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Optimization

2,311 missions · 1,728 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions XI: Convexity and Subgradients of the Value Function in Decomposition with Respect to VariablesTextbook

Large convex programs often have a block structure: a small set of "complicating" variables xxx couples otherwise separate subproblems in the remaining variables yyy. Decomposition with respect to variables fixes xxx, solves the subproblem in yyy, and treats the optimal subproblem value as a function of xxx alone. The outer problem in xxx is then small but nonsmooth,…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationNumerical AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions X: The Space-Dilation Ellipsoid Method Localizes the Solution in Ellipsoids Shrinking by the Ratio q_nTextbook

The ellipsoid method is the algorithm that settled the polynomial-time solvability of linear programming (Khachiyan, 1979) and that underlies the equivalence of separation and optimization in combinatorial optimization (Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver, 1981). Its origin is in nonsmooth convex optimization. In 1976 Yudin and Nemirovskii proposed a modified…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions II: Convex Functions Are Almost Differentiable and Their Almost-Gradients Are SubgradientsTextbook

Gradient methods assume a continuous gradient; subgradient methods assume convexity. Many objective functions met in practice satisfy neither. Shor's example is economic planning, where components of the objective are piecewise-smooth, not necessarily convex functions of a parameter describing the productivity of a unit, and where minimax formulations…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains V: Marginal Allocation and Risk PoolingTextbook

Service parts networks (spare parts for aircraft, military systems, industrial equipment) hold stock at several echelons: a depot, intermediate stocking facilities, and bases or warehouses that face demand. Two questions recur in their planning. First, how should a given amount of stock be split among locations whose expected costs are convex in the stock…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization III: Stochastic Quasi-Féjer Sequences and the Stochastic Quasigradient Projection MethodTextbook

Many optimization problems in operations research have an objective that is an expectation, F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω)F^0(x)=E f^0(x,\omega)F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω), over a random parameter ω\omegaω whose distribution is known only through samples or is too complex to integrate. Two-stage stochastic programs, inventory and reliability models, and simulation-based design all have this form. Neither F0F^0F0 nor…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to the Scenario Approach V: Support Sets Certify the Violation of Nonconvex Scenario SolutionsTextbook

The scenario approach replaces an optimization problem with uncertain constraints θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​, δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, by the program that enforces only NNN constraints Θδ1,…,ΘδN\Theta_{\delta_1},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_N}Θδ1​​,…,ΘδN​​ drawn at random from the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty. Its solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is then judged by its violation, the probability that a…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VIII: A Truthful Approximation Scheme for Bounded Scheduling with VerificationResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design asks for algorithms whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: the designer can pay the agents, and must choose payments so that each agent's own interest leads it to reveal what the algorithm needs. Nisan and Ronen introduced the framework with task scheduling on unrelated machines as the running example (Nisan–Ronen 2001)…

16 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VI: With Verification, the Compensation-and-Bonus Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful Optimal ImplementationResearch Paper

Scheduling tasks on machines owned by self-interested parties is the running example of Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001), the paper that introduced the study of mechanisms whose allocation rule is an algorithm with a computational objective. Each machine (agent) privately knows how long it needs for each…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design V: The Randomly Biased Min Work Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful 7/4-Approximation for Two AgentsResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design, introduced by Nisan and Ronen (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001), studies optimization problems whose input is held by self-interested agents. Each agent reports its private data to a protocol, and the protocol must choose an output and payments so that reporting the truth is in every agent's interest while the chosen output is…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design IV: No Local Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) asks how well a computational task can be carried out when its inputs are held by self-interested agents who may lie about them. Their test case is scheduling on unrelated machines: tasks must be assigned to agents (machines), each agent privately knows how long it needs…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design II: A Lower Bound for Truthful Task SchedulingResearch Paper

Algorithms deployed on the Internet often take their inputs from parties who own them and who may lie when lying pays. Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) proposed studying optimization problems in this setting: the algorithm designer may hand out payments, and must guarantee that the intended output is…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Single Machine Scheduling with Release Dates III: The Random Per-Job α-Schedule with a Truncated Exponential DensityResearch Paper

Scheduling jobs with release dates on one machine to minimize the total weighted completion time, written 1∣rj∣∑wjCj1|r_j|\sum w_jC_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​, is strongly NP-hard even with unit weights (Lenstra, Rinnooy Kan & Brucker, 1977). It is a basic model of scheduling theory and a standard testbed for approximation algorithms built on linear programming relaxations. Several LP…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Single Machine Scheduling with Release Dates II: The Random α-Schedule with a Truncated Exponential DensityResearch Paper

Minimizing the total weighted completion time ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_j C_j∑j​wj​Cj​ of jobs with release dates on a single machine, written 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​ in scheduling notation, is strongly NP-hard. It is one of the basic models of machine scheduling, and it has served as a test case for a general technique in approximation algorithms: solve a linear programming…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XIV: The König-Egerváry Theorem for Mixed MatricesTextbook

Every physical or engineering model built from linear relations mixes two kinds of numbers. Some coefficients are exact — the ±1\pm 1±1 entries recording Kirchhoff's current and voltage laws in an electrical network, or the incidence structure of a mechanical linkage — because they come from a topological or combinatorial fact, not a measurement. Others are…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXV: Gross Substitutes and Equilibrium PricesTextbook

This mission continues chapter 11's account of the M♮-concave/M♮-convex exchange-economy model begun in mission 14-economic-equilibrium, placing seven of that chunk's own results that were previously left out-of-cone: the two gross-substitutes-style characterizations of M♮-concavity (§11.3), the transfer theorem that lifts an equilibrium of the continuous…

41 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem V: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk over Covariance Ambiguity Sets as a Quadratically Constrained ProgramResearch Paper

In the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) a fleet of mmm vehicles of capacity QQQ leaves a depot and serves nnn customers; every customer is visited once, and the load of each route must not exceed QQQ. In practice customer demands are uncertain at planning time. The chance-constrained CVRP asks that each route respect the capacity with probability at least …

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem IV: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk over First-Order Generic Moment Ambiguity Sets as a Convex ProgramResearch Paper

In the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) a depot serves customers VC={1,…,n}V_C=\{1,\dots,n\}VC​={1,…,n} with mmm vehicles of capacity QQQ, and every route must respect the capacity. When customer demands are uncertain, the distributionally robust chance-constrained CVRP of Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) requires every route to meet its capacity with…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem III: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk Is Additive over Marginalized Moment Ambiguity SetsResearch Paper

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) assigns customers to a fleet of mmm identical vehicles of capacity QQQ and orders each vehicle's visits so as to minimize transportation cost, subject to each vehicle's total load not exceeding QQQ. In practice the customers' demands are not known when the routes are planned. Two classical responses are the robust CVR…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXI: The Potential Criterion for Network FlowsTextbook

Chapter 9 is where discrete convex analysis meets classical network flow theory: the minimum cost flow problem's three hallmark properties — an optimality criterion by potentials, an optimality criterion by negative cycles, and integrality of optimal solutions — are shown to survive, in a precise and increasingly general form, first for arbitrary polyhedral…

88 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem II: Moment Ambiguity Sets Give Subadditive Demand EstimatorsResearch Paper

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) asks for a set of minimum-cost routes by which a fleet of identical vehicles of capacity QQQ, based at a depot, serves every customer exactly once without any vehicle carrying more than its capacity. In practice customer demands are not known when routes are planned. Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020)…

4 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XI: Max-Flow Min-Cut for Submodular FlowsTextbook

Chapters 6 through 8 built M-convex and L-convex functions and their conjugacy theory as abstract combinatorial objects on the integer lattice. Chapter 9 grounds that theory in a setting every reader already knows: network flows. The chapter's throughline is that the classical minimum cost flow problem — flows bounded by simple arc capacities, with a single…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXX: Lagrangian Duality for M-Convex ProgramsTextbook

Missions 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality and 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality built the M2-/L2-convex function classes and proved their conjugacy correspondence is nearly complete. This mission finishes that correspondence (Theorems 8.48-8.49) and then turns to chapter 8's capstone application: a Lagrangian duality theory for integer programs, built entirely from the…

56 thms3 active usersReviewed
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