive. The objective is the expected total gold f(∞)=∫0∞f′(t) dtf(\infty) = \int_0^\infty f'(t)\,dtf(∞)=∫0∞​f′(t)dt.

In the three-choice problem (§ 12) a third decision CCC removes gold from A at rate r3r_3r3​ and from B at rate r4r_4r4​, and fails at rate q3q_3q3​. A control is a triple φ1,φ2,φ3≥0\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3 \ge 0φ1​,φ2​,φ3​≥0 with φ1+φ2+φ3=1\varphi_1 + \varphi_2 + \varphi_3 = 1φ1​+φ2​+φ3​=1 (Eq. (12.2)). For a horizon TTT, the switching functions K1,K2,K3K_1, K_2, K_3K1​,K2​,K3​ of Eq. (12.5) are computed along a control. For instance,

K1(t)=−q1∫tTf′(s) ds+r1 p(T) x(T)−r1∫tTp′(s) x(s) ds.K_1(t) = -q_1\int_t^T f'(s)\,ds + r_1\,p(T)\,x(T) - r_1\int_t^T p'(s)\,x(s)\,ds.K1​(t)=−q1​∫tT​f′(s)ds+r1​p(T)x(T)−r1​∫tT​p′(s)x(s)ds.

They measure the first-order gain from shifting effort towards each decision at time ttt. The linear forms

C1=q1r2y−q2r1x,C2=q1r4y−(q3r1−q1r3)x,C3=(q3r2−q2r4)y−q2r3xC_1 = q_1 r_2 y - q_2 r_1 x,\qquad C_2 = q_1 r_4 y - (q_3 r_1 - q_1 r_3)x,\qquad C_3 = (q_3 r_2 - q_2 r_4) y - q_2 r_3 xC1​=q1​r2​y−q2​r1​x,C2​=q1​r4​y−(q3​r1​−q1​r3​)x,C3​=(q3​r2​−q2​r4​)y−q2​r3​x

and the quantity D=q1r2r3+q2r1r4−q3r1r2D = q_1 r_2 r_3 + q_2 r_1 r_4 - q_3 r_1 r_2D=q1​r2​r3​+q2​r1​r4​−q3​r1​r2​ (Eqs. (13.2)–(13.3)) organize the analysis.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter VIII, Theorem 1

For the two-choice process, the maximum of f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) is attained by the policy

φ1=1 for q1r2y<q2r1x,φ2=1 for q1r2y>q2r1x,φ1=r2r1+r2, φ2=r1r1+r2 for q1r2y=q2r1x.\varphi_1 = 1 \text{ for } q_1 r_2 y < q_2 r_1 x,\qquad \varphi_2 = 1 \text{ for } q_1 r_2 y > q_2 r_1 x,\qquad \varphi_1 = \tfrac{r_2}{r_1+r_2},\ \varphi_2 = \tfrac{r_1}{r_1+r_2} \text{ for } q_1 r_2 y = q_2 r_1 x.φ1​=1 for q1​r2​y<q2​r1​x,φ2​=1 for q1​r2​y>q2​r1​x,φ1​=r1​+r2​r2​​, φ2​=r1​+r2​r1​​ for q1​r2​y=q2​r1​x.

The formal statement asserts that some admissible control follows this rule along its own trajectory, and that every such control maximizes f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) over all measurable controls with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Milestones

  1. Eq. (10.1): fA(∞)=r1x0/(q1+r1)f_A(\infty) = r_1 x_0/(q_1 + r_1)fA​(∞)=r1​x0​/(q1​+r1​) and fB(∞)=r2y0/(q2+r2)f_B(\infty) = r_2 y_0/(q_2 + r_2)fB​(∞)=r2​y0​/(q2​+r2​) for the pure policies.
  2. Lemmas 1–3 (§ 13): for a control that maximizes f(T)f(T)f(T), almost everywhere, Ki>KjK_i > K_jKi​>Kj​ forces φi=1\varphi_i = 1φi​=1 or φj=0\varphi_j = 0φj​=0; a strictly largest KiK_iKi​ forces φi=1\varphi_i = 1φi​=1; a strictly beaten KiK_iKi​ forces φi=0\varphi_i = 0φi​=0.
  3. Lemma 4 (§ 14): if C2=0C_2 = 0C2​=0 and C3=0C_3 = 0C3​=0 lie in the positive quadrant and D≠0D \ne 0D=0, no optimal control mixes AAA, BBB and CCC on an interval.
  4. Lemma 5 (§ 14): a mixture of exactly two decisions on an interval keeps the state on C1=0C_1 = 0C1​=0, C2=0C_2 = 0C2​=0 or C3=0C_3 = 0C3​=0 respectively, with the proportions that hold y/xy/xy/x fixed.
  5. § 15, Eq. (1) (corrected): fC(∞)=r3x0/(q3+r3)+r4y0/(q3+r4)f_C(\infty) = r_3 x_0/(q_3 + r_3) + r_4 y_0/(q_3 + r_4)fC​(∞)=r3​x0​/(q3​+r3​)+r4​y0​/(q3​+r4​).
  6. "Theorem 8" (§ 16, the chapter's third theorem): if D<0D < 0D<0 (with r3>r4r_3 > r_4r3​>r4​ and x0,y0>0x_0, y_0 > 0x0​,y0​>0), the three-choice problem is solved by the two-choice rule of Theorem 1, and every optimal control has φ3=0\varphi_3 = 0φ3​=0 almost everywhere.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives a closed-form optimal feedback policy for a continuous-time stochastic scheduling problem. The policy depends only on the slope y/xy/xy/x, and on the line q1r2y=q2r1xq_1 r_2 y = q_2 r_1 xq1​r2​y=q2​r1​x it is a mixed (chattering) policy: the discrete optimum becomes a mixture in the continuous limit. Lemmas 1–5 are a hand-made maximum principle for controls that enter linearly, read almost everywhere. "Theorem 8" says exactly when a composite decision is useless: D<0D < 0D<0 means that CCC removes gold at a higher failure cost than an equivalent mixture of AAA and BBB.

On the formal side, none of these results is formalized anywhere. Mathlib has no theory of controlled differential equations or of necessary conditions for optimal control. The platform's maximum principles (BertsekasDP.pontryagin_minimum_principle, VectorSpaceOpt.pontryagin_minimum_principle) assume smooth dynamics and a finite horizon with differentiable costs. They do not cover this process, with measurable controls and an improper-integral objective. A formal proof of Theorem 1 would be a complete optimality proof for a continuous-time index policy with chattering controls. The book's argument for Theorem 1 is partly informal; a complete proof, by that route or another, is the target.

Difficulty

The optimization is over an infinite-dimensional set of measurable controls on an infinite horizon, and the objective is not concave in the control. The first-order conditions of §§ 8–9 are necessary, not sufficient, so they do not by themselves prove that the rule is optimal. The book's argument combines them with qualitative facts (the rule is used thereafter once used above the line, and BBB is preferred near the yyy-axis). Making this rigorous requires comparing an arbitrary control with the rule, not just perturbing near an optimum. It is also not known in advance that an optimal control exists, so arguments of the form "let φ\varphiφ be optimal" need an existence step or a direct comparison. For the lemmas, the switching functions must be shown absolutely continuous, with the derivative formulas (13.1) holding almost everywhere, before "equal on an interval" can be turned into "Ck=0C_k = 0Ck​=0 on the interval".

Formalization scope

  • Process by closed forms. No differential equations are formalized. With Φi(t)=∫0tφi\Phi_i(t) = \int_0^t \varphi_iΦi​(t)=∫0t​φi​, the definitions are x=x0e−r1Φ1−r3Φ3x = x_0 e^{-r_1\Phi_1 - r_3\Phi_3}x=x0​e−r1​Φ1​−r3​Φ3​, y=y0e−r2Φ2−r4Φ3y = y_0 e^{-r_2\Phi_2 - r_4\Phi_3}y=y0​e−r2​Φ2​−r4​Φ3​, p=e−∑iqiΦip = e^{-\sum_i q_i\Phi_i}p=e−∑i​qi​Φi​, f(T)=∫0Tf′f(T) = \int_0^T f'f(T)=∫0T​f′. These are the unique absolutely continuous solutions of (7.2) and (12.1). The two-choice process is the three-choice one with φ3=0\varphi_3 = 0φ3​=0.
  • Controls are open-loop and measurable, with φi≥0\varphi_i \ge 0φi​≥0 and ∑iφi=1\sum_i \varphi_i = 1∑i​φi​=1. Decisions are indexed 0, 1, 2 for A,B,CA, B, CA,B,C.
  • f(∞)f(\infty)f(∞) is a lower Lebesgue integral with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. It has no junk value, and optimality is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Theorem 1's feedback rule is encoded as a predicate on open-loop controls: the rule holds along the control's own trajectory for almost every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0. The goal also asserts that such a control exists, which rules out the trivializing reading in which no control satisfies the rule and the optimality claim is vacuous.
  • Horizon of Lemmas 1–5. § 12 considers only T=∞T = \inftyT=∞, but the variation (12.4) and the switching functions (12.5) are written for a general TTT. Each lemma is formalized for both: every finite horizon TTT, with KiK_iKi​ built from that horizon, and T=∞T = \inftyT=∞, with KiK_iKi​ given by (12.5) at T=∞T = \inftyT=∞ (boundary term 000).
  • Implicit ranges. All rates q1,q2,q3,r1,…,r4q_1, q_2, q_3, r_1, \dots, r_4q1​,q2​,q3​,r1​,…,r4​ are taken positive, and x0,y0≥0x_0, y_0 \ge 0x0​,y0​≥0. Lemmas 4–5 and "Theorem 8" take x0,y0>0x_0, y_0 > 0x0​,y0​>0, the open quadrant the book analyses. Lemma 4 carries the book's assumption that C2=0C_2 = 0C2​=0 and C3=0C_3 = 0C3​=0 lie in the positive quadrant (q1r3<q3r1q_1 r_3 < q_3 r_1q1​r3​<q3​r1​, q2r4<q3r2q_2 r_4 < q_3 r_2q2​r4​<q3​r2​). "Theorem 8" carries the standing assumption r3>r4r_3 > r_4r3​>r4​ of § 15.
  • Misprint corrected. The value of the pure CCC-policy in the proof of Lemma 6 (§ 15, Eq. (1), p. 237) is printed r3x0/(q2+r3)+r4y0/(q3+r4)r_3 x_0/(q_2 + r_3) + r_4 y_0/(q_3 + r_4)r3​x0​/(q2​+r3​)+r4​y0​/(q3​+r4​). The first denominator must be q3+r3q_3 + r_3q3​+r3​: for x0=1x_0 = 1x0​=1, y0=0y_0 = 0y0​=0, q2=1q_2 = 1q2​=1, q3=2q_3 = 2q3​=2, r3=1r_3 = 1r3​=1 the process yields 1/31/31/3, not 1/21/21/2. The corrected identity is stated.
  • Numbering. The third theorem of the chapter is printed "Theorem 8" and is cited that way.
  • Left out. Theorem 2 (D>0D > 0D>0) specifies its solution only through Fig. 7 and an unspecified line LLL. Lemmas 6–8, 11 and the two Lemmas 12 describe regions of figures. The finite-horizon analysis of § 11 has no numbered result, and neither does the nonlinear utility of § 18.

Useful infrastructure: the derivative formulas (13.1) for the KiK_iKi​, a first-variation lemma for f(T)f(T)f(T) under bounded perturbations of a measurable control, and a comparison principle for deteriorating projects. The last is reusable for other continuous-time index policies. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Theorem 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics edition, 2010. Chapter VIII, pp. 222–244. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • L. S. Pontryagin, V. G. Boltyanskii, R. V. Gamkrelidze, E. F. Mishchenko, The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes, Interscience, 1962.
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
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Calculus of VariationsControl TheoryDynamic Programming+3·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming VII: Convergence of Discrete Approximations in the Calculus of VariationsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter IX of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks edition 2010, DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) recasts problems of the calculus of variations with constraints as dynamic programming processes. A variational problem with an inequality constraint on the control, such as 0≤y≤x0 \le y \le x0≤y≤x, is awkward for the classical Euler–Lagrange theory: the optimal control switches between the constraint boundary and the interior, and the number and location of the switches are unknown in advance. Bellman's proposal is to replace the continuous problem by a discrete-time one and to solve that by the recurrence relations of dynamic programming, a procedure he describes as the more reliable computational one "in cases treated to date" (§ 11, p. 260).

That proposal is sound only if the discrete values converge to the continuous value as the time step goes to zero. Chapter IX states one such convergence result, Theorem 2 of § 12, and proves it through an Euler-scheme error estimate. The same chapter works through an example (§§ 10–11) whose discrete version is described by Theorem 1. Both are the subject of this mission. The convergence of time-discretized dynamic programming to the continuous value function has since become a standard topic of numerical optimal control (for example the semi-Lagrangian schemes analysed by Capuzzo-Dolcetta and Falcone), and Bellman's § 12 is an early rigorous instance of it.

Setting

A state x(t)≥0x(t) \ge 0x(t)≥0 evolves on a horizon [0,T][0, T][0,T] under a control y(t)y(t)y(t) with 0≤y≤x0 \le y \le x0≤y≤x, a running reward F(x,y)F(x, y)F(x,y) and dynamics

dxdt=G(x,y),x(0)=c.\frac{dx}{dt} = G(x, y), \qquad x(0) = c .dtdx​=G(x,y),x(0)=c.

Writing y=φxy = \varphi xy=φx with a fractional control 0≤φ≤10 \le \varphi \le 10≤φ≤1 turns FFF and GGG into F~(x,φ)=F(x,φx)\tilde F(x, \varphi) = F(x, \varphi x)F~(x,φ)=F(x,φx) and G~(x,φ)=G(x,φx)\tilde G(x, \varphi) = G(x, \varphi x)G~(x,φ)=G(x,φx) (phiForm). The continuous value is

f(c,T)=sup⁡φ∫0TF~(x(t),φ(t)) dt,f(c, T) = \sup_{\varphi} \int_0^T \tilde F(x(t), \varphi(t))\, dt,f(c,T)=φsup​∫0T​F~(x(t),φ(t))dt,

over measurable φ\varphiφ with values in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], where xxx solves x(t)=c+∫0tG~(x(s),φ(s)) dsx(t) = c + \int_0^t \tilde G(x(s), \varphi(s))\,dsx(t)=c+∫0t​G~(x(s),φ(s))ds on [0,T][0, T][0,T] (IsTrajectory, contValue).

For n=1,2,…n = 1, 2, \dotsn=1,2,… the discrete problem uses step 1/n1/n1/n and N=⌊Tn⌋N = \lfloor Tn \rfloorN=⌊Tn⌋ steps (horizonSteps): for φ0,…,φN∈[0,1]\varphi_0, \dots, \varphi_N \in [0, 1]φ0​,…,φN​∈[0,1],

x0=c,xk+1=xk+G~(xk,φk)n,JN({φk},n)=∑k=0NF~(xk,φk)n,x_0 = c, \quad x_{k+1} = x_k + \frac{\tilde G(x_k, \varphi_k)}{n}, \qquad J_N(\{\varphi_k\}, n) = \sum_{k=0}^{N} \frac{\tilde F(x_k, \varphi_k)}{n},x0​=c,xk+1​=xk​+nG~(xk​,φk​)​,JN​({φk​},n)=k=0∑N​nF~(xk​,φk​)​,

and f(c,T,n)=max⁡JNf(c, T, n) = \max J_Nf(c,T,n)=maxJN​ (eulerTraj, discretePayoff, discreteValue). A discrete control defines the step control φ(t)=φk\varphi(t) = \varphi_kφ(t)=φk​ on k/n≤t<(k+1)/nk/n \le t < (k+1)/nk/n≤t<(k+1)/n (stepControl).

The example of §§ 10–11 has a gain function bbb with b(0)=0b(0) = 0b(0)=0, b′(0)=∞b'(0) = \inftyb′(0)=∞, b′>0b' > 0b′>0, b′(y)→0b'(y) \to 0b′(y)→0 as y→∞y \to \inftyy→∞, b′′<0b'' < 0b′′<0 (IsGainFunction; b(y)=y1/2b(y) = y^{1/2}b(y)=y1/2 is one), and value functions (uSeq)

u0(c)=c,uN+1(c)=max⁡0≤v≤c [c−v+uN(c+b(v))].u_0(c) = c, \qquad u_{N+1}(c) = \max_{0 \le v \le c}\,\bigl[c - v + u_N(c + b(v))\bigr].u0​(c)=c,uN+1​(c)=0≤v≤cmax​[c−v+uN​(c+b(v))].

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter IX, Theorem 2 (corrected)

Assume (11): (a) FFF and GGG have continuous second partial derivatives; (b) px≤G(x,y)≤qx+rpx \le G(x, y) \le qx + rpx≤G(x,y)≤qx+r for x>0x > 0x>0, 0≤y≤x0 \le y \le x0≤y≤x; (c) Gy>0G_y > 0Gy​>0 throughout that region, or Gy<0G_y < 0Gy​<0 throughout. Then for all c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, T>0T > 0T>0, the set of continuous payoffs is nonempty and bounded above, and

lim⁡n→∞f(c,T,n)=f(c,T).\lim_{n \to \infty} f(c, T, n) = f(c, T).n→∞lim​f(c,T,n)=f(c,T).

Milestones

  1. Chapter IX, Theorem 1: the structure of uNu_NuN​. There are vN(c)v_N(c)vN​(c) and thresholds cNc_NcN​ with vNv_NvN​ decreasing in ccc, vN+1>vNv_{N+1} > v_NvN+1​>vN​, cNc_NcN​ the unique fixed point of vNv_NvN​ with cN+1>cNc_{N+1} > c_NcN+1​>cN​, uN(c)=uN−1(c+b(c))u_N(c) = u_{N-1}(c + b(c))uN​(c)=uN−1​(c+b(c)) for c≤cNc \le c_Nc≤cN​, uN(c)=c−vN(c)+uN−1(c+b(vN(c)))u_N(c) = c - v_N(c) + u_{N-1}(c + b(v_N(c)))uN​(c)=c−vN​(c)+uN−1​(c+b(vN​(c))) for c≥cNc \ge c_Nc≥cN​, and uN′≥uN−1′u_N' \ge u_{N-1}'uN′​≥uN−1′​.
  2. § 12, Lemma (corrected): for GGG Lipschitz on [m,M]×[0,1][m, M] \times [0, 1][m,M]×[0,1], the Euler states with a step control are within κ/n\kappa / nκ/n of the exact solution on [0,T][0, T][0,T].
  3. Eq. (12.13): ∣J(φ)−JN({φk},n)∣≤B′/n|J(\varphi) - J_N(\{\varphi_k\}, n)| \le B'/n∣J(φ)−JN​({φk​},n)∣≤B′/n for step controls.
  4. Eq. (12.14): f(c,T,n)≤f(c,T)+B′/nf(c, T, n) \le f(c, T) + B'/nf(c,T,n)≤f(c,T)+B′/n for all n≥1n \ge 1n≥1.
  5. Eq. (12.17): f(c,T)≤lim inf⁡n→∞f(c,T,n)f(c, T) \le \liminf_{n \to \infty} f(c, T, n)f(c,T)≤liminfn→∞​f(c,T,n).

Milestones 3–5 are stated for c>0c > 0c>0, as in the book's proof ("Given c>0c > 0c>0 and T>0T > 0T>0"); the goal is stated for c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, as in the theorem.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that the value of a constrained continuous-time control problem can be computed, to any accuracy, by the finite recurrence of dynamic programming on a time grid. Its upper half (12.14) gives a rate: the discrete value never exceeds the continuous one by more than B′/nB'/nB′/n. The lower half (12.17) needs no rate and holds because measurable controls are approximated by step controls. Theorem 1 is a discrete counterpart of the transition curve computed in § 10: below the threshold cNc_NcN​ the whole state is invested, above it an interior amount, and the thresholds increase with the number of remaining stages.

As far as the mission's author could establish, none of these results has a machine-checked proof. The Euler error estimate is classical and has a Gronwall-type proof; Mathlib contains Gronwall's inequality (Analysis/ODE/Gronwall) and Picard–Lindelöf for continuous right-hand sides, but no convergence theory for the value of discretized control problems. The book leaves the proof of Theorem 1 to the reader.

Difficulty

The upper bound (12.14) follows from the Lemma once the continuous and the discrete trajectories are known to stay in a common bounded strip m≤x≤Mm \le x \le Mm≤x≤M; that uniform bound is what assumption (11b) provides and must be established first. The lower bound is where the obvious argument fails: an arbitrary measurable control is not a step control on the grid k/nk/nk/n, and passing to a step control changes the trajectory, so the payoff must be shown continuous under almost-everywhere convergence of controls. This uses the trajectory's dependence on the control in L1L^1L1, not only on the initial value. Solutions exist in the Carathéodory sense only, so the integral form of the equation is required. For Theorem 1 the induction must carry concavity of uNu_NuN​ and a strict comparison of marginal values across NNN, and uNu_NuN​ is not differentiable at c=0c = 0c=0, where b′(0)=∞b'(0) = \inftyb′(0)=∞.

Formalization scope

States, controls and rewards are real; F,G,b:R→RF, G, b : \mathbb R \to \mathbb RF,G,b:R→R (or R→R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R→R), with the hypotheses imposed where the book imposes them. The conventions:

  • Misprint in (12.5). The print sets N=[T/n]N = [T/n]N=[T/n] while using the step 1/n1/n1/n in (12.6) and the intervals k/n≤t<(k+1)/nk/n \le t < (k+1)/nk/n≤t<(k+1)/n in the Lemma. Under the literal reading the discrete horizon N/nN/nN/n tends to 000 and Theorem 2 is false: for F≡1F \equiv 1F≡1, G(x,y)=yG(x, y) = yG(x,y)=y (which satisfies (11) with p=0p = 0p=0, q=1q = 1q=1, r=0r = 0r=0, Gy=1G_y = 1Gy​=1) and T=1T = 1T=1, f(c,1)=1f(c, 1) = 1f(c,1)=1 but f(c,1,n)=1/nf(c, 1, n) = 1/nf(c,1,n)=1/n for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. The mission uses N=⌊Tn⌋N = \lfloor Tn \rfloorN=⌊Tn⌋ and keeps the book's sum ∑k=0N\sum_{k=0}^{N}∑k=0N​; the range "k=0,…,n−1k = 0, \dots, n - 1k=0,…,n−1" in (12.6) is read as k=0,…,N−1k = 0, \dots, N - 1k=0,…,N−1.
  • Lemma. Its range "0≤t≤N0 \le t \le N0≤t≤N" is read as 0≤t≤T0 \le t \le T0≤t≤T. The bounds m≤x≤Mm \le x \le Mm≤x≤M are required of the solution x(t)x(t)x(t) as well as of the sequence xkx_kxk​, since a Lipschitz condition on the strip says nothing about GGG outside it; the proof of Theorem 2 supplies both bounds. The constant may depend on mmm, MMM and the Lipschitz constant.
  • Assumptions (11) are on the original F(x,y)F(x, y)F(x,y), G(x,y)G(x, y)G(x,y), with (11a) read as C2C^2C2 on R2\mathbb R^2R2; the problem is posed through y=φxy = \varphi xy=φx.
  • "Max" over measurable controls is a supremum (the proof picks ε\varepsilonε-optimal controls). The goal asserts that the set of payoffs is nonempty and bounded above, so the Lean supremum cannot take its default value 000. Trajectories satisfy the integral equation with integrable right-hand side, and the reward is required integrable, so the Bochner integral's default 000 cannot enter either.
  • Theorem 1. (5a) is read as non-strict monotonicity: for N=1N = 1N=1 the interior optimum solves b′(v)=1b'(v) = 1b′(v)=1 and is constant in ccc. vN(c)≥0v_N(c) \ge 0vN​(c)≥0 is required for c≥cNc \ge c_Nc≥cN​, so that vN(c)v_N(c)vN​(c) is a feasible choice. (5f) presupposes differentiability and is stated where both derivatives exist.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the discrete and continuous values are defined from FFF and GGG by the book's recursions and integrals, not assumed as hypotheses, and the corrected step count is not a free parameter.

Needed infrastructure: Carathéodory existence and uniqueness for Lipschitz right-hand sides with measurable controls, Gronwall estimates for the Euler scheme, and approximation of measurable controls by step functions. All three are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics edition, 2010. Chapter IX, §§ 10–12, pp. 256–263. DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, On a discrete approximation of the Hamilton–Jacobi equation of dynamic programming, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 10 (1983) 367–377. DOI 10.1007/BF01448394
  • M. Bardi and I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Optimal Control and Viscosity Solutions of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman Equations, Birkhäuser, 1997. DOI 10.1007/978-0-8176-4755-1
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming VIII: Multi-Stage Games, Games of Survival and the Extended Min-Max TheoremTextbook

Why multi-stage games

Chapter X of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks edition 2010, DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) carries the functional-equation method of the earlier chapters from one-player decision processes to two-player zero-sum games that are played over many stages. At each stage the two players make simultaneous choices, and those choices change the state in which the next stage is played. Games of survival are the standard example. They generalize the gambler's ruin: two players with finite resources play until one of them is ruined. The same framework is the discrete-time form of what Shapley (1953) called stochastic games. It underlies pursuit games, attrition models and the later theory of dynamic games in operations research and economics.

The chapter builds on von Neumann's min-max theorem (1928), which Bellman assumes without proof (§ 3, Eq. (3.4)). It proves three kinds of result: existence and uniqueness for the general multi-stage game equation (§§ 11–16), existence and uniqueness for games of survival with integer payoffs (§ 19), and an extended min-max theorem for ratios of bilinear forms (§ 23). Bellman proposes the ratio as a criterion for non-zero-sum games.

Setting

A matrix game is given by a real M×NM\times NM×N matrix A=(aij)A=(a_{ij})A=(aij​). Player AAA chooses row iii with probability pip_ipi​ and player BBB chooses column jjj with probability qjq_jqj​; ppp and qqq are distribution vectors (points of the standard simplex). The expected return to AAA is

EA(p,q)=∑i,jaij pi qj.E_A(p,q)=\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}\,p_i\,q_j .EA​(p,q)=i,j∑​aij​pi​qj​.

The game has value vvv when max⁡pmin⁡qEA=v=min⁡qmax⁡pEA\max_p\min_q E_A=v=\min_q\max_p E_Amaxp​minq​EA​=v=minq​maxp​EA​, all extrema attained. In the Lean development this is IsMaxMinMinMaxValue, and the bilinear form is bilin.

In the general multi-stage game (§ 12) the state is a pair of vectors P∈D⊆RnP\in D\subseteq\mathbb R^nP∈D⊆Rn, P′∈D′⊆Rn′P'\in D'\subseteq\mathbb R^{n'}P′∈D′⊆Rn′ with norms ∥P∥=∑i∣Pi∣\|P\|=\sum_i|P_i|∥P∥=∑i​∣Pi​∣. In state (P,P′)(P,P')(P,P′), AAA chooses uuu in a choice domain S(P,P′)S(P,P')S(P,P′) and BBB chooses vvv in S′(P,P′)S'(P,P')S′(P,P′). AAA receives R(u,v)R(u,v)R(u,v), and play continues from the state T(P,P′;u,v)T(P,P';u,v)T(P,P′;u,v), T′(P,P′;u,v)T'(P,P';u,v)T′(P,P′;u,v) with weight h(P,P′;u,v)h(P,P';u,v)h(P,P′;u,v). Mixed strategies GGG, G′G'G′ are probability measures on the choice domains. The multi-stage game equation is

f(P,P′)=max⁡Gmin⁡G′∬[R(u,v)+h(P,P′;u,v) f(T,T′)] dG(u) dG′(v)=min⁡G′max⁡G[ ⋯ ].f(P,P')=\max_G\min_{G'}\iint\big[R(u,v)+h(P,P';u,v)\,f(T,T')\big]\,dG(u)\,dG'(v)=\min_{G'}\max_G[\ \cdots\ ].f(P,P′)=Gmax​G′min​∬[R(u,v)+h(P,P′;u,v)f(T,T′)]dG(u)dG′(v)=G′min​Gmax​[ ⋯ ].

A game of survival with integer payoffs (§ 19) has one integer state xxx, the resources of AAA out of a fixed total ddd. AAA is ruined at x≤0x\le0x≤0 and wins at x≥dx\ge dx≥d. At each stage the players play the 2×22\times22×2 game with matrix (−1ac−b)\begin{pmatrix}-1&a\\c&-b\end{pmatrix}(−1c​a−b​), whose entries are the transfers to AAA.

Formalization targets

Goal: the extended min-max theorem (Chapter X, Theorem 7)

For real matrices A=(aij)A=(a_{ij})A=(aij​), B=(bij)B=(b_{ij})B=(bij​) with ∑i,jbijpiqj≥d>0\sum_{i,j}b_{ij}p_iq_j\ge d>0∑i,j​bij​pi​qj​≥d>0 for all distribution vectors p,qp,qp,q,

max⁡pmin⁡q∑i,jaijpiqj∑i,jbijpiqj=min⁡qmax⁡p∑i,jaijpiqj∑i,jbijpiqj.\max_p\min_q\frac{\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}p_iq_j}{\sum_{i,j}b_{ij}p_iq_j}=\min_q\max_p\frac{\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}p_iq_j}{\sum_{i,j}b_{ij}p_iq_j}.pmax​qmin​∑i,j​bij​pi​qj​∑i,j​aij​pi​qj​​=qmin​pmax​∑i,j​bij​pi​qj​∑i,j​aij​pi​qj​​.

It is the chapter's final result, and its statement involves only finite matrices.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (3.4), von Neumann's theorem VA=VBV_A=V_BVA​=VB​. It is already on the platform as AGT.zero_sum_minimax (existence of a saddle point) and enters as a reference.
  2. Lemma 1: the value of a one-stage game moves by at most the largest change of its kernel, ∣L(f)−L1(F)∣≤max⁡u,v [ ∣R−R1∣+∣h∣ ∣f(T,T′)−F(T,T′)∣ ]|L(f)-L_1(F)|\le\max_{u,v}\,[\,|R-R_1|+|h|\,|f(T,T')-F(T,T')|\,]∣L(f)−L1​(F)∣≤maxu,v​[∣R−R1​∣+∣h∣∣f(T,T′)−F(T,T′)∣].
  3. Theorem 1: under hypotheses (4a)–(4e), the multi-stage game equation has a unique solution among functions continuous on D×D′D\times D'D×D′ that vanish at the origin, and it is the uniform limit on bounded regions of the successive approximations.
  4. Theorem 3: the successive approximations converge from any admissible initial function.
  5. Theorem 4: stability, ∣f(P,P′)−F(P,P′)∣≤∑n≥0Δ(knc)|f(P,P')-F(P,P')|\le\sum_{n\ge0}\Delta(k^nc)∣f(P,P′)−F(P,P′)∣≤∑n≥0​Δ(knc).
  6. Theorem 5: the game of survival equation with boundary values 000 and 111 has a unique solution with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Significance

Theorem 7 gives a value for ratio games, the games in which a player maximizes a return per unit of a resource consumed. Bellman uses it to give a rationale for the play of non-zero-sum games (§ 24) and to derive the approximate equation (22.4) for non-zero-sum games of survival. Chapter XI, Theorem 5 generalizes it to Markovian decision processes. Theorem 1 is the existence and uniqueness result that justifies replacing an infinite game by its functional equation, and Theorems 3 and 4 make that equation usable for computation and perturbation. Theorem 5 is an early uniqueness theorem for a discrete stochastic game with absorbing boundaries.

None of these statements is formalized on the platform. Von Neumann's theorem is (AGT.zero_sum_minimax, and Sion's theorem as FamousTheorems.sion_minimax_theorem). Theorem 7 is a classical result: with a positive denominator the ratio is quasiconcave in ppp and quasiconvex in qqq. This mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the book's statement, by Bellman's route or by any other. Theorems 1, 3 and 4 need a formal theory of games whose mixed strategies are probability measures on moving compact choice domains. No such theory is on the platform yet.

Difficulty

The ratio in Theorem 7 is not bilinear, and in general it is neither concave in ppp nor convex in qqq, so neither von Neumann's theorem nor a concave-convex min-max theorem applies to it directly. For Theorem 1, the contraction argument needs each one-stage game to have a value and the value to depend continuously on the state. That requires a min-max theorem for continuous games on compact sets, together with continuity of the value when the choice domains move. In Theorem 5, existence follows from monotone iteration. The uniqueness step is the hard part: the operator is not a contraction in the sup norm, and a second solution must be ruled out even at states where the optimal mixed strategies are degenerate.

Formalization scope

  • Distribution vectors are points of stdSimplex ℝ ι for nonempty finite types. "Max-min equals min-max" always asserts attainment (IsGreatest/IsLeast) and never uses sSup/sInf, which return 000 on empty or unbounded sets. Theorem 7 must not assume a saddle point; its only hypothesis is the bound on the denominator.
  • States are Fin n → ℝ with the ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norm of Eq. (12.1). Choice domains are nonempty compact sets (NonemptyCompacts), and mixed strategies are probability measures of full mass on them. "Vary continuously" in (4b), which the book does not define, is read as continuity in Mathlib's topology on nonempty compact sets (for a metric space, the topology of the Hausdorff distance).
  • The maxima w(c)w(c)w(c) of (4d) and Δ(c)\Delta(c)Δ(c) of Theorem 4 are expressed through majorants, which is equivalent to the book's condition. k≥0k\ge0k≥0 is stated explicitly. In Lemma 1 the kernels are assumed measurable and bounded on S×S′S\times S'S×S′ so that the integrals exist, and each game having a value is a hypothesis, as in Bellman's footnote 4.
  • Theorem 3's "converges" is stated as uniform convergence on bounded regions, the mode of Theorem 1, whose proof Theorem 3 repeats. Theorem 4's unspecified ccc is any c≥∥P∥+∥P′∥c\ge\|P\|+\|P'\|c≥∥P∥+∥P′∥. The book's p. 301 prints the first min-max of Theorem 4 with the subscripts GGG, G′G'G′ interchanged; the equation used is that of Theorem 1.
  • Theorem 5 adds the implicit d≥1d\ge1d≥1: for d≤0d\le0d≤0 the boundary conditions contradict each other. The state is an integer and f:Z→Rf:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Rf:Z→R.
  • Taking the choice domains constant would trivialize Theorem 1: condition (4d) would then force R≡0R\equiv0R≡0 on them. The choice domains therefore depend on the state.
  • Not included: Theorem 2 (optimal strategies of the infinite game, which needs a model of the game's plays), Theorem 6 (non-zero-sum survival; the boundary conditions (21.3) do not cover all states, see the moderation notes).

Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: the min-max theorem for continuous games on compact sets (Eq. (4.2)), continuity of the value in the choice domains, and value iteration for contracting game operators.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics, 2010. DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • J. von Neumann, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische Annalen 100, 1928. DOI 10.1007/BF01448847
  • L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39, 1953. DOI 10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
  • M. Sion, On general minimax theorems, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8, 1958. DOI 10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
  • I. L. Glicksberg, A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium points, Proceedings of the AMS 3, 1952. DOI 10.1090/S0002-9939-1952-0046638-5
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingLinear algebra+3·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming IX: Markovian Decision Processes and the Maximal Perron RootTextbook

Motivation

Chapter XI of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) studies decision processes whose state is a vector of nonnegative quantities, for example the probabilities that a system is in each of NNN states, or the stocks of NNN commodities, and whose transitions are linear maps chosen stage by stage by a controller. Maximizing a linear functional of the state at every stage leads to the nonlinear difference equation

xi(n+1)=max⁡q∑j=1Naij(q) xj(n),xi(0)=ci,x_i(n+1) = \max_q \sum_{j=1}^N a_{ij}(q)\, x_j(n), \qquad x_i(0) = c_i,xi​(n+1)=qmax​j=1∑N​aij​(q)xj​(n),xi​(0)=ci​,

and, in the limit of small time steps, to differential equations of the form dx/dt=max⁡q[A(q,t)x+b(q,t)]dx/dt = \max_q [A(q,t)x + b(q,t)]dx/dt=maxq​[A(q,t)x+b(q,t)] and, when two opposing controllers act, dx/dt=max⁡pmin⁡q[… ]dx/dt = \max_p \min_q[\dots]dx/dt=maxp​minq​[…].

These equations are the multiplicative counterpart of the additive Bellman equation. Their growth rate is the natural object for controlled population models, controlled Markov chains observed through their unnormalized state vectors, and economic growth models with a choice of technology. Bellman announced the discrete results in "A Markovian decision process" (J. Math. Mech. 6, 1957) the same year as the book, and R. A. Howard's Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes (MIT Press, 1960) developed policy iteration for the related average-reward problem. The central discrete result of the chapter, Theorem 2, is an early instance of what is now called nonlinear Perron–Frobenius theory (Lemmens and Nussbaum, 2012).

Setting

Fix N≥1N \ge 1N≥1. Row iii of the matrix carries its own control qiq_iqi​, ranging over a set SiS_iSi​; the joint control is q=(q1,…,qN)q = (q_1, \dots, q_N)q=(q1​,…,qN​) in S=S1×⋯×SNS = S_1 \times \dots \times S_NS=S1​×⋯×SN​, and A(q)=(aij(qi))A(q) = (a_{ij}(q_i))A(q)=(aij​(qi​)). Bellman insists on this row-wise structure (§ 3): "the set of q's for each row is distinct from the corresponding set for any other row ... so that there is no interaction between the various maximizations". The maximum of a vector over qqq is then taken row by row.

The Perron root φ(q)\varphi(q)φ(q) is the characteristic root of A(q)A(q)A(q) of largest absolute value, the spectral radius of A(q)A(q)A(q) as a complex matrix. The conditions (10.3) of the chapter are:

  1. for every yyy and every row the maximum of ∑jaij(qi)yj\sum_j a_{ij}(q_i) y_j∑j​aij​(qi​)yj​ over SiS_iSi​ is attained;
  2. 0<aij(q)≤m<∞0 < a_{ij}(q) \le m < \infty0<aij​(q)≤m<∞ on SSS;
  3. φ\varphiφ attains its maximum on SSS.

For the continuous processes, ∥x∥=∑i∣xi∣\|x\| = \sum_i |x_i|∥x∥=∑i​∣xi​∣ and ∥A∥=∑i,j∣aij∣\|A\| = \sum_{i,j}|a_{ij}|∥A∥=∑i,j​∣aij​∣, and a solution of dx/dt=F(t,x)dx/dt = F(t,x)dx/dt=F(t,x), x(0)=cx(0)=cx(0)=c, on [0,T][0,T][0,T] is a continuous xxx with x(t)=c+∫0tF(s,x(s)) dsx(t) = c + \int_0^t F(s, x(s))\,dsx(t)=c+∫0t​F(s,x(s))ds, which is the book's "satisfying the equation almost everywhere". The successive approximations are x0=cx_0 = cx0​=c, xn+1(t)=c+∫0tF(s,xn(s)) dsx_{n+1}(t) = c + \int_0^t F(s, x_n(s))\,dsxn+1​(t)=c+∫0t​F(s,xn​(s))ds.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter XI, Theorem 2

Under (10.3) there is exactly one λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 for which

λyi=max⁡q∑j=1Naij(q) yj,i=1,…,N,\lambda y_i = \max_q \sum_{j=1}^N a_{ij}(q)\, y_j, \qquad i = 1,\dots,N,λyi​=qmax​j=1∑N​aij​(q)yj​,i=1,…,N,

has a solution with all yi>0y_i > 0yi​>0. That solution is unique up to a positive factor, and

λ=max⁡q∈Sφ(q).\lambda = \max_{q \in S} \varphi(q).λ=q∈Smax​φ(q).

Milestones

  1. § 4, Lemma. For row-wise maximized operators T1(x)=max⁡q[b1(q,t)+∫0tA(q,s)x ds]T_1(x) = \max_q[b_1(q,t) + \int_0^t A(q,s)x\,ds]T1​(x)=maxq​[b1​(q,t)+∫0t​A(q,s)xds] and T2(y)T_2(y)T2​(y) likewise, ∥T1(x)−T2(y)∥≤max⁡q[∥b1−b2∥+∫0t∥A(q,s)∥ ∥x−y∥ ds]\|T_1(x) - T_2(y)\| \le \max_q[\|b_1 - b_2\| + \int_0^t \|A(q,s)\|\,\|x-y\|\,ds]∥T1​(x)−T2​(y)∥≤maxq​[∥b1​−b2​∥+∫0t​∥A(q,s)∥∥x−y∥ds].
  2. Theorem 1. If ∥A(q,t)∥,∥b(q,t)∥≤f(t)\|A(q,t)\|, \|b(q,t)\| \le f(t)∥A(q,t)∥,∥b(q,t)∥≤f(t) with fff locally integrable and the maximum is attained, then dx/dt=max⁡q[A(q,t)x+b(q,t)]dx/dt = \max_q[A(q,t)x + b(q,t)]dx/dt=maxq​[A(q,t)x+b(q,t)], x(0)=cx(0) = cx(0)=c, has a unique solution, the uniform limit of the successive approximations.
  3. Theorem 3 (corrected). If moreover φ\varphiφ has a unique maximizer on SSS and c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, c≠0c \ne 0c=0, then the recurrence satisfies xi(n)∼a yi λnx_i(n) \sim a\,y_i\,\lambda^nxi​(n)∼ayi​λn with a=a(c)>0a = a(c) > 0a=a(c)>0.
  4. Theorem 4. The same well-posedness for dx/dt=max⁡pmin⁡q[A(p,q,t)x+b(p,q,t)]=min⁡qmax⁡p[… ]dx/dt = \max_p\min_q[A(p,q,t)x + b(p,q,t)] = \min_q\max_p[\dots]dx/dt=maxp​minq​[A(p,q,t)x+b(p,q,t)]=minq​maxp​[…] on [0,T][0,T][0,T].
  5. Theorem 5. If (Bp,q)≥d>0(Bp,q) \ge d > 0(Bp,q)≥d>0 on probability vectors, the solution of du/dt=max⁡pmin⁡q[(Ap,q)−(Bp,q)u]du/dt = \max_p\min_q[(Ap,q) - (Bp,q)u]du/dt=maxp​minq​[(Ap,q)−(Bp,q)u] satisfies
lim⁡t→∞u(t)=max⁡pmin⁡q(Ap,q)(Bp,q)=min⁡qmax⁡p(Ap,q)(Bp,q).\lim_{t\to\infty} u(t) = \max_p \min_q \frac{(Ap,q)}{(Bp,q)} = \min_q \max_p \frac{(Ap,q)}{(Bp,q)} .t→∞lim​u(t)=pmax​qmin​(Bp,q)(Ap,q)​=qmin​pmax​(Bp,q)(Ap,q)​.

Significance

Theorem 2 identifies the optimal long-run growth rate of a controlled multiplicative process with the largest Perron root among the admissible matrices, and shows that the optimal process has a single positive stationary direction. Theorem 3 turns this into the asymptotics of the value iteration x(n+1)=max⁡qA(q)x(n)x(n+1) = \max_q A(q)x(n)x(n+1)=maxq​A(q)x(n): after normalization by λn\lambda^nλn the iterates converge to a multiple of the eigenvector. Theorems 1 and 4 are the existence and uniqueness results that justify defining continuous-time controlled processes and differential games by these equations. Theorem 5 recovers the min-max theorem for ratios of bilinear forms (Chapter X) as the long-run limit of a scalar differential game.

The results are classical, and none of them is formalized. Mathlib has the spectral radius and irreducible matrices but no Perron–Frobenius theorem and no Brouwer fixed point theorem; the platform has a statement of the Perron theorem for a single positive matrix (ClassicalGaps.perron_positive_matrix). A formal proof of the goal therefore also produces a reusable monotone, positively homogeneous eigenvector theorem on the positive orthant.

Difficulty

The map y↦max⁡qA(q)yy \mapsto \max_q A(q)yy↦maxq​A(q)y is not linear, so the linear-algebra proof of the Perron theorem through the characteristic polynomial does not apply. Existence of a positive eigenvector needs a fixed point argument for a nonlinear map of the simplex (Bellman uses Brouwer's theorem). The identification λ=max⁡qφ(q)\lambda = \max_q \varphi(q)λ=maxq​φ(q) must connect the nonlinear eigenvalue with the spectra of the individual matrices, which requires the Perron theory of each A(q)A(q)A(q), including the fact that the Perron root dominates every complex eigenvalue in modulus. For Theorem 3, the iterates may switch controls infinitely often when SSS is infinite, so an argument that the optimal control is eventually constant does not settle convergence. For Theorems 1 and 4, the right-hand side is only measurable in ttt and Lipschitz in xxx with an integrable constant, so the classical Picard–Lindelöf theorem with a continuous right-hand side does not apply directly.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace BellmanDP.Markovian. Vectors are Fin N → ℝ and matrices are Matrix (Fin N) (Fin N) ℝ. Row iii's control type is Q i with admissible set S i, and the joint admissible set is Set.pi Set.univ S. The Perron root is (spectralRadius ℂ (A.map (algebraMap ℝ ℂ))).toReal, the largest modulus of a complex eigenvalue; it is not defined as a positive eigenvalue with a positive eigenvector, which would make the Perron–Frobenius content of the goal definitional. The maximized eigen-equation is stated with IsGreatest, so the maxima are attained. The goal and Theorem 3 assume N≥1N \ge 1N≥1; for N=0N = 0N=0 every λ\lambdaλ would qualify.

Conventions and repairs:

  • Theorem 3 prints "a unique q for which the maximum value of q is assumed". A control has no maximum value; the proof uses "q∗q^*q∗ ... the value of qqq for which λ=φ(q∗)\lambda = \varphi(q^*)λ=φ(q∗)", so the hypothesis is uniqueness of the maximizer of φ\varphiφ. For c=0c = 0c=0 the iterates vanish and xi(n)∼ayiλnx_i(n) \sim a y_i\lambda^nxi​(n)∼ayi​λn fails, so c≠0c \ne 0c=0 is assumed (the proof takes c>0c > 0c>0 "without loss of generality"). The asymptotic is stated as xi(n)/λn→ayix_i(n)/\lambda^n \to a y_ixi​(n)/λn→ayi​ with a>0a > 0a>0.
  • Theorems 1 and 4: the book's controls are functions of ttt with the maximum outside the integral; since the maximization is pointwise (§ 4), the statements use pointwise sets and the integral of the pointwise maximum. Measurability of t↦F(t,x)t \mapsto F(t,x)t↦F(t,x) is not stated in the book and is assumed. In Theorem 4 the max-min is taken row by row, and (2a) is encoded as the existence of a saddle point in each row.
  • § 4 Lemma: "≤max⁡q[… ]\le \max_q[\dots]≤maxq​[…]" is stated as "≤[… ]\le [\dots]≤[…] at some admissible joint qqq".
  • Theorem 5: the right-hand side is the max-min form; the equality of the two ratio values is part of the conclusion.

Degenerate readings are ruled out: the maxima are attained or taken over nonempty compact sets, never Lean's junk sSup of an unbounded set, and the Perron root is spectral rather than defined through the conclusion. Contributions welcome: a proof of the single-matrix Perron theorem in the form needed here, a Brouwer or Kakutani fixed point theorem for the simplex, and a Carathéodory existence theorem for dx/dt=F(t,x)dx/dt = F(t,x)dx/dt=F(t,x) with an integrable Lipschitz constant, each reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics ed., 2010, Chapter XI. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • R. Bellman, "A Markovian decision process", Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 6 (1957), 679–684.
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • O. Perron, "Zur Theorie der Matrices", Mathematische Annalen 64 (1907), 248–263. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01449896
  • B. Lemmens and R. Nussbaum, Nonlinear Perron–Frobenius Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139026079
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Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional AnalysisMechanism Design+2·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design I: Screening and the Optimality of a Posted PriceTextbook

Motivation

A seller with one good and one buyer whose valuation she does not know faces the simplest problem of mechanism design: choose a selling procedure, anticipating that the buyer will act in his own interest given what he knows. The textbook answer, "post the monopoly price", is usually derived by optimizing over prices alone. The question that opens Börgers' An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001) is whether the seller could do better with anything else: negotiation, lotteries, menus of price–probability pairs, or any extensive game she can commit to.

Chapter 2 answers this for one buyer, and in doing so introduces the tools the rest of the book, and most of auction theory, reuse: the revelation principle, the envelope characterization of incentive compatibility, payoff and revenue equivalence, and the virtual valuation. The book's exposition of §2.2 follows Manelli and Vincent (2007), and the nonlinear pricing model of §2.3 is due to Mussa and Rosen (1978, doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6); both attributions are the book's own (§2.5, p.29).

Setting

The buyer's type θ\thetaθ is his valuation for the good. His utility is θ−t\theta-tθ−t if he receives the good and pays ttt, and −t-t−t if he only pays ttt. The seller's belief about θ\thetaθ is a cumulative distribution function FFF with density fff on an interval [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ], 0≤θ‾<θˉ0\le\underline\theta<\bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ, with f(θ)>0f(\theta)>0f(θ)>0 throughout and F(θ)=∫θ‾θf(x) dxF(\theta)=\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}f(x)\,dxF(θ)=∫θ​θ​f(x)dx.

A direct mechanism is a pair q:[θ‾,θˉ]→[0,1]q:[\underline\theta,\bar\theta]\to[0,1]q:[θ​,θˉ]→[0,1], t:[θ‾,θˉ]→Rt:[\underline\theta,\bar\theta]\to\mathbb Rt:[θ​,θˉ]→R: the buyer reports a type θ′\theta'θ′, receives the good with probability q(θ′)q(\theta')q(θ′) and pays t(θ′)t(\theta')t(θ′). Write u(θ)=θq(θ)−t(θ)u(\theta)=\theta q(\theta)-t(\theta)u(θ)=θq(θ)−t(θ). The mechanism is incentive-compatible if u(θ)≥θq(θ′)−t(θ′)u(\theta)\ge\theta q(\theta')-t(\theta')u(θ)≥θq(θ′)−t(θ′) for all θ,θ′\theta,\theta'θ,θ′, and individually rational if u(θ)≥0u(\theta)\ge 0u(θ)≥0 for all θ\thetaθ. The seller's expected revenue is ∫θ‾θˉt(θ)f(θ) dθ\int_{\underline\theta}^{\bar\theta}t(\theta)f(\theta)\,d\theta∫θ​θˉ​t(θ)f(θ)dθ.

For the extreme-point argument, F\mathcal FF denotes the space of functions on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] with the L1L^1L1 norm, and M⊂FM\subset\mathcal FM⊂F the set of increasing functions with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. A point xxx of a convex set CCC is an extreme point if for every y≠0y\neq 0y=0 at least one of x+yx+yx+y, x−yx-yx−y lies outside CCC.

In the nonlinear pricing model of §2.3 the good is divisible, quantity q≥0q\ge 0q≥0 costs the seller cqcqcq with c>0c>0c>0, and the buyer's utility is θν(q)−t\theta\nu(q)-tθν(q)−t, with ν(0)=0\nu(0)=0ν(0)=0, ν′>0\nu'>0ν′>0, ν′′<0\nu''<0ν′′<0, θˉν′(0)>c\bar\theta\nu'(0)>cθˉν′(0)>c and lim⁡q→∞θˉν′(q)<c\lim_{q\to\infty}\bar\theta\nu'(q)<climq→∞​θˉν′(q)<c. The seller maximizes expected profit ∫(t−cq)f\int(t-cq)f∫(t−cq)f. The distribution FFF is regular if the virtual valuation θ−(1−F(θ))/f(θ)\theta-(1-F(\theta))/f(\theta)θ−(1−F(θ))/f(θ) is increasing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.5, a posted price is optimal

If p∗∈arg⁡max⁡p∈[θ‾,θˉ]p(1−F(p))p^*\in\arg\max_{p\in[\underline\theta,\bar\theta]}p(1-F(p))p∗∈argmaxp∈[θ​,θˉ]​p(1−F(p)), then the mechanism

q(θ)={1θ>p∗0θ<p∗,t(θ)={p∗θ>p∗0θ<p∗q(\theta)=\begin{cases}1&\theta>p^*\\0&\theta<p^*\end{cases},\qquad t(\theta)=\begin{cases}p^*&\theta>p^*\\0&\theta<p^*\end{cases}q(θ)={10​θ>p∗θ<p∗​,t(θ)={p∗0​θ>p∗θ<p∗​

maximizes expected revenue among all incentive-compatible, individually rational direct mechanisms. The comparison class contains every randomized rule qqq with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the statement fixes no distribution and no constant.

Milestones on the way

  1. Proposition 2.1: every mechanism and optimal buyer strategy can be replaced by a truthful direct mechanism with the same outcomes.
  2. Lemmas 2.1–2.4: incentive compatibility forces qqq increasing, uuu increasing and convex with u′=qu'=qu′=q, and
u(θ)=u(θ‾)+∫θ‾θq(x) dx,t(θ)=t(θ‾)+(θq(θ)−θ‾q(θ‾))−∫θ‾θq(x) dx.u(\theta)=u(\underline\theta)+\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}q(x)\,dx,\qquad t(\theta)=t(\underline\theta)+\big(\theta q(\theta)-\underline\theta q(\underline\theta)\big)-\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}q(x)\,dx.u(θ)=u(θ​)+∫θ​θ​q(x)dx,t(θ)=t(θ​)+(θq(θ)−θ​q(θ​))−∫θ​θ​q(x)dx.
  1. Propositions 2.2–2.3 and Lemma 2.5: these conditions characterize incentive compatibility; individual rationality reduces to u(θ‾)≥0u(\underline\theta)\ge0u(θ​)≥0; at the optimum t(θ‾)=θ‾q(θ‾)t(\underline\theta)=\underline\theta q(\underline\theta)t(θ​)=θ​q(θ​).
  2. Lemma 2.6, Proposition 2.4, Lemma 2.7: MMM is compact and convex, a linear function continuous on a compact convex set attains its maximum at an extreme point, and the extreme points of MMM are the {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}-valued functions.
  3. Proposition 2.6: under regularity, q(θ)=0q(\theta)=0q(θ)=0 when ν′(0)(θ−1−F(θ)f(θ))≤c\nu'(0)\big(\theta-\tfrac{1-F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\big)\le cν′(0)(θ−f(θ)1−F(θ)​)≤c, otherwise ν′(q(θ))(θ−1−F(θ)f(θ))=c\nu'(q(\theta))\big(\theta-\tfrac{1-F(\theta)}{f(\theta)}\big)=cν′(q(θ))(θ−f(θ)1−F(θ)​)=c, with t(θ)=θν(q(θ))−∫θ‾θν(q(x)) dxt(\theta)=\theta\nu(q(\theta))-\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}\nu(q(x))\,dxt(θ)=θν(q(θ))−∫θ​θ​ν(q(x))dx, maximizes expected profit.

Significance

Proposition 2.5 says that the elementary monopoly price is not a restriction of the seller's options but the solution of the unrestricted design problem, including every lottery and every indirect procedure. Its one-buyer argument is the template for Myerson's optimal auction (Chapter 3 of the book), whose revenue formula is the multi-buyer form of Lemma 2.4. Proposition 2.6 exhibits the two standard features of screening, no distortion at the top and downward distortion below, which recur in regulation, insurance and contract theory.

All results of the chapter are classical and proved in the book. None of them is formalized on Prove2Me, and Mathlib has neither the revelation principle, the envelope lemma for incentive-compatible mechanisms, nor a maximum principle for linear functions on compact convex sets (Mathlib has the Krein–Milman lemma, IsCompact.extremePoints_nonempty, but not Bauer's maximum principle). The mission therefore produces the first machine-checked foundation for the one-agent screening model on which chapters 3, 4 and 11 of the book build.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the goal compares the posted price with other posted prices; that comparison is one line and is not the theorem. The content is the comparison with randomized mechanisms: an arbitrary increasing qqq with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1] may do better than every deterministic threshold rule unless one shows that expected revenue is linear in qqq and that its maximum over the infinite-dimensional set MMM is attained at an extreme point. That step needs compactness of MMM in L1L^1L1 and a maximum principle on compact convex sets in a normed space, neither of which is finite-dimensional linear programming. The envelope step (Lemma 2.3) needs absolute continuity of a convex function on a closed interval, including its endpoints, where uuu need not be differentiable. For Proposition 2.6 the pointwise maximizer of the virtual surplus must be shown to be monotone and to satisfy incentive compatibility, which is where regularity enters.

Formalization scope

Types are real numbers; every function of the type is a total function R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R and every condition quantifies over [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] only. "Increasing" means weakly increasing (the book's note 3). The distribution is a structure carrying the density fff, positive and integrable on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] with total mass 111, and FFF tied to it by F(θ)=∫θ‾θfF(\theta)=\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}fF(θ)=∫θ​θ​f. No measurability or integrability hypothesis is placed on mechanisms: incentive compatibility makes qqq monotone and ttt bounded and measurable, so every expected revenue is a genuine integral.

The explicit formulas are part of the statements: the posted-price mechanism of Proposition 2.5 with p∗∈arg⁡max⁡p(1−F(p))p^*\in\arg\max p(1-F(p))p∗∈argmaxp(1−F(p)); the payment formulas of Lemmas 2.3–2.4 and Proposition 2.2; t(θ‾)=θ‾q(θ‾)t(\underline\theta)=\underline\theta q(\underline\theta)t(θ​)=θ​q(θ​) in Lemma 2.5; and in Proposition 2.6 the two-case rule for qqq and the payment t(θ)=θν(q(θ))−∫θ‾θν(q(x)) dxt(\theta)=\theta\nu(q(\theta))-\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}\nu(q(x))\,dxt(θ)=θν(q(θ))−∫θ​θ​ν(q(x))dx. The goal fixes q(p∗)=1q(p^*)=1q(p∗)=1, t(p∗)=p∗t(p^*)=p^*t(p∗)=p∗ for existence and quantifies over every incentive-compatible, individually rational completion at the tie.

The space F\mathcal FF is L1([θ‾,θˉ])L^1([\underline\theta,\bar\theta])L1([θ​,θˉ]) of almost-everywhere classes, because the book's L1L^1L1 "norm" on bounded functions vanishes on null functions; MMM is the set of classes with an increasing [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued representative, and Lemma 2.7 is an almost-everywhere statement, as the book's notes 4–6 already indicate. Proposition 2.4 is stated for a nonempty compact convex set in a real normed space and a linear map continuous on that set. The revelation principle models a general mechanism as the buyer's reduced strategy set, an arbitrary type, with a purchase probability and an expected payment for each strategy.

A goal that compared the posted price only with other posted prices, or only with deterministic mechanisms, would be trivial and is excluded: the competitors range over all incentive-compatible, individually rational direct mechanisms with qqq valued in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Reusable beyond this mission: the one-agent envelope and revenue-equivalence lemmas (needed again in Chapters 3, 4 and 11), compactness of monotone functions in L1L^1L1, and the maximum principle for linear functions on compact convex sets. Contributions to any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers (with D. Krähmer and R. Strausz), An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • M. Mussa and S. Rosen, "Monopoly and product quality", Journal of Economic Theory 18(2), 1978. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6
  • E. A. Ok, Real Analysis with Economic Applications, Princeton University Press, 2007 (Extreme Point Theorem, p.658), cited by the book at p.16.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design II: Myerson's Optimal Single-Unit AuctionTextbook

Why revenue-maximizing auctions matter

A seller with one indivisible good and several potential buyers, each of whom privately knows how much the good is worth to them, has to choose a selling procedure: a posted price, an English auction, a sealed-bid auction with a reserve price, or something more elaborate. Which procedure raises the most expected revenue? Myerson's answer (Myerson 1981) is the foundation of optimal auction design. It underlies reserve-price setting in practice, the analysis of sponsored-search and ad-exchange auctions, and the modern algorithmic mechanism design literature, which treats Myerson's auction as the benchmark against which simple and approximately optimal auctions are measured.

This mission formalizes Section 3.2 of Tilman Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015), the textbook treatment of Myerson's result in the independent private values model with Bayesian incentive compatibility. It is the second mission of a series covering the book.

Timeline. Vickrey (1961) showed that the second-price auction makes truthful bidding a dominant strategy and compared auction formats. Myerson (1981) characterized the revenue-maximizing mechanism for independent private values with possibly asymmetric distributions; Riley and Samuelson (1981) obtained the symmetric case and the optimal reserve price independently. The revelation principle in the Bayesian form used here goes back to Myerson (1979) and Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979).

Setting

There are N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 potential buyers i∈I={1,…,N}i \in I = \{1,\dots,N\}i∈I={1,…,N}. Buyer iii values the good at θi\theta_iθi​; if he receives it and pays tit_iti​ his utility is θi−ti\theta_i - t_iθi​−ti​, and otherwise −ti-t_i−ti​. The seller's utility is ∑iti\sum_i t_i∑i​ti​. The valuations θ1,…,θN\theta_1,\dots,\theta_Nθ1​,…,θN​ are independent; θi\theta_iθi​ has cumulative distribution function FiF_iFi​ and density fif_ifi​ with fi(θi)>0f_i(\theta_i) > 0fi​(θi​)>0 on the common support [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta, \bar\theta][θ​,θˉ], where 0≤θ‾<θˉ0 \le \underline\theta < \bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ. The type space is Θ=[θ‾,θˉ]N\Theta = [\underline\theta,\bar\theta]^NΘ=[θ​,θˉ]N and the joint density is f(θ)=∏ifi(θi)f(\theta) = \prod_i f_i(\theta_i)f(θ)=∏i​fi​(θi​).

A direct mechanism asks buyers to report their types and consists of an allocation rule q:Θ→Δq : \Theta \to \Deltaq:Θ→Δ, where Δ={(q1,…,qN):0≤qi≤1, ∑iqi≤1}\Delta = \{(q_1,\dots,q_N) : 0 \le q_i \le 1,\ \sum_i q_i \le 1\}Δ={(q1​,…,qN​):0≤qi​≤1, ∑i​qi​≤1}, and payment rules ti:Θ→Rt_i : \Theta \to \mathbb Rti​:Θ→R. Its interim quantities are the expected allocation probability, payment and utility of buyer iii conditional on his own type:

Qi(θi)=∫Θ−iqi(θi,θ−i)f−i(θ−i) dθ−i,Ti(θi)=∫Θ−iti(θi,θ−i)f−i(θ−i) dθ−i,Ui=θiQi−Ti.Q_i(\theta_i) = \int_{\Theta_{-i}} q_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i}) f_{-i}(\theta_{-i})\,d\theta_{-i},\quad T_i(\theta_i) = \int_{\Theta_{-i}} t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i}) f_{-i}(\theta_{-i})\,d\theta_{-i},\quad U_i = \theta_i Q_i - T_i.Qi​(θi​)=∫Θ−i​​qi​(θi​,θ−i​)f−i​(θ−i​)dθ−i​,Ti​(θi​)=∫Θ−i​​ti​(θi​,θ−i​)f−i​(θ−i​)dθ−i​,Ui​=θi​Qi​−Ti​.

The mechanism is incentive-compatible if θiQi(θi)−Ti(θi)≥θiQi(θi′)−Ti(θi′)\theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - T_i(\theta_i) \ge \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i') - T_i(\theta_i')θi​Qi​(θi​)−Ti​(θi​)≥θi​Qi​(θi′​)−Ti​(θi′​) for all i,θi,θi′i,\theta_i,\theta_i'i,θi​,θi′​ (truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium) and individually rational if Ui(θi)≥0U_i(\theta_i) \ge 0Ui​(θi​)≥0 for all i,θii,\theta_ii,θi​. The virtual valuation of buyer iii is

ψi(θi)=θi−1−Fi(θi)fi(θi),\psi_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i - \frac{1 - F_i(\theta_i)}{f_i(\theta_i)},ψi​(θi​)=θi​−fi​(θi​)1−Fi​(θi​)​,

and the distribution FiF_iFi​ is regular if ψi\psi_iψi​ is strictly increasing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Myerson's optimal auction (Proposition 3.4)

Under regularity, among all incentive-compatible and individually rational direct mechanisms, a mechanism maximizes the seller's expected revenue E[∑iti(θ)]\mathbb E[\sum_i t_i(\theta)]E[∑i​ti​(θ)] exactly when, for every buyer iii,

qi(θ)={1if ψi(θi)>0 and ψi(θi)>ψj(θj) for all j≠i,0otherwise,Ti(θi)=θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQi(x) dx,q_i(\theta) = \begin{cases}1 & \text{if } \psi_i(\theta_i) > 0 \text{ and } \psi_i(\theta_i) > \psi_j(\theta_j) \text{ for all } j \ne i,\\ 0&\text{otherwise,}\end{cases}\qquad T_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_i(x)\,dx,qi​(θ)={10​if ψi​(θi​)>0 and ψi​(θi​)>ψj​(θj​) for all j=i,otherwise,​Ti​(θi​)=θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​(x)dx,

the allocation identity holding for almost every θ\thetaθ; and such a mechanism exists.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.1, the revelation principle: every Bayesian Nash equilibrium of every mechanism is replicated by truth-telling in an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.
  2. Lemmas 3.1–3.4: incentive compatibility makes QiQ_iQi​ increasing and UiU_iUi​ convex with Ui′=QiU_i' = Q_iUi′​=Qi​; payoff equivalence Ui(θi)=Ui(θ‾)+∫θ‾θiQiU_i(\theta_i) = U_i(\underline\theta) + \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_iUi​(θi​)=Ui​(θ​)+∫θ​θi​​Qi​; revenue equivalence for TiT_iTi​.
  3. Proposition 3.2: incentive compatibility holds if and only if every QiQ_iQi​ is increasing and the revenue-equivalence formula holds.
  4. Proposition 3.3: under incentive compatibility, individual rationality is equivalent to Ti(θ‾)≤θ‾Qi(θ‾)T_i(\underline\theta) \le \underline\theta Q_i(\underline\theta)Ti​(θ​)≤θ​Qi​(θ​).
  5. Lemma 3.5: an optimal mechanism has Ti(θ‾)=θ‾Qi(θ‾)T_i(\underline\theta) = \underline\theta Q_i(\underline\theta)Ti​(θ​)=θ​Qi​(θ​).
  6. Eqs. (3.4)–(3.5): expected revenue equals expected virtual surplus ∑i∫Θqi(θ)ψi(θi)f(θ) dθ\sum_i \int_\Theta q_i(\theta)\psi_i(\theta_i) f(\theta)\,d\theta∑i​∫Θ​qi​(θ)ψi​(θi​)f(θ)dθ.
  7. Proposition 3.5: a mechanism maximizes expected welfare E[∑iqi(θ)θi]\mathbb E[\sum_i q_i(\theta)\theta_i]E[∑i​qi​(θ)θi​] among incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanisms if and only if it gives the good to the highest value (almost everywhere) and Ti(θi)≤θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQiT_i(\theta_i) \le \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i}Q_iTi​(θi​)≤θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​.

Significance

The theorem identifies the revenue-maximizing selling procedure among all procedures, not among a parametric family: by the revelation principle, no auction format, however elaborate, and no equilibrium of it can beat the mechanism of Proposition 3.4. Its consequences include the optimality of first- and second-price auctions with reserve price ψ−1(0)\psi^{-1}(0)ψ−1(0) when buyers are symmetric, the revenue equivalence of standard auction formats, the fact that an asymmetric optimal auction may sell to a buyer without the highest value, and the monopoly inefficiency that the optimal seller sometimes withholds the good. The envelope characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility (Proposition 3.2) is the tool reused throughout the rest of the book, in public goods provision, bilateral trade and dynamic screening.

The result is classical and fully proved in the literature. What is missing is a machine-checked version at this generality: asymmetric distributions, an arbitrary lower support end θ‾≥0\underline\theta \ge 0θ​≥0, Bayesian (interim) rather than dominant-strategy constraints, and optimality over all incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. Existing formalizations on the platform treat the i.i.d. case with values on [0,vˉ][0,\bar v][0,vˉ].

Difficulty

The obvious argument maximizes the virtual surplus ∑iqi(θ)ψi(θi)\sum_i q_i(\theta)\psi_i(\theta_i)∑i​qi​(θ)ψi​(θi​) pointwise and declares victory, but this ignores that the seller's feasible set is constrained by monotonicity of every QiQ_iQi​; the pointwise maximizer is feasible only because regularity makes ψi\psi_iψi​ increasing, and that has to be proved for the interim probabilities, which integrate over the other buyers' types. The revenue identity links interim payments, which integrate over the other buyers' types, to an integral over the whole type space weighted by the virtual valuation, and it is only valid for mechanisms whose lowest types' payments are pinned down. The necessity direction requires showing that ties and zero virtual values are null events, which rests on strict monotonicity of every ψi\psi_iψi​ and on the absolute continuity of the type distribution. Finally, the envelope step requires convexity and almost-everywhere differentiability of UiU_iUi​, with care at the endpoints of the type interval.

Formalization scope

Buyers form a finite type with at least two elements. The prior is the measure on RN\mathbb R^NRN with density ∏ifi(θi)\prod_i f_i(\theta_i)∏i​fi​(θi​) on Θ\ThetaΘ and no mass outside it; each fif_ifi​ is measurable, strictly positive on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] and integrates to 111; Fi(θi)=∫θ‾θifiF_i(\theta_i) = \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} f_iFi​(θi​)=∫θ​θi​​fi​. Allocation and payment rules are total functions whose values on Θ\ThetaΘ are constrained, and QiQ_iQi​, TiT_iTi​ are prior expectations with the iii-th coordinate fixed. "Increasing" is weak monotonicity, as in the book; regularity is strict monotonicity of ψi\psi_iψi​ on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] (Assumption 3.1).

The following conventions are committed to:

  • Measurability. The book omits measurability throughout. The comparison class for optimality consists of mechanisms with measurable qi,tiq_i, t_iqi​,ti​, integrable tit_iti​, and integrable sections θ−i↦ti(θi,θ−i)\theta_{-i}\mapsto t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})θ−i​↦ti​(θi​,θ−i​). Without these hypotheses the Lean integrals would be 000 and revenue comparisons would be meaningless.
  • Almost-everywhere characterizations. Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 are printed with "for all θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ". Changing qqq on a null set of type vectors changes neither incentives nor revenue nor welfare, so the "only if" directions hold only almost everywhere; they are stated for almost every θ\thetaθ, and the existence of a mechanism satisfying the allocation rule at every θ\thetaθ is stated separately. The payment conditions hold for every θi\theta_iθi​.
  • Explicit formulas. The goal states Myerson's allocation rule and the payment formula Ti(θi)=θiQi(θi)−∫θ‾θiQi(x) dxT_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i Q_i(\theta_i) - \int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta_i} Q_i(x)\,dxTi​(θi​)=θi​Qi​(θi​)−∫θ​θi​​Qi​(x)dx explicitly. Proposition 3.5 states the efficient rule qi(θ)=1q_i(\theta) = 1qi​(θ)=1 iff θi>θj\theta_i > \theta_jθi​>θj​ for all j≠ij \ne ij=i, and the payment inequality. A statement asserting only that some optimal mechanism exists, or only that the optimal auction is efficient, would not be this theorem.
  • Revelation principle. A general mechanism has arbitrary measurable message sets and an outcome function giving allocation probabilities in Δ\DeltaΔ and expected transfers; equilibria are in pure type-contingent strategies. A version in which the mechanism is already direct would be trivial and is not the statement.
  • Interim constraints. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality are Bayesian and interim, not dominant-strategy or ex post; the latter are the subject of a later mission.
  • Endpoints in Lemma 3.2. Differentiability of UiU_iUi​ and Ui′=QiU_i' = Q_iUi′​=Qi​ are stated at interior points of [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ].

The envelope and payoff-equivalence lemmas, and the revenue identity, are reused in later missions of this series, so proofs of the milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • Tilman Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, §3.2, pp. 31–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, American Economic Review 71(3), 381–392, 1981. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1802786
  • William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1), 8–37, 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • Roger B. Myerson, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 47(1), 61–73, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346
  • Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin, The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility, Review of Economic Studies 46(2), 185–216, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design V: Dominant-Strategy Public Goods Mechanisms for Two Agents Are Fixed Cost SharesTextbook

Motivation

Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows a common prior from which every agent's beliefs about the others are derived. Chapter 4 of Börgers' An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001) drops that assumption. The designer is unwilling to rely on anything about what agents believe about each other, and therefore requires that truth telling be optimal for every type whatever the other agents report (dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and that participation be worthwhile after all reports are known (ex post individual rationality). The chapter revisits the three examples of Chapter 3 (single unit auctions, public goods, bilateral trade) and asks which mechanisms survive these requirements.

The answer differs sharply between examples. In auctions nothing is lost: an expected-revenue-maximizing auction can be implemented in dominant strategies. With a budget constraint, the class collapses. For a public good shared by two agents, the only dominant-strategy, ex post individually rational mechanisms that exactly balance the budget are fixed cost shares; in bilateral trade they are fixed-price mechanisms. These results go back to the dominant-strategy literature on public goods (Serizawa 1999, Econometrica) and on bilateral trade (Hagerty and Rogerson 1987, Journal of Economic Theory), as the book's §4.5 records (p.93), and they explain why simple posted-price and cost-sharing rules are common in practice.

Setting

Every agent iii has a type θi\theta_iθi​ in an interval. In the auction and the public good examples the interval is [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] with 0≤θ‾<θˉ0 \le \underline\theta < \bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ; Θ=[θ‾,θˉ]I\Theta = [\underline\theta,\bar\theta]^IΘ=[θ​,θˉ]I is the set of type vectors, and θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​ is θ\thetaθ without its iii-th entry. A direct mechanism asks every agent to report a type and maps the reports to an outcome.

  • Auction (§4.2). A seller has one good. The mechanism consists of allocation probabilities qi(θ)≥0q_i(\theta) \ge 0qi​(θ)≥0 with ∑iqi(θ)≤1\sum_i q_i(\theta) \le 1∑i​qi​(θ)≤1 and payments ti(θ)t_i(\theta)ti​(θ); buyer iii's utility is θiqi(θ)−ti(θ)\theta_i q_i(\theta) - t_i(\theta)θi​qi​(θ)−ti​(θ).
  • Public good (§4.3). A good costing c>0c > 0c>0 is produced (q(θ)=1q(\theta) = 1q(θ)=1) or not (q(θ)=0q(\theta) = 0q(θ)=0); agent iii pays ti(θ)t_i(\theta)ti​(θ) and has utility θiq(θ)−ti(θ)\theta_i q(\theta) - t_i(\theta)θi​q(θ)−ti​(θ). Ex post budget balance is the equality ∑iti(θ)=c q(θ)\sum_i t_i(\theta) = c\,q(\theta)∑i​ti​(θ)=cq(θ) for every θ\thetaθ.
  • Bilateral trade (§4.4). A seller with type θS∈[θ‾S,θˉS]\theta_S \in [\underline\theta_S,\bar\theta_S]θS​∈[θ​S​,θˉS​] and a buyer with type θB∈[θ‾B,θˉB]\theta_B \in [\underline\theta_B,\bar\theta_B]θB​∈[θ​B​,θˉB​]; trade takes place (q(θ)=1q(\theta) = 1q(θ)=1) or not; the seller receives tS(θ)t_S(\theta)tS​(θ) and has utility θS(1−q(θ))+tS(θ)\theta_S(1-q(\theta)) + t_S(\theta)θS​(1−q(θ))+tS​(θ); the buyer pays tB(θ)t_B(\theta)tB​(θ) and has utility θBq(θ)−tB(θ)\theta_B q(\theta) - t_B(\theta)θB​q(θ)−tB​(θ). Ex post exact budget balance is tB=tSt_B = t_StB​=tS​.

A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive-compatible if for every agent, every true type, every false report and every report profile of the others, truthful reporting yields at least as much utility. It is ex post individually rational if every type's utility at every type vector is at least its outside option: 000 for buyers and public good agents, θS\theta_SθS​ (keeping the good) for the seller. A canonical mechanism (Definitions 4.3–4.5) allocates according to strictly increasing continuous scores ψi(θi)\psi_i(\theta_i)ψi​(θi​) and charges each agent the smallest report with which the outcome would have been the same.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.8, fixed cost shares

For N=2N = 2N=2 and a decision rule whose production set {θ∈Θ∣q(θ)=1}\{\theta \in \Theta \mid q(\theta) = 1\}{θ∈Θ∣q(θ)=1} is closed, a direct public good mechanism is dominant strategy incentive-compatible, ex post individually rational and ex post budget balanced if and only if there are τ1,τ2∈R\tau_1, \tau_2 \in \mathbb Rτ1​,τ2​∈R with τ1+τ2=c\tau_1 + \tau_2 = cτ1​+τ2​=c and, for all θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ,

q(θ)=1, ti(θ)=τi  if θ1≥τ1 and θ2≥τ2;q(θ)=0, ti(θ)=0  otherwise.q(\theta) = 1,\ t_i(\theta) = \tau_i \ \text{ if } \theta_1 \ge \tau_1 \text{ and } \theta_2 \ge \tau_2; \qquad q(\theta) = 0,\ t_i(\theta) = 0 \ \text{ otherwise.}q(θ)=1, ti​(θ)=τi​  if θ1​≥τ1​ and θ2​≥τ2​;q(θ)=0, ti​(θ)=0  otherwise.

Both directions are part of the goal; the "only if" direction is the content.

Milestones

  • The revelation principle for dominant strategies (Proposition 4.1).
  • Characterizations of dominant strategy incentive compatibility: monotone allocation with the envelope payment formula in auctions (Proposition 4.2), threshold rules with payment jump τ^i−τi=θ^i\hat\tau_i - \tau_i = \hat\theta_iτ^i​−τi​=θ^i​ for public goods (Proposition 4.5) and bilateral trade (Proposition 4.9).
  • Ex post individual rationality reduces to the lowest type, or to the highest seller type (Propositions 4.3, 4.6, 4.10).
  • Canonical mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive-compatible and ex post individually rational, with zero rent for the lowest type (Propositions 4.4, 4.7, 4.11).
  • The bilateral trade analogue of the goal (Proposition 4.12): the only such mechanisms with tB=tSt_B = t_StB​=tS​ and closed trade set are no trade, or trade at a fixed price θ^\hat\thetaθ^ exactly when θS≤θ^≤θB\theta_S \le \hat\theta \le \theta_BθS​≤θ^≤θB​.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 shows that the optimal auctions of Chapter 3 remain available without any assumption on beliefs, while Propositions 4.8 and 4.12 show that under exact budget balance, dominant strategy implementation forces rules that ignore reported valuations except through a yes/no participation decision. Together they mark the boundary between settings where the Bayesian and the belief-free approaches coincide and settings where the belief-free requirement is severe. This contrast motivates the robust mechanism design of Chapter 10.

These results are proved in the book: Propositions 4.5 and 4.8 in full, the others with proofs omitted or "analogous". No machine-checked proof of them appears on the platform or in Mathlib. The platform has a single-parameter characterization in a different model (AGT.single_parameter_characterization: valuation profiles, win sets, normalized losers' payments) and the second-price dominance fact; neither covers public goods, bilateral trade, budget balance or randomized allocations. The mission would add a machine-checked belief-free counterpart of Chapter 3, including the two characterization theorems whose printed proofs leave cases to the reader.

Difficulty

The characterizations (Propositions 4.2, 4.5, 4.9) are standard single-agent arguments applied to every profile of the others. The goal is harder. Proposition 4.5 describes each agent's incentives separately, for each report of the other agent, with thresholds and payments that may vary with that report. Budget balance couples the two agents' payments at every type vector. The step that fails when attempted naively is going from "a threshold for each θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​" to "one fixed threshold for each agent": the thresholds may lie outside the type interval, several degenerate configurations occur (an agent whose report never matters, a good that is always or never produced), and the printed proof treats the degenerate cases by assuming θ‾=0\underline\theta = 0θ​=0 and leaves one of them "analogous". The closedness hypothesis is what makes the relevant minimal types exist; without it the boundary of the production set is not determined. Proposition 4.12 has the same structure with the seller's orientation reversed.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are a finite type with decidable equality (auctions, public goods), Fin 2 for the goal, and a pair (θS, θB) : ℝ × ℝ for bilateral trade. A deviation (θi′,θ−i)(\theta_i', \theta_{-i})(θi′​,θ−i​) is Function.update θ i x for θ ∈ Θ; quantifying over θ ∈ Θ quantifies over θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​.
  • Decision and trading rules are real-valued and take values in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} on Θ\ThetaΘ; auction allocations lie in Δ\DeltaΔ on Θ\ThetaΘ. Values outside Θ\ThetaΘ play no role.
  • Budget balance in §§4.3–4.4 is the equality ∑iti=c q\sum_i t_i = c\,q∑i​ti​=cq (resp. tB=tSt_B = t_StB​=tS​). The inequality of Definition 3.5 would make the goal false.
  • Explicit formulas stated as in the book: the payment identity of Proposition 4.2, the relation τ^i−τi=θ^i\hat\tau_i - \tau_i = \hat\theta_iτ^i​−τi​=θ^i​ (Propositions 4.5, 4.9), the canonical payments of Definitions 4.3–4.5 (with the 1/n1/n1/n tie-splitting of Definition 4.3), the cost shares with τ1+τ2=c\tau_1 + \tau_2 = cτ1​+τ2​=c (Proposition 4.8) and the fixed price θ^\hat\thetaθ^ with trade iff θS≤θ^≤θB\theta_S \le \hat\theta \le \theta_BθS​≤θ^≤θB​ (Proposition 4.12). Minima and maxima in the canonical payments are written as sInf/sSup of sets that are nonempty and closed whenever they are used.
  • Thresholds θ^i\hat\theta_iθ^i​ range over R\mathbb RR and depend on θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​; cost shares τi\tau_iτi​ may be negative; the goal does not assume θ‾=0\underline\theta = 0θ​=0.
  • The general mechanism of Proposition 4.1 has arbitrary message sets and an outcome function to allocation probabilities and expected payments. Stating the revelation principle for a mechanism that is already direct would trivialize it and is ruled out.
  • The goal must not be weakened to one direction, to the existence of some fixed-share mechanism, or to budget balance as an inequality.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the characterization milestones (4.2, 4.5, 4.9), which the goal and Proposition 4.12 use; a proof of the goal covering the degenerate cases the book leaves to the reader; and the three-agent counterexample of p.90 as a separate statement.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers (with D. Krähmer and R. Strausz), An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Chapter 4. DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • K. M. Hagerty and W. P. Rogerson, Robust trading mechanisms, Journal of Economic Theory 42 (1987) 94–107.
  • S. Serizawa, Strategy-proof and symmetric social choice functions for public good economies, Econometrica 67 (1999) 121–145.
  • D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein, Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules, Journal of Economic Theory 56 (1992) 378–399.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design X: Robust Mechanism Design — Belief Revelation on Finite Type SpacesTextbook

Motivation

Classical Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows the agents' beliefs about each other: typically a commonly known prior over independent private values. Wilson's critique (1987) observed that mechanisms tuned to such a prior can depend on details that no designer knows, and a literature on robust mechanism design replaced the fixed prior by a large family of possible beliefs. Chapter 10 of Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (OUP 2015), develops this programme in the framework of Bergemann and Morris (2001, 2005): agents' information is described by a type space, the designer is uncertain which beliefs agents hold, and mechanisms are compared across all type profiles at once.

Timeline of the results formalized here:

  • 1980: Hylland shows that strategy-proof random mechanisms satisfying unanimity conditions are random dictatorships; Dutta, Peters and Sen (2007, 2008) give and correct the cardinal version used in the chapter.
  • 1985: Mertens and Zamir construct the universal type space of belief hierarchies; the space of finite types is emphasized by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006).
  • 1988: Crémer and McLean show that with correlated types satisfying a spanning condition, beliefs can be elicited at no cost (Proposition 6.4 of the book).
  • 2001–2005: Bergemann and Morris introduce payoff and belief types and prove that on finite type spaces only incentive constraints between types with the same beliefs matter (their Proposition 4.5, the goal of this mission).
  • 2010–2014: Smith, Börgers and Smith study the ranking of mechanisms without a common prior; random dictatorship with compromise comes from Börgers and Smith (2012, 2014).

Setting

There are finitely many agents i∈Ii \in Ii∈I, and agent iii has a set Θi\Theta_iΘi​ of payoff types. An outcome xxx gives agent iii the utility ui(x,θ)u_i(x,\theta)ui​(x,θ), which may depend on all payoff types. A type space T=(Ti,θ^i,β^i)i∈I\mathcal T = (T_i,\hat\theta_i,\hat\beta_i)_{i\in I}T=(Ti​,θ^i​,β^​i​)i∈I​ consists of nonempty sets TiT_iTi​ of types, a payoff type map θ^i:Ti→Θi\hat\theta_i : T_i \to \Theta_iθ^i​:Ti​→Θi​ and a belief map β^i:Ti→Δ(T−i)\hat\beta_i : T_i \to \Delta(T_{-i})β^​i​:Ti​→Δ(T−i​), where T−i=∏j≠iTjT_{-i} = \prod_{j\ne i}T_jT−i​=∏j=i​Tj​. Different types may share a payoff type and differ only in their beliefs, and vice versa. A common prior is a distribution μ\muμ on TTT from which every type's belief is obtained by conditioning. A type space has a large variety of certainties if for every θi\theta_iθi​ and θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​ some type with payoff type θi\theta_iθi​ is certain that the others' payoff types are θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​. The space of finite types T+\mathcal T^+T+ collects every infinite hierarchy of beliefs ("I believe that you believe that …") that is generated by a type of some finite type space.

A mechanism (S1,…,SN,g)(S_1,\dots,S_N,g)(S1​,…,SN​,g) has strategy sets SiS_iSi​ and an outcome rule g:S→Δ(X)g : S \to \Delta(X)g:S→Δ(X). Strategies σi:Ti→Δ(Si)\sigma_i : T_i \to \Delta(S_i)σi​:Ti​→Δ(Si​) form a Bayesian equilibrium if each type maximizes expected utility under its own belief; it is belief-independent if types with equal payoff types play alike, and ex post if each type's choice stays optimal when it becomes certain of the others' types. A direct mechanism asks agents for their types, a reduced direct mechanism only for their payoff types. In the quasi-linear case outcomes are (a,t1,…,tN)(a,t_1,\dots,t_N)(a,t1​,…,tN​) and ui=vi(a,θ)−tiu_i = v_i(a,\theta) - t_iui​=vi​(a,θ)−ti​, with tit_iti​ paid by agent iii; a direct mechanism is (q,t)(q,t)(q,t).

Formalization targets

Goal: belief revelation on finite type spaces (Proposition 10.6)

On a finite type space with quasi-linear utilities, suppose that for every agent no belief in {β^i(τi):τi∈Ti}\{\hat\beta_i(\tau_i) : \tau_i\in T_i\}{β^​i​(τi​):τi​∈Ti​} is a convex combination of the others, and that in the direct mechanism (q,t)(q,t)(q,t) no type wants to imitate another type with the same belief. Then there is a direct mechanism (q~,t~)(\tilde q,\tilde t)(q~​,t~) in which truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium, with

q~(τ)=q(τ)  ∀τ∈T,∑τ−iβ^i(τi)(τ−i) t~i(τ)=∑τ−iβ^i(τi)(τ−i) ti(τ)  ∀i,τi.\tilde q(\tau) = q(\tau)\ \ \forall \tau\in T,\qquad \sum_{\tau_{-i}}\hat\beta_i(\tau_i)(\tau_{-i})\,\tilde t_i(\tau) = \sum_{\tau_{-i}}\hat\beta_i(\tau_i)(\tau_{-i})\, t_i(\tau)\ \ \forall i,\tau_i.q~​(τ)=q(τ)  ∀τ∈T,τ−i​∑​β^​i​(τi​)(τ−i​)t~i​(τ)=τ−i​∑​β^​i​(τi​)(τ−i​)ti​(τ)  ∀i,τi​.

The goal fixes neither the transfers t~\tilde tt~ nor any bound on them; it asserts the existence of a truthful mechanism with the same alternatives and the same interim payments.

Milestones

The other fourteen numbered results of the chapter: conditional independence of payoff types under a full-support common prior (10.1); three revelation principles (10.2–10.4); existence of Bayesian equilibria of finite mechanisms on T+\mathcal T^+T+ (10.5); betting between agents with inconsistent beliefs (10.7); ex post implementation of unique equilibrium outcomes and alternatives (10.8, 10.9); emptiness of the set of undominated auctions under interim Pareto welfare and under ex post revenue (10.10, 10.11); Hylland's characterization of random dictatorship (10.12); and three comparisons of random dictatorship with random dictatorship with compromise (10.13–10.15).

Significance

Proposition 10.6 reduces the design problem on a finite type space to incentive constraints among types with the same beliefs: belief types can always be elicited by side payments that leave interim utilities unchanged. With a common prior and Proposition 10.1 this yields optimal mechanisms by solving an independent-types problem for each profile of belief types (§10.8; Farinha Luz 2013 carries this out for auctions). Proposition 10.7 and its consequences 10.10–10.11 show why the same construction cannot be used without a common prior: inconsistent beliefs allow unbounded bets, so interim or revenue criteria admit no undominated mechanism. Propositions 10.12–10.15 show that relaxing belief independence escapes Hylland's impossibility result in the voting problem.

None of these results is formalized elsewhere to our knowledge. The book proves only some of them (10.1, 10.5, 10.8, 10.9, 10.13–10.15 are proved or outlined; 10.6 is sketched; the proofs of 10.2–10.4 are omitted as standard; 10.7 and 10.10–10.12 are stated without proof), so formalization also produces complete proofs of results the book leaves informal. Two printed statements are corrected (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The obvious approach to Proposition 10.6 applies the Crémer–McLean construction type by type. This fails because several types may share a belief: a side payment that depends on the reported belief cannot separate them, and the convex-independence condition concerns the set of distinct beliefs rather than the indexed family of types.

For the results on T+\mathcal T^+T+, a type is an infinite belief hierarchy, and a strategy must be one function on all finite types simultaneously. Existence (10.5) cannot be obtained by applying Nash's theorem to a single finite type space, because a type belongs to many finite type spaces and must play the same strategy in all of them. Hylland's theorem (10.12) requires a full characterization of strategy-proof random rules on a cardinal preference domain.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions Δ(X)\Delta(X)Δ(X) are countably supported (PMF X); expected utilities are sums. The book leaves the measure structure of type spaces unspecified (p.179, note 3); finite type spaces, T+\mathcal T^+T+ and point beliefs are covered exactly. A Bayesian equilibrium requires every type's expected utility to exist (absolute summability) under every mixed strategy.
  • A type's belief is a distribution on ∏j≠iTj\prod_{j\ne i}T_j∏j=i​Tj​. Beliefs in Proposition 10.6 are vectors in RT−i\mathbb R^{T_{-i}}RT−i​, and condition (i) is stated with the convex hull of the other distinct beliefs.
  • Quasi-linear direct mechanisms are deterministic, q:T→Aq : T\to Aq:T→A, ti:T→Rt_i : T\to\mathbb Rti​:T→R. Mixed misreports are allowed in every equilibrium notion.
  • T+\mathcal T^+T+ is built from belief hierarchies encoded level by level (L0=ΘiL_0 = \Theta_iL0​=Θi​, Ln+1=Θi×Δ(∏j≠iLn,j)L_{n+1} = \Theta_i\times\Delta(\prod_{j\ne i}L_{n,j})Ln+1​=Θi​×Δ(∏j=i​Ln,j​)) and the finite type spaces generating them. The universal type space (Definition 10.5) is not needed and not formalized.
  • §10.11: two agents Fin 2, candidates {a,b,c}\{a,b,c\}{a,b,c}, strict private vNM utilities with every strict utility attained; mechanisms map to lotteries over candidates; rankings are bijections C ≃ Fin 3.
  • Corrections of the page: in Proposition 10.7 the signs of the transfers in (v) are reversed on the page relative to the bet described on p.186 and are stated as described; Proposition 10.9 is false under a large variety of certainties alone and is stated under the common-certainty condition that its proof uses, on type spaces whose beliefs have finite support (with countably supported beliefs the reduced mechanism's expected utilities need not exist). Both are explained in the item notes.
  • The goal is not trivialized by taking (q~,t~)=(q,t)(\tilde q,\tilde t) = (q,t)(q~​,t~)=(q,t): condition (ii) constrains only types with the same belief, so the original mechanism is in general not incentive-compatible, and the conclusion demands full Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Welcome contributions: a finite Farkas/separation lemma in the form needed for 10.6 (the platform has Polyhedral.farkas_lemma), basic API for PMF-valued type spaces (products of mixed strategies, conditioning), and the hierarchy map of finite type spaces, which all T+\mathcal T^+T+ milestones share.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Ch. 10. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • D. Bergemann, S. Morris, Robust Mechanism Design, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1421, 2001; Econometrica 73 (2005) 1771–1813. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x
  • J. Crémer, R. McLean, Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1257. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096
  • J.-F. Mertens, S. Zamir, Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1985) 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770224
  • B. Dutta, H. Peters, A. Sen, Strategy-Proof Cardinal Decision Schemes, Social Choice and Welfare 28 (2007) 163–179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0152-4
  • T. Börgers, D. Smith, Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules, Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 339–360. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1100
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