On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play II: Almost Sure Convergence in Zero-Sum Games and Symmetric Games with an Interior ESSResearch Paper
Motivation
Fictitious play is the oldest model of learning in games: players repeatedly play a fixed normal form game, and each round every player best-responds to the empirical frequencies of the opponents' past play. Brown (1951) proposed it as an algorithm for computing the value of a zero-sum game, and Robinson (1951) proved that the empirical frequencies converge to the set of equilibria in that case. In stochastic fictitious play (Fudenberg and Kreps 1993) each player's payoffs are perturbed by fresh random shocks before every choice. The shocks make best responses single-valued and smooth in beliefs, which puts the process within reach of stochastic approximation theory: its long-run behaviour is governed by a deterministic perturbed best response dynamic.
Before Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), convergence of stochastic fictitious play was known only for 2×2 games (Fudenberg and Kreps 1993; Kaniovski and Young 1995) and for certain games with two strategies per player (Benaïm and Hirsch 1999). The difficulty was the perturbed dynamic itself, whose vector field involves choice probabilities with no closed form for general noise distributions. Hofbauer and Sandholm showed that every such dynamic can be rewritten with a deterministic payoff perturbation (their Theorem 2.1), and used that to carry Lyapunov functions over to arbitrary noise distributions. This mission covers the first two classes of games in their main convergence theorem: symmetric games with an interior evolutionarily stable strategy, and two player zero-sum games.
Setting
A two player normal form game has strategy sets and and utilities . Player 's mixed strategies form the simplex , and . The payoff vector lists the expected payoff of each pure strategy of against the opponent's mixed strategy. The game is zero-sum if for every profile .
Each player has a shock density on . The choice function , for with density , gives the perturbed best response . The densities are required to be strictly positive with continuously differentiable choice functions ("the conditions of Theorem 2.1").
Standard stochastic fictitious play. Pure strategies are identified with basis vectors . Choices are arbitrary. At every time each player draws a shock with density and plays at time the pure strategy maximizing , where the beliefs are the time averages
The shocks are independent over time and across players. The expected motion of is the perturbed best response dynamic
Symmetric games. A two player game is symmetric if and ; it is described by the matrix , and . In symmetric stochastic fictitious play two players in roles 1 and 2 play at every time, their shocks are independent and identically distributed with one density , and the state is the average of all past plays in both roles,
Its mean dynamic is on . A mixed strategy in the interior of is an interior evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for all mixed near .
Rest points and chain recurrence. For a dynamic on a compact set , the rest points are the zeros of in . A point is chain recurrent if for every one can return from to by following solution segments of length at least , with jumps of size less than between segments.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.1 (i) and (ii)
(i) If has an interior ESS, then (SP) has a unique rest point and
(ii) If the two player game is zero-sum, then (P) has a unique rest point and
Both hold for all shock densities meeting the conditions of Theorem 2.1, all probability spaces carrying the shocks, and all initial choices.
Milestones
- Theorem 2.1: for such a density, the choice function is the unique maximizer for one admissible deterministic perturbation .
- With an interior ESS, , where , is strictly concave and a strict Lyapunov function for the deterministically perturbed dynamic (SPV).
- Its maximizer is the unique chain recurrent point of (SPV).
- In zero-sum games, is strictly concave and a strict Lyapunov function for (PV).
- Its maximizer is the unique chain recurrent point of (P).
- The maximizer of is the unique chain recurrent point of (SP).
Significance
The theorem gives global, almost sure convergence of a learning process for arbitrary noise distributions, not only for the logit (Gumbel) noise under which the perturbed dynamic has a closed form. For zero-sum games it is the stochastic counterpart of Robinson's theorem. For symmetric games with an interior ESS it shows that a population learning by stochastic fictitious play settles at a single mixed state. Since the choice functions are continuous, the players' choice probabilities converge as well. The limit is the rest point of the perturbed dynamic, which approximates a Nash equilibrium (in case (i), the ESS) as the noise vanishes.
On the formal side, the paper's results are proved, but no part of them is machine-checked, and the platform has no model of learning in games, of chain recurrence, or of stochastic approximation. The mission produces a formal model of stochastic fictitious play as a random process, formal statements of the Hofbauer and Hofbauer–Hopkins Lyapunov functions, and the chain recurrence characterizations that connect them to the process.
Difficulty
The obvious route replaces the process by the ODE (P) and argues that (P) converges. That step is where the argument is incomplete: convergence of every solution of (P) does not give convergence of the stochastic process, because a stochastic approximation can in principle circulate near a set of orbits the ODE never follows. The right invariant is the chain recurrent set, and the limit sets of the process lie in a connected component of it (Benaïm and Hirsch 1999; Benaïm 1999). The characterization therefore has to be of chain recurrence, which is strictly weaker than asymptotic stability of individual orbits.
The second obstacle is that (P) itself is defined through the noise distribution and admits no useful Lyapunov function in general. The Lyapunov functions exist for the deterministic form (PV)/(SPV), and moving between the two forms requires the representation of Theorem 2.1, whose perturbation has no closed form either.
Formalization scope
Players and strategies are indexed from . Mixed profiles live in and every vector field is defined on that ambient space. The processes are defined pathwise from a family of shock vectors on an arbitrary probability space. Ties in the argmax are broken by the smallest index, an event of probability zero because the shocks have densities. The shock drawn at time produces the choice at time . Shock densities are arbitrary strictly positive densities with continuously differentiable choice functions; no noise law is fixed, and the two players' densities in (ii) may differ. Independence is joint over times and players (and roles in (i)). The symmetric process has its own state in one simplex and is not the standard process applied to a symmetric game.
Deterministic perturbations are functions defined on the whole space whose values off the open simplex are ignored; derivatives are taken of their composition with the projection onto the affine plane . Perturbed best responses in (PV) and (SPV) are supplied as maps together with the hypothesis that they are the unique maximizers. A strict Lyapunov function must increase strictly along every non-constant solution on . The ESS definition includes , which the source omits.
The conclusions assert existence and uniqueness of the rest point; they are not hypotheses. A statement for the ODE (P) in place of the process , for one fixed noise law, or with the ESS as the limit point would be a different theorem.
A complete development needs Theorem 2.1 (convex duality and the Legendre transform on the simplex), existence and uniqueness of solutions of (P), basic chain recurrence theory, and the stochastic approximation results of Benaïm and Hirsch, which are not restated here and are welcome as independent contributions. The model layer (games, payoff vectors, choice functions, stochastic fictitious play) is shared with the other missions of this series.
Selected references
- J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm, On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play, Econometrica 70(6), 2265–2294, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00376 (theorem numbers and pages here follow the authors' manuscript of February 21, 2002).
- D. Fudenberg and D. M. Kreps, Learning Mixed Equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 320–367, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1021
- Y. M. Kaniovski and H. P. Young, Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations, Games and Economic Behavior 11, 330–363, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1054
- M. Benaïm and M. W. Hirsch, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games, Games and Economic Behavior 29, 36–72, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0717
- M. Benaïm, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, 1–68, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
- J. Robinson, An Iterative Method of Solving a Game, Annals of Mathematics 54, 296–301, 1951. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969530
- J. Hofbauer and E. Hopkins, Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games, Games and Economic Behavior 52, 133–152, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.006