Motivation
A supplier who must produce before a selling season, and a retailer who sells into uncertain demand, have to decide who holds the inventory that may go unsold. Cachon (Management Science 50(2), 2004) studies this allocation of inventory risk using nothing but wholesale prices. With a push contract the retailer orders everything before production and bears all the risk; with a pull contract the retailer orders only during the season and the supplier bears it; an advance-purchase discount sits between the two, offering a lower price for early orders. The paper's introduction contrasts Trek, which holds bicycle inventory and ships to retailers on demand, with O'Neill, which offers retailers a prebook discount for ordering before the season.
The classical view is that wholesale-price contracts cannot coordinate a supply chain: a single wholesale price above marginal cost makes the retailer order too little (the double-marginalization effect). Coordination was known to need richer terms, such as buyback contracts (Pasternack 1985) or revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). This mission formalizes the paper's Theorem 7, which shows that two wholesale prices, one for early and one for in-season orders, suffice both to coordinate the chain and to divide its profit arbitrarily. A companion mission of the same series formalizes Theorem 6, the Pareto set of push and pull contracts alone.
Setting
Demand is a random variable with distribution function F and density f. The paper assumes F(0)=0, F strictly increasing, and an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR): g(x)=xf(x)/(1−F(x)) has g′(x)>0. Production costs c per unit, the retail price is p, and leftover units are salvaged for v, with v<c<p. Expected sales with q units available are
S(q)=q−∫0qF(x)dx,
and the integrated supply chain's expected profit is Π(q)=(p−v)S(q)−(c−v)q. It is maximized at qo with F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v); write Πo=Π(qo). The efficiency of a contract is Π(q)/Πo, where q is the quantity produced.
A contract is a pair of wholesale prices {w1,w2} with w1≤w2. The retailer first prebooks y≥0 units at w1 each. The supplier, seeing y, produces q≥y. During the season the retailer sells the prebook and, once it runs out, places at-once orders at w2 per unit from the supplier's remaining stock, provided w2≤p. The supplier's and retailer's expected profits are
πs(y,q)=(w1−v)y+(w2−v)(S(q)−S(y))−(c−v)q,
πr(y,q)=−(w1−v)y+(p−v)S(y)+(p−w2)(S(q)−S(y)),
with the at-once terms absent when w2>p. An outcome of a contract is a pair (y,q) where q maximizes the supplier's profit given y, and y maximizes the retailer's profit given that he anticipates the supplier's response. The contract classes are push (w1<p<w2), pull (w1=w2≤p) and advance-purchase discount (w1<w2≤p). A contract is Pareto if no outcome of any contract in these classes makes one firm strictly better off and neither firm worse off than one of its own outcomes (p. 224).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 7
For every w1 with c≤w1≤p, the contract {w1,p} has an outcome and is Pareto; every outcome (y,q) of every Pareto contract satisfies
Π(q)=Πo;
and for every r∈[0,Πo] some contract {w1,p} with c≤w1≤p has an outcome with payoffs
(πr,πs)=(r, Πo−r).
Milestones
- Eq. (2): Π is concave on [0,∞) and maximized exactly where F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v).
- Eqs. (20)–(21): for c≤w2≤p, the supplier's best response to y is max{y,qs} with F(qs)=(w2−c)/(w2−v).
- Eq. (22): for c≤w1≤w2≤p, yr with F(yr)=(w2−w1)/(w2−v) is the unique maximizer of πr(⋅,q).
- Eq. (3): in push mode the retailer's optimal prebook solves F(q)=(p−w^1)/(p−v).
A further draft theorem states the step of the proof in which the retailer's outcome profit along {w1,p} falls strictly from Πo to 0 as w1 rises from c to p.
Significance
The theorem identifies a coordinating family inside the simplest contract language there is. Setting the at-once price equal to the retail price gives the supplier exactly the chain's marginal incentive for capacity, so she produces qo; the prebook price then acts as a pure transfer. Every division of Πo is reached, so for any bargaining process the Pareto set is fully efficient. This contrasts with Theorem 6 of the same paper, where push and pull contracts alone leave the Pareto set inefficient, and with the buyback and revenue-sharing coordination results (formalized on the platform as Theorems 14.4–14.6 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory), which need contract terms beyond wholesale prices.
The result is proved in the paper and has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a formal prebook game (best responses, outcomes and Pareto dominance as optimization statements) and Theorem 7 with all three claims, including the claim about every Pareto contract, which the paper argues in one sentence.
Difficulty
The closed forms are fractile equations, and the obvious argument substitutes them. That argument is incomplete in three places. First, the retailer's anticipated profit is piecewise: below the supplier's own quantity he gets at-once service, above it the chain runs in push mode, and the proof must show the retailer never prefers the push branch when w2=p. Second, "every Pareto contract is efficient" is a statement about all contracts, including push and pull, and needs both firms' payoffs to be nonnegative at every outcome of every admissible contract, which depends on the prebook y=0 always being available and on w1≥c. Third, the division claim is surjectivity of the retailer's equilibrium payoff over w1∈[c,p], which needs the solution of F(yr)=(p−w1)/(p−v) to vary continuously with w1, including at both ends (yr=qo at w1=c, yr=0 at w1=p).
Formalization scope
Demand is a probability measure μ on R with F = ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ. The standing assumptions are a structure: F(0)=0, F strictly increasing on [0,∞), F′=f on (0,∞), and g′>0 on (0,∞). Differentiability is required only on (0,∞), so the exponential distribution, which the paper names as IGFR, is admitted. Theorem 7 does not use IGFR; it is kept so that the series shares one model. Quantities range over [0,∞). qo is a parameter with the hypothesis F(qo)=(p−c)/(p−v); its existence is part of milestone 1.
Readings of informal words: "includes all" means every contract {w1,p} with c≤w1≤p has an outcome and each of its outcomes is undominated; "the Pareto set coordinates" is stated for every Pareto contract, not only the w2=p family; "any division is achievable" is surjectivity onto [0,Πo]; "increasing" in Eq. (2) and "decreases" in the proof are strict; "arg max" in Eqs. (3) and (22) is the unique maximizer; "the optimal production is max{y,qs}" is an if-and-only-if characterization of the supplier's best responses. At-once orders are submitted exactly when w2≤p (p. 226, "with push w2>p, so at-once orders are never submitted"). Additions to the paper's contract classes: every class requires w1≥c (p. 228 sets aside w^1<c as Pareto inferior); pull includes w1=w2=p (the paper's remark in the proof) and advance-purchase discounts include w2=p (as Theorem 7 names them). Pareto dominance is between payoff pairs of outcomes.
Outcomes are defined as maximizers, not by the closed forms (21)–(22). Defining the outcome of {w1,p} as (yr,qo) would turn the goal into algebra, and is ruled out.
Needed infrastructure: continuity and inverse of a strictly increasing distribution function, concavity of S, and first-order conditions on half-lines. The definitions of the prebook game are reusable for Theorem 8 of the same paper. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome.
Selected references
- G. P. Cachon, The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts, Management Science 50(2):222–238, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0190
- M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
- B. A. Pasternack, Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
- G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
- L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445