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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 2: Advance-Purchase Discounts Coordinate the Supply ChainResearch Paper

Motivation

A supplier who must produce before a selling season, and a retailer who sells into uncertain demand, have to decide who holds the inventory that may go unsold. Cachon (Management Science 50(2), 2004) studies this allocation of inventory risk using nothing but wholesale prices. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before production and bears all the risk; with a pull contract the retailer orders only during the season and the supplier bears it; an advance-purchase discount sits between the two, offering a lower price for early orders. The paper's introduction contrasts Trek, which holds bicycle inventory and ships to retailers on demand, with O'Neill, which offers retailers a prebook discount for ordering before the season.

The classical view is that wholesale-price contracts cannot coordinate a supply chain: a single wholesale price above marginal cost makes the retailer order too little (the double-marginalization effect). Coordination was known to need richer terms, such as buyback contracts (Pasternack 1985) or revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). This mission formalizes the paper's Theorem 7, which shows that two wholesale prices, one for early and one for in-season orders, suffice both to coordinate the chain and to divide its profit arbitrarily. A companion mission of the same series formalizes Theorem 6, the Pareto set of push and pull contracts alone.

Setting

Demand is a random variable with distribution function FFF and density fff. The paper assumes F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0, FFF strictly increasing, and an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR): g(x)=xf(x)/(1−F(x))g(x) = x f(x)/(1 - F(x))g(x)=xf(x)/(1−F(x)) has g′(x)>0g'(x) > 0g′(x)>0. Production costs ccc per unit, the retail price is ppp, and leftover units are salvaged for vvv, with v<c<pv < c < pv<c<p. Expected sales with qqq units available are

S(q)=q−∫0qF(x) dx,S(q) = q - \int_0^q F(x)\,dx,S(q)=q−∫0q​F(x)dx,

and the integrated supply chain's expected profit is Π(q)=(p−v)S(q)−(c−v)q\Pi(q) = (p - v)S(q) - (c - v)qΠ(q)=(p−v)S(q)−(c−v)q. It is maximized at qoq^oqo with F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v)F(q^o) = (p-c)/(p-v)F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v); write Πo=Π(qo)\Pi^o = \Pi(q^o)Πo=Π(qo). The efficiency of a contract is Π(q)/Πo\Pi(q)/\Pi^oΠ(q)/Πo, where qqq is the quantity produced.

A contract is a pair of wholesale prices {w1,w2}\{w_1, w_2\}{w1​,w2​} with w1≤w2w_1 \le w_2w1​≤w2​. The retailer first prebooks y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 units at w1w_1w1​ each. The supplier, seeing yyy, produces q≥yq \ge yq≥y. During the season the retailer sells the prebook and, once it runs out, places at-once orders at w2w_2w2​ per unit from the supplier's remaining stock, provided w2≤pw_2 \le pw2​≤p. The supplier's and retailer's expected profits are

πs(y,q)=(w1−v)y+(w2−v)(S(q)−S(y))−(c−v)q,\pi_s(y, q) = (w_1 - v)y + (w_2 - v)(S(q) - S(y)) - (c - v)q,πs​(y,q)=(w1​−v)y+(w2​−v)(S(q)−S(y))−(c−v)q, πr(y,q)=−(w1−v)y+(p−v)S(y)+(p−w2)(S(q)−S(y)),\pi_r(y, q) = -(w_1 - v)y + (p - v)S(y) + (p - w_2)(S(q) - S(y)),πr​(y,q)=−(w1​−v)y+(p−v)S(y)+(p−w2​)(S(q)−S(y)),

with the at-once terms absent when w2>pw_2 > pw2​>p. An outcome of a contract is a pair (y,q)(y, q)(y,q) where qqq maximizes the supplier's profit given yyy, and yyy maximizes the retailer's profit given that he anticipates the supplier's response. The contract classes are push (w1<p<w2w_1 < p < w_2w1​<p<w2​), pull (w1=w2≤pw_1 = w_2 \le pw1​=w2​≤p) and advance-purchase discount (w1<w2≤pw_1 < w_2 \le pw1​<w2​≤p). A contract is Pareto if no outcome of any contract in these classes makes one firm strictly better off and neither firm worse off than one of its own outcomes (p. 224).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every w1w_1w1​ with c≤w1≤pc \le w_1 \le pc≤w1​≤p, the contract {w1,p}\{w_1, p\}{w1​,p} has an outcome and is Pareto; every outcome (y,q)(y, q)(y,q) of every Pareto contract satisfies

Π(q)=Πo;\Pi(q) = \Pi^o;Π(q)=Πo;

and for every r∈[0,Πo]r \in [0, \Pi^o]r∈[0,Πo] some contract {w1,p}\{w_1, p\}{w1​,p} with c≤w1≤pc \le w_1 \le pc≤w1​≤p has an outcome with payoffs

(πr,πs)=(r, Πo−r).\bigl(\pi_r, \pi_s\bigr) = \bigl(r,\ \Pi^o - r\bigr).(πr​,πs​)=(r, Πo−r).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (2): Π\PiΠ is concave on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) and maximized exactly where F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v)F(q^o) = (p-c)/(p-v)F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v).
  2. Eqs. (20)–(21): for c≤w2≤pc \le w_2 \le pc≤w2​≤p, the supplier's best response to yyy is max⁡{y,qs}\max\{y, q_s\}max{y,qs​} with F(qs)=(w2−c)/(w2−v)F(q_s) = (w_2 - c)/(w_2 - v)F(qs​)=(w2​−c)/(w2​−v).
  3. Eq. (22): for c≤w1≤w2≤pc \le w_1 \le w_2 \le pc≤w1​≤w2​≤p, yry_ryr​ with F(yr)=(w2−w1)/(w2−v)F(y_r) = (w_2 - w_1)/(w_2 - v)F(yr​)=(w2​−w1​)/(w2​−v) is the unique maximizer of πr(⋅,q)\pi_r(\cdot, q)πr​(⋅,q).
  4. Eq. (3): in push mode the retailer's optimal prebook solves F(q)=(p−w^1)/(p−v)F(q) = (p - \hat w_1)/(p - v)F(q)=(p−w^1​)/(p−v).

A further draft theorem states the step of the proof in which the retailer's outcome profit along {w1,p}\{w_1, p\}{w1​,p} falls strictly from Πo\Pi^oΠo to 000 as w1w_1w1​ rises from ccc to ppp.

Significance

The theorem identifies a coordinating family inside the simplest contract language there is. Setting the at-once price equal to the retail price gives the supplier exactly the chain's marginal incentive for capacity, so she produces qoq^oqo; the prebook price then acts as a pure transfer. Every division of Πo\Pi^oΠo is reached, so for any bargaining process the Pareto set is fully efficient. This contrasts with Theorem 6 of the same paper, where push and pull contracts alone leave the Pareto set inefficient, and with the buyback and revenue-sharing coordination results (formalized on the platform as Theorems 14.4–14.6 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory), which need contract terms beyond wholesale prices.

The result is proved in the paper and has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a formal prebook game (best responses, outcomes and Pareto dominance as optimization statements) and Theorem 7 with all three claims, including the claim about every Pareto contract, which the paper argues in one sentence.

Difficulty

The closed forms are fractile equations, and the obvious argument substitutes them. That argument is incomplete in three places. First, the retailer's anticipated profit is piecewise: below the supplier's own quantity he gets at-once service, above it the chain runs in push mode, and the proof must show the retailer never prefers the push branch when w2=pw_2 = pw2​=p. Second, "every Pareto contract is efficient" is a statement about all contracts, including push and pull, and needs both firms' payoffs to be nonnegative at every outcome of every admissible contract, which depends on the prebook y=0y = 0y=0 always being available and on w1≥cw_1 \ge cw1​≥c. Third, the division claim is surjectivity of the retailer's equilibrium payoff over w1∈[c,p]w_1 \in [c, p]w1​∈[c,p], which needs the solution of F(yr)=(p−w1)/(p−v)F(y_r) = (p - w_1)/(p - v)F(yr​)=(p−w1​)/(p−v) to vary continuously with w1w_1w1​, including at both ends (yr=qoy_r = q^oyr​=qo at w1=cw_1 = cw1​=c, yr=0y_r = 0yr​=0 at w1=pw_1 = pw1​=p).

Formalization scope

Demand is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with FFF = ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ. The standing assumptions are a structure: F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0, FFF strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), F′=fF' = fF′=f on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and g′>0g' > 0g′>0 on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞). Differentiability is required only on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), so the exponential distribution, which the paper names as IGFR, is admitted. Theorem 7 does not use IGFR; it is kept so that the series shares one model. Quantities range over [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). qoq^oqo is a parameter with the hypothesis F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v)F(q^o) = (p-c)/(p-v)F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v); its existence is part of milestone 1.

Readings of informal words: "includes all" means every contract {w1,p}\{w_1, p\}{w1​,p} with c≤w1≤pc \le w_1 \le pc≤w1​≤p has an outcome and each of its outcomes is undominated; "the Pareto set coordinates" is stated for every Pareto contract, not only the w2=pw_2 = pw2​=p family; "any division is achievable" is surjectivity onto [0,Πo][0, \Pi^o][0,Πo]; "increasing" in Eq. (2) and "decreases" in the proof are strict; "arg max" in Eqs. (3) and (22) is the unique maximizer; "the optimal production is max⁡{y,qs}\max\{y, q_s\}max{y,qs​}" is an if-and-only-if characterization of the supplier's best responses. At-once orders are submitted exactly when w2≤pw_2 \le pw2​≤p (p. 226, "with push w2>pw_2 > pw2​>p, so at-once orders are never submitted"). Additions to the paper's contract classes: every class requires w1≥cw_1 \ge cw1​≥c (p. 228 sets aside w^1<c\hat w_1 < cw^1​<c as Pareto inferior); pull includes w1=w2=pw_1 = w_2 = pw1​=w2​=p (the paper's remark in the proof) and advance-purchase discounts include w2=pw_2 = pw2​=p (as Theorem 7 names them). Pareto dominance is between payoff pairs of outcomes.

Outcomes are defined as maximizers, not by the closed forms (21)–(22). Defining the outcome of {w1,p}\{w_1, p\}{w1​,p} as (yr,qo)(y_r, q^o)(yr​,qo) would turn the goal into algebra, and is ruled out.

Needed infrastructure: continuity and inverse of a strictly increasing distribution function, concavity of SSS, and first-order conditions on half-lines. The definitions of the prebook game are reusable for Theorem 8 of the same paper. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts, Management Science 50(2):222–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0190
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts 3: Advance-Purchase Discounts Pareto-Improve Pull Contracts under At-Once Shipping CostsResearch Paper

Motivation

A supplier and a retailer who trade a seasonal product must decide who carries the inventory risk: the stock left unsold, or the demand left unserved, when the season ends. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before the season and bears the risk; with a pull contract he orders during the season from the supplier's stock at a single wholesale price, and the supplier bears it. Cachon (Management Science 50(2), 2004) studies the two and the contract between them, the advance-purchase discount, in which units ordered before the season are cheaper than units ordered during it.

In the base model of that paper, shipping a unit during the season costs the same as shipping it before. In practice orders placed during the season are often smaller and more urgent, and shipping and handling them costs more. §5.1 of the paper adds such a cost and asks whether pull contracts remain attractive. Theorem 8 answers that they are then never Pareto efficient: some advance-purchase discount is better for both firms.

Setting

Demand DDD for the season has law μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR, distribution function FFF and density fff. As in §3 of the paper, F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0, FFF is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), F′=fF' = fF′=f on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and the generalized failure rate g(x)=xf(x)/(1−F(x))g(x) = x f(x)/(1 - F(x))g(x)=xf(x)/(1−F(x)) is strictly increasing (IGFR). The expected sales from qqq available units are

S(q)=q−∫0qF(x) dx.S(q) = q - \int_0^q F(x)\,dx .S(q)=q−∫0q​F(x)dx.

The retail price is ppp, the unit production cost ccc, the salvage value vvv, with v<c<pv < c < pv<c<p.

A contract is a pair of wholesale prices {w1,w2}\{w_1, w_2\}{w1​,w2​}. Before production the retailer submits a prebook order of y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 units at w1w_1w1​. The supplier then produces q≥yq \ge yq≥y. During the season, after running out of prebooked stock, the retailer places at-once orders at w2w_2w2​, filled from the supplier's remaining stock. Pull is w1=w2<pw_1 = w_2 < pw1​=w2​<p; an advance-purchase discount is w1<w2w_1 < w_2w1​<w2​. In §5.1 the supplier pays an extra shipping and handling cost τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 per at-once unit. The profits are

πr(y,q)=−(w1−v)y+(p−v)S(y)+(p−w2)(S(q)−S(y)),\pi_r(y,q) = -(w_1 - v)y + (p - v)S(y) + (p - w_2)\bigl(S(q) - S(y)\bigr),πr​(y,q)=−(w1​−v)y+(p−v)S(y)+(p−w2​)(S(q)−S(y)), πs(y,q)=(w1−v)y+(w2−τ−v)(S(q)−S(y))−(c−v)q.\pi_s(y,q) = (w_1 - v)y + (w_2 - \tau - v)\bigl(S(q) - S(y)\bigr) - (c - v)q .πs​(y,q)=(w1​−v)y+(w2​−τ−v)(S(q)−S(y))−(c−v)q.

A supplier best response to yyy maximizes πs(y,⋅)\pi_s(y,\cdot)πs​(y,⋅) over q≥yq \ge yq≥y. An outcome of {w1,w2}\{w_1, w_2\}{w1​,w2​} is a pair (y,q)(y, q)(y,q) with qqq a best response to yyy and y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 maximizing πr\pi_rπr​ when every alternative prebook is followed by a best response to it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

Fix w2<pw_2 < pw2​<p and τ>0\tau > 0τ>0, and suppose the retailer does not prebook under the pull contract {w2,w2}\{w_2, w_2\}{w2​,w2​}: y=0y = 0y=0 is his unique best reply, followed by the supplier's best response q0q_0q0​. Then there is w1w_1w1​ with

c<w1<w2c < w_1 < w_2c<w1​<w2​

such that {w1,w2}\{w_1, w_2\}{w1​,w2​} has an outcome, and every outcome (y,q)(y, q)(y,q) of it satisfies

πr{w1,w2}(y,q)>πr{w2,w2}(0,q0),πs{w1,w2}(y,q)>πs{w2,w2}(0,q0).\pi_r^{\{w_1,w_2\}}(y,q) > \pi_r^{\{w_2,w_2\}}(0,q_0), \qquad \pi_s^{\{w_1,w_2\}}(y,q) > \pi_s^{\{w_2,w_2\}}(0,q_0).πr{w1​,w2​}​(y,q)>πr{w2​,w2​}​(0,q0​),πs{w1​,w2​}​(y,q)>πs{w2​,w2​}​(0,q0​).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (22): for v<w1≤w2≤pv < w_1 \le w_2 \le pv<w1​≤w2​≤p the retailer's profit is concave in yyy and uniquely maximized at yry_ryr​ with F(yr)=(w2−w1)/(w2−v)F(y_r) = (w_2 - w_1)/(w_2 - v)F(yr​)=(w2​−w1​)/(w2​−v), whatever qqq.
  2. Eqs. (20)–(21) with w2−τw_2 - \tauw2​−τ: the supplier's best response to yyy is max⁡{y,qs}\max\{y, q_s\}max{y,qs​} with F(qs)=(w2−τ−c)/(w2−τ−v)F(q_s) = (w_2 - \tau - c)/(w_2 - \tau - v)F(qs​)=(w2​−τ−c)/(w2​−τ−v), independent of w1w_1w1​, and qsq_sqs​ is smaller than without the shipping cost.
  3. §5.1: for fixed w2w_2w2​ the retailer is never worse off with w1≤w2w_1 \le w_2w1​≤w2​ than with w1=w2w_1 = w_2w1​=w2​.
  4. yr(w1)>0y_r(w_1) > 0yr​(w1​)>0 for every w1<w2w_1 < w_2w1​<w2​.
  5. The derivative of w1↦πs(yr(w1),q)w_1 \mapsto \pi_s(y_r(w_1), q)w1​↦πs​(yr​(w1​),q), where the density at yr(w1)y_r(w_1)yr​(w1​) is positive:
dπs(yr(w1),q)dw1=yr(w1)−(w1−v)−(w2−τ−v)(1−F(yr(w1)))(w2−v)f(yr(w1)).\frac{d\pi_s(y_r(w_1), q)}{dw_1} = y_r(w_1) - \frac{(w_1 - v) - (w_2 - \tau - v)(1 - F(y_r(w_1)))}{(w_2 - v) f(y_r(w_1))}.dw1​dπs​(yr​(w1​),q)​=yr​(w1​)−(w2​−v)f(yr​(w1​))(w1​−v)−(w2​−τ−v)(1−F(yr​(w1​)))​.
  1. yr(w1)→0y_r(w_1) \to 0yr​(w1​)→0 as w1→w2w_1 \to w_2w1​→w2​, and, when fff has a positive right limit f(0)f(0)f(0) at 000, the derivative in 5 tends to −τ/((w2−v)f(0))<0-\tau/((w_2 - v) f(0)) < 0−τ/((w2​−v)f(0))<0.

Significance

Without shipping costs, advance-purchase discounts with w2=pw_2 = pw2​=p coordinate the supply chain (Theorem 7 of the paper, the subject of mission 2 of this series), and a pull contract can lie in the Pareto set among push and pull contracts (Theorem 6, mission 1). Theorem 8 shows that the second fact does not survive an at-once shipping cost of any size: pulling inventory during the season incurs a cost the integrated chain would avoid, and a small discount for early commitment shifts part of the stock to the prebook, where it is cheaper to ship. The Pareto set then no longer consists of a single contract type. The result supports the paper's conclusion that each of its three extensions makes push relatively more attractive than pull.

The theorem is proved in the paper, not formalized anywhere. A formal proof requires making precise two points the paper passes over: what "the retailer does not prebook" means when the retailer could switch to a large prebook once a discount is offered, and why no positive density at 000 is needed. Formalized, the statement also gives a checked account of the prebook game under a two-price contract, reusable for the other extensions of §5.

Difficulty

The paper's argument differentiates the supplier's profit along the retailer's optimal prebook and takes the limit as w1→w2w_1 \to w_2w1​→w2​. That limit involves f(0)f(0)f(0), which the model does not provide: FFF is differentiable only on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and for gamma demand with shape above 111 the density vanishes at 000, so the paper's limit is −∞-\infty−∞. A proof of the goal must therefore not rest on the limit display alone.

The second obstacle is the retailer's global choice. The calculus concerns prebooks yr(w1)y_r(w_1)yr​(w1​) below the supplier's production qsq_sqs​. Once w1<w2w_1 < w_2w1​<w2​, the retailer might instead prefer a prebook at least qsq_sqs​, turning the chain into push mode, and the outcome would then not be the one the derivative describes. Ruling this out for w1w_1w1​ close to w2w_2w2​ requires the strict form of the premise and a uniform comparison of the two regimes; it is not a local argument at yry_ryr​.

Formalization scope

Demand is a probability measure μ on ℝ with F := ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ, and the standing assumptions of §3 form the predicate DemandModel μ f; differentiability of F is required on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) only, so the exponential law is admitted. Quantities range over [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). Best responses and outcomes are defined as maximizers, not by the closed forms of milestones 1 and 2. All profit formulas are those of §4.5 for w2≤pw_2 \le pw2​≤p, and every statement assumes it. The shipping cost enters only the supplier's at-once net revenue w2−τw_2 - \tauw2​−τ. The prebook function yry_ryr​ in milestones 5 and 6 is a function pinned on (v,w2)(v, w_2)(v,w2​) by Eq. (22), which determines it uniquely.

Readings of the paper's words:

  • "the retailer does not prebook when w1=w2w_1 = w_2w1​=w2​" is read as "y=0y = 0y=0 is the retailer's unique best reply" (every y>0y > 0y>0 gives strictly less); with a tie the conclusion can fail;
  • "profit increases for both" is read as a strict increase for both firms, in every outcome of the discounted contract;
  • the conclusion c<w1c < w_1c<w1​ strengthens "advance-purchase discount" (w1<w2w_1 < w_2w1​<w2​);
  • "reduces the supplier's optimal production" (milestone 2) is a strict decrease; its formula is stated for c≤w2−τc \le w_2 - \tauc≤w2​−τ;
  • "f(0)f(0)f(0)" in milestone 6 is the right limit of fff at 000, assumed positive there only; the positivity of f(yr(w1))f(y_r(w_1))f(yr​(w1​)) in milestone 5 is the hypothesis of the implicit-function step;
  • "never worse off" (milestone 3) compares every outcome of {w1,w2}\{w_1, w_2\}{w1​,w2​} with every outcome of {w2,w2}\{w_2, w_2\}{w2​,w2​}.

A version of the goal that assumed f(0)>0f(0) > 0f(0)>0, assumed yr(w1)<qsy_r(w_1) < q_syr​(w1​)<qs​, compared only one favourably chosen outcome of the discounted contract, or stated either firm's gain with ≥\ge≥, would be weaker than Theorem 8 and is not the target.

A complete development needs the concavity and first-order conditions for SSS, the inverse-function derivative for FFF, and the regime comparison between prebooks below and above qsq_sqs​. The first two are reusable across all newsvendor-type models; contributions proving the milestones in any order are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts, Management Science 50(2):222–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0190
  • M. A. Lariviere, E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling I: Best-α on One Machine with Release DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the average completion time of jobs that arrive over time is one of the basic objectives of machine scheduling: it measures how long, on average, a job waits in the system. On a single machine with release dates and no preemption (written 1∣rj∣∑Cj1|r_j|\sum C_j1∣rj​∣∑Cj​), the problem is strongly NP-hard, so research has focused on approximation algorithms whose guarantees are stated against every feasible schedule.

The standard route runs through the preemptive relaxation. When jobs may be interrupted and resumed, the shortest-remaining-processing-time rule (SRPT) produces an optimal schedule, and its value is a lower bound for every nonpreemptive schedule. The question is how to turn that preemptive schedule into a nonpreemptive one without losing too much.

Timeline:

  • 1995, Phillips, Stein and Wein (WADS 1995, pp. 86–97): order the jobs by their SRPT completion times and schedule them nonpreemptively in that order. This gives a 2-approximation. Later 2-approximations are by Hoogeveen and Vestjens (IPCO 1996), Stougie (1995), and Goemans (SODA 1997). Hoogeveen and Vestjens also showed that deterministic on-line algorithms cannot beat 2.
  • 2001, Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1)): order by α\alphaα-points instead of completion times, choose α\alphaα at random, and take the best α\alphaα off-line. This gives the e/(e−1)≈1.58e/(e-1)\approx1.58e/(e−1)≈1.58 bound for Best-α\alphaα that is the goal of this mission, and an optimal randomized on-line algorithm.
  • 1999, Afrati et al. (FOCS 1999): a polynomial-time approximation scheme for 1∣rj∣∑wjCj1|r_j|\sum w_jC_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​. This settled the approximability of the problem, but the resulting algorithms are far from simple.

Setting

An instance has nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0, a release date rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0, and, where the objective is weighted, a weight wj>0w_j>0wj​>0. There is one machine.

A nonpreemptive schedule assigns each job a start time Sj≥rjS_j\ge r_jSj​≥rj​ such that the intervals [Sj,Sj+pj)[S_j,S_j+p_j)[Sj​,Sj​+pj​) are pairwise disjoint. Its completion times are Cj=Sj+pjC_j=S_j+p_jCj​=Sj​+pj​.

A preemptive schedule PPP specifies, for each time ttt, which job runs at ttt, if any. Job JjJ_jJj​ runs only at times t≥max⁡(0,rj)t\ge\max(0,r_j)t≥max(0,rj​), receives exactly pjp_jpj​ units of processing in total, and finishes by some finite time. Its completion time CjPC^P_jCjP​ is the first time by which all of JjJ_jJj​ has been processed. For α∈(0,1]\alpha\in(0,1]α∈(0,1], its α\alphaα-point CjP(α)C^P_j(\alpha)CjP​(α) is the first time by which αpj\alpha p_jαpj​ units have been processed.

For a job JiJ_iJi​, TiT_iTi​ denotes the idle time of PPP before CiPC^P_iCiP​. xijx_{ij}xij​ denotes the fraction of JjJ_jJj​ processed before CiPC^P_iCiP​. The paper writes SiP(β)S^P_i(\beta)SiP​(β) for the set of jobs with xij=βx_{ij}=\betaxij​=β, and also for their total processing time.

One-machine list scheduling in a given order runs the jobs nonpreemptively in that order. Each job starts at the later of its release date and the completion of the previous job in the list. An α\alphaα-schedule is list scheduling in nondecreasing order of the α\alphaα-points CjP(α)C^P_j(\alpha)CjP​(α). CjαC^\alpha_jCjα​ denotes the completion times of an α\alphaα-schedule.

Random-α\alphaα draws α\alphaα from a distribution on (0,1](0,1](0,1] and outputs the α\alphaα-schedule. Best-α\alphaα outputs the α\alphaα-schedule of smallest total completion time min⁡α∑jCjα\min_\alpha\sum_j C^\alpha_jminα​∑j​Cjα​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2.7

Let PPP be optimal among preemptive schedules for ∑jCj\sum_j C_j∑j​Cj​. Then there is α∈(0,1]\alpha\in(0,1]α∈(0,1] such that every α\alphaα-schedule derived from PPP satisfies

∑jCjα  ≤  ee−1∑jCjfor every feasible nonpreemptive schedule (Cj)j.\sum_j C^\alpha_j\;\le\;\frac{e}{e-1}\sum_j C_j\qquad\text{for every feasible nonpreemptive schedule } (C_j)_j .j∑​Cjα​≤e−1e​j∑​Cj​for every feasible nonpreemptive schedule (Cj​)j​.

Since Best-α\alphaα returns a schedule no worse than this α\alphaα-schedule, Best-α\alphaα is an e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1)-approximation.

Milestones

  1. The calculus behind the constant. For f(α)=eα/(e−1)f(\alpha)=e^\alpha/(e-1)f(α)=eα/(e−1) and every β∈(0,1]\beta\in(0,1]β∈(0,1],
∫0β1+α−ββf(α) dα=1e−1.\int_0^\beta\frac{1+\alpha-\beta}{\beta}f(\alpha)\,d\alpha=\frac1{e-1}.∫0β​β1+α−β​f(α)dα=e−11​.
  1. Lemma 2.2: CiP=Ti+∑0<β≤1βSiP(β)C^P_i=T_i+\sum_{0<\beta\le1}\beta S^P_i(\beta)CiP​=Ti​+∑0<β≤1​βSiP​(β).
  2. Lemma 2.3: Ciα≤Ti+(1+α)∑β≥αSiP(β)+∑β<αβSiP(β)C^\alpha_i\le T_i+(1+\alpha)\sum_{\beta\ge\alpha}S^P_i(\beta)+\sum_{\beta<\alpha}\beta S^P_i(\beta)Ciα​≤Ti​+(1+α)∑β≥α​SiP​(β)+∑β<α​βSiP​(β).
  3. Lemma 2.5: if α\alphaα has density fff on (0,1](0,1](0,1], then E[Ciα]≤(1+δ)CiPE[C^\alpha_i]\le(1+\delta)C^P_iE[Ciα​]≤(1+δ)CiP​ with δ=max⁡0<β≤1∫0β1+α−ββf(α) dα\delta=\max_{0<\beta\le1}\int_0^\beta\frac{1+\alpha-\beta}{\beta}f(\alpha)\,d\alphaδ=max0<β≤1​∫0β​β1+α−β​f(α)dα.
  4. Theorem 2.6, for the weighted objective with PPP optimal among preemptive schedules: the expected approximation ratio of Random-α\alphaα is at most 222 for uniform α\alphaα, at most 1.81.81.8 for α=1\alpha=1α=1 w.p. 3/53/53/5 and α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2 w.p. 2/52/52/5, and at most e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) for the density eα/(e−1)e^\alpha/(e-1)eα/(e−1).

Companion statements, not milestones:

  • the upper bound of Theorem 2.1, ∑jCjα≤(1+1/α)∑jCjP\sum_jC^\alpha_j\le(1+1/\alpha)\sum_jC^P_j∑j​Cjα​≤(1+1/α)∑j​CjP​;
  • the existence of an optimal preemptive schedule.

Significance

The e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) bound shows that conversion from the preemptive relaxation can beat the factor 2 of the natural ordering. It does so by exploiting that no single instance is bad for many values of α\alphaα at once. The α\alphaα-point technique was also used with LP relaxations, for example by Goemans (SODA 1997) and by Schulz and Skutella. The randomized version is an optimal randomized on-line algorithm for 1∣rj∣∑Cj1|r_j|\sum C_j1∣rj​∣∑Cj​. Lemma 2.3 is a statement about any preemptive schedule, so it applies wherever a good preemptive or fractional schedule is available.

All results of the mission are proved in the paper, except that the proof of Theorem 2.6, part 2 is omitted there. No machine-checked proof of them is known. A complete development would give a verified model of preemptive one-machine schedules, α\alphaα-points and list scheduling, together with the averaging argument over α\alphaα. These are reusable for the later results of the same paper and for the α\alphaα-point literature.

Difficulty

The obvious argument bounds each job's α\alphaα-schedule completion time directly against its preemptive completion time. That argument loses a factor 1+1/α1+1/\alpha1+1/α (Theorem 2.1), which is at least 2 for every fixed α\alphaα. The improvement needs Lemma 2.3. There the charge to each job depends on how much of it was done by CiPC^P_iCiP​ relative to α\alphaα, and the idle time TiT_iTi​ is not inflated at all. Proving Lemma 2.3 requires reasoning about a preemptive schedule as a measure on time, and about how moving pieces of jobs changes completion times. A proof that treats the preemptive schedule as a finite list of pieces must first show that nothing is lost by this discretization.

The averaging step needs the expectation over α\alphaα to be an honest integral. The map α↦Ciα\alpha\mapsto C^\alpha_iα↦Ciα​ must be shown integrable, which requires a fixed rule for ties between equal α\alphaα-points.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Jobs are Fin n, time is real, pj>0p_j>0pj​>0 and rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0. The paper admits pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 only in its tightness instances.
    • A preemptive schedule is a function σ:R→\sigma:\mathbb R\toσ:R→ Option (Fin n) (none = idle). Each job's run set is measurable, lies in [max⁡(0,rj),∞)[\max(0,r_j),\infty)[max(0,rj​),∞), is bounded above, and has Lebesgue measure pjp_jpj​.
    • Completion times and α\alphaα-points are infima of nonempty sets that are bounded below.
    • TiT_iTi​ is the measure of the idle set in [0,CiP)[0,C^P_i)[0,CiP​).
    • The paper's sums over β\betaβ are sums over jobs, weighted by the fraction xijx_{ij}xij​.
  • List scheduling is strict: jobs never overtake the list order, and the machine is free from time 000.
    • Lemma 2.3, Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.6.2 and the goal hold for every tie-break among equal α\alphaα-points.
    • The expectations (Lemma 2.5, Theorem 2.6.1 and 2.6.3) use the tie-break by job index. They assert integrability as part of the conclusion.
  • Optimality. "Approximation ratio ccc" is stated as an inequality against every feasible nonpreemptive schedule, never against an infimum.
    • The optimality of PPP among preemptive schedules is the paper's standing assumption for its upper bounds (p. 151). It appears as a hypothesis of Theorem 2.6 and of the goal.
    • The lemmas hold for arbitrary PPP and do not carry it.
    • An existence statement shows the hypothesis can be met.
  • Lemma 2.5's δ\deltaδ is replaced by any upper bound of the integrals over β∈(0,1]\beta\in(0,1]β∈(0,1]. This is equivalent, and it avoids assuming that the maximum is attained.
  • Not stated:
    • the running time O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) of Best-α\alphaα and the optimality of SRPT;
    • the tightness parts of Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.4, and the lower bounds of Theorem 2.9, which use zero-length jobs;
    • the on-line Theorem 2.8, which needs a model of on-line algorithms.
  • Trivializing formalization ruled out. Dropping the optimality of PPP from the goal would turn it into a statement about arbitrary preemptive schedules, which is Lemma 2.5, not Corollary 2.7. Comparing against ∑jCjP\sum_jC^P_j∑j​CjP​ instead of every nonpreemptive schedule would likewise remove the content of the corollary.

Contributions are welcome at every level. The calculus milestone and Lemma 2.2 are good first targets.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM J. Comput. 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • C. Phillips, C. Stein, J. Wein, Scheduling jobs that arrive over time, Proc. 4th Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS), 1995, pp. 86–97 (reference [25] of the paper; no link verified).
  • J. A. Hoogeveen, A. P. A. Vestjens, Optimal on-line algorithms for single-machine scheduling, Proc. 5th IPCO, 1996, pp. 404–414 (reference [21]; no link verified).
  • M. X. Goemans, Improved approximation algorithms for scheduling with release dates, Proc. 8th ACM-SIAM SODA, 1997, pp. 591–598 (reference [12]; no link verified).
  • F. Afrati et al., Approximation schemes for minimizing average weighted completion time with release dates, Proc. 40th FOCS, 1999 (reference [2]; no link verified).
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Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling II: A 2.83-Approximation for Parallel Machines with Release DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the average completion time of jobs that arrive over time is a basic objective in machine scheduling. It measures how long a job spends in the system on average. With several identical machines, release dates and no preemption (written P∣rj∣∑CjP|r_j|\sum C_jP∣rj​∣∑Cj​), the problem is strongly NP-hard already on one machine. Research has therefore looked for approximation algorithms: polynomial-time rules whose total completion time is provably within a constant factor of every feasible schedule.

A common approach solves a relaxation that is easy to optimize and converts its solution into a feasible schedule. Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), 2001) use a relaxation that needs neither linear programming nor dynamic programming: pretend that the mmm machines are one machine that is mmm times as fast, and allow preemption.

Timeline:

  • 1996, Chakrabarti, Phillips, Schulz, Shmoys, Stein and Wein (ICALP 1996, LNCS 1099, pp. 646–657): a (2.89+ϵ)(2.89+\epsilon)(2.89+ϵ)-approximation for P∣rj∣∑CjP|r_j|\sum C_jP∣rj​∣∑Cj​.
  • 2001, Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), §3 and §4.5). §3 gives a simple (3−1/m)(3-1/m)(3−1/m)-approximation by list scheduling from the one-machine relaxation. §4.5 combines it with the Delay List conversion to obtain 22≈2.832\sqrt2\approx2.8322​≈2.83. This mission's goal is the §4.5 result.
  • 1999, Afrati, Bampis, Chekuri, Karger, Kenyon, Khanna, Milis, Queyranne, Skutella, Stein and Sviridenko (FOCS 1999, pp. 32–43): polynomial-time approximation schemes for P∣rj∣∑wjCjP|r_j|\sum w_jC_jP∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​. These settle the approximability, but the algorithms are far more involved than the ones formalized here.

Setting

An instance has nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​ and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 identical machines. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0 and a release date rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0.

A feasible schedule gives each job a start time Sj≥rjS_j\ge r_jSj​≥rj​ and a machine. Job JjJ_jJj​ runs without interruption on its machine during [Sj,Sj+pj)[S_j,S_j+p_j)[Sj​,Sj​+pj​), and two jobs on the same machine never overlap. The completion times are Cj=Sj+pjC_j=S_j+p_jCj​=Sj​+pj​ and the objective is ∑jCj\sum_j C_j∑j​Cj​. Cj∗C^*_jCj∗​ denotes the completion times of an arbitrary feasible schedule, against which every bound is stated.

The one-machine relaxation I1I1I1 has the same jobs and a single machine. Job JjJ_jJj​ has processing time pj/mp_j/mpj​/m and release date rjr_jrj​ in I1I1I1, and may be preempted. A preemptive schedule P1P1P1 of I1I1I1 gives each job a processing rate ρj(t)≥0\rho_j(t)\ge0ρj​(t)≥0. The rates sum to at most 111 at each time, and no job is processed before its release date. Each job receives pj/mp_j/mpj​/m units in total. Its completion time CjP1C^{P1}_jCjP1​ is the first time by which all of it has been processed. P1P1P1 is optimal if ∑jCjP1\sum_j C^{P1}_j∑j​CjP1​ is minimal among all such schedules.

A list is an ordering π\piπ of the jobs, and the completion order of P1P1P1 lists the jobs by nondecreasing CjP1C^{P1}_jCjP1​. Two ways of turning a list into an mmm-machine schedule are compared.

  • Strict-order list scheduling gives the schedule NNN. The jobs start in the order of the list. Each job starts at the earliest time that is no earlier than its release date, no earlier than the previous job's start, and at which some machine is free.
  • Delay List with parameter β>0\beta>0β>0 gives the schedule DDD. When a machine is idle, Delay List starts the first unscheduled job of the list if it has been released. If that job has not been released, the first released job of the list may jump ahead, but only once at least βpj\beta p_jβpj​ units of idle time (machine × time) have accumulated that no earlier job has charged. The job then charges exactly that amount. A job started in list order charges all uncharged idle time since its release.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.19

With P1P1P1 optimal, π\piπ its completion order, NNN the strict-order list schedule of π\piπ and DDD a Delay List schedule of π\piπ with β0=3−22\beta_0=\sqrt{3-2\sqrt2}β0​=3−22​​, every feasible schedule satisfies

min⁡(∑jCjN, ∑jCjD)≤22 ∑jCj∗.\min\Bigl(\sum_j C^N_j,\ \sum_j C^D_j\Bigr)\le 2\sqrt2\,\sum_j C^*_j .min(j∑​CjN​, j∑​CjD​)≤22​j∑​Cj∗​.

The printed lemma says 2.832.832.83. Its proof gives 22≈2.82842\sqrt2\approx2.828422​≈2.8284, which is stated here.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. (4.2): if ∑jpj>α∑jCj∗\sum_j p_j>\alpha\sum_j C^*_j∑j​pj​>α∑j​Cj∗​ then ∑jrj≤(1−α)∑jCj∗\sum_j r_j\le(1-\alpha)\sum_j C^*_j∑j​rj​≤(1−α)∑j​Cj∗​.
  2. Lemma 3.1: ∑jCjP1≤∑jCj∗\sum_j C^{P1}_j\le\sum_j C^*_j∑j​CjP1​≤∑j​Cj∗​ for P1P1P1 optimal.
  3. (3.3): ∑jCjN≤2∑jCjP1+(1−1/m)∑jpj\sum_j C^N_j\le 2\sum_j C^{P1}_j+(1-1/m)\sum_j p_j∑j​CjN​≤2∑j​CjP1​+(1−1/m)∑j​pj​ for any P1P1P1.
  4. Lemma 3.2: ∑jCjN≤(3−1/m)∑jCj∗\sum_j C^N_j\le(3-1/m)\sum_j C^*_j∑j​CjN​≤(3−1/m)∑j​Cj∗​.
  5. Theorem 4.9, specialised to no precedence constraints. With BiB_iBi​ the jobs at or before JiJ_iJi​ in the list,
CiD≤(1+β)p(Bi)m+(1+1β)(ri+pi)−piβ.C^D_i\le\frac{(1+\beta)p(B_i)}{m}+\Bigl(1+\frac1\beta\Bigr)(r_i+p_i)-\frac{p_i}{\beta}.CiD​≤m(1+β)p(Bi​)​+(1+β1​)(ri​+pi​)−βpi​​.
  1. Lemma 4.18: ∑jCjD≤(2+β)∑jCj∗+1β∑jrj\sum_j C^D_j\le(2+\beta)\sum_j C^*_j+\frac1\beta\sum_j r_j∑j​CjD​≤(2+β)∑j​Cj∗​+β1​∑j​rj​.
  2. The balanced bound: under (4.2)'s hypothesis, ∑jCjD≤(2+β+(1−α)/β)∑jCj∗\sum_j C^D_j\le(2+\beta+(1-\alpha)/\beta)\sum_j C^*_j∑j​CjD​≤(2+β+(1−α)/β)∑j​Cj∗​.
  3. The constants: at α=22−2\alpha=2\sqrt2-2α=22​−2 and β=3−22\beta=\sqrt{3-2\sqrt2}β=3−22​​, 2+α=2+β+(1−α)/β=222+\alpha=2+\beta+(1-\alpha)/\beta=2\sqrt22+α=2+β+(1−α)/β=22​.

Two existence statements accompany them. One says an optimal P1P1P1 exists. The other says a Delay List schedule exists for every list and every β>0\beta>0β>0.

Significance

The result gives a 222\sqrt222​-approximation for P∣rj∣∑CjP|r_j|\sum C_jP∣rj​∣∑Cj​ that is simple to state and runs in O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) time. It improves the 2.89+ϵ2.89+\epsilon2.89+ϵ bound of Chakrabarti et al. Neither of its two algorithms achieves the ratio alone. It comes from an analysis in which each algorithm is good exactly when the other is bad. List scheduling is good when processing times are small relative to the optimum. Delay List is good when release dates are small. The inequality (4.2) connects the two cases.

The component results are reusable beyond this paper. The one-machine relaxation lower bound (Lemma 3.1) and the (3−1/m)(3-1/m)(3−1/m) bound for list scheduling from it (Lemma 3.2) apply to any conversion from a fast single machine. The per-job bound of Theorem 4.9 is the core of the Delay List technique. Its general form, with precedence constraints, drives the paper's results for precedence-constrained scheduling.

All results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof that this mission knows of. A formalization would check the Delay List charging argument, which the paper states only in discrete time and adapts to continuous time in one sentence. It would also produce reusable Lean definitions of parallel-machine schedules with release dates and of list scheduling.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of the goal is routine once the milestones are in place. The substance lies in two places.

The first is Lemma 3.1 together with the "standard makespan argument" behind (3.2). The one-machine relaxation must be related to the mmm-machine schedule, and to the list schedule, with care about release dates. In particular, in the list schedule every machine is busy between the last release among the first jjj jobs of the list and the start of the jjj-th job. Proving this needs the strict order.

The second, and harder, is Theorem 4.9. The obvious argument bounds the waiting time of job JiJ_iJi​ by the work of the jobs ahead of it, but Delay List lets later jobs jump ahead. The idle time before JiJ_iJi​ starts and the work of the jobs that jump ahead of it must both be controlled, and the paper's charging argument for this depends on where charged idle time lies on the time axis and on which jobs charged it. Making that bookkeeping precise for a continuous-time algorithm is the main formalization cost.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n and machines Fin m with m≥1m\ge1m≥1. Times are real, processing times are positive and release dates nonnegative. There are no weights and no precedence constraints. "Optimal" is never an infimum. Every bound is stated against every feasible nonpreemptive schedule, and P1P1P1's optimality is the hypothesis that its total completion time is at most that of every preemptive schedule of I1I1I1.

Committed conventions:

  • Preemptive schedules of I1I1I1 are rate functions, so the machine of I1I1I1 may be shared. The paper's one-job-at-a-time schedules are a special case.
  • Lists are bijections Fin n ≃ Fin n. A list of P1P1P1 may break ties in completion time in any way, and every such list is covered.
  • NNN is the strict-order variant of list scheduling, which footnote 3 of the paper contrasts with the greedy variant used in §4. It is a recursive definition over list positions.
  • Delay List is the continuous-time algorithm, as adopted in the proof of Fact 4.6. It is a predicate on start times, machines, the scheduling order and charge windows. A job scheduled out of order takes its charge from the most recent uncharged idle time; the paper leaves this placement open. Theorem 4.9 and Lemma 4.18 assume m≥2m\ge2m≥2, the setting of §4.1. The goal assumes only m≥1m\ge1m≥1.
  • The printed Lemma 4.18 lacks a ∑j\sum_j∑j​ on the C∗C^*C∗ term. The summed form of its proof's last display is stated.

The statement cannot be made easy by the hypotheses. Two existence items show that an optimal P1P1P1 and a Delay List schedule always exist, so no statement is vacuous. The bound is against every feasible schedule, not against the relaxation's value.

Not stated: the O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) running time, the on-line version of §3's algorithm, and Delay List with precedence constraints (Theorem 4.9 in general, which is the subject of mission III of this series). Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and reusable lemmas on list scheduling with release dates.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM J. Comput. 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • S. Chakrabarti, C. A. Phillips, A. S. Schulz, D. B. Shmoys, C. Stein, J. Wein, Improved scheduling algorithms for minsum criteria, in Proceedings of ICALP 1996, LNCS 1099, Springer, pp. 646–657 (reference [3] of the paper).
  • F. Afrati et al., Approximation schemes for minimizing average weighted completion time with release dates, in Proceedings of the 40th IEEE FOCS, 1999, pp. 32–43 (reference [2] of the paper).
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Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling III: From One Machine to Many with Delay ListResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the sum of weighted completion times ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​ is one of the standard objectives of machine scheduling: it measures the average time a job spends in the system, weighted by its importance. With release dates or precedence constraints the problem is NP-hard already on one machine, and on mmm identical parallel machines it is harder still, so the literature of the 1990s concentrated on approximation algorithms. Many of these, including LP-based ones, are naturally designed for a single machine, where an order of the jobs determines the schedule.

Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), 2001) gave a generic way to move from one machine to many. Their §4 describes an algorithm, Delay List, that takes any one-machine schedule as a priority list and produces an mmm-machine schedule, and proves that a ρ\rhoρ-approximate one-machine schedule yields a ((1+β)ρ+1+1/β)\bigl((1+\beta)\rho+1+1/\beta\bigr)((1+β)ρ+1+1/β)-approximate mmm-machine schedule for every β>0\beta>0β>0. The guarantee holds with release dates and arbitrary precedence constraints simultaneously, which at the time gave the best bounds known for several special cases, for example a factor 4 for series-parallel precedence without release dates.

Setting

An instance has nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0, release date rj≥0r_j\ge 0rj​≥0 and weight wj>0w_j>0wj​>0. Precedence constraints form a strict partial order ≺\prec≺: i≺ji\prec ji≺j means that JjJ_jJj​ may start only after JiJ_iJi​ completes.

A feasible nonpreemptive schedule on mmm machines assigns each job a start time SjS_jSj​ and a machine; each job runs uninterrupted for pjp_jpj​ time units on its machine, two jobs on one machine do not overlap, Sj≥rjS_j\ge r_jSj​≥rj​, and Si+pi≤SjS_i+p_i\le S_jSi​+pi​≤Sj​ whenever i≺ji\prec ji≺j. The completion time is Cj=Sj+pjC_j=S_j+p_jCj​=Sj​+pj​ and the value of the schedule is ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​. A one-machine schedule is the case m=1m=1m=1.

The critical-path length κj\kappa_jκj​ (Definition 4.1) is pj+rjp_j+r_jpj​+rj​ for a job without predecessors and pj+max⁡{max⁡i≺jκi, rj}p_j+\max\{\max_{i\prec j}\kappa_i,\,r_j\}pj​+max{maxi≺j​κi​,rj​} otherwise; it is the earliest time JjJ_jJj​ could complete with unlimited machines.

A list is an ordering π\piπ of the jobs. Delay List with parameter β>0\beta>0β>0 processes time continuously. A job is ready once it is released and all its predecessors have completed; qjmq^m_jqjm​ is the time it becomes ready. The head is the first unscheduled job of the list. Idle machine-time is recorded as charged to jobs. Whenever a machine is idle:

  1. if the head is ready, it is started, and charged all uncharged idle time in (qjm,sjm)(q^m_j,s^m_j)(qjm​,sjm​);
  2. otherwise the first ready job JkJ_kJk​ of the list is started as soon as at least βpk\beta p_kβpk​ units of uncharged idle time have accumulated, and is charged βpk\beta p_kβpk​ of it;
  3. otherwise nothing happens.

For a job JiJ_iJi​, BiB_iBi​ is the set of jobs up to and including JiJ_iJi​ in the list, AiA_iAi​ the set after it, Oi⊆AiO_i\subseteq A_iOi​⊆Ai​ the set of jobs of AiA_iAi​ started before JiJ_iJi​, and p(A)=∑k∈Apkp(A)=\sum_{k\in A}p_kp(A)=∑k∈A​pk​. Definition 4.4 builds from the schedule a backward path Pi′P'_iPi′​ ending at JiJ_iJi​, whose length is κi′\kappa'_iκi′​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.13

Let S1S^1S1 be a feasible one-machine schedule of the instance with ∑jwjCj1≤ρ∑jwjCj′\sum_j w_jC^1_j\le\rho\sum_j w_jC'_j∑j​wj​Cj1​≤ρ∑j​wj​Cj′​ for every feasible one-machine schedule C′C'C′. Let m≥2m\ge 2m≥2 and β>0\beta>0β>0. Every Delay List schedule SmS^mSm built on the completion order of S1S^1S1 satisfies, for every feasible mmm-machine schedule NNN,

∑jwjCjm≤((1+β)ρ+1+1β)∑jwjCjN.\sum_j w_jC^m_j\le\Bigl((1+\beta)\rho+1+\frac1\beta\Bigr)\sum_j w_jC^N_j .j∑​wj​Cjm​≤((1+β)ρ+1+β1​)j∑​wj​CjN​.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • Fact 4.5: κi′≤κi\kappa'_i\le\kappa_iκi′​≤κi​.
  • Fact 4.6: the idle time charged to JiJ_iJi​ is at most βpi\beta p_iβpi​.
  • Lemma 4.7: no uncharged idle time remains in (qim,sim)(q^m_i,s^m_i)(qim​,sim​), and that idle time is charged only to jobs in BiB_iBi​.
  • Lemma 4.8: the idle time charged to AiA_iAi​ within (0,sim)(0,s^m_i)(0,sim​) is at most m(κi′−pi)m(\kappa'_i-p_i)m(κi′​−pi​), so p(Oi)≤m(κi′−pi)/β≤m(κi−pi)/βp(O_i)\le m(\kappa'_i-p_i)/\beta\le m(\kappa_i-p_i)/\betap(Oi​)≤m(κi′​−pi​)/β≤m(κi​−pi​)/β.
  • Theorem 4.9: Cim≤(1+β)p(Bi)/m+(1+1/β)κi′−pi/βC^m_i\le(1+\beta)p(B_i)/m+(1+1/\beta)\kappa'_i-p_i/\betaCim​≤(1+β)p(Bi​)/m+(1+1/β)κi′​−pi​/β for any list obeying precedence.
  • Lemma 4.10: COPTm≥COPT1/mC^m_{\mathrm{OPT}}\ge C^1_{\mathrm{OPT}}/mCOPTm​≥COPT1​/m.
  • Lemma 4.11: COPTm≥∑iwiκi=COPT∞C^m_{\mathrm{OPT}}\ge\sum_i w_i\kappa_i=C^\infty_{\mathrm{OPT}}COPTm​≥∑i​wi​κi​=COPT∞​.
  • Corollary 4.12: Cim≤(1+β)Ci1/m+(1+1/β)κiC^m_i\le(1+\beta)C^1_i/m+(1+1/\beta)\kappa_iCim​≤(1+β)Ci1​/m+(1+1/β)κi​ when the list is the completion order of S1S^1S1.

A further item states that a Delay List schedule exists for every instance and every list, so that the goal does not hold vacuously.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.13 turns every one-machine approximation algorithm for weighted completion time with release dates and precedence into an mmm-machine algorithm at a bounded loss. With an optimal one-machine schedule and β=1\beta=1β=1 the factor is 444 (Corollary 4.14, for series-parallel orders), and the bounds are job-by-job (Theorem 4.9, Corollary 4.12), which the paper uses in Remark 4.15 to extend the method to other metrics and to one-machine schedules that ignore release dates. The same algorithm is the engine of the paper's 222\sqrt222​-approximation for parallel machines with release dates (§4.5).

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1997 (SODA) and 2001 (journal). There is no machine-checked version of it or of any of its lemmas, and the platform currently has no model of scheduling with release dates and precedence constraints. A formalization produces a precise specification of Delay List, whose informal description is given in discrete time and repaired in a remark; a checked proof of the charging argument; and reusable lower bounds (Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11) for any later work on parallel-machine scheduling with precedence.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt, list scheduling (start the first available job of the list whenever a machine is free), fails with non-identical processing times: a long job taken out of order can occupy a machine and delay a more valuable job that becomes ready shortly afterwards. Delay List allows out-of-order jobs only against accumulated idle time, and the analysis rests on a charging invariant. Stating it needs care about time (the paper's discrete-time exposition can over-charge by a time unit), about which idle time a charge consumes, and about many jobs being scheduled at one instant. The bound must hold simultaneously for release dates and arbitrary precedence constraints, where idle machines can be forced both by jobs that are not yet released and by chains of predecessors, and it must hold for every tie-breaking choice of the algorithm.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n, machines Fin m, and times are real numbers. Processing times are positive, release dates nonnegative and weights positive, as in §1. Precedence is a strict partial order, the transitive closure of the paper's DAG; κ\kappaκ, readiness and feasibility are unchanged by taking the closure. The optimum is never a real infimum: "within a factor ρ\rhoρ of an optimal one-machine schedule" and "within a factor ccc of an optimal mmm-machine schedule" are inequalities against every feasible schedule of the same instance, with the same release dates and precedence constraints.

Delay List is formalized in the continuous-time version described in the proof of Fact 4.6, as a predicate on runs that records start times, machines, the order in which jobs are scheduled at equal times, and charge windows. A case-2 charge takes the most recent uncharged idle time, and idle time is charged by whole time slices. Every guarantee is claimed for every run satisfying the predicate. The ties in Definition 4.4 are broken arbitrarily, so statements involving κi′\kappa'_iκi′​ hold for every admissible path. Lemma 4.10 uses nonpreemptive one-machine schedules. Lemma 4.11's COPT∞C^\infty_{\mathrm{OPT}}COPT∞​ is modelled by nnn machines.

It would be trivializing to assume the conclusions of Fact 4.6 or Lemma 4.7 as properties of the run, or to measure ρ\rhoρ against a relaxation without release dates or precedence; both are ruled out. The algorithm's rules are the only hypotheses on the run.

Not stated: the running time of Delay List; the discrete-time algorithm; Corollary 4.14 (it needs a formal class of series-parallel orders and the external one-machine algorithm of Adolphson for them); Remark 4.15 (release-date-free one-machine schedules), whose hypotheses the paper does not pin down; and the extension to delays between jobs. Contributions of general infrastructure, such as idle-time accounting for step functions and lemmas about list schedules under precedence, are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM Journal on Computing 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • R. L. Graham, Bounds for certain multiprocessing anomalies, Bell System Technical Journal 45:1563–1581, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1966.tb01709.x
  • D. Adolphson, Single machine job sequencing with precedence constraints, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(1):40–54, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206002
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Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling IV: List Scheduling from an Optimal One-Machine Schedule Is a 2-Approximation for In-TreesResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the sum of weighted completion times of jobs on identical parallel machines is one of the basic objectives of machine scheduling: it measures the average time a job spends in the system, weighted by its importance. When the jobs are subject to precedence constraints (a job may start only after certain other jobs have finished), the problem is strongly NP-hard already in very restricted cases, and the question becomes how close to optimal a polynomial-time algorithm can guarantee to be.

Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), 2001, doi:10.1137/S0097539797327180), develop a general way to turn a good schedule for a single machine into a good schedule for mmm machines. For arbitrary precedence constraints their conversion (Delay List, §4.1–4.3) loses a factor (1+β)ρ+(1+1/β)(1+\beta)\rho+(1+1/\beta)(1+β)ρ+(1+1/β) over a ρ\rhoρ-approximate one-machine schedule, which is 444 when the one-machine schedule is optimal. In §4.4 they show that for in-tree precedence without release dates, the plain list-scheduling rule of Graham, fed with an optimal one-machine schedule, already achieves ratio 222. In-trees are the precedence structures of assembly processes: every job feeds into at most one later job.

Timeline of the relevant results:

  • 1966–1969: Graham introduces list scheduling on parallel machines and analyzes it for makespan (Graham 1969).
  • 1972: Horn gives a polynomial-time optimal one-machine algorithm for weighted completion time under treelike precedence (Horn 1972).
  • 1977: Adolphson gives O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) one-machine algorithms for tree and series-parallel precedence (Adolphson 1977, the paper's reference [1]).
  • 2001: Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein prove the ratio-222 bound for in-trees on mmm machines (Theorem 4.17).

Setting

There are nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​ and m≥1m\ge 1m≥1 identical machines. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0 and a weight wj>0w_j>0wj​>0; every job is available at time 000 (there are no release dates).

The precedence constraints form an in-tree (more generally, an in-forest): every job jjj has at most one immediate successor succ⁡(j)\operatorname{succ}(j)succ(j), and following successors never returns to the start. Write i≺ji\prec ji≺j if jjj is reached from iii by following successors one or more times.

A feasible schedule SmS^mSm on mmm machines gives each job a start time Sj≥0S_j\ge 0Sj​≥0 and a machine; a job runs without interruption for pjp_jpj​ time units; two jobs on the same machine do not overlap; and i≺ji\prec ji≺j implies that jjj starts no earlier than iii completes. The completion time is Cjm=Sj+pjC^m_j=S_j+p_jCjm​=Sj​+pj​ and the value of the schedule is ∑jwjCjm\sum_j w_jC^m_j∑j​wj​Cjm​.

The critical-path length κj\kappa_jκj​ (Definition 4.1 with no release dates) is κj=pj\kappa_j=p_jκj​=pj​ if jjj has no predecessors and κj=pj+max⁡i≺jκi\kappa_j=p_j+\max_{i\prec j}\kappa_iκj​=pj​+maxi≺j​κi​ otherwise.

A list is an ordering π\piπ of the jobs that obeys the precedence constraints. It defines the one-machine schedule S1S^1S1 that runs the jobs in list order without idle time; its completion times are Cj1C^1_jCj1​, the total processing time of the jobs up to and including jjj in the list. An optimal one-machine schedule is a list minimizing C1=∑jwjCj1C^1=\sum_j w_jC^1_jC1=∑j​wj​Cj1​.

List scheduling (Graham's rule, footnote 3 of the paper) on mmm machines with list π\piπ: whenever a machine is free, start on it the first job of the list that is ready, i.e. whose predecessors have all completed.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.17

Let π\piπ be an optimal one-machine schedule and GGG the list schedule on mmm machines with list π\piπ. Then for every feasible mmm-machine schedule NNN,

∑jwjCjG ≤ 2∑jwjCjN.\sum_j w_jC^G_j\ \le\ 2\sum_j w_jC^N_j .j∑​wj​CjG​ ≤ 2j∑​wj​CjN​.

Milestones

Lemma 4.16 (any precedence-respecting list π\piπ, with its idle-free one-machine schedule S1S^1S1): for every job iii,

CiG ≤ κi+Ci1m.C^G_i\ \le\ \kappa_i+\frac{C^1_i}{m}.CiG​ ≤ κi​+mCi1​​.

Lemma 4.10: COPTm≥COPT1/mC^m_{\mathrm{OPT}}\ge C^1_{\mathrm{OPT}}/mCOPTm​≥COPT1​/m, i.e. ∑jwjCj1/m≤∑jwjCjN\sum_j w_jC^1_j/m\le\sum_j w_jC^N_j∑j​wj​Cj1​/m≤∑j​wj​CjN​ for an optimal list and every feasible NNN.

Lemma 4.11: COPTm≥∑iwiκi=COPT∞C^m_{\mathrm{OPT}}\ge\sum_i w_i\kappa_i=C^\infty_{\mathrm{OPT}}COPTm​≥∑i​wi​κi​=COPT∞​, i.e. ∑iwiκi≤∑iwiCiN\sum_i w_i\kappa_i\le\sum_i w_iC^N_i∑i​wi​κi​≤∑i​wi​CiN​ for every feasible NNN on any number of machines, and the value ∑iwiκi\sum_i w_i\kappa_i∑i​wi​κi​ is attained by a feasible schedule on nnn machines.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.17 gives a simple, fast algorithm with a guaranteed factor 222 for a strongly NP-hard problem, halving the factor 444 that the general Delay List conversion gives for the same class. The per-job bound of Lemma 4.16 is stronger than the aggregate statement: every single job completes within its critical-path length plus a 1/m1/m1/m share of its one-machine completion time, so the same bound applies to other objectives built from completion times.

Formalizing it. The paper's proof is complete and short, but it argues about events at a time ttt (jobs that finish exactly at ttt, jobs that become ready at ttt, machines freed at ttt) and runs an induction over jobs ordered by start time with an invariant about idle time. A machine-checked version fixes what "list scheduling" means precisely, pins down the counting argument that uses the in-tree structure, and yields reusable definitions of nonpreemptive parallel-machine schedules, critical paths and list schedules. To the knowledge of this mission, none of these results has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

List scheduling may start a job that is late in the list before an earlier one, because the earlier job is not yet ready; so the one-machine order is not preserved and the obvious comparison with S1S^1S1 fails. Idle machines are the other obstacle: a machine can stay idle while a job waits for its predecessors, and a per-job bound of the form κi+Ci1/m\kappa_i+C^1_i/mκi​+Ci1​/m holds only if such idle time can be accounted for by JiJ_iJi​'s own chain of predecessors. For general precedence constraints, and for out-trees (every job has at most one immediate predecessor), the paper's accounting breaks down, and the paper states the per-job bound only for in-trees; the in-tree structure is essential to the argument. Events with several jobs finishing at the same instant, and ties in start times, have to be handled without loss.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are Fin n, machines Fin m, times real numbers. Processing times and weights are strictly positive. There are no release dates: start times are nonnegative. The paper admits pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 only in lower-bound instances elsewhere; the bounds here assume pj>0p_j>0pj​>0.
  • In-trees are encoded by an immediate-successor map succ : Fin n → Option (Fin n) with no cycles; this covers in-forests, the reading of "in-trees" in Theorem 4.17. The precedence relation is its transitive closure.
  • κ\kappaκ is defined by well-founded recursion on the precedence order, exactly as Definition 4.1 with r≡0r\equiv 0r≡0.
  • One-machine schedules are represented by their precedence-respecting order and are idle-free; with no release dates and positive processing times idle time only delays jobs, so optimality among orders is optimality among one-machine schedules. The optimal one-machine schedule is a hypothesis of the goal; the paper's O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) algorithm for computing it (reference [1]) is not formalized, and the running-time claim of Theorem 4.17 is not stated. A separate item asserts that an optimal order exists.
  • List scheduling is specified by two properties that determine Graham's rule up to machine labels: no machine is idle while a ready job waits, and among jobs ready at a start time the earlier one in the list starts first. A separate item asserts that such a schedule exists for every precedence-respecting list, so the goal is not vacuous.
  • Optima are never formed as infima: the approximation ratio is stated against every feasible schedule. A statement of the form "there is an algorithm with ratio 2" would be trivial (an optimal schedule exists) and is ruled out: the goal is about the paper's algorithm.
  • The equality ∑iwiκi=COPT∞\sum_i w_i\kappa_i=C^\infty_{\mathrm{OPT}}∑i​wi​κi​=COPT∞​ in Lemma 4.11 is stated as attainment on nnn machines (as many machines as jobs), which together with the lower bound on every number of machines is the optimum with unboundedly many machines.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the two existence items (Graham's list schedule by event-driven construction; an optimal order over the finite set of linear extensions), of Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11, and of Lemma 4.16. The schedule and list-scheduling definitions are reusable for other parallel-machine results with precedence constraints.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM J. Comput. 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • R. L. Graham, Bounds on multiprocessing timing anomalies, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17(2):416–429, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117039
  • W. A. Horn, Single-machine job sequencing with treelike precedence ordering and linear delay penalties, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 23(2):189–202, 1972. https://doi.org/10.1137/0123021
  • D. L. Adolphson, Single machine job sequencing with precedence constraints, SIAM J. Comput. 6(1):40–54, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206002
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On Certain Polytopes Associated with Graphs I: Clique Inequalities Define the Stable Set Polytope Exactly for Perfect GraphsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many combinatorial optimization problems ask for the best subset of a finite set subject to combinatorial side conditions. The polyhedral method replaces the finite family of feasible subsets by the convex hull of their incidence vectors and asks for an explicit system of linear inequalities describing that convex hull; once such a system is known, linear programming duality gives min–max theorems and certificates of optimality. The maximum weight stable set problem is the central test case: it is NP-hard in general, so no tractable complete description of its polytope is expected for all graphs, and the question becomes for which graphs a simple description suffices.

V. Chvátal's 1975 paper On certain polytopes associated with graphs answers this question for the two simplest families of valid inequalities, and its Section 3 connects the answer to Berge's perfect graphs. The result is a standard entry point to polyhedral combinatorics and is one of the ingredients behind the later polynomial-time algorithms for stable sets in perfect graphs by Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver.

Timeline. Berge (1961) introduced perfect graphs and conjectured that a graph is perfect if and only if its complement is. Lovász (Normal hypergraphs and the perfect graph conjecture, Discrete Math. 1972; A characterization of perfect graphs, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 1972) proved this, together with the characterization of perfection by α(GA) ω(GA)≥∣A∣\alpha(G_A)\,\omega(G_A)\ge|A|α(GA​)ω(GA​)≥∣A∣ and the invariance of perfection under vertex duplication. Fulkerson's theory of antiblocking polyhedra (1971–72) gave a polyhedral route to the same equivalence. Chvátal (received 1972, published 1975) gave the self-contained polyhedral statement formalized here, with a proof based on Lovász's two theorems.

Setting

A graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) is finite, undirected and loopless. A stable set is a set of vertices no two of which are adjacent. A clique is a maximal complete subgraph, and C(G)C(G)C(G) is the set of vertex sets W⊆VW\subseteq VW⊆V of the cliques of GGG.

S(G)⊆RVS(G)\subseteq\mathbb R^VS(G)⊆RV is the set of zero–one vectors x=(xu:u∈V)x=(x_u:u\in V)x=(xu​:u∈V) such that {u:xu=1}\{u:x_u=1\}{u:xu​=1} is stable, and the stable set polytope is P(G)=conv⁡S(G)P(G)=\operatorname{conv}S(G)P(G)=convS(G). A finite system of linear inequalities is a defining linear system of P(G)P(G)P(G) if its solution set is exactly P(G)P(G)P(G). For c∈RVc\in\mathbb R^Vc∈RV write cx=∑u∈Vcuxucx=\sum_{u\in V}c_ux_ucx=∑u∈V​cu​xu​.

GGG is perfect (the paper's α\alphaα-perfect) if for every zero–one vector ccc,

max⁡{cx:x∈S(G)}=min⁡{∑W∈C(G)λW: λW∈{0,1}, ∑W∈C(G), u∈WλW≥cu (u∈V)}.\max\{cx:x\in S(G)\}=\min\Big\{\sum_{W\in C(G)}\lambda_W:\ \lambda_W\in\{0,1\},\ \sum_{W\in C(G),\,u\in W}\lambda_W\ge c_u\ (u\in V)\Big\}.max{cx:x∈S(G)}=min{W∈C(G)∑​λW​: λW​∈{0,1}, W∈C(G),u∈W∑​λW​≥cu​ (u∈V)}.

For A⊆VA\subseteq VA⊆V, GAG_AGA​ is the induced subgraph, α(GA)\alpha(G_A)α(GA​) its stability number and ω(GA)\omega(G_A)ω(GA​) its clique number. To duplicate a vertex uuu is to add a new vertex u′u'u′ adjacent to all neighbours of uuu but not to uuu.

In the Lean development these are stableVectors G, stablePolytope G, maximalCliques G, IsPerfect G and duplicate G u in the namespace ChvatalPolytopes.Perfect.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 140)

For every graph GGG, the system

−xu≤0(u∈V),∑u∈Wxu≤1(W∈C(G))-x_u\le0\quad(u\in V),\qquad\sum_{u\in W}x_u\le1\quad(W\in C(G))−xu​≤0(u∈V),u∈W∑​xu​≤1(W∈C(G))

is a defining linear system of P(G)P(G)P(G) if and only if GGG is perfect. Both directions are required.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1 (pp. 139–140). For a finite nonempty set SSS of solutions of −xu≤0-x_u\le0−xu​≤0, ∑uaiuxu≤bi\sum_u a_{iu}x_u\le b_i∑u​aiu​xu​≤bi​ (i∈J)(i\in J)(i∈J), the solution set equals conv⁡S\operatorname{conv}SconvS if and only if for every c∈ZVc\in\mathbb Z^Vc∈ZV
max⁡{cx:x∈S}=min⁡{∑iλibi:λ≥0, ∑iλiaiu≥cu (u∈V)}.\max\{cx:x\in S\}=\min\Big\{\sum_i\lambda_ib_i:\lambda\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda_ia_{iu}\ge c_u\ (u\in V)\Big\}.max{cx:x∈S}=min{i∑​λi​bi​:λ≥0, i∑​λi​aiu​≥cu​ (u∈V)}.
  1. Lovász's first theorem (§3, p. 140). Every nonperfect GGG has A⊆VA\subseteq VA⊆V with α(GA) ω(GA)<∣A∣\alpha(G_A)\,\omega(G_A)<|A|α(GA​)ω(GA​)<∣A∣.
  2. Lovász's second theorem (§3, p. 140). Duplicating a vertex of a perfect graph gives a perfect graph.
  3. Condition (iii) (p. 141). GGG is perfect if and only if for every c∈ZVc\in\mathbb Z^Vc∈ZV
max⁡{cx:x∈S(G)}=min⁡{∑W∈C(G)λW:λW≥0, ∑W∋uλW≥cu (u∈V)}.\max\{cx:x\in S(G)\}=\min\Big\{\sum_{W\in C(G)}\lambda_W:\lambda_W\ge0,\ \sum_{W\ni u}\lambda_W\ge c_u\ (u\in V)\Big\}.max{cx:x∈S(G)}=min{W∈C(G)∑​λW​:λW​≥0, W∋u∑​λW​≥cu​ (u∈V)}.

Significance

The result. The nonnegativity and clique inequalities are valid for P(G)P(G)P(G) for every graph. Theorem 3.1 says they are complete exactly for perfect graphs, so on perfect graphs the maximum weight stable set problem is a linear program over an explicitly described polytope, and weighted min–max theorems (stable sets versus clique covers) follow from LP duality. Combined with the perfect graph theorem, it gives a polyhedral characterization of perfect graphs, and it is the model for later results that identify graph classes by the facets of their stable set polytopes (odd-cycle inequalities, ttt-perfection, Section 7 of the same paper).

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved. No machine-checked version of it is known, and Mathlib has neither perfect graphs nor stable set polytopes. The mission produces a formal statement of the polyhedral characterization with the paper's own notion of perfection, a formal version of the convex-hull/LP min–max principle (Proposition 2.1), which is reusable for any 0–1 polytope, and formal statements of the two theorems of Lovász that the proof relies on.

Difficulty

Proposition 2.1 reduces Theorem 3.1 to the equivalence of perfection with a fractional min–max for all integer weights. The obvious approach to that equivalence fails in both directions. From perfection one only gets the min–max for zero–one weights and zero–one multipliers; general integer weights do not reduce to zero–one weights by linearity, because the minimum over clique covers is not additive in ccc. Conversely, a fractional clique cover of value α\alphaα does not directly produce an integral one. The paper crosses this gap with two theorems of Lovász: a numerical certificate of nonperfection, and the invariance of perfection under vertex duplication. Both are substantial graph-theoretic results in their own right, and neither follows from the definitions by routine manipulation.

Proposition 2.1 itself needs separation of a point from a polytope by an integral objective and LP strong duality with the nonnegativity rows handled separately.

Formalization scope

Vertices form a finite type V with decidable equality; a graph is a SimpleGraph V. S(G)S(G)S(G) is a set of functions V → ℝ, and P(G)P(G)P(G) is Mathlib's convexHull ℝ of it. C(G)C(G)C(G) is the finset of finsets that are maximal among cliques (Maximal), as on the page; with V=∅V=\emptysetV=∅ the only maximal clique is ∅\emptyset∅. "Defining linear system" is an equality of sets. Every "max = min" is written out in full: there is a value mmm that is the maximum over SSS (attained and an upper bound), some feasible multiplier vector attains mmm, and every feasible multiplier vector has objective at least mmm. Clique multipliers are functions Finset V → ℝ read only on C(G)C(G)C(G).

Explicit conventions and added hypotheses:

  • In Proposition 2.1 the index set JJJ is a finite type, coefficients are real, the nonnegativity rows are kept as a separate conjunct x≥0x\ge0x≥0, and SSS is assumed nonempty (the paper's max⁡\maxmax over SSS needs it).
  • α\alphaα and ω\omegaω are Mathlib's indepNum and cliqueNum (natural numbers) of G.induce A.
  • The duplicated graph lives on Option V, with none the new vertex.

Perfection is the paper's zero–one min–max, not "the clique system defines P(G)P(G)P(G)" (which would make the goal a tautology) and not Berge's χ(GA)=ω(GA)\chi(G_A)=\omega(G_A)χ(GA​)=ω(GA​) (a different definition, equivalent only through the perfect graph theorem). P(G)P(G)P(G) is the convex hull of S(G)S(G)S(G), never the solution set of an inequality system.

Needed infrastructure, all reusable: integral separation from a rational polytope and LP strong duality in the form max⁡{cx:Ax≤b,x≥0}=min⁡{λb:λA≥c,λ≥0}\max\{cx:Ax\le b,x\ge0\}=\min\{\lambda b:\lambda A\ge c,\lambda\ge0\}max{cx:Ax≤b,x≥0}=min{λb:λA≥c,λ≥0}; basic facts about stable sets and maximal cliques of induced subgraphs and of duplicated graphs; invariance of IsPerfect under graph isomorphism and under taking induced subgraphs. Proofs of the Lovász milestones, which have independent value for a Mathlib theory of perfect graphs, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Chvátal, On certain polytopes associated with graphs, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 18 (1975) 138–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(75)90041-6
  • L. Lovász, Normal hypergraphs and the perfect graph conjecture, Discrete Math. 2 (1972) 253–267. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(72)90006-4
  • L. Lovász, A characterization of perfect graphs, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 13 (1972) 95–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(72)90045-7
  • D. R. Fulkerson, Anti-blocking polyhedra, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 12 (1972) 50–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(72)90032-9
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4
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On Certain Polytopes Associated with Graphs II: No Clique Is a Cutset of a Connected α-Critical GraphResearch Paper

Motivation

The stability number α(G)\alpha(G)α(G) of a graph, the largest number of pairwise non-adjacent vertices, is the optimum of an integer program over the stable set polytope P(G)P(G)P(G). Linear programming duality turns any explicit linear description of P(G)P(G)P(G) into a certificate of optimality for α(G)\alpha(G)α(G), which is why the question "which inequalities are needed to describe P(G)P(G)P(G)?" has been central to polyhedral combinatorics since Edmonds' description of the matching polytope (Edmonds 1965). Chvátal's 1975 paper (doi:10.1016/0095-8956(75)90041-6) initiated the systematic study of P(G)P(G)P(G) for arbitrary graphs: which graph operations preserve a known description, and which inequalities are facets, i.e. indispensable in every description.

Section 4 of the paper treats one such operation, gluing two graphs along a complete subgraph, and one family of facets, the "rank" inequality ∑uxu≤α(G)\sum_u x_u\le\alpha(G)∑u​xu​≤α(G) for graphs whose critical edges connect all vertices. Combining the two yields a purely graph-theoretic fact about α\alphaα-critical graphs (graphs in which deleting any edge increases the stability number): no complete subgraph separates such a graph. The fact is due to Berge (Graphes et hypergraphes, 1970, Ch. 13, §3, Corollary 2); Chvátal's derivation obtains it from polyhedral arguments. α\alphaα-critical graphs were studied by Erdős and Gallai, Hajnal, Andrásfai and Lovász, and their structure is closely tied to the facets of P(G)P(G)P(G).

Setting

Graphs are finite, undirected and loopless: G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E). A stable set is a set of pairwise non-adjacent vertices; α(G)\alpha(G)α(G) is the largest size of a stable set. The incidence vector of s⊆Vs\subseteq Vs⊆V is χs∈RV\chi^s\in\mathbb R^Vχs∈RV with χus=1\chi^s_u=1χus​=1 for u∈su\in su∈s and 000 otherwise. S(G)S(G)S(G) is the set of incidence vectors of stable sets and

P(G)=conv⁡S(G)⊆RV.P(G)=\operatorname{conv}S(G)\subseteq\mathbb R^V .P(G)=convS(G)⊆RV.

A finite system ∑u∈Vaiuxu≤bi\sum_{u\in V}a_{iu}x_u\le b_i∑u∈V​aiu​xu​≤bi​ (i∈J)(i\in J)(i∈J) is a defining linear system of PPP if its solution set is exactly PPP. An inequality ∑uauxu≤b\sum_u a_ux_u\le b∑u​au​xu​≤b is a facet of PPP if every defining linear system of PPP contains, for some t>0t>0t>0, the inequality ∑utauxu≤tb\sum_u ta_ux_u\le tb∑u​tau​xu​≤tb.

An edge eee of GGG is critical if α(G−e)=α(G)+1\alpha(G-e)=\alpha(G)+1α(G−e)=α(G)+1; E∗E^*E∗ denotes the set of critical edges, G∗=(V,E∗)G^*=(V,E^*)G∗=(V,E∗), and GGG is α\alphaα-critical if every edge is critical. For graphs G1=(V1,E1)G_1=(V_1,E_1)G1​=(V1​,E1​), G2=(V2,E2)G_2=(V_2,E_2)G2​=(V2​,E2​) put G1∩G2=(V1∩V2,E1∩E2)G_1\cap G_2=(V_1\cap V_2,E_1\cap E_2)G1​∩G2​=(V1​∩V2​,E1​∩E2​) and G1∪G2=(V1∪V2,E1∪E2)G_1\cup G_2=(V_1\cup V_2,E_1\cup E_2)G1​∪G2​=(V1​∪V2​,E1​∪E2​). A vertex set KKK is a cutset of GGG if two vertices outside KKK are joined by no path of G−KG-KG−K, the subgraph induced on V∖KV\setminus KV∖K.

In Lean, all objects live in the namespace ChvatalPolytopes.Separation: stablePolytope G, IsFacet P a b, IsCriticalEdge, criticalGraph G (for G∗G^*G∗), IsAlphaCritical G and IsCutset G K.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 4.3 (p. 144)

For a finite connected α\alphaα-critical graph GGG and any K⊆VK\subseteq VK⊆V inducing a complete subgraph,

K is not a cutset of G.K \text{ is not a cutset of } G .K is not a cutset of G.

The goal is pure graph theory; its proof in the paper consists of the two polyhedral theorems below.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1 (pp. 139–140). For a finite nonempty set SSS of solutions of −xu≤0-x_u\le0−xu​≤0 (u∈V)(u\in V)(u∈V), ∑uaiuxu≤bi\sum_u a_{iu}x_u\le b_i∑u​aiu​xu​≤bi​ (i∈J)(i\in J)(i∈J): the solution set equals conv⁡S\operatorname{conv}SconvS if and only if for every c∈ZVc\in\mathbb Z^Vc∈ZV
max⁡{cx:x∈S}=min⁡{∑iλibi:λ≥0, ∑iλiaiu≥cu (u∈V)}.\max\{cx:x\in S\}=\min\Big\{\sum_i\lambda_ib_i:\lambda\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda_ia_{iu}\ge c_u\ (u\in V)\Big\}.max{cx:x∈S}=min{i∑​λi​bi​:λ≥0, i∑​λi​aiu​≥cu​ (u∈V)}.
  1. Theorem 4.1 (p. 141). If G1∩G2G_1\cap G_2G1​∩G2​ is complete, the union of defining linear systems of P(G1)P(G_1)P(G1​) and P(G2)P(G_2)P(G2​) (each containing its nonnegativity rows) is a defining linear system of P(G1∪G2)P(G_1\cup G_2)P(G1​∪G2​).
  2. Theorem 4.2 (p. 143). If G∗G^*G∗ is connected, then
∑u∈Vxu≤α(G)\sum_{u\in V}x_u\le\alpha(G)u∈V∑​xu​≤α(G)

is a facet of P(G)P(G)P(G).

Significance

Theorem 4.1 says that clique-sums are harmless for linear descriptions of P(G)P(G)P(G): a description of a graph glued along a clique is the union of descriptions of the pieces. It underlies the later decomposition theory of stable set polytopes (clique cutsets appear throughout the study of perfect and ttt-perfect graphs). Theorem 4.2 supplies a large class of facets with a combinatorial certificate, and was the starting point of the study of rank facets. Corollary 4.3 illustrates how polyhedral statements yield structural graph theory: the facet in Theorem 4.2 cannot coexist with a clique cutset.

All three results are proved in the paper, and Berge's corollary was known before it. None of them has, to the knowledge of this mission, a machine-checked proof; Mathlib has stable sets (IsIndepSet, indepNum), cliques and convex hulls, but no stable set polytope, no notion of facet via defining systems, and no α\alphaα-critical graphs. The mission produces these definitions and the formal proofs of Proposition 2.1, Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and Corollary 4.3.

Difficulty

Proposition 2.1 requires LP duality in the form "min = max with both optima attained" together with a separation argument that reduces arbitrary objectives to integral ones; the "if" direction fails without the nonnegativity rows, so the statement is sensitive to the exact form of the system. In Theorem 4.1 the inclusion P(G1∪G2)⊆P(G_1\cup G_2)\subseteqP(G1​∪G2​)⊆ (solutions of the union) is routine; the difficulty is the converse: a point whose restrictions lie in P(G1)P(G_1)P(G1​) and in P(G2)P(G_2)P(G2​) is a convex combination of stable sets on each side, and the two combinations have to be matched on the clique V1∩V2V_1\cap V_2V1​∩V2​ to produce stable sets of G1∪G2G_1\cup G_2G1​∪G2​. Theorem 4.2 concerns every defining linear system, so it cannot be proved by exhibiting one description; the natural route via "affinely independent tight points" is a different definition of facet and needs full-dimensionality of P(G)P(G)P(G) to be equivalent. Finally, the goal requires translating a cutset into a decomposition G=G1∪G2G=G_1\cup G_2G=G1​∪G2​ with complete intersection, and then showing that a union of two systems on smaller vertex sets cannot contain a positive multiple of ∑u∈Vxu≤α(G)\sum_{u\in V}x_u\le\alpha(G)∑u∈V​xu​≤α(G).

Formalization scope

  • Graphs are SimpleGraph V on a Fintype V with DecidableEq V. S(G)S(G)S(G) is a set of functions V → ℝ (incidence vectors of stable finsets), and P(G)P(G)P(G) is convexHull ℝ (stableVectors G).
  • Linear systems are indexed by finite types with real coefficients. "Defining linear system" is equality of the solution set with the polytope. IsFacet quantifies over all finite index types J : Type and all real systems whose solution set equals the polytope; it is the paper's definition, not the affinely-independent-points characterization.
  • Proposition 2.1: "min = max" means an attained minimum equal to the maximum; the hypothesis S≠∅S\neq\emptysetS=∅ is added (the paper's max⁡\maxmax over SSS needs it), and the nonnegativity rows are kept.
  • Theorem 4.1: the glued graph GGG lives on a type VVV with finsets V1∪V2=VV_1\cup V_2=VV1​∪V2​=V; G1,G2G_1,G_2G1​,G2​ are the induced subgraphs on V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​; "G1∩G2G_1\cap G_2G1​∩G2​ complete" is encoded as "V1∩V2V_1\cap V_2V1​∩V2​ is a clique of GGG and no edge joins V1−V2V_1-V_2V1​−V2​ to V2−V1V_2-V_1V2​−V1​", which is equivalent to the paper's hypotheses. The rows of each system are evaluated on the restriction of xxx.
  • Theorem 4.2: "G∗G^*G∗ connected" is Mathlib's Connected, which requires V≠∅V\neq\emptysetV=∅ — for V=∅V=\emptysetV=∅ the statement would be false. α(G)\alpha(G)α(G) is indepNum, cast to R\mathbb RR.
  • Corollary 4.3: "complete subgraph" is any clique set G.IsClique K, not only maximal cliques (the paper reserves "clique" for maximal complete subgraphs, but the corollary speaks of complete subgraphs), including K=∅K=\emptysetK=∅. "Cutset" means two vertices outside KKK joined by no path of G−KG-KG−K. The formalization "G−KG-KG−K is not connected" is ruled out: under Mathlib's convention it would make K=VK=VK=V a cutset and the statement false for K1K_1K1​ and K2K_2K2​.
  • Reusable infrastructure: the stable set polytope, facets via defining systems, Proposition 2.1 (shared with the other missions of this series), critical edges and α\alphaα-critical graphs. Contributions of intermediate lemmas (LP duality in the attained form, full-dimensionality of P(G)P(G)P(G), the cutset–decomposition equivalence) are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Chvátal, On certain polytopes associated with graphs, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 18 (1975) 138–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(75)90041-6
  • C. Berge, Graphes et hypergraphes, Dunod, Paris, 1970 (English translation: Graphs and Hypergraphs, North-Holland, 1973), Chapter 13, §3.
  • J. Edmonds, Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965) 125–130. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069B.013
  • M. W. Padberg, On the facial structure of set packing polyhedra, Math. Programming 5 (1973) 199–215. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580121
  • L. Lovász, Normal hypergraphs and the perfect graph conjecture, Discrete Math. 2 (1972) 253–267. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(72)90006-4
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On Certain Polytopes Associated with Graphs IV: Adjacent Stable Sets on the Stable Set PolytopeResearch Paper

Motivation

Many combinatorial optimization problems are linear programs over a polytope whose vertices are the zero–one incidence vectors of the feasible objects: matchings, stable sets, spanning trees. The edges of such a polytope (pairs of vertices joined by a one-dimensional face) govern the behaviour of the simplex method and of local-search procedures, which move from vertex to vertex along edges: a pivot of the simplex method on a nondegenerate basis replaces a vertex by one of its neighbours.

In December 1971 M. L. Balinski asked when two matchings M1,M2M_1, M_2M1​,M2​ of a graph are neighbours on the matching polyhedron determined by Edmonds (Edmonds 1965). V. Chvátal answered a more general question in §6 of On certain polytopes associated with graphs (Chvátal 1975): he characterized the neighbours on the stable set polytope of an arbitrary graph. Since matchings of GGG are the stable sets of the line graph L(G)L(G)L(G), Balinski's question is the special case of line graphs (Corollary 6.3 of the paper).

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a finite undirected loopless graph. A stable set is a set of vertices no two of which are adjacent. S(G)S(G)S(G) denotes the set of all zero–one vectors x=(xu:u∈V)x=(x_u : u\in V)x=(xu​:u∈V) such that {u:xu=1}\{u : x_u=1\}{u:xu​=1} is stable, and the stable set polytope is

P(G)=conv⁡S(G)⊆RV.P(G)=\operatorname{conv} S(G)\subseteq \mathbb R^V .P(G)=convS(G)⊆RV.

For y∈S(G)y\in S(G)y∈S(G) the corresponding stable set is Y={u:yu=1}Y=\{u : y_u=1\}Y={u:yu​=1}.

For an integer-valued vector c=(cu:u∈V)c=(c_u : u\in V)c=(cu​:u∈V) write cx=∑u∈Vcuxucx=\sum_{u\in V}c_ux_ucx=∑u∈V​cu​xu​. Two vectors y,zy, zy,z are neighbours in P(G)P(G)P(G) if there is an integer-valued ccc such that yyy and zzz are the only two vectors which maximize cxcxcx over S(G)S(G)S(G); in particular y≠zy\neq zy=z. This is the definition the paper states at the start of the proof of Theorem 6.2.

A bicoloration of a graph TTT is a partition V=B∪RV=B\cup RV=B∪R, B∩R=∅B\cap R=\emptysetB∩R=∅, such that every edge joins BBB to RRR. Every tree has one.

In the Lean development these objects are stableVectors G (S(G)S(G)S(G)), stablePolytope G (P(G)P(G)P(G)), onesSet y (YYY), AreNeighbors G y z and IsBicoloration T B R, all in the namespace ChvatalPolytopes.Neighbors.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2 (p. 149)

For y,z∈S(G)y,z\in S(G)y,z∈S(G) with corresponding stable sets Y,ZY,ZY,Z,

y and z are neighbours in P(G)  ⟺  the subgraph H of G induced by (Y−Z)∪(Z−Y) is connected.y \text{ and } z \text{ are neighbours in } P(G) \iff \text{the subgraph } H \text{ of } G \text{ induced by } (Y-Z)\cup(Z-Y) \text{ is connected.}y and z are neighbours in P(G)⟺the subgraph H of G induced by (Y−Z)∪(Z−Y) is connected.

Milestone: Lemma 6.1 (p. 149)

For a tree T=(V,E)T=(V,E)T=(V,E) with a bicoloration V=B∪RV=B\cup RV=B∪R there are nonnegative integers cuc_ucu​ (u∈Vu\in Vu∈V) and mmm with

∑u∈Vcuxu≤mfor all x∈S(T),\sum_{u\in V}c_ux_u\le m\quad\text{for all } x\in S(T),u∈V∑​cu​xu​≤mfor all x∈S(T),

with equality exactly when xxx is the incidence vector of BBB or of RRR.

Milestone: the certificate of the "if" part (p. 149, proof of Theorem 6.2, (i))

If HHH is connected with spanning tree TTT, and cuc_ucu​ (u∈(Y−Z)∪(Z−Y)u\in (Y-Z)\cup(Z-Y)u∈(Y−Z)∪(Z−Y)), mmm are as in Lemma 6.1 for TTT, extend ccc by cu=1c_u=1cu​=1 on Y∩ZY\cap ZY∩Z and cu=−1c_u=-1cu​=−1 outside Y∪ZY\cup ZY∪Z. Then

∑u∈Vcuxu≤m+∣Y∩Z∣for all x∈S(G),\sum_{u\in V}c_ux_u\le m+|Y\cap Z|\quad\text{for all } x\in S(G),u∈V∑​cu​xu​≤m+∣Y∩Z∣for all x∈S(G),

with equality if and only if x=yx=yx=y or x=zx=zx=z.

Significance

Theorem 6.2 describes the 1-skeleton of the stable set polytope of every graph by a condition that can be checked in linear time, although optimizing over P(G)P(G)P(G) is NP-hard in general and no complete linear description of P(G)P(G)P(G) is known for general graphs. Through line graphs it gives the adjacency criterion for the matching polytope (two matchings are neighbours if and only if their symmetric difference is a single path or cycle), which settled Balinski's question. Characterizations of this type underlie the analysis of simplex-type and pivoting algorithms on combinatorial polytopes and the study of their diameters.

The result has been proved since 1975. The mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the theorem as stated in the paper; no formal proof of Theorem 6.2 or of the matching-polytope corollary is known to exist on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. The two milestones isolate the constructive half (Lemma 6.1 and the weighting built from it), which is reusable for any statement that needs an explicit objective singling out two stable sets.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction and the equality analysis are elementary; the substance lies in the "if" direction. An objective that makes both yyy and zzz optimal is easy to write down, for example c=y+zc=y+zc=y+z; the difficulty is to make them the only optimal vectors. Any stable set that agrees with YYY on some connected pieces of HHH and with ZZZ on others ties with yyy and zzz under naive weightings, so the weights on (Y−Z)∪(Z−Y)(Y-Z)\cup(Z-Y)(Y−Z)∪(Z−Y) must be chosen so that every mixed choice loses strictly. The integrality requirement on ccc and the need to control all of S(G)S(G)S(G), not only the stable sets contained in Y∪ZY\cup ZY∪Z, rule out a direct perturbation argument.

Formalization scope

  • Graphs. VVV is a finite type with decidable equality and GGG is a SimpleGraph V; loops and multiple edges are excluded, as in the paper.
  • S(G)S(G)S(G) and P(G)P(G)P(G). S(G)S(G)S(G) is the set of incidence vectors in V → ℝ of stable finsets; P(G)P(G)P(G) is convexHull ℝ (S G).
  • Neighbours. Defined exactly as on p. 149: y≠zy\ne zy=z and, for some c:V→Zc : V\to\mathbb Zc:V→Z, the set of maximizers of cxcxcx over S(G)S(G)S(G) equals {y,z}\{y,z\}{y,z}. The face-lattice notion of an edge of P(G)P(G)P(G) is not used; its equivalence with this definition is not part of the paper.
  • Induced subgraph and connectedness. HHH is G.induce of the set (Y∖Z)∪(Z∖Y)(Y\setminus Z)\cup(Z\setminus Y)(Y∖Z)∪(Z∖Y), and "connected" is Mathlib's SimpleGraph.Connected, which requires at least one vertex. For y=zy=zy=z both sides of the goal are therefore false.
  • Trees. SimpleGraph.IsTree, which includes connectedness; a spanning tree of HHH is a graph TTT on the vertex set of HHH with T≤HT\le HT≤H and T.IsTree. In Lemma 6.1 the integers cuc_ucu​ and mmm are natural numbers.

A trivializing formalization — defining neighbours through the symmetric-difference condition or through Lemma 6.1's certificate, or omitting y≠zy\neq zy=z from the definition — is excluded: neighbours are defined only through unique maximizers of integer objectives over S(G)S(G)S(G).

A complete development needs only finite graphs, induced subgraphs, spanning trees of connected graphs (available in Mathlib) and finite sums. Contributions welcome beyond the milestones: the equivalence of this notion of neighbours with the one-dimensional faces of P(G)P(G)P(G), and Corollary 6.3 for the matching polytope via line graphs.

Selected references

  • V. Chvátal, On certain polytopes associated with graphs, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B 18 (1975), 138–154. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(75)90041-6
  • J. Edmonds, Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices, Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards 69B (1965), 125–130. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069B.013
  • M. W. Padberg, On the facial structure of set packing polyhedra, Mathematical Programming 5 (1973), 199–215. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580121
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Linear Optimization under Bandit Feedback 1: The Regret Bound of ConfidenceBallResearch Paper

Motivation

In stochastic linear optimization under bandit feedback a learner repeatedly chooses a decision xtx_txt​ from a fixed set D⊆RnD\subseteq\mathbb R^nD⊆Rn and observes only the noisy cost of that one decision, whose expectation is a fixed but unknown linear function μ⊤xt\mu^\top x_tμ⊤xt​. The model covers online routing, ad and product selection with feature vectors, and any sequential decision problem whose decision set is too large to enumerate but whose expected cost is linear in a known representation. The multi-armed bandit is the special case where DDD is the set of standard basis vectors.

Dani, Hayes and Kakade (COLT 2008) analysed the algorithm ConfidenceBall₂, a generalization of Auer's LinRel (JMLR 2002), and proved that its regret is O∗(nT)O^*(n\sqrt T)O∗(nT​) with high probability for an arbitrary compact decision set, and that this is optimal up to logarithmic factors. Their confidence-ellipsoid construction became the template for later linear bandit algorithms (OFUL, LinUCB), and the ellipsoid-plus-potential analysis is the standard argument of the field (Lattimore and Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Chapters 19–20).

Timeline: Auer (2002) introduced LinRel for finite decision sets; Dani, Hayes and Kakade (2008) extended it to arbitrary compact sets with the O∗(nT)O^*(n\sqrt T)O∗(nT​) bound and a matching Ω(nT)\Omega(n\sqrt T)Ω(nT​) lower bound; Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis (Math. Oper. Res. 2010) studied linearly parameterized bandits with dimension-dependent regret bounds; Abbasi-Yadkori, Pál and Szepesvári (NeurIPS 2011) sharpened the confidence ellipsoids with self-normalized martingale bounds.

Setting

Fix n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and a compact decision set D⊆RnD\subseteq\mathbb R^nD⊆Rn whose standard basis e1,…,ene_1,\dots,e_ne1​,…,en​ is a barycentric spanner: each ei∈De_i\in Dei​∈D and every x∈Dx\in Dx∈D lies in the cube [−1,1]n[-1,1]^n[−1,1]n. The paper's Section 5 adopts these coordinates without loss of generality. An unknown vector μ∈Rn\mu\in\mathbb R^nμ∈Rn satisfies ∣μ⊤x∣≤1|\mu^\top x|\le1∣μ⊤x∣≤1 for x∈Dx\in Dx∈D, and x∗∈Dx^*\in Dx∗∈D minimises μ⊤x\mu^\top xμ⊤x.

On round t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… the learner plays xt∈Dx_t\in Dxt​∈D, measurable with respect to the information Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ before round ttt, and observes a loss ℓt∈[−1,1]\ell_t\in[-1,1]ℓt​∈[−1,1] with E[ℓt∣Ft]=μ⊤xt\mathbb E[\ell_t\mid\mathcal F_t]=\mu^\top x_tE[ℓt​∣Ft​]=μ⊤xt​. The regret after TTT rounds is

RT=∑t=1T(μ⊤xt−μ⊤x∗).R_T=\sum_{t=1}^T\big(\mu^\top x_t-\mu^\top x^*\big).RT​=t=1∑T​(μ⊤xt​−μ⊤x∗).

ConfidenceBall₂(D,δ)(D,\delta)(D,δ) maintains the design matrix At=I+∑τ<txτxτ⊤A_t=I+\sum_{\tau<t}x_\tau x_\tau^\topAt​=I+∑τ<t​xτ​xτ⊤​, the least-squares estimate μ^t=At−1∑τ<tℓτxτ\hat\mu_t=A_t^{-1}\sum_{\tau<t}\ell_\tau x_\tauμ^​t​=At−1​∑τ<t​ℓτ​xτ​, the radius

βt=max⁡(128 nln⁡tln⁡(t2/δ), (83ln⁡(t2/δ))2),\beta_t=\max\Big(128\,n\ln t\ln(t^2/\delta),\ \big(\tfrac83\ln(t^2/\delta)\big)^2\Big),βt​=max(128nlntln(t2/δ), (38​ln(t2/δ))2),

and the confidence ellipsoid Bt2={ν:(ν−μ^t)⊤At(ν−μ^t)≤βt}B^2_t=\{\nu:(\nu-\hat\mu_t)^\top A_t(\nu-\hat\mu_t)\le\beta_t\}Bt2​={ν:(ν−μ^​t​)⊤At​(ν−μ^​t​)≤βt​}. It plays the optimistic decision xt∈argmin⁡x∈Dmin⁡ν∈Bt2ν⊤xx_t\in\operatorname{argmin}_{x\in D}\min_{\nu\in B^2_t}\nu^\top xxt​∈argminx∈D​minν∈Bt2​​ν⊤x. The analysis uses the width wt=xt⊤At−1xtw_t=\sqrt{x_t^\top A_t^{-1}x_t}wt​=xt⊤​At−1​xt​​, the error Zt=(μ^t−μ)⊤At(μ^t−μ)Z_t=(\hat\mu_t-\mu)^\top A_t(\hat\mu_t-\mu)Zt​=(μ^​t​−μ)⊤At​(μ^​t​−μ), and the noise ηt=ℓt−μ⊤xt\eta_t=\ell_t-\mu^\top x_tηt​=ℓt​−μ⊤xt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, ConfidenceBall₂ bullet (corrected)

For 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1 with n≤β1n\le\beta_1n≤β1​ and noise ∣ηt∣≤1|\eta_t|\le1∣ηt​∣≤1,

Pr⁡(∀T≥1, RT≤8nTβTln⁡(T+1))≥1−δ.\Pr\Big(\forall T\ge1,\ R_T\le\sqrt{8nT\beta_T\ln(T+1)}\Big)\ge1-\delta.Pr(∀T≥1, RT​≤8nTβT​ln(T+1)​)≥1−δ.

A single event covers every horizon, so the bound is anytime.

Milestones

  • Lemma 8. If μ∈Bt2\mu\in B^2_tμ∈Bt2​ then rt≤2min⁡(βtwt,1)r_t\le2\min(\sqrt{\beta_t}w_t,1)rt​≤2min(βt​​wt​,1).
  • Lemma 10. det⁡At+1=∏τ=1t(1+wτ2)\det A_{t+1}=\prod_{\tau=1}^t(1+w_\tau^2)detAt+1​=∏τ=1t​(1+wτ2​).
  • Lemma 9 (corrected). ∑τ=1tmin⁡(wτ2,1)≤2nln⁡(t+1)\sum_{\tau=1}^t\min(w_\tau^2,1)\le2n\ln(t+1)∑τ=1t​min(wτ2​,1)≤2nln(t+1).
  • Theorem 6 (corrected). If μ∈Bt2\mu\in B^2_tμ∈Bt2​ for all t≤Tt\le Tt≤T, then ∑t≤Trt2≤8nβTln⁡(T+1)\sum_{t\le T}r_t^2\le8n\beta_T\ln(T+1)∑t≤T​rt2​≤8nβT​ln(T+1).
  • Theorem 4 (Freedman). Pr⁡(∑Xi≥a, V≤v)≤exp⁡(−a2/(2v+2ab/3))\Pr(\sum X_i\ge a,\ V\le v)\le\exp(-a^2/(2v+2ab/3))Pr(∑Xi​≥a, V≤v)≤exp(−a2/(2v+2ab/3)) for martingale differences bounded above by bbb.
  • Lemma 12. Zt≤n+2∑τ<tητxτ⊤(μ^τ−μ)1+wτ2+∑τ<tητ2wτ21+wτ2Z_t\le n+2\sum_{\tau<t}\eta_\tau\frac{x_\tau^\top(\hat\mu_\tau-\mu)}{1+w_\tau^2}+\sum_{\tau<t}\eta_\tau^2\frac{w_\tau^2}{1+w_\tau^2}Zt​≤n+2∑τ<t​ητ​1+wτ2​xτ⊤​(μ^​τ​−μ)​+∑τ<t​ητ2​1+wτ2​wτ2​​.
  • Lemma 14. Pr⁡(∀t, ∑τ<tMτ≤βt/2)≥1−δ\Pr(\forall t,\ \sum_{\tau<t}M_\tau\le\beta_t/2)\ge1-\deltaPr(∀t, ∑τ<t​Mτ​≤βt​/2)≥1−δ.
  • Theorem 5 (Confidence). Pr⁡(∀t, μ∈Bt2)≥1−δ\Pr(\forall t,\ \mu\in B^2_t)\ge1-\deltaPr(∀t, μ∈Bt2​)≥1−δ.

Significance

The result gives a regret bound for linear bandits over an arbitrary compact decision set that depends on the dimension nnn rather than on ∣D∣|D|∣D∣, holds uniformly over horizons, and requires no gap between the best and second-best decision. With the paper's lower bound it shows that the price of bandit feedback, compared with full information, is a factor Θ∗(n)\Theta^*(\sqrt n)Θ∗(n​). The two components, a confidence theorem for a least-squares ellipsoid under martingale noise and a deterministic potential argument on log⁡det⁡At\log\det A_tlogdetAt​, are reused in the analysis of most optimistic linear and generalized-linear bandit algorithms.

The theorem has a published proof but, to our knowledge, no machine-checked one. The platform already has the elliptical potential lemma (BanditAlgorithm.elliptical_potential_lemma, Lattimore–Szepesvári Lemma 19.4), the matrix determinant lemma and the Woodbury identity, which cover the linear-algebra layer; the LinUCB regret theorem there (BanditAlgorithm.linear_bandit_linucb_regret_bound) is pathwise given confidence, for a different algorithm, so the probabilistic half is new. Formalization also settles the printed constants, three of which need correction (below).

Difficulty

The deterministic half is linear algebra. The difficulty is the confidence theorem. Hoeffding–Azuma applied to ∑τMτ\sum_\tau M_\tau∑τ​Mτ​ would need a deterministic step bound, and the natural one gives only a T3/4T^{3/4}T3/4 regret. The step sizes of MtM_tMt​ are bounded in terms of the random widths wtw_twt​, so the argument must control the conditional variances pathwise and apply Freedman's inequality, whose event {V≤v}\{V\le v\}{V≤v} is random. The escape indicator EtE_tEt​, which switches the martingale off after the first failure of confidence, is what makes the variance bound hold on every path, and the induction that turns Lemma 14 into Theorem 5 must be carried out on a single event for all ttt simultaneously. Freedman's inequality itself is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ, rounds are indexed t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… in ℕ. The spanner is the standard basis, as in Section 5 of the paper (the algorithm is equivariant under the linear change of coordinates). The probability model is a probability space with a general filtration (Ft)(\mathcal F_t)(Ft​); xtx_txt​ is Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable and ℓt\ell_tℓt​ is Ft+1\mathcal F_{t+1}Ft+1​-measurable. The argmin is encoded as a joint minimiser over D×Bt2D\times B^2_tD×Bt2​, which admits every tie-break and is required on every outcome; measurability of xtx_txt​ is a hypothesis, not derived from the selection. The optimum x∗x^*x∗ is a hypothesis (x∗∈Dx^*\in Dx∗∈D, minimising), not an sInf.

Corrections of the printed statements, each labelled in the item's Formalization Note:

  1. ln⁡(T+1)\ln(T+1)ln(T+1) for ln⁡T\ln TlnT in Lemma 9, Theorem 6 and Theorem 2. The printed bounds are false at T=1T=1T=1 (with n=1n=1n=1, D=[−1,1]D=[-1,1]D=[−1,1], μ>0\mu>0μ>0, the tie-break x1=1x_1=1x1​=1 gives R1=2μ>0R_1=2\mu>0R1​=2μ>0 against a bound of 000); the proof of Lemma 9 gives 2ln⁡det⁡At+1≤2nln⁡(t+1)2\ln\det A_{t+1}\le2n\ln(t+1)2lndetAt+1​≤2nln(t+1).
  2. n≤β1=(83ln⁡(1/δ))2n\le\beta_1=(\tfrac83\ln(1/\delta))^2n≤β1​=(38​ln(1/δ))2 is added to Theorems 5 and 2: the proof of Theorem 5 claims Z1≤n<β1Z_1\le n<\beta_1Z1​≤n<β1​, which fails for δ\deltaδ near 111. Theorem 6 takes the proof's "1<β11<\beta_11<β1​" as the hypothesis β1≥1\beta_1\ge1β1​≥1.
  3. ∣ℓt−μ⊤xt∣≤1|\ell_t-\mu^\top x_t|\le1∣ℓt​−μ⊤xt​∣≤1 is added to Lemma 14, Theorems 5 and 2: Section 5.2 uses ∣ηt∣≤1|\eta_t|\le1∣ηt​∣≤1, while the model gives only ∣ηt∣≤2|\eta_t|\le2∣ηt​∣≤2. It holds when costs lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  4. Theorem 5's "δ>0\delta>0δ>0" is stated with 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1; Lemma 10's index typo (wtw_twt​ for wτw_\tauwτ​) and Theorem 4's ∑i=1n\sum_{i=1}^n∑i=1n​ (for TTT) are corrected.

A regret bound for an arbitrary decision sequence under the assumption μ∈Bt2\mu\in B^2_tμ∈Bt2​ for all ttt is Theorem 6, not the goal; the goal carries the ConfidenceBall₂ selection rule, the conditional-mean and measurability hypotheses, and δ\deltaδ as the algorithm's own parameter. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable, for example by a finite DDD with a fixed tie-break and i.i.d. costs in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Needed infrastructure: Freedman's inequality for a filtration (reusable across all of bandit theory), the potential lemma (available), and measurability of the algorithm's statistics. Contributions of alternative proofs of Theorem 5, for example via self-normalized bounds, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Dani, T. P. Hayes, S. M. Kakade, Stochastic Linear Optimization under Bandit Feedback, COLT 2008. http://colt2008.cs.helsinki.fi/papers/80-Dani.pdf
  • P. Auer, Using Confidence Bounds for Exploitation-Exploration Trade-offs, JMLR 3, 2002. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/auer02a.html
  • D. A. Freedman, On Tail Probabilities for Martingales, Annals of Probability 3(1), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996452
  • B. Awerbuch, R. Kleinberg, Adaptive Routing with End-to-End Feedback, STOC 2004. https://doi.org/10.1145/1007352.1007367
  • P. Rusmevichientong, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Linearly Parameterized Bandits, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0446
  • Y. Abbasi-Yadkori, D. Pál, Cs. Szepesvári, Improved Algorithms for Linear Stochastic Bandits, NeurIPS 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1102.2670
  • T. Lattimore, Cs. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108571401
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Stochastic Linear Optimization under Bandit Feedback 2: A Regret Lower Bound on the CircleResearch Paper

Motivation

In stochastic linear optimization under bandit feedback a learner repeatedly chooses a point xtx_txt​ from a compact decision set D⊂RnD\subset\mathbb R^nD⊂Rn and observes only the random cost ℓt\ell_tℓt​ of that point, whose mean is μ⋅xt\mu\cdot x_tμ⋅xt​ for an unknown vector μ\muμ. The problem models online routing, ad placement and other sequential decisions with linearly structured costs. The quality of a learner is measured by its regret against the best fixed decision.

For the KKK-armed bandit the achievable regret for a fixed instance is logarithmic in the horizon TTT (Lai and Robbins 1985; Auer, Cesa-Bianchi and Fischer 2002). Dani, Hayes and Kakade (COLT 2008) showed that for linear costs the picture depends on the geometry of DDD. Their Theorem 1 gives polylogarithmic regret when the decision set has a positive gap between the best and second-best extreme point (a polytope, for instance), and their Theorem 2 gives O∗(nT)O^*(n\sqrt T)O∗(nT​) regret for every decision set. Their Theorem 3 shows that the second rate cannot be improved in general: on a decision set with zero gap, every algorithm pays Ω(T)\Omega(\sqrt T)Ω(T​) in expectation.

Timeline:

  • 2002: Auer, Using confidence bounds for exploitation–exploration trade-offs (JMLR 3), introduces confidence-bound algorithms for linear bandits on finite decision sets.
  • 2008: Dani, Hayes and Kakade prove the O∗(nT)O^*(n\sqrt T)O∗(nT​) upper bound for ConfidenceBall₂ and the Ω(T)\Omega(\sqrt T)Ω(T​) lower bound on a product of circles, the subject of this mission. A hypercube lower bound for the adversarial setting appears in their NIPS 2007 paper.
  • 2010: Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis, Linearly parameterized bandits (Math. OR 35), give Ω(nT)\Omega(n\sqrt T)Ω(nT​) lower bounds on the unit sphere.
  • 2020: Lattimore and Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Theorems 24.1 and 24.2, give minimax lower bounds on the hypercube and the unit ball with Gaussian noise.

Setting

The decision set is the unit circle D2=S1={x∈R2:x12+x22=1}D_2=S^1=\{x\in\mathbb R^2: x_1^2+x_2^2=1\}D2​=S1={x∈R2:x12​+x22​=1}. An unknown mean vector μ∈R2\mu\in\mathbb R^2μ∈R2 is drawn once, uniformly from the circle D2/2D_2/2D2​/2 of radius 1/21/21/2; concretely μ=μ(θ)=12(cos⁡θ,sin⁡θ)\mu=\mu(\theta)=\tfrac12(\cos\theta,\sin\theta)μ=μ(θ)=21​(cosθ,sinθ) with θ\thetaθ uniform on [0,2π)[0,2\pi)[0,2π).

On each round t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T the algorithm plays xt∈D2x_t\in D_2xt​∈D2​ and observes a cost ℓt∈{−1,+1}\ell_t\in\{-1,+1\}ℓt​∈{−1,+1} with Pr⁡(ℓt=+1)=(1+μ⋅xt)/2\Pr(\ell_t=+1)=(1+\mu\cdot x_t)/2Pr(ℓt​=+1)=(1+μ⋅xt​)/2, so that E[ℓt]=μ⋅xt\mathbb E[\ell_t]=\mu\cdot x_tE[ℓt​]=μ⋅xt​. Given the decision, the cost is independent of the past.

An algorithm may be randomised. It draws a seed sss once from a probability measure ρ\rhoρ on a measurable space SSS, and chooses xtx_txt​ as a function of sss and the costs ℓ1,…,ℓt−1\ell_1,\dots,\ell_{t-1}ℓ1​,…,ℓt−1​ observed so far, measurably in sss.

The regret over TTT rounds is

R=∑t=1T(μ⋅xt−μ⋅x∗),μ⋅x∗=min⁡x∈D2μ⋅x,R=\sum_{t=1}^T(\mu\cdot x_t-\mu\cdot x^*),\qquad \mu\cdot x^*=\min_{x\in D_2}\mu\cdot x,R=t=1∑T​(μ⋅xt​−μ⋅x∗),μ⋅x∗=x∈D2​min​μ⋅x,

so each round costs rt=μ⋅xt+12≥0r_t=\mu\cdot x_t+\tfrac12\ge0rt​=μ⋅xt​+21​≥0 when ∥μ∥=1/2\|\mu\|=1/2∥μ∥=1/2. The expected regret ER=Eμ E(R∣μ)\mathbb E R=\mathbb E_\mu\,\mathbb E(R\mid\mu)ER=Eμ​E(R∣μ) averages over the seed, the prior and the costs.

In the Lean development these objects are unitCircle, meanVec, optCost, RandomizedPolicy and expectedRegret in the namespace StochLinOpt.LowerBound.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 for n=2n=2n=2

There is a universal constant c>0c>0c>0 such that for every randomised algorithm and every T≥1T\ge1T≥1,

ER ≥ cT.\mathbb E R\ \ge\ c\sqrt T.ER ≥ cT​.

The constant is left existential, which is the form that survives any later improvement of the constant; it is chosen before the algorithm and before TTT.

Milestones

  1. Section 6.1, Eq. (3). For ∥μ1∥=∥μ2∥=1/2\|\mu_1\|=\|\mu_2\|=1/2∥μ1​∥=∥μ2​∥=1/2, x∈S1x\in S^1x∈S1, a posterior probability p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1] of μ=μ1\mu=\mu_1μ=μ1​ and a cost ℓ∈{±1}\ell\in\{\pm1\}ℓ∈{±1}, the Bayes-updated bias bt+1b_{t+1}bt+1​ satisfies ∣bt+1−bt∣≤∣(μ1−μ2)⋅x∣|b_{t+1}-b_t|\le|(\mu_1-\mu_2)\cdot x|∣bt+1​−bt​∣≤∣(μ1​−μ2​)⋅x∣, where bt=2p−1b_t=2p-1bt​=2p−1.
  2. Lemma 15. With ε=∥μ1−μ2∥>0\varepsilon=\|\mu_1-\mu_2\|>0ε=∥μ1​−μ2​∥>0 and the same data,
Eμ(rt∣Ht)≥116(ε2+∣bt+1−bt∣2ε2)1{∣bt∣≤1/2}.\mathbb E_\mu(r_t\mid\mathcal H_t)\ge\frac1{16}\Big(\varepsilon^2+\frac{|b_{t+1}-b_t|^2}{\varepsilon^2}\Big)\mathbf 1\{|b_t|\le1/2\}.Eμ​(rt​∣Ht​)≥161​(ε2+ε2∣bt+1​−bt​∣2​)1{∣bt​∣≤1/2}.
  1. Theorem 4 (Freedman). For a martingale difference sequence X1,…,XTX_1,\dots,X_TX1​,…,XT​ bounded above by bbb, with conditional variance sum VVV, and all a,v>0a,v>0a,v>0,
Pr⁡(∑iXi≥a, V≤v)≤exp⁡(−a22v+2ab/3).\Pr\Big(\sum_i X_i\ge a,\ V\le v\Big)\le\exp\Big(\frac{-a^2}{2v+2ab/3}\Big).Pr(i∑​Xi​≥a, V≤v)≤exp(2v+2ab/3−a2​).

Significance

The lower bound shows that the T\sqrt TT​ dependence of the problem-independent upper bound (Theorem 2 of the same paper) is necessary. It also shows that the gap-dependent polylogarithmic rate of Theorem 1 cannot extend to decision sets without a gap, such as the sphere. Together with the upper bound it characterises the minimax regret of stochastic linear bandits in TTT up to logarithmic factors, and in the paper's general-nnn form it also underlies the claim that the price of bandit information is Θ∗(n)\Theta^*(\sqrt n)Θ∗(n​).

The result is proved in the paper for n=2n=2n=2 and has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a checked Bayesian lower bound over all randomised algorithms, with an explicit probability model for the protocol. Two related platform results are different theorems: BanditAlgorithm.linear_bandit_unit_ball_minimax_lower_bound (Lattimore–Szepesvári Theorem 24.2: unit ball, Gaussian noise, a worst-case μ\muμ) and BanditAlgorithm.linear_bandit_hypercube_minimax_lower_bound (Theorem 24.1: hypercube). The {−1,+1}\{-1,+1\}{−1,+1} costs, the circle and the uniform prior used here are not covered by either.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt is a two-point change-of-measure argument with a fixed pair of means at distance ε\varepsilonε. It fails as stated because the decision set has no gap: an algorithm that plays close to the optimum of both candidates learns slowly but also pays little. The per-round trade-off between regret and information (Lemma 15) is exact only while the posterior is undecided, ∣bt∣≤1/2|b_t|\le1/2∣bt​∣≤1/2. Turning it into a bound on the whole horizon requires controlling how long the posterior stays undecided, which is a statement about a martingale whose step sizes are chosen by the algorithm; a concentration bound that ignores the accumulated conditional variance (Azuma–Hoeffding with worst-case steps) is too weak for this. The averaging step from a two-point prior to the uniform prior on the circle is also part of the formal work.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin 2 → ℝ with the dot product ⬝ᵥ; Euclidean norms are written through dot products, never with Lean's sup norm. Rounds are 0-indexed internally: the Lean index ttt is the paper's round t+1t+1t+1. The expected regret is the exact finite expectation

ER=∫S12π∫02π∑ℓ∈{±1}T∏t=1T1+ℓt μ(θ)⋅xt2  R  dθ dρ(s),\mathbb E R=\int_S\frac1{2\pi}\int_0^{2\pi}\sum_{\ell\in\{\pm1\}^T}\prod_{t=1}^T\frac{1+\ell_t\,\mu(\theta)\cdot x_t}{2}\;R\;d\theta\,d\rho(s),ER=∫S​2π1​∫02π​ℓ∈{±1}T∑​t=1∏T​21+ℓt​μ(θ)⋅xt​​Rdθdρ(s),

so no infinite product of measures is needed. A randomised algorithm is a seeded policy, which covers every randomised algorithm. The optimal cost is the infimum of μ⋅x\mu\cdot xμ⋅x over the compact circle and is attained. Every junk value in the model (a non-integrable integrand) could only make the lower bound harder to prove, never easier.

A statement over deterministic algorithms only, over a worst-case μ\muμ instead of the uniform prior, or with the constant allowed to depend on the algorithm or on TTT would be a weaker theorem. The goal quantifies ∃c>0\exists c>0∃c>0 before the algorithm and TTT, and fixes the prior.

Corrections relative to the printed paper:

  • General nnn is not stated. Theorem 3 as printed claims ER≥110nT\mathbb E R\ge\frac1{10}n\sqrt TER≥101​nT​ for every even nnn. It is false for n>10n>10n>10: on DnD_nDn​ with μ∈Dn/n\mu\in D_n/nμ∈Dn​/n each round has regret at most 111, so at T=1T=1T=1 the claim would need ER≥n/10>1\mathbb E R\ge n/10>1ER≥n/10>1. The general case rests on Lemma 16, which has no proof. The goal is the n=2n=2n=2 case, which Section 6.1 proves.
  • The constant. For n=2n=2n=2 the paper prints 15T\frac15\sqrt T51​T​; its proof gives c=116min⁡(12−1e,164)=11024c=\frac1{16}\min(\frac12-\frac1e,\frac1{64})=\frac1{1024}c=161​min(21​−e1​,641​)=10241​. The proof's Freedman step prints 2exp⁡(−1/41/8+ε/3)≤2/e22\exp(-\frac{1/4}{1/8+\varepsilon/3})\le 2/e^22exp(−1/8+ε/31/4​)≤2/e2; with v=1/32v=1/32v=1/32 the denominator is 1/16+ε/31/16+\varepsilon/31/16+ε/3, and the bound 2/e22/e^22/e2 then needs ε=T−1/4≤3/16\varepsilon=T^{-1/4}\le3/16ε=T−1/4≤3/16. Small TTT is covered by the first round, whose expected regret is 1/21/21/2. The goal leaves ccc existential.
  • Theorem 4. The printed variance sum runs to nnn; it runs to TTT. The conditioning is on a general filtration, and square-integrability of the steps is assumed so that the conditional variance is defined.
  • Lemma 15. Its right side depends on the round-ttt cost ℓt\ell_tℓt​, which is not part of Ht\mathcal H_tHt​; the Lean statement holds for either value of ℓt\ell_tℓt​.

Welcome contributions: a Lean proof of Freedman's inequality (reusable across the bandit and concentration missions on the platform); the averaging argument from two-point priors to the uniform prior; and the stopped-martingale bookkeeping for the bias sequence.

Selected references

  • Varsha Dani, Thomas P. Hayes, Sham M. Kakade, Stochastic Linear Optimization under Bandit Feedback, Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT), 2008.
  • David A. Freedman, On tail probabilities for martingales, The Annals of Probability 3(1):100–118, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996452
  • Colin McDiarmid, Concentration, in Probabilistic Methods for Algorithmic Discrete Mathematics, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12788-9_6
  • Peter Auer, Using confidence bounds for exploitation–exploration trade-offs, JMLR 3:397–422, 2002. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v3/auer02a.html
  • Paat Rusmevichientong, John N. Tsitsiklis, Linearly parameterized bandits, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2):395–411, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0446
  • Tor Lattimore, Csaba Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020, Chapter 24. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108571401
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Scenario Reduction in Stochastic Programming: The Optimal Redistribution Rule and the Explicit Kantorovich Distance of a Reduced MeasureResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic programs are solved in practice on a finite set of scenarios: a discrete probability distribution P=∑i=1NpiδωiP=\sum_{i=1}^N p_i\delta_{\omega_i}P=∑i=1N​pi​δωi​​ that approximates the true distribution of the uncertain data. The size of the resulting deterministic problem grows with NNN, and for multistage models it grows very fast, so NNN is often reduced before solving. The question is which scenarios to delete and how to reweight the remaining ones so that the optimal value and solutions of the stochastic program change as little as possible.

Dupačová, Gröwe-Kuska and Römisch (Math. Program. Ser. A 95 (2003) 493–511) answered this with probability metrics. Stability results for stochastic programs bound the change of the optimal value by a Fortet–Mourier type distance, which is in turn bounded by a Kantorovich functional μ^c\hat\mu_cμ^​c​ (an optimal transport cost). Scenario reduction then becomes: find a measure QQQ supported on a subset of the scenarios with μ^c(P,Q)\hat\mu_c(P,Q)μ^​c​(P,Q) small. Section 3 of the paper solves the weight part of this problem in closed form. That result, together with the heuristics built on it (backward reduction and forward selection), became the standard scenario-reduction method, implemented for example in the GAMS tool SCENRED.

Setting

Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a set and c:Ω×Ω→R+c:\Omega\times\Omega\to\mathbb R_+c:Ω×Ω→R+​ a cost function with c(ω,ω~)=0c(\omega,\tilde\omega)=0c(ω,ω~)=0 if and only if ω=ω~\omega=\tilde\omegaω=ω~, and c(ω,ω~)=c(ω~,ω)c(\omega,\tilde\omega)=c(\tilde\omega,\omega)c(ω,ω~)=c(ω~,ω) (conditions (C1)–(C2), p. 498). The original distribution has scenarios ω1,…,ωN∈Ω\omega_1,\dots,\omega_N\in\Omegaω1​,…,ωN​∈Ω with weights pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 and ∑ipi=1\sum_i p_i=1∑i​pi​=1. Write cij=c(ωi,ωj)c_{ij}=c(\omega_i,\omega_j)cij​=c(ωi​,ωj​).

A set J⊂{1,…,N}J\subset\{1,\dots,N\}J⊂{1,…,N} of scenarios is deleted. The reduced measure is Q=∑j∉JqjδωjQ=\sum_{j\notin J}q_j\delta_{\omega_j}Q=∑j∈/J​qj​δωj​​ with reduced weights qj≥0q_j\ge0qj​≥0, ∑j∉Jqj=1\sum_{j\notin J}q_j=1∑j∈/J​qj​=1. A transport plan from PPP to QQQ is a nonnegative matrix (ηij)i≤N, j∉J(\eta_{ij})_{i\le N,\,j\notin J}(ηij​)i≤N,j∈/J​ with row sums ∑j∉Jηij=pi\sum_{j\notin J}\eta_{ij}=p_i∑j∈/J​ηij​=pi​ and column sums ∑iηij=qj\sum_i\eta_{ij}=q_j∑i​ηij​=qj​. The Kantorovich functional (10) is the value of this transportation problem,

D(J;q)=min⁡{∑i∑j∉Jcijηij: η a transport plan from P to Q},D(J;q)=\min\Big\{\sum_{i}\sum_{j\notin J}c_{ij}\eta_{ij}:\ \eta\ \text{a transport plan from }P\text{ to }Q\Big\},D(J;q)=min{i∑​j∈/J∑​cij​ηij​: η a transport plan from P to Q},

and DJ=min⁡{D(J;q):q reduced weights}D_J=\min\{D(J;q): q\ \text{reduced weights}\}DJ​=min{D(J;q):q reduced weights} is the best distance achievable once JJJ is fixed. The optimal deletion problem (13) asks for min⁡{DJ:#J=k}\min\{D_J:\#J=k\}min{DJ​:#J=k} for a given 1≤k<N1\le k<N1≤k<N.

In the Lean development these objects are IsReducedWeight, IsTransportPlan, transportCost, transportValue (D(J;q)D(J;q)D(J;q)), optWeightsValue (DJD_JDJ​) and optimalDeletionValue (the value of (13)), all in the namespace ScenarioReduction.Redistribution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (optimal weights), p. 500

For every J≠{1,…,N}J\neq\{1,\dots,N\}J={1,…,N},

DJ=min⁡{D(J;q):qj≥0, ∑j∉Jqj=1}=∑i∈Jpimin⁡j∉Jc(ωi,ωj),D_J=\min\Big\{D(J;q): q_j\ge0,\ \sum_{j\notin J}q_j=1\Big\}=\sum_{i\in J}p_i\min_{j\notin J}c(\omega_i,\omega_j),DJ​=min{D(J;q):qj​≥0, j∈/J∑​qj​=1}=i∈J∑​pi​j∈/Jmin​c(ωi​,ωj​),

and the minimum is attained at the optimal redistribution rule qˉj=pj+∑i∈Jjpi\bar q_j=p_j+\sum_{i\in J_j}p_iqˉ​j​=pj​+∑i∈Jj​​pi​, where Jj={i∈J:j(i)=j}J_j=\{i\in J: j(i)=j\}Jj​={i∈J:j(i)=j} and j(i)∈arg⁡min⁡j∉Jc(ωi,ωj)j(i)\in\arg\min_{j\notin J}c(\omega_i,\omega_j)j(i)∈argminj∈/J​c(ωi​,ωj​), for every such choice of j(⋅)j(\cdot)j(⋅).

Milestones

  1. Primal–dual representation of D(J;q)D(J;q)D(J;q) (first display of the proof, p. 501): the transportation problem and its linear-programming dual both attain D(J;q)D(J;q)D(J;q).
  2. Lower bound (p. 501): ∑i∈Jpimin⁡k∉Jcik≤D(J;q)\sum_{i\in J}p_i\min_{k\notin J}c_{ik}\le D(J;q)∑i∈J​pi​mink∈/J​cik​≤D(J;q) for every feasible qqq.
  3. Upper bound at qˉ\bar qqˉ​ (p. 501): qˉ\bar qqˉ​ is feasible and D(J;qˉ)≤∑i∈Jpimin⁡j∉JcijD(J;\bar q)\le\sum_{i\in J}p_i\min_{j\notin J}c_{ij}D(J;qˉ​)≤∑i∈J​pi​minj∈/J​cij​.
  4. Theorem 3 (p. 501): for weights prescribed by qj=pj+λjpJq_j=p_j+\lambda_jp_Jqj​=pj​+λj​pJ​, D(J;q)≤∑i∈Jpi∑j∉Jλjc(ωi,ωj)D(J;q)\le\sum_{i\in J}p_i\sum_{j\notin J}\lambda_jc(\omega_i,\omega_j)D(J;q)≤∑i∈J​pi​∑j∈/J​λj​c(ωi​,ωj​), with equality if #J=1\#J=1#J=1 and ccc satisfies the triangle inequality.
  5. Theorem 4 (p. 503): the greedy recursions (16) and (17) give a lower and an upper bound for min⁡{DJ:#J=k}\min\{D_J:\#J=k\}min{DJ​:#J=k}, and the backward set {l1,…,lk}\{l_1,\dots,l_k\}{l1​,…,lk​} is optimal under a nonemptiness condition.

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces the continuous part of scenario reduction to a formula: once the set of kept scenarios is chosen, the best reweighting is to move the mass of every deleted scenario to a nearest kept scenario, and the resulting distance is an explicit sum. This leaves only the combinatorial choice of JJJ, which Theorem 4 brackets by two greedy procedures; these are the backward-reduction and forward-selection algorithms of the paper and of later work by Heitsch and Römisch. Theorem 3 covers the case in which the reduced weights are fixed by the modeller, for instance to keep a uniform distribution uniform.

The results are proved in the paper by elementary linear-programming arguments. As far as is known, none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them produces a verified finite transportation-problem layer with a general (not necessarily metric) cost and a deleted index set, and verified correctness certificates for the two standard scenario-reduction heuristics.

Difficulty

The upper bound of Theorem 2 is a direct construction. The content lies in the lower bound, which must hold for every reweighting qqq simultaneously; this needs the dual side of the transportation problem, and the full primal–dual representation (Milestone 1) requires strong duality for a transportation problem with only the kept columns, which Mathlib does not provide in this form. A naive argument that bounds each plan row by row gives the lower bound directly for plans, but relating it to D(J;q)D(J;q)D(J;q) as an infimum also requires that plans exist and that the infimum is attained. In Theorem 4, the recursions (16) and (17) are greedy and do not in general produce optimal sets; the lower bound works only because its inner minimum ranges over all j≠lj\neq lj=l, not over the kept scenarios.

Formalization scope

Scenarios are indexed by Fin N (0-based), scenarios are a function ω : Fin N → Ω into an arbitrary type Ω, the cost is c : Ω → Ω → ℝ, and weights, plans and dual variables are real-valued functions on Fin N and Fin N × Fin N. Only the entries at kept indices j∉Jj\notin Jj∈/J enter any constraint, cost or objective. No measure theory is used: the index-level transportation problem is the paper's own representation of μ^c\hat\mu_cμ^​c​ for discrete measures (p. 495). Every theorem carries the standing assumptions of Section 3: c≥0c\ge0c≥0, (C1), (C2), pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 and ∑ipi=1\sum_ip_i=1∑i​pi​=1. Measurability of ccc and conditions (C3) and (C4) concern Ω⊂Rs\Omega\subset\mathbb R^sΩ⊂Rs and play no role for finitely supported measures; they are dropped, so the statements are more general than the page. The hypothesis J≠{1,…,N}J\neq\{1,\dots,N\}J={1,…,N}, implicit in Theorem 2, is stated explicitly; in Theorem 4, 1≤k<N1\le k<N1≤k<N plays this role.

D(J;q)D(J;q)D(J;q) and DJD_JDJ​ are real infima (sInf) of transport costs and are only asserted about where the underlying sets are nonempty and bounded below; "min" is stated as attainment (IsLeast), not as an equality of infima. D(J;q)D(J;q)D(J;q) is defined as the transportation problem and is not defined by the closed form ∑i∈Jpimin⁡j∉Jcij\sum_{i\in J}p_i\min_{j\notin J}c_{ij}∑i∈J​pi​minj∈/J​cij​; under that definition Theorem 2 would be trivial, and it is ruled out here. Likewise the reduced-weight constraint does not force q=qˉq=\bar qq=qˉ​.

Needed infrastructure: finite transportation problems with nonnegativity and marginal constraints, existence of optimal plans (compactness of the feasible polytope), and LP duality for transportation problems. The transportation-problem layer is reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a general strong-duality result for finite transportation problems, and the examples of p. 502 (single scenario deletion, keeping one scenario).

Selected references

  • J. Dupačová, N. Gröwe-Kuska, W. Römisch, Scenario reduction in stochastic programming: An approach using probability metrics, Math. Program. Ser. A 95 (2003) 493–511. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0331-0
  • S. T. Rachev, Probability Metrics and the Stability of Stochastic Models, Wiley, 1991.
  • H. Heitsch, W. Römisch, Scenario reduction algorithms in stochastic programming, Comput. Optim. Appl. 24 (2003) 187–206. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021805924152
  • W. Römisch, R. Schultz, Stability analysis for stochastic programs, Ann. Oper. Res. 30 (1991) 241–266. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02204819
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Optimum Branchings: The Vertices of the Branching Polyhedron Are Exactly the BranchingsResearch Paper

Motivation

A branching in a directed graph is a set of edges that contains no cycle (even ignoring directions) and in which no two edges point to the same node; a connected branching is an arborescence, a tree rooted at one node with all edges directed away from the root. The optimum branching problem asks, for real weights on the edges, for a branching of maximum total weight. It contains the minimum-cost spanning arborescence problem (the directed analogue of the minimum spanning tree), which appears in network design, in the analysis of broadcast and routing structures, in phylogenetics, and in dependency parsing in computational linguistics, where maximum spanning arborescences are the standard decoding step of graph-based parsers.

J. Edmonds solved the problem in Optimum branchings (J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 71B (1967) 233–240). The paper gives an algorithm (the shrinking algorithm usually attributed to Chu–Liu and Edmonds) and, proved together with it, a polyhedral theorem: the linear system that every branching obviously satisfies has no other vertices. This was one of the first integral polyhedron theorems beyond bipartite matching and network flows, and together with Edmonds' matching polytope (1965) it set the pattern of polyhedral combinatorics: describe the convex hull of the combinatorial objects by linear inequalities, and prove optimality by a linear programming dual.

Timeline:

  • 1965: Y. J. Chu and T. H. Liu describe the shrinking algorithm for the maximum arborescence.
  • 1965: Edmonds, Paths, trees, and flowers and Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices: the matching polytope.
  • 1967: Edmonds, Optimum branchings: the algorithm, Theorem 2 (vertices of the branching polyhedron), and the dual certificate built along the algorithm.
  • 1970–1971: Edmonds' matroid intersection theorem, which contains the branching polyhedron theorem as the intersection of a graphic matroid and a partition matroid.
  • 1977–1986: faster implementations (Tarjan; Gabow, Galil, Spencer and Tarjan).

Setting

A graph GGG consists of a finite set VVV of nodes and a finite set EEE of edges. Each edge eee is directed toward a node front(e)\mathrm{front}(e)front(e), its front end, and away from a different node rear(e)\mathrm{rear}(e)rear(e), its rear end. Parallel edges are allowed; loops are not.

For F⊆EF\subseteq EF⊆E, a node vvv meets kkk edges of FFF if #{e∈F:front(e)=v}+#{e∈F:rear(e)=v}=k\#\{e\in F:\mathrm{front}(e)=v\}+\#\{e\in F:\mathrm{rear}(e)=v\}=k#{e∈F:front(e)=v}+#{e∈F:rear(e)=v}=k. A set B⊆EB\subseteq EB⊆E is a forest if it contains no polygon, i.e. no nonempty F⊆BF\subseteq BF⊆B in which every node meets zero or two edges of FFF; it is a branching if in addition distinct edges of BBB have distinct front ends. The incidence vector xB∈REx^B\in\mathbb R^ExB∈RE of BBB has xeB=1x^B_e=1xeB​=1 for e∈Be\in Be∈B and 000 otherwise.

The branching polyhedron PG⊆REP_G\subseteq\mathbb R^EPG​⊆RE is the set of xxx with

  • (L1)(L_1)(L1​) xe≥0x_e\ge0xe​≥0 for every edge eee;
  • (L2)(L_2)(L2​) ∑e: front(e)=vxe≤1\sum_{e:\,\mathrm{front}(e)=v}x_e\le1∑e:front(e)=v​xe​≤1 for every node vvv;
  • (L3)(L_3)(L3​) ∑e: front(e),rear(e)∈Sxe≤∣S∣−1\sum_{e:\,\mathrm{front}(e),\mathrm{rear}(e)\in S}x_e\le|S|-1∑e:front(e),rear(e)∈S​xe​≤∣S∣−1 for every set SSS of two or more nodes.

A vertex of a set P⊆REP\subseteq\mathbb R^EP⊆RE is a point of PPP that is the unique maximizer over PPP of some linear function x↦∑ecexex\mapsto\sum_e c_ex_ex↦∑e​ce​xe​.

For weights c∈REc\in\mathbb R^Ec∈RE, the dual variables are yhy_hyh​ for each node vhv_hvh​ and ySy_SyS​ for each SSS with ∣S∣≥2|S|\ge2∣S∣≥2; write we=∑S∋front(e),rear(e)ySw_e=\sum_{S\ni\mathrm{front}(e),\mathrm{rear}(e)}y_Swe​=∑S∋front(e),rear(e)​yS​ and (b,y)=∑hyh+∑S(∣S∣−1)yS(b,y)=\sum_hy_h+\sum_S(|S|-1)y_S(b,y)=∑h​yh​+∑S​(∣S∣−1)yS​. Edmonds' conditions are (15) yh≥0y_h\ge0yh​≥0, (16) yS≥0y_S\ge0yS​≥0, (17) yfront(e)+we≥cey_{\mathrm{front}(e)}+w_e\ge c_eyfront(e)​+we​≥ce​ for every edge, and, for a branching BBB, (18) yh≠0⇒y_h\ne0\Rightarrowyh​=0⇒ some edge of BBB enters vhv_hvh​, (19) yS≠0⇒y_S\ne0\RightarrowyS​=0⇒ exactly ∣S∣−1|S|-1∣S∣−1 edges of BBB lie inside SSS, (20) yfront(e)+we=cey_{\mathrm{front}(e)}+w_e=c_eyfront(e)​+we​=ce​ for e∈Be\in Be∈B.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 235)

{x: x is a vertex of PG}  =  {xB: B is a branching of G}.\{x:\ x\text{ is a vertex of }P_G\}\;=\;\{x^B:\ B\text{ is a branching of }G\}.{x: x is a vertex of PG​}={xB: B is a branching of G}.

Both inclusions, for every finite loopless directed multigraph.

Milestones

  1. §5, p. 236: for every branching BBB, xB∈PGx^B\in P_GxB∈PG​.
  2. §5, p. 236: for every branching BBB, xBx^BxB is a vertex of PGP_GPG​.
  3. §6, (12)–(14): if BBB is a branching and yyy satisfies (15)–(20), then (c,xB)=(b,y)(c,x^B)=(b,y)(c,xB)=(b,y), xBx^BxB maximizes (c,x)(c,x)(c,x) over PGP_GPG​, and yyy minimizes (b,y)(b,y)(b,y) subject to (15)–(17).
  4. §7, p. 237: for every c∈REc\in\mathbb R^Ec∈RE there are a branching BBB and a yyy satisfying (15)–(20).
  5. Lemma 1, p. 236: for every c∈REc\in\mathbb R^Ec∈RE some branching vector lies in PGP_GPG​ and maximizes ∑ecexe\sum_ec_ex_e∑e​ce​xe​ over PGP_GPG​.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that the linear program max⁡{(c,x):x∈PG}\max\{(c,x):x\in P_G\}max{(c,x):x∈PG​} always has an optimal solution that is a branching, and that every vertex of PGP_GPG​ is one. Consequently optimum branchings, and after the reductions of the paper's §2 optimum spanning and rooted arborescences, can be computed by linear programming, and their optimality is certified by a dual vector satisfying (15)–(20). The same statement underlies the separation-based treatment of arborescence constraints in integer programming formulations of network design and of the asymmetric travelling salesman problem. The integrality of the dual for integer weights (the paper's §8) yields min–max theorems of König type for branchings.

The result is proved and classical; no machine-checked proof of it in a proof assistant is known. The mission asks for the paper's own proof chain: branching vectors are points and vertices of PGP_GPG​, linear programming optimality from complementary slackness, existence of a dual certificate for every weight vector, and the deduction of Theorem 2. Proofs through matroid intersection or total dual integrality would also establish the goal and are welcome as alternative routes.

Difficulty

The inclusion "branching vectors are vertices" and the certificate criterion are short. The substance is Milestone 4: for arbitrary real weights, a branching and a dual vector satisfying the complementary slackness conditions must exist simultaneously. Finiteness gives an optimum branching at once, but that says nothing about optimality over the fractional points of PGP_GPG​; the difficulty is the dual. The natural attempt, taking yS=0y_S=0yS​=0 for all sets and yhy_hyh​ the largest positive weight entering vhv_hvh​, violates (20) as soon as the greedy choice closes a circuit: the (L3)(L_3)(L3​) duals of nested node sets, arising from repeatedly shrinking circuits, are needed, and they must be kept nonnegative through weight changes of the form c3+c0−c4c_3+c_0-c_4c3​+c0​−c4​ on edges entering a shrunk circuit.

Formalization scope

A graph is a structure Graph V E with front rear : E → V and a proof that front e ≠ rear e; V and E carry Fintype and DecidableEq. Edge sets are Finset E; vectors are E → ℝ; the linear function with weights c is ∑ e, c e * x e. A branching is defined combinatorially (no nonempty edge subset in which every node meets zero or two edges, and distinct front ends), never by counting edges inside node sets, and PGP_GPG​ is the solution set of (L1)(L_1)(L1​)–(L3)(L_3)(L3​), never a convex hull; either shortcut would make half of Theorem 2 true by definition. A vertex is a unique maximizer of a linear function, as on p. 236 (Mathlib's Set.exposedPoints has the same content); the set variables of the dual are a function Finset V → ℝ whose values on sets of fewer than two nodes are ignored. The right side of (L3)(L_3)(L3​) is the real number ∣S∣−1|S|-1∣S∣−1.

Implicit conventions made explicit: the no-loop condition is part of the graph (with a loop eee, the vector of {e}\{e\}{e} is a vertex of PGP_GPG​ but not a branching); parallel edges are allowed; weights have arbitrary sign and the empty branching is allowed. The mission does not model the algorithm of §4 or Theorem 1's notion of a "good" algorithm; Milestone 4 states only the existence of a certificate, which is what Lemma 1 uses.

Useful reusable infrastructure: finite directed multigraphs with an edge type, forests via polygons, and a finite LP duality lemma for max⁡{c⊤x:x≥0, Ax≤b}\max\{c^\top x: x\ge0,\ Ax\le b\}max{c⊤x:x≥0, Ax≤b}; contributions of either are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Optimum branchings, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards Sect. B 71B (1967), 233–240. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.071b.032
  • Y. J. Chu and T. H. Liu, On the shortest arborescence of a directed graph, Scientia Sinica 14 (1965), 1396–1400.
  • J. Edmonds, Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 125–130. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069B.013
  • R. E. Tarjan, Finding optimum branchings, Networks 7 (1977), 25–35. https://doi.org/10.1002/net.3230070103
  • H. N. Gabow, Z. Galil, T. Spencer and R. E. Tarjan, Efficient algorithms for finding minimum spanning trees in undirected and directed graphs, Combinatorica 6 (1986), 109–122. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579168
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Springer (2003), Chapter 52.
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Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions I: A Uniformly Random Set Achieves 1/4 of the Optimum, and 1/2 for Symmetric FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many combinatorial optimization problems ask for a subset of a finite ground set that maximizes a set function with diminishing returns: Max Cut and Max Directed Cut in graphs, facility location, maximum entropy sampling, and welfare problems in combinatorial auctions all fit this pattern. The common abstraction is the maximization of a submodular function, the discrete analogue of a concave function. Unlike the monotone case, where the objective only grows as elements are added, the non-monotone problem has no constraint at all and is still NP-hard, since Max Cut is a special case.

For Max Cut and Max Directed Cut, the simplest algorithm there is, putting every vertex on a side by an independent fair coin, already cuts half, respectively a quarter, of the optimum in expectation. Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (SIAM J. Comput. 40(4), 2011; extended abstract at FOCS 2007) showed that this is not a feature of cut functions: the same random choice achieves the same factors for every nonnegative submodular function, and for every symmetric one. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 2.1 of the paper, together with the two sampling lemmas on which it rests. The paper's other results (a nonadaptive 1/3-approximation, deterministic and smoothed local search, and query lower bounds) are the subjects of companion missions in the same series.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite set with n=∣X∣n = |X|n=∣X∣ elements. A set function assigns a real number f(S)f(S)f(S) to every subset S⊆XS \subseteq XS⊆X. It is submodular if

f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X,f(S \cup T) + f(S \cap T) \le f(S) + f(T) \qquad \text{for all } S, T \subseteq X,f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X,

equivalently if the marginal value f(B∪{x})−f(B)f(B \cup \{x\}) - f(B)f(B∪{x})−f(B) of an element xxx does not increase as the set BBB grows. It is symmetric if f(X∖S)=f(S)f(X \setminus S) = f(S)f(X∖S)=f(S) for every S⊆XS \subseteq XS⊆X; the cut function of an undirected graph is the standard example. The optimum is

OPT=max⁡S⊆Xf(S).OPT = \max_{S \subseteq X} f(S).OPT=S⊆Xmax​f(S).

For p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1], X(p)X(p)X(p) denotes the random subset of XXX containing each element independently with probability ppp; similarly A(p)A(p)A(p) is the random subset of a fixed A⊆XA \subseteq XA⊆X. The Random Set Algorithm (RS) returns R=X(1/2)R = X(1/2)R=X(1/2), a uniformly random subset of XXX, without querying fff. Its expected value is the average of fff over all subsets,

E[f(R)]=F(12,…,12)=12n∑S⊆Xf(S),\mathbf{E}[f(R)] = F(\tfrac12, \dots, \tfrac12) = \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{S \subseteq X} f(S),E[f(R)]=F(21​,…,21​)=2n1​S⊆X∑​f(S),

where F(x)=∑S⊆Xf(S)∏i∈Sxi∏i∉S(1−xi)F(x) = \sum_{S \subseteq X} f(S) \prod_{i \in S} x_i \prod_{i \notin S} (1 - x_i)F(x)=∑S⊆X​f(S)∏i∈S​xi​∏i∈/S​(1−xi​) is the multilinear extension of fff, the expectation of fff on a random set that includes element iii independently with probability xix_ixi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1

For every nonnegative submodular f:2X→R+f : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}_+f:2X→R+​,

E[f(X(1/2))]≥14 OPT,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] \ge \tfrac14\, OPT,E[f(X(1/2))]≥41​OPT,

and if fff is in addition symmetric,

E[f(X(1/2))]≥12 OPT.\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] \ge \tfrac12\, OPT.E[f(X(1/2))]≥21​OPT.

Both parts form the goal, stated as one theorem. The constants 14\tfrac1441​ and 12\tfrac1221​ are exact, not asymptotic, and they are tight: the directed cut of a single arc attains 14\tfrac1441​, and the cut of a single edge attains 12\tfrac1221​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.2. For submodular g:2X→Rg : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}g:2X→R, A⊆XA \subseteq XA⊆X and p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1],
E[g(A(p))]≥(1−p) g(∅)+p g(A).\mathbf{E}[g(A(p))] \ge (1-p)\, g(\emptyset) + p\, g(A).E[g(A(p))]≥(1−p)g(∅)+pg(A).
  1. Lemma 2.3. For submodular f:2X→Rf : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}f:2X→R, sets A,B⊆XA, B \subseteq XA,B⊆X that need not be disjoint, independent samples A(p)A(p)A(p), B(q)B(q)B(q), and p,q∈[0,1]p, q \in [0,1]p,q∈[0,1],
E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]≥(1−p)(1−q)f(∅)+p(1−q)f(A)+(1−p)qf(B)+pqf(A∪B).\mathbf{E}[f(A(p) \cup B(q))] \ge (1-p)(1-q) f(\emptyset) + p(1-q) f(A) + (1-p)q f(B) + pq f(A \cup B).E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]≥(1−p)(1−q)f(∅)+p(1−q)f(A)+(1−p)qf(B)+pqf(A∪B).
  1. The display in the proof of Theorem 2.1. For submodular f:2X→Rf : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}f:2X→R and every S⊆XS \subseteq XS⊆X, with Sˉ=X∖S\bar S = X \setminus SSˉ=X∖S,
E[f(X(1/2))]≥14f(∅)+14f(S)+14f(Sˉ)+14f(X).\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] \ge \tfrac14 f(\emptyset) + \tfrac14 f(S) + \tfrac14 f(\bar S) + \tfrac14 f(X).E[f(X(1/2))]≥41​f(∅)+41​f(S)+41​f(Sˉ)+41​f(X).

The milestones need no sign on the function; nonnegativity enters only in the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.1 gives an algorithm that makes no query at all and is still a constant-factor approximation for unconstrained non-monotone submodular maximization. It sets the baseline that every later algorithm for the problem is measured against: the paper's own nonadaptive 13\tfrac1331​-algorithm and its local search algorithms with factors 13\tfrac1331​ and 25\tfrac2552​, followed by later work culminating in the tight 12\tfrac1221​-approximation of Buchbinder, Feldman, Naor and Schwartz (FOCS 2012). The paper also shows that 14\tfrac1441​ is optimal among nonadaptive algorithms required to return one of the queried sets, and that 12\tfrac1221​ is optimal for symmetric functions among all algorithms using polynomially many value queries, so both factors of Theorem 2.1 have a precise place in the complexity landscape. Lemma 2.3, the probabilistic inequality behind it, is reused in the analyses of the nonadaptive algorithm and of smooth local search.

Formalizing it. The result is proved, with a short proof. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version of the random-set guarantee and of the two sampling lemmas, stated for arbitrary finite ground sets and, for the lemmas, for real-valued submodular functions without a sign. To our knowledge none of these statements has a machine-checked proof; Mathlib has no theory of submodular set functions or of their multilinear extension.

Difficulty

The goal itself is a two-line consequence of the third milestone. The work sits in the lemmas and in one change of viewpoint.

Lemma 2.2 is not a pointwise statement: the random set A(p)A(p)A(p) can be any subset of AAA, and ggg can be smaller on it than both g(∅)g(\emptyset)g(∅) and g(A)g(A)g(A). The inequality holds only in expectation, and only because submodularity controls the marginal value of each element uniformly across the sets it can be added to. Lemma 2.3 needs a conditioning argument over two independent samples; the sets AAA and BBB may overlap, and on A∩BA \cap BA∩B the union A(p)∪B(q)A(p) \cup B(q)A(p)∪B(q) contains an element with probability 1−(1−p)(1−q)1 - (1-p)(1-q)1−(1−p)(1−q), so it is not the product distribution with probability ppp on AAA and qqq on BBB. Finally, the third milestone requires identifying the uniform random subset X(1/2)X(1/2)X(1/2) with the union of independent half-samples of SSS and of its complement, as a statement about finite sums.

The obvious attempt at the goal, comparing f(R)f(R)f(R) with f(S∗)f(S^*)f(S∗) for an optimal S∗S^*S∗ set by set, fails: fff is not monotone, so a random set that contains most of S∗S^*S∗ may still have small value, and a random set can pick up elements that hurt.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a Lean type X with [Fintype X] [DecidableEq X]; subsets are Finset X and set functions are f : Finset X → ℝ. Submodularity is the lattice inequality of Definition 1.1, not the decreasing-marginals property. Nonnegativity, the paper's standing assumption f:2X→R+f : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}_+f:2X→R+​, is the hypothesis ∀ S, 0 ≤ f S; it appears only in the goal. Symmetry is ∀ S, f Sᶜ = f S for all subsets, not only for an optimal one. OPTOPTOPT is Finset.univ.sup' Finset.univ_nonempty f, a maximum over the always nonempty family of all subsets, so it is attained. The ground set may be empty; the goal holds there too and no nonemptiness is assumed.

Expectations are written as exact finite sums, not as integrals. E[f(X(1/2))]\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))]E[f(X(1/2))] is the multilinear extension F f (fun _ => 1/2). E[g(A(p))]\mathbf{E}[g(A(p))]E[g(A(p))] is ∑T⊆Ap∣T∣(1−p)∣A∖T∣g(T)\sum_{T \subseteq A} p^{|T|}(1-p)^{|A \setminus T|} g(T)∑T⊆A​p∣T∣(1−p)∣A∖T∣g(T), and E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]\mathbf{E}[f(A(p) \cup B(q))]E[f(A(p)∪B(q))] is the double sum over independent samples S⊆AS \subseteq AS⊆A, T⊆BT \subseteq BT⊆B with the product of the two weights. The ranges 0≤p≤10 \le p \le 10≤p≤1 and 0≤q≤10 \le q \le 10≤q≤1, implied in the paper by the word "probability", are explicit hypotheses; Lemma 2.2 is false without them.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: the weights are exactly those of the uniform distribution on all 2n2^n2n subsets, OPTOPTOPT is the true maximum rather than the value at one fixed set, and fff is required to be both nonnegative and submodular.

Reusable infrastructure produced by a complete development: the multilinear extension of a set function and its expression as an expectation, product-weight identities for independent sampling of subsets (including the decomposition of X(1/2)X(1/2)X(1/2) along a set and its complement), and Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, which the companion missions on the nonadaptive algorithm and on smooth local search also need. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions, SIAM Journal on Computing 40(4):1133–1153, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/090779346
  • U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing non-monotone submodular functions, Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2007, pp. 461–471. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2007.29
  • N. Buchbinder, M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, SIAM Journal on Computing 44(5):1384–1402, 2015 (FOCS 2012). https://doi.org/10.1137/130929205
  • G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, M. L. Fisher, An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions — I, Mathematical Programming 14:265–294, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01588971
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Incentives in Teams: The Own Profit Incentive Structure Is an Optimal Incentive Structure for a ConglomerateResearch Paper

Motivation

An organization whose members hold private information faces two problems at once. The first is the team problem of Marschak and Radner: choose the rules by which members observe, communicate and decide so as to maximize the expected payoff of the organization as a whole (Marschak–Radner 1972). The second is the incentive problem: a member who is paid by their own results has no reason to follow those rules, and in particular no reason to report truthfully what they have observed. Theodore Groves' Incentives in Teams (Econometrica 41(4), 1973) connected the two. For a decentralized firm in which subunits report to a head, it exhibits compensation rules that make the team-optimal behaviour, truthful messages included, each subunit manager's unique best reply.

The construction is the origin of what is now called the Groves scheme, and with Vickrey's second-price auction (Vickrey 1961) and Clarke's pivot rule (Clarke 1971) it forms the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) family of mechanisms.

Timeline:

  • 1961, Vickrey: second-price auctions make truthful bidding a dominant strategy for a single object.
  • 1971, Clarke: pivot payments for public-good decisions with deterministic valuations.
  • 1972, Marschak–Radner: the economic theory of teams, with information and decision structures but a common payoff.
  • 1973, Groves: compensation CiIIC_i^{II}CiII​ based on the head's conditional expectation of the other units' payoffs; Theorem 1 proves optimality in a conglomerate with independent component states and one round of communication.
  • 1977, Green–Laffont: in the complete-information setting, Groves-type payments are the only ones that make truth-telling dominant (Econometrica 45(2)).
  • 1979, d'Aspremont–Gérard-Varet: Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with expected externality payments (J. Public Econ. 11(1)).

The conglomerate model

The organization consists of a head (component 000) and finitely many subunits i=1,…,ni = 1, \dots, ni=1,…,n. Each component kkk has its own random component state sk∈Sks_k \in S_ksk​∈Sk​, and the components are independent: the state of the environment s=(s0,s1,…,sn)s = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_n)s=(s0​,s1​,…,sn​) is distributed according to the product law P(s)=P0(s0)∏iPi(si)P(s) = P_0(s_0) \prod_{i} P_i(s_i)P(s)=P0​(s0​)∏i​Pi​(si​) (Condition S.2).

Every member plays a strategy βk=(ζk,γk,δk)\beta_k = (\zeta_k, \gamma_k, \delta_k)βk​=(ζk​,γk​,δk​) made of an observation strategy ζk\zeta_kζk​ on its own state, a message strategy γk\gamma_kγk​ and a decision strategy δk\delta_kδk​ (Condition S.3). Communication runs only between the head and each subunit, in one exchange: the head observes ζ0(s0)\zeta_0(s_0)ζ0​(s0​) and sends γ0i(ζ0(s0))\gamma_0^i(\zeta_0(s_0))γ0i​(ζ0​(s0​)) to subunit iii; the subunit, with information yi(s)=[ζi(si),γ0i(ζ0(s0))]y_i(s) = [\zeta_i(s_i), \gamma_0^i(\zeta_0(s_0))]yi​(s)=[ζi​(si​),γ0i​(ζ0​(s0​))], sends back γi(yi(s))\gamma_i(y_i(s))γi​(yi​(s)); the head's information is y0(s)=[ζ0(s0),{γi(yi(s))}i]y_0(s) = [\zeta_0(s_0), \{\gamma_i(y_i(s))\}_{i}]y0​(s)=[ζ0​(s0​),{γi​(yi​(s))}i​] (3.1). Decisions are δi(yi(s))\delta_i(y_i(s))δi​(yi​(s)) and δ0(y0(s))\delta_0(y_0(s))δ0​(y0​(s)).

The organization payoff is a sum of components (Condition S.4),

ω0(β,s)=∑i=1nvi[δi(yi(s)),δ0(y0(s));si]+v0[δ0(y0(s)),s0],\omega_0(\beta, s) = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i[\delta_i(y_i(s)), \delta_0(y_0(s)); s_i] + v_0[\delta_0(y_0(s)), s_0],ω0​(β,s)=i=1∑n​vi​[δi​(yi​(s)),δ0​(y0​(s));si​]+v0​[δ0​(y0​(s)),s0​],

and ωˉ0(β)=E[ω0(β,s)]\bar\omega_0(\beta) = E[\omega_0(\beta, s)]ωˉ0​(β)=E[ω0​(β,s)]. Each viv_ivi​ accrues directly to subunit iii (Condition S.5). Strategy sets B0,B1,…,BnB_0, B_1, \dots, B_nB0​,B1​,…,Bn​ are given; β/βi\beta/\beta_iβ/βi​ denotes β\betaβ with subunit iii's strategy replaced by βi\beta_iβi​. Two strategies βi′,βi′′\beta_i', \beta_i''βi′​,βi′′​ are equivalent if ωˉ0(β/βi′)=ωˉ0(β/βi′′)\bar\omega_0(\beta/\beta_i') = \bar\omega_0(\beta/\beta_i'')ωˉ0​(β/βi′​)=ωˉ0​(β/βi′′​) for every β∈B\beta \in Bβ∈B.

Assumption A requires a β∗∈B\beta^* \in Bβ∗∈B maximizing ωˉ0\bar\omega_0ωˉ0​ over BBB such that, for each subunit, ωˉ0(β∗)>ωˉ0(β∗/βi)\bar\omega_0(\beta^*) > \bar\omega_0(\beta^*/\beta_i)ωˉ0​(β∗)>ωˉ0​(β∗/βi​) whenever βi∈Bi\beta_i \in B_iβi​∈Bi​ is not equivalent to βi∗\beta_i^*βi∗​.

An incentive structure W={ωi}W = \{\omega_i\}W={ωi​} pays subunit iii the amount ωi(β,s)\omega_i(\beta, s)ωi​(β,s). The class J\mathscr{J}J (3.2) consists of those of the form ωi=vi[… ]+Ci(y0(s))\omega_i = v_i[\dots] + C_i(y_0(s))ωi​=vi​[…]+Ci​(y0​(s)): own payoff plus a compensation computed from the head's information only. WWW is optimal (2.6) if βi∗\beta_i^*βi∗​ maximizes ωˉi(β∗/βi)\bar\omega_i(\beta^*/\beta_i)ωˉi​(β∗/βi​) over BiB_iBi​, uniquely up to equivalence.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 625)

With CiII(y0)=∑j≠iE[vj[δj∗(yj∗(s)),δ0∗(y0∗(s));sj] ∣ y0∗(s)=y0]−AiC_i^{II}(y_0) = \sum_{j \ne i} E\big[v_j[\delta_j^*(y_j^*(s)), \delta_0^*(y_0^*(s)); s_j] \,\big|\, y_0^*(s) = y_0\big] - A_iCiII​(y0​)=∑j=i​E[vj​[δj∗​(yj∗​(s)),δ0∗​(y0∗​(s));sj​]​y0∗​(s)=y0​]−Ai​, the sum running over all components j∈{0,…,n}j \in \{0, \dots, n\}j∈{0,…,n} other than iii and the expectation taken under β∗\beta^*β∗ (3.3), the structure ωiII=vi[… ]+CiII(y0(s))\omega_i^{II} = v_i[\dots] + C_i^{II}(y_0(s))ωiII​=vi​[…]+CiII​(y0​(s)) lies in J\mathscr{J}J and satisfies, for every subunit iii and every βi∈Bi\beta_i \in B_iβi​∈Bi​,

ωˉiII(β∗/βi)≤ωˉiII(β∗),with strict inequality if βi≢βi∗.\bar\omega_i^{II}(\beta^*/\beta_i) \le \bar\omega_i^{II}(\beta^*), \qquad \text{with strict inequality if } \beta_i \not\equiv \beta_i^*.ωˉiII​(β∗/βi​)≤ωˉiII​(β∗),with strict inequality if βi​≡βi∗​.

It holds for every β∗\beta^*β∗ satisfying Assumption A, all strategy sets and all constants AiA_iAi​.

Milestones

  1. The Appendix Lemma: the sets of states consistent with the head's information under β∗/βi\beta^*/\beta_iβ∗/βi​ and under β∗\beta^*β∗ have the same projections onto every component other than iii.
  2. The right-hand side of (A.2): the head's conditional expectation factorizes over the independent components.
  3. (A.2) for a subunit j≠ij \ne ij=i, and 4. (A.2) for the head's component j=0j = 0j=0: the expected payoff of component jjj under β∗/βi\beta^*/\beta_iβ∗/βi​ equals the expected value of its conditional expectation.
  4. (A.1): ωˉiII(β∗/βi)+Ai=ωˉ0(β∗/βi)\bar\omega_i^{II}(\beta^*/\beta_i) + A_i = \bar\omega_0(\beta^*/\beta_i)ωˉiII​(β∗/βi​)+Ai​=ωˉ0​(β∗/βi​) for all βi∈Bi\beta_i \in B_iβi​∈Bi​.

Significance

Theorem 1 shows that a head who knows only the messages it receives can nonetheless align every subunit's interest with the organization's, without monitoring decisions or observations. It is an early statement that expected-externality payments make truthful communication an equilibrium of a decentralized organization, and the Bayesian, team-theoretic counterpart of the dominant-strategy results of Vickrey and Clarke. Its structure (own payoff plus a transfer depending only on the others' reported information) is the template later characterized by Green and Laffont and generalized by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet.

Theorem 1 is proved in the paper; nothing here is open mathematically. What the mission adds is a machine-checked version with every modelling choice explicit: how information is generated by the message protocol, what the conditional expectation in (3.3) means on events of probability zero, and which equivalence "uniquely" refers to. No machine-checked proof of Theorem 1 is known to the platform. The platform's AGT.vcg_incentive_compatible treats the complete-information, direct-revelation analogue (deterministic valuations, dominant strategies), a different model with a different conclusion.

Difficulty

The tempting argument conditions on the head's information y0∗(s)=y0y_0^*(s) = y_0y0∗​(s)=y0​ under β∗\beta^*β∗ and compares it with the head's information under a deviation. That comparison fails when a deviating subunit sends a message that γi∗\gamma_i^*γi∗​ never sends: the conditioning event then has probability zero under β∗\beta^*β∗, and the conditional expectation of (3.3) is not determined by the joint law. A second obstacle is that the head's information under a deviation differs from the information under β∗\beta^*β∗ in every coordinate the deviation touches, while the compensation is computed as if β∗\beta^*β∗ were played; the statement to be proved compares expectations taken under two different joint strategies, and the one-exchange protocol makes the head's messages, and hence every subunit's information, depend on the head's own state. Treating these dependencies loosely either produces a circular definition of the information functions (as (3.1) is printed) or a statement that fails on events of probability zero.

Formalization scope

  • Every component state space SkS_kSk​ is a finite type with weights that are nonnegative and sum to one; the joint law is the product of these weights and expectations are finite sums. The paper allows general probability spaces; the finite case covers the whole argument and gives conditional expectations at a point an elementary meaning.
  • Subunits form a finite index type; the head is a separate component with its own observation, message and decision types. Observation, message and decision spaces are fixed types per component.
  • Information (3.1) follows the single exchange of messages the paper describes in §4.A (p. 627): the head's message to subunit iii is a function of the head's observation. As printed, (3.1) is circular; this protocol is the paper's own resolution.
  • CiIIC_i^{II}CiII​ is used in factorized form: the head's term conditions only the head's state on the head's observation, and subunit jjj's term conditions only sjs_jsj​ on the message jjj sent. A separate milestone states that this equals the literal conditional expectation of (3.3) whenever the conditioning event has positive probability. The literal elementary quotient takes the value 000 on null events, and with it Theorem 1 is false (one subunit that can send an unused message suffices); the factorized form is what the Appendix computes. The sum in (3.3) includes the head's component v0v_0v0​.
  • Equivalence of strategies is footnote 5's, over all β∈B\beta \in Bβ∈B; optimality includes the strict inequality for non-equivalent deviations. A formalization that replaces equivalence by equality of strategies, fixes Bi={βi∗}B_i = \{\beta_i^*\}Bi​={βi∗​}, drops the strict inequality, or assumes (A.1) as a hypothesis is not this theorem.
  • The Lemma carries the added hypothesis that the set B(s)B(s)B(s) is nonempty; the paper's proof presumes it and the statement is false without it.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and reusable finite-probability facts (conditioning on product events, iterated expectation over a coordinate) stated for product weights.

Selected references

  • T. Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41(4):617–631, 1973. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
  • J. Marschak and R. Radner, Economic Theory of Teams, Yale University Press, 1972.
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1):8–37, 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • E. H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice 11:17–33, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726210
  • J. Green and J.-J. Laffont, Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods, Econometrica 45(2):427–438, 1977. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911219
  • C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gérard-Varet, Incentives and Incomplete Information, Journal of Public Economics 11(1):25–45, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization 1: Logarithmic Regret of Online Gradient DescentResearch Paper

Motivation

Online convex optimization is a repeated game between a learner and an adversary. In each round t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T the learner commits to a point xtx_txt​ of a convex set P⊆Rn\mathcal P\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn; only then is a convex cost function ftf_tft​ revealed, and the learner pays ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​). The learner is judged by its regret: its total cost minus the total cost of the best fixed point chosen in hindsight. The model covers online portfolio selection, online regression, prediction with expert advice and the analysis of stochastic gradient methods, and it is the standard language of online learning theory.

Zinkevich (ICML 2003) showed that projected gradient descent with step sizes of order 1/t1/\sqrt t1/t​ has regret O(GDT)O(GD\sqrt T)O(GDT​) for any convex costs with gradients bounded by GGG on a set of diameter DDD, and this rate cannot be improved for linear costs. Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (Machine Learning 69, 2007) asked what curvature buys. Their first result, the subject of this mission, is that the same algorithm with the faster step sizes 1/(Ht)1/(Ht)1/(Ht) has regret only logarithmic in TTT once every cost function is HHH-strongly convex. The paper's other three results (the Online Newton Step, Follow the Approximate Leader and Exponentially Weighted Online Optimization, for exp-concave costs) are the subject of the other missions of this series.

Setting

Fix n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N and a nonempty, closed, bounded, convex set P⊆Rn\mathcal P\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn, with the Euclidean norm ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​ (§2.1, p. 171).

  • Cost functions. A sequence f1,f2,⋯:Rn→Rf_1,f_2,\dots:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf1​,f2​,⋯:Rn→R. Write ∇ft(x)\nabla f_t(x)∇ft​(x) for the gradient and ∇2ft(x)\nabla^2 f_t(x)∇2ft​(x) for the Hessian.
  • Gradient bound. A number GGG with ∥∇ft(x)∥2≤G\|\nabla f_t(x)\|_2\le G∥∇ft​(x)∥2​≤G for all x∈Px\in\mathcal Px∈P and all rounds ttt (p. 172).
  • HHH-strong convexity (p. 172). For H>0H>0H>0, fff is HHH-strongly convex on P\mathcal PP when it is twice differentiable and ∇2f(x)⪰HIn\nabla^2 f(x)\succeq H I_n∇2f(x)⪰HIn​ for every x∈Px\in\mathcal Px∈P, i.e. v⊤∇2f(x)v≥H∥v∥22v^\top\nabla^2 f(x)v\ge H\|v\|_2^2v⊤∇2f(x)v≥H∥v∥22​ for all vvv.
  • Euclidean projection. ΠP(y)\Pi_{\mathcal P}(y)ΠP​(y) is the point of P\mathcal PP nearest to yyy, ΠP(y)=arg⁡min⁡x∈P∥x−y∥2\Pi_{\mathcal P}(y)=\arg\min_{x\in\mathcal P}\|x-y\|_2ΠP​(y)=argminx∈P​∥x−y∥2​ (IsProj P y z).
  • Online Gradient Descent (Fig. 1, p. 174), with step sizes η1,η2,…\eta_1,\eta_2,\dotsη1​,η2​,…: x1∈Px_1\in\mathcal Px1​∈P is arbitrary, and in iteration t>1t>1t>1
xt=ΠP(xt−1−ηt∇ft−1(xt−1))x_t=\Pi_{\mathcal P}\bigl(x_{t-1}-\eta_t\nabla f_{t-1}(x_{t-1})\bigr)xt​=ΠP​(xt−1​−ηt​∇ft−1​(xt−1​))

(IsOGDRun P η f x).

  • Regret (p. 171): RegretT=∑t=1Tft(xt)−min⁡x∈P∑t=1Tft(x)\mathrm{Regret}_T=\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x_t)-\min_{x\in\mathcal P}\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x)RegretT​=∑t=1T​ft​(xt​)−minx∈P​∑t=1T​ft​(x), and RegretT(OGD)\mathrm{Regret}_T(\mathrm{OGD})RegretT​(OGD) is its supremum over all cost sequences.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 175)

For H>0H>0H>0, cost functions that are HHH-strongly convex on P\mathcal PP with gradients bounded by GGG on P\mathcal PP, and any run of Online Gradient Descent whose step after round ttt is ηt+1=1/(Ht)\eta_{t+1}=1/(Ht)ηt+1​=1/(Ht), for every T≥1T\ge1T≥1 and every u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P:

∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u)) ≤ G22H (1+log⁡T).\sum_{t=1}^{T}\bigl(f_t(x_t)-f_t(u)\bigr)\ \le\ \frac{G^2}{2H}\,\bigl(1+\log T\bigr).t=1∑T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u)) ≤ 2HG2​(1+logT).

This is LogRegretOCO.OGD.ogd_regret_bound. The constant is the paper's, and at T=1T=1T=1 the bound reads G2/(2H)G^2/(2H)G2/(2H).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (1), the strong-convexity inequality: for x,y∈Px,y\in\mathcal Px,y∈P, 2(f(x)−f(y))≤2∇f(x)⊤(x−y)−H∥y−x∥222(f(x)-f(y))\le 2\nabla f(x)^\top(x-y)-H\|y-x\|_2^22(f(x)−f(y))≤2∇f(x)⊤(x−y)−H∥y−x∥22​.
  2. Lemma 8 with A=InA=I_nA=In​: for a convex P\mathcal PP, z=ΠP(y)z=\Pi_{\mathcal P}(y)z=ΠP​(y) and a∈Pa\in\mathcal Pa∈P, ∥y−a∥22≥∥z−a∥22\|y-a\|_2^2\ge\|z-a\|_2^2∥y−a∥22​≥∥z−a∥22​. This is already on the platform, proved, as UnderstandingML.projection_lemma, and is reused as a reference item.
  3. Eq. (2), the one-step inequality: for z=ΠP(x−ηg)z=\Pi_{\mathcal P}(x-\eta g)z=ΠP​(x−ηg), η>0\eta>0η>0, ∥g∥2≤G\|g\|_2\le G∥g∥2​≤G and u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P, 2g⊤(x−u)≤(∥x−u∥22−∥z−u∥22)/η+ηG22g^\top(x-u)\le(\|x-u\|_2^2-\|z-u\|_2^2)/\eta+\eta G^22g⊤(x−u)≤(∥x−u∥22​−∥z−u∥22​)/η+ηG2.

The last step of the argument is the harmonic-sum bound ∑t=1T1/t≤1+log⁡T\sum_{t=1}^T 1/t\le 1+\log T∑t=1T​1/t≤1+logT, which Mathlib already provides (harmonic_le_one_add_log).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 separates two regimes of online convex optimization: Θ(T)\Theta(\sqrt T)Θ(T​) regret for general convex costs and O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) for strongly convex ones, with an algorithm that costs one gradient and one projection per round. Through the online-to-batch conversion, the same step-size schedule gives the O(log⁡T/T)O(\log T/T)O(logT/T) rate of stochastic gradient descent on strongly convex objectives. The theorem is also the reference point for the paper's weaker exp-concavity assumption, under which the other three algorithms obtain O(nlog⁡T)O(n\log T)O(nlogT) regret.

Formalizing it. The result is proved and well known; what this mission adds is a machine-checked proof with the paper's exact constant. The Prove2Me platform holds a statement of the textbook version of this theorem (Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, Theorem 3.3), OnlineConvexOpt.FirstOrder.online_gradient_descent_strongly_convex_regret, but it is Disproved: its regret is written with a real infimum over the decision set, which Lean evaluates to a junk value. No proved version of the logarithmic bound is on the platform. The strong-convexity inequality, the one-step projected-gradient inequality and the telescoping argument are reusable by every later formalization of gradient methods on the platform.

Difficulty

The argument is short, and its difficulty lies in the bookkeeping. The telescoping sum of squared distances cancels exactly only with the right step-size indexing: the step taken after round ttt must be 1/(Ht)1/(Ht)1/(Ht). Reading Fig. 1 literally with ηt=1/(Ht)\eta_t=1/(Ht)ηt​=1/(Ht) makes the step after round ttt equal to 1/(H(t+1))1/(H(t+1))1/(H(t+1)), and the sum then leaves an uncancelled term H2∥x1−x∗∥22\frac H2\|x_1-x^*\|_2^22H​∥x1​−x∗∥22​ that the printed bound does not contain. Strong convexity is a statement about the Hessian, so the curvature inequality (1) needs a second-order Taylor expansion along a segment of P\mathcal PP; convexity of P\mathcal PP keeps the segment inside the set where the Hessian bound holds. The projection step needs the obtuse-angle property of Euclidean projection onto a convex set.

Formalization scope

Points are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the Euclidean norm (the sup norm of Fin n → ℝ would change the gradient bound). Cost functions are functions on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, as the paper's use of gradients and Hessians presupposes; the gradient is Mathlib's gradient, and the Hessian quadratic form is the second Fréchet derivative applied to (v,v)(v,v)(v,v). Rounds are 1-based: x 0, f 0 and η 1 are never read, and sums run over Finset.Icc 1 T. The run of the algorithm is a predicate on the whole trajectory, required at every round; the projection is a predicate (nearest point of P\mathcal PP), which is unique for nonempty closed convex P\mathcal PP.

Choices and corrections relative to the printed text:

  • Step-size index. Theorem 1 prints "step sizes ηt=1Ht\eta_t=\frac1{Ht}ηt​=Ht1​", while its proof sets ηt+1=1/(Ht)\eta_{t+1}=1/(Ht)ηt+1​=1/(Ht) for the step after round ttt. The goal uses the proof's indexing, as a hypothesis η (t + 1) = 1 / (H * t) for t≥1t\ge1t≥1 on the step sizes of Fig. 1.
  • Eq. (2). The paper prints "5∇t⊤(xt−x∗)5\nabla_t^\top(x_t-x^*)5∇t⊤​(xt​−x∗)"; the 555 is a typo for 222, and the milestone states 222. The verbatim milestone text keeps the printed 555.
  • Regret. Regret is stated against every comparator u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P; the minimum over the compact set P\mathcal PP is attained, so this is the paper's statement. The expectation in the paper's regret is vacuous for this deterministic algorithm, and the supremum over cost sequences is the universal quantifier over fff.
  • Hypotheses. Strong convexity and the gradient bound are required for the rounds 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T only. Convexity of each ftf_tft​, a standing assumption of §2.2, follows from HHH-strong convexity on the convex set P\mathcal PP and is not added. No diameter bound enters Theorem 1.

A regret bound written with a real ⨅/sInf over P\mathcal PP, or a bound for an arbitrary sequence satisfying Eq. (2) instead of a run of the paper's algorithm, would not be Theorem 1; the goal quantifies over every comparator in P\mathcal PP and carries the run predicate, the Hessian hypothesis and the gradient bound. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: on the closed unit ball, ft(x)=H2∥x∥22f_t(x)=\frac H2\|x\|_2^2ft​(x)=2H​∥x∥22​ with G=HG=HG=H meets all of them.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the two inequalities and of the goal; a general projection lemma for positive semidefinite AAA (Lemma 8 in full, needed by the Online Newton Step mission) is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, A. Agarwal, S. Kale, Logarithmic regret algorithms for online convex optimization, Machine Learning 69 (2007), 169–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-007-5016-8
  • M. Zinkevich, Online convex programming and generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent, ICML 2003. https://www.aaai.org/Papers/ICML/2003/ICML03-120.pdf
  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., MIT Press 2022 (Theorem 3.3). https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05207
  • S. Shalev-Shwartz, S. Ben-David, Understanding Machine Learning: From Theory to Algorithms, Cambridge University Press 2014 (Lemma 14.9, the projection lemma). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107298019
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization 2: Logarithmic Regret of the Online Newton StepResearch Paper

Motivation

Online convex optimization models repeated decision making against an unknown, possibly adversarial environment: in each round t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T a player picks a point xtx_txt​ of a convex set P⊆Rn\mathcal P\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn, and only then learns a convex cost function ftf_tft​ and pays ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​). Performance is measured by regret, the excess of the total cost over that of the best fixed point in hindsight. Zinkevich (ICML 2003) showed that online gradient descent has regret O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) for arbitrary convex costs with bounded gradients, and this rate cannot be improved in general.

Many costs met in practice have more curvature than bare convexity. The log-loss f(x)=−log⁡(x⊤a)f(x)=-\log(x^\top a)f(x)=−log(x⊤a) of universal portfolio management (Cover, Math. Finance 1991) is not strongly convex, but it is exp-concave. Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (Mach Learn 69, 2007) gave the first efficient algorithms with regret logarithmic in TTT for exp-concave costs. This mission formalizes the second of their algorithms, the Online Newton Step (ONS), and its regret bound (Theorem 2 of the paper). ONS is the basis of later second-order online methods and appears as a standard algorithm in textbooks on online learning.

Timeline:

  • 2003 — Zinkevich: O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) regret for general convex costs by online gradient descent.
  • 2006–2007 — Hazan, Agarwal, Kale (COLT 2006; Mach Learn 2007): O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) regret for strongly convex costs by gradient descent, and O(nlog⁡T)O(n\log T)O(nlogT) regret for exp-concave costs by ONS, Follow the Approximate Leader, and exponentially weighted online optimization.
  • 2016 — Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization (Found. Trends Optim., arXiv:1909.05207): textbook treatment of ONS with modified parameters.

Setting

The decision set P⊆Rn\mathcal P\subseteq\mathbb R^nP⊆Rn is nonempty, closed, bounded and convex, and DDD bounds its diameter: ∥x−y∥≤D\|x-y\|\le D∥x−y∥≤D for all x,y∈Px,y\in\mathcal Px,y∈P, with the Euclidean norm. The costs f1,f2,…f_1,f_2,\dotsf1​,f2​,… are real functions, differentiable at every point of P\mathcal PP, with gradient bound ∥∇ft(x)∥≤G\|\nabla f_t(x)\|\le G∥∇ft​(x)∥≤G on P\mathcal PP. A cost is α\alphaα-exp-concave (α>0\alpha>0α>0) if x↦exp⁡(−αft(x))x\mapsto\exp(-\alpha f_t(x))x↦exp(−αft​(x)) is concave on P\mathcal PP.

For a matrix AAA, the generalized projection ΠPA(y)\Pi^A_{\mathcal P}(y)ΠPA​(y) is a point of P\mathcal PP minimising (y−x)⊤A(y−x)(y-x)^\top A(y-x)(y−x)⊤A(y−x) over x∈Px\in\mathcal Px∈P.

The Online Newton Step fixes

β=12min⁡{14GD,α},ε=1β2D2,\beta=\tfrac12\min\Big\{\frac1{4GD},\alpha\Big\},\qquad \varepsilon=\frac1{\beta^2D^2},β=21​min{4GD1​,α},ε=β2D21​,

writes ∇t=∇ft(xt)\nabla_t=\nabla f_t(x_t)∇t​=∇ft​(xt​) and At=∑i=1t∇i∇i⊤+εInA_t=\sum_{i=1}^t\nabla_i\nabla_i^\top+\varepsilon I_nAt​=∑i=1t​∇i​∇i⊤​+εIn​, plays an arbitrary x1∈Px_1\in\mathcal Px1​∈P, and then

xt+1=ΠPAt(xt−1βAt−1∇t).x_{t+1}=\Pi^{A_t}_{\mathcal P}\Big(x_t-\frac1\beta A_t^{-1}\nabla_t\Big).xt+1​=ΠPAt​​(xt​−β1​At−1​∇t​).

The regret after TTT rounds against a comparator u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P is ∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u))\sum_{t=1}^T\big(f_t(x_t)-f_t(u)\big)∑t=1T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u)); the paper's regret is its maximum over u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P.

In Lean the objects are LogRegretOCO.ONS.onsBeta, onsEps, onsMatrix, IsGenProj and IsONSRun, with the regularised Gram matrix regGram and the quadratic form quadForm.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 with nlog⁡T≥4n\log T\ge4nlogT≥4

For every run of ONS, every horizon TTT with nlog⁡T≥4n\log T\ge 4nlogT≥4, and every u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P,

∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u))≤5(1α+GD) nlog⁡T.\sum_{t=1}^T\big(f_t(x_t)-f_t(u)\big)\le 5\Big(\frac1\alpha+GD\Big)\,n\log T.t=1∑T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u))≤5(α1​+GD)nlogT.

The added condition nlog⁡T≥4n\log T\ge4nlogT≥4 is what makes the printed constant correct (see Formalization scope).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 177): for 0<β≤12min⁡{1/(4GD),α}0<\beta\le\frac12\min\{1/(4GD),\alpha\}0<β≤21​min{1/(4GD),α} and x,y∈Px,y\in\mathcal Px,y∈P,
f(x)≥f(y)+∇f(y)⊤(x−y)+β2(∇f(y)⊤(x−y))2.f(x)\ge f(y)+\nabla f(y)^\top(x-y)+\tfrac\beta2\big(\nabla f(y)^\top(x-y)\big)^2 .f(x)≥f(y)+∇f(y)⊤(x−y)+2β​(∇f(y)⊤(x−y))2.
  1. Lemma 8 (p. 188): for convex P\mathcal PP, A⪰0A\succeq0A⪰0, z=ΠPA(y)z=\Pi^A_{\mathcal P}(y)z=ΠPA​(y) and a∈Pa\in\mathcal Pa∈P: (y−a)⊤A(y−a)≥(z−a)⊤A(z−a)(y-a)^\top A(y-a)\ge(z-a)^\top A(z-a)(y−a)⊤A(y−a)≥(z−a)⊤A(z−a).
  2. The display on p. 178: for every run of ONS and u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P,
∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u))≤12β∑t=1T∇t⊤At−1∇t+12β.\sum_{t=1}^T\big(f_t(x_t)-f_t(u)\big)\le\frac1{2\beta}\sum_{t=1}^T\nabla_t^\top A_t^{-1}\nabla_t+\frac1{2\beta}.t=1∑T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u))≤2β1​t=1∑T​∇t⊤​At−1​∇t​+2β1​.
  1. Lemma 12 (p. 191): for A⪰B≻0A\succeq B\succ0A⪰B≻0, A−1∙(A−B)≤log⁡(∣A∣/∣B∣)A^{-1}\bullet(A-B)\le\log(|A|/|B|)A−1∙(A−B)≤log(∣A∣/∣B∣).
  2. Lemma 11 (p. 190): if ∥ut∥≤r\|u_t\|\le r∥ut​∥≤r, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and Vt=∑τ≤tuτuτ⊤+εInV_t=\sum_{\tau\le t}u_\tau u_\tau^\top+\varepsilon I_nVt​=∑τ≤t​uτ​uτ⊤​+εIn​, then ∑t=1Tut⊤Vt−1ut≤nlog⁡(r2T/ε+1)\sum_{t=1}^Tu_t^\top V_t^{-1}u_t\le n\log(r^2T/\varepsilon+1)∑t=1T​ut⊤​Vt−1​ut​≤nlog(r2T/ε+1).

Significance

Theorem 2 shows that exp-concavity alone, without strong convexity, suffices for regret logarithmic in TTT, at a per-round cost of one rank-one matrix update and one generalized projection. Its consequences include logarithmic regret for universal portfolio selection with a polynomial-time algorithm, and, by online-to-batch conversion, fast rates for stochastic exp-concave optimization. Lemma 11 (the elliptical potential bound) is used well beyond this paper, in linear bandits and online regression.

The result has been proved on paper since 2007. The remaining work is its machine-checked proof: the potential argument, the log-determinant inequality and the generalized-projection inequality for positive semidefinite matrices. As far as is known, none of these results is formalized in Mathlib. Prove2Me holds a related elliptical potential lemma for linear bandits (BanditAlgorithm.elliptical_potential_lemma, with Vt−1V_{t-1}Vt−1​ and a min⁡(1,⋅)\min(1,\cdot)min(1,⋅), a different statement) and the Euclidean case A=IA=IA=I of Lemma 8 (UnderstandingML.projection_lemma). The textbook version of ONS (OnlineConvexOpt.SecondOrder.online_newton_step_regret, with γ=12min⁡{1/(GD),α}\gamma=\frac12\min\{1/(GD),\alpha\}γ=21​min{1/(GD),α} and bound 2(1/α+GD)nlog⁡T2(1/\alpha+GD)n\log T2(1/α+GD)nlogT) is an open private draft with different parameters.

Difficulty

The obvious route to logarithmic regret, the gradient-descent argument of Theorem 1 with step sizes 1/(Ht)1/(Ht)1/(Ht), needs a uniform lower bound H>0H>0H>0 on the Hessians. Exp-concave costs such as the log-loss have no such bound: their curvature vanishes in directions orthogonal to the gradients seen so far. The analysis therefore has to track curvature only along the observed gradient directions. This requires a matrix-valued potential ∑t∇t⊤At−1∇t\sum_t\nabla_t^\top A_t^{-1}\nabla_t∑t​∇t⊤​At−1​∇t​ and a projection in the norm of AtA_tAt​ rather than the Euclidean norm. The Euclidean projection inequality does not transfer to this norm, which changes from round to round. Bounding the potential requires determinant inequalities for positive definite matrices. The analytic facts are elementary, but their Lean statements involve the interaction of EuclideanSpace, Matrix.mulVec, Matrix.inv and Matrix.det.

Formalization scope

Points live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so all norms are Euclidean; matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ acting on coordinate vectors. Rounds are 1-based: sums run over Finset.Icc 1 T and the index 000 is unused. Cost functions are ambient functions Rn→R\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb RRn→R, differentiable at the points of P\mathcal PP, with ∇ft\nabla f_t∇ft​ given by Mathlib's gradient. The paper's standing assumptions of convexity and twice differentiability are not needed and are omitted. DDD enters only as an upper bound on distances in P\mathcal PP. The generalized projection is a predicate that every minimiser satisfies, and ONS is the predicate IsONSRun on the whole trajectory, so the goal covers every tie-break and every adaptive adversary.

Corrections and added hypotheses:

  • Theorem 2 is false as printed at T=1T=1T=1. Take n=1n=1n=1, P=[−1,1]\mathcal P=[-1,1]P=[−1,1], f1(x)=x2f_1(x)=x^2f1​(x)=x2, α=12\alpha=\frac12α=21​, G=D=2G=D=2G=D=2 and x1=1x_1=1x1​=1: the regret is 111 and the bound is 000. The paper's proof gives 4(1/α+GD)(nlog⁡T+1)4(1/\alpha+GD)(n\log T+1)4(1/α+GD)(nlogT+1) for T≥2T\ge2T≥2; the final sentence drops the additive 1/(2β)1/(2\beta)1/(2β) of the p. 178 display. The goal adds nlog⁡T≥4n\log T\ge4nlogT≥4, under which the printed constant 555 follows.
  • G,D,α>0G,D,\alpha>0G,D,α>0 are assumed wherever β\betaβ or ε\varepsilonε appear: they are the non-degeneracy the formulas presuppose (in Lean, 1/0=01/0=01/0=0).
  • Lemma 3 adds 0<β0<\beta0<β; the proof divides by β\betaβ.
  • Lemma 11 adds ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and reads the printed ∑τ=1tutut⊤\sum_{\tau=1}^tu_tu_t^\top∑τ=1t​ut​ut⊤​ as ∑τ=1tuτuτ⊤\sum_{\tau=1}^tu_\tau u_\tau^\top∑τ=1t​uτ​uτ⊤​.
  • Lemma 12's product ∙\bullet∙ is the entrywise inner product ∑i,jCijEij\sum_{i,j}C_{ij}E_{ij}∑i,j​Cij​Eij​, written out as a double sum.
  • The printed "ft:P→Rnf_t:\mathcal P\to\mathbb R^nft​:P→Rn" is read as ft:P→Rf_t:\mathcal P\to\mathbb Rft​:P→R, and "ΠSnAt\Pi^{A_t}_{S_n}ΠSn​At​​" on p. 177 as ΠPAt\Pi^{A_t}_{\mathcal P}ΠPAt​​.

Regret is stated against every comparator u∈Pu\in\mathcal Pu∈P, never as a real infimum ⨅ over P\mathcal PP, which is junk-valued in Lean on unbounded or empty sets. The goal is a statement about runs of the paper's algorithm with the paper's β\betaβ, ε\varepsilonε and AtA_tAt​. A bound for an arbitrary sequence satisfying the p. 178 display would be a milestone, not Theorem 2. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: the closed unit ball with ft(x)=∥x∥2/2f_t(x)=\|x\|^2/2ft​(x)=∥x∥2/2, α=1\alpha=1α=1, G=1G=1G=1, D=2D=2D=2 is a model.

A complete development needs: first-order conditions for concave functions on convex sets at boundary points; the optimality condition for minimising a convex quadratic over a convex set; spectral facts about symmetric positive definite matrices (square roots, eigenvalues, tr⁡\operatorname{tr}tr and det⁡\detdet); and the telescoping of log-determinants. Lemmas 8, 11 and 12 are reusable beyond this mission, in the sibling missions of this series (Follow the Approximate Leader) and in linear-bandit analyses. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of Lemma 12 through concavity of log⁡det⁡\log\detlogdet.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, A. Agarwal, S. Kale, Logarithmic regret algorithms for online convex optimization, Machine Learning 69 (2007), 169–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-007-5016-8
  • M. Zinkevich, Online convex programming and generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent, ICML 2003. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3041838.3041955
  • T. M. Cover, Universal portfolios, Mathematical Finance 1 (1991), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.1991.tb00002.x
  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, Foundations and Trends in Optimization 2 (2016); 2nd ed. arXiv:1909.05207. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05207
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Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization 3: Logarithmic Regret of Follow the Approximate LeaderResearch Paper

Motivation

Online convex optimization models repeated decision making against an adversary: in each round a player chooses a point of a convex set, and only then learns the convex cost of that round. It covers online portfolio selection, online regression and routing, and it is the standard lens for analysing learning algorithms that must commit before seeing data. The figure of merit is regret, the player's total cost minus the cost of the best fixed decision in hindsight. For general convex costs regret Θ(T)\Theta(\sqrt T)Θ(T​) over TTT rounds is optimal; for costs with curvature it can be logarithmic.

Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (Mach Learn 69 (2007) 169–192) gave several algorithms with O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) regret for α\alphaα-exp-concave costs, the class that contains the log-loss of portfolio selection. This mission formalizes one of them, Follow the Approximate Leader (FTAL). It connects to the oldest online algorithm, Follow the Leader (FTL), which plays the minimiser of all past costs: FTAL is FTL run on quadratic lower models of the costs, and the paper's analysis shows that FTL itself has logarithmic regret on a class of curved costs.

Timeline. Zinkevich (2003) proved O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) regret for online gradient descent on convex costs. Cover (1991) gave a universal portfolio with logarithmic regret for the log-loss, at a running time exponential in the dimension. Kalai and Vempala (2005) analysed perturbed Follow the Leader through the "be the leader" argument. Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (2007) gave efficient algorithms (Online Newton Step, FTAL, EWOO) with O(nlog⁡T)O(n \log T)O(nlogT) regret for exp-concave costs.

Setting

The decision set P⊆RnP \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nP⊆Rn is nonempty, convex, closed and bounded, and DDD bounds its diameter: ∥y−z∥2≤D\|y - z\|_2 \le D∥y−z∥2​≤D for y,z∈Py, z \in Py,z∈P. In rounds t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… the player picks xt∈Px_t \in Pxt​∈P and then pays ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​), where ftf_tft​ is a cost function differentiable at the points of PPP with gradient norm ∥∇ft(x)∥≤G\|\nabla f_t(x)\| \le G∥∇ft​(x)∥≤G on PPP. The cost ftf_tft​ is α\alphaα-exp-concave (α>0\alpha > 0α>0) if x↦exp⁡(−αft(x))x \mapsto \exp(-\alpha f_t(x))x↦exp(−αft​(x)) is concave on PPP. The regret over TTT rounds against a comparator u∈Pu \in Pu∈P is ∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u))\sum_{t=1}^T \bigl(f_t(x_t) - f_t(u)\bigr)∑t=1T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u)).

Follow the Leader plays xt∈arg⁡min⁡x∈P∑τ=1t−1fτ(x)x_t \in \arg\min_{x \in P} \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} f_\tau(x)xt​∈argminx∈P​∑τ=1t−1​fτ​(x) (any point of PPP in round 1). Follow the Approximate Leader (version 1 of the paper's Fig. 3) with parameter β\betaβ plays FTL on the approximate costs

f~τ(x)=fτ(xτ)+∇τ⊤(x−xτ)+β2(x−xτ)⊤∇τ∇τ⊤(x−xτ),∇τ=∇fτ(xτ).\tilde f_\tau(x) = f_\tau(x_\tau) + \nabla_\tau^\top(x - x_\tau) + \frac{\beta}{2}(x - x_\tau)^\top \nabla_\tau\nabla_\tau^\top (x - x_\tau), \qquad \nabla_\tau = \nabla f_\tau(x_\tau).f~​τ​(x)=fτ​(xτ​)+∇τ⊤​(x−xτ​)+2β​(x−xτ​)⊤∇τ​∇τ⊤​(x−xτ​),∇τ​=∇fτ​(xτ​).

In the Lean development these are IsFTLRun P f x and IsFTALRun P β f x, predicates on a whole trajectory xxx.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

With β=12min⁡{1/(4GD),α}\beta = \tfrac12 \min\{1/(4GD), \alpha\}β=21​min{1/(4GD),α}, every FTAL run on α\alphaα-exp-concave costs satisfies, for every T≥1T \ge 1T≥1 and u∈Pu \in Pu∈P,

∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u))≤64(1α+GD)n (log⁡T+1).\sum_{t=1}^T \bigl(f_t(x_t) - f_t(u)\bigr) \le 64\left(\frac1\alpha + GD\right) n\,(\log T + 1).t=1∑T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u))≤64(α1​+GD)n(logT+1).

This is the paper's statement with its constant, stated for the algorithm as defined, and for every adversarial sequence of costs.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3: an α\alphaα-exp-concave cost with gradients bounded by GGG lies above the paraboloid f(y)+∇f(y)⊤(x−y)+β2(∇f(y)⊤(x−y))2f(y) + \nabla f(y)^\top(x-y) + \frac\beta2 (\nabla f(y)^\top (x - y))^2f(y)+∇f(y)⊤(x−y)+2β​(∇f(y)⊤(x−y))2 on PPP.
  2. Lemma 9: regret on lower surrogates that touch the costs at the played points dominates the true regret.
  3. Lemma 10: ∑tft(xt+1)≤∑tft(u)\sum_t f_t(x_{t+1}) \le \sum_t f_t(u)∑t​ft​(xt+1​)≤∑t​ft​(u) for an FTL run ("be the leader").
  4. Lemma 12: A−1∙(A−B)≤log⁡(∣A∣/∣B∣)A^{-1} \bullet (A - B) \le \log(|A|/|B|)A−1∙(A−B)≤log(∣A∣/∣B∣) for A⪰B≻0A \succeq B \succ 0A⪰B≻0.
  5. Lemma 11: ∑t=1Tut⊤Vt−1ut≤nlog⁡(r2T/ε+1)\sum_{t=1}^T u_t^\top V_t^{-1} u_t \le n\log(r^2T/\varepsilon + 1)∑t=1T​ut⊤​Vt−1​ut​≤nlog(r2T/ε+1) with Vt=∑τ≤tuτuτ⊤+εIV_t = \sum_{\tau \le t} u_\tau u_\tau^\top + \varepsilon IVt​=∑τ≤t​uτ​uτ⊤​+εI.
  6. Theorem 5 (corrected constant): FTL on costs gt(vt⊤x)g_t(v_t^\top x)gt​(vt⊤​x) with ∥vt∥≤R\|v_t\| \le R∥vt​∥≤R, ∣gt′∣≤b|g_t'| \le b∣gt′​∣≤b, gt′′≥ag_t'' \ge agt′′​≥a has regret at most nb2alog⁡(a2D2R2T2b2+1)+b2a\frac{nb^2}{a}\log\bigl(\frac{a^2D^2R^2T^2}{b^2} + 1\bigr) + \frac{b^2}{a}anb2​log(b2a2D2R2T2​+1)+ab2​.

Significance

Theorem 6 shows that a simple rule, re-solving a convex quadratic program over all past linearized costs, achieves O(nlog⁡T)O(n\log T)O(nlogT) regret on exp-concave costs, matching the Online Newton Step up to constants. Theorem 5 is of independent interest: it shows that unmodified Follow the Leader, which has linear regret on linear costs, has logarithmic regret whenever each cost is a strongly curved function of one linear form. Portfolio selection is such a case. The appendix lemmas (log-determinant potential, elliptical potential) are standard tools reused throughout the bandit and online-learning literature.

On formalization: the results are proved on paper; none is formalized. The Lean development provides a reusable encoding of Follow the Leader as a trajectory predicate, the "be the leader" reduction, the surrogate reduction for regret, and the matrix potential inequalities, which the Online Newton Step analysis also needs. The paper's printed statements of Theorem 5 and Lemma 10 contain errors (see below); this mission states corrected versions that suffice for the goal.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt, bounding each term ft(xt)−ft(xt+1)f_t(x_t) - f_t(x_{t+1})ft​(xt​)−ft​(xt+1​) by how far the leader moves, requires knowing how far the minimiser of a constrained problem moves when one cost is added. For unconstrained strongly convex quadratics this is an explicit Newton step, but here the minimiser lies in a general convex set and each cost contributes curvature in only one direction, so the accumulated curvature can be singular for many rounds and no per-round strong convexity is available. Turning the per-round movement into a sum that grows only like log⁡T\log TlogT, with the paper's explicit constant, is the core of the work; the printed Theorem 5 bound is negative for small TTT, so the constants must be tracked exactly rather than asymptotically.

Formalization scope

Points are in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) so that ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the Euclidean norm; cost functions are functions on all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, differentiable at the points of PPP, with Mathlib's gradient. Rounds are 111-based; x0x_0x0​ and f0f_0f0​ are unused. DDD is any upper bound on pairwise distances in PPP. Exp-concavity is ConcaveOn ℝ P (fun x => Real.exp (-α * f t x)). Algorithms are predicates on the trajectory, required at every round, so every tie-breaking rule is covered and adaptive adversaries are included.

Regret is always stated against every comparator u∈Pu \in Pu∈P. A formalization with a real-valued ⨅/sInf over PPP, or one that bounds the regret of an arbitrary sequence of points rather than of an FTAL run with the paper's β\betaβ, would be trivial or false, and is excluded: the goal carries IsFTALRun with β=12min⁡{1/(4GD),α}\beta = \frac12\min\{1/(4GD),\alpha\}β=21​min{1/(4GD),α}.

Corrections and conventions relative to the printed paper:

  • Theorem 5: the printed bound 2nb2a[log⁡(DRaT/b)+1]\frac{2nb^2}{a}[\log(DRaT/b) + 1]a2nb2​[log(DRaT/b)+1] is false when DRaT/b<1/eDRaT/b < 1/eDRaT/b<1/e. The milestone states the bound the paper's proof gives, nb2alog⁡(a2D2R2T2b2+1)+b2a\frac{nb^2}{a}\log(\frac{a^2D^2R^2T^2}{b^2} + 1) + \frac{b^2}{a}anb2​log(b2a2D2R2T2​+1)+ab2​, which implies the printed one when DRaT≥bDRaT \ge bDRaT≥b. Derivatives are deriv with explicit differentiability at the points vt⊤xv_t^\top xvt⊤​x, x∈Px \in Px∈P.
  • Lemma 10: printed with xt=arg⁡min⁡∑τ=1tfτx_t = \arg\min \sum_{\tau=1}^{t} f_\tauxt​=argmin∑τ=1t​fτ​, under which it is false at T=1T = 1T=1; the proof and its use require the FTL index ∑τ=1t−1\sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1}∑τ=1t−1​, which is stated.
  • Lemma 11: the typo ∑τutut⊤\sum_\tau u_t u_t^\top∑τ​ut​ut⊤​ is read as ∑τuτuτ⊤\sum_\tau u_\tau u_\tau^\top∑τ​uτ​uτ⊤​, and ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 is stated.
  • Lemma 3: β>0\beta > 0β>0 is added (the proof divides by β\betaβ), and G,D>0G, D > 0G,D>0 so that 1/(4GD)1/(4GD)1/(4GD) is meaningful.
  • Theorem 6: "ft:P→Rnf_t : P \to \mathbb{R}^nft​:P→Rn" is read as R\mathbb{R}R-valued; only first-order differentiability is assumed; G,D>0G, D > 0G,D>0. The theorem is true as printed, although the paper's route through the printed Theorem 5 is invalid for T<16T < 16T<16.
  • Only version 1 of FTAL is formalized; Lemma 4 (equivalence with the pseudoinverse form) is out of scope.

Needed infrastructure: first-order optimality for convex minimisation over a convex set, a mean-value theorem along segments, determinants and eigenvalues of symmetric positive definite matrices (Mathlib has most of this), and the matrix inequality ∣A∣≤(tr⁡A/n)n|A| \le (\operatorname{tr} A/n)^n∣A∣≤(trA/n)n. Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and a proof of the goal from the milestones.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, A. Agarwal, S. Kale, Logarithmic regret algorithms for online convex optimization, Machine Learning 69 (2007), 169–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-007-5016-8
  • M. Zinkevich, Online convex programming and generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent, ICML 2003. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3041838.3041955
  • T. M. Cover, Universal portfolios, Mathematical Finance 1 (1991), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.1991.tb00002.x
  • A. Kalai, S. Vempala, Efficient algorithms for online decision problems, J. Comput. System Sci. 71 (2005), 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2004.10.016
  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, Foundations and Trends in Optimization 2 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.05207
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Logarithmic Regret Algorithms for Online Convex Optimization 4: Logarithmic Regret of Exponentially Weighted Online OptimizationResearch Paper

Motivation

In online convex optimization a player repeatedly chooses a point xtx_txt​ from a convex set P⊆RnP \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nP⊆Rn, after which an adversary reveals a convex cost function ftf_tft​ and the player pays ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​). The player's regret after TTT rounds is its total cost minus the cost of the best fixed point in hindsight. The model covers online portfolio selection, online regression and prediction with expert advice, and it underlies the analysis of stochastic and adaptive optimization methods (Zinkevich 2003; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006).

For general convex costs the best achievable regret is of order T\sqrt{T}T​. Hazan, Agarwal and Kale (Mach Learn 69, 2007) showed that a curvature condition, α\alphaα-exp-concavity, brings the regret down to order log⁡T\log TlogT, and gave several algorithms that achieve it. This mission concerns the simplest of them, Exponentially Weighted Online Optimization (EWOO), which needs nothing beyond exp-concavity: no bound on gradients and no bound on the diameter of PPP.

Timeline.

  • 1991: Cover's universal portfolio algorithm attains regret O(nlog⁡T)O(n \log T)O(nlogT) for online portfolio selection, whose log-loss is 111-exp-concave (Cover 1991).
  • 1997: Blum and Kalai give a short analysis of the universal portfolio with transaction costs, using a shrinking argument around the best portfolio (Blum and Kalai 1997/1999).
  • 2003: Kalai and Vempala give a polynomial-time randomized implementation of Cover's algorithm via random walks (JMLR 3, 2003).
  • 2007: Hazan, Agarwal and Kale state EWOO for general α\alphaα-exp-concave costs and prove the regret bound of Theorem 7, alongside the Online Newton Step and Follow the Approximate Leader.

Setting

Fix n≥0n \ge 0n≥0 and a set P⊆RnP \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nP⊆Rn that is nonempty, closed, bounded and convex, with positive Lebesgue volume vol(P)\mathrm{vol}(P)vol(P). Fix α>0\alpha > 0α>0. The cost functions are f1,f2,⋯:Rn→Rf_1, f_2, \dots : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}f1​,f2​,⋯:Rn→R, each continuous on PPP and α\alphaα-exp-concave on PPP: the function ht(x)=e−αft(x)h_t(x) = e^{-\alpha f_t(x)}ht​(x)=e−αft​(x) is concave on PPP (LogRegretOCO.EWOO.IsExpConcave).

EWOO keeps the weights

wt(x)=exp⁡(−α∑τ=1t−1fτ(x))=∏τ=1t−1hτ(x),w_t(x) = \exp\Bigl(-\alpha \sum_{\tau=1}^{t-1} f_\tau(x)\Bigr) = \prod_{\tau=1}^{t-1} h_\tau(x),wt​(x)=exp(−ατ=1∑t−1​fτ​(x))=τ=1∏t−1​hτ​(x),

and on round ttt plays the wtw_twt​-weighted mean of PPP,

xt=∫Px wt(x) dx∫Pwt(x) dxx_t = \frac{\int_P x\, w_t(x)\, dx}{\int_P w_t(x)\, dx}xt​=∫P​wt​(x)dx∫P​xwt​(x)dx​

(LogRegretOCO.EWOO.ewooPoint). In particular x1x_1x1​ is the centroid of PPP, and each xtx_txt​ depends only on f1,…,ft−1f_1, \dots, f_{t-1}f1​,…,ft−1​. The regret against a comparator u∈Pu \in Pu∈P is ∑t=1T(ft(xt)−ft(u))\sum_{t=1}^T \bigl(f_t(x_t) - f_t(u)\bigr)∑t=1T​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every T≥1T \ge 1T≥1 and every u∈Pu \in Pu∈P,

∑t=1Tft(xt)−∑t=1Tft(u)  ≤  1α n (1+log⁡(T+1)).\sum_{t=1}^{T} f_t(x_t) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} f_t(u) \;\le\; \frac{1}{\alpha}\, n\, \bigl(1 + \log(T+1)\bigr).t=1∑T​ft​(xt​)−t=1∑T​ft​(u)≤α1​n(1+log(T+1)).

This is the paper's printed constant. The paper's proof yields the slightly sharper 1α(1+nlog⁡(T+1))\frac{1}{\alpha}\bigl(1 + n\log(T+1)\bigr)α1​(1+nlog(T+1)); the printed form is the goal.

Milestones

The proof in §3.4 (p. 187) passes through five displays, each a milestone:

  1. Jensen for the weighted mean (first display on p. 187): ht(xt)≥∫Pht wt /∫Pwth_t(x_t) \ge \int_P h_t\, w_t \,/ \int_P w_tht​(xt​)≥∫P​ht​wt​/∫P​wt​.
  2. Eq. (18): ∏τ=1thτ(xτ)≥∫P∏τ=1thτ / vol(P)\prod_{\tau=1}^t h_\tau(x_\tau) \ge \int_P \prod_{\tau=1}^t h_\tau \,/\, \mathrm{vol}(P)∏τ=1t​hτ​(xτ​)≥∫P​∏τ=1t​hτ​/vol(P).
  3. The nearby set S={TT+1x∗+1T+1y:y∈P}S = \{\frac{T}{T+1}x^* + \frac{1}{T+1}y : y \in P\}S={T+1T​x∗+T+11​y:y∈P}: for x∈Sx \in Sx∈S, ht(x)≥TT+1ht(x∗)h_t(x) \ge \frac{T}{T+1}h_t(x^*)ht​(x)≥T+1T​ht​(x∗) and ∏τ=1Thτ(x)≥1e∏τ=1Thτ(x∗)\prod_{\tau=1}^T h_\tau(x) \ge \frac1e \prod_{\tau=1}^T h_\tau(x^*)∏τ=1T​hτ​(x)≥e1​∏τ=1T​hτ​(x∗).
  4. Volume of SSS: vol(S)=vol(P)/(T+1)n\mathrm{vol}(S) = \mathrm{vol}(P)/(T+1)^nvol(S)=vol(P)/(T+1)n.
  5. Multiplicative regret bound (last display on p. 187): ∏τ=1Thτ(xτ)≥1e(T+1)n∏τ=1Thτ(x∗)\prod_{\tau=1}^T h_\tau(x_\tau) \ge \frac{1}{e(T+1)^n}\prod_{\tau=1}^T h_\tau(x^*)∏τ=1T​hτ​(xτ​)≥e(T+1)n1​∏τ=1T​hτ​(x∗).

Significance

The result. Theorem 7 shows that exp-concavity alone suffices for logarithmic regret, with a constant n/αn/\alphan/α that does not depend on the size of PPP or on the gradients of the costs. Specialised to the log-loss ft(x)=−log⁡(rt⊤x)f_t(x) = -\log(r_t^\top x)ft​(x)=−log(rt⊤​x) on the simplex, where α=1\alpha = 1α=1, it recovers the O(nlog⁡T)O(n\log T)O(nlogT) regret of Cover's universal portfolio. The bound is the benchmark against which the computationally cheaper second-order methods of the same paper (Online Newton Step, Follow the Approximate Leader) are compared: those need a gradient bound GGG and diameter DDD and pay a factor (1/α+GD)(1/\alpha + GD)(1/α+GD).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, and a textbook version with a different constant, (n/α)log⁡T+2/α(n/\alpha)\log T + 2/\alpha(n/α)logT+2/α, appears in Hazan's Introduction to Online Convex Optimization (Theorem 4.4). No machine-checked proof of either is known. The work here is to formalize the paper's proof: Jensen's inequality for a weighted Lebesgue average in Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, the change of volume under homothety, and the elementary inequality (1+1/T)T≤e(1 + 1/T)^T \le e(1+1/T)T≤e. A companion draft of the textbook version exists on the platform as a private item (OnlineConvexOpt.SecondOrder.ewoo_regret) with another constant; it is not reused.

Difficulty

The pieces are classical, but they have to be assembled in measure-theoretic form. The point xtx_txt​ is a Bochner integral of a vector-valued function over PPP, and its membership in PPP and the Jensen inequality both require the normalised weight wt dx/∫Pwtw_t\,dx/\int_P w_twt​dx/∫P​wt​ to be a genuine probability measure on PPP, with every integrand integrable. The obvious one-dimensional intuition — "the weighted mean of a convex set lies in the set" — hides the requirement that PPP be closed and have positive volume.

The second obstacle is that Eq. (18) compares the algorithm with an average of the product ∏hτ\prod h_\tau∏hτ​ over all of PPP, while the regret compares it with a single point. The natural attempt, bounding the average below by the value at the comparator, fails: the average can be far smaller than the maximum, and a lower bound that loses more than a factor polynomial in TTT destroys the logarithmic rate. Controlling this loss in nnn dimensions, with a constant independent of the shape and size of PPP, is the heart of the argument.

Formalization scope

Points live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with its Lebesgue (Haar) measure volume. Rounds are numbered from 111: the weights sum over Finset.Ico 1 t, the regret over Finset.Icc 1 T. Cost functions are defined on all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn; only their values on PPP enter. The algorithm is the total function ewooPoint P α f t, and the goal is stated for xtx_txt​ equal to it — not for an arbitrary sequence satisfying a Jensen-type inequality.

Conventions and corrections relative to the printed text:

  • Regret against every comparator. The regret is stated as ∑t(ft(xt)−ft(u))≤\sum_t (f_t(x_t) - f_t(u)) \le∑t​(ft​(xt​)−ft​(u))≤ bound for every u∈Pu \in Pu∈P, never through a real-valued ⨅ or sInf over PPP, which in Lean would return a junk value off its intended domain and trivialize the statement.
  • Positive volume volume P ≠ 0 is added: the algorithm divides by ∫Pwt\int_P w_t∫P​wt​, which the paper leaves implicit. Without it Lean's convention 0−1=00^{-1} = 00−1=0 would set xt=0x_t = 0xt​=0.
  • Continuity of each ftf_tft​ on PPP is the paper's standing assumption (§2.2: costs twice differentiable and convex) weakened to what the argument uses; it makes every integral in the development an integral of an integrable function.
  • Typos. Theorem 7's "ft:P→Rnf_t : P \to \mathbb{R}^nft​:P→Rn" is read as real-valued, and its "exp⁡(−αf(x))\exp(-\alpha f(x))exp(−αf(x))" as exp⁡(−αft(x))\exp(-\alpha f_t(x))exp(−αft​(x)). The set-builder "S={x∈S∣… }S = \{x \in S \mid \dots\}S={x∈S∣…}" defines SSS in terms of itself and is read as the set of all TT+1x∗+1T+1y\frac{T}{T+1}x^* + \frac{1}{T+1}yT+1T​x∗+T+11​y, y∈Py \in Py∈P; the printed "S=x∗+1T+1PS = x^* + \frac{1}{T+1}PS=x∗+T+11​P" is a translate of that set with the same volume.
  • Comparator. The paper's x∗x^*x∗ is a minimizer of ∑tft\sum_t f_t∑t​ft​; milestones 3 and 5 are stated for every x∗∈Px^* \in Px∗∈P, which implies the minimizer case.
  • Constant. The printed 1αn(1+log⁡(T+1))\frac{1}{\alpha}n(1+\log(T+1))α1​n(1+log(T+1)) is stated, although the proof gives the sharper 1α(1+nlog⁡(T+1))\frac{1}{\alpha}(1 + n\log(T+1))α1​(1+nlog(T+1)).
  • Not in scope. The randomized variant (sampling xtx_txt​ with density proportional to wtw_twt​, "in expectation") and the running-time discussion of §3.4.1 have no separate proof in the paper.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs, and that is reusable beyond this mission: Jensen's inequality for concave functions under a probability measure with a continuous density on a compact convex set (Mathlib has ConcaveOn.le_map_integral and Convex.integral_mem); the scaling identity for Haar measure (MeasureTheory.Measure.addHaar_smul); and the elementary bound (T/(T+1))T≥1/e(T/(T+1))^T \ge 1/e(T/(T+1))T≥1/e. Proofs of any milestone, and a general weighted-Jensen lemma usable across the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, A. Agarwal, S. Kale, Logarithmic regret algorithms for online convex optimization, Machine Learning 69 (2007), 169–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-007-5016-8
  • T. M. Cover, Universal portfolios, Mathematical Finance 1 (1991), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.1991.tb00002.x
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Methods of Conjugate Gradients for Solving Linear Systems I: Finite Termination of the Conjugate Gradient MethodResearch Paper

Motivation

Solving a linear system Ax=kAx = kAx=k with a large symmetric positive definite matrix AAA is a basic task of scientific computing: it arises from discretized elliptic equations, least-squares problems and the Newton steps of optimization methods. In 1952 Magnus Hestenes and Eduard Stiefel published the conjugate gradient method (cg-method) (J. Res. Natl. Bur. Stand. 49 (1952) 409–436). The method uses AAA only through matrix–vector products and stores a few vectors. The paper's abstract states its central property in one sentence: "The solution is given in nnn steps."

The paper obtains this property from a more general scheme, the method of conjugate directions (cd-method), which also contains Gaussian elimination as a special case. Its argument has two parts. Every cd-method with nonzero directions reaches the solution within nnn steps (Theorem 4:2). The cg-method is a cd-method (Theorem 5:2), which follows from the orthogonality and conjugacy relations of Theorem 5:1. This mission formalizes that chain.

Setting

Vectors are real nnn-tuples, with scalar product (x,y)=x1y1+⋯+xnyn(x, y) = x_1y_1 + \cdots + x_ny_n(x,y)=x1​y1​+⋯+xn​yn​ and squared length ∣x∣2=(x,x)|x|^2 = (x, x)∣x∣2=(x,x). The matrix AAA is real, n×nn \times nn×n, symmetric and positive definite, which is the paper's standing assumption (p. 410). The solution hhh satisfies Ah=kAh = kAh=k. The residual of an estimate xxx is r=k−Axr = k - Axr=k−Ax. Two vectors x,yx, yx,y are conjugate when (x,Ay)=0(x, Ay) = 0(x,Ay)=0.

The cg-method (eq. (3:1), p. 411) starts from an arbitrary estimate x0x_0x0​ and sets p0=r0=k−Ax0p_0 = r_0 = k - Ax_0p0​=r0​=k−Ax0​. Given xix_ixi​, rir_iri​, pip_ipi​, it computes

ai=∣ri∣2(pi,Api),xi+1=xi+aipi,ri+1=ri−aiApi,bi=∣ri+1∣2∣ri∣2,pi+1=ri+1+bipi.a_i = \frac{|r_i|^2}{(p_i, Ap_i)},\quad x_{i+1} = x_i + a_i p_i,\quad r_{i+1} = r_i - a_i Ap_i,\quad b_i = \frac{|r_{i+1}|^2}{|r_i|^2},\quad p_{i+1} = r_{i+1} + b_i p_i.ai​=(pi​,Api​)∣ri​∣2​,xi+1​=xi​+ai​pi​,ri+1​=ri​−ai​Api​,bi​=∣ri​∣2∣ri+1​∣2​,pi+1​=ri+1​+bi​pi​.

In Lean the iterates are cgIter A k x₀ i, a structure with fields x, r, p. The step length is cgA.

The cd-method (Section 4, p. 412) chooses an arbitrary first direction p0p_0p0​ and then sets xi+1=xi+aipix_{i+1} = x_i + a_i p_ixi+1​=xi​+ai​pi​ with ai=(pi,ri)/(pi,Api)a_i = (p_i, r_i)/(p_i, Ap_i)ai​=(pi​,ri​)/(pi​,Api​) and ri=k−Axir_i = k - Ax_iri​=k−Axi​. Each new direction pi+1p_{i+1}pi+1​ may be any vector conjugate to p0,…,pip_0, \dots, p_ip0​,…,pi​. Because the directions are free, a cd-run is a property of sequences: IsCDRun A k x r p.

Formalization targets

Goal: finite termination of the cg-method

For every nnn, every symmetric positive definite AAA, every kkk and hhh with Ah=kAh = kAh=k, and every initial estimate x0x_0x0​,

∃ m≤n:xm=h,\exists\, m \le n:\quad x_m = h,∃m≤n:xm​=h,

where xmx_mxm​ is the mmm-th cg iterate. This is the statement of the abstract and of Section 3 (p. 410): "one will reach an estimate xmx_mxm​ (m≤nm \le nm≤n) at which rm=0r_m = 0rm​=0. This estimate is the desired solution hhh."

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4:1 (p. 412). For every cd-run, the directions are mutually conjugate (4:3a). The residual rir_iri​ is orthogonal to p0,…,pi−1p_0, \dots, p_{i-1}p0​,…,pi−1​ (4:3b). The products (pi,rj)(p_i, r_j)(pi​,rj​) are the same for all j≤ij \le ij≤i (4:3c). Hence ai=(pi,r0)/(pi,Api)a_i = (p_i, r_0)/(p_i, Ap_i)ai​=(pi​,r0​)/(pi​,Api​) (4:4).
  2. Theorem 4:2 (p. 412). Every cd-run whose directions p0,…,pn−1p_0, \dots, p_{n-1}p0​,…,pn−1​ are nonzero has xm=hx_m = hxm​=h for some m≤nm \le nm≤n.
  3. Theorem 5:1 (p. 414), in four items. For the cg-method:
    • (5:3a) (ri,rj)=0(r_i, r_j) = 0(ri​,rj​)=0 for i≠ji \ne ji=j;
    • (5:3b) (pi,Apj)=0(p_i, Ap_j) = 0(pi​,Apj​)=0 for i≠ji \ne ji=j;
    • (5:3c) (pi,rj)=0(p_i, r_j) = 0(pi​,rj​)=0 for i<ji < ji<j and (pi,rj)=∣ri∣2(p_i, r_j) = |r_i|^2(pi​,rj​)=∣ri​∣2 for i≥ji \ge ji≥j;
    • (5:3d) (ri,Api)=(pi,Api)(r_i, Ap_i) = (p_i, Ap_i)(ri​,Api​)=(pi​,Api​), and (ri,Apj)=0(r_i, Ap_j) = 0(ri​,Apj​)=0 for i≠j,j+1i \ne j, j + 1i=j,j+1.
  4. Theorem 5:5, eq. (5:10) (p. 416):
ai=∣ri∣2(pi,Api)=(pi,ri)(pi,Api)=(pi,r0)(pi,Api).a_i = \frac{|r_i|^2}{(p_i, Ap_i)} = \frac{(p_i, r_i)}{(p_i, Ap_i)} = \frac{(p_i, r_0)}{(p_i, Ap_i)}.ai​=(pi​,Api​)∣ri​∣2​=(pi​,Api​)(pi​,ri​)​=(pi​,Api​)(pi​,r0​)​.
  1. Theorem 5:2, first sentence (p. 415). The cg-method is a cd-method: its iterates satisfy IsCDRun.

Significance

Finite termination is the property that distinguishes the conjugate gradient method from stationary iterations such as Jacobi or Gauss–Seidel. It explains why the method can be used as a direct solver in exact arithmetic. It is the starting point for the later theory of Krylov subspace methods. The relations of Theorem 5:1 are the checks the paper recommends for monitoring a computation (eq. (3:3)). They are also the input to the paper's further results on the monotone decrease of the error (Section 6) and on the connection with orthogonal polynomials (Sections 14–18).

The result has been proved since 1952 and appears in every numerical linear algebra textbook. As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows (September 2026), it has no machine-checked proof there. The only conjugate gradient material on the platform is a Hilbert-space convergence result for a different recurrence. This mission adds a faithful formal version of the original recursion (3:1) and of the cd-method. It also adds the complete termination argument, organized as in the paper. The definitions and the Theorem 5:1 relations are reusable by any later formalization of Krylov methods, including the second mission of this series on the decrease of the error ∣h−xi∣|h - x_i|∣h−xi​∣.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says that the residuals are mutually orthogonal, so at most nnn of them are nonzero. That argument is only as good as the orthogonality, and Theorem 5:1 must be established by a simultaneous induction over four families of relations. The recursion defines ri+1r_{i+1}ri+1​ by an update, not as k−Axi+1k - Ax_{i+1}k−Axi+1​, so even ri=k−Axir_i = k - Ax_iri​=k−Axi​ needs a proof. Orthogonality of ri+1r_{i+1}ri+1​ to the earlier residuals needs the conjugacy of the earlier directions, and conjugacy of pi+1p_{i+1}pi+1​ needs the orthogonality of the earlier residuals. Neither family can be proved first.

A second obstacle is the passage from orthogonality to termination. A cd-run with a zero direction stalls, so Theorem 4:2 needs the directions p0,…,pn−1p_0, \dots, p_{n-1}p0​,…,pn−1​ to be nonzero. The cg directions become zero exactly when the solution is reached, so applying Theorem 4:2 to cg needs a case split at the first vanishing residual.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, the scalar product is dotProduct (⬝ᵥ), and AxAxAx is Matrix.mulVec (*ᵥ). The hypothesis on AAA is Mathlib's Matrix.PosDef, which includes symmetry. The solution enters only through the hypothesis A *ᵥ h = k. Indices are 0-based, as in the paper.

The cg iteration is total and has no stopping test. Once rm=0r_m = 0rm​=0, Lean's convention x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0 gives pm=0p_m = 0pm​=0 and am=0a_m = 0am​=0. From then on the iteration stays at xmx_mxm​, with zero residuals and directions. For this reason the relations of Theorem 5:1 are stated for all indices without guards: after termination they hold trivially.

Two formulations would make the goal trivial, and neither is used. One is a stopping test or step that refers to hhh or to A−1kA^{-1}kA−1k. The other replaces (3:1b), (3:1d) or (3:1e) by the equivalent formulas (3:2a), (3:2b) or ri+1=k−Axi+1r_{i+1} = k - Ax_{i+1}ri+1​=k−Axi+1​, which would move Theorem 5:5 and part of Theorem 5:2 into the definition. The iteration is (3:1) literally.

The cd-method's implicit hypothesis, that the directions p0,…,pn−1p_0, \dots, p_{n-1}p0​,…,pn−1​ are nonzero, is an explicit binder of Theorem 4:2. Without it the statement fails (take p0=0p_0 = 0p0​=0). The hypothesis is satisfiable: the cg run with nonzero residuals is one example.

A complete development needs the standard facts that mutually conjugate nonzero vectors are linearly independent and that nnn independent vectors span Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn. It also needs the induction behind Theorem 5:1. Contributions welcome beyond the milestones include the converse half of Theorem 5:2, the relation (5:2) expressing pkp_kpk​ through r0,…,rkr_0, \dots, r_kr0​,…,rk​, and Theorem 4:5 (the cd-method computes A−1A^{-1}A−1).

Selected references

  • M. R. Hestenes and E. Stiefel, Methods of Conjugate Gradients for Solving Linear Systems, Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards 49(6), 409–436, 1952. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.049.044
  • L. Fox, H. D. Huskey and J. H. Wilkinson, Notes on the solution of algebraic linear simultaneous equations, Quarterly Journal of Mechanics and Applied Mathematics 1(1), 149–173, 1948 (the cd-method from a different point of view; cited in the paper's Section 4 footnote). https://doi.org/10.1093/qjmam/1.1.149
  • G. H. Golub and C. F. Van Loan, Matrix Computations, 4th ed., Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, §11.3 (textbook account of the method).
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