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🏆Completed
Linear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

A Robust Spectral Clustering Algorithm for Sub-Gaussian Mixture Models with Outliers 3: Binary PSD Rank-r Lifting (4) Is Equivalent to Robust Cluster Assignment (3)Research Paper

Clustering separates observations into groups whose members resemble one another. In kernel clustering, a matrix KKK records a similarity score for each pair of observations, and an assignment seeks groups with high total within-group similarity. Real data can also contain outliers, observations that should not be assigned to any cluster. Srivastava, Sarkar,…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization II: On Low-Moreishness, Near-Constant-Value Manifolds, Engagement Maximization Is Near-OptimalResearch Paper

Recommender systems on online platforms are usually trained to maximize engagement: time spent, items consumed, sessions returned. The implicit justification is revealed preference: a user who consumes more must value the content more. Behavioural economics questions that inference when a person's choices are driven by two conflicting processes, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes I: With Manufacturer Pricing, Subsidize Only the Manufacturer; Outcome-Based Pay Raises the Price iff B < k − 1/8Research Paper

Treatments for rare diseases can require substantial research and development spending while reaching a small patient population. A public subsidy can cover part of the manufacturer's development cost, part of the patient's price, or both. Which recipient should receive the subsidy depends on how the manufacturer responds. A further design choice is whether…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization I: Engagement Beats Utility Only Through Higher Moreishness, or Higher Span with Lower ValueResearch Paper

Online platforms rank content by what they can measure: clicks, watch time, session length. The implicit justification is revealed preference: if users stay longer, they must like what they see. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776v3, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) question this justification with a model of a user…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 2: For Linear Valuations on [0,1] the Feasible Utility Set Is a Projection of Linear and Parabolic ConstraintsResearch Paper

A Fisher market divides a supply of goods among buyers with different values and budgets. In many fair division models, the goods form a continuum: pieces of time, land, or a divisible resource can be allocated in arbitrarily small amounts. A direct description of all possible buyer utilities then appears to require one allocation function for every buyer.…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design II: The Combined Subsidy Needs the Least Budget, and the Selective Subsidy Needs Less Than Either Single SubsidyResearch Paper

Governments sometimes pay crop producers to increase supply. A payment for each unit planted and a payment for each unit harvested create different incentives when farmers have different yields. An agency choosing among those formats needs to know how much it must spend to attain the same total output. Fan, Feng, Li, Shanthikumar, and Wu study that question…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 1: Committing to a Matching Capacity, Then Competing in Price and Wage, Yields the Quantity-Competition OutcomeResearch Paper

A service platform makes decisions on two sides of a market. It charges consumers a price and pays independent providers a wage, then earns a margin only when it can match a consumer with a provider. Capacity is another decision available to the platform: it can limit how many matches it will carry, for example by limiting the active provider pool. Hu and…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing II: With Price Commitment and a Small Quality Gap, the Unique Refined Separating Equilibrium Lowers the Funding Price and Raises the Regular PriceResearch Paper

In reward-based crowdfunding, a seller asks customers to pay before the product's quality is known to them. A high-quality seller can try to communicate private quality through the prices he posts. That signal is costly because a price that deters imitation may also reduce the seller's own expected revenue. Bolandifar, Chen, Kouvelis and Zhou study this…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity II: A Token Pre-Sale with Revenue Share t/(t+c) Induces Monopoly Output, Has a Unique Break-Even Size, and Leaves the Entrepreneur the NPVResearch Paper

Entrepreneurs sometimes sell claims on a product before it exists. A token can represent a claim on a future unit, and its eventual market price can depend on how much the entrepreneur produces. That link creates a production incentive absent from a simple sale of equity. Malinova and Park study whether the token allocation can fund a venture while…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design I: Under a Combined Subsidy, More Dispersed Farmer Productivity Gives More Dispersed Outputs and ProfitsResearch Paper

Agricultural subsidies can raise total crop supply while changing which farmers produce it. A payment tied to planted input gives a larger reward per unit of harvested output to a farmer who needs more input for that output. A payment tied to harvested output gives the same reward per unit of output to every farmer. These differences matter when a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing I: Without Price Commitment, a Low Enough Funding Price Is the Unique Separating Equilibrium That Survives the Intuitive CriterionResearch Paper

In reward based crowdfunding, customers must decide whether to back a product before its quality is known to them. The entrepreneur knows that quality and chooses a funding price. A high quality entrepreneur may therefore use price to convey information, but the same price is available to a low quality entrepreneur. The choice also changes the chance that…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Courier Dispatch in On-Demand Delivery II: In a Crowded Market with Endogenous Demand, Batch Delivery Earns More Exactly Below One Threshold in Wait Cost and in Service RadiusResearch Paper

A delivery vendor controls both how a courier serves orders and what customers pay. Serving one order per trip avoids waiting for a second order, but serving two together can save travel time when demand is high. If the vendor can change its price, it also changes the rate at which customers join the system. The preferred dispatch rule therefore depends on…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Numerical AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Primal-Dual Method for Nonconvex Constrained Optimization Based on the Augmented Lagrangian 3: The Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz Property with Exponent 1/2 Implies the VP-EB Error BoundResearch Paper

Augmented Lagrangian methods are a standard tool for constrained optimization, and first-order primal-dual variants of them are used when the objective is large, nonsmooth or nonconvex and second-order information is too expensive. Zhu, Zhao and Zhang (arXiv:2007.12219v1, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) analyse such a method, NAPP-AL (…

14 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Algorithms for Zero-Sum Games 2: The Value of a Zero-Sum Game, Known to Error ε/(6R(r+1)), Decides Whether an LP Has OPT < α or OPT ≥ α − εResearch Paper

Linear programming and two-player zero-sum matrix games are two faces of one theory. Von Neumann's minimax theorem is a statement of LP duality, and conversely, since Dantzig's 1951 note, every linear program can be rewritten as a zero-sum game. The equivalence matters in practice whenever an algorithm is much better at one of the two problems. Game solvers…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 2: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration When Each Backer Type Shares One Valuation and Herding Is WeakResearch Paper

On reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, a project creator fixes two numbers before launch: the pledge level ppp, the amount a backer commits, and the campaign duration TTT. Both are set once and cannot be revised. A higher pledge earns more per backer but turns away backers whose valuation falls short, and a longer campaign reaches more…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins II: The Triage Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≤ α̲ and the Strategic Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≥ ᾱResearch Paper

Many outpatient clinics offer two ways in: an appointment booked online, and walk-in hours on the day. Some patients have no choice (acute cases arrive as walk-ins), but many can pick either channel, and they pick the one that costs them less: a long appointment delay pushes them into the walk-in room, a crowded walk-in room pushes them to book or to give…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Approach to Accelerated Value Iteration 4: Safe Accelerated Value Iteration Converges to v* at Rate O(λ′^s) for Every λ′ ∈ [λ, 1)Research Paper

Value iteration (VI) is the standard method for computing the optimal value function of a discounted Markov decision process (MDP). It applies the Bellman operator repeatedly, and because that operator is a λ\lambdaλ-contraction in the sup norm, the error after sss steps is at most λs\lambda^sλs times the initial error. When the discount factor λ\lambdaλ is close to 111…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Approach to Accelerated Value Iteration 3: On the n-State Chain MDP, Every First-Order Method Has ‖v_s − v*‖∞ ≥ λ^s/(1+λ) for s = 1, …, n − 1Research Paper

Value iteration (VI) is the basic algorithm for computing the optimal value function of a discounted Markov decision process (MDP). Its error contracts by the discount factor λ\lambdaλ per step, so it needs on the order of (1−λ)−1log⁡(1/ϵ)(1-\lambda)^{-1}\log(1/\epsilon)(1−λ)−1log(1/ϵ) iterations, which is slow when λ\lambdaλ is close to 111, the regime of interest in long-horizon planning and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 3: Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates to Mining Capacity and Reward, and Shares Shift to Smaller MinersResearch Paper

Bitcoin and other proof-of-work cryptocurrencies rely on miners, who spend computing power ("hash rate") to win the right to append a block and collect a reward. The security argument for such systems assumes that no single miner, or small coalition, controls a large share of the total hash rate. Whether the economics of mining push the system towards or…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
AnalysisNumerical AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Generalized Newton Method for Subgradient Systems 2: Under Metric Regularity and Semismoothness*, the FBE-Based Newton Algorithm Converges Superlinearly in Quadratic Composite OptimizationResearch Paper

Many optimization models in statistics, signal processing and machine learning minimize a smooth loss plus a nonsmooth regularizer, min⁡xf(x)+g(x)\min_x f(x)+g(x)minx​f(x)+g(x). When fff is quadratic this is the quadratic composite problem, which also appears as the subproblem of sequential quadratic programming and of proximal Newton methods. First-order splitting methods (proximal…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins I: With Total Capacity μ ≤ √(λC_D/(2R)), the Observable Scheduling Setting Costs No More Than the Unobservable OneResearch Paper

Outpatient clinics serve two kinds of patients: those who book an appointment and those who walk in on the day. Many providers now run open-access or hybrid schedules, which reserve part of the day for walk-ins. Whether patients book or walk in depends on what they know about the appointment delay. Some clinics publish the next available slot in real time…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 4: The Marketplace Prefers Not to Impose a Price-Parity Clause If and Only If q < 1/2 and μ > (v − c)/2Research Paper

Online marketplaces (Amazon, Booking.com, Airbnb, Upwork) charge sellers a fee on every transaction they intermediate. Once a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This is leakage (also called disintermediation or showrooming), and it limits the fees a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 2: Optimal Investment in Transaction Benefits Decreases in Its Cost and Is First Constant, Then Decreasing, Then Increasing in Switching CostsResearch Paper

Online marketplaces for services (home repair, tutoring, beauty appointments, freelancing) earn a fee on each transaction they intermediate. After a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both sides can often complete the transaction, or the next one, off the platform and avoid the fee. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

How Advance Sales Can Reduce Profits: When to Buy, When to Sell, and What Price to Charge: The Profit-Maximizing Price and Induced Arrival Rates Under High DemandResearch Paper

A seller with scarce stock may offer a product before its main selling period. This gives buyers another chance to obtain it, but it can also alter when they compete for the stock. The seller must choose a price while anticipating that buyers respond to both the price and the chance that the unit will already be gone. Glazer, Hassin, and Nowik study this…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intertemporal Price Discrimination via Randomized Promotions: A Two-Point Price Distribution Is Optimal for Randomized Pricing with Two Customer SegmentsResearch Paper

Retailers that run predictable promotions teach their customers to wait for them. A customer who knows that a discount will come next week has no reason to buy at the list price today. Firms therefore lose margin on exactly the customers who would have paid in full. One response, documented in practice by Moon, Bimpikis and Mendelson (2017), is to randomize…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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