Motivation
A recurring question in economics and operations research is: when a decision problem
depends on a parameter, does the optimal decision move monotonically as the parameter
changes? A firm's optimal input mix as a price rises, a consumer's optimal consumption
bundle as income grows, a Cournot firm's optimal output as a rival's output changes — in
each case one wants "more of the parameter implies (weakly) more of the optimum" without
assuming convexity, differentiability, or a unique optimizer. The classical tool for such
comparative statics questions is the implicit function theorem, which needs smoothness
and a nondegenerate Hessian and breaks down the moment the optimum is not unique or the
objective is not differentiable. Topkis [1978] showed that a purely order-theoretic
condition — supermodularity of the objective jointly in the decision variable and the
parameter — is sufficient on its own, with no smoothness, uniqueness, or convexity
assumed at all, and Milgrom and Roberts [1990a, 1994] later showed this lattice-theoretic
approach subsumes and strengthens the classical monotone-comparative-statics results in
economics. This mission formalizes the two central results this book calls "Topkis's
theorem" (Theorem 2.8.1 and Theorem 2.8.2), together with the structural fact about
maximizers of a supermodular function (Theorem 2.7.1) that both rest on, and the
strengthening to strictly ordered optimal selections (Theorem 2.8.4).
Setting
Let X be a lattice: a partially ordered set (X,⪯) in which every pair
x,x′ has a join x∨x′ and a meet x∧x′. A real-valued function
f:X→R is supermodular on X if
f(x′)+f(x′′)≤f(x′∨x′′)+f(x′∧x′′) for all x′,x′′∈X; this is
the same relativized notion (SupermodularOn) used, with S=X, throughout chunk I of
this series.
Now let T also be a partially ordered set (the parameter set), and let
f:X×T→R be a real-valued function of the pair (x,t). f has
increasing differences in (x,t) if, for every t′≺t′′ in T, the map
x↦f(x,t′′)−f(x,t′) is monotone (order-preserving) in x; equivalently, the
marginal gain from raising t is itself increasing in x. Replacing "monotone" with
"strictly monotone" gives strictly increasing differences. To compare the resulting
sets of optimizers rather than single points, this mission reuses the induced set
ordering ⊑ from chunk I: for A,B⊆X, A⊑B holds
when a∧b∈A and a∨b∈B for all a∈A, b∈B.
Formalization targets
Goal — Theorem 2.8.2 (Topkis's theorem)
Let X and T be lattices, let S be a sublattice of the product lattice X×T,
and let St={x∈X:(x,t)∈S} be the section of S at t∈T. If
f:X×T→R is supermodular on S (jointly in the pair (x,t)), then
t⟼argmaxx∈Stf(x,t)
is increasing in t, with respect to ⊑, on {t∈T:argmaxx∈Stf(x,t)=∅}.
Theorem 2.8.1 (the underlying, more elementary sufficient condition)
With St⊆X increasing in t (with respect to ⊑), f(x,t)
supermodular in x for each fixed t, and f(x,t) having increasing differences in
(x,t) on X×T, the same conclusion — t↦argmaxx∈Stf(x,t) increasing in ⊑ — holds. Theorem 2.8.2's joint-supermodularity
hypothesis on a sublattice of X×T automatically forces both of Theorem 2.8.1's
hypotheses, so 2.8.1 is the logically weaker, more elementary statement from which 2.8.2's
proof proceeds.
Theorem 2.8.4 (strict strengthening)
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 2.8.1 but with strictly increasing differences, every
individual optimal solution at a larger parameter value dominates every individual
optimal solution at a smaller one: t′≺t′′, x′∈argmaxx∈St′f(x,t′), and x′′∈argmaxx∈St′′f(x,t′′) together
force x′⪯x′′ — a genuinely stronger conclusion than ⊑ alone gives.
A supporting result is formalized as a milestone because both goals' proofs use it
directly: Theorem 2.7.1, that argmaxx∈Xf(x) is a sublattice
of X whenever f is supermodular on X — the structural fact that makes it meaningful
to compare optimal-solution sets with ⊑ in the first place.
Significance
The result itself. Theorem 2.8.2 is the book's own headline theorem, cited throughout
the rest of the monograph: it underlies the assortative-matching existence theorem
(Chapter 3), monotone optimal policies in Markov decision processes (Chapter 3), and
equilibrium comparative statics in supermodular games (Chapter 4) — each a later mission
in this series. Its distinguishing feature relative to the implicit function theorem is
that it needs no differentiability, no uniqueness of the optimizer, and no interiority: it
applies equally to discrete decision problems (integer programming, combinatorial
selection) and continuous ones.
Formalizing it. Nothing in Mathlib currently states a parametric monotone-comparative-
statics result of this shape: the closest neighboring material (order-preserving maps,
MonotoneOn, lattice structures) supplies only the vocabulary, not the theorem. This
mission is the first formalization of Topkis's theorem on this platform and introduces
the increasing-differences vocabulary (IncreasingDifferencesOn,
StrictlyIncreasingDifferencesOn) that later missions in this series (matching, MDPs,
supermodular games) reuse directly.
Difficulty
The natural first idea — differentiate f in x, set the gradient to zero, and use the
implicit function theorem on the resulting first-order condition — fails immediately
because nothing here is assumed differentiable, and argmaxx∈Stf(x,t) need not be a single point. The correct argument instead compares two arbitrary
elements x′∈St′, x′′∈St′′ directly through the supermodularity
inequality applied to the pair (x′,t′) against (x′∨x′′,t′) (a chain of
inequalities Topkis calls "Lemma 2.8.1"), using increasing differences only to move the
parameter from t′ to t′′ inside that chain — at no point is a derivative, a
selection function, or an interior point used. A second subtlety is that "increasing" in
the conclusion is with respect to the induced set order ⊑, not a claim that
some selection t↦x(t) is monotone: proving the stronger, pointwise-ordered
conclusion (Theorem 2.8.4) genuinely needs the strict form of increasing differences,
not merely increasing differences plus an extra hypothesis.
Formalization scope
X and T are kept as abstract Lattice/PartialOrder types throughout, matching the
book's own generality — Theorem 2.8.1's and 2.8.2's Rn/Rm
corollary via second partial derivatives (discussed in the book's prose immediately after
Theorem 2.8.2, p. 77) is not itself a numbered theorem and is not formalized here.
Supermodularity, increasing differences, and strictly increasing differences are each
formalized as a single relativized definition (SupermodularOn f S,
IncreasingDifferencesOn f S, StrictlyIncreasingDifferencesOn f S) so the same
declaration expresses both "supermodular on the whole lattice X" (used by Theorem 2.7.1
and Theorem 2.8.1's per-t hypothesis) and "jointly supermodular on a sublattice S of
X×T" (Theorem 2.8.2) — a formalization that instead only ever supermodularized
f(⋅,t) for fixed t would collapse Theorem 2.8.2's genuinely joint hypothesis into
a restatement of Theorem 2.8.1, which is exactly the trivialization this mission's chunk
brief warns against. argmaxx∈Stf(x,t) is written out as the set
of x∈St that dominate every other element of St under f(⋅,t), and every
conclusion is stated only for pairs t⪯t′ at which both argmax sets are assumed
nonempty — matching the book's own restriction to {t∈T:argmaxx∈Stf(x,t)=∅}, since ⊑ holds
vacuously whenever either side is empty. This mission depends on chunk I's
InducedSetOrder; it introduces no reusable infrastructure beyond its own three
definitions, which later missions in the series (matching, MDPs, supermodular games) are
expected to import directly rather than redefine.
Selected references
- Topkis, D. M., Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice, Operations Research
26(2), 1978, pp. 305–321. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.2.305
- Topkis, D. M., Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 2011
(DOI 10.1515/9781400822539), Chapter 2, §2.6–2.8.
- Milgrom, P. and Shannon, C., Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62(1), 1994,
pp. 157–180. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479
- Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with
strategic complementarities, Econometrica 58(6), 1990, pp. 1255–1277.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2938316