The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 2: Advance-Purchase Discounts Coordinate the Supply ChainResearch Paper
Motivation
A supplier who must produce before a selling season, and a retailer who sells into uncertain demand, have to decide who holds the inventory that may go unsold. Cachon (Management Science 50(2), 2004) studies this allocation of inventory risk using nothing but wholesale prices. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before production and bears all the risk; with a pull contract the retailer orders only during the season and the supplier bears it; an advance-purchase discount sits between the two, offering a lower price for early orders. The paper's introduction contrasts Trek, which holds bicycle inventory and ships to retailers on demand, with O'Neill, which offers retailers a prebook discount for ordering before the season.
The classical view is that wholesale-price contracts cannot coordinate a supply chain: a single wholesale price above marginal cost makes the retailer order too little (the double-marginalization effect). Coordination was known to need richer terms, such as buyback contracts (Pasternack 1985) or revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). This mission formalizes the paper's Theorem 7, which shows that two wholesale prices, one for early and one for in-season orders, suffice both to coordinate the chain and to divide its profit arbitrarily. A companion mission of the same series formalizes Theorem 6, the Pareto set of push and pull contracts alone.
Setting
Demand is a random variable with distribution function and density . The paper assumes , strictly increasing, and an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR): has . Production costs per unit, the retail price is , and leftover units are salvaged for , with . Expected sales with units available are
and the integrated supply chain's expected profit is . It is maximized at with ; write . The efficiency of a contract is , where is the quantity produced.
A contract is a pair of wholesale prices with . The retailer first prebooks units at each. The supplier, seeing , produces . During the season the retailer sells the prebook and, once it runs out, places at-once orders at per unit from the supplier's remaining stock, provided . The supplier's and retailer's expected profits are
with the at-once terms absent when . An outcome of a contract is a pair where maximizes the supplier's profit given , and maximizes the retailer's profit given that he anticipates the supplier's response. The contract classes are push (), pull () and advance-purchase discount (). A contract is Pareto if no outcome of any contract in these classes makes one firm strictly better off and neither firm worse off than one of its own outcomes (p. 224).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 7
For every with , the contract has an outcome and is Pareto; every outcome of every Pareto contract satisfies
and for every some contract with has an outcome with payoffs
Milestones
- Eq. (2): is concave on and maximized exactly where .
- Eqs. (20)–(21): for , the supplier's best response to is with .
- Eq. (22): for , with is the unique maximizer of .
- Eq. (3): in push mode the retailer's optimal prebook solves .
A further draft theorem states the step of the proof in which the retailer's outcome profit along falls strictly from to as rises from to .
Significance
The theorem identifies a coordinating family inside the simplest contract language there is. Setting the at-once price equal to the retail price gives the supplier exactly the chain's marginal incentive for capacity, so she produces ; the prebook price then acts as a pure transfer. Every division of is reached, so for any bargaining process the Pareto set is fully efficient. This contrasts with Theorem 6 of the same paper, where push and pull contracts alone leave the Pareto set inefficient, and with the buyback and revenue-sharing coordination results (formalized on the platform as Theorems 14.4–14.6 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory), which need contract terms beyond wholesale prices.
The result is proved in the paper and has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a formal prebook game (best responses, outcomes and Pareto dominance as optimization statements) and Theorem 7 with all three claims, including the claim about every Pareto contract, which the paper argues in one sentence.
Difficulty
The closed forms are fractile equations, and the obvious argument substitutes them. That argument is incomplete in three places. First, the retailer's anticipated profit is piecewise: below the supplier's own quantity he gets at-once service, above it the chain runs in push mode, and the proof must show the retailer never prefers the push branch when . Second, "every Pareto contract is efficient" is a statement about all contracts, including push and pull, and needs both firms' payoffs to be nonnegative at every outcome of every admissible contract, which depends on the prebook always being available and on . Third, the division claim is surjectivity of the retailer's equilibrium payoff over , which needs the solution of to vary continuously with , including at both ends ( at , at ).
Formalization scope
Demand is a probability measure on with = ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ. The standing assumptions are a structure: , strictly increasing on , on , and on . Differentiability is required only on , so the exponential distribution, which the paper names as IGFR, is admitted. Theorem 7 does not use IGFR; it is kept so that the series shares one model. Quantities range over . is a parameter with the hypothesis ; its existence is part of milestone 1.
Readings of informal words: "includes all" means every contract with has an outcome and each of its outcomes is undominated; "the Pareto set coordinates" is stated for every Pareto contract, not only the family; "any division is achievable" is surjectivity onto ; "increasing" in Eq. (2) and "decreases" in the proof are strict; "arg max" in Eqs. (3) and (22) is the unique maximizer; "the optimal production is " is an if-and-only-if characterization of the supplier's best responses. At-once orders are submitted exactly when (p. 226, "with push , so at-once orders are never submitted"). Additions to the paper's contract classes: every class requires (p. 228 sets aside as Pareto inferior); pull includes (the paper's remark in the proof) and advance-purchase discounts include (as Theorem 7 names them). Pareto dominance is between payoff pairs of outcomes.
Outcomes are defined as maximizers, not by the closed forms (21)–(22). Defining the outcome of as would turn the goal into algebra, and is ruled out.
Needed infrastructure: continuity and inverse of a strictly increasing distribution function, concavity of , and first-order conditions on half-lines. The definitions of the prebook game are reusable for Theorem 8 of the same paper. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome.
Selected references
- G. P. Cachon, The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts, Management Science 50(2):222–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0190
- M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
- B. A. Pasternack, Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
- G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
- L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445