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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

476 open missions

Missions

101–120 of 476
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis IX: The Discrete Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

The Legendre-Fenchel transform is the single most structurally important operation in convex analysis: for a proper closed convex function fff, its conjugate f∙(p)=sup⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x \{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)\}f∙(p)=supx​{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)} is again proper closed convex, and the transform is an involution — f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet} = ff∙∙=f. This one fact underlies duality theory across optimization: every strong-duality theorem is, at bottom, a statement about conjugate pairs. Chapters 6 and 7 of this book developed M-convex and L-convex functions as if they were two separate theories, each with its own exchange axiom, optimality criterion, and proximity theorem. Chapter 8 reveals they were never separate: the Legendre-Fenchel transform, suitably discretized, is a bijection between the two classes. This mission formalizes that discrete conjugacy theorem together with its classical real-valued precursor and a genuine function-level generalization of Edmonds's intersection theorem, completing the picture that chunks 06 through 09 built the two halves of.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈RV}f^\bullet(p) = \sup\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x) : x \in \mathbb R^V\}f∙(p)=sup{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈RV}; fff is submodular if f(x)+f(y)≥f(x∨y)+f(x∧y)f(x)+f(y) \ge f(x\vee y)+f(x\wedge y)f(x)+f(y)≥f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) and supermodular under the reverse inequality. For f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞}, the discrete Legendre-Fenchel transform restricts the same supremum formula to p∈ZVp \in \mathbb Z^Vp∈ZV: f∙(p)=sup⁡{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈ZV}f^\bullet(p) = \sup\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x) : x \in \mathbb Z^V\}f∙(p)=sup{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈ZV} for p∈ZVp \in \mathbb Z^Vp∈ZV — a genuinely different object from the real-valued transform, since the supremum is now over integer xxx only, and the codomain is checked back against the discrete M-/L-convexity axioms of chunks 06–09. The integer biconjugate f∙∙f^{\bullet\bullet}f∙∙ is the transform applied twice. fff is integer valued if every finite value it takes is an integer (the classes M[Z→Z]M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M[Z→Z], L[Z→Z]L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L[Z→Z] of the goal theorem are exactly the M-/L-convex functions with this property).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.12 (the discrete conjugacy theorem)

(1) The classes M[Z→Z]M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M[Z→Z] and L[Z→Z]L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L[Z→Z] are in one-to-one correspondence under the discrete Legendre-Fenchel transform: for f∈M[Z→Z]f \in M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]f∈M[Z→Z] and g∈L[Z→Z]g \in L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]g∈L[Z→Z], f∙∈L[Z→Z]f^\bullet \in L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]f∙∈L[Z→Z], g∙∈M[Z→Z]g^\bullet \in M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]g∙∈M[Z→Z], f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, and g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g. (2) The same correspondence holds between M♮[Z→Z]M^\natural[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M♮[Z→Z] and L♮[Z→Z]L^\natural[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L♮[Z→Z].

Milestones: Theorem 8.1, Proposition 8.11, Theorem 8.17

Theorem 8.1: the conjugate of a real-valued submodular function is always supermodular — the classical warm-up, and evidence that submodularity/supermodularity is not symmetric under conjugation on its own (the converse fails). Proposition 8.11: the integer biconjugate recovers fff at any point with a nonempty integer subdifferential — the fact that makes discrete biconjugation meaningful at all. Theorem 8.17 (the M-convex intersection theorem): a point jointly minimizes a sum of two M♮^\natural♮-convex functions if and only if a single linear functional separately certifies it as a minimizer of each perturbed function — the function-level generalization of chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem for M-convex sets.

Significance

The result itself. The discrete conjugacy theorem is, in the book's own words, "the unifying result of the entire book": every theorem proved separately for M-convex functions (chunks 06–07) has an exact mirror for L-convex functions (chunks 08–09) precisely because the Legendre-Fenchel transform carries one class to the other. Theorem 8.17's function-level Edmonds generalization shows the payoff directly — the classical matroid-intersection-style min-max duality of chunk 04 was never really about sets; it is a special case (indicator functions) of a duality that holds for the whole class of M-convex functions.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for conjugate functions, discrete conjugacy, or this generality of intersection theorem. This mission gives the first formal statement of the discrete conjugacy theorem, distinguishing it carefully from its real-valued (polyhedral) precursor, Theorem 8.4 — a genuinely different, harder theorem this mission does not draft (see Formalization scope), since the integer bijection needs the M-/L-proximity theorems of chunks 06–09 to control integrality under convex extension, while the real-valued case does not.

Difficulty

The obvious approach — try to prove the discrete conjugacy theorem directly by mimicking the real-valued proof (Theorem 8.4) with ℤ in place of ℝ everywhere — fails, because the real-valued proof's key step (Proposition 8.3, an infimal-convolution argument comparing arg min sets of perturbed polyhedral functions) has no immediate discrete analogue: a discrete arg min need not vary continuously with the perturbation the way a polyhedral one does. The book's actual strategy instead routes through the convex extension of the discrete function (chunk 06/08's bridge to chapter 3's integral convexity), applies the already-proved real-valued conjugacy theorem to the extension, and then must separately argue that the resulting conjugate, restricted back to integer points, is again integer-valued and satisfies the discrete exchange axiom — an argument that needs different treatment depending on whether the original function's domain is bounded or unbounded (an exhaustion argument via restriction to a growing integer interval, invoking chunk 06's proximity theorem to control convergence). Skipping this discreteness argument and treating the real-valued theorem as if it settled the integer case would silently discard exactly the chapter's own point.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq. ConvexConjugate (the discrete transform) has domain and codomain both (V → ℤ) → WithTop ℝ, obtained by taking the defining supremum in EReal (a complete lattice, so it is always total) and projecting back via a new FromEReal map — this is what lets the biconjugate f•• typecheck as an equality of functions of the same type as f. ConvexConjugateR (the real-valued transform, used only by the milestone Theorem 8.1) is a separate object with no shared code, per the explicit warning against conflating the two transforms; the two never appear in the same item.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would draft only the real-valued case (Theorem 8.4) as if it were the discrete theorem, or would silently allow WithTop ℝ's subtraction-avoidance convention to change which values are compared; neither is done. Theorem 8.4 itself (the polyhedral conjugacy theorem) is not drafted in this mission at all — it would require a fresh, otherwise-unused polyhedral M-/L-convex-function layer on Rⱽ that no other item here needs (see MODERATION_NOTES.md). The M-/L-separation theorems (8.15, 8.16) and the Fenchel-type duality theorem (8.21) are likewise left for a follow-on mission; contributions building the polyhedral bridge or the separation theorems, which depend on machinery this mission establishes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXVIII: The Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 8 is where discrete convex analysis explains why it needed two separate notions — M-convexity (exchangeability) and L-convexity (submodularity) — rather than one. The answer is conjugacy: under the classical Legendre-Fenchel transform, the two classes turn out to be exactly dual to each other, the discrete analogue of the fact that convex analysis's transform is self-dual within a single class of convex functions. Mission 10-conjugacy-i proved the integer-lattice version of this fact (Theorem 8.12) but explicitly deferred the polyhedral version — Theorem 8.4, the chapter's own headline "Conjugacy theorem" — noting it needed a real-variable M-/L-convex-function layer the series had not yet built. That layer now exists, built across missions 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions. This mission proves Theorem 8.4 and its companions: the polar-cone correspondence it induces, its nonpolyhedral generalization, the separation and Fenchel-duality theorems for M♮-/L♮-convex functions, and the basic theory of M2-convex functions (sums of M-convex functions), which the Edmonds intersection theorem's own combinatorics is built from.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡x[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x [\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)]f∙(p)=supx​[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]. A polyhedral convex function fff is M-convex (f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R]) if it satisfies (M-EXC[R]); ggg is L-convex (g∈L[R→R]g \in L[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]g∈L[R→R]) if it satisfies (SBF[R]) and (TRF[R]). A concave function hhh is always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h, an ordinary convex function, so every "f≥hf \ge hf≥h" hypothesis is restated as "f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0" — an equivalent formulation avoiding any need to represent −∞-\infty−∞ in the codomain. A polyhedral cone's polar is C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}C^\circ = \{y : \langle y,x\rangle \le 0\ \forall x \in C\}C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}. A function is M2-convex if it is the sum of two M-convex functions.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjugacy theorem (Theorem 8.4)

The classes of polyhedral M-convex functions and polyhedral L-convex functions are in one-to-one correspondence under the Legendre-Fenchel transform: f∈M⇒f∙∈Lf \in M \Rightarrow f^\bullet \in Lf∈M⇒f∙∈L, g∈L⇒g∙∈Mg \in L \Rightarrow g^\bullet \in Mg∈L⇒g∙∈M, and the transform is an involution (f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g) on each class, with the identical statement for the M♮^\natural♮/L♮^\natural♮ variants. This is the theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i deferred, citing exactly the missing infrastructure this series has since built.

Supporting structural targets

Twelve further results build the surrounding theory. Proposition 8.2 gives the easy two-variable case of the general submodularity-preservation fact (Theorem 8.1, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i); Proposition 8.3 is the technical minimizer-difference lemma the goal's harder direction is built from. Theorem 8.5 derives the M-convex/L-convex cone polarity from the goal, and Theorem 8.6 extends the correspondence beyond the polyhedral case to general closed proper convex functions. Proposition 8.14 and Theorems 8.15-8.16 build the separation theory for M♮-/L♮-convex and concave function pairs, with integral witnesses when the functions are integer valued; Theorem 8.21 (parts 1-2) derives the Fenchel-type strong-duality equality these separation theorems make possible. Propositions 8.29-8.30 and Theorem 8.31 (plus Theorem 8.32, found by direct reading immediately after 8.31) build the basic theory of M2-convex functions: their domains and minimizer sets are M2-convex, they are integrally convex, and their global optimality reduces to a finite local check.

Significance

The goal is the theorem that retroactively explains this entire series' two-track structure: missions 20-25 (M-convex sets and functions) and 08/21/26-28 (L-convex sets and functions) are not two independent theories that happen to share techniques — they are conjugate images of each other, so every theorem proved on one side has a dual counterpart automatically available on the other via Theorem 8.4. This is made concrete immediately: Theorem 8.5's cone polarity and the diagram the book draws connecting M0[R]M_0[\mathbb R]M0​[R], 0L[R→R]0L[\mathbb R\to\mathbb R]0L[R→R], and submodular set functions S[R]S[\mathbb R]S[R] (already correspondences this series proved independently, in missions 24-ch06d-mconvexfunctions and 28-ch07d-lconvexfunctions) are shown to be facets of one single conjugacy fact rather than three separate coincidences. The separation and Fenchel duality theorems (8.15, 8.16, 8.21) are the discrete analogues of the two theorems every convex optimization course opens with, and the book is explicit that they are not corollaries of the classical versions plus convex extensibility — they carry genuinely combinatorial content, specializing to Frank's discrete separation theorem and Edmonds's intersection theorem as examples the book itself gives.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the duality at the heart of discrete convex analysis, the reason the theory needed two dual notions rather than one. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing a theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i explicitly left for a future session once the necessary polyhedral apparatus existed, and including one result (Theorem 8.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal's harder direction (L⇒M) would try to verify the exchange inequality for g∙g^\bulletg∙ directly from the definition of the transform; the book's actual proof instead identifies the exchange inequality with a statement about weighted minimizers of ggg itself via Proposition 8.3 (the minimizer-difference bound), converting a claim about the conjugate function into a claim about ggg's own combinatorial structure — a genuine change of perspective, not a direct calculation. Proposition 8.3's own proof is the hardest single argument in this block: it derives the minimizer-difference bound by a contradiction argument that constructs an explicit pair of "worse" minimizers via a join/meet perturbation and derives a strict inequality from Theorem 7.29's translation inequality — a multi-step combinatorial argument with no direct shortcut.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; convex functions are WithTop ℝ valued throughout (never EReal, except for the Legendre-Fenchel transform itself, whose defining supremum/infimum can genuinely be infinite). All thirteen numbered results found in this chunk's page range — the twelve in BRIEF.md's own table plus Theorem 8.32 — are placed, with one documented scope reduction: Theorem 8.21 states only its real-attainment parts (1)-(2), not the integer-attainment refinement of parts (3)-(4), which needs a separate argument no other result in this chunk requires — see HARD.md. Concave functions hhh are always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h and every inequality f≥hf \ge hf≥h restated as f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0, avoiding WithTop ℝ negation entirely. This chunk's own BRIEF.md inherited the chapters-4-7 page-offset boilerplate (printed = PDF −-− 19); chapter 8 uses offset 18, confirmed against the PDF's own footers — every citation here uses the corrected offset. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared from missions 10-conjugacy-i, 20-ch04b-mconvexsets, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets, 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions, and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the thirteen sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 8.3 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 [152] (the polyhedral M-/L-convex conjugacy theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
73 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXIX: M2-Convex and L2-Convex FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

Mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality opened chapter 8's account of M2-convex functions — sums of M-convex functions — proving their domains and minimizers are M2-convex and that they are integrally convex. This mission completes that program and builds its exact mirror for L2-convex functions (integer infimal convolutions of L-convex functions), the class that appears on the opposite side of Edmonds's intersection theorem's min-max relation from M2-convexity. It proves optimality and proximity theorems for both classes, shows their subdifferentials add (a discrete analogue of the classical subdifferential sum rule), derives how the Legendre-Fenchel transform interacts with the sum/infimal-convolution operation, and — the technically hardest result in the whole cluster — establishes that L♮₂-convex functions are integrally convex, by a genuinely different and more intricate argument than the M2-side analogue required.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. A function g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} is L2-convex if g=g1□g2g = g_1 \square g_2g=g1​□g2​, the integer infimal convolution g1□g2(p)=inf⁡{g1(p1)+g2(p2):p1+p2=p}g_1\square g_2(p) = \inf\{g_1(p_1)+g_2(p_2) : p_1+p_2=p\}g1​□g2​(p)=inf{g1​(p1​)+g2​(p2​):p1​+p2​=p}, of two L-convex functions g1,g2g_1, g_2g1​,g2​; L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex if the summands are L♮^\natural♮-convex. An M2-convex function is a sum f1+f2f_1+f_2f1​+f2​ of two M-convex functions (mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality). The integer subdifferential ∂Zf(x)\partial_{\mathbb Z} f(x)∂Z​f(x) and real subdifferential ∂Rf(x)\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)∂R​f(x) generalize the subgradient set to integer- and real-valued perturbation directions respectively.

Formalization targets

Goal: L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions are integrally convex (Theorem 8.42)

Every L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex function is integrally convex, and in particular every L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex set is integrally convex. The book's own proof is the most intricate argument in this cluster: given ppp in the Minkowski sum D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​ of two L-convex sets, it constructs an explicit representation of ppp as a convex combination of finitely many integer points of D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​, all lying in ppp's own integral neighborhood, via the sorted fractional-part values of a chosen decomposition p=p1+p2p=p_1+p_2p=p1​+p2​ — a genuinely different technique from the M2-side analogue (Theorem 8.31), whose proof is a two-line consequence of convex extensibility.

Supporting structural targets

Eleven further results build the M2-/L2-convex theory in parallel. Theorems 8.33-8.34 give the M2-optimality criterion (a nonnegative-sum condition over cyclic exchange families) and its scaling-based proximity theorem; Theorem 8.35 shows subdifferentials of a sum of M♮^\natural♮- convex functions add, and that subdifferentials of M2-/M2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions are L2-/L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex; Theorem 8.36 computes the conjugate of a sum as the infimal convolution of conjugates, with biconjugacy recovering the original sum. Propositions 8.39-8.41 transfer L-(natural-)convexity from summands to the domain and minimizer set of an L2-convex function, and give the precise attainment condition under which a linearly-perturbed infimal convolution's minimizer set splits additively. Theorems 8.43-8.44 give the L2-optimality and L2-proximity theorems, the exact L-side mirrors of Theorems 8.33-8.34; Theorem 8.45 mirrors Theorem 8.35 for subdifferentials of an infimal convolution; and Theorem 8.46 (found by direct reading, immediately following 8.45 and explicitly named by the book as 8.36's counterpart) shows biconjugacy for L♮^\natural♮-convex infimal convolutions.

Significance

The M2-/L2-convex function classes are where discrete convex analysis's abstract machinery meets concrete combinatorial optimization: Edmonds's matroid intersection theorem and its generalizations are literally statements about M2-convex minimization, with the L2-convex side supplying the dual bound. Theorem 8.35's subdifferential additivity is the discrete analogue of the classical Moreau-Rockafellar sum rule, and its proof (via the M-convex intersection theorem, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i) shows the sum rule holding without the constraint-qualification technicalities the continuous theory needs — a case where the discrete theory is cleaner than its continuous ancestor. Theorem 8.42's harder, dedicated proof technique is itself informative: it demonstrates that L2-convexity's combinatorial structure is not a routine transcription of the M2-convex case, foreshadowing the book's broader theme that M- and L-convexity, while conjugate, are not interchangeable in how their proofs actually work.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the sum/infimal-convolution closure properties of M-convex and L-convex functions, continuing chapter 8's duality program into its most combinatorially concrete corner. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including one result (Theorem 8.46) the platform's own automated extractor missed, extending the shared Lean vocabulary (InfConv, L2Convex, M2ConvexSet) mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality began; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal would try to adapt the M2-side integral-convexity proof (a direct appeal to convex extensibility) verbatim; the book's own proof shows this does not work, requiring instead a from-scratch construction: decompose p=p1+p2p=p_1+p_2p=p1​+p2​, take fractional parts a1=p1−⌊p1⌋a_1 = p_1-\lfloor p_1\rfloora1​=p1​−⌊p1​⌋ and a2=⌈p2⌉−p2a_2=\lceil p_2\rceil-p_2a2​=⌈p2​⌉−p2​, sort their combined distinct values, build threshold sets exactly as in the Lovász-extension construction, and verify each resulting integer point qi=⌊p1⌋+χU1i+⌈p2⌉−χU2iq_i = \lfloor p_1\rfloor+\chi_{U_{1i}}+\lceil p_2\rceil-\chi_{U_{2i}}qi​=⌊p1​⌋+χU1i​​+⌈p2​⌉−χU2i​​ both lies in D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​ (via L-convex-set closure properties, Theorem 5.10) and in ppp's integral neighborhood (a case split on whether p(v)p(v)p(v) is itself an integer) — a genuinely multi-stage combinatorial argument with no single-inequality shortcut, unlike almost every other result in this mission.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; M2-/L2-convex functions are (V→ℤ)→WithTop ℝ. All twelve numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed, with no partial-coverage scope reduction needed — every clause of every result, including all three parts of Theorems 8.35 and 8.45 and the full cyclic-exchange condition of Theorems 8.33-8.34, is stated in full. One numbered result nominally in this chunk's page range, Theorem 8.32, is not re-placed here: it was already found and placed as a milestone in mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality, whose own page range overlaps this chunk's by one page (PDF245) — see HARD.md. "g1□g2 > −∞" hypotheses are omitted rather than translated, since WithTop ℝ has no −∞ element to violate. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared verbatim from mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another; ConvexConjugate is redeclared from mission 10-conjugacy-i. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 8.35 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "Extreme points of a generalized polymatroid," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 152 (2005), pp. 268-278 [153] (the L2-convex integral-convexity proof this mission's goal is drawn from).
  • K. Murota and A. Tamura, "Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics," Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 20 (2003), pp. 257-277 [162] (the M2-proximity theorem, Theorem 8.34).
55 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXX: Lagrangian Duality for M-Convex ProgramsTextbook

Motivation

Missions 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality and 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality built the M2-/L2-convex function classes and proved their conjugacy correspondence is nearly complete. This mission finishes that correspondence (Theorems 8.48-8.49) and then turns to chapter 8's capstone application: a Lagrangian duality theory for integer programs, built entirely from the M-/L-convexity machinery developed across the whole book. It develops the general perturbation-based duality framework (mirroring Rockafellar's conjugate duality for nonlinear programming), specializes it to M-convex programs via the perturbation FrF_rFr​, and proves the strong duality theorem this specialization exists to deliver — together with its mirror construction recovering the primal problem from the dual.

Setting

An M-convex program consists of a set B⊆ZVB\subseteq\mathbb Z^VB⊆ZV satisfying (REG) — BBB is an M-convex set — and an objective c:ZV→Z∪{+∞}c:\mathbb Z^V\to\mathbb Z\cup\{+\infty\}c:ZV→Z∪{+∞} satisfying (OBJ) — ccc is an M-convex function. The general duality framework embeds any f(x)=c(x)+δB(x)f(x)=c(x)+\delta_B(x)f(x)=c(x)+δB​(x) in a family of perturbed problems via F:ZV×ZV→Z∪{+∞}F:\mathbb Z^V\times\mathbb Z^V\to\mathbb Z\cup\{+\infty\}F:ZV×ZV→Z∪{+∞} with F(x,0)=f(x)F(x,0)=f(x)F(x,0)=f(x), yielding an optimal-value function φ\varphiφ, a Lagrangian KKK, and a dual objective ggg. For M-convex programs the perturbation Fr(x,u)=c(x)+δB(x+u)+r(u)F_r(x,u)=c(x)+\delta_B(x+u)+r(u)Fr​(x,u)=c(x)+δB​(x+u)+r(u), for an M-convex regularizer rrr with r(0)=0r(0)=0r(0)=0, makes this framework concrete; the case r≡0r\equiv 0r≡0 is written with subscript 000.

Formalization targets

Goal: Strong duality for M-convex programs (Theorem 8.59)

For a feasible, bounded-below M-convex program, min⁡(P)=φr(0)=φr∙∙(0)=max⁡(Dr)\min(P)=\varphi_r(0)=\varphi_r^{\bullet\bullet}(0) =\max(D_r)min(P)=φr​(0)=φr∙∙​(0)=max(Dr​), and opt⁡(Dr)=−∂Zφr(0)\operatorname{opt}(D_r)=-\partial_{\mathbb Z}\varphi_r(0)opt(Dr​)=−∂Z​φr​(0). This is the theorem mission 11-conjugacy-ii-lagrange's own STATUS.md explicitly deferred, noting it needs the specific M-convex perturbation FrF_rFr​ (Eq. (8.61)) and Propositions 8.55-8.56/Theorems 8.57-8.58 as prerequisites — all built as milestones of this mission.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 8.48 completes the M2-/L2-convex conjugacy correspondence; Theorem 8.49 characterizes separable convex functions as exactly the M2♮^\natural_22♮​-and-L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions. Theorem 8.53 (reduced to parts (1),(2),(4)) gives the general perturbation-independent duality identities: the dual objective is g=−φ∙(−⋅)g=-\varphi^{\bullet}(-\cdot)g=−φ∙(−⋅), weak duality's biconjugate form sup⁡(D)=φ∙∙(0)\sup(D)=\varphi^{\bullet\bullet}(0)sup(D)=φ∙∙(0), and the equivalence of strong duality with biconjugate exactness. Proposition 8.55 shows the M-convex perturbation FrF_rFr​ legitimately instantiates the general framework; Proposition 8.56 (reduced to part (1)) gives the closed form for the unregularized Lagrangian kernel K0K_0K0​ via the conjugate of BBB's indicator function; Theorems 8.57 and 8.58 establish the resulting convexity/concavity of the kernel, the dual objective, and the optimal-value function in each of their arguments. Propositions 8.62-8.63 and Theorems 8.64-8.65 build and analyze the mirror construction — the dual perturbation GrG_rGr​, its optimal-value function γr\gamma_rγr​, and the dual-of-dual reconstruction — showing that for bounded BBB the process exactly recovers the primal problem and its own strong duality theorem.

Significance

This is chapter 8's payoff: a full nonlinear-integer-programming duality theory, built without any convexity assumption beyond M-/L-convexity, mirroring Rockafellar's classical conjugate duality approach line for line while replacing every continuous convexity argument with a discrete M-/L-convexity one. Theorem 8.59's proof is a two-line consequence of the machinery this mission assembles (Theorems 8.35, 8.53, 8.58), which is itself the point: the discrete theory's hard combinatorial work (Theorems 8.35, 8.36, 8.42 from prior missions) is what makes the strong duality theorem here nearly free, exactly as convex analysis makes classical Lagrangian duality nearly free once Fenchel duality is established. The bidirectional construction of Theorems 8.62-8.65 is the discrete analogue of the classical fact that Lagrangian duality is symmetric between primal and dual convex programs.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of M2-/L2-conjugacy and Lagrangian duality (section 8.3.3 and section 8.4), continuing chapter 8's duality program to its conclusion. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing the platform's coverage of chapter 8's duality theorems begun in missions 10-conjugacy-i and 11-conjugacy-ii-lagrange; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The EReal-valued (Z∪{±∞}\mathbb Z\cup\{\pm\infty\}Z∪{±∞}) typing is essential and new to this mission: unlike every prior mission in this series, the general framework's derived quantities (φ\varphiφ, KKK, ggg, and their mirror-construction analogues GrG_rGr​, γr\gamma_rγr​, K~r\tilde K_rK~r​, f~\tilde ff~​) are defined as infima/suprema over families that are not a priori bounded, so they can genuinely equal −∞-\infty−∞ or +∞+\infty+∞ — a value WithTop ℝ cannot represent and whose sInf instance would silently substitute a junk value (0) rather than correctly returning −∞-\infty−∞. The book's own repeated "XXX is convex (resp. concave), or X≡+∞X\equiv+\inftyX≡+∞, or X≡−∞X\equiv-\inftyX≡−∞" disjunctive escape clauses (Theorems 8.57, 8.58, Propositions 8.63) are captured with two small generic combinators, IsEmbedOf/IsNegOf, rather than restating the embedding by hand at each of the roughly dozen occurrences.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; the base M-/L-/M2-/L2-convexity vocabulary is redeclared verbatim from missions 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality and 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Two results carry a documented partial-coverage scope reduction (see HARD.md): Theorem 8.53 is placed with only parts (1),(2),(4), the purely algebraic identities holding unconditionally for any perturbation FFF, omitting parts (3),(5),(6), which characterize opt⁡(D)\operatorname{opt}(D)opt(D) under the book's own biconjugacy hypothesis (8.55) — a hypothesis this mission's M-convex-specific Theorem 8.59 later establishes directly rather than invoking Theorem 8.53's general form; and Proposition 8.56 is placed with only part (1), the K0K_0K0​ closed form, omitting part (2), the KrK_rKr​ closed form via the infimal convolution δ−B□r[y]\delta_{-B}\square r[y]δ−B​□r[y], not independently needed elsewhere in this chunk. One numbered result nominally in this chunk's page range, Theorem 8.46, is not re-placed here: it was already found and placed as a milestone in mission 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality, whose own page range overlaps this chunk's by one page (PDF251/printed 233) — see HARD.md. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 8.57 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, "Conjugate duality and optimization," CBMS-NSF Regional Conference Series in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, 1974 [177] (the classical conjugate-duality framework this mission's section 8.4 adapts to the discrete M-/L-convex setting).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (the original source of M2-/L2-convexity, Theorems 8.35, 8.36, 8.45, 8.46, 8.48, and the Lagrange duality theory of section 8.4).
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XI: Max-Flow Min-Cut for Submodular FlowsTextbook

Motivation

Chapters 6 through 8 built M-convex and L-convex functions and their conjugacy theory as abstract combinatorial objects on the integer lattice. Chapter 9 grounds that theory in a setting every reader already knows: network flows. The chapter's throughline is that the classical minimum cost flow problem — flows bounded by simple arc capacities, with a single linear cost — is a shadow of a much richer submodular flow problem, in which the constraint on a flow's boundary is not "equal a fixed supply vector" but "lie in the base polyhedron of an arbitrary submodular set function." This mission formalizes the feasibility theory for both problems and its capstone: a max-flow min-cut theorem for submodular flows that specializes to the classical max-flow min-cut theorem exactly when the submodular function degenerates to a plain capacity function.

Setting

Let G=(V,A)G = (V, A)G=(V,A) be a finite directed graph, with tail,head:A→V\mathrm{tail}, \mathrm{head} : A \to Vtail,head:A→V giving each arc's start and end vertex. The boundary of a flow ξ:A→R\xi : A \to \mathbb Rξ:A→R is ∂ξ(v)=∑a:tail(a)=vξ(a)−∑a:head(a)=vξ(a)\partial\xi(v) = \sum_{a : \mathrm{tail}(a) = v} \xi(a) - \sum_{a : \mathrm{head}(a) = v} \xi(a)∂ξ(v)=∑a:tail(a)=v​ξ(a)−∑a:head(a)=v​ξ(a). For X⊆VX \subseteq VX⊆V, Δ+X\Delta^+XΔ+X and Δ−X\Delta^-XΔ−X are the arcs leaving and entering XXX. Given an upper capacity cˉ:A→R∪{+∞}\bar c : A \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}cˉ:A→R∪{+∞} and lower capacity c‾:A→R∪{−∞}\underline c : A \to \mathbb R \cup \{-\infty\}c​:A→R∪{−∞}, the cut capacity function is κ(X)=cˉ(Δ+X)−c‾(Δ−X)\kappa(X) = \bar c(\Delta^+X) - \underline c(\Delta^-X)κ(X)=cˉ(Δ+X)−c​(Δ−X). A submodular set function ρ:2V→R∪{+∞}\rho : 2^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}ρ:2V→R∪{+∞} with ρ(∅)=ρ(V)=0\rho(\emptyset) = \rho(V) = 0ρ(∅)=ρ(V)=0 plays the same structural role as κ\kappaκ but is arbitrary problem data rather than a derived quantity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.13 (max-flow min-cut for submodular flows)

For a feasible maximum submodular flow problem on a specified arc a0a_0a0​: sup⁡{ξ(a0):ξ feasible}=min⁡(cˉ(a0),min⁡X{cˉ(Δ−X)−c‾(Δ+X∖{a0})+ρ(X):a0∈Δ+X})\sup\{\xi(a_0) : \xi \text{ feasible}\} = \min\big(\bar c(a_0), \min_X\{\bar c(\Delta^-X) - \underline c(\Delta^+X \setminus \{a_0\}) + \rho(X) : a_0 \in \Delta^+X\}\big)sup{ξ(a0​):ξ feasible}=min(cˉ(a0​),minX​{cˉ(Δ−X)−c​(Δ+X∖{a0​})+ρ(X):a0​∈Δ+X}), a common value in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}; if the data is integer valued and the value is finite, an integer-valued maximum flow exists.

Milestones: Proposition 9.2, Theorem 9.3, Theorem 9.10

Proposition 9.2: the cut capacity function κ\kappaκ is always submodular — the fact that lets the classical minimum cost flow problem's feasibility be phrased in exactly the same base- polyhedron language as the general submodular flow problem. Theorem 9.3: a flow meeting the capacity constraint with boundary xxx exists if and only if x(X)≤κ(X)x(X) \le \kappa(X)x(X)≤κ(X) for all XXX and x(V)=0x(V) = 0x(V)=0 — the classical case, and the direct predecessor of the goal's feasibility side. Theorem 9.10: the submodular flow problem is feasible if and only if cˉ(Δ−X)−c‾(Δ+X)+ρ(X)≥0\bar c(\Delta^-X) - \underline c(\Delta^+X) + \rho(X) \ge 0cˉ(Δ−X)−c​(Δ+X)+ρ(X)≥0 for all XXX — obtained from Theorem 9.3 via Edmonds's intersection theorem in the book's own proof, and the feasibility half of the goal's own maximum-flow variant.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 9.13 is a genuine generalization of the max-flow min-cut theorem — one of the most-cited results in combinatorial optimization — to a submodularly constrained setting where the classical single-source-single-sink cut structure is replaced by an arbitrary vertex subset XXX scored by a submodular function ρ\rhoρ rather than merely counted. It specializes to the classical theorem when ρ\rhoρ is the indicator of a fixed boundary value and the graph carries a single source/sink; the book's own derivation (dividing the target arc a0a_0a0​ and reducing to Theorem 9.10's feasibility criterion) is exactly the kind of "one shared mechanism explains two theorems" result this whole book is organized around.

Formalizing it. A prior-art search (GET /theorems?q=max-flow min-cut) found two existing platform items for the classical theorem — LinearOptimization.max_flow_min_cut (Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis, single source/sink, plain capacities) and menger_directed_max_flow (Ford-Fulkerson, integer capacities) — both at a genuinely different, simpler generality (no lower capacity bounds, no submodular vertex-cut function, a fixed source/sink rather than an arbitrary marked arc). A further search (q=network flow) found a distinct mission formalizing Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis's uncapacitated network flow LP theory (basic feasible solutions, tree solutions, basis-matrix integrality) — a different technique (linear-algebraic, not cut-based) for a different problem (no capacities at all). Neither family is reused; this mission gives the first formal statement of submodular-flow feasibility and its max-flow min-cut theorem at the book's own generality.

Difficulty

The obvious shortcut — state only the value equality of Theorem 9.13 and drop the integrality clause — would misrepresent the theorem's own content: the equality of the extremal values follows from ordinary LP duality on the polyhedron B(κ)∩B(ρ)B(\kappa) \cap B(\rho)B(κ)∩B(ρ) (arguably already within reach of chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem machinery, as the book's own proof of the feasibility predecessor Theorem 9.10 uses exactly that), whereas the integer-flow existence half is the theorem's genuine combinatorial content, unique to the integer lattice. This chunk keeps both halves in every drafted theorem (Theorem 9.3, 9.10, and the goal) rather than only the polyhedral half.

A second, more structural difficulty governed this chunk's scope: BRIEF.md recommended Theorem 9.4 (the potential-optimality criterion) and its M-convex-cost specialization Theorem 9.14 as milestones, but both need a polyhedral convexity hypothesis on real-valued (or M-convex) functions over RV\mathbb R^VRV that this series has never built — the identical scope boundary chunk 10 hit with Theorem 8.4. Rather than silently drop the polyhedral-convexity hypothesis (which would make the drafted statement unsound, since the theorem's hard direction genuinely needs it), this chunk selects only results — Proposition 9.2, Theorem 9.3, Theorem 9.10, Theorem 9.13 — that need no convexity apparatus of any kind, only the submodularity of κ\kappaκ/ρ\rhoρ and elementary capacity-constraint feasibility.

Formalization scope

VVV and AAA are Fintypes with DecidableEq V (and DecidableEq A where a Finset.erase is needed); tail, head : A → V are plain functions, not a bundled graph structure. Every capacity- and cut-related quantity is WithTop ℝ-valued (ℝ ∪ {+∞}) throughout, with no EReal: a per-term check (documented in MODERATION_NOTES.md) confirms every subtraction this chunk needs is really an addition of two terms each individually in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}, via a small new cast NegLowerToUpper : WithBot ℝ → WithTop ℝ. The base polyhedron B(ρ)B(\rho)B(ρ) is stated by its defining inequalities rather than via a named polyhedral object (chunk 04's BasePolyhedron is ℤ^V-domain and does not fit chapter 9's real-vector- space setting). Not drafted: Theorem 9.4/9.14 (needs the real-domain polyhedral-convexity layer above), Theorem 9.6 (needs a real-domain polyhedral L-convexity notion for its dual-integrality half), Theorem 9.5/9.18/9.20/9.22 (negative-cycle criteria, an alternative non-potential certificate family, checked against platform prior art and found adjacent only), Propositions 9.23–9.25 (supporting technical facts), and Theorems 9.26–9.28 (the separate network- transformation technique of §9.6). A trivializing formalization would state Theorem 9.13's value equality with the integrality clause dropped, or would silently allow cˉ\bar ccˉ/c‾\underline cc​ to range over all of EReal (permitting a nonsensical c‾(a)=+∞\underline c(a) = +\inftyc​(a)=+∞ upper- capacity-like lower bound); neither is done — both the integrality clause and the WithTop ℝ/WithBot ℝ type-level domain restriction are kept exactly as the book states them.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment: For Any Positive Holding Cost the Buyer Withholds Strategic Inventory When the Direct Selling Cost Is Just Below 5/6, at Total Holding Cost Below 11/72Research Paper

Motivation

Two strategic levers shape the balance of power between a manufacturer and the retailer that resells its product. The first is strategic inventory: a buyer that orders more than it sells today, and carries the surplus into the next period, weakens the supplier's leverage over tomorrow's wholesale price. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that in a two-period channel the buyer withholds inventory exactly when its unit holding cost is below α/4\alpha/4α/4. The second is supplier encroachment: a supplier that can sell directly to consumers competes with its own buyer. Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (Marketing Science 2007) showed that the threat of encroachment can lower wholesale prices and benefit both parties.

Guan, Gurnani, Geng and Luo, Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment (MSOM 2019), combine the two levers in one game. Their headline qualitative finding is Proposition 4.2. When the supplier's direct channel is costly, but not quite too costly to use, the buyer keeps withholding inventory at every finite holding cost. This contrasts with the α/4\alpha/4α/4 cutoff of Anand et al. This mission formalizes that proposition, together with the equilibrium characterizations of Appendix A on which it rests.

Setting

There is one supplier and one buyer, two periods, deterministic demand and complete information. In each period the market price is p=α−qp = \alpha - qp=α−q, where qqq is the total quantity sold in that period and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 is the demand intercept. The buyer pays a per-unit holding cost h≥0h \ge 0h≥0 on inventory carried into period 2. The supplier pays a per-unit direct selling cost s≥0s \ge 0s≥0. All other costs and the salvage value are zero. The moves are:

  1. The supplier quotes a wholesale price w1≥0w_1 \ge 0w1​≥0.
  2. The buyer orders Q1Q_1Q1​ and sells q1q_1q1​, with 0≤q1≤Q10 \le q_1 \le Q_10≤q1​≤Q1​. It carries the inventory I=Q1−q1I = Q_1 - q_1I=Q1​−q1​ into period 2.
  3. The supplier quotes w2≥0w_2 \ge 0w2​≥0.
  4. The buyer orders Q2≥0Q_2 \ge 0Q2​≥0 and sells q2q_2q2​, with 0≤q2≤I+Q20 \le q_2 \le I + Q_20≤q2​≤I+Q2​.
  5. Having observed everything, the supplier sells qs≥0q_s \ge 0qs​≥0 directly. The period-2 price is α−q2−qs\alpha - q_2 - q_sα−q2​−qs​.

The total profits are

Πb=(α−q1)q1−w1Q1−hI+(α−q2−qs)q2−w2Q2,Πs=w1Q1+w2Q2+(α−q2−qs−s)qs.\Pi_b = (\alpha - q_1)q_1 - w_1 Q_1 - hI + (\alpha - q_2 - q_s)q_2 - w_2 Q_2, \qquad \Pi_s = w_1 Q_1 + w_2 Q_2 + (\alpha - q_2 - q_s - s)q_s .Πb​=(α−q1​)q1​−w1​Q1​−hI+(α−q2​−qs​)q2​−w2​Q2​,Πs​=w1​Q1​+w2​Q2​+(α−q2​−qs​−s)qs​.

A strategy profile assigns an action to every history at which a player moves. It is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if, at every feasible history, the mover's prescribed action is feasible and no feasible alternative, followed by the profile afterwards, raises the mover's total profit. The equilibrium path is the outcome the profile generates; the equilibrium inventory is III on that path. Following the paper (§4), the goal theorem sets α=1\alpha = 1α=1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.2

With α=1\alpha = 1α=1,

∀h>0  ∃ϵ>0  ∀s∈(56−ϵ,56):an SPE exists, and every SPE has I>0 and hI<1172.\forall h > 0\ \ \exists \epsilon > 0\ \ \forall s \in \big(\tfrac56 - \epsilon, \tfrac56\big):\quad \text{an SPE exists, and every SPE has } I > 0 \text{ and } hI < \tfrac{11}{72}.∀h>0  ∃ϵ>0  ∀s∈(65​−ϵ,65​):an SPE exists, and every SPE has I>0 and hI<7211​.

Here ϵ\epsilonϵ may depend on hhh, and the bound 11/7211/7211/72 applies at the same (h,s)(h, s)(h,s).

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Stage-3 best response (§3.1.1): in every SPE, the supplier sells qs=(α−q2−s)+/2q_s = (\alpha - q_2 - s)^+/2qs​=(α−q2​−s)+/2 at every history.
  2. Eq. (1) (§3.1.1): with no inventory, the buyer's period-2 quantity is the four-branch function qb(w)q_b(w)qb​(w) of the period-2 wholesale price www.
  3. Proposition 4.1, existence half: an SPE exists for every h≥0h \ge 0h≥0 and s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.
  4. Region 8 (Tables A.1 and A.4): for h<h11h < h_{11}h<h11​ with s3≤s<5α/6s_3 \le s < 5\alpha/6s3​≤s<5α/6, or for h<α/4h < \alpha/4h<α/4 with 5α/6≤s<α5\alpha/6 \le s < \alpha5α/6≤s<α, every SPE has I=5(α−4h)/34I = 5(\alpha - 4h)/34I=5(α−4h)/34 and the path of Table A.4.
  5. Region 7, second part (Tables A.1 and A.3): for h11<h<h10h_{11} < h < h_{10}h11​<h<h10​ and s3≤s<5α/6s_3 \le s < 5\alpha/6s3​≤s<5α/6, every SPE has I=I∗=(2α−3s+x)/2I = I^* = (2\alpha - 3s + x)/2I=I∗=(2α−3s+x)/2 and the path of Table A.3.
  6. Region 10, second part (Tables A.1 and A.4): for h>h7h > h_7h>h7​ and 2α/3<s<5α/62\alpha/3 < s < 5\alpha/62α/3<s<5α/6, every SPE has I=0I = 0I=0.

The thresholds xxx, s3s_3s3​, h7h_7h7​, h10h_{10}h10​, h11h_{11}h11​ are explicit algebraic functions of sss, given in Appendix A.

Significance

Proposition 4.2 separates the combined model from the two models it merges. Without a direct channel, inventory disappears once h≥α/4h \ge \alpha/4h≥α/4. With a direct channel, a threat of encroachment that is only barely credible keeps inventory alive at every holding cost. The total holding cost nevertheless stays below a constant, because the inventory shrinks as hhh grows. Milestone 6 shows the flip side: for a fixed s<5α/6s < 5\alpha/6s<5α/6, a large enough hhh removes the inventory. This is why the window ϵ\epsilonϵ must depend on hhh.

The paper's proofs are in an online appendix that is not reproduced in the article. The article itself gives the equilibrium only as tables. A formal development would supply a checked backward-induction proof of those tables in the regions near s=5α/6s = 5\alpha/6s=5α/6. It would also give a machine-checked SPE framework for multi-stage pricing-and-quantity games in supply chains, which none of the following exists for: Stackelberg pricing, sequential quantity competition, or dual-channel encroachment. No part of this paper has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The equilibrium is found by backward induction through five stages. Each stage's value function is only piecewise smooth, because the supplier's direct-channel response (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ switches on and off. As a result the buyer's period-2 profit has kinks, the supplier's period-2 profit as a function of III has several local maxima, and the period-1 problems must compare branches whose boundaries are the irrational thresholds of Appendix A. The obvious approach, solving the first-order conditions stage by stage, fails at the kinks. At some region boundaries it also misses that the supplier is indifferent between two first-period prices, which makes the equilibrium path change discontinuously. Proposition 4.2 then needs uniform control of h7h_7h7​, h10h_{10}h10​ and h11h_{11}h11​ as s↑5/6s \uparrow 5/6s↑5/6, where the denominator 3s−2−x3s - 2 - x3s−2−x of h7h_7h7​ tends to 000.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Strategies are functions of the full history, not Markov rules in III. IsSPE imposes optimality at every feasible history, including off-path ones. All actions are real numbers; wholesale prices and quantities are nonnegative, with q1≤Q1q_1 \le Q_1q1​≤Q1​ and q2≤I+Q2q_2 \le I + Q_2q2​≤I+Q2​.
  • Normalization. The goal instantiates α=1\alpha = 1α=1 as the paper does from §4 on. The milestones keep a general α>0\alpha > 0α>0.
  • Uniqueness is not stated. Proposition 4.1's uniqueness claim is false for strategy profiles: after the off-path price w2=0w_2 = 0w2​=0, every order Q2≥q2−IQ_2 \ge q_2 - IQ2​≥q2​−I is optimal. The goal and the region milestones therefore quantify over every SPE and carry existence as a separate conjunct.
  • Corrected hypotheses.
    • The printed s3=((37−365)/34+4/6)α≈1.28αs_3 = (\sqrt{(37 - 3\sqrt{65})/34} + 4/6)\alpha \approx 1.28\alphas3​=((37−365​)/34​+4/6)α≈1.28α is replaced by (37−365/34+4/6)α≈0.772α(\sqrt{37 - 3\sqrt{65}}/34 + 4/6)\alpha \approx 0.772\alpha(37−365​​/34+4/6)α≈0.772α, which matches the paper's "≈0.77".
    • Eq. (1) excludes the corner w=0w = 0w=0, s<α/3s < \alpha/3s<α/3, where its second branch is wrong.
    • Region 8 drops its boundary h=h11h = h_{11}h=h11​ and Region 7 drops h=h10h = h_{10}h=h10​, because the equilibrium path switches there and need not be unique.
  • Ruled-out trivialization. The inventory in the goal is the inventory on the path of an SPE of the game above. It is not the closed form 5(1−4h)/345(1 - 4h)/345(1−4h)/34 or I∗I^*I∗ from the tables, and the regional characterization is not a hypothesis. Otherwise the goal would reduce to algebra about the thresholds.
  • Infrastructure and contributions. The definitions Game, IsSPE and Thresholds are shared by every statement. Welcome contributions include:
    • lemmas on maximizing concave piecewise-quadratic functions on half-lines;
    • a reusable backward-induction lemma for finite-stage games with real action sets;
    • interval-arithmetic facts about xxx, h7h_7h7​, h10h_{10}h10​ and h11h_{11}h11​ near s=5/6s = 5/6s=5/6;
    • proofs of the paper's other regions.

Selected references

  • T. Guan, H. Gurnani, X. Geng, Y. Luo, Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 21(3):536–555, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0705
  • K. Anand, R. Anupindi, Y. Bassok, Strategic Inventories in Vertical Contracts, Management Science 54(10):1792–1804, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0894
  • A. Arya, B. Mittendorf, D. Sappington, The Bright Side of Supplier Encroachment, Marketing Science 26(5):651–659, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0280
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Exit Problems for Spectrally Negative Lévy Processes and Applications to (Canadized) Russian Options III: Optimal Stopping for the Canadized Russian OptionResearch Paper

Motivation

The Russian option of Shepp and Shiryaev pays its holder, at an exercise time of their choosing, the running maximum of the stock price, discounted, with no fixed maturity. It is the standard example of a perpetual lookback option, and its value is a model problem of optimal stopping for a two-dimensional Markov process (the price and its running maximum). Perpetual contracts are simple to analyse but economically unrealistic: every real contract ends. Canadization (Carr, Randomization and the American put, Rev. Financial Stud. 11, 1998, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/11.3.597) replaces a fixed maturity by an independent exponential time η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ). The holder must exercise before η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ); if they have not, they are paid the claim evaluated at η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ). Because the exponential law is memoryless, the problem stays time-homogeneous and its value can be computed in closed form, while it approximates a contract of finite expected life 1/λ1/\lambda1/λ.

Avram, Kyprianou and Pistorius (AKP04) solved both the perpetual and the Canadized Russian problem when the log-price is a spectrally negative Lévy process: a process with stationary independent increments whose only jumps are downward. This covers Brownian motion with drift, the Black–Scholes model, and jump-diffusions with downward jumps (crashes). Their answer is written with the scale functions W(q)W^{(q)}W(q), Z(q)Z^{(q)}Z(q) of the process. This mission is the third of three drawn from that paper, and formalizes the Canadized problem (§7, Theorem 3).

Timeline. Shepp and Shiryaev (1993) solved the Russian option for geometric Brownian motion. Carr (1998) introduced Canadization for the American put. Kyprianou and Pistorius (Ann. Appl. Probab. 13, 2003) studied perpetual options through fluctuation theory; §7 of [AKP04] builds on their calculations. Avram, Kyprianou and Pistorius (2004) solved the perpetual and Canadized problems for general spectrally negative Lévy processes.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,F={Ft}t≥0,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbf F=\{\mathcal F_t\}_{t\ge0},\mathbb P)(Ω,F,F={Ft​}t≥0​,P) be a filtered probability space with F\mathbf FF right-continuous, and let X={Xt}t≥0X=\{X_t\}_{t\ge0}X={Xt​}t≥0​ be a spectrally negative Lévy process adapted to F\mathbf FF: X0=0X_0=0X0​=0, paths càdlàg with no upward jumps and not monotone, increments Xs+t−XsX_{s+t}-X_sXs+t​−Xs​ stationary and independent of Fs\mathcal F_sFs​. The standing assumption is that XXX has unbounded variation, or bounded variation and a Lévy measure Λ(dx)≪dx\Lambda(dx)\ll dxΛ(dx)≪dx.

The Laplace exponent is ψ(θ)=log⁡E[eθX1]\psi(\theta)=\log\mathbb E[e^{\theta X_1}]ψ(θ)=logE[eθX1​]. Fix r≥0r\ge0r≥0 with ψ(1)=r\psi(1)=rψ(1)=r, and let P1\mathbb P^1P1 be the Esscher measure, dP1/dP∣Ft=eXt−rtd\mathbb P^1/d\mathbb P|_{\mathcal F_t}=e^{X_t-rt}dP1/dP∣Ft​​=eXt​−rt.

For q≥0q\ge0q≥0 the qqq-scale function W(q):R→[0,∞)W^{(q)}:\mathbb R\to[0,\infty)W(q):R→[0,∞) vanishes on (−∞,0](-\infty,0](−∞,0], is continuous on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and satisfies ∫0∞e−θxW(q)(x) dx=(ψ(θ)−q)−1\int_0^\infty e^{-\theta x}W^{(q)}(x)\,dx=(\psi(\theta)-q)^{-1}∫0∞​e−θxW(q)(x)dx=(ψ(θ)−q)−1 for θ>Φ(q)\theta>\Phi(q)θ>Φ(q), where Φ(q)\Phi(q)Φ(q) is the largest root of ψ(θ)=q\psi(\theta)=qψ(θ)=q. Further, Z(q)(x)=1+q∫−∞xW(q)(y) dyZ^{(q)}(x)=1+q\int_{-\infty}^xW^{(q)}(y)\,dyZ(q)(x)=1+q∫−∞x​W(q)(y)dy. All scale functions in this mission are those of (X,P)(X,\mathbb P)(X,P).

Starting from Y0=z≥0Y_0=z\ge0Y0​=z≥0 (the paper's P−z1\mathbb P^1_{-z}P−z1​), the reflected process is Yt=X‾t−XtY_t=\overline X_t-X_tYt​=Xt​−Xt​, where X‾t=max⁡{0,sup⁡u≤t(−z+Xu)}\overline X_t=\max\{0,\sup_{u\le t}(-z+X_u)\}Xt​=max{0,supu≤t​(−z+Xu​)} and the position is −z+Xt-z+X_t−z+Xt​. Its passage time above kkk is τk=inf⁡{t≥0:Yt∉[0,k)}\tau_k=\inf\{t\ge0:Y_t\notin[0,k)\}τk​=inf{t≥0:Yt​∈/[0,k)}.

Let α>0\alpha>0α>0, and let η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ) be an exponential random variable of rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 which under P1\mathbb P^1P1 is independent of F∞\mathcal F_\inftyF∞​. The Canadized Russian problem (32) is

wCR(z)=sup⁡τ E−z1[e−α(τ∧η(λ))+Yτ∧η(λ)],w^{CR}(z)=\sup_\tau\ \mathbb E^1_{-z}\Big[e^{-\alpha(\tau\wedge\eta(\lambda))+Y_{\tau\wedge\eta(\lambda)}}\Big],wCR(z)=τsup​ E−z1​[e−α(τ∧η(λ))+Yτ∧η(λ)​],

over all P1\mathbb P^1P1-a.s. finite F\mathbf FF-stopping times τ\tauτ. Write p=α+λ+rp=\alpha+\lambda+rp=α+λ+r.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

With

κ∗=inf⁡{x≥0: Z(p)(x)−pW(p)(x)≤−λ/(p−λ)},h(z)=(p−λ)ezZ(p)(κ∗−z)p+λezp,\kappa_*=\inf\{x\ge0:\ Z^{(p)}(x)-pW^{(p)}(x)\le-\lambda/(p-\lambda)\},\qquad h(z)=\frac{(p-\lambda)e^zZ^{(p)}(\kappa_*-z)}{p}+\frac{\lambda e^z}{p},κ∗​=inf{x≥0: Z(p)(x)−pW(p)(x)≤−λ/(p−λ)},h(z)=p(p−λ)ezZ(p)(κ∗​−z)​+pλez​,

for every z≥0z\ge0z≥0:

wCR(z)=h(z),w^{CR}(z)=h(z),wCR(z)=h(z),

and τκ∗\tau_{\kappa_*}τκ∗​​ is a P1\mathbb P^1P1-a.s. finite F\mathbf FF-stopping time attaining the supremum. The statement covers every variation regime at once.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Lemma 2 (i), which gives the monotonicity behind κ∗\kappa_*κ∗​.
  2. Corollary 1 (29), the value of stopping at τk\tau_kτk​ at discount rate α+λ\alpha+\lambdaα+λ.
  3. The elimination of η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ) (display after (32)):
E−z1[e−α(τ∧η)+Yτ∧η]=E−z1[e−(α+λ)τ+Yτ+λ∫0τe−(α+λ)t+Ytdt].\mathbb E^1_{-z}\big[e^{-\alpha(\tau\wedge\eta)+Y_{\tau\wedge\eta}}\big]=\mathbb E^1_{-z}\Big[e^{-(\alpha+\lambda)\tau+Y_\tau}+\lambda\int_0^\tau e^{-(\alpha+\lambda)t+Y_t}dt\Big].E−z1​[e−α(τ∧η)+Yτ∧η​]=E−z1​[e−(α+λ)τ+Yτ​+λ∫0τ​e−(α+λ)t+Yt​dt].
  1. The Itô identity (34).
  2. The expected dX‾d\overline XdX-integral up to τk\tau_kτk​.
  3. Lemma 3 (33), the value of τk∧η(λ)\tau_k\wedge\eta(\lambda)τk​∧η(λ).
  4. Lemma 4, with two misprints corrected.
  5. The supermartingale property of Ut=e−(α+λ)th(Yt)+λ∫0te−(α+λ)u+YuduU_t=e^{-(\alpha+\lambda)t}h(Y_t)+\lambda\int_0^te^{-(\alpha+\lambda)u+Y_u}duUt​=e−(α+λ)th(Yt​)+λ∫0t​e−(α+λ)u+Yu​du.
  6. The identity h(z)=ez+(p−λ)ez∫0κ∗−zW(p)≥ezh(z)=e^z+(p-\lambda)e^z\int_0^{\kappa_*-z}W^{(p)}\ge e^zh(z)=ez+(p−λ)ez∫0κ∗​−z​W(p)≥ez.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 gives the price and the optimal exercise rule of a Russian option with random (exponential) maturity, for every spectrally negative Lévy model at once. It makes three things explicit. The optimal rule is a threshold rule for the reflected process YYY. The threshold κ∗\kappa_*κ∗​ is the crossing point of one explicit function of the scale functions. Whenever W(p)(0+)≥(p−λ)−1W^{(p)}(0+)\ge(p-\lambda)^{-1}W(p)(0+)≥(p−λ)−1 (possible only with bounded variation), immediate exercise is optimal. Because scale functions are known in closed form for many models, including Brownian motion with drift and hyper-exponential jump-diffusions (§8 of the paper), the theorem produces explicit prices.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper. It is not formalized in any proof assistant, and none of its infrastructure is available in Lean. This mission produces:

  • a path-level definition of spectrally negative Lévy processes;
  • scale functions defined as definite descriptions;
  • the reflected process and its passage times;
  • the Esscher change of measure as data;
  • a continuous-time optimal stopping problem with an independent random horizon, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

A machine-checked proof would also check the verification argument, which the paper states in detail only for the unbounded-variation case.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to compute the value of every threshold rule (Lemma 3) and optimize over kkk. That identifies the right candidate, but it does not show that no other stopping time does better. The verification step needs two things for all regimes of W(p)(0+)W^{(p)}(0+)W(p)(0+): that UUU is a supermartingale, and that UUU stopped at τκ∗\tau_{\kappa_*}τκ∗​​ is a martingale. For processes of bounded variation, hhh is only continuous, not C1C^1C1, at κ∗\kappa_*κ∗​, so a smooth Itô formula does not apply directly. Computing the expected dX‾d\overline XdX-integral up to τk\tau_kτk​ uses excursion theory of YYY away from 000, which Mathlib does not have. Eliminating η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ) is easy only if η\etaη is independent of the whole filtration. If it is independent of XXX alone, a stopping time could depend on η\etaη.

Formalization scope

  • Conventions. Time is [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (ℝ≥0) and values are real. Random times take values in WithTop ℝ≥0, and the payoff is 000 on {τ=∞}\{\tau=\infty\}{τ=∞}. Expectations of nonnegative payoffs are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and wCRw^{CR}wCR is an extended-real supremum, so no expectation defaults to 000. Equalities with a real right-hand side also assert finiteness.
  • Readings of informal words.
    • "The usual conditions" means right-continuity of F\mathbf FF, without completeness. Completing F0\mathcal F_0F0​ with P\mathbb PP-null sets would contradict the Esscher relation, since P1\mathbb P^1P1 and P\mathbb PP are typically singular on F∞\mathcal F_\inftyF∞​.
    • "Unbounded variation" means "not almost surely of bounded variation on compacts". (AC) is stated through jumps.
    • "ψ(v) < ∞" means integrability of evX1e^{vX_1}evX1​.
    • "Decreases monotonically" means strictly decreasing, and "the unique root" means unique on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).
    • W(p)(0+)W^{(p)}(0+)W(p)(0+) is the right limit.
    • "Almost surely finite" and the law and independence of η(λ)\eta(\lambda)η(λ) are all under P1\mathbb P^1P1, where independence is from F∞\mathcal F_\inftyF∞​. "Parameter λ\lambdaλ" is the rate.
    • Ps,x1\mathbb P^1_{s,x}Ps,x1​ is encoded pathwise through the reflected process with Y0=s−xY_0=s-xY0​=s−x.
    • The elimination of η\etaη is stated τ by τ, which implies the page's equality of suprema.
    • The supermartingale claim, derived on the page in the unbounded-variation case, is stated for all cases.
    • Corollary 1's discount rate is renamed aaa.
    • (34) is stated as pA+B=es−x+CpA+B=e^{s-x}+CpA+B=es−x+C with AAA, BBB, CCC finite.
  • Definition choices. Scale functions are defined by choice from their defining property, never as hypotheses on an arbitrary function. W(q)W^{(q)}W(q) for q<0q<0q<0 is the series (5), not the tilting formula of Remark 4. P1\mathbb P^1P1 is a measure given with the Esscher relation. dX‾td\overline X_tdXt​ is the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure of the running-maximum path.
  • Corrected misprints. Lemma 4 is printed with p−1p^{-1}p−1 and −λ/p-\lambda/p−λ/p. The definition of κ∗\kappa_*κ∗​ (p. 233) and the proof of Theorem 3 (p. 235) require (p−λ)−1(p-\lambda)^{-1}(p−λ)−1 and −λ/(p−λ)-\lambda/(p-\lambda)−λ/(p−λ), and the printed version is false when p−1≤W(p)(0+)<(p−λ)−1p^{-1}\le W^{(p)}(0+)<(p-\lambda)^{-1}p−1≤W(p)(0+)<(p−λ)−1. The corrected statement is formalized.
  • Ruled out. A supremum over stopping times of a filtration containing σ(η)\sigma(\eta)σ(η), or a real-valued supremum or Bochner expectation that could be 000 by default, would trivialize the goal or change it. The admissible class is every P1\mathbb P^1P1-a.s. finite stopping time of the given filtration, of which η\etaη is independent. Replacing the goal by the η\etaη-free rewriting would state milestone 3 as if it were Theorem 3.
  • Needed and reusable. A complete development needs Lévy process theory, scale functions, fluctuation identities for the reflected process, optional stopping in continuous time, and Itô or change-of-variable formulas for semimartingales with jumps. The Lévy-process, scale-function and reflected-process definitions are shared with the other two missions of the series and are reusable in ruin theory and queueing. Proofs of any milestone, and sorry-free facts about the definitions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Avram, A. E. Kyprianou, M. R. Pistorius, Exit problems for spectrally negative Lévy processes and applications to (Canadized) Russian options, Ann. Appl. Probab. 14(1), 215–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1075828052
  • P. Carr, Randomization and the American put, Rev. Financial Stud. 11(3), 597–626, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/11.3.597
  • L. A. Shepp, A. N. Shiryaev, The Russian option: reduced regret, Ann. Appl. Probab. 3, 603–631, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177005715
  • A. E. Kyprianou, M. R. Pistorius, Perpetual options through fluctuation theory, Ann. Appl. Probab. 13, 1077–1098, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1060202835
  • J. Bertoin, Lévy Processes, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play I: Every Additive Random Utility Choice Function Has an Admissible Deterministic Perturbation RepresentationResearch Paper

Motivation

Models of learning in games, and discrete choice models in econometrics, describe an agent who does not always pick the best alternative. Two descriptions of such an agent are standard. In the additive random utility model (McFadden 1981; Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992) the agent maximizes payoffs perturbed by random shocks. In the deterministic perturbation model (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) the agent chooses a probability vector and pays a deterministic, strictly convex cost for it. The logit choice rule arises from both: from i.i.d. extreme-value shocks, and from the entropy cost V(y)=η∑jyjln⁡yjV(y) = \eta \sum_j y_j \ln y_jV(y)=η∑j​yj​lnyj​.

Hofbauer and Sandholm (Econometrica 70 (2002)) show that the second description is general enough to cover the first for every shock distribution with a strictly positive density, not only for logit. Their analysis of stochastic fictitious play rests on this: the deterministic representation provides the perturbed payoff functions from which Lyapunov functions for the learning dynamics are built, for arbitrary noise. This mission formalizes that discrete choice theorem, Theorem 2.1 of the paper, together with the steps of its proof.

Setting

Fix n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 alternatives A={1,…,n}A = \{1, \dots, n\}A={1,…,n} with base payoffs π=(π1,…,πn)∈Rn\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n) \in \mathbb{R}^nπ=(π1​,…,πn​)∈Rn. A random vector ε=(ε1,…,εn)\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n)ε=(ε1​,…,εn​) has a strictly positive density f:Rn→Rf : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}f:Rn→R, whose law does not depend on π\piπ. The agent chooses the alternative whose total payoff πj+εj\pi_j + \varepsilon_jπj​+εj​ is largest, which gives the choice probability function C:Rn→RnC : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^nC:Rn→Rn,

Ci(π)=P(argmax⁡j πj+εj=i).C_i(\pi) = P\big(\operatorname{argmax}_j\, \pi_j + \varepsilon_j = i\big).Ci​(π)=P(argmaxj​πj​+εj​=i).

The probability simplex is ΔA={x∈R+n:∑jxj=1}\Delta A = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ : \sum_j x_j = 1\}ΔA={x∈R+n​:∑j​xj​=1}, with relative interior int⁡(ΔA)\operatorname{int}(\Delta A)int(ΔA) (all coordinates positive) and tangent space R0n={z∈Rn:∑jzj=0}\mathbb{R}^n_0 = \{z \in \mathbb{R}^n : \sum_j z_j = 0\}R0n​={z∈Rn:∑j​zj​=0}.

A deterministic perturbation is a function V:int⁡(ΔA)→RV : \operatorname{int}(\Delta A) \to \mathbb{R}V:int(ΔA)→R. Because VVV lives on the relative interior, its gradient ∇V(y)\nabla V(y)∇V(y) is the vector of R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​ with V(y+hz)=V(y)+(∇V(y)⋅z)h+o(h)V(y + hz) = V(y) + (\nabla V(y) \cdot z) h + o(h)V(y+hz)=V(y)+(∇V(y)⋅z)h+o(h) for all z∈R0nz \in \mathbb{R}^n_0z∈R0n​, and its second derivative D2V(y)D^2 V(y)D2V(y) is a quadratic form on R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​. The perturbation is admissible if VVV is twice continuously differentiable along the simplex, D2V(y)D^2V(y)D2V(y) is positive definite on R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​ for every yyy, and ∥∇V(y)∥→∞\|\nabla V(y)\| \to \infty∥∇V(y)∥→∞ as yyy approaches the boundary of ΔA\Delta AΔA.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1

If ε\varepsilonε has a strictly positive density and CCC is continuously differentiable, then there is an admissible VVV such that, for every π∈Rn\pi \in \mathbb{R}^nπ∈Rn,

C(π)=argmax⁡y∈int⁡(ΔA)(y⋅π−V(y)),C(\pi) = \operatorname*{argmax}_{y \in \operatorname{int}(\Delta A)} \big( y \cdot \pi - V(y) \big),C(π)=y∈int(ΔA)argmax​(y⋅π−V(y)),

with a unique maximizer. The perturbation VVV is one function serving all payoff vectors at once.

Milestones

The milestones are the steps of the paper's proof (pp. 5–7), in order:

  1. Eq. (4). DC(π)DC(\pi)DC(π) is symmetric, ∂Ci/∂πj=∂Cj/∂πi\partial C_i/\partial \pi_j = \partial C_j / \partial \pi_i∂Ci​/∂πj​=∂Cj​/∂πi​, and its off-diagonal terms are strictly negative.
  2. Eq. (5). ∂Ci/∂πi=−∑j≠i∂Cj/∂πi\partial C_i/\partial \pi_i = -\sum_{j \ne i} \partial C_j/\partial \pi_i∂Ci​/∂πi​=−∑j=i​∂Cj​/∂πi​, and DC(π)1=0DC(\pi)\mathbf{1} = 0DC(π)1=0.
  3. Eq. (6). z⋅DC(π)z>0z \cdot DC(\pi) z > 0z⋅DC(π)z>0 whenever zzz is not proportional to 1\mathbf{1}1.
  4. Shift invariance and injectivity. C(π+c1)=C(π)C(\pi + c\mathbf{1}) = C(\pi)C(π+c1)=C(π), and CCC is one-to-one on R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​.
  5. Range observation. If the payoffs πj\pi_jπj​, j∈Jj \in Jj∈J, stay bounded while the others tend to +∞+\infty+∞, then Cj(π)→0C_j(\pi) \to 0Cj​(π)→0 for j∈Jj \in Jj∈J.
  6. Convex potential. There is W:Rn→RW : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}W:Rn→R with ∇W≡C\nabla W \equiv C∇W≡C, strictly convex on R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​.
  7. Range. CCC takes values in int⁡(ΔA)\operatorname{int}(\Delta A)int(ΔA), and C(R0n)=int⁡(ΔA)C(\mathbb{R}^n_0) = \operatorname{int}(\Delta A)C(R0n​)=int(ΔA).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.1 lets any smooth additive random utility model be replaced by an optimizing agent with a strictly convex, boundary-repelling cost. In the paper this is the bridge from the perturbed best response dynamic to a deterministic perturbed-payoff formulation, which yields Lyapunov functions for zero-sum games, games with an interior evolutionarily stable strategy, and potential games (§4 of the paper), and so the almost sure convergence of stochastic fictitious play under general noise (Theorem 6.1). Without it those convergence results would be restricted to noise distributions whose choice rule has a known deterministic representation, essentially logit. The paper also shows (Proposition 2.2) that the converse fails when n≥4n \ge 4n≥4: deterministic perturbations generate strictly more choice rules than random utility.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. The mission asks for a formal proof of Theorem 2.1 and the seven steps above. Along the way it requires symmetric Jacobians of probability integrals, a gradient-field potential on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, and the Legendre transform of a strictly convex function restricted to a hyperplane. None of these is currently packaged in Mathlib in the needed form.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to take VVV to be the Legendre transform of the potential W(π)=Emax⁡j(πj+εj)W(\pi) = \mathbb{E}\max_j(\pi_j + \varepsilon_j)W(π)=Emaxj​(πj​+εj​) and read off the first-order conditions. Three steps of that argument are not routine. First, the derivative identity (4) is a change of variables inside an (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-fold integral over a moving region, and its strict sign needs the density to be positive on the relevant hyperplane sections. Second, the Legendre transform is well defined on all of int⁡(ΔA)\operatorname{int}(\Delta A)int(ΔA) only if CCC maps R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​ onto the whole open simplex. The paper takes this from Theorem 26.5 of Rockafellar (1970), whose hypotheses (essential smoothness, strict convexity, identification of the conjugate's domain) must be checked here. Third, positive definiteness of D2VD^2VD2V and the gradient blow-up at the boundary are statements about the inverse of CCC on R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​. They need an inverse function argument on a subspace and a properness argument, not only pointwise convexity.

Verifying that C(π)C(\pi)C(π) satisfies the first-order condition for one fixed π\piπ does not suffice: the goal requires a single VVV for all π\piπ, and a unique maximizer.

Formalization scope

Alternatives are indexed by Fin n with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1; vectors are Fin n → ℝ with its sup norm. The density is a real function fff that is continuous, strictly positive at every point, and has ∫f=1\int f = 1∫f=1; the law of ε\varepsilonε is Lebesgue measure weighted by fff. The paper's formula (4) evaluates fff on hyperplanes, which is meaningful for a continuous fff. Without continuity the theorem can fail: a density that is positive everywhere but tends to zero near a hyperplane can make CCC continuously differentiable with a vanishing off-diagonal derivative, and then no twice differentiable VVV represents CCC. Continuous differentiability of CCC is a hypothesis, as in the paper, stated as ContDiff ℝ 1 of the map π↦C(π)\pi \mapsto C(\pi)π↦C(π). The event "iii is the argmax" uses strict inequalities; ties have probability zero.

VVV is a function on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn of which only the values on int⁡(ΔA)\operatorname{int}(\Delta A)int(ΔA) enter. Its smoothness and second derivative are taken in the chart z↦V(y+z)z \mapsto V(y + z)z↦V(y+z) on the subspace R0n\mathbb{R}^n_0R0n​. ∇V(y)\nabla V(y)∇V(y) is the tangent gradient of the paper's footnote 3, not an ambient gradient of an extension. The boundary blow-up is stated uniformly: for every MMM there is δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 such that every tangent gradient at an interior point with some coordinate below δ\deltaδ has norm above MMM.

The goal cannot be satisfied trivially. VVV must be chosen before π\piπ, all three admissibility conditions are part of the definition, and the maximizer must be unique. Weakening any of these (a VVV depending on π\piπ, a VVV without second derivatives, a non-strict maximum) changes the theorem.

Reusable infrastructure: differentiation of choice probabilities under a density, potentials of symmetric C1C^1C1 vector fields on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, and Legendre duality for strictly convex functions on a subspace. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the milestones, for instance obtaining the potential directly as Emax⁡j(πj+εj)\mathbb{E}\max_j(\pi_j + \varepsilon_j)Emaxj​(πj​+εj​).

Selected references

  • J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm, On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play, Econometrica 70(6), 2265–2294, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00376 (theorem numbers and pages here follow the authors' manuscript of February 21, 2002).
  • D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press, 1998.
  • S. P. Anderson, A. de Palma and J.-F. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, MIT Press, 1992.
  • D. McFadden, Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice, in C. F. Manski and D. McFadden (eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, MIT Press, 1981.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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An Efficient Approximation Scheme for the One-Dimensional Bin-Packing Problem I: ALGORITHM 1, Linear Grouping with LP Rounding, Is an Asymptotic Approximation SchemeResearch Paper

Motivation

One-dimensional bin packing asks for the fewest unit-capacity bins that hold a given list of items with sizes in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). It is the model behind cutting stock (cutting rolls of paper or steel to ordered widths), memory and file allocation, and batch scheduling on identical machines, and it is NP-hard. Its algorithmic study is therefore about approximation: how close to the optimum a polynomial-time algorithm can guarantee to come.

  • 1961–1963: Gilmore and Gomory introduce the configuration linear program for cutting stock and solve it by column generation (Gilmore–Gomory 1961).
  • 1974: Johnson, Demers, Ullman, Garey and Graham analyse First Fit and related heuristics, with asymptotic ratio 17/1017/1017/10 and 11/911/911/9 (Johnson et al. 1974).
  • 1981: Fernandez de la Vega and Lueker give the first asymptotic approximation scheme, packing within (1+ε) OPT(I)+1(1+\varepsilon)\,OPT(I) + 1(1+ε)OPT(I)+1 bins in time linear in nnn for fixed ε\varepsilonε, using elimination of small pieces and linear grouping (Fernandez de la Vega–Lueker 1981).
  • 1982: Karmarkar and Karp replace the enumeration of configurations by an approximate solution of the configuration LP and a rounding step, obtaining an additive term polynomial in 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε (this mission), and, with geometric grouping, OPT(I)+O(log⁡2OPT(I))OPT(I) + O(\log^2 OPT(I))OPT(I)+O(log2OPT(I)) (Karmarkar–Karp 1982).
  • 2013–2017: Rothvoß and then Hoberg–Rothvoß improve the additive term to O(log⁡OPT⋅log⁡log⁡OPT)O(\log OPT \cdot \log\log OPT)O(logOPT⋅loglogOPT) and O(log⁡OPT)O(\log OPT)O(logOPT) (Hoberg–Rothvoß 2017).

Setting

An instance III is a finite multiset of piece sizes, each in the open interval (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). Write n(I)n(I)n(I) for the number of pieces, m(I)m(I)m(I) for the number of distinct sizes, and SIZE(I)SIZE(I)SIZE(I) for the sum of all sizes. A packing of III is a finite multiset of bins, each a multiset of sizes, whose union is exactly III and in which every bin has total size at most 111. Its cost is the number of bins, and OPT(I)OPT(I)OPT(I) is the minimum cost.

A configuration of III is a nonempty multiset of sizes occurring in III with total at most 111. With btb_tbt​ the number of pieces of size ttt and atca_{tc}atc​ the number of occurrences of ttt in configuration ccc, the fractional bin-packing problem is the linear program

min⁡ 1⋅xs.t.x≥0,∑catcxc≥bt  for every size t,\min\ \mathbf 1\cdot x\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x\ge 0,\qquad \sum_c a_{tc}x_c \ge b_t\ \ \text{for every size } t,min 1⋅xs.t.x≥0,c∑​atc​xc​≥bt​  for every size t,

whose optimal value is LIN(I)LIN(I)LIN(I). A basic feasible solution is an extreme point of its feasible region.

For instances I,JI,JI,J, write I≤JI\le JI≤J if there is a one-to-one map fff from the pieces of III into the pieces of JJJ with x≤f(x)x\le f(x)x≤f(x). Linear grouping with parameter kkk sorts III non-increasingly, cuts it into groups G1,…,GqG_1,\dots,G_qG1​,…,Gq​ of kkk consecutive pieces (the last possibly shorter), rounds every piece of GiG_iGi​ up to the largest size of GiG_iGi​ to get Gi′G_i'Gi′​, and outputs J=⋃i≥2Gi′J = \bigcup_{i\ge 2} G_i'J=⋃i≥2​Gi′​ and J′=G1J' = G_1J′=G1​.

ALGORITHM 1 takes III and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0: (1) discard the pieces of size ≤max⁡(1/n(I),ε/2)\le \max(1/n(I), \varepsilon/2)≤max(1/n(I),ε/2), leaving JJJ; (2) apply linear grouping to JJJ with k=⌈n(J)ε2⌉k = \lceil n(J)\varepsilon^2\rceilk=⌈n(J)ε2⌉, giving KKK and K′K'K′; (3) put each piece of K′K'K′ in its own bin; (4) obtain from a Fractional Bin-Packing subroutine a basic feasible solution xxx of the LP of KKK with 1⋅x≤LIN(K)+1\mathbf 1\cdot x\le LIN(K)+11⋅x≤LIN(K)+1; (5) round xxx to a packing of KKK with at most 1⋅x+(m(K)+1)/2\mathbf 1\cdot x + (m(K)+1)/21⋅x+(m(K)+1)/2 bins; (6) shrink the pieces back to obtain a packing of JJJ; (7) insert the discarded pieces, opening a new bin only when a piece fits nowhere. A(I)A(I)A(I) is the cost of the resulting packing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, as its proof establishes it

A(I)≤(1+2ε) OPT(I)+12ε2+3for every ε>0, every instance I, every run of ALGORITHM 1.A(I) \le (1+2\varepsilon)\,OPT(I) + \frac{1}{2\varepsilon^2} + 3 \qquad\text{for every } \varepsilon>0,\ \text{every instance } I,\ \text{every run of ALGORITHM 1.}A(I)≤(1+2ε)OPT(I)+2ε21​+3for every ε>0, every instance I, every run of ALGORITHM 1.

The additive term depends on ε\varepsilonε only, so ALGORITHM 1 is an asymptotic approximation scheme. The paper prints the factor 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε, which fails for ALGORITHM 1 as printed (see Formalization scope); running the algorithm with ε/2\varepsilon/2ε/2 gives the paper's main result (4), A(I)≤(1+ε)OPT(I)+O(ε−2)A(I)\le(1+\varepsilon)OPT(I)+O(\varepsilon^{-2})A(I)≤(1+ε)OPT(I)+O(ε−2), stated as a separate corollary with the explicit term 2/ε2+32/\varepsilon^2+32/ε2+3.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: OPT(I)≤2 SIZE(I)+1OPT(I)\le 2\,SIZE(I)+1OPT(I)≤2SIZE(I)+1.
  2. Lemma 2: SIZE(I)≤LIN(I)≤OPT(I)≤LIN(I)+m(I)+12SIZE(I)\le LIN(I)\le OPT(I)\le LIN(I)+\frac{m(I)+1}{2}SIZE(I)≤LIN(I)≤OPT(I)≤LIN(I)+2m(I)+1​.
  3. Corollary 1: every basic feasible solution xxx can be rounded to a packing of cost ≤1⋅x+m(I)+12\le \mathbf 1\cdot x + \frac{m(I)+1}{2}≤1⋅x+2m(I)+1​.
  4. Lemma 3: inserting pieces of size ≤g/2\le g/2≤g/2 last, with new bins only when necessary, costs at most max⁡(A,(1+g) OPT(I)+1)\max(A, (1+g)\,OPT(I)+1)max(A,(1+g)OPT(I)+1).
  5. Monotonicity: I≤JI\le JI≤J implies OPTOPTOPT, LINLINLIN and SIZESIZESIZE do not decrease.
  6. Lemma 4: linear grouping loses at most kkk in OPTOPTOPT, LINLINLIN and SIZESIZESIZE.
  7. Proof steps (ii)–(iii) (corrected): k≤2ε OPT(I)+1k\le 2\varepsilon\,OPT(I)+1k≤2εOPT(I)+1.
  8. Proof step (iv): m(K)≤1/ε2m(K)\le 1/\varepsilon^2m(K)≤1/ε2.
  9. Proof step (vii): 1⋅x≤OPT(I)+1\mathbf 1\cdot x\le OPT(I)+11⋅x≤OPT(I)+1.
  10. Proof step (viii) (corrected): the packing of Step 6 has at most (1+2ε)OPT(I)+12ε2+52(1+2\varepsilon)OPT(I)+\frac{1}{2\varepsilon^2}+\frac52(1+2ε)OPT(I)+2ε21​+25​ bins.

Significance

The result showed that the configuration LP, of exponential size in general, can be used for a guaranteed approximation: its value is within (m+1)/2(m+1)/2(m+1)/2 of the integer optimum, and grouping reduces mmm at small cost. The same template (eliminate small items, group, solve the configuration LP, round a basic solution, reinsert) underlies later schemes for bin packing, cutting stock, bin packing with cardinality constraints and scheduling, and the LP-based analysis is the starting point of the Rothvoß and Hoberg–Rothvoß improvements.

The theorems are proved in the literature; none of them has a machine-checked proof on the platform or, to our knowledge, in Mathlib. This mission produces a checked analysis of the algorithm, including a correction: the printed approximation factor is not valid for the algorithm as printed, and the checked statement records the factor its proof yields. The definitions (instances, packings, the configuration LP, basic solutions, the order I≤JI\le JI≤J, any-fit insertion) are reusable for the second mission of the series and for other bin-packing results.

Difficulty

The Lean statements are short, but several proofs need linear-programming structure that is not in Mathlib in this form. Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 use that an extreme point of {x≥0, Ax≥b}\{x\ge0,\ Ax\ge b\}{x≥0, Ax≥b} has at most as many nonzero coordinates as there are rows of AAA; the configuration LP is indexed by a finite but implicitly described set of multisets. Monotonicity of LINLINLIN under I≤JI\le JI≤J ("clearly" in the paper) requires transporting a fractional solution across a piece-to-piece matching whose images are types, not pieces. The existence of a run requires an optimal basic feasible solution of the configuration LP. Lemma 3 concerns an insertion process with unrestricted order and bin choice, so its bound has to hold for every execution, not for one greedy rule.

Formalization scope

  • Sizes are real numbers in the open interval (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); the paper says "a rational number between 0 and 1". Real sizes generalize rational ones; the open interval is what the paper's arguments use.
  • Instances are Multiset ℝ; packings are Multiset (Multiset ℝ) with join equal to the instance, bin loads at most 111, empty bins allowed and counted. OPTOPTOPT is a natural-number infimum over a set that is always nonempty.
  • LP solutions are Multiset ℝ →₀ ℝ supported on configurations. LINLINLIN is a real infimum over a set that is nonempty (singleton configurations) and bounded below by 000. "Basic" is the extreme-point property; the bound on the number of nonzero coordinates is a consequence, not the definition.
  • The Fractional Bin-Packing subroutine is modelled by its contract only (§5, p. 315): any basic feasible solution of cost at most LIN(K)+1LIN(K)+1LIN(K)+1. The ellipsoid method of §6 is not modelled.
  • ALGORITHM 1 is a relation Alg1Run ε I P: PPP is a possible output. Every open choice is quantified: the subroutine's output, the packing of Step 5 (any packing within the stated bound), the size reduction of Step 6 (bin by bin), and the insertion of Step 7 (any order, any fitting bin). The goal holds for every run, and a separate item states that a run exists, so the goal is not vacuous.
  • The paper's O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) in result (4) is replaced by the explicit 2/ε2+32/\varepsilon^2+32/ε2+3.
  • Corrected statements. The printed Theorem 3 bound (1+ε)OPT(I)+12ε2+3(1+\varepsilon)OPT(I)+\frac{1}{2\varepsilon^2}+3(1+ε)OPT(I)+2ε21​+3 fails: for ε=1/10\varepsilon=1/10ε=1/10 and 19 00019\,00019000 pieces of size 0.0510.0510.051, some run uses 118011801180 bins while the bound is 115311531153. The failing step is (ii), SIZE(J)≥ε n(J)SIZE(J)\ge\varepsilon\,n(J)SIZE(J)≥εn(J), since Step 1 discards only pieces ≤ε/2\le\varepsilon/2≤ε/2. Steps (ii)–(iii) and (viii) are stated with 2ε2\varepsilon2ε; step (iv) is stated as m(K)≤1/ε2m(K)\le 1/\varepsilon^2m(K)≤1/ε2 because its first link m(K)≤n(K)/km(K)\le n(K)/km(K)≤n(K)/k fails when the last group is short.
  • Running time (Theorem 3's first half, Corollary 1's time bound, the function TTT) is out of scope.
  • Trivializations are ruled out: "some packing has at most the bound" is not the goal; the goal constrains every output of the algorithm, and the packing property of that output is part of its conclusion.

Proofs of any item are welcome; Lemma 2, Corollary 1 and the monotonicity display are the most reusable.

Selected references

  • N. Karmarkar, R. M. Karp, An Efficient Approximation Scheme for the One-Dimensional Bin-Packing Problem, Proc. 23rd FOCS (SFCS 1982), IEEE, pp. 312–320. https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.1982.61
  • W. Fernandez de la Vega, G. S. Lueker, Bin packing can be solved within 1+ε in linear time, Combinatorica 1 (1981) 349–355. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579456
  • P. C. Gilmore, R. E. Gomory, A Linear Programming Approach to the Cutting-Stock Problem, Operations Research 9 (1961) 849–859. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.9.6.849
  • D. S. Johnson, A. Demers, J. D. Ullman, M. R. Garey, R. L. Graham, Worst-Case Performance Bounds for Simple One-Dimensional Packing Algorithms, SIAM J. Comput. 3 (1974) 299–325. https://doi.org/10.1137/0203025
  • R. Hoberg, T. Rothvoß, A Logarithmic Additive Integrality Gap for Bin Packing, Proc. SODA 2017, 2616–2625. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611974782.172
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Competitive Caching with Machine Learned Advice: The Competitive Ratio of Predictive MarkerResearch Paper

Motivation

Caching (online paging) is one of the oldest problems in online algorithms: a fast memory of kkk slots serves a sequence of requests, and every request for an element not in the fast memory is a cache miss that forces the element to be loaded, possibly evicting another one. With the whole request sequence known in advance, evicting the element whose next request is furthest in the future is optimal (Bélády, 1966). Without that knowledge, no deterministic algorithm is better than kkk-competitive, and the best randomized algorithms are Θ(log⁡k)\Theta(\log k)Θ(logk)-competitive (Fiat, Karp, Luby, McGeoch, Sleator and Young, 1991).

Lykouris and Vassilvitskii asked what happens in between: an online algorithm receives, with every request, a machine-learned prediction of the element's next arrival time. A good predictor should make the algorithm nearly as good as Bélády's rule (consistency), and a bad predictor should never make it worse than a classical algorithm (robustness). Their paper (arXiv:1802.05399v4; J. ACM 2021) is one of the founding papers of learning-augmented algorithms, and its algorithm, Predictive Marker, is the reference point for the later literature on caching with predictions.

Timeline.

  • 1966: Bélády's furthest-in-future rule is optimal offline.
  • 1985: Sleator and Tarjan show that deterministic online paging is at best kkk-competitive.
  • 1991: Fiat et al. introduce the Marker algorithm, 2Hk2H_k2Hk​-competitive, and the clean-element lower bound on the optimum.
  • 2018: Lykouris and Vassilvitskii (arXiv:1802.05399) introduce Predictive Marker, with ratio 2min⁡(1+2Sℓ(ϵ),2Hk)2\min(1+2S_\ell(\epsilon), 2H_k)2min(1+2Sℓ​(ϵ),2Hk​) for an ϵ\epsilonϵ-accurate predictor.
  • 2020: Rohatgi (arXiv:1910.12172, SODA 2020) and Wei (arXiv:2005.13716, APPROX/RANDOM 2020) improve the dependence on the error.

Setting

A request sequence σ=(z1,…,zn)\sigma = (z_1, \dots, z_n)σ=(z1​,…,zn​) lists elements of a set ZZZ. A cache of size k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 starts empty. A request for a cached element is a hit; otherwise it is a miss, the element is loaded, and if the cache is full some element is evicted first. The offline optimum Opt(σ)\mathrm{Opt}(\sigma)Opt(σ) is the least number of misses over all eviction schedules chosen with knowledge of σ\sigmaσ.

With each request ziz_izi​ the algorithm receives a real prediction hih_ihi​. The true label yiy_iyi​ is the position of the next request of ziz_izi​, or n+1n+1n+1 if there is none. For a loss function ℓ≥0\ell \ge 0ℓ≥0, the error of the predictions is ηℓ(h,σ)=∑iℓ(yi,hi)\eta_\ell(h,\sigma) = \sum_i \ell(y_i, h_i)ηℓ​(h,σ)=∑i​ℓ(yi​,hi​), and the predictions are ϵ\epsilonϵ-accurate when ηℓ(h,σ)≤ϵ⋅Opt(σ)\eta_\ell(h,\sigma) \le \epsilon \cdot \mathrm{Opt}(\sigma)ηℓ​(h,σ)≤ϵ⋅Opt(σ).

The spread of ℓ\ellℓ measures how cheaply a predictor can get the order of arrivals completely wrong: Sℓ(m)S_\ell(m)Sℓ​(m) is the least length T≥1T \ge 1T≥1 such that every strictly increasing integer sequence a1<⋯<aTa_1 < \dots < a_Ta1​<⋯<aT​ and every non-increasing real sequence b1≥⋯≥bTb_1 \ge \dots \ge b_Tb1​≥⋯≥bT​ have total loss ∑iℓ(ai,bi)≥m\sum_i \ell(a_i, b_i) \ge m∑i​ℓ(ai​,bi​)≥m.

Predictive Marker (Algorithm 1) works in the phases of the Marker algorithm. Requested elements are marked. A phase ends when the cache is full, every cached element is marked, and a miss occurs; then all marks are removed. An element requested in a phase but not in the previous one is clean, and Q(σ)Q(\sigma)Q(σ) is the total number of clean elements. Each clean miss starts a chain. An element evicted in the current phase that is requested again (a stale miss) extends the chain in which it was evicted. Evictions are among unmarked elements. As long as the chain's length n(r,c)n(r,c)n(r,c) is at most Hk=1+12+⋯+1kH_k = 1 + \tfrac12 + \dots + \tfrac1kHk​=1+21​+⋯+k1​, the evicted element is one with the largest prediction. After that it is chosen uniformly at random. The expected number of misses of Predictive Marker is costPM(σ)\mathrm{cost}_{PM}(\sigma)costPM​(σ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3

If SSS is concave on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and majorizes the spread, then for every ϵ≥0\epsilon \ge 0ϵ≥0, every tie-breaking rule, and every sequence with ϵ\epsilonϵ-accurate predictions,

E[costPM(σ)]≤2⋅min⁡(1+2S(ϵ), 2Hk)⋅Opt(σ).\mathbb E\bigl[\mathrm{cost}_{PM}(\sigma)\bigr] \le 2\cdot\min\bigl(1 + 2S(\epsilon),\ 2H_k\bigr)\cdot \mathrm{Opt}(\sigma).E[costPM​(σ)]≤2⋅min(1+2S(ϵ), 2Hk​)⋅Opt(σ).

Milestones

  • Claim 1 (Fiat et al.): Q(σ)≤2 Opt(σ)Q(\sigma) \le 2\,\mathrm{Opt}(\sigma)Q(σ)≤2Opt(σ).
  • Proof of Theorem 3.3, last sentence: Opt(σ)≤Q(σ)\mathrm{Opt}(\sigma) \le Q(\sigma)Opt(σ)≤Q(σ).
  • Lemma 3.3: a chain that evicts by the predictions only has length n(r,c)≤1+S(ηr,c)n(r,c) \le 1 + S(\eta_{r,c})n(r,c)≤1+S(ηr,c​), where ηr,c\eta_{r,c}ηr,c​ is the error of the predictions on the elements evicted into it.
  • Lemma 3.4: E[n(r,c)]≤E[min⁡(1+2S(ηr,c),2Hk)]\mathbb E[n(r,c)] \le \mathbb E[\min(1 + 2S(\eta_{r,c}), 2H_k)]E[n(r,c)]≤E[min(1+2S(ηr,c​),2Hk​)].

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.3 gives both guarantees at once. For an exact predictor (ϵ=0\epsilon = 0ϵ=0) the ratio is a constant, 2(1+2S(0))2(1 + 2S(0))2(1+2S(0)), independent of kkk; for an arbitrary predictor it is 4Hk4H_k4Hk​, within a constant factor of the optimal randomized ratio. In between, the ratio degrades with the error at the rate of the spread: for the absolute loss the spread grows like m\sqrt mm​, so the ratio grows like ϵ\sqrt\epsilonϵ​. The spread and the chain decomposition are the tools later papers build on to trade consistency against robustness.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it, of the Marker analysis, or of the clean-element bound of Fiat et al. is known. A formalization supplies a precise model of a randomized online algorithm with predictions. It also settles the details the paper leaves implicit: the eviction missing from the clean branch of Algorithm 1 as printed, the cap 2Hk2H_k2Hk​ printed as 2log⁡k2\log k2logk in Lemma 3.4, and the behaviour of the spread at 000.

Difficulty

The obvious argument charges every miss to a chain and bounds each chain separately. That works for chains that follow the predictions, but a chain that switches to random evictions interacts with every other chain of the phase, because all of them evict from the same pool of unmarked elements. A bound on its expected length must hold whatever the other chains evict, including evictions that depend on earlier coin flips. A second difficulty is summing. The chain errors ηr,c\eta_{r,c}ηr,c​ and the chain lengths are both random, while the hypothesis controls only the total error ηℓ(h,σ)\eta_\ell(h,\sigma)ηℓ​(h,σ) against Opt(σ)\mathrm{Opt}(\sigma)Opt(σ), not the number of chains Q(σ)Q(\sigma)Q(σ) in which the error is spread.

Formalization scope

Elements form a type with decidable equality. A request sequence is a list; predictions are one real per request, and every real sequence is allowed. Labels are 1-based next-arrival positions, with n+1n+1n+1 for elements never requested again. The paper prints the label with equal features; the element is meant. Opt\mathrm{Opt}Opt is computed as the minimum over all demand-paging schedules from the empty cache, which loses no generality. HkH_kHk​ is harmonic k as a real number, never log⁡k\log klogk.

Predictive Marker is a PMF over final states. The random eviction of line 21 is uniform over the unmarked cached elements, and ties in the arg max are a parameter quantified universally. The eviction of lines 23–24 is also performed after a clean miss; as printed, it sits only in the stale branch. The expected cost lies in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

The spread takes real arguments and lengths T≥1T \ge 1T≥1. SSS must be concave on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), finite, and at least the spread. It must also be continuous at 000, which the paper does not say: without it the chain lemma fails for losses whose minimal reversed-order loss stays 000 over several lengths. ϵ\epsilonϵ-accuracy is the pointwise condition on the given pair (σ,h)(\sigma, h)(σ,h). The competitive ratio is written as a product, so Opt(σ)=0\mathrm{Opt}(\sigma) = 0Opt(σ)=0 needs no special case. Lemma 3.3 is stated pointwise for chains without random evictions, as its proof shows. Lemma 3.4 has 2Hk2H_k2Hk​ in place of the printed 2log⁡k2\log k2logk, with the minimum inside the expectation because ηr,c\eta_{r,c}ηr,c​ is random.

The statement must not be trivialized. Opt\mathrm{Opt}Opt is the true offline optimum, not Bélády's rule applied to the predictions. The expectation is taken over Predictive Marker's own run, never compared with itself. The spread hypothesis is satisfiable; for example, the constant loss 111 has spread max⁡(1,⌈m⌉)≤m+1\max(1,\lceil m\rceil) \le m + 1max(1,⌈m⌉)≤m+1.

Out of scope: Lemma 3.2 (the special-marking algorithm SM, which enters only through Lemma 3.4's proof); Lemma 3.1 and Corollaries 1–2, whose printed constants are false for small mmm or disagree with Theorem 3.3; the lower bounds of §3.1 and §3.4; the extensions of §4; the experiments of §5; running time and learnability.

Welcome contributions: the Marker phase structure and its equivalence with the combinatorial phases, the clean-element bounds Q/2≤Opt≤QQ/2 \le \mathrm{Opt} \le QQ/2≤Opt≤Q (reusable for any marking algorithm), and a bound on the expected number of misses caused by elements evicted uniformly at random within a phase.

Selected references

  • T. Lykouris, S. Vassilvitskii, Competitive Caching with Machine Learned Advice, arXiv:1802.05399v4, 2020; J. ACM 68(4), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.05399v4
  • A. Fiat, R. M. Karp, M. Luby, L. A. McGeoch, D. D. Sleator, N. E. Young, Competitive paging algorithms, J. Algorithms 12(4), 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-6774(91)90041-V
  • L. A. Bélády, A study of replacement algorithms for a virtual-storage computer, IBM Systems Journal 5(2), 1966. https://doi.org/10.1147/sj.52.0078
  • D. D. Sleator, R. E. Tarjan, Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules, Comm. ACM 28(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1145/2786.2793
  • D. Rohatgi, Near-optimal bounds for online caching with machine learned advice, SODA 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.12172
  • A. Wei, Better and simpler learning-augmented online caching, APPROX/RANDOM 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.13716
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The Matroids with the Max-Flow Min-Cut Property: Binary Mengerian Clutters and the Q6 MinorResearch Paper

Motivation

Several classical theorems of combinatorial optimization say that a family of sets arising from a graph packs: the maximum number of pairwise disjoint members equals the minimum size of a set meeting every member. König's theorem on bipartite graphs, Menger's theorem, the max-flow min-cut theorem of Ford and Fulkerson, Edmonds' branching theorem and the Lucchesi–Younger theorem all have this form (Seymour 1977, (1.1)–(1.5)). In the capacitated version (weights on elements, integral flows) the max-flow min-cut theorem says more: the packing property survives every deletion and replication of elements. Clutters with this stronger property are called Mengerian. For each 000–111 matrix they are exactly the systems whose covering linear program and its dual have integral optima for every integral weight vector, which is why the notion matters to integer programming and polyhedral combinatorics.

Seymour's paper answers the question for the class of binary clutters, the clutters coming from binary matroids, which includes path collections, cut collections and odd-circuit collections of graphs. Earlier, Gallai's theorem implied that ports of regular matroids are Mengerian (Seymour 1977, p. 200); combined with Tutte's excluded-minor characterization of regular matroids, this showed that binary clutters without Q6Q_6Q6​ or b(Q6)b(Q_6)b(Q6​) minors are Mengerian. Seymour shows that the second excluded minor is unnecessary, so a single small clutter is the only obstruction.

Setting

All sets are finite. A clutter L\mathbf LL is a finite collection of finite sets, no member of which is contained in another; ∅\emptyset∅ and {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} are the two trivial clutters. Its ground set is E(L)=⋃A∈LAE(\mathbf L)=\bigcup_{A\in\mathbf L}AE(L)=⋃A∈L​A. The blocker b(L)b(\mathbf L)b(L) is the collection of minimal subsets of E(L)E(\mathbf L)E(L) that meet every member of L\mathbf LL, and τ(L)\tau(\mathbf L)τ(L) is the minimum cardinality of a member of b(L)b(\mathbf L)b(L).

L\mathbf LL is Mengerian if L={∅}\mathbf L=\{\emptyset\}L={∅}, or if for every weight map w:E(L)→Z+w:E(\mathbf L)\to\mathbb Z^+w:E(L)→Z+ there is an integral packing q:L→Z+q:\mathbf L\to\mathbb Z^+q:L→Z+ with ∑A∋xq(A)≤w(x)\sum_{A\ni x}q(A)\le w(x)∑A∋x​q(A)≤w(x) for each x∈E(L)x\in E(\mathbf L)x∈E(L) and

∑A∈Lq(A)=min⁡B∈b(L)∑x∈Bw(x).\sum_{A\in\mathbf L}q(A)=\min_{B\in b(\mathbf L)}\sum_{x\in B}w(x).A∈L∑​q(A)=B∈b(L)min​x∈B∑​w(x).

For a set ZZZ, the deletion is L∖Z={A∈L:A∩Z=∅}\mathbf L\setminus Z=\{A\in\mathbf L:A\cap Z=\emptyset\}L∖Z={A∈L:A∩Z=∅} and the contraction L/Z\mathbf L/ZL/Z is the collection of minimal members of {A−Z:A∈L}\{A-Z:A\in\mathbf L\}{A−Z:A∈L} (minimal, not minimal nonempty). A minor of L\mathbf LL is any clutter obtained by a finite sequence of deletions and contractions.

A clutter is binary if ∣A∩B∣|A\cap B|∣A∩B∣ is odd for all A∈LA\in\mathbf LA∈L and B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L); this is condition (3.2)(ii) of the paper, which is equivalent to being a port of a binary matroid. Finally

Q6={{1,3,5},{1,4,6},{2,3,6},{2,4,5}},Q_6=\{\{1,3,5\},\{1,4,6\},\{2,3,6\},\{2,4,5\}\},Q6​={{1,3,5},{1,4,6},{2,3,6},{2,4,5}},

the triangles of K4K_4K4​ with its edges labelled 1,…,61,\dots,61,…,6.

For the structure theory, a circuit of a binary clutter is a minimal nonempty C⊆E(L)C\subseteq E(\mathbf L)C⊆E(L) with ∣C∩B∣|C\cap B|∣C∩B∣ even for every B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L); xxx and yyy are parallel when {x,y}\{x,y\}{x,y} is a circuit, and the point ⟨x⟩\langle x\rangle⟨x⟩ is the parallel class of xxx. With mb(L)={B∈b(L):∣B∣=τ(L)}mb(\mathbf L)=\{B\in b(\mathbf L):|B|=\tau(\mathbf L)\}mb(L)={B∈b(L):∣B∣=τ(L)}, L\mathbf LL is critical if E(mb(L))=E(L)E(mb(\mathbf L))=E(\mathbf L)E(mb(L))=E(L). In a critical binary clutter, x→yx\to yx→y means that every member of mb(L)mb(\mathbf L)mb(L) containing xxx contains yyy while y∉⟨x⟩y\notin\langle x\rangley∈/⟨x⟩, and yyy is initial if no xxx has x→yx\to yx→y. MBC abbreviates "Mengerian binary clutter".

Formalization targets

Goal: Seymour's theorem (p. 209)

For every binary clutter L\mathbf LL,

L is Mengerian  ⟺  L has no minor isomorphic to Q6.\mathbf L\ \text{is Mengerian}\iff \mathbf L\ \text{has no minor isomorphic to } Q_6 .L is Mengerian⟺L has no minor isomorphic to Q6​.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  • (2.3) Every minor of a Mengerian clutter is Mengerian.
  • Section 1, p. 193. Q6Q_6Q6​ is not Mengerian. With (2.3) this is the "only if" direction.
  • (3.6)(i) Circuits of a binary clutter have at least two elements.
  • (3.6)(iii) If Z⊆E(L)Z\subseteq E(\mathbf L)Z⊆E(L) meets every member of b(L)b(\mathbf L)b(L) evenly, then ZZZ is a disjoint union of circuits. If it meets every member oddly, then ZZZ is a disjoint union of circuits and one member of L\mathbf LL.
  • (4.3) In a critical MBC, x→yx\to yx→y implies y↛xy\not\to xy→x.
  • (4.4) In a critical MBC, x→yx\to yx→y gives a circuit C∋x,yC\ni x,yC∋x,y with ∣C∣≥3|C|\ge3∣C∣≥3, z→yz\to yz→y for z∈C−{y}z\in C-\{y\}z∈C−{y}, and ∣B−(C−{y})∣≥τ(L)−1|B-(C-\{y\})|\ge\tau(\mathbf L)-1∣B−(C−{y})∣≥τ(L)−1 for B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L).
  • (4.5) In a critical MBC, a non-initial xxx lies on a circuit CCC with ∣C∣≥3|C|\ge3∣C∣≥3 whose other elements are initial and point to xxx, and ∣B∩(C−{x})∣≤1|B\cap(C-\{x\})|\le1∣B∩(C−{x})∣≤1 for B∈mb(L)B\in mb(\mathbf L)B∈mb(L).
  • (4.6) A nontrivial critical MBC has a member consisting of initial elements.
  • (5.1) A binary clutter with six elements x1,y1,x2,y2,x3,y3x_1,y_1,x_2,y_2,x_3,y_3x1​,y1​,x2​,y2​,x3​,y3​ whose only circuits are the three sets {xi,yi,xj,yj}\{x_i,y_i,x_j,y_j\}{xi​,yi​,xj​,yj​}, together with a member AAA that meets each pair {xi,yi}\{x_i,y_i\}{xi​,yi​} once and satisfies a minimality condition, has a Q6Q_6Q6​ minor.

Significance

The theorem is an excluded-minor characterization of the max-flow min-cut property. For binary clutters it decides exactly when the covering system Mx≥1Mx\ge1Mx≥1, x≥0x\ge0x≥0 has integral optimal primal and dual solutions for every integral cost vector, and it identifies Q6Q_6Q6​ as the single obstruction. Its matroid form (the Corollary, p. 220) states that for a matroid MMM the port Ω(M)\Omega(M)Ω(M) is Mengerian for every element Ω\OmegaΩ if and only if MMM is binary and has no F7∗F_7^*F7∗​ minor. Consequences discussed in the paper include the two-commodity setting of (3.5): the clutter of minimal edge sets joining sss to s′s's′ or ttt to t′t't′ is Mengerian exactly when the graph does not reduce to the configuration of its Figure 2. The theorem is also a basis for later work on ideal and Mengerian clutters, such as Cornuéjols' book Combinatorial Optimization: Packing and Covering (SIAM, 2001).

The result has been proved since 1977. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. Mathlib at the pinned revision has matroids but no clutters, blockers, clutter minors, or matroids representable over GF(2). This mission builds that layer. The minor-closedness of the Mengerian property (2.3), the parity decomposition (3.6)(iii) and the structure theory of critical Mengerian binary clutters (4.3)–(4.6) are results in their own right and are useful beyond the main theorem.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is short: minors of Mengerian clutters are Mengerian, and Q6Q_6Q6​ fails with unit weights. The "if" direction is, in the author's words, "very much harder". A natural first idea is to show directly, by LP duality, that the covering polyhedron of a Q6Q_6Q6​-free binary clutter is integral. This does not work: integrality of the polyhedron is the weak max-flow min-cut property, and Q6Q_6Q6​ itself has that property while not being Mengerian, so no argument that sees only fractional optima can separate the two cases. The paper's proof works with a minimal counterexample and derives the Q6Q_6Q6​ minor from the structure of critical Mengerian binary clutters in Section 4; its intermediate claims (5.2)–(5.39) hold only for that minimal counterexample, which is why they are not milestones here.

Formalization scope

Elements form a type α with decidable equality. A clutter is L : Finset (Finset α) with the clutter axiom as a hypothesis, E(L)E(\mathbf L)E(L) is the union of members, and deletion and contraction take an arbitrary finite set ZZZ. Weights www and packings qqq are N\mathbb NN-valued. The minimum in the Mengerian condition is expressed as "some B∈b(L)B\in b(\mathbf L)B∈b(L) of least weight has weight equal to the packing value", never as an infimum. {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} is Mengerian by the paper's convention, and τ({∅})\tau(\{\emptyset\})τ({∅}), which the paper leaves undefined, has the junk value 000 in Lean; every item reading τ\tauτ excludes {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} or is vacuous there. "Minor" is the reflexive–transitive closure of single deletions and contractions. "Has a Q6Q_6Q6​ minor" means that some minor equals the image of Q6Q_6Q6​ (on Fin 6, with the paper's labels shifted down by one) under an injective relabelling Fin 6 ↪ α. Binary clutters are defined by (3.2)(ii); the paper defines them as ports of binary matroids and quotes (3.2) [15, 28] for the equivalence, and Mathlib has no GF(2)-representable matroids at this revision. Circuits are defined intrinsically, which makes (3.6)(ii) hold by definition.

Four readings would change the theorem and are ruled out: real-valued packings qqq (the weak max-flow min-cut property, which Q6Q_6Q6​ has, so the goal would be false), a non-minimal blocker or one not restricted to E(L)E(\mathbf L)E(L), dropping the {∅}\{\emptyset\}{∅} exception, and reading "Q6Q_6Q6​ minor" as literal equality instead of isomorphism.

A complete development needs the blocker calculus ((2.1), (2.2), cited from [28] with proofs omitted), the parity theory of binary clutters, and the replication operation Lw\mathbf L_wLw​. The clutter layer (blocker, minors, Mengerian, binary, circuits) is reusable for later work on ideal clutters, Lehman's theorem and the Corollary's matroid form. Proofs of any milestone, of the helper facts b(b(L))=Lb(b(\mathbf L))=\mathbf Lb(b(L))=L, (2.1) and (2.2), and of the equivalences in (3.2) are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. D. Seymour, The Matroids with the Max-Flow Min-Cut Property, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 23 (1977) 189–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(77)90031-4
  • J. Edmonds and D. R. Fulkerson, Bottleneck extrema, J. Combin. Theory 8 (1970) 299–306. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0021-9800(70)80083-7
  • L. R. Ford and D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal flow through a network, Canad. J. Math. 8 (1956) 399–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • G. Cornuéjols, Combinatorial Optimization: Packing and Covering, CBMS-NSF Regional Conf. Ser. in Appl. Math. 74, SIAM, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898717105
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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Extremal Problems in Discrete Geometry: The Szemerédi–Trotter Incidence BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

How many times can nnn points and ttt lines in the plane meet? The question is the prototype of incidence geometry, and the answer controls a long list of problems in discrete and computational geometry: the number of lines rich in points, the number of distinct distances or unit distances among nnn points, the complexity of arrangements, and sum–product estimates in additive combinatorics. Erdős asked for the order of magnitude when t=nt = nt=n and conjectured that the answer is n4/3n^{4/3}n4/3; Erdős and Purdy asked for the matching bound on the number of lines containing at least kkk of the points.

Szemerédi and Trotter settled both questions in Extremal Problems in Discrete Geometry (Combinatorica 3 (1983) 381–392, doi:10.1007/BF02579194). Their principal theorem bounds the number of point–line incidences by c1n2/3t2/3c_1 n^{2/3} t^{2/3}c1​n2/3t2/3 over the whole range n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​), and the same paper derives from it the Erdős–Purdy bound on kkk-rich lines, a version of Dirac's conjecture (proved independently by Beck, Combinatorica 3 (1983)), and a bound on the number of sequences of line densities.

Timeline.

  • Erdős conjectures O(n4/3)O(n^{4/3})O(n4/3) incidences for nnn points and nnn lines, and shows by a grid construction that this order would be sharp.
  • 1983: Szemerédi and Trotter prove the bound c1n2/3t2/3c_1 n^{2/3} t^{2/3}c1​n2/3t2/3 for n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​), with c1=1060c_1 = 10^{60}c1​=1060, by a minimal-counterexample argument and a covering lemma for squares from their earlier paper.
  • 1990: Clarkson, Edelsbrunner, Guibas, Sharir and Welzl give a second proof by cuttings, with a far smaller constant (Discrete Comput. Geom. 5 (1990) 99–160).
  • 1997: Székely derives the bound in a few lines from the crossing lemma (Combin. Probab. Comput. 6 (1997) 353–358).

Setting

Work in the Euclidean plane R2\mathbb R^2R2, written Plane in the Lean development. A line is an affine subspace l⊆R2l \subseteq \mathbb R^2l⊆R2 whose direction space has dimension one (IsLine l). Let P\mathcal PP be a finite set of nnn points and L\mathcal LL a finite family of ttt distinct lines. The number of incidences is

I(P,L)=#{(p,l)∈P×L:p∈l},I(\mathcal P, \mathcal L) = \#\{(p, l) \in \mathcal P \times \mathcal L : p \in l\},I(P,L)=#{(p,l)∈P×L:p∈l},

written incidences P L. The degree did_idi​ of a point pip_ipi​ is the number of lines of L\mathcal LL through it (degree L p), and the density yjy_jyj​ of a line ljl_jlj​ is the number of points of P\mathcal PP on it (density P l); so I=∑idi=∑jyjI = \sum_i d_i = \sum_j y_jI=∑i​di​=∑j​yj​.

For the covering lemma, coordinate axes are fixed and a square is a closed axis-parallel square Q(a,b,s)=[a,a+s]×[b,b+s]Q(a,b,s) = [a, a+s] \times [b, b+s]Q(a,b,s)=[a,a+s]×[b,b+s] with side s>0s > 0s>0 (closedSquare (a, b, s)); its interior is the open square (a,a+s)×(b,b+s)(a, a+s) \times (b, b+s)(a,a+s)×(b,b+s) (openSquare). A square contains the points of P\mathcal PP in the closed square, and a family of squares covers the points lying in at least one of them.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 381, restated and proved on p. 383)

There is an absolute constant c1c_1c1​ such that for every finite point set P\mathcal PP with ∣P∣=n|\mathcal P| = n∣P∣=n and every finite family L\mathcal LL of ttt distinct lines,

n≤t≤(n2)⟹I(P,L)≤c1 n2/3 t2/3.\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2 \quad\Longrightarrow\quad I(\mathcal P, \mathcal L) \le c_1\, n^{2/3}\, t^{2/3}.n​≤t≤(2n​)⟹I(P,L)≤c1​n2/3t2/3.

The goal leaves c1c_1c1​ unspecified. The paper's proof gives c1=1060c_1 = 10^{60}c1​=1060, and later proofs give much smaller values; any improvement of the constant still proves this statement.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Section 3, display on p. 383. Two distinct lines meet in at most one point, so the number of good intersections is at most the number of pairs of lines:
∑i(di2)≤(t2),I22n−I2≤t22.\sum_{i} \binom{d_i}{2} \le \binom t2, \qquad \frac{I^2}{2n} - \frac I2 \le \frac{t^2}{2}.i∑​(2di​​)≤(2t​),2nI2​−2I​≤2t2​.
  1. Section 3, inequality (1), p. 384. 0.6 x+(1−x)2/3≤10.6\,x + (1-x)^{2/3} \le 10.6x+(1−x)2/3≤1 for 0<x≤1/20 < x \le 1/20<x≤1/2.
  2. Section 3, inequality (5), p. 385. x2/3+(1−x)/100+2−1/3(1−x)2/3≤1x^{2/3} + (1-x)/100 + 2^{-1/3}(1-x)^{2/3} \le 1x2/3+(1−x)/100+2−1/3(1−x)2/3≤1 for 0<x≤0.10 < x \le 0.10<x≤0.1, and the reverse strict inequality holds somewhere in (0.1,0.2)(0.1, 0.2)(0.1,0.2).
  3. Section 3, display on p. 387. With M=1010M = 10^{10}M=1010, 2i/3(1−2/M)4i/3≥200/((0.1)1/322/3)2^{i/3}(1 - 2/M)^{4i/3} \ge 200/((0.1)^{1/3} 2^{2/3})2i/3(1−2/M)4i/3≥200/((0.1)1/322/3) for every integer i≥30i \ge 30i≥30.
  4. Section 2, Lemma (covering lemma), p. 382. For integers 1≤r1≤n1 \le r_1 \le n1≤r1​≤n and r2≥256r1r_2 \ge 256 r_1r2​≥256r1​, every set of nnn points is covered, to at least n/16n/16n/16 of its points, by a family of squares with pairwise disjoint interiors, each containing between r1r_1r1​ and r2r_2r2​ of the points.

Significance

The result. The bound n2/3t2/3n^{2/3} t^{2/3}n2/3t2/3 is sharp up to the constant throughout the range n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​), as integer-grid configurations show. Outside that range the trivial bounds n+t2n + t^2n+t2 and t+n2t + n^2t+n2 take over. Theorem 1 is the source of the O(n2/k3)O(n^2/k^3)O(n2/k3) bound on kkk-rich lines (the paper's Theorem 2), of Beck's theorem (Theorem 3), and, through them, of the unit-distance bound O(n4/3)O(n^{4/3})O(n4/3), of the Elekes sum–product estimate and of many algorithmic bounds on arrangements. It is the first nontrivial case of the polynomial-partitioning incidence theory developed since 2010.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved, and reproved in several ways, for four decades. To the best of the mission's knowledge Mathlib has no statement of it, of the crossing lemma, or of any point–line incidence bound in the Euclidean plane. This mission produces a checked statement of the theorem with lines as genuine one-dimensional affine subspaces and an absolute constant. It also produces checked statements of the auxiliary facts the 1983 proof uses. A complete proof may follow the original argument, the cutting argument or Székely's crossing-lemma argument; any of them closes the goal.

Difficulty

Counting pairs of lines through common points (milestone 1) gives only I≲n1/2t+nI \lesssim n^{1/2} t + nI≲n1/2t+n, and its dual gives I≲t1/2n+tI \lesssim t^{1/2} n + tI≲t1/2n+t. These Cauchy–Schwarz bounds use only the fact that two lines meet at most once, a property shared by lines in finite projective planes, where the incidence count genuinely reaches order n3/2n^{3/2}n3/2. Any proof of the n2/3t2/3n^{2/3} t^{2/3}n2/3t2/3 bound must therefore use a property of the real plane that the finite geometries lack: order, continuity, or the planarity of drawings. Szemerédi and Trotter use it through a covering lemma for axis-parallel squares, whose proof is only cited in the paper ([7]). The remaining difficulty is keeping the constants of a multi-stage minimal-counterexample argument under control.

Formalization scope

The plane is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 2). A line is an AffineSubspace ℝ Plane whose direction has Module.finrank equal to 111. Every statement requires IsLine of each member of L\mathcal LL, so neither the whole plane nor a single point counts as a line. The points form a Finset Plane and the lines a Finset (AffineSubspace ℝ Plane), which makes the ttt lines distinct. Incidences, degrees and densities are Finset.filter cardinalities under classical decidability. Powers n2/3n^{2/3}n2/3, t2/3t^{2/3}t2/3 are Real.rpow of the counts cast to R\mathbb RR, and (n2)\binom n2(2n​) is Nat.choose.

In the goal, the constant c1c_1c1​ is quantified before the points and the lines. The form "for every configuration there is a c1c_1c1​" is trivially true (take c1=I+1c_1 = I + 1c1​=I+1) and is not this theorem. Both ends of the range n≤t≤(n2)\sqrt n \le t \le \binom n2n​≤t≤(2n​) are kept exactly: without the lower end, a single line through nnn collinear points has nnn incidences, more than c1n2/3c_1 n^{2/3}c1​n2/3 for large nnn.

The goal follows the wording of p. 381 ("at most"). The restatement on p. 383 says "less than", which fails at n=t=0n = t = 0n=t=0 and is equivalent for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 after doubling c1c_1c1​. The covering lemma is stated with the added non-degeneracy hypotheses 1≤r1≤n1 \le r_1 \le n1≤r1​≤n. As printed it fails when 0<n<r10 < n < r_10<n<r1​ (no square can hold r1r_1r1​ points), and when r1=r2=0r_1 = r_2 = 0r1​=r2​=0 with n>0n > 0n>0.

A full development needs a real-plane incidence toolkit: a crossing lemma or a cutting lemma, or the covering lemma with its quadtree proof. That toolkit is reusable for kkk-rich lines, Beck's theorem, unit distances and sum–product bounds, and contributions of such infrastructure as separate theorems are welcome. The three numerical milestones are self-contained real-analysis exercises.

Selected references

  • E. Szemerédi, W. T. Trotter, Jr., Extremal problems in discrete geometry, Combinatorica 3 (1983) 381–392. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579194
  • E. Szemerédi, W. T. Trotter, Jr., A combinatorial distinction between the Euclidean and projective planes, European J. Combin. 4 (1983) 385–394. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0195-6698(83)80036-5
  • J. Beck, On the lattice property of the plane and some problems of Dirac, Motzkin and Erdős in combinatorial geometry, Combinatorica 3 (1983) 281–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579184
  • K. L. Clarkson, H. Edelsbrunner, L. J. Guibas, M. Sharir, E. Welzl, Combinatorial complexity bounds for arrangements of curves and spheres, Discrete Comput. Geom. 5 (1990) 99–160. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02187783
  • L. A. Székely, Crossing numbers and hard Erdős problems in discrete geometry, Combin. Probab. Comput. 6 (1997) 353–358. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963548397002976
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies II: Bounds on the Optimal s and S of the n-Period Model from the One-Period CostResearch Paper

Motivation

The (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is the standard ordering rule for a single stocked item with a fixed charge per order: when the stock position falls below a reorder point sss, order up to a level SSS; otherwise order nothing. Scarf (1960) proved that when the expected one-period cost is convex, some (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is optimal in every period of a finite-horizon model with set-up cost. Iglehart (1963) extended this to the infinite horizon. These results establish existence only. They give no procedure for finding the optimal pair.

Veinott and Wagner (1965) gave such a procedure. Its first step is to bound the optimal sss and SSS by four integers s‾≤sˉ≤S‾≤Sˉ\underline{s} \le \bar{s} \le \underline{S} \le \bar{S}s​≤sˉ≤S​≤Sˉ computed from the one-period cost alone. This reduces the search for an optimal policy to a finite box. Their Theorem 4(a) proves that the bounds hold for the first-period parameters of an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy in every nnn-period model. This mission formalizes that theorem and the four comparison lemmas (Lemmas 2–5 of the paper's Appendix §2) from which the paper derives it.

Setting

Demands ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1, \xi_2, \dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… in periods 1,2,…1, 2, \dots1,2,… are independent, non-negative integer random variables with common distribution φ(k)=Pr⁡(ξt=k)\varphi(k) = \Pr(\xi_t = k)φ(k)=Pr(ξt​=k) and finite mean. Unfilled demand is backlogged, so stock levels are arbitrary integers. In period ttt, XtX_tXt​ is the stock on hand plus on order before ordering and Yt≥XtY_t \ge X_tYt​≥Xt​ the level after ordering. Then X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x and Xt+1=Yt−ξtX_{t+1} = Y_t - \xi_tXt+1​=Yt​−ξt​.

A policy chooses YtY_tYt​ as any integer function of the information available at the start of period ttt. Given X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x, that information is determined by xxx and ξ1,…,ξt−1\xi_1, \dots, \xi_{t-1}ξ1​,…,ξt−1​. Policies may therefore depend on the whole history; they are not required to be Markov.

Costs are summarized by a set-up cost K≥0K \ge 0K≥0, a discount factor 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1 and a one-period cost Gα:Z→RG_\alpha : \mathbb Z \to \mathbb RGα​:Z→R. The paper reduces the model with purchase cost ccc, lead time λ\lambdaλ and holding–penalty cost LLL to these data by its Eq. (2), with Gα(y)=(1−α)cy+L(y)G_\alpha(y) = (1 - \alpha) c y + L(y)Gα​(y)=(1−α)cy+L(y). The nnn-period cost of a policy YYY from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x is

fn(x∣Y)=∑t=1nαt−1[K E δ(Yt−Xt)+E Gα(Yt)],f_n(x \mid Y) = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \alpha^{t-1}\bigl[K\,E\,\delta(Y_t - X_t) + E\,G_\alpha(Y_t)\bigr],fn​(x∣Y)=t=1∑n​αt−1[KEδ(Yt​−Xt​)+EGα​(Yt​)],

where δ(0)=0\delta(0) = 0δ(0)=0 and δ(z)=1\delta(z) = 1δ(z)=1 for z>0z > 0z>0. A policy is optimal if it minimizes fn(x∣⋅)f_n(x \mid \cdot)fn​(x∣⋅) for every xxx simultaneously. The standing assumptions are that GαG_\alphaGα​ is convex on the integers (non-decreasing forward differences) and Gα(y)→∞G_\alpha(y) \to \inftyGα​(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞.

The bounds (p. 537) are defined as follows. S‾\underline{S}S​ is the smallest minimizer of GαG_\alphaGα​. Sˉ\bar SSˉ is the smallest integer ≥S‾\ge \underline{S}≥S​ with Gα(Sˉ+1)≥Gα(S‾)+αKG_\alpha(\bar S + 1) \ge G_\alpha(\underline S) + \alpha KGα​(Sˉ+1)≥Gα​(S​)+αK (21). s‾\underline ss​ is the smallest integer with Gα(s‾)≤Gα(S‾)+KG_\alpha(\underline s) \le G_\alpha(\underline S) + KGα​(s​)≤Gα​(S​)+K (22). sˉ\bar ssˉ is the smallest integer with Gα(sˉ)≤Gα(S‾)+(1−α)KG_\alpha(\bar s) \le G_\alpha(\underline S) + (1 - \alpha)KGα​(sˉ)≤Gα​(S​)+(1−α)K (23).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4(a)

For every n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 there is an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy for the nnn-period model whose first-period rule (sn,Sn)(s_n, S_n)(sn​,Sn​) satisfies

s‾≤sn≤sˉ≤S‾≤Sn≤Sˉ.\underline{s} \le s_n \le \bar{s} \le \underline{S} \le S_n \le \bar{S}.s​≤sn​≤sˉ≤S​≤Sn​≤Sˉ.

Optimality is against all history-dependent policies and for every starting level. The existence of an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is part of the conclusion.

Milestones

  1. The characterization of S‾\underline SS​ by ΔGα(S‾−1)<0≤ΔGα(S‾)\Delta G_\alpha(\underline S - 1) < 0 \le \Delta G_\alpha(\underline S)ΔGα​(S​−1)<0≤ΔGα​(S​), and the existence of the parameters of (21)–(23).
  2. Lemma 2: S‾≤Sn\underline{S} \le S_nS​≤Sn​ for any optimal policy using (sn,Sn)(s_n, S_n)(sn​,Sn​) in period 1.
  3. Lemma 3: if sˉ<sn\bar s < s_nsˉ<sn​, some policy using (sˉ,Sn)(\bar s, S_n)(sˉ,Sn​) in period 1 costs no more, from every xxx.
  4. Lemma 4: if Sˉ<Sn\bar S < S_nSˉ<Sn​ (and sn≤sˉs_n \le \bar ssn​≤sˉ), some policy using (sn,S‾)(s_n, \underline S)(sn​,S​) in period 1 costs no more, from every xxx.
  5. Lemma 5: s‾≤sn\underline{s} \le s_ns​≤sn​ for any optimal policy using (sn,Sn)(s_n, S_n)(sn​,Sn​) in period 1.

Significance

The theorem turns the optimization over (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies into a search over a finite box that depends only on GαG_\alphaGα​, KKK and α\alphaα. The paper's Section 4 procedure for the infinite-horizon problem (Theorem 4(b), Step i) is built on this box, and the bounds also give an interpretation of sss and SSS: S‾\underline SS​ is the single-period optimum, and sˉ\bar ssˉ, s‾\underline ss​, Sˉ\bar SSˉ mark where the one-period cost exceeds that optimum by the fractions (1−α)K(1 - \alpha)K(1−α)K, KKK and αK\alpha KαK of the set-up cost.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof as far as is known; no discrete-state finite-horizon inventory model with set-up cost is on the platform. A formal proof would provide a reusable finite-horizon dynamic-programming model with history-dependent policies and extended-real expected costs, and a machine-checked version of the existence of optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies in the discrete setting, which Theorem 4(a) contains.

Difficulty

The four lemmas compare an optimal policy with an explicit modification of it. The modification in Lemmas 2 and 5 raises the stock in period 1 and then orders max⁡(Xt′,Ytn)\max(X'_t, Y^n_t)max(Xt′​,Ytn​), where YtnY^n_tYtn​ is the original policy's decision along the original demand path. This comparison policy is history-dependent even when the original policy is not, so the argument cannot be carried out inside the class of Markov or (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies. Expectations must be handled over finite demand histories, and costs can be infinite for general policies.

The goal also contains the existence of an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy for the nnn-period model. The paper cites this from Scarf and Zabel rather than proving it. Applying Lemma 3 or 4 yields an optimal policy whose later periods are no longer of (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) form. Restoring the (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) form requires the dynamic-programming principle of optimality together with the KKK-convexity argument.

Formalization scope

The Lean model (VeinottWagnerSS.Bounds.Model) uses the reduced model of Eq. (2): G : ℤ → ℝ is a primitive, and ccc, λ\lambdaλ and LLL do not appear. Stock levels are integers and demands are natural numbers; the demand law is a PMF ℕ with finite mean. A policy is Y : (t : ℕ) → ℤ → (Fin t → ℕ) → ℤ: period t+1t + 1t+1's level as a function of xxx and the first ttt demands, so it cannot see current or future demand. Periods are numbered from 000 in Lean. Expectations are sums over demand histories weighted by ∏iφ(ξi)\prod_i \varphi(\xi_i)∏i​φ(ξi​). E Gα(Yt)E\,G_\alpha(Y_t)EGα​(Yt​) is the difference of the expectations of the positive and negative parts, and fnf_nfn​ is valued in EReal. Under the standing assumptions GαG_\alphaGα​ is bounded below, so the negative part is finite and no ∞−∞\infty - \infty∞−∞ arises. Both α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and α=0\alpha = 0α=0 are allowed.

The bounds SLow, SHigh, sLow, sHigh are infima of the sets in (21)–(23); a milestone proves they are the least elements. A trivializing formalization is ruled out as follows. Optimality is over all admissible policies and for every xxx. The bounds are the least integers of (21)–(23). The goal requires an optimal policy, not only a bounded pair. Existence of an optimal policy is proved, not assumed.

Printed statements corrected. Lemma 4 as printed has no hypothesis on sns_nsn​. Its proof begins "By lemma 3 we may assume that sn≤sˉs_n \le \bar ssn​≤sˉ", and without that assumption (sn,S‾)(s_n, \underline S)(sn​,S​) need not be an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) rule. The Lean statement adds sn≤sˉs_n \le \bar ssn​≤sˉ. The last display of the proof of Lemma 5 reads Gα(s‾+1)G_\alpha(\underline s + 1)Gα​(s​+1) where Gα(s‾−1)G_\alpha(\underline s - 1)Gα​(s​−1) is meant; this affects only the proof. The milestone texts are verbatim.

Useful contributions include lemmas on convex functions on Z\mathbb ZZ (monotonicity on either side of a minimizer), expectation lemmas for sums over Fin t → ℕ, and the finite-horizon principle of optimality for this model.

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott, Jr. and H. M. Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(5), 525–552, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.5.525
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • E. Zabel, A Note on the Optimality of (S, s) Policies in Inventory Theory, Management Science 9(1), 123–125, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.123
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2), 259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
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Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies III: Selecting an (s, S) Policy That Is Optimal for Every Starting StockResearch Paper

Motivation

The periodic-review inventory model with a fixed ordering cost is one of the basic models of operations research. When every order incurs a set-up cost KKK in addition to holding and shortage costs, the optimal replenishment rule over an infinite horizon is, under standard convexity assumptions, a stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy: whenever the stock falls below the reorder point sss, order up to the level SSS. Existence of such an optimal policy goes back to Scarf (1960) and Iglehart (1963). Knowing that an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy exists does not say how to find one, and the average cost of an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is neither convex nor unimodal in (s,S)(s, S)(s,S).

Veinott and Wagner (Management Science 11 (1965) 525–552) gave an exact algorithm. It proceeds in three steps: (i) compute integers s‾≤sˉ≤S‾≤Sˉ\underline{s} \le \bar{s} \le \underline{S} \le \bar{S}s​≤sˉ≤S​≤Sˉ bounding an optimal policy; (ii) find the set S\mathcal SS of all policies within those bounds that minimize the cost for starting stocks below s‾\underline{s}s​; (iii) choose from S\mathcal SS a policy that is optimal for every starting stock. This mission formalizes the theory behind Step iii. It is the third mission of a series on the paper: mission I treats the renewal closed form of the discounted cost, mission II the bounds of Step i.

Setting

Demands ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1, \xi_2, \dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… are independent non-negative integer random variables with common distribution φ\varphiφ and finite mean. Following the paper's Eq. (2), the unit purchase cost and the holding and penalty costs are combined into a single function Gα:Z→RG_\alpha : \mathbb Z \to \mathbb RGα​:Z→R, assumed convex with Gα(y)→∞G_\alpha(y) \to \inftyGα​(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞; the set-up cost is K≥0K \ge 0K≥0 and α\alphaα is the discount factor.

A stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy, with integers s≤Ss \le Ss≤S, sets the stock after ordering to

Yt=S if Xt<s,Yt=Xt if Xt≥s,Y_t = S \text{ if } X_t < s, \qquad Y_t = X_t \text{ if } X_t \ge s,Yt​=S if Xt​<s,Yt​=Xt​ if Xt​≥s,

and the stock evolves as Xt+1=Yt−ξtX_{t+1} = Y_t - \xi_tXt+1​=Yt​−ξt​ from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x. Its discounted cost is

f(x∣s,S)=∑t≥1αt−1E[Kδ(Yt−Xt)+Gα(Yt)],f(x \mid s, S) = \sum_{t \ge 1} \alpha^{t-1} E\bigl[K\delta(Y_t - X_t) + G_\alpha(Y_t)\bigr],f(x∣s,S)=t≥1∑​αt−1E[Kδ(Yt​−Xt​)+Gα​(Yt​)],

where δ(z)=1\delta(z) = 1δ(z)=1 for z>0z > 0z>0 and δ(0)=0\delta(0) = 0δ(0)=0, and its equivalent average cost is aα(x∣s,S)=(1−α)f(x∣s,S)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S) = (1-\alpha) f(x \mid s, S)aα​(x∣s,S)=(1−α)f(x∣s,S).

A policy (s′,S′)(s', S')(s′,S′) is optimal for a set X\mathfrak XX of integers if, for each x∈Xx \in \mathfrak Xx∈X, it minimizes aα(x∣s,S)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S)aα​(x∣s,S) over all (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies; it is optimal if it is optimal for every integer xxx. Under a fixed policy, x′x'x′ is accessible from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x if Pr⁡(Xt=x′∣X1=x)>0\Pr(X_t = x' \mid X_1 = x) > 0Pr(Xt​=x′∣X1​=x)>0 for some t>1t > 1t>1.

Below the reorder point the cost does not depend on the starting stock; its value is written Lα(S,D)\mathcal L_\alpha(S, D)Lα​(S,D) with D=S−sD = S - sD=S−s. The bounds are: S‾\underline{S}S​ the smallest minimizer of GαG_\alphaGα​; Sˉ\bar{S}Sˉ the smallest integer ≥S‾\ge \underline{S}≥S​ with Gα(Sˉ+1)≥Gα(S‾)+αKG_\alpha(\bar{S}+1) \ge G_\alpha(\underline{S}) + \alpha KGα​(Sˉ+1)≥Gα​(S​)+αK (21); s‾\underline{s}s​ the smallest integer with Gα(s‾)≤Gα(S‾)+KG_\alpha(\underline{s}) \le G_\alpha(\underline{S}) + KGα​(s​)≤Gα​(S​)+K (22); sˉ\bar{s}sˉ the smallest integer with Gα(sˉ)≤Gα(S‾)+(1−α)KG_\alpha(\bar{s}) \le G_\alpha(\underline{S}) + (1-\alpha)KGα​(sˉ)≤Gα​(S​)+(1−α)K (23). The candidate set S\mathcal SS consists of the policies with s‾≤s≤sˉ\underline{s} \le s \le \bar{s}s​≤s≤sˉ, S‾≤S≤Sˉ\underline{S} \le S \le \bar{S}S​≤S≤Sˉ that minimize Lα(S,S−s)\mathcal L_\alpha(S, S-s)Lα​(S,S−s) among such policies.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 543)

For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1 and (si,Si),(sj,Sj)∈S(s^i, S^i), (s^j, S^j) \in \mathcal S(si,Si),(sj,Sj)∈S: if (si,Si)(s^i, S^i)(si,Si) is optimal and every x′x'x′ with

min⁡(si,sj)≤x′<max⁡(si,sj)\min(s^i, s^j) \le x' < \max(s^i, s^j)min(si,sj)≤x′<max(si,sj)

is accessible from SjS^jSj under (sj,Sj)(s^j, S^j)(sj,Sj), then (sj,Sj)(s^j, S^j)(sj,Sj) is optimal.

Milestones

  1. §3, p. 533. For x<sx < sx<s, f(x∣s,S)=K+f(S∣s,S)f(x \mid s, S) = K + f(S \mid s, S)f(x∣s,S)=K+f(S∣s,S).
  2. Theorem 1, p. 542. For 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1 and s≤s′s \le s's≤s′: if aα(x∣s,S)=aα(x∣s′,S′)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S) = a_\alpha(x \mid s', S')aα​(x∣s,S)=aα​(x∣s′,S′) for all x<s′x < s'x<s′, then equality holds for all xxx.
  3. Lemma 1, p. 543. For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1: if (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) is optimal for X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x, it is optimal for every x′x'x′ accessible from xxx.

Significance

Theorem 2 turns the final selection step of the algorithm into a reachability check on the demand distribution: a policy of S\mathcal SS is certified optimal without comparing average costs at every starting stock. Its corollaries give checkable sufficient conditions; for example (Corollary 2.2) if φ(k)>0\varphi(k) > 0φ(k)>0 for k=1,…,sn−s1k = 1, \dots, s^n - s^1k=1,…,sn−s1, the policy of S\mathcal SS with the largest reorder point is optimal, which covers Poisson and negative binomial demand. Theorem 1 separately reduces the comparison of two policies to finitely many starting stocks.

The results are proved in the paper (Section 4 and Appendix §3). No machine-checked version is known: the platform has no discrete (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) inventory chain, no discounted cost of a stationary policy on Z\mathbb ZZ, and no accessibility notion for such a chain. The mission produces these objects together with the paper's selection theory on top of them.

Difficulty

Theorem 1 needs a renewal decomposition at the first passage of the stock below s′s's′, carried out for expectations over an unbounded integer state space with a discounted infinite sum. Lemma 1 is the delicate step. The paper's argument compares the (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy with a hybrid policy that follows (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) until the stock first reaches x′x'x′ and then switches to an optimal policy; the inequality "the hybrid cannot be better than the optimal policy" requires that some stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is optimal among all ordering policies, including non-stationary ones. That existence result is cited by the paper (Section 2), not proved there. A proof of Lemma 1 within the class of (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies alone does not go through, because the hybrid policy is not an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace VeinottWagnerSS.Selection. The model is the structure Model: the demand distribution φ : PMF ℕ with finite mean, K ≥ 0, and G : ℤ → ℝ convex (non-decreasing forward differences) and tending to +∞+\infty+∞ at both ends. The unit cost ccc, the function LLL and the lead time λ\lambdaλ do not appear (the paper's own reduction, Eq. (2), p. 529). Stock levels are integers. stateLaw is the law of Xt+1X_{t+1}Xt+1​, obtained by iterated PMF.bind; fCost is the expected discounted cost of that chain as a real series, which converges absolutely for 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1 because every YtY_tYt​ lies in [s,max⁡(x,S)][s, \max(x, S)][s,max(x,S)]. aCost is (1−α)(1-\alpha)(1−α) times fCost. Accessible uses the law of XtX_tXt​ with t>1t > 1t>1 strictly. Optimality is among (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies (p. 536); the class of general ordering policies is not formalized.

The bounds s‾,sˉ,S‾,Sˉ\underline{s}, \bar{s}, \underline{S}, \bar{S}s​,sˉ,S​,Sˉ are infima of sets of integers; under the standing assumptions and α<1\alpha < 1α<1 these sets are nonempty and bounded below, so each bound is the least integer the paper describes. Lα(S,D)\mathcal L_\alpha(S, D)Lα​(S,D) is defined as aα(S−D−1∣S−D,S)a_\alpha(S - D - 1 \mid S - D, S)aα​(S−D−1∣S−D,S), the cost at the starting stock just below sss; that this is the common value for every x<sx < sx<s is milestone 1.

The standing assumptions are kept in every statement, including Theorem 1 and milestone 1, which do not need them; Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 are true only because of them. No printed slip was found in the three results.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: fff is the expected cost of the stock process, not a closed formula or a fixed point of a recursion, so milestone 1 is not definitional; the bounds are the least integers of (21)–(23), not arbitrary integers, so S\mathcal SS is determined by the data; the goal does not assume that (sj,Sj)(s^j, S^j)(sj,Sj) is optimal below max⁡(si,sj)\max(s^i, s^j)max(si,sj), and Lemma 1 assumes optimality only at the single starting stock xxx.

Useful contributions beyond the milestones: summability lemmas for fCost, the Markov (one-step) equation for fCost, the first-passage decomposition, and, for Lemma 1, a formalization of general ordering policies with the existence of an optimal stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy. The chain and cost definitions are reusable for other (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) results of the paper (Theorem 3, Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2).

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott, Jr. and H. M. Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(5), 525–552, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.5.525
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2), 259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
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Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually lowers a driver's expected travel cost in equilibrium, and how this advantage depends on how many drivers use each system. More information for one population also changes the congestion everybody else faces, so the answer is not simply "more information is better".

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1), 2021) answer this question for nonatomic routing games with heterogeneous, possibly correlated information. Their model builds on the weighted potential game framework of Sandholm (2001) and on sensitivity analysis of convex programs. This mission formalizes their Section 5 result: for any two populations the sign of the relative value of information is determined by which of three explicitly computable size regimes the population sizes lie in, and the relative value decreases as one population grows at the expense of the other.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game has a finite set of populations I\mathcal II, one per TIS, a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS, and for each population iii a finite nonempty type space Ti\mathcal T^iTi of signals. A common prior π\piπ is a probability distribution on S×T\mathcal S\times\mathcal TS×T, T=∏iTi\mathcal T=\prod_i\mathcal T^iT=∏i​Ti. A network with a single origin–destination pair has edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR; each edge has a state-dependent cost cesc^s_eces​ that is positive, strictly increasing and differentiable. The total demand is D>0D>0D>0, and population iii carries the fraction λi\lambda^iλi of it, with λi≥0\lambda^i\ge0λi≥0 and ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda^i=1∑i​λi=1.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population iii and type tit^iti a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand λiD\lambda^iDλiD over routes. It induces the route flow fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and the edge load we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). With the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti), type tit^iti evaluates route rrr by its expected cost E[cr(q)∣ti]\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]E[cr​(q)∣ti]. A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a feasible qqq in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is Ci∗(λ)=∑tiPr⁡(ti)min⁡rE[cr(q)∣ti]C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_r\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]Ci∗(λ)=∑ti​Pr(ti)minr​E[cr​(q)∣ti] at a BWE qqq.

The game has a weighted potential Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz; its minimum over feasible profiles is the equilibrium potential value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ). For two populations i≠ji\ne ji=j, the direction zijz^{ij}zij moves demand share from jjj to iii, and ∣λ−ij∣|\lambda^{-ij}|∣λ−ij∣ is the total share of the other populations. The impact of information J^i(f)\widehat J^i(f)Ji(f) measures how much of population iii's demand is moved by its signal. Two thresholds λ‾i≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi are computed from the optimal set Fij,†\mathcal F^{ij,\dagger}Fij,† of an auxiliary convex program over route flows in which the separate information constraints of iii and jjj are merged. They define three regimes: Λ1ij\Lambda^{ij}_1Λ1ij​ (λi<λ‾i\lambda^i<\underline\lambda^iλi<λ​i), Λ2ij\Lambda^{ij}_2Λ2ij​ (λ‾i≤λi≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi≤λi) and Λ3ij\Lambda^{ij}_3Λ3ij​ (λi>λ‾i\lambda^i>\overline\lambda^iλi>λi). The relative value of information is Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=C^{j*}(\lambda)-C^{i*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For i≠ji\ne ji=j and admissible λ\lambdaλ (in the simplex with λi,λj>0\lambda^i,\lambda^j>0λi,λj>0), and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij,V^{ij*}(\lambda)>0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_1,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)=0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_2,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)<0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_3,Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij​,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij​,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij​,

and Vij∗V^{ij*}Vij∗ is nonincreasing along zijz^{ij}zij: Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda+\varepsilon z^{ij})\le V^{ij*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ) for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with both endpoints admissible.

Milestones

The route to the goal follows the paper: Lemma 1 (weighted potential), Lemma 2 (strict convexity of the edge-load potential), Theorem 1 (equilibria are the minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ; unique edge load), Lemma 3 (unique Lagrange multipliers), Proposition 1 (the feasible route flows form a polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Proposition 2 (equilibrium route flows minimize Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Lemma 4 (0≤λ‾i≤λ‾i≤1−∣λ−ij∣0\le\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^i\le1-|\lambda^{-ij}|0≤λ​i≤λi≤1−∣λ−ij∣), Theorem 2 (equilibrium flows in each regime), Proposition 3 (Ψ\PsiΨ decreases, stays constant, increases along zijz^{ij}zij in the three regimes) and Lemma 5 (Ψ\PsiΨ is convex and directionally differentiable, and Vij∗(λ)=−1D∇zijΨ(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=-\frac1D\nabla_{z^{ij}}\Psi(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=−D1​∇zij​Ψ(λ)).

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a population has an advantage over another exactly when it is the minor population of the pair, relative to thresholds that depend only on the other populations' sizes. Both populations face the same equilibrium cost in the middle regime. It gives a procedure for comparing two information systems without computing equilibria for each size vector: solve one convex program, read off two thresholds, and locate λi\lambda^iλi. The paper's Section 6 uses the same machinery, through Lemma 5, to characterize the equilibrium adoption rates of information systems.

The paper proves these results with the main proofs in the article and the sensitivity-analysis lemmas (Lemmas EC.1–EC.4) in its e-companion. None of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization requires a Lean account of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, of the equivalence between equilibria and a convex program, and of directional derivatives of the optimal value of a parametric convex program. Parts of this are reusable for any nonatomic routing or congestion game.

Difficulty

The equilibrium strategy profile is not unique and changes discontinuously with λ\lambdaλ. Differentiating equilibrium costs in λ\lambdaλ directly therefore fails. The paper instead works with the optimal value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ), whose one-sided directional derivative is expressed through Lagrange multipliers. That requires a sensitivity theorem for convex programs whose constraints depend affinely on the parameter, together with uniqueness of multipliers, which fails for populations of size zero. The regime analysis also needs a characterization of the route flows that are induced by feasible strategy profiles. That set is described by the nonlinear-looking constraint J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, a minimum over types inside a sum over routes. Strict monotonicity of Ψ\PsiΨ in the side regimes needs the tightness of an information constraint at every equilibrium, not only at one.

Formalization scope

The model is a Lean structure BayesRouting.VOI.Game over finite types of populations, type spaces, states, edges and routes. Routes are given by their edge sets, and the directed-graph structure is not used. Type spaces and the route set are nonempty. The prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and costs are positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable on R\mathbb RR. One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. It makes beliefs well defined and the equilibrium edge load unique, and it excludes perfectly correlated signals.

Conventions: Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of eq. (7), which does not divide by λiD\lambda^iDλiD. J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum of eq. (16) over the reference profile, so that J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD is exactly (14d). Ψ\PsiΨ and the thresholds are sInf/sSup over sets that are nonempty and compact for size vectors in the simplex, and every statement keeps size vectors there. Statements about "the" equilibrium are stated for every BWE, and existence of a BWE is a separate item, so they are not vacuous. The thresholds are defined from the optimal set of the auxiliary program, not assumed as parameters. Taking them as parameters constrained only by Lemma 4 would give a different theorem.

Disclosed deviations: Lemma 2's C2C^2C2 clause assumes C1C^1C1 costs; Lemma 3 is stated for populations of positive size; Lemma 5 assumes λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0; Proposition 3 is stated with strict monotonicity in the side regimes, as used in the proof of Theorem 3. Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: interval-integral potentials of monotone costs, KKT theory for polyhedral constraints, and directional derivatives of parametric optimal values.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Directional Differentiability of the Optimal Value Function in a Nonlinear Programming Problem, in Sensitivity, Stability and Parametric Analysis (Mathematical Programming Studies 21), Springer, 1984, pp. 213–226.
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and Concavity Properties of the Optimal Value Function in Parametric Nonlinear Programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986.
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Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games II: Equilibrium Adoption Rates of Information Systems Are the Minimizers of the Equilibrium PotentialResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers private, noisy signals about the state of the road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, their subscribers act on different information, and the congestion each population experiences depends on how all of them route. A question then arises for transport planners and for the information providers themselves: if travelers are free to choose which system to subscribe to, which market shares of the competing systems are stable?

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021; preprint arXiv:1808.10590) model this situation as a Bayesian routing game with heterogeneous information and answer the question exactly: the equilibrium adoption rates are the minimizers of a convex function of the population sizes, the equilibrium value of a weighted potential. This mission formalizes that characterization (Theorem 4 of the paper) together with the results its proof rests on. A companion mission (Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I) formalizes the paper's other main result, the sign and monotonicity of the relative value of information between two populations.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ) has a single origin–destination pair, a finite set of edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR (each route a set of edges), and a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS. Travelers of total demand D>0D>0D>0 are split into populations i∈Ii\in\mathcal Ii∈I, one per TIS; population iii has size λiD\lambda^iDλiD, where the size vector λ\lambdaλ lies in the simplex Δ={λ:λi≥0, ∑iλi=1}\Delta=\{\lambda:\lambda^i\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda^i=1\}Δ={λ:λi≥0, ∑i​λi=1}. Each population receives a signal (its type) tit^iti from a finite set Ti\mathcal T^iTi; states and type profiles t=(ti)it=(t^i)_it=(ti)i​ are drawn from a common prior π∈Δ(S×T)\pi\in\Delta(\mathcal S\times\mathcal T)π∈Δ(S×T). Edge eee in state sss has cost ces(w)c^s_e(w)ces​(w) at load www, positive, strictly increasing and differentiable.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population and type a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand over routes, with ∑rqri(ti)=λiD\sum_rq^i_r(t^i)=\lambda^iD∑r​qri​(ti)=λiD; these form the polytope Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ). It induces route flows fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and edge loads we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). A traveler of population iii with signal tit^iti forms the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti) and evaluates the expected route cost E[cr(q)∣ti]=∑s,t−i∑e∈rβi(s,t−i∣ti) ces(we(t))\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]=\sum_{s,t^{-i}}\sum_{e\in r}\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)\,c^s_e(w_e(t))E[cr​(q)∣ti]=∑s,t−i​∑e∈r​βi(s,t−i∣ti)ces​(we​(t)). A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a q∈Q(λ)q\in\mathcal Q(\lambda)q∈Q(λ) in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is

Ci∗(λ)=∑ti∈TiPr⁡(ti)min⁡r∈RE[cr(q∗)∣ti].C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i\in\mathcal T^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_{r\in\mathcal R}\mathbb E[c_r(q^*)\mid t^i].Ci∗(λ)=ti∈Ti∑​Pr(ti)r∈Rmin​E[cr​(q∗)∣ti].

The weighted potential is Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz, and Ψ(λ)=min⁡q∈Q(λ)Φ(q)\Psi(\lambda)=\min_{q\in\mathcal Q(\lambda)}\Phi(q)Ψ(λ)=minq∈Q(λ)​Φ(q) is its equilibrium value. In route-flow form, Φ^(f)\widehat\Phi(f)Φ(f) is the same expression in terms of fff; route flows satisfy linear constraints (14a)–(14c) (a separability condition across populations, total demand DDD, nonnegativity) and one information impact constraint per population, J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, where J^i(f)=D−∑rmin⁡tifr(ti,t^−i)\widehat J^i(f)=D-\sum_r\min_{t^i}f_r(t^i,\widehat t^{-i})Ji(f)=D−∑r​minti​fr​(ti,t−i) measures how much of the demand reacts to population iii's signal. Let F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† be the set of minimizers of Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ subject to (14a)–(14c) only, and

Λ†={λ∈Δ: ∃f†∈F†, J^i(f†)≤λiD  ∀i}.\Lambda^\dagger=\{\lambda\in\Delta:\ \exists f^\dagger\in\mathcal F^\dagger,\ \widehat J^i(f^\dagger)\le\lambda^iD\ \ \forall i\}.Λ†={λ∈Δ: ∃f†∈F†, Ji(f†)≤λiD  ∀i}.

In the two-stage game, travelers first choose a TIS, inducing λ\lambdaλ, and then play Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ). A size vector is a vector of equilibrium adoption rates if no traveler gains by switching TIS:

λi>0 ⟹ Ci∗(λ)=min⁡j∈ICj∗(λ)∀i∈I.(31)\lambda^i>0\ \Longrightarrow\ C^{i*}(\lambda)=\min_{j\in\mathcal I}C^{j*}(\lambda)\qquad\forall i\in\mathcal I.\tag{31}λi>0 ⟹ Ci∗(λ)=j∈Imin​Cj∗(λ)∀i∈I.(31)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

For every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

(31) holds  ⟺  λ∈Λ†.(31)\ \text{holds}\iff\lambda\in\Lambda^\dagger .(31) holds⟺λ∈Λ†.

With the existence of a BWE for every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ, this is the paper's statement that the set of equilibrium adoption rates is Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ†.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1. qqq is a BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ) iff qqq minimizes Φ\PhiΦ over Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ); the equilibrium edge load w∗(λ)w^*(\lambda)w∗(λ) is unique.
  2. Proposition 2. A route flow in the flow polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ) ((14a)–(14c) plus all information impact constraints) is an equilibrium flow iff it minimizes Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ).
  3. Lemma 5. Ψ\PsiΨ is convex on Δ\DeltaΔ, and with zij=ei−ejz^{ij}=e_i-e_jzij=ei​−ej​ and Vij∗=Cj∗−Ci∗V^{ij*}=C^{j*}-C^{i*}Vij∗=Cj∗−Ci∗,
lim⁡ϵ→0+Ψ(λ+ϵzij)−Ψ(λ)ϵ=−D Vij∗(λ).\lim_{\epsilon\to0^+}\frac{\Psi(\lambda+\epsilon z^{ij})-\Psi(\lambda)}{\epsilon}=-D\,V^{ij*}(\lambda).ϵ→0+lim​ϵΨ(λ+ϵzij)−Ψ(λ)​=−DVij∗(λ).
  1. Proposition 5. Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† is convex, Λ†=argmin⁡λ∈ΔΨ(λ)\Lambda^\dagger=\operatorname{argmin}_{\lambda\in\Delta}\Psi(\lambda)Λ†=argminλ∈Δ​Ψ(λ), and the equilibrium edge load equals the size-independent load w†w^\daggerw† of F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† iff λ∈Λ†\lambda\in\Lambda^\daggerλ∈Λ†.

A separate item states the existence of a BWE for every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 reduces a question about a two-stage game with a continuum of travelers and private signals to the minimization of one convex function over a simplex. It shows that the stable market shares form a convex set, generally not a single point, so each system's equilibrium adoption rate ranges over an interval; and that this set is determined by the joint information environment of all systems, not by each system's signal alone. On ˆ\Lambda^\daggerˆ the equilibrium edge load does not depend on the shares at all, which identifies when changes in market shares leave congestion unchanged.

Formalizing it. The proofs of Theorem 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 5 are in the paper's online e-companion, and Lemma 5 relies on sensitivity results for parametric convex programs cited from the literature. No part of this development has, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A complete formalization would produce a verified potential-game characterization of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria with heterogeneous information and a verified directional-derivative formula for the optimal value of a parametric convex program; nothing comparable is currently on the platform (the existing Wardrop development covers complete information only).

Difficulty

The direction "λ∈Λ†\lambda\in\Lambda^\daggerλ∈Λ† implies (31)" is not a pointwise statement about costs: it follows from Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† being the argmin of Ψ\PsiΨ together with the formula linking directional derivatives of Ψ\PsiΨ to cost differences. Both are hard. The derivative formula (26) is a statement about the optimal value of a convex program whose feasible set moves with λ\lambdaλ; its standard proofs pass through uniqueness of Lagrange multipliers, which fails exactly at the degenerate size vectors (λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0) that Theorem 4 must cover, since an unused TIS is a legitimate outcome. The identity Λ†=argmin⁡Ψ\Lambda^\dagger=\operatorname{argmin}\PsiΛ†=argminΨ needs the route-flow reformulation (Proposition 2), in which the size vector enters only through the information impact constraints, and the uniqueness of the minimizing edge load. The natural first idea, comparing population costs directly at a given equilibrium, gives no handle on which size vectors make them equal.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace BayesRouting.Adoption. Populations, types, states, edges and routes are finite types; type spaces and the route set are nonempty; routes are edge sets. The game is a structure whose fields include the paper's standing assumptions: the prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and each cost is positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable (on all of R\mathbb RR, which loses no generality). One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. Without it the equilibrium edge load need not be unique and the beliefs can be undefined; it excludes the paper's Example 2(i) (perfectly correlated signals).

Conventions: size vectors range over the probability simplex; Ψ\PsiΨ is the infimum of Φ\PhiΦ over Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ) and is only compared at points of the simplex (outside it the feasible set can be empty and the value is a default); Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of the paper's (7), well defined when λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0; J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum over reference profiles, which equals the paper's value on flows satisfying (14a); equilibrium statements are made for every BWE rather than for "the" equilibrium; F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† and similar sets are argmin sets. Lemma 5 is stated for the directions zijz^{ij}zij with λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0 (otherwise λ+ϵzij\lambda+\epsilon z^{ij}λ+ϵzij leaves the simplex); λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0 is allowed.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the existence of a BWE is its own item, so "for every BWE" is not vacuous, and Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† is defined by (30) from the flow problem (28), not as the argmin of Ψ\PsiΨ, so the goal is not a restatement of Proposition 5.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: KKT conditions for convex programs with linear constraints, convexity of integrals of increasing functions, compactness arguments for existence of minimizers, and one-sided directional derivatives of optimal-value functions. The last two are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any item, and of auxiliary lemmas such as Proposition 1 of the paper (feasible route flows form the polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. E. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999 (preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.10590)
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential games with continuous player sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and concavity properties of the optimal value function in parametric nonlinear programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00938592
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Global Convergence of Splitting Methods for Nonconvex Composite Optimization III: For Semi-Algebraic Problems the ADMM Sequence Converges and Has Finite LengthResearch Paper

Motivation

The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is a standard method for problems of the form min⁡xh(x)+P(Mx)\min_x h(x)+P(\mathcal Mx)minx​h(x)+P(Mx), in which a smooth loss hhh is composed with a structured, possibly nonsmooth regularizer PPP through a linear map M\mathcal MM. Its convergence theory was developed for convex problems, yet it is routinely run on nonconvex ones: sparse recovery with the ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ constraint, low-rank matrix problems, and total-variation-type models with nonconvex penalties. For such problems a practitioner wants a guarantee about the iterates actually produced, not only about the existence of good subsequences.

Li and Pong (arXiv:1407.0753v6, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015) gave the first such guarantee for the classical ADMM on nonconvex composite problems with a surjective M\mathcal MM. Their Theorem 1 shows that cluster points of the (proximal) ADMM are stationary; their Theorem 3, the subject of this mission, shows that for semi-algebraic data the whole sequence converges. The argument adapts the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz (KL) framework of Attouch, Bolte and Svaiter (Math. Program. 137, 2013) to a setting where the ADMM only decreases its merit function in the xxx-block.

Setting

Fix M:Rn→Rm\mathcal M:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^mM:Rn→Rm linear, h:Rn→Rh:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rh:Rn→R twice continuously differentiable with bounded Hessian, and P:Rm→(−∞,+∞]P:\mathbb R^m\to(-\infty,+\infty]P:Rm→(−∞,+∞] proper (finite somewhere) and closed (lower semicontinuous). For β>0\beta>0β>0 the augmented Lagrangian is

Lβ(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+β2∥Mx−y∥2.L_\beta(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)-\langle z,\mathcal Mx-y\rangle+\tfrac\beta2\|\mathcal Mx-y\|^2 .Lβ​(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+2β​∥Mx−y∥2.

The ADMM produces (xt,yt,zt)t≥0(x^t,y^t,z^t)_{t\ge0}(xt,yt,zt)t≥0​ from arbitrary (x0,z0)(x^0,z^0)(x0,z0) by

yt+1∈Arg min⁡yLβ(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈Arg min⁡xLβ(x,yt+1,zt),zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).y^{t+1}\in\operatorname*{Arg\,min}_y L_\beta(x^t,y,z^t),\quad x^{t+1}\in\operatorname*{Arg\,min}_x L_\beta(x,y^{t+1},z^t),\quad z^{t+1}=z^t-\beta(\mathcal Mx^{t+1}-y^{t+1}).yt+1∈yArgmin​Lβ​(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈xArgmin​Lβ​(x,yt+1,zt),zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).

Assumption 1 with T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0 asks for σ,δ>0\sigma,\delta>0σ,δ>0, γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and symmetric maps Q1,Q2,Q3\mathcal Q_1,\mathcal Q_2,\mathcal Q_3Q1​,Q2​,Q3​ with MM∗⪰σI\mathcal M\mathcal M^*\succeq\sigma\mathcal IMM∗⪰σI, Q1⪰∇2h(x)⪰Q2\mathcal Q_1\succeq\nabla^2h(x)\succeq\mathcal Q_2Q1​⪰∇2h(x)⪰Q2​ and Q3⪰[∇2h(x)]2\mathcal Q_3\succeq[\nabla^2h(x)]^2Q3​⪰[∇2h(x)]2 for all xxx, Q2+βM∗M⪰δI\mathcal Q_2+\beta\mathcal M^*\mathcal M\succeq\delta\mathcal IQ2​+βM∗M⪰δI, and δI≻2σβγQ3\delta\mathcal I\succ\frac{2}{\sigma\beta\gamma}\mathcal Q_3δI≻σβγ2​Q3​.

The limiting subdifferential ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) of fff consists of limits vvv of regular subgradients vtv^tvt at points xt→xx^t\to xxt→x with f(xt)→f(x)f(x^t)\to f(x)f(xt)→f(x). A point xxx is stationary if 0∈∇h(x)+M∗∂P(Mx)0\in\nabla h(x)+\mathcal M^*\partial P(\mathcal Mx)0∈∇h(x)+M∗∂P(Mx).

A set in RN\mathbb R^NRN is semi-algebraic if it is a finite union of sets cut out by finitely many polynomial equations pi=0p_i=0pi​=0 and strict inequalities gj<0g_j<0gj​<0; a function is semi-algebraic if its graph is. A proper fff has the KL property at x^∈dom⁡∂f\hat x\in\operatorname{dom}\partial fx^∈dom∂f if there are η>0\eta>0η>0, a neighbourhood VVV of x^\hat xx^ and a continuous concave φ:[0,η)→R+\varphi:[0,\eta)\to\mathbb R_+φ:[0,η)→R+​ with φ(0)=0\varphi(0)=0φ(0)=0, φ∈C1(0,η)\varphi\in C^1(0,\eta)φ∈C1(0,η), φ′>0\varphi'>0φ′>0, such that φ′(f(x)−f(x^)) dist⁡(0,∂f(x))≥1\varphi'(f(x)-f(\hat x))\,\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial f(x))\ge1φ′(f(x)−f(x^))dist(0,∂f(x))≥1 whenever x∈Vx\in Vx∈V and f(x^)<f(x)<f(x^)+ηf(\hat x)<f(x)<f(\hat x)+\etaf(x^)<f(x)<f(x^)+η. A KL function is proper, closed, and KL at every point of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f.

In the Lean development LβL_\betaLβ​ is augLag h P M β x y z, and also augLagX h P M β as a single function on the triple space Rn×Rm×Rm\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^mRn×Rm×Rm with the Euclidean inner product.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 13)

Under the standing assumptions and Assumption 1 with T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0, if hhh and PPP are semi-algebraic and the ADMM sequence has a cluster point (x∗,y∗,z∗)(x^*,y^*,z^*)(x∗,y∗,z∗), then

(xt,yt,zt)→(x∗,y∗,z∗),0∈∇h(x∗)+M∗∂P(Mx∗),∑t∥xt+1−xt∥<∞.(x^t,y^t,z^t)\to(x^*,y^*,z^*),\qquad 0\in\nabla h(x^*)+\mathcal M^*\partial P(\mathcal Mx^*),\qquad \sum_{t}\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|<\infty .(xt,yt,zt)→(x∗,y∗,z∗),0∈∇h(x∗)+M∗∂P(Mx∗),t∑​∥xt+1−xt∥<∞.

No constants are fixed: every parameter is quantified exactly as in the paper.

Milestones

  1. (35): some w∈∂Lβ(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)w\in\partial L_\beta(x^{t+1},y^{t+1},z^{t+1})w∈∂Lβ​(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1) has ∥w∥≤C∥xt+1−xt∥\|w\|\le C\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|∥w∥≤C∥xt+1−xt∥ for t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  2. (36): Lβ(xt,yt,zt)−Lβ(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)≥D∥xt+1−xt∥2L_\beta(x^t,y^t,z^t)-L_\beta(x^{t+1},y^{t+1},z^{t+1})\ge D\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2Lβ​(xt,yt,zt)−Lβ​(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)≥D∥xt+1−xt∥2 for t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  3. (39): Lβ(xt,yt,zt)→Lβ(x∗,y∗,z∗)L_\beta(x^t,y^t,z^t)\to L_\beta(x^*,y^*,z^*)Lβ​(xt,yt,zt)→Lβ​(x∗,y∗,z∗).
  4. Finite termination when LβL_\betaLβ​ reaches its limit value.
  5. (41): the one-step KL estimate.
  6. Remark 4(1): the goal with "LβL_\betaLβ​ is a KL function" in place of semi-algebraicity.
  7. LβL_\betaLβ​ is semi-algebraic when hhh and PPP are.
  8. Proper closed semi-algebraic functions are KL functions, with φ(s)=cs1−θ\varphi(s)=cs^{1-\theta}φ(s)=cs1−θ.

Milestones 6, 7 and 8 together imply the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 upgrades subsequential convergence to convergence of the whole iterate sequence, with finite length of the xxx-trajectory, for a nonconvex ADMM without any convexity of hhh or PPP. Semi-algebraicity covers the paper's applications: polynomial losses, the ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ constraint, and indicators of polyhedral or algebraic sets. Remark 4(1) isolates the only property actually used, the KL property of LβL_\betaLβ​, so the result extends to any class of functions for which that property is known (for instance, globally subanalytic or o-minimal definable data).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper and, as far as is known, formalized nowhere. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the paper's convergence argument, a Lean definition of the KL property with the correct convention for empty subdifferentials, and a semi-algebraic set predicate over MvPolynomial. Milestone 8 is a published theorem of real algebraic geometry and nonsmooth analysis (Bolte–Daniilidis–Lewis 2007) that the paper quotes without proof; it is part of what a complete development of the goal requires.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to invoke the abstract convergence theorem of Attouch–Bolte–Svaiter for descent methods. It does not apply: its sufficient-decrease hypothesis requires LβL_\betaLβ​ to drop by a multiple of ∥xt+1−xt∥2+∥yt+1−yt∥2+∥zt+1−zt∥2\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2+\|y^{t+1}-y^t\|^2+\|z^{t+1}-z^t\|^2∥xt+1−xt∥2+∥yt+1−yt∥2+∥zt+1−zt∥2, while the ADMM only guarantees a drop proportional to ∥xt+1−xt∥2\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2∥xt+1−xt∥2 (Remark 4(2)). The relative-error bound (35) is likewise in terms of the xxx-step alone, and relating the yyy- and zzz-blocks back to the xxx-block uses the surjectivity of M\mathcal MM and the specific structure of the multiplier update. The neighbourhood on which the KL inequality holds is a neighbourhood of the full triple, whereas the trajectory is controlled only in xxx.

The semi-algebraic part has a separate difficulty: showing that LβL_\betaLβ​ is semi-algebraic needs closure of semi-algebraic sets under projection (the Tarski–Seidenberg theorem), and the KL property of semi-algebraic functions needs the Łojasiewicz inequality for subanalytic or semi-algebraic functions. Mathlib has neither.

Formalization scope

Spaces are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); M\mathcal MM is a continuous linear map and M∗\mathcal M^*M∗ its adjoint. PPP and LβL_\betaLβ​ take values in EReal, never passed through toReal except where the value is provably finite. ⪰\succeq⪰ is Mathlib's Loewner order on self-maps; the Hessian is fderiv ℝ (gradient h). The ADMM is the proximal-ADMM relation with ϕ=0\phi=0ϕ=0; argmin steps are "value at most the value anywhere", with no uniqueness; y0y^0y0 is unconstrained. The triple space is the nested L2L^2L2 product, so its inner product is the sum of the block inner products.

The KL inequality is stated for every v∈∂f(x)v\in\partial f(x)v∈∂f(x), which encodes dist⁡(0,∅)=+∞\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=+\inftydist(0,∅)=+∞. Writing it with Metric.infDist 0 (∂f x) would give dist⁡(0,∅)=0\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=0dist(0,∅)=0 and make the KL property fail at every point with empty subdifferential, so that "semi-algebraic implies KL" becomes false and the goal becomes a statement about a different notion. The KL property is required only at points of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f, only on a neighbourhood and only for values in (f(x^),f(x^)+η)(f(\hat x),f(\hat x)+\eta)(f(x^),f(x^)+η); φ\varphiφ is differentiable only on the open interval. Semi-algebraicity of an extended-valued function is that of its graph over its real values. η\etaη is a positive real, which is equivalent to the paper's η∈(0,∞]\eta\in(0,\infty]η∈(0,∞].

The hypotheses ϕ=0\phi=0ϕ=0 and T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0 are part of the theorem, not a simplification: the analogous statement for the proximal ADMM is open (Remark 4(3)). The cluster point is assumed, not derived.

Needed infrastructure: calculus of the limiting subdifferential (a smooth-plus-separable sum rule), the Tarski–Seidenberg theorem, and the Łojasiewicz/KL inequality for semi-algebraic functions. The last two are reusable far beyond this mission; contributions toward them, and toward the analytic core (milestones 1–6), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Li, T. K. Pong, Global convergence of splitting methods for nonconvex composite optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.0753 (v6 is the cited version)
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, P. Redont, A. Soubeyran, Proximal alternating minimization and projection methods for nonconvex problems: an approach based on the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz inequality, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0449
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, B. F. Svaiter, Convergence of descent methods for semi-algebraic and tame problems, Math. Program. 137, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0484-9
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, The Łojasiewicz inequality for nonsmooth subanalytic functions with applications to subgradient dynamical systems, SIAM J. Optim. 17(4), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644641
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 2: Under Production Economy the Retailer Earns Weakly More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retailers hold point-of-sale and loyalty-card data that their suppliers cannot observe, and many of them sell access to it through data-sharing programs; others share the same data for free, or with only some suppliers (Shang, Ha & Tong 2016, §1). When two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer, sharing a demand signal with a manufacturer changes how he sets his wholesale price, which in turn changes the retailer's margins and the rival's demand. Whether the retailer wants to share, with how many manufacturers, and at what price, is therefore a question about a multistage game with incomplete information.

Shang, Ha and Tong answer it for linear demand, a linear-expectation signal and quadratic production costs, under two contracting protocols. This mission covers the production economy case (marginal cost decreasing in volume, §6 of the paper), in which the retailer may have an incentive to share information even without payment. A companion mission covers production diseconomy (§5).

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1} sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j ,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition intensity and θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY with E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ and a linear-expectation structure E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY, where β=β(t,σ)\beta = \beta(t,\sigma)β=β(t,σ) is the signal weight. Producing qqq units costs bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2 with ce>0c_e > 0ce​>0; the paper writes c=−cec = -c_ec=−ce​ and assumes ce<2/(1+ϕ)c_e < 2/(1+\phi)ce​<2/(1+ϕ) (the Assumption, p. 251). Retailing is costless.

The game has three stages.

  1. Information contracting. Under concurrent contracting the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 for the signal; they decide simultaneously and play a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium. Under sequential contracting she offers a payment TfT_fTf​ to a first manufacturer kkk and, after his decision, a payment TsT_sTs​ to the other; the outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The retailer commits not to share for free after a rejection (§6.2).
  2. Pricing. Given the information statuses Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U}, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price wiw_iwi​ (a function of YYY if informed, a constant otherwise), then the retailer sets retail prices; the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  3. Demand realizes and profits are collected.

The ex ante profits of the pricing equilibrium are denoted πM(0)\pi_M(0)πM​(0), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πM(2)\pi_M(2)πM​(2) for a manufacturer and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, nnn the number of informed manufacturers. neNn_e^NneN​, neCn_e^CneC​, neSn_e^SneS​ denote the equilibrium number of informed manufacturers without contracting, under concurrent and under sequential contracting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 and 0<ce<2/(1+ϕ)0 < c_e < 2/(1+\phi)0<ce​<2/(1+ϕ), pricing equilibria exist, concurrent outcomes and sequential SPEs exist, and for every concurrent outcome and every SPE (either first mover)

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^C \le \Pi_R^S, \qquad \Pi_M^S \le \Pi_M^C ,ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

where ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The second inequality is asserted for all cec_ece​ except at most two values depending only on ϕ\phiϕ. The comparisons about every pricing equilibrium family exclude the single value ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)] (see Formalization scope). The paper says "higher"; the inequalities are weak because both sides coincide on intervals of positive length.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists and, for ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​, is unique and linear in YYY with explicit coefficients.
  2. §4.2: the ex ante profits πM(⋅)\pi_M(\cdot)πM​(⋅) and πR(⋅)\pi_R(\cdot)πR​(⋅) in closed form.
  3. Lemma 5(a)–(c) and Lemma 5(d): sign comparisons of these profits in cec_ece​, with thresholds 1/(1+ϕ)1/(1+\phi)1/(1+ϕ), (4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)](4+5\phi)/[(2+3\phi)(1+\phi)](4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)], ceac_e^acea​ and ceNc_e^NceN​.
  4. Proposition 7: thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ such that
neZ=0 for ce<11+ϕ,neZ=2 for 11+ϕ≤ce<ceZ,neZ=1 for ceZ≤ce<21+ϕ.n_e^Z = 0 \text{ for } c_e < \tfrac{1}{1+\phi}, \quad n_e^Z = 2 \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{1+\phi} \le c_e < c_e^Z, \quad n_e^Z = 1 \text{ for } c_e^Z \le c_e < \tfrac{2}{1+\phi}.neZ​=0 for ce​<1+ϕ1​,neZ​=2 for 1+ϕ1​≤ce​<ceZ​,neZ​=1 for ceZ​≤ce​<1+ϕ2​.
  1. Proposition 6(b): the same structure for neNn_e^NneN​ with a threshold ceNc_e^NceN​.
  2. Proposition 8(a): ceN<ceS≤ceCc_e^N < c_e^S \le c_e^CceN​<ceS​≤ceC​.

Significance

Proposition 8(d) says that a common retailer who sells information prefers to sell it sequentially, and that the manufacturers bear the cost: sequential offers let her extract a larger payment from the first manufacturer, because his outside option depends on what she will do with the second. Together with Propositions 6 and 7 it explains why retailers under production economy share with only a subset of suppliers once economies of scale or competition are strong, and why a retailer may share data for free, a practice the diseconomy model cannot produce.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it is straightforward" arguments (the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 are omitted). No part of the paper is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked account of the equilibrium selection at the boundary payments, where the paper's case analysis is informal, and of the points at which the retailer is indifferent between outcomes.

Difficulty

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game with a continuum of strategies: an informed manufacturer's strategy is an arbitrary square-integrable function of the signal. Lemma 1's uniqueness needs the Assumption (without it the manufacturer's problem is not concave) and a conditional-expectation argument, not a finite-dimensional computation. The comparisons of Lemma 5 are sign conditions on rational functions of (ce,ϕ)(c_e, \phi)(ce​,ϕ) whose thresholds ceac_e^acea​, ceNc_e^NceN​ are implicit roots. The contracting stage is where the naive argument fails: at the boundary payments several equilibria give the retailer the same payoff but the manufacturers different payoffs, so "the" outcome is not well defined there, and a direct comparison of closed-form profits at the paper's selected equilibria does not cover every equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents manufacturers by Fin 2, statuses by an inductive type with informed and uninformed, and a pricing strategy by a function of the signal value. The committed conventions are these.

  1. Admissible strategies are measurable with square-integrable wi(Y)w_i(Y)wi​(Y), and constant for an uninformed manufacturer; ex ante optimality over them is the Bayesian equilibrium condition.
  2. The retailer's rule is a best response for every wholesale price pair and signal value, off path included.
  3. The production cost is the uncapped quadratic bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2. The paper caps the quantity at qˉ=b/(2ce)\bar q = b/(2c_e)qˉ​=b/(2ce​) but assumes the cap is reached with negligible probability (footnote 11, p. 251) and computes every result of §4.2 and §6 without it. The condition b<ab < ab<a of that footnote is not imposed.
  4. Contracting uses pure strategies, nonnegative payments, and no free-sharing move after a rejection.
  5. A concurrent outcome is a payment and a pure equilibrium whose retailer payoff equals the supremum of her payoffs over Pareto-optimal equilibria. The supremum is not always attained: for large cec_ece​ the paper's optimal payment πMI(1)−πM(0)\pi_M^I(1) - \pi_M(0)πMI​(1)−πM​(0) makes (U,U)(U,U)(U,U) an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one-informed outcome it selects.
  6. Threshold statements take the two-clause form: the stated value of nnn is attained on each region with its printed endpoints, and is the only value on the region's interior. Thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ and are quantified before all other parameters.
  7. The manufacturers' comparison in the goal excludes at most two values of cec_ece​. At the thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ outcomes with different manufacturer totals coexist, and the universal comparison fails.
  8. A correction of the paper. At ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)], which lies in (1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ))(1/(1+\phi), 2/(1+\phi))(1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ)), the slope of the best-response wholesale price (2) is exactly −1-1−1. The equations wi=w^i(wj)w_i = \hat w_i(w_j)wi​=w^i​(wj​) are then singular, and every status profile has a continuum of pricing equilibria (for n=0n = 0n=0, w1,2=wˉ±tw_{1,2} = \bar w \pm tw1,2​=wˉ±t for every ttt) whose ex ante profits differ. Lemma 1's uniqueness claim fails there, so do the §4.2 identities for every equilibrium family, and so does every statement built on them. Each statement that quantifies over all pricing equilibria therefore assumes ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​; existence is still asserted at ce∗c_e^*ce∗​.

The ex ante profits in every statement are those of an equilibrium of the pricing game on the signal model, not the §4.2 closed forms; a formalization that defined them by the closed forms would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out. The model layer (signal model, pricing equilibrium, payoff table, both contracting games) is shared, name for name, with the production diseconomy mission. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on reusable pieces: linear-expectation signals, and pointwise optimization under conditional expectation.

Selected references

  • Shang W., Ha A. Y., Tong S., Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • Ericson W. A., A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969 (cited for the formula of β(t,σ)\beta(t,\sigma)β(t,σ), which this mission does not use).
  • Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999, §2.7.2.
  • Li L., Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to the Scenario Approach I: The Violation Distribution of the Scenario SolutionTextbook

Motivation

Many design problems in control, finance and operations research are convex programs with uncertain constraints: a decision θ\thetaθ must satisfy θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​ for a parameter δ\deltaδ that is not known in advance. Enforcing the constraint for every possible δ\deltaδ (robust optimization) is often intractable or too conservative, and a chance-constrained formulation needs the distribution of δ\deltaδ, which in practice is rarely known. The scenario approach replaces the uncertain constraint by the constraints of NNN observed samples δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ and solves the resulting ordinary convex program. The question it answers is how much of the unseen uncertainty the resulting decision still violates.

The answer, the generalization theorem of the scenario approach, is distribution-free: the probability that the scenario solution violates more than a fraction ε\varepsilonε of the uncertainty is bounded by a binomial tail that depends only on NNN and on the number ddd of decision variables. This mission formalizes that theorem as it is presented in Chapters 3 and 5 of Campi and Garatti's textbook Introduction to the Scenario Approach (SIAM/MOS 2018), the first mission of a series on the book.

Timeline. Calafiore and Campi introduced scenario programs and bounded the violation of their solutions through the count of support constraints (Math. Program. 2005; IEEE TAC 2006). Campi and Garatti proved in 2008 that the binomial-tail bound of Theorem 3.7 holds for every convex scenario program under existence and uniqueness of the solution, and that it is attained with equality by fully supported problems (SIAM J. Optim. 2008), which settled the tightness question. The textbook (DOI 10.1137/1.9781611975444) presents the theorem with a complete proof for fully supported problems in the plane.

Setting

Fix a cost vector c∈Rdc\in\mathbb R^dc∈Rd, a domain Θ⊆Rd\Theta\subseteq\mathbb R^dΘ⊆Rd, a measurable space Δ\DeltaΔ of uncertainty instances with a probability P\mathbb PP, and a constraint set Θδ⊆Rd\Theta_\delta\subseteq\mathbb R^dΘδ​⊆Rd for each δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ.

  • The violation of a decision θ\thetaθ (Definition 3.1) is V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}V(\theta)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\theta\notin\Theta_\delta\}V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​}, the probability that θ\thetaθ fails the constraint of a fresh instance.
  • For a sample (δ1,…,δm)(\delta_1,\dots,\delta_m)(δ1​,…,δm​), the scenario program is
min⁡θ∈ΘcTθsubject toθ∈⋂i=1mΘδi.\min_{\theta\in\Theta}c^T\theta\quad\text{subject to}\quad\theta\in\bigcap_{i=1}^{m}\Theta_{\delta_i}.θ∈Θmin​cTθsubject toθ∈i=1⋂m​Θδi​​.

A solution is a feasible point of least cost. With m=Nm=Nm=N i.i.d. samples its solution is denoted θ∗\theta^*θ∗; it is a random vector, a function of the sample, and V(θ∗)V(\theta^*)V(θ∗) is a random variable in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

  • Assumption 3.4 (convexity): Θ\ThetaΘ and every Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ are convex and closed. Assumption 3.6 (existence and uniqueness): for every mmm and every sample, the program with mmm constraints has exactly one solution.
  • A constraint is a support constraint (Definition 5.1) if its removal improves the solution. A problem is fully supported (Definition 5.4) if for every m≥dm\ge dm≥d the program with mmm constraints has, with probability 1, exactly ddd support constraints.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.7

For 1≤d≤N1\le d\le N1≤d≤N and every ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1], under Assumptions 3.4 and 3.6,

PN{V(θ∗)>ε}≤∑i=0d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\varepsilon\}\le\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N-i}.PN{V(θ∗)>ε}≤i=0∑d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i.

The right-hand side is the upper tail of a Beta(d,N−d+1)(d,N-d+1)(d,N−d+1) distribution. The statement leaves P\mathbb PP, Θ\ThetaΘ and the constraint family completely unspecified beyond the two assumptions.

Milestones

  1. Helly's lemma (Lemma 5.3), referenced from the platform in its ddd-dimensional form.
  2. Theorem 5.2: for every mmm and every sample, a convex scenario program has at most ddd support constraints.
  3. Eq. (5.3): for a fully supported problem with d=N=2d=N=2d=N=2, P2{V(θ∗)>ε}=1−ε2\mathbb P^2\{V(\theta^*)>\varepsilon\}=1-\varepsilon^2P2{V(θ∗)>ε}=1−ε2.
  4. Eq. (5.2): for fully supported problems, Theorem 3.7 holds with equality.
  5. Eqs. (3.5)–(3.6): the bound is the Beta(d,N−d+1)(d,N-d+1)(d,N−d+1) distribution function (a published incomplete-beta identity).
  6. Eq. (3.9): ∑i=0d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i≤2d−1(1−ε/2)N≤2d−1e−εN/2\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N-i}\le 2^{d-1}(1-\varepsilon/2)^N\le2^{d-1}e^{-\varepsilon N/2}∑i=0d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i≤2d−1(1−ε/2)N≤2d−1e−εN/2.
  7. Theorem 3.8: E[V(θ∗)]≤d/(N+1)\mathbb E[V(\theta^*)]\le d/(N+1)E[V(θ∗)]≤d/(N+1).
  8. Theorem 1.3: if N≥2ε(ln⁡1β+d−1)N\ge\frac2\varepsilon(\ln\frac1\beta+d-1)N≥ε2​(lnβ1​+d−1), then V(θ∗)≤εV(\theta^*)\le\varepsilonV(θ∗)≤ε with probability at least 1−β1-\beta1−β.

Significance

Theorem 3.7 is what makes the scenario approach usable as a design method: it certifies the reliability of a decision computed from data without any knowledge of the data-generating distribution, requiring only independence of the samples. Theorems 3.8 and 1.3 are its two most used consequences, an expected-violation bound and an explicit sample size, and later chapters of the book (constraint removal, the FAST algorithm, empirical-cost results) build on the same statement. Equality for fully supported problems shows that the bound cannot be improved for any ddd and NNN.

The theorem is proved in the literature; it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization produces, beyond the result itself, a reusable library of scenario programs, violation probabilities and support constraints on which the rest of the series (constraint removal, nonconvex support sets) can be stated, and it checks the measure-theoretic content that the book deliberately leaves aside ("measurability issues are glossed over throughout", p. 33).

Difficulty

The deterministic part, at most ddd support constraints, is a short consequence of Helly's theorem. The probabilistic part is where the obvious approach fails. A uniform-convergence argument over all θ\thetaθ (Vapnik–Chervonenkis theory, footnote 11 of the book) gives bounds of the wrong order and can be vacuous, because it ignores that only the solution matters. The sharp bound is an exact statement about the law of V(θ∗)V(\theta^*)V(θ∗), not a union bound, and problems with fewer than ddd support constraints, or with degenerate configurations of constraints, must be shown to be no worse than fully supported ones; the book treats the general case only in the plane and refers to Campi & Garatti 2008 for general ddd. Handling the null sets and the exchangeability of the samples under the product measure is a substantial part of the work.

Formalization scope

  • Decisions live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d); the cost is inner ℝ c θ. A sample of size mmm is ω : Fin m → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin m => P), and P is a probability measure.
  • The violation is the real number (P {δ | θ ∉ Θδ δ}).toReal; probabilities of events over the sample are compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] through ENNReal.ofReal.
  • The solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is a function θstar : (Fin N → Δ) → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) together with the hypothesis that θstar ω solves the program for every sample; it is never an arbitrary map.
  • Assumption 3.6 is stated for every mmm including m=0m=0m=0 (a unique minimizer on Θ\ThetaΘ itself) and for every sample, as on the page.
  • Hypotheses the page leaves implicit are explicit: the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta):\theta\in\Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is jointly measurable and θstar is measurable (the book's p. 33 convention); ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1]; d≥1d\ge1d≥1.
  • A support constraint is one whose removal leaves a feasible point of strictly smaller cost than the solution; the count is a Finset.card over Fin m.
  • Theorem 3.8 asserts integrability of V(θ∗)V(\theta^*)V(θ∗) together with the bound, so it cannot hold through the convention that a non-integrable function integrates to 000. Theorem 1.3's own sentence omits the assumptions; they are added as in §3.2.1, where it is derived from Theorem 3.7.

A statement in which θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is any feasible point of the program, or merely a measurable function of the sample, is false and does not count as a formalization of Theorem 3.7; nor does one in which Assumption 3.6 is weakened to almost every sample. Contributions of general infrastructure are welcome: exchangeability arguments for product measures, the binomial–beta identity, and Helly-type counting lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19(3), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • G. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, Uncertain convex programs: randomized solutions and confidence levels, Mathematical Programming 102, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y
  • G. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 51(5), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • E. Helly, Über Mengen konvexer Körper mit gemeinschaftlichen Punkten, Jahresbericht der DMV 32, 1923.
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Introduction to the Scenario Approach III: The Risks of the Empirical Costs Follow an Ordered Dirichlet DistributionTextbook

Motivation

A scenario program replaces an uncertain optimization problem by its worst case over finitely many sampled instances. In its simplest form it reads

min⁡ν∈Rd−1[max⁡i=1,…,Nℓ(ν,δi)],\min_{\nu\in\mathbb R^{d-1}}\Big[\max_{i=1,\dots,N}\ell(\nu,\delta_i)\Big],ν∈Rd−1min​[i=1,…,Nmax​ℓ(ν,δi​)],

where ℓ(ν,δ)\ell(\nu,\delta)ℓ(ν,δ) is the cost of a decision ν\nuν when the uncertain parameter takes the value δ\deltaδ, and δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ are independent draws from an unknown probability P\mathbb PP. The classical guarantee of the scenario approach (Campi and Garatti, 2008) bounds the probability that a new instance produces a cost above the optimal value ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗, and it does so without any knowledge of P\mathbb PP.

That guarantee concerns a single number, ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗. Two scenario programs with the same NNN and the same optimal value can look very different at the solution: in one, most sampled costs lie just below ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗; in the other, they are widely scattered. The costs that do not determine the solution still carry information about how the cost of the chosen decision is distributed on future instances. Carè, Garatti and Campi (2015) showed that this information can be extracted with the same distribution-free character as the classical result, which is the subject of this mission. It is Chapter 8, §8.1 ("Probability box") of Campi and Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach (SIAM/MOS 2018), the third mission of the series formalizing that book.

Timeline:

  • 2008: Campi and Garatti prove that the violation of the scenario solution is dominated by a beta distribution B(d,N−d+1)B(d,N-d+1)B(d,N−d+1), with equality for fully supported problems (doi:10.1137/07069821X).
  • 2015: Carè, Garatti and Campi prove that the risks of all empirical costs from index ddd on have a joint ordered Dirichlet law (doi:10.1137/130928546).
  • 2018: the book states the result as Theorem 8.4 and draws the probability box from it.

Setting

Let Δ\DeltaΔ be a measurable space with a probability P\mathbb PP, and ℓ:Rd−1×Δ→R\ell:\mathbb R^{d-1}\times\Delta\to\mathbb Rℓ:Rd−1×Δ→R a cost that is convex in ν\nuν for every δ\deltaδ (a standing assumption of the book). For a sample (δ1,…,δN)(\delta_1,\dots,\delta_N)(δ1​,…,δN​) of independent draws from P\mathbb PP, let ν∗\nu^*ν∗ be the solution of the program above and ℓ∗=max⁡iℓ(ν∗,δi)\ell^*=\max_i\ell(\nu^*,\delta_i)ℓ∗=maxi​ℓ(ν∗,δi​) its optimal value.

Empirical costs (Definition 8.1). Sort the costs of the solution on the sampled scenarios in decreasing order, ℓ1∗≥ℓ2∗≥⋯≥ℓN∗\ell^*_1\ge\ell^*_2\ge\dots\ge\ell^*_Nℓ1∗​≥ℓ2∗​≥⋯≥ℓN∗​; so ℓ1∗=ℓ∗\ell^*_1=\ell^*ℓ1∗​=ℓ∗.

Risk (Definition 8.2). For a decision ν\nuν and a level ℓ\ellℓ, R(ν,ℓ)=P{δ:ℓ(ν,δ)>ℓ}R(\nu,\ell)=\mathbb P\{\delta:\ell(\nu,\delta)>\ell\}R(ν,ℓ)=P{δ:ℓ(ν,δ)>ℓ}. The risk of the kkk-th empirical cost is Rk=R(ν∗,ℓk∗)R_k=R(\nu^*,\ell^*_k)Rk​=R(ν∗,ℓk∗​), and R1≤R2≤⋯≤RNR_1\le R_2\le\dots\le R_NR1​≤R2​≤⋯≤RN​.

Nondegeneracy (Definition 8.3). For every N≥dN\ge dN≥d, with probability 111, ℓd∗≠ℓd+1∗≠…≠ℓN∗\ell^*_d\ne\ell^*_{d+1}\ne\dots\ne\ell^*_Nℓd∗​=ℓd+1∗​=…=ℓN∗​. Costs with index below ddd are excluded because several scenarios typically attain the maximum at ν∗\nu^*ν∗.

Support constraints and full support (Definitions 5.1 and 5.4). In epigraph form, min⁡t\min tmint subject to t≥ℓ(ν,δi)t\ge\ell(\nu,\delta_i)t≥ℓ(ν,δi​), the constraint of scenario iii is a support constraint if removing it lowers the optimal value; the problem is fully supported if for every m≥dm\ge dm≥d the program with mmm scenarios has exactly ddd support constraints with probability 111.

The ordered Dirichlet distribution with parameters (d,1,…,1)(d,1,\dots,1)(d,1,…,1) is the law on {0≤αd≤⋯≤αN≤1}\{0\le\alpha_d\le\dots\le\alpha_N\le1\}{0≤αd​≤⋯≤αN​≤1} with density N!(d−1)!αdd−1\frac{N!}{(d-1)!}\alpha_d^{d-1}(d−1)!N!​αdd−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.4

Under nondegeneracy, for N≥dN\ge dN≥d and all εd,…,εN\varepsilon_d,\dots,\varepsilon_Nεd​,…,εN​,

PN{Rd≤εd,…,RN≤εN}=N!(d−1)!∫0εdαdd−1∫0εd+1 ⁣ ⁣⋯∫0εN1{0≤αd≤⋯≤αN≤1} dαN⋯dαd.\mathbb P^N\{R_d\le\varepsilon_d,\dots,R_N\le\varepsilon_N\}=\frac{N!}{(d-1)!}\int_0^{\varepsilon_d}\alpha_d^{d-1}\int_0^{\varepsilon_{d+1}}\!\!\cdots\int_0^{\varepsilon_N}\mathbf 1_{\{0\le\alpha_d\le\dots\le\alpha_N\le1\}}\,\mathrm d\alpha_N\cdots\mathrm d\alpha_d .PN{Rd​≤εd​,…,RN​≤εN​}=(d−1)!N!​∫0εd​​αdd−1​∫0εd+1​​⋯∫0εN​​1{0≤αd​≤⋯≤αN​≤1}​dαN​⋯dαd​.

This is an identity of joint distribution functions, not a bound, and it does not depend on ℓ\ellℓ or P\mathbb PP.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.7 for the min-max program: PN{R(ν∗,ℓ∗)>ε}≤∑i=0d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i\mathbb P^N\{R(\nu^*,\ell^*)>\varepsilon\}\le\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N-i}PN{R(ν∗,ℓ∗)>ε}≤∑i=0d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i for ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1].
  2. Fully supported problems: ℓ∗=ℓd∗\ell^*=\ell^*_dℓ∗=ℓd∗​ with probability 111.
  3. Marginal of RdR_dRd​ (a corollary of the goal): PN{Rd≤ε}=1−∑i=0d−1(Ni)εi(1−ε)N−i\mathbb P^N\{R_d\le\varepsilon\}=1-\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\varepsilon^i(1-\varepsilon)^{N-i}PN{Rd​≤ε}=1−∑i=0d−1​(iN​)εi(1−ε)N−i, the beta law B(d,N−d+1)B(d,N-d+1)B(d,N−d+1).

Significance

The result. The theorem controls the whole distribution function of the cost ℓ(ν∗,δ)\ell(\nu^*,\delta)ℓ(ν∗,δ) of the scenario solution on a new instance, not just one quantile of it. Discarding the extreme tails of the laws of Rd,…,RNR_d,\dots,R_NRd​,…,RN​ yields, with a prescribed confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β, a region (the book's "probability box", Figure 8.2) that contains the entire cumulative distribution function of ℓ(ν∗,δ)\ell(\nu^*,\delta)ℓ(ν∗,δ), computed from the sample alone. The first marginal recovers the classical Theorem 3.7, since ℓ∗≥ℓd∗\ell^*\ge\ell^*_dℓ∗≥ℓd∗​ makes the risk of ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗ at most RdR_dRd​.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in Carè, Garatti and Campi (2015); the book states it and gives no proof. No machine-checked version of the scenario approach, of its generalization theorem, or of ordered Dirichlet laws of risks is known to exist. A formalization would produce a checked proof of the distribution-free identity together with the combinatorial and measure-theoretic infrastructure (order statistics of sampled costs, laws of random risks) that the rest of scenario theory reuses. The milestones separate the classical beta bound, which is also the goal of the first mission of this series, from the new exact joint law.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt treats Rd,…,RNR_d,\dots,R_NRd​,…,RN​ as the order statistics of the uniform variables 1−F(ℓ(ν∗,δi))1-F(\ell(\nu^*,\delta_i))1−F(ℓ(ν∗,δi​)). That works only for d=1d=1d=1, when the decision space is a point and the costs are independent. For d≥2d\ge2d≥2 the decision ν∗\nu^*ν∗ is itself a function of the whole sample, so the sampled costs at ν∗\nu^*ν∗ are neither independent nor identically distributed, and the ddd-th cost is tied to the scenarios that determine the solution. The factor αdd−1\alpha_d^{d-1}αdd−1​ and the constant N!/(d−1)!N!/(d-1)!N!/(d−1)! encode exactly this dependence. Any argument must account for which scenarios are active at ν∗\nu^*ν∗ without assuming full support, since the theorem holds whether or not ℓ∗=ℓd∗\ell^*=\ell^*_dℓ∗=ℓd∗​.

Formalization scope

The decision space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and the book's ddd is n+1n+1n+1; the sample is ω : Fin N → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ => P). Empirical costs are read from Tuple.sort with kkk counted from 111; risks are real numbers (P {δ | c < ℓ ν δ}).toReal. The right-hand side of the goal is a Lebesgue integral over the box ∏k[0,εk]\prod_k[0,\varepsilon_k]∏k​[0,εk​] intersected with the ordered simplex, stated for all real εk\varepsilon_kεk​. The solution map ω↦ν∗\omega\mapsto\nu^*ω↦ν∗ is a hypothesis-constrained function, never an arbitrary map.

Implicit hypotheses of the book pinned down in the binders:

  • ℓ(⋅,δ)\ell(\cdot,\delta)ℓ(⋅,δ) is convex for every δ\deltaδ (p. 6).
  • Existence and uniqueness of the solution of the program for every sample size m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and every sample; the book's Assumption 3.6 says "every mmm", but the program with no scenario has no solution.
  • Nondegeneracy for every sample size m≥dm\ge dm≥d, not only for the NNN of the theorem, as Definition 8.3 is written.
  • Joint measurability of (ν,δ)↦ℓ(ν,δ)(\nu,\delta)\mapsto\ell(\nu,\delta)(ν,δ)↦ℓ(ν,δ) and measurability of the solution map (measurability is glossed over in the book, p. 6 footnote 1 and p. 33).
  • N≥dN\ge dN≥d, and ε∈[0,1]\varepsilon\in[0,1]ε∈[0,1] in the binomial-form statements.

A statement in which the solution is an arbitrary measurable map, or in which the nondegeneracy or existence hypothesis is unsatisfiable, would make the goal vacuous; the hypotheses here are met, for example, by ℓ(ν,δ)=∥ν−δ∥2\ell(\nu,\delta)=\|\nu-\delta\|^2ℓ(ν,δ)=∥ν−δ∥2 with a continuous law on Rn\mathbb R^{n}Rn, and for d=1d=1d=1 by any cost independent of ν\nuν with an atomless law.

A complete development needs: the scenario approach generalization theorem (reusable across this series), laws of order statistics of i.i.d. uniform variables, and the combinatorics of support sets of convex min-max programs. Proofs of the milestones, of the d=1d=1d=1 case of the goal, and of auxiliary facts about kthLargest are all welcome.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM, 2018. doi:10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • A. Carè, S. Garatti, M. C. Campi, Scenario min-max optimization and the risk of empirical costs, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4):2061–2080, 2015. doi:10.1137/130928546
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM J. Optim. 19:1211–1230, 2008. doi:10.1137/07069821X
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