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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sequencing with Earliness and Tardiness Penalties: With Due-Date Tolerances, the Least Optimal Common Due Date Puts One Job at an End of Its Tolerance WindowResearch Paper

Motivation

Earliness/tardiness (E/T) scheduling penalizes a job both for finishing late and for finishing early. It models just-in-time production, where an early job ties up inventory and a late one delays a customer. Baker and Scudder's review (Oper. Res. 38 (1990) 22–36) organized the single-machine E/T literature around a short list of structural properties of optimal schedules for a common due date shared by all jobs. For the problem without tolerances these properties go back to work the review surveys, beginning with Kanet (1981) for equal penalties.

The review then turns to due-date tolerances: a job pays nothing if it completes within a window around the due date, as in contracts that accept delivery within a few days of a target. Cheng (1988) studied a version in which the penalty is discontinuous at the window ends. Baker and Scudder state the continuous version and prove two generalized properties, III(G) and IV(G), in the paper's Appendix (pp. 34–35). They are the paper's own results; the rest of the review cites results proved elsewhere.

Setting

Fix n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 jobs, processed on one machine in a fixed order, one after another, starting at time 000 with no idle time between them. The job in position jjj has a processing time pjp_jpj​, so it completes at Cj=p1+⋯+pjC_j = p_1 + \dots + p_jCj​=p1​+⋯+pj​. All jobs share a common due date d∈Rd \in \mathbb Rd∈R, which is a decision variable. Job jjj has tolerances uj,vj≥0u_j, v_j \ge 0uj​,vj​≥0 and is free of penalty when Cj∈[d−uj, d+vj]C_j \in [d - u_j,\ d + v_j]Cj​∈[d−uj​, d+vj​]. Outside its window it pays a unit earliness penalty αj>0\alpha_j > 0αj​>0 or a unit tardiness penalty βj>0\beta_j > 0βj​>0:

Ej=(d−Cj−uj)+,Tj=(Cj−d−vj)+,f(d)=∑j=1n(αjEj+βjTj).E_j = (d - C_j - u_j)^+,\qquad T_j = (C_j - d - v_j)^+,\qquad f(d) = \sum_{j=1}^n \bigl(\alpha_j E_j + \beta_j T_j\bigr).Ej​=(d−Cj​−uj​)+,Tj​=(Cj​−d−vj​)+,f(d)=j=1∑n​(αj​Ej​+βj​Tj​).

The tolerances are small compared with the processing times: pj−vj−ui>0p_j - v_j - u_i > 0pj​−vj​−ui​>0 for distinct jobs i≠ji \ne ji=j. Under this condition at most one job can avoid penalty costs. A due date is optimal if it minimizes fff over R\mathbb RR, and the least optimal due date is the smallest optimal one. The paper minimizes ddd as a secondary criterion when there are alternative optima.

In Lean the model is BakerScudder1990.Tolerance.Instance n, with fields p u v α β : Fin n → ℝ, completion times I.C, earliness I.earliness d, tardiness I.tardiness d, total penalty I.cost d, and the predicates I.IsOptimalDueDate and I.IsLeastOptimalDueDate.

Formalization targets

Goal: Property IV(G)

Let ddd be the least optimal due date and let bbb be the number of jobs with Tj=0T_j = 0Tj​=0. Then a least optimal due date exists, and exactly one of the following holds:

Cb=d+vbwith∑i<bαi<∑i≥bβi,  ∑i<bαi≥∑i>bβi,Cb=d−ubwith∑i<bαi<∑i>bβi,  ∑i≤bαi≥∑i>bβi.\begin{aligned} C_b &= d + v_b \quad\text{with}\quad \textstyle\sum_{i<b}\alpha_i < \sum_{i\ge b}\beta_i,\ \ \sum_{i<b}\alpha_i \ge \sum_{i>b}\beta_i,\\ C_b &= d - u_b \quad\text{with}\quad \textstyle\sum_{i<b}\alpha_i < \sum_{i>b}\beta_i,\ \ \sum_{i\le b}\alpha_i \ge \sum_{i>b}\beta_i. \end{aligned}Cb​Cb​​=d+vb​with∑i<b​αi​<∑i≥b​βi​,  ∑i<b​αi​≥∑i>b​βi​,=d−ub​with∑i<b​αi​<∑i>b​βi​,  ∑i≤b​αi​≥∑i>b​βi​.​

The case labels follow the paper's proof. The printed statement swaps them (see Formalization scope).

Milestones

  1. Case 1 of the proof of III(G). Between the window of job j−1j-1j−1 and the window of job jjj, fff is affine with slope ∑i<jαi−∑i≥jβi\sum_{i<j}\alpha_i - \sum_{i\ge j}\beta_i∑i<j​αi​−∑i≥j​βi​. Before the first window and after the last, the slopes are −∑iβi-\sum_i\beta_i−∑i​βi​ and ∑iαi\sum_i\alpha_i∑i​αi​.
  2. Case 2 of the proof of III(G). Inside the window of job jjj, fff is affine with slope ∑i<jαi−∑i>jβi\sum_{i<j}\alpha_i - \sum_{i>j}\beta_i∑i<j​αi​−∑i>j​βi​.
  3. Property III(G). A least optimal due date exists, and at it some job completes at d−ujd - u_jd−uj​ or at d+vjd + v_jd+vj​.
  4. The two optimality conditions. The first pair of inequalities above makes Cj−vjC_j - v_jCj​−vj​ the least optimal due date, and the second pair makes Cj+ujC_j + u_jCj​+uj​ the least optimal due date.

Significance

III(G) reduces the choice of an optimal common due date for a given sequence to 2n2n2n candidates. IV(G) goes further and names the candidate directly from prefix and suffix sums of the penalties. Baker and Scudder use this to say which V-shaped sequences remain candidates for optimality, so that an enumeration over sequences can discard the others. With uj=vj=0u_j = v_j = 0uj​=vj​=0 the two properties reduce to the classical common-due-date conditions: some job completes exactly at ddd, and which one is fixed by a weighted-median condition.

The results are proved in the paper, so the formalization does not settle an open question. It produces a machine-checked version of the Appendix, with two printed errors corrected, and a reusable model of single-machine E/T costs with tolerance windows. No earliness/tardiness model or result was formalized on Prove2Me as of October 2026.

Difficulty

Each linear piece of fff is elementary. The work lies in showing that the pieces are the claimed ones: the tolerance condition must imply that a job before position jjj is early, and a job after it tardy, throughout each gap and window. That needs the ordering Ci+ui<Cj−vjC_i + u_i < C_j - v_jCi​+ui​<Cj​−vj​ for every i<ji < ji<j, not only for consecutive jobs. The second point is the least optimal due date. Optimality alone does not determine ddd on a flat stretch of fff, where every point is optimal and only the left end satisfies the strict inequalities. Existence of a least minimizer also has to be shown, from the two outer slopes and finitely many breakpoints. Finally, the count bbb of jobs without tardiness must be matched to the position of the critical job at both kinds of breakpoint.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are indexed by 0-based positions Fin n, so the paper's job bbb is position k=b−1k = b - 1k=b−1 and the goal states the count of untardy jobs as k+1k+1k+1. Data are real numbers. (x)+(x)^+(x)+ is max 0 x.
  • The sequence starts at time 000 and ddd ranges over all of R\mathbb RR; this is the unrestricted problem, which is the one where the paper asserts III(G) and IV(G). Shifting the start time is equivalent to shifting ddd.
  • "In an optimal schedule" is read for a fixed sequence and its least optimal due date. If a sequence and due date are jointly optimal with ddd least among such optima, then ddd is the least optimal due date for that sequence, so this reading implies the paper's.
  • The tolerance condition is assumed only for distinct jobs. That is a weaker hypothesis than the literal "for all pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j)", so the theorems are stronger.
  • Errata, corrected and disclosed. (i) IV(G) is printed (p. 30 and p. 35) with its two case labels swapped relative to its own proof. One job with u1,v1>0u_1, v_1 > 0u1​,v1​>0 has least optimal due date C1−v1C_1 - v_1C1​−v1​, so C1=d+v1C_1 = d + v_1C1​=d+v1​ while the first condition pair holds. (ii) In Cases 1 and 2 the identity is printed as f(S)−f(S′)=[… ]εf(S) - f(S') = [\dots]\varepsilonf(S)−f(S′)=[…]ε; the correct one is f(S′)−f(S)=[… ]εf(S') - f(S) = [\dots]\varepsilonf(S′)−f(S)=[…]ε. The milestone texts are quoted as printed; the Lean states the corrected mathematics.
  • Existence of a least optimal due date is a conjunct of III(G) and of IV(G), and both assume n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. A version quantifying only over least optimal due dates without existence would be vacuous. A version for every optimal due date would be false. Neither is acceptable.
  • The optimality conditions are stated as sufficient. Their converse fails when uj=vj=0u_j = v_j = 0uj​=vj​=0.
  • Properties I and II (no inserted idle time, V-shaped sequences) are quoted in the paper, not proved there, and are not formalized. Optimization over sequences is out of scope.
  • Welcome contributions: proofs of the two slope identities (finite sums of max 0 terms with a sign determined on each piece), a general lemma that a convex piecewise-linear coercive function on R\mathbb RR attains its least minimizer at a breakpoint, and the special cases u=v=0u = v = 0u=v=0 as corollaries.

Selected references

  • K. R. Baker and G. D. Scudder, Sequencing with earliness and tardiness penalties: a review, Operations Research 38(1) (1990) 22–36. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.38.1.22
  • J. J. Kanet, Minimizing the average deviation of job completion times about a common due date, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 28 (1981) 643–651 (as cited in Baker and Scudder 1990).
  • U. Bagchi, R. S. Sullivan and Y.-L. Chang, Minimizing mean absolute deviation of completion times about a common due date, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 33 (1986) 227–240 (as cited in Baker and Scudder 1990).
  • T. C. E. Cheng, Optimal common due date with limited completion time deviation, Computers & Operations Research 15 (1988) 91–96 (as cited in Baker and Scudder 1990).
6 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Scheduling of a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Completion Time: Delayed SWPT Has Competitive Ratio 2Research Paper

Motivation

A single machine must process nnn jobs that arrive over time. Job jjj is released at time rjr_jrj​, needs pjp_jpj​ units of uninterrupted processing, and has weight wj>0w_j > 0wj​>0; the goal is to minimize the total weighted completion time ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_j C_j∑j​wj​Cj​. Offline, with all release dates equal to zero, Smith's rule (sequence by nondecreasing pj/wjp_j/w_jpj​/wj​) is optimal (Smith 1956); with arbitrary release dates the problem 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​ is strongly NP-hard (Lenstra, Rinnooy Kan and Brucker 1977).

In the online version the scheduler learns of job jjj only at time rjr_jrj​, and at each moment must either start a released job or keep the machine idle. Its quality is measured by its competitive ratio: the worst case, over all instances, of the ratio between the online schedule's cost and the offline optimum. Release-date scheduling is one of the basic test cases of online optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1996. Hoogeveen and Vestjens show that no online algorithm has competitive ratio below 2, even with equal weights, and give the 2-competitive algorithm Delayed SPT for equal weights.
  • 1997. Hall, Schulz, Shmoys and Wein give a (3+ε)(3+\varepsilon)(3+ε)-competitive algorithm for arbitrary weights, based on geometric intervals and linear programming.
  • 1998. Phillips, Stein and Wein give another 2-competitive algorithm for equal weights, which does not extend to arbitrary weights.
  • 2002. Goemans, Queyranne, Schulz, Skutella and Wang obtain a (1+2)(1+\sqrt2)(1+2​)-competitive deterministic algorithm from an LP relaxation.
  • 2004. Anderson and Potts show that Delayed SWPT has competitive ratio exactly 2 for arbitrary positive weights, matching the lower bound.

Setting

An instance has jobs j∈J={1,…,n}j \in J = \{1,\dots,n\}j∈J={1,…,n} with integer release dates rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0, integer processing times pj≥1p_j \ge 1pj​≥1 and real weights wj>0w_j > 0wj​>0. A schedule assigns each job an integer start time SjS_jSj​. It is feasible if Sj≥rjS_j \ge r_jSj​≥rj​ for every jjj and no two intervals [Sj,Sj+pj)[S_j, S_j + p_j)[Sj​,Sj​+pj​) overlap; idle time is allowed. Its cost is C(S)=∑jwj(Sj+pj)C(S) = \sum_j w_j (S_j + p_j)C(S)=∑j​wj​(Sj​+pj​).

Delayed SWPT runs over unit time slots [t,t+1)[t, t+1)[t,t+1). When the machine is available at time ttt, it looks at the jobs released by ttt and not yet started, and selects one with the smallest ratio pj/wjp_j/w_jpj​/wj​. Ties go to the smaller pjp_jpj​, then to the smaller index. If pj≤tp_j \le tpj​≤t, it starts jjj at ttt and the machine is busy until t+pjt + p_jt+pj​. Otherwise the machine stays idle and the rule is applied again at t+1t+1t+1. The resulting schedule is written π\piπ, or dswpt I in Lean. In particular no job starts before time pjp_jpj​.

The proof uses three auxiliary problems:

  • the doubled problem (2P), with data (2rj,2pj,wj)(2r_j, 2p_j, w_j)(2rj​,2pj​,wj​);
  • the extended problem (E), with release dates rj′=max⁡{pj,f(rj)}r'_j = \max\{p_j, f(r_j)\}rj′​=max{pj​,f(rj​)}, where f(t)f(t)f(t) is the first time at or after ttt at which π\piπ leaves the machine free;
  • one unit-length gap job gtg_tgt​ for each slot [t,t+1)[t,t+1)[t,t+1) in which Delayed SWPT idles although a job jjj is available. The gap job has release date f(rj)f(r_j)f(rj​) and weight wj/pjw_j/p_jwj​/pj​.

The schedule πE\pi_EπE​ of (E) runs the original jobs as in π\piπ and each gtg_tgt​ in [t,t+1)[t,t+1)[t,t+1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

min⁡{ρ  :  ∑jwjCj(π)≤ρ∑jwjCj(S) for every instance and every feasible schedule S}=2.\min\Bigl\{\rho \;:\; \sum_j w_j C_j(\pi) \le \rho \sum_j w_j C_j(S)\ \text{for every instance and every feasible schedule } S\Bigr\} = 2.min{ρ:j∑​wj​Cj​(π)≤ρj∑​wj​Cj​(S) for every instance and every feasible schedule S}=2.

Lean: IsLeast {ρ | ∀ n I S, IsFeasible I.r I.p S → cost I.w I.p (dswpt I) ≤ ρ * cost I.w I.p S} 2. Both halves are required: the upper bound 222 and the fact that no smaller constant is valid for this algorithm.

Milestones

  1. πj≥pj\pi_j \ge p_jπj​≥pj​ for every job (§2) and rj′≤max⁡{2rj,pj}r'_j \le \max\{2r_j, p_j\}rj′​≤max{2rj​,pj​} (§3.2).
  2. πE\pi_EπE​ is feasible for (E) (§3.2).
  3. Lemma 1. If π∗\pi^*π∗ and μ∗\mu^*μ∗ are optimal for (P) and (2P), then C(μ∗)=2 C(π∗)C(\mu^*) = 2\,C(\pi^*)C(μ∗)=2C(π∗).
  4. Lemma 2. πE\pi_EπE​ is optimal for (E).
  5. Lemma 3. If μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is optimal for (2P) and a feasible σE\sigma_EσE​ for (E) satisfies
∑j∈JwjCj(σE)+∑g∈GwgCg(σE)≤∑j∈JwjCj(μ∗)+∑g∈GwgCg(πE),(1)\sum_{j\in J} w_j C_j(\sigma_E) + \sum_{g\in G} w_g C_g(\sigma_E) \le \sum_{j\in J} w_j C_j(\mu^*) + \sum_{g\in G} w_g C_g(\pi_E), \tag{1}j∈J∑​wj​Cj​(σE​)+g∈G∑​wg​Cg​(σE​)≤j∈J∑​wj​Cj​(μ∗)+g∈G∑​wg​Cg​(πE​),(1)

then C(π)≤2 C(S)C(\pi) \le 2\,C(S)C(π)≤2C(S) for every feasible SSS. 6. Inequality (1) holds for some feasible σE\sigma_EσE​, for every optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of (2P) (§§3.4–3.6).

Significance

The theorem shows that a deterministic online algorithm can match the lower bound of Hoogeveen and Vestjens for arbitrary positive weights. This settles the best competitive ratio for deterministic online algorithms for 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​. The algorithm needs no linear program. The analysis also does not compare the algorithm with a lower bound on the optimum. Instead it shows that the online schedule is optimal for a modified problem (E), and it converts an optimal schedule of (2P) into a schedule of (E).

The result was proved on paper in 2004. Neither Mathlib nor the Prove2Me catalog contains a machine-checked proof of it, or of any competitive ratio for online scheduling with release dates. This mission provides several reusable pieces:

  • an executable, verified-terminating definition of an online scheduling rule;
  • the doubling lemma for release-date problems;
  • the optimality criterion behind Lemma 2;
  • the block-by-block exchange argument of §§3.3–3.6.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at Lemma 2. Delayed SWPT is far from optimal for (P) itself, and its idle time is unbounded in relative terms. The proof therefore has to show that the inserted gap jobs make every idle slot "justified", so that a preemptive best-available argument becomes valid for (E). That argument rests on an optimality criterion of Belouadah, Posner and Potts (1992), which is not in Mathlib.

The second difficulty is inequality (1). Once μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is doubled and the gap jobs are inserted, nongap jobs must be shifted, and the gain of each gap-generating job must be charged against the delay of the gap jobs in its block. That accounting (Lemmas 4–7 of the paper) is an induction over blocks with signed differences of completion times.

The natural first idea, plain online SWPT (start the available job with the smallest pj/wjp_j/w_jpj​/wj​ whenever the machine is free), has no finite competitive ratio (Example 1 of the paper), so the delay πj≥pj\pi_j \ge p_jπj​≥pj​ is essential to the bound and must be tracked through the whole argument.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • Data. Jobs are Fin n (0-based, so "smallest index" is the order of Fin n). Times are natural numbers, the paper's standing integer-data assumption (p. 688), and weights are real. Every instance carries pj≥1p_j \ge 1pj​≥1 and wj>0w_j > 0wj​>0.
  • Schedules and optimality. Schedules are integer start times. Feasibility, cost and optimality are defined for any finite job type, so (E), with job type Fin n ⊕ gapTimes I, uses the same notions. "Optimal" means optimal among all feasible nonpreemptive schedules with integer start times.
  • The algorithm. Delayed SWPT is a def: a unit-time simulation that compares ratios by cross-multiplication and re-applies the rule at every slot. It runs to the horizon ∑j(rj+2pj)+1\sum_j (r_j + 2p_j) + 1∑j​(rj​+2pj​)+1. A sorry-free check (not uploaded) shows that every job has started by then, and that the simulation reproduces Examples 3 and 4 of the paper, including the gap times 0,2,3,4,5,60,2,3,4,5,60,2,3,4,5,6 of Table 2.
  • Completion times. In (2P) the completion time is μj∗+2pj\mu^*_j + 2p_jμj∗​+2pj​, and gap jobs have unit length.

The goal quantifies over every feasible schedule of every instance. It cannot be met by restricting the competitor to schedules without idle time or to list schedules, by dropping release-date feasibility, or by leaving jobs unscheduled.

Out of scope:

  • The general lower bound "no online algorithm beats 2" (Example 2 of the paper, due to Hoogeveen and Vestjens) is not part of the mission. The lower half of the goal concerns Delayed SWPT only.
  • The Belouadah–Posner–Potts optimality criterion is an external ingredient of Lemma 2. Solvers may formalize it as a supporting theorem.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs:

  • simulation invariants for the algorithm;
  • exchange and left-shift arguments for single-machine schedules;
  • the job-splitting relaxation behind the best-available criterion.

The schedule vocabulary and the criterion are reusable for other release-date scheduling results. Contributions toward the block lemmas of §§3.3–3.6 (Lemmas 4–7, the bound (9)) are welcome as supporting theorems.

Selected references

  • E. J. Anderson and C. N. Potts, Online Scheduling of a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Completion Time, Mathematics of Operations Research 29(3), 686–697, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0092
  • J. A. Hoogeveen and A. P. A. Vestjens, Optimal On-Line Algorithms for Single-Machine Scheduling, IPCO 1996, LNCS 1084, 404–414. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61310-2_30
  • L. A. Hall, A. S. Schulz, D. B. Shmoys and J. Wein, Scheduling to Minimize Average Completion Time: Off-line and On-line Approximation Algorithms, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(3), 513–544, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.3.513
  • C. Phillips, C. Stein and J. Wein, Minimizing Average Completion Time in the Presence of Release Dates, Mathematical Programming 82, 199–223, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585872
  • M. X. Goemans, M. Queyranne, A. S. Schulz, M. Skutella and Y. Wang, Single Machine Scheduling with Release Dates, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 15(2), 165–192, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S089548019936223X
  • H. Belouadah, M. E. Posner and C. N. Potts, Scheduling with Release Dates on a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Completion Time, Discrete Applied Mathematics 36(3), 213–231, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(92)90255-9
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and P. Brucker, Complexity of Machine Scheduling Problems, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1, 343–362, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70743-X
  • W. E. Smith, Various Optimizers for Single-Stage Production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3, 59–66, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationNumerical Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

The Rate of Convergence of Nesterov's Accelerated Forward-Backward Method is Actually Faster than 1/k^2 I: For α > 3, (Ψ + Φ)(x_k) − min(Ψ + Φ) = o(k⁻²) and ‖x_{k+1} − x_k‖ = o(k⁻¹)Research Paper

Motivation

Many problems in signal processing, statistics and machine learning take the form

min⁡x∈H Ψ(x)+Φ(x),\min_{x\in\mathcal H}\ \Psi(x)+\Phi(x),x∈Hmin​ Ψ(x)+Φ(x),

where Φ\PhiΦ is smooth and convex (a data-fit term) and Ψ\PsiΨ is convex but possibly nonsmooth or infinite-valued (an ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 penalty, the indicator function of a constraint set). The forward-backward method alternates a gradient step on Φ\PhiΦ with a proximal step on Ψ\PsiΨ and reduces the objective gap at rate O(k−1)O(k^{-1})O(k−1) after kkk iterations. Combining it with Nesterov's extrapolation scheme gives the accelerated forward-backward method, best known as FISTA, which improves the guaranteed rate to O(k−2)O(k^{-2})O(k−2). FISTA and its variants are standard solvers for sparse recovery and image reconstruction.

Timeline:

  • 1983. Nesterov introduces the extrapolation scheme for smooth convex minimization, with an O(k−2)O(k^{-2})O(k−2) rate for function values (Nesterov 1983).
  • 2009. Beck and Teboulle extend it to the composite problem above (FISTA), with the O(k−2)O(k^{-2})O(k−2) rate (doi:10.1137/080716542).
  • 2014. Su, Boyd and Candès read the scheme as a discretization of the ODE x¨+αtx˙+∇Θ(x)=0\ddot x+\frac{\alpha}{t}\dot x+\nabla\Theta(x)=0x¨+tα​x˙+∇Θ(x)=0 (arXiv:1503.01243).
  • 2014–2015. Chambolle and Dossal (doi:10.1007/s10957-015-0746-4) and, independently, Attouch, Chbani, Peypouquet and Redont (arXiv:1507.04782) prove weak convergence of the iterates for the variant with parameter α>3\alpha>3α>3. Before that, convergence of the iterates had been open for about two decades.
  • 2015. May shows that for α>3\alpha>3α>3 the continuous-time gap is o(t−2)o(t^{-2})o(t−2) (arXiv:1509.05598).
  • 2016. Attouch and Peypouquet prove the discrete analogue: for α>3\alpha>3α>3 the function gap of the algorithm is o(k−2)o(k^{-2})o(k−2) and the velocity is o(k−1)o(k^{-1})o(k−1) (arXiv:1510.08740, SIAM J. Optim. 26(3):1824–1834).

Setting

Let H\mathcal HH be a real Hilbert space with inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥. Let:

  1. Ψ:H→R∪{+∞}\Psi:\mathcal H\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}Ψ:H→R∪{+∞} be proper (finite somewhere), lower semicontinuous and convex;
  2. Φ:H→R\Phi:\mathcal H\to\mathbb RΦ:H→R be convex and continuously differentiable, with gradient ∇Φ\nabla\Phi∇Φ Lipschitz continuous with constant LLL;
  3. Θ=Ψ+Φ\Theta=\Psi+\PhiΘ=Ψ+Φ, and assume the set of minimizers S=argmin⁡ΘS=\operatorname{argmin}\ThetaS=argminΘ is nonempty.

For s>0s>0s>0, the proximal map prox⁡sΨ(z)\operatorname{prox}_{s\Psi}(z)proxsΨ​(z) is the unique minimizer of u↦Ψ(u)+12s∥u−z∥2u\mapsto\Psi(u)+\frac1{2s}\|u-z\|^2u↦Ψ(u)+2s1​∥u−z∥2. Given α>0\alpha>0α>0, a step size 0<s<1/L0<s<1/L0<s<1/L and starting points x0,x1x_0,x_1x0​,x1​, algorithm (2) generates

yk=xk+k−1k+α−1(xk−xk−1),xk+1=prox⁡sΨ(yk−s∇Φ(yk)),k≥1.y_k=x_k+\frac{k-1}{k+\alpha-1}(x_k-x_{k-1}),\qquad x_{k+1}=\operatorname{prox}_{s\Psi}\big(y_k-s\nabla\Phi(y_k)\big),\qquad k\ge1.yk​=xk​+k+α−1k−1​(xk​−xk−1​),xk+1​=proxsΨ​(yk​−s∇Φ(yk​)),k≥1.

The common choice is α=3\alpha=3α=3; this mission concerns α>3\alpha>3α>3.

The proofs use the operator Gs(y)=1s(y−prox⁡sΨ(y−s∇Φ(y)))G_s(y)=\frac1s\big(y-\operatorname{prox}_{s\Psi}(y-s\nabla\Phi(y))\big)Gs​(y)=s1​(y−proxsΨ​(y−s∇Φ(y))), the sequence zk=xk+k−1α−1(xk−xk−1)z_k=x_k+\frac{k-1}{\alpha-1}(x_k-x_{k-1})zk​=xk​+α−1k−1​(xk​−xk−1​), a minimizer x∗x^*x∗, and the quantity

E(k)=2sα−1(k+α−2)2(Θ(xk)−Θ(x∗))+(α−1)∥zk−x∗∥2.\mathcal E(k)=\frac{2s}{\alpha-1}(k+\alpha-2)^2\big(\Theta(x_k)-\Theta(x^*)\big)+(\alpha-1)\|z_k-x^*\|^2 .E(k)=α−12s​(k+α−2)2(Θ(xk​)−Θ(x∗))+(α−1)∥zk​−x∗∥2.

Write θk=Θ(xk)−Θ(x∗)\theta_k=\Theta(x_k)-\Theta(x^*)θk​=Θ(xk​)−Θ(x∗) and dk=12s∥xk+1−xk∥2d_k=\frac1{2s}\|x_{k+1}-x_k\|^2dk​=2s1​∥xk+1​−xk​∥2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 2)

For α>3\alpha>3α>3 and 0<s<1/L0<s<1/L0<s<1/L,

lim⁡k→∞k2(Θ(xk)−min⁡Θ)=0andlim⁡k→∞k ∥xk+1−xk∥=0.\lim_{k\to\infty}k^2\big(\Theta(x_k)-\min\Theta\big)=0\qquad\text{and}\qquad\lim_{k\to\infty}k\,\|x_{k+1}-x_k\|=0.k→∞lim​k2(Θ(xk​)−minΘ)=0andk→∞lim​k∥xk+1​−xk​∥=0.

The statement fixes no constants, so it is unaffected by later improvements of the explicit bounds below.

Milestones (in attack order)

  1. (9), p. 2. If sL≤1sL\le1sL≤1, then for all x,yx,yx,y: Θ(y−sGs(y))≤Θ(x)+⟨Gs(y),y−x⟩−s2∥Gs(y)∥2\Theta(y-sG_s(y))\le\Theta(x)+\langle G_s(y),y-x\rangle-\frac s2\|G_s(y)\|^2Θ(y−sGs​(y))≤Θ(x)+⟨Gs​(y),y−x⟩−2s​∥Gs​(y)∥2.
  2. (13), p. 3. For α≥3\alpha\ge3α≥3 and k≥1k\ge1k≥1: E(k+1)+2sα−3α−1k θk≤E(k)\mathcal E(k+1)+2s\frac{\alpha-3}{\alpha-1}k\,\theta_k\le\mathcal E(k)E(k+1)+2sα−1α−3​kθk​≤E(k).
  3. Fact 1, p. 3. (E(k))(\mathcal E(k))(E(k)) is nonincreasing and has a finite limit.
  4. Fact 2, p. 3. θk≤(α−1)E(1)2s(k+α−2)2\theta_k\le\frac{(\alpha-1)\mathcal E(1)}{2s(k+\alpha-2)^2}θk​≤2s(k+α−2)2(α−1)E(1)​ and ∥zk−x∗∥2≤E(1)α−1\|z_k-x^*\|^2\le\frac{\mathcal E(1)}{\alpha-1}∥zk​−x∗∥2≤α−1E(1)​ for k≥1k\ge1k≥1.
  5. Fact 3, p. 3. For α>3\alpha>3α>3: ∑k≥1k θk≤(α−1)E(1)2s(α−3)\sum_{k\ge1}k\,\theta_k\le\frac{(\alpha-1)\mathcal E(1)}{2s(\alpha-3)}∑k≥1​kθk​≤2s(α−3)(α−1)E(1)​.
  6. (14), p. 4. Θ(xk+1)+dk≤Θ(xk)+(k−1)2(k+α−1)2dk−1\Theta(x_{k+1})+d_k\le\Theta(x_k)+\frac{(k-1)^2}{(k+\alpha-1)^2}d_{k-1}Θ(xk+1​)+dk​≤Θ(xk​)+(k+α−1)2(k−1)2​dk−1​ for k≥1k\ge1k≥1.
  7. Fact 4, p. 4. For α>3\alpha>3α>3: ∑k≥1k dk≤α(3α−5)E(1)4s(α−1)(α−3)\sum_{k\ge1}k\,d_k\le\frac{\alpha(3\alpha-5)\mathcal E(1)}{4s(\alpha-1)(\alpha-3)}∑k≥1​kdk​≤4s(α−1)(α−3)α(3α−5)E(1)​.
  8. Lemma 2, p. 4. For α>3\alpha>3α>3, lim⁡k[k2dk+(k+1)2θk+1]\lim_k\big[k^2d_k+(k+1)^2\theta_{k+1}\big]limk​[k2dk​+(k+1)2θk+1​] exists and is finite.

Significance

The result. The O(k−2)O(k^{-2})O(k−2) rate of FISTA is often quoted as optimal for first-order methods. Theorem 1 shows that for α>3\alpha>3α>3 the worst-case rate along every single run is strictly better, o(k−2)o(k^{-2})o(k−2), and that the steps ∥xk+1−xk∥\|x_{k+1}-x_k\|∥xk+1​−xk​∥ decay faster than 1/k1/k1/k. No better power is possible: by Attouch et al., Example 2.13 there is no p>2p>2p>2 with an O(k−p)O(k^{-p})O(k−p) rate for every Φ\PhiΦ and Ψ\PsiΨ. The intermediate estimates (Facts 2–4) give explicit, quantitative bounds that are reused in the analysis of inexact and perturbed variants (Theorem 4 of the paper) and in mission II of this series, which proves weak convergence of the iterates.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper. As far as we know, no machine-checked proof of the O(k−2)O(k^{-2})O(k−2) rate of FISTA in this Hilbert-space, extended-valued setting exists in Mathlib or on this platform, and neither does the o(k−2)o(k^{-2})o(k−2) refinement. A complete development would provide reusable statements about proximal-gradient steps for functions valued in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}. The page also has a factor slip in Fact 4 and Lemma 2 (see Formalization scope); checking it mechanically is one of the outputs.

Difficulty

The O(k−2)O(k^{-2})O(k−2) bound follows from the monotonicity of E\mathcal EE alone. That argument cannot give o(k−2)o(k^{-2})o(k−2): it controls k2θkk^2\theta_kk2θk​ only by the constant E(1)\mathcal E(1)E(1), and summability of kθkk\theta_kkθk​ (Fact 3) gives a decay of k2θkk^2\theta_kk2θk​ only along a subsequence, not of the whole sequence. The missing ingredient is convergence of a weighted combination of function gaps and velocities, which is Lemma 2. The bookkeeping is delicate: every step carries explicit coefficients in kkk and α\alphaα, and the inequalities must hold in the extended reals because Ψ\PsiΨ may be +∞+\infty+∞ at the starting point.

Formalization scope

  • Space and functions. H\mathcal HH is a real inner product space that is complete. Ψ\PsiΨ takes values in EReal and satisfies the published predicate IsProperClosedConvex (never −∞-\infty−∞, finite somewhere, lower semicontinuous, convex epigraph). Φ:H→R\Phi:\mathcal H\to\mathbb RΦ:H→R is ConvexOn and ContDiff ℝ 1, and gradient Φ is LipschitzWith L for some L : ℝ≥0.
  • Step size. 0<s<1/L0<s<1/L0<s<1/L is written 0 < s and s * L < 1, so that L=0L=0L=0 is allowed (s < 1 / L would be unsatisfiable when L=0L=0L=0). Display (9) uses the page's s≤1/Ls\le1/Ls≤1/L, written s * L ≤ 1.
  • Proximal map. It is a map P with the published predicate IsProx s Ψ P, which determines P=prox⁡sΨP=\operatorname{prox}_{s\Psi}P=proxsΨ​ for proper closed convex Ψ\PsiΨ and s>0s>0s>0.
  • The run. It is required to follow (2) for every k≥1k\ge1k≥1, with x0,x1x_0,x_1x0​,x1​ arbitrary; the coefficient of x0x_0x0​ vanishes at k=1k=1k=1.
  • Extended reals. Θ\ThetaΘ, E\mathcal EE and the function-value statements live in EReal. No value is ever converted to R\mathbb RR with toReal, which would turn +∞+\infty+∞ into 000. "The limit exists" (Fact 1, Lemma 2) means convergence to a real number, because in EReal every monotone sequence converges. Infinite series of nonnegative terms are stated as bounds on every partial sum. min⁡Θ\min\ThetaminΘ in the goal is ⨅ y, Θ y together with the hypothesis that a minimizer exists.
  • Corrected slips. Fact 2 is stated with E(1)\mathcal E(1)E(1) for k≥1k\ge1k≥1; the page writes E(0)\mathcal E(0)E(0) for k≥0k\ge0k≥0, which needs an iterate x−1x_{-1}x−1​. Fact 4 is stated for ∑k dk\sum k\,d_k∑kdk​; the page prints ∑k∥xk+1−xk∥2\sum k\|x_{k+1}-x_k\|^2∑k∥xk+1​−xk​∥2 with the same constant, which is off by the factor 2s2s2s and false in general. Lemma 2 is stated for the bracket k2dk+(k+1)2θk+1k^2d_k+(k+1)^2\theta_{k+1}k2dk​+(k+1)2θk+1​ of its proof (16).
  • Ruled out. The goal assumes nothing about E\mathcal EE, zkz_kzk​, θk\theta_kθk​ or dkd_kdk​. A statement of the first limit for toReal values, or with an extended-real "limit exists", would be trivially weaker and is not what is asked.
  • Welcome contributions. Proofs of any milestone; general facts about proximal maps of EReal-valued convex functions and about the descent property of LLL-smooth convex functions, which are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • H. Attouch, J. Peypouquet, The Rate of Convergence of Nesterov's Accelerated Forward-Backward Method is Actually Faster than 1/k21/k^21/k2, SIAM J. Optim. 26(3):1824–1834, 2016. arXiv:1510.08740v4, doi:10.1137/15M1046095
  • H. Attouch, Z. Chbani, J. Peypouquet, P. Redont, Fast convergence of inertial dynamics and algorithms with asymptotic vanishing viscosity, Math. Program. 168:123–175, 2018. arXiv:1507.04782
  • A. Beck, M. Teboulle, A fast iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm for linear inverse problems, SIAM J. Imaging Sci. 2(1):183–202, 2009. doi:10.1137/080716542
  • A. Chambolle, C. Dossal, On the convergence of the iterates of the "fast iterative shrinkage/thresholding algorithm", J. Optim. Theory Appl. 166:968–982, 2015. doi:10.1007/s10957-015-0746-4
  • R. May, Asymptotic for a second order evolution equation with convex potential and vanishing damping term, 2015. arXiv:1509.05598
  • Y. Nesterov, A method of solving a convex programming problem with convergence rate O(1/k2)O(1/k^2)O(1/k2), Soviet Math. Dokl. 27:372–376, 1983. mathnet
  • W. Su, S. Boyd, E. J. Candès, A differential equation for modeling Nesterov's accelerated gradient method: theory and insights, J. Mach. Learn. Res. 17(153):1–43, 2016. arXiv:1503.01243
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

Motivation

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this decision for thousands of items. The practical rule used everywhere is the order-up-to (base-stock) rule: bring the inventory position up to a fixed target level whenever it falls below it, and order nothing otherwise. Chapter 2 of the book justifies this rule for a single item with linear costs, following the dynamic-programming argument of Karlin and Scarf, and the rest of the book takes the rule as given.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak posed the periodic-review inventory problem as a dynamic program in 1951 (Econometrica). Bellman, Glicksberg and Gross showed in 1955 that with linear ordering cost and convex expected holding and shortage costs the optimal policy has a critical-number form (Management Science). Karlin and Scarf (1958) extended the analysis to a positive lead time, the setting of the book's Theorems 1–3. Veinott (1965) gave conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal in multi-product, nonstationary models (Management Science).

Setting

One item is stocked at one location. At the start of each period the inventory position yyy is observed and a quantity u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 is ordered; with lead time one period it arrives at the start of the next period. Demand in each period is independent of other periods and has a density ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) that is positive and continuous. Unmet demand is backordered. Costs are linear: ccc per unit ordered, hhh per unit on hand at the end of a period, bbb per unit backordered at the end of a period, and future costs are discounted by α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1). The one-period cost is

L(y)={h∫0y(y−x)g(x) dx+b∫y∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y>0,b∫0∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y≤0.L(y) = \begin{cases} h\displaystyle\int_0^y (y-x)g(x)\,dx + b\int_y^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y > 0,\\[1mm] b\displaystyle\int_0^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y \le 0. \end{cases}L(y)=⎩⎨⎧​h∫0y​(y−x)g(x)dx+b∫y∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,b∫0∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,​y>0,y≤0.​

The book assumes throughout that b>1−αα cb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\,cb>α1−α​c: the backorder cost outweighs the saving from deferring a purchase.

The nnn-period value functions are f1=Lf_1 = Lf1​=L and, for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2,

fn(y)=min⁡u≥0{c u+L(y)+α∫0∞fn−1(y+u−x) g(x) dx}.f_n(y) = \min_{u \ge 0}\Big\{ c\,u + L(y) + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}(y+u-x)\,g(x)\,dx \Big\}.fn​(y)=u≥0min​{cu+L(y)+α∫0∞​fn−1​(y+u−x)g(x)dx}.

An order uuu is optimal at yyy if it attains this minimum over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0. The order-up-to rule with level sss orders u(y)=max⁡{0,s−y}u(y) = \max\{0, s-y\}u(y)=max{0,s−y}. The marginal function of eq. (2.8) is Fn(w)=c+α∫0∞fn′(w−x) g(x) dxF_n(w) = c + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_n'(w-x)\,g(x)\,dxFn​(w)=c+α∫0∞​fn′​(w−x)g(x)dx. In Lean these are Model, Model.L, Model.f, Model.IsOptimalOrder, Model.IsOrderUpToOptimal and Model.F in the namespace ServiceParts.BaseStock.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18) in its nnn-period form

For every horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, either there is a real level sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ with

un∗(y)=max⁡{0, sn∗−y} optimal for every y,u_n^*(y) = \max\{0,\ s_n^* - y\} \ \text{optimal for every } y,un∗​(y)=max{0, sn∗​−y} optimal for every y,

or ordering nothing is optimal for every yyy (level −∞-\infty−∞); and there is N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 such that the level is real for all n≥Nn \ge Nn≥N. No value of sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is fixed: the goal asserts the shape of the optimal policy only.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. LLL is convex (p. 21).
  2. Every fnf_nfn​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, is convex (p. 19, property (c)).
  3. Every fnf_nfn​ is differentiable with −(c+b)≤fn′≤h/(1−α)-(c+b) \le f_n' \le h/(1-\alpha)−(c+b)≤fn′​≤h/(1−α) (p. 20).
  4. Property (b): given an optimal real level sss for horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, fn′=−c+L′f_n' = -c + L'fn′​=−c+L′ below sss and fn′=L′+α∫0∞fn−1′(⋅−x)g(x) dxf_n' = L' + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}'(\cdot - x)g(x)\,dxfn′​=L′+α∫0∞​fn−1′​(⋅−x)g(x)dx from sss on (p. 19).
  5. Given such a level, Fn(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0F_n(w) \to (1-\alpha)c - b\alpha < 0Fn​(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0 as w→−∞w \to -\inftyw→−∞ (p. 19).
  6. Property (a): optimal real levels are nondecreasing in the horizon, sn∗≤sn+1∗s_n^* \le s_{n+1}^*sn∗​≤sn+1∗​ (p. 18).

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-dimensional control problem, a choice of order quantity for every possible inventory position, to one number per period. Every later chapter of the book (Palm's theorem for (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) policies, METRIC-type stock level optimization, allocation in multi-echelon systems) parameterizes policies by such stock levels; this is where the book justifies that parameterization.

The result is classical and proved in many texts. On Prove2Me the mission produces a machine-checked finite-horizon version with a continuous demand density, including the calculus the proof needs: convexity of an expected cost defined by integrals against a density, differentiation under the integral sign in the recursion, and the one-sided behaviour of the value function at the order-up-to level. Existing platform results on base-stock optimality (Veinott's multi-product model, advance demand information) use different models and different arguments; none covers this recursion.

Difficulty

The argument is an induction on nnn whose hypothesis carries convexity, the derivative formula (b), and bounds on fn′f_n'fn′​. The delicate step is the existence of a finite root of FnF_nFn​: its limit at −∞-\infty−∞ depends on whether the previous level was finite. For n=1n = 1n=1 nothing is ordered and the limit is c−bαc - b\alphac−bα, which the assumption b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c does not make negative. The book's base case ("left to the reader") therefore fails when c>αbc > \alpha bc>αb: with α=12\alpha = \tfrac12α=21​, c=1c = 1c=1, b=32b = \tfrac32b=23​ the two-period problem never orders. The goal is corrected accordingly.

Two properties the book's induction also carries are not usable as printed. Property (d), fn′≤fn−1′f_n' \le f_{n-1}'fn′​≤fn−1′​, is false: for large yyy, fn′(y)f_n'(y)fn′​(y) approaches h(1+α+⋯+αn−1)h(1 + \alpha + \dots + \alpha^{n-1})h(1+α+⋯+αn−1), which increases with nnn. The second-derivative clause of property (c) fails at y=0y = 0y=0 whenever g(0+)>0g(0^+) > 0g(0+)>0. A solver cannot follow the printed induction step for step; property (a), which the book derives from (d), is true and is a milestone in its own right.

Formalization scope

  • Horizon. The book states Theorem 2 for "the optimal policy" without a horizon. Its proof is an induction on a finite horizon, and the passage n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ is left as a conjecture (p. 21). The goal is the finite-horizon theorem; no infinite-horizon value function is constructed.
  • Lead time. The proof sets τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 "to simplify notation"; so does the formalization. Theorem 1 (dependence on the inventory position only) and Theorem 3 (general τ\tauτ, whose level equation is the conjectured infinite-horizon one) are not stated.
  • Level −∞-\infty−∞. The goal allows "never order" as the order-up-to rule with level −∞-\infty−∞ and adds eventual finiteness; see Difficulty.
  • Added hypotheses. c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, h>0h > 0h>0 (the book uses lim⁡w→∞fn′(w−x)>0\lim_{w\to\infty} f_n'(w - x) > 0limw→∞​fn′​(w−x)>0), 0<α0 < \alpha0<α (the book divides by α\alphaα), and a finite mean ∫0∞x g(x) dx<∞\int_0^\infty x\,g(x)\,dx < \infty∫0∞​xg(x)dx<∞ (without it LLL is infinite). All are fields of Model, together with positivity and continuity of ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), ∫0∞g=1\int_0^\infty g = 1∫0∞​g=1, and b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c.
  • Minimum and derivatives. fnf_nfn​ is defined with the infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 of a nonnegative quantity; optimality is always against every u′≥0u' \ge 0u′≥0. Statements about fn′f_n'fn′​ assert differentiability (Differentiable, HasDerivAt) and do not read deriv as evidence of it.
  • Levels. The book's sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is "the unique solution of (2.6)"; milestones take any real level at which the order-up-to rule is optimal.

A recursion in which ordering is restricted to order-up-to rules, or in which fnf_nfn​ is defined through sn∗s_n^*sn∗​, would make the goal a tautology; here fnf_nfn​ is defined by minimization over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 and optimality is checked against all orders.

Needed infrastructure: convexity and differentiation of parametric integrals against a density on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and minimization of a differentiable convex function over a half-line. Both are reusable for the other stochastic inventory missions on the platform. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI).
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris and J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906814
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to the Scenario Approach V: Support Sets Certify the Violation of Nonconvex Scenario SolutionsTextbook

Why certify nonconvex scenario solutions

The scenario approach replaces an optimization problem with uncertain constraints θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​, δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, by the program that enforces only NNN constraints Θδ1,…,ΘδN\Theta_{\delta_1},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_N}Θδ1​​,…,ΘδN​​ drawn at random from the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty. Its solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is then judged by its violation, the probability that a new instance δ\deltaδ is not satisfied. For convex programs in Rd\mathbb R^dRd the violation is controlled by the dimension ddd alone (Calafiore and Campi 2006; Campi and Garatti 2008), because a convex program has at most ddd support constraints. Many problems where the scenario approach is used in practice are not convex: control with quantized inputs, mixed-integer design, classification with nonconvex losses, and decisions over infinite-dimensional or unstructured sets. For those programs no a priori bound on the number of constraints that determine the solution exists.

Timeline, as recorded in Chapter 8 of Campi and Garatti's textbook:

  • 2006–2008: the violation of convex scenario solutions is bounded, and then characterized exactly, in terms of ddd.
  • 2018: the wait-and-judge theory (Campi and Garatti, Math. Programming 2018) evaluates the violation from the number of support constraints counted after solving the program; it extends to nonconvex programs but requires a nondegeneracy assumption.
  • 2018: Campi, Garatti and Ramponi (IEEE TAC 2018) prove a bound in terms of the size of any support set, with no convexity and no nondegeneracy assumption. This is the result formalized here, stated in the book as Eq. (8.15).

Setting

Let Θ\ThetaΘ be a generic set; it may be an infinite-dimensional space or a set with no algebraic structure. Let f:Θ→Rf:\Theta\to\mathbb Rf:Θ→R be a cost and Θδ⊆Θ\Theta_\delta\subseteq\ThetaΘδ​⊆Θ constraint sets indexed by δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, where Δ\DeltaΔ carries a probability P\mathbb PP. Neither fff nor the Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ is required to be convex. With a sample δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ drawn independently from P\mathbb PP, the scenario program is

min⁡θ∈Θf(θ)subject toθ∈⋂i=1,…,NΘδi,(8.12)\min_{\theta\in\Theta} f(\theta)\quad\text{subject to}\quad \theta\in\bigcap_{i=1,\dots,N}\Theta_{\delta_i},\tag{8.12}θ∈Θmin​f(θ)subject toθ∈i=1,…,N⋂​Θδi​​,(8.12)

and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ denotes its solution, assumed to exist and be unique for every sample.

The violation of a decision is V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}V(\theta)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\theta\notin\Theta_\delta\}V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​} (Definition 3.1).

A support set (Definition 8.8) is a subset {Θδi1,…,Θδik}\{\Theta_{\delta_{i_1}},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_{i_k}}\}{Θδi1​​​,…,Θδik​​​} of the constraints such that the program with only these constraints in place has the same solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ as the program with all constraints. The full set of constraints is always a support set; a support set need not be minimal (of smallest cardinality) or irreducible (with no removable element). Let σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ be the cardinality of the support set returned, for every sample, by some fixed algorithm.

Formalization targets

Goal: the support-set bound, Eq. (8.15)

For every function ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,1,\dots,N\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1] with ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1,

PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤∑k=0N−1(Nk) (1−ϵ(k))N−k.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\sum_{k=0}^{N-1}\binom Nk\,(1-\epsilon(k))^{N-k}.PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤k=0∑N−1​(kN​)(1−ϵ(k))N−k.

The level function ϵ\epsilonϵ is free: the statement is one inequality per admissible ϵ\epsilonϵ, and it holds for any algorithm producing support sets. This is the weakest form that carries the whole result.

Milestone: the level function for a confidence β\betaβ, Eq. (8.16)

For β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] let

ϵ(k)={1k=N,1−βN(Nk)N−kotherwise.\epsilon(k)=\begin{cases}1 & k=N,\\ 1-\sqrt[N-k]{\dfrac{\beta}{N\binom Nk}} & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}ϵ(k)=⎩⎨⎧​11−N−kN(kN​)β​​​k=N,otherwise.​

The arithmetic half states that ϵ\epsilonϵ maps {0,…,N}\{0,\dots,N\}{0,…,N} into [0,1][0,1][0,1], ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1, and the right-hand side of (8.15) equals β\betaβ (for N≥1N\ge1N≥1). The probabilistic half states PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\betaPN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β.

Significance

The result turns the size of a support set, a quantity observed after the program is solved, into a certificate on the violation of the solution, for any optimization or decision problem whose solution is determined by a subset of the data. With the choice (8.16), a user who finds a support set of size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ can assert V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗)V(\theta^*)\le\epsilon(\sigma^*)V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗) with confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β. The book's Figure 8.12 shows that ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) for β=10−6\beta=10^{-6}β=10−6 remains well below 111 for kkk up to a sizeable fraction of NNN. Because the algorithm that finds the support set is arbitrary, cheap heuristics that return non-minimal support sets still give valid, if weaker, guarantees. The result does not recover the tight convex bound (3.4); for convex programs the Chapter 3 theory remains sharper.

The statement is proved in [31] and is the probabilistic core of the sample-compression arguments of learning theory (Floyd and Warmuth 1995) in the form used by the scenario approach. To the best of available knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The platform's UnderstandingML.compression_bound proves a sample-compression bound for a fixed compression size with a different constant; it does not cover a data-dependent size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ or an arbitrary level function. A formal proof here provides a reusable bound for data-dependent support sets over arbitrary decision sets.

Difficulty

The natural first step is: condition on the support set being a particular index set III with ∣I∣=k|I|=k∣I∣=k, and argue that the solution is then a function of the kkk sampled constraints in III alone, while the other N−kN-kN−k samples are independent of it and must all be satisfied. The difficulty is that the event "the algorithm returns III" depends on all NNN samples, and the solution of the reduced program on III is defined only where that program has a unique solution; the decomposition of the probability therefore has to be carried out on sections of the product space, with a measurability argument for each piece. A second point is that σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is random and data-dependent: a bound for each fixed kkk does not directly give a bound at the random level ϵ(σ∗)\epsilon(\sigma^*)ϵ(σ∗), and the role of the condition ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1 must be accounted for at k=Nk=Nk=N.

Formalization scope

Lean representation and committed conventions:

  • Θ\ThetaΘ and Δ\DeltaΔ are arbitrary types with measurable structures; P\mathbb PP is a probability measure on Δ\DeltaΔ; a sample is ω : Fin N → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin N => P); indices run over 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1.
  • A subset of constraints is a Finset (Fin N); the reduced program with index set III has feasible set ⋂i∈IΘδi\bigcap_{i\in I}\Theta_{\delta_i}⋂i∈I​Θδi​​ (all of Θ\ThetaΘ for I=∅I=\emptysetI=∅).
  • The solution map θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is a parameter with the hypothesis that θ∗(ω)\theta^*(\omega)θ∗(ω) is the unique solution of the full program for every sample.
  • "Has the same solution" in Definition 8.8 means: the reduced program has a unique solution and it equals the unique solution of the full program. Existence of solutions is not assumed for reduced programs in general, only for those that are support sets.
  • The algorithm is an arbitrary map alg : (Fin N → Δ) → Finset (Fin N) returning a support set for every sample; σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is the cardinality of its output. The goal is universal over such maps.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ is a real function on N\mathbb NN with ϵ(k)∈[0,1]\epsilon(k)\in[0,1]ϵ(k)∈[0,1] for k≤Nk\le Nk≤N and ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1.
  • The violation is real-valued in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the probability of the event is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with ENNReal.ofReal of the real right-hand side.

Implicit hypotheses of the page, made explicit (the book states on p. 33 that measurability issues are glossed over): the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta):\theta\in\Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is measurable in Θ×Δ\Theta\times\DeltaΘ×Δ; the solution map is measurable; each event {ω:the algorithm returns J}\{\omega:\text{the algorithm returns }J\}{ω:the algorithm returns J} is measurable; θ∗\theta^*θ∗ exists and is unique for every sample; N≥1N\ge1N≥1 in the arithmetic half of (8.16).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the algorithm is not existentially quantified and is not the minimal support set, the reduced programs are not all assumed solvable (which would be unsatisfiable when fff has no unconstrained minimizer), and the support-set property requires uniqueness of the reduced solution, without which the bound is false.

Needed infrastructure: product measures on Fin N → Δ, splitting of such products along a subset of coordinates, and Fubini/Tonelli for sections. These pieces are reusable for other compression-type bounds. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on splitting Measure.pi over a Finset of coordinates.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018, §8.6, pp. 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, F. A. Ramponi, A general scenario theory for nonconvex optimization and decision making, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2018.2808446
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • S. Floyd, M. Warmuth, Sample compression, learnability, and the Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension, Machine Learning, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993593
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 2: Under Production Economy the Retailer Earns Weakly More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retailers hold point-of-sale and loyalty-card data that their suppliers cannot observe, and many of them sell access to it through data-sharing programs; others share the same data for free, or with only some suppliers (Shang, Ha & Tong 2016, §1). When two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer, sharing a demand signal with a manufacturer changes how he sets his wholesale price, which in turn changes the retailer's margins and the rival's demand. Whether the retailer wants to share, with how many manufacturers, and at what price, is therefore a question about a multistage game with incomplete information.

Shang, Ha and Tong answer it for linear demand, a linear-expectation signal and quadratic production costs, under two contracting protocols. This mission covers the production economy case (marginal cost decreasing in volume, §6 of the paper), in which the retailer may have an incentive to share information even without payment. A companion mission covers production diseconomy (§5).

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1} sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j ,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition intensity and θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY with E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ and a linear-expectation structure E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY, where β=β(t,σ)\beta = \beta(t,\sigma)β=β(t,σ) is the signal weight. Producing qqq units costs bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2 with ce>0c_e > 0ce​>0; the paper writes c=−cec = -c_ec=−ce​ and assumes ce<2/(1+ϕ)c_e < 2/(1+\phi)ce​<2/(1+ϕ) (the Assumption, p. 251). Retailing is costless.

The game has three stages.

  1. Information contracting. Under concurrent contracting the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 for the signal; they decide simultaneously and play a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium. Under sequential contracting she offers a payment TfT_fTf​ to a first manufacturer kkk and, after his decision, a payment TsT_sTs​ to the other; the outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The retailer commits not to share for free after a rejection (§6.2).
  2. Pricing. Given the information statuses Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U}, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price wiw_iwi​ (a function of YYY if informed, a constant otherwise), then the retailer sets retail prices; the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  3. Demand realizes and profits are collected.

The ex ante profits of the pricing equilibrium are denoted πM(0)\pi_M(0)πM​(0), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πM(2)\pi_M(2)πM​(2) for a manufacturer and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, nnn the number of informed manufacturers. neNn_e^NneN​, neCn_e^CneC​, neSn_e^SneS​ denote the equilibrium number of informed manufacturers without contracting, under concurrent and under sequential contracting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 and 0<ce<2/(1+ϕ)0 < c_e < 2/(1+\phi)0<ce​<2/(1+ϕ), pricing equilibria exist, concurrent outcomes and sequential SPEs exist, and for every concurrent outcome and every SPE (either first mover)

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^C \le \Pi_R^S, \qquad \Pi_M^S \le \Pi_M^C ,ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

where ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The second inequality is asserted for all cec_ece​ except at most two values depending only on ϕ\phiϕ. The comparisons about every pricing equilibrium family exclude the single value ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)] (see Formalization scope). The paper says "higher"; the inequalities are weak because both sides coincide on intervals of positive length.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists and, for ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​, is unique and linear in YYY with explicit coefficients.
  2. §4.2: the ex ante profits πM(⋅)\pi_M(\cdot)πM​(⋅) and πR(⋅)\pi_R(\cdot)πR​(⋅) in closed form.
  3. Lemma 5(a)–(c) and Lemma 5(d): sign comparisons of these profits in cec_ece​, with thresholds 1/(1+ϕ)1/(1+\phi)1/(1+ϕ), (4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)](4+5\phi)/[(2+3\phi)(1+\phi)](4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)], ceac_e^acea​ and ceNc_e^NceN​.
  4. Proposition 7: thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ such that
neZ=0 for ce<11+ϕ,neZ=2 for 11+ϕ≤ce<ceZ,neZ=1 for ceZ≤ce<21+ϕ.n_e^Z = 0 \text{ for } c_e < \tfrac{1}{1+\phi}, \quad n_e^Z = 2 \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{1+\phi} \le c_e < c_e^Z, \quad n_e^Z = 1 \text{ for } c_e^Z \le c_e < \tfrac{2}{1+\phi}.neZ​=0 for ce​<1+ϕ1​,neZ​=2 for 1+ϕ1​≤ce​<ceZ​,neZ​=1 for ceZ​≤ce​<1+ϕ2​.
  1. Proposition 6(b): the same structure for neNn_e^NneN​ with a threshold ceNc_e^NceN​.
  2. Proposition 8(a): ceN<ceS≤ceCc_e^N < c_e^S \le c_e^CceN​<ceS​≤ceC​.

Significance

Proposition 8(d) says that a common retailer who sells information prefers to sell it sequentially, and that the manufacturers bear the cost: sequential offers let her extract a larger payment from the first manufacturer, because his outside option depends on what she will do with the second. Together with Propositions 6 and 7 it explains why retailers under production economy share with only a subset of suppliers once economies of scale or competition are strong, and why a retailer may share data for free, a practice the diseconomy model cannot produce.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it is straightforward" arguments (the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 are omitted). No part of the paper is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked account of the equilibrium selection at the boundary payments, where the paper's case analysis is informal, and of the points at which the retailer is indifferent between outcomes.

Difficulty

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game with a continuum of strategies: an informed manufacturer's strategy is an arbitrary square-integrable function of the signal. Lemma 1's uniqueness needs the Assumption (without it the manufacturer's problem is not concave) and a conditional-expectation argument, not a finite-dimensional computation. The comparisons of Lemma 5 are sign conditions on rational functions of (ce,ϕ)(c_e, \phi)(ce​,ϕ) whose thresholds ceac_e^acea​, ceNc_e^NceN​ are implicit roots. The contracting stage is where the naive argument fails: at the boundary payments several equilibria give the retailer the same payoff but the manufacturers different payoffs, so "the" outcome is not well defined there, and a direct comparison of closed-form profits at the paper's selected equilibria does not cover every equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents manufacturers by Fin 2, statuses by an inductive type with informed and uninformed, and a pricing strategy by a function of the signal value. The committed conventions are these.

  1. Admissible strategies are measurable with square-integrable wi(Y)w_i(Y)wi​(Y), and constant for an uninformed manufacturer; ex ante optimality over them is the Bayesian equilibrium condition.
  2. The retailer's rule is a best response for every wholesale price pair and signal value, off path included.
  3. The production cost is the uncapped quadratic bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2. The paper caps the quantity at qˉ=b/(2ce)\bar q = b/(2c_e)qˉ​=b/(2ce​) but assumes the cap is reached with negligible probability (footnote 11, p. 251) and computes every result of §4.2 and §6 without it. The condition b<ab < ab<a of that footnote is not imposed.
  4. Contracting uses pure strategies, nonnegative payments, and no free-sharing move after a rejection.
  5. A concurrent outcome is a payment and a pure equilibrium whose retailer payoff equals the supremum of her payoffs over Pareto-optimal equilibria. The supremum is not always attained: for large cec_ece​ the paper's optimal payment πMI(1)−πM(0)\pi_M^I(1) - \pi_M(0)πMI​(1)−πM​(0) makes (U,U)(U,U)(U,U) an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one-informed outcome it selects.
  6. Threshold statements take the two-clause form: the stated value of nnn is attained on each region with its printed endpoints, and is the only value on the region's interior. Thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ and are quantified before all other parameters.
  7. The manufacturers' comparison in the goal excludes at most two values of cec_ece​. At the thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ outcomes with different manufacturer totals coexist, and the universal comparison fails.
  8. A correction of the paper. At ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)], which lies in (1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ))(1/(1+\phi), 2/(1+\phi))(1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ)), the slope of the best-response wholesale price (2) is exactly −1-1−1. The equations wi=w^i(wj)w_i = \hat w_i(w_j)wi​=w^i​(wj​) are then singular, and every status profile has a continuum of pricing equilibria (for n=0n = 0n=0, w1,2=wˉ±tw_{1,2} = \bar w \pm tw1,2​=wˉ±t for every ttt) whose ex ante profits differ. Lemma 1's uniqueness claim fails there, so do the §4.2 identities for every equilibrium family, and so does every statement built on them. Each statement that quantifies over all pricing equilibria therefore assumes ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​; existence is still asserted at ce∗c_e^*ce∗​.

The ex ante profits in every statement are those of an equilibrium of the pricing game on the signal model, not the §4.2 closed forms; a formalization that defined them by the closed forms would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out. The model layer (signal model, pricing equilibrium, payoff table, both contracting games) is shared, name for name, with the production diseconomy mission. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on reusable pieces: linear-expectation signals, and pointwise optimization under conditional expectation.

Selected references

  • Shang W., Ha A. Y., Tong S., Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • Ericson W. A., A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969 (cited for the formula of β(t,σ)\beta(t,\sigma)β(t,σ), which this mission does not use).
  • Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999, §2.7.2.
  • Li L., Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Global Convergence of Splitting Methods for Nonconvex Composite Optimization III: For Semi-Algebraic Problems the ADMM Sequence Converges and Has Finite LengthResearch Paper

Motivation

The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is a standard method for problems of the form min⁡xh(x)+P(Mx)\min_x h(x)+P(\mathcal Mx)minx​h(x)+P(Mx), in which a smooth loss hhh is composed with a structured, possibly nonsmooth regularizer PPP through a linear map M\mathcal MM. Its convergence theory was developed for convex problems, yet it is routinely run on nonconvex ones: sparse recovery with the ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ constraint, low-rank matrix problems, and total-variation-type models with nonconvex penalties. For such problems a practitioner wants a guarantee about the iterates actually produced, not only about the existence of good subsequences.

Li and Pong (arXiv:1407.0753v6, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015) gave the first such guarantee for the classical ADMM on nonconvex composite problems with a surjective M\mathcal MM. Their Theorem 1 shows that cluster points of the (proximal) ADMM are stationary; their Theorem 3, the subject of this mission, shows that for semi-algebraic data the whole sequence converges. The argument adapts the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz (KL) framework of Attouch, Bolte and Svaiter (Math. Program. 137, 2013) to a setting where the ADMM only decreases its merit function in the xxx-block.

Setting

Fix M:Rn→Rm\mathcal M:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^mM:Rn→Rm linear, h:Rn→Rh:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rh:Rn→R twice continuously differentiable with bounded Hessian, and P:Rm→(−∞,+∞]P:\mathbb R^m\to(-\infty,+\infty]P:Rm→(−∞,+∞] proper (finite somewhere) and closed (lower semicontinuous). For β>0\beta>0β>0 the augmented Lagrangian is

Lβ(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+β2∥Mx−y∥2.L_\beta(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)-\langle z,\mathcal Mx-y\rangle+\tfrac\beta2\|\mathcal Mx-y\|^2 .Lβ​(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+2β​∥Mx−y∥2.

The ADMM produces (xt,yt,zt)t≥0(x^t,y^t,z^t)_{t\ge0}(xt,yt,zt)t≥0​ from arbitrary (x0,z0)(x^0,z^0)(x0,z0) by

yt+1∈Arg min⁡yLβ(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈Arg min⁡xLβ(x,yt+1,zt),zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).y^{t+1}\in\operatorname*{Arg\,min}_y L_\beta(x^t,y,z^t),\quad x^{t+1}\in\operatorname*{Arg\,min}_x L_\beta(x,y^{t+1},z^t),\quad z^{t+1}=z^t-\beta(\mathcal Mx^{t+1}-y^{t+1}).yt+1∈yArgmin​Lβ​(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈xArgmin​Lβ​(x,yt+1,zt),zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).

Assumption 1 with T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0 asks for σ,δ>0\sigma,\delta>0σ,δ>0, γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and symmetric maps Q1,Q2,Q3\mathcal Q_1,\mathcal Q_2,\mathcal Q_3Q1​,Q2​,Q3​ with MM∗⪰σI\mathcal M\mathcal M^*\succeq\sigma\mathcal IMM∗⪰σI, Q1⪰∇2h(x)⪰Q2\mathcal Q_1\succeq\nabla^2h(x)\succeq\mathcal Q_2Q1​⪰∇2h(x)⪰Q2​ and Q3⪰[∇2h(x)]2\mathcal Q_3\succeq[\nabla^2h(x)]^2Q3​⪰[∇2h(x)]2 for all xxx, Q2+βM∗M⪰δI\mathcal Q_2+\beta\mathcal M^*\mathcal M\succeq\delta\mathcal IQ2​+βM∗M⪰δI, and δI≻2σβγQ3\delta\mathcal I\succ\frac{2}{\sigma\beta\gamma}\mathcal Q_3δI≻σβγ2​Q3​.

The limiting subdifferential ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) of fff consists of limits vvv of regular subgradients vtv^tvt at points xt→xx^t\to xxt→x with f(xt)→f(x)f(x^t)\to f(x)f(xt)→f(x). A point xxx is stationary if 0∈∇h(x)+M∗∂P(Mx)0\in\nabla h(x)+\mathcal M^*\partial P(\mathcal Mx)0∈∇h(x)+M∗∂P(Mx).

A set in RN\mathbb R^NRN is semi-algebraic if it is a finite union of sets cut out by finitely many polynomial equations pi=0p_i=0pi​=0 and strict inequalities gj<0g_j<0gj​<0; a function is semi-algebraic if its graph is. A proper fff has the KL property at x^∈dom⁡∂f\hat x\in\operatorname{dom}\partial fx^∈dom∂f if there are η>0\eta>0η>0, a neighbourhood VVV of x^\hat xx^ and a continuous concave φ:[0,η)→R+\varphi:[0,\eta)\to\mathbb R_+φ:[0,η)→R+​ with φ(0)=0\varphi(0)=0φ(0)=0, φ∈C1(0,η)\varphi\in C^1(0,\eta)φ∈C1(0,η), φ′>0\varphi'>0φ′>0, such that φ′(f(x)−f(x^)) dist⁡(0,∂f(x))≥1\varphi'(f(x)-f(\hat x))\,\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial f(x))\ge1φ′(f(x)−f(x^))dist(0,∂f(x))≥1 whenever x∈Vx\in Vx∈V and f(x^)<f(x)<f(x^)+ηf(\hat x)<f(x)<f(\hat x)+\etaf(x^)<f(x)<f(x^)+η. A KL function is proper, closed, and KL at every point of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f.

In the Lean development LβL_\betaLβ​ is augLag h P M β x y z, and also augLagX h P M β as a single function on the triple space Rn×Rm×Rm\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^mRn×Rm×Rm with the Euclidean inner product.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 13)

Under the standing assumptions and Assumption 1 with T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0, if hhh and PPP are semi-algebraic and the ADMM sequence has a cluster point (x∗,y∗,z∗)(x^*,y^*,z^*)(x∗,y∗,z∗), then

(xt,yt,zt)→(x∗,y∗,z∗),0∈∇h(x∗)+M∗∂P(Mx∗),∑t∥xt+1−xt∥<∞.(x^t,y^t,z^t)\to(x^*,y^*,z^*),\qquad 0\in\nabla h(x^*)+\mathcal M^*\partial P(\mathcal Mx^*),\qquad \sum_{t}\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|<\infty .(xt,yt,zt)→(x∗,y∗,z∗),0∈∇h(x∗)+M∗∂P(Mx∗),t∑​∥xt+1−xt∥<∞.

No constants are fixed: every parameter is quantified exactly as in the paper.

Milestones

  1. (35): some w∈∂Lβ(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)w\in\partial L_\beta(x^{t+1},y^{t+1},z^{t+1})w∈∂Lβ​(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1) has ∥w∥≤C∥xt+1−xt∥\|w\|\le C\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|∥w∥≤C∥xt+1−xt∥ for t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  2. (36): Lβ(xt,yt,zt)−Lβ(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)≥D∥xt+1−xt∥2L_\beta(x^t,y^t,z^t)-L_\beta(x^{t+1},y^{t+1},z^{t+1})\ge D\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2Lβ​(xt,yt,zt)−Lβ​(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)≥D∥xt+1−xt∥2 for t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  3. (39): Lβ(xt,yt,zt)→Lβ(x∗,y∗,z∗)L_\beta(x^t,y^t,z^t)\to L_\beta(x^*,y^*,z^*)Lβ​(xt,yt,zt)→Lβ​(x∗,y∗,z∗).
  4. Finite termination when LβL_\betaLβ​ reaches its limit value.
  5. (41): the one-step KL estimate.
  6. Remark 4(1): the goal with "LβL_\betaLβ​ is a KL function" in place of semi-algebraicity.
  7. LβL_\betaLβ​ is semi-algebraic when hhh and PPP are.
  8. Proper closed semi-algebraic functions are KL functions, with φ(s)=cs1−θ\varphi(s)=cs^{1-\theta}φ(s)=cs1−θ.

Milestones 6, 7 and 8 together imply the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 upgrades subsequential convergence to convergence of the whole iterate sequence, with finite length of the xxx-trajectory, for a nonconvex ADMM without any convexity of hhh or PPP. Semi-algebraicity covers the paper's applications: polynomial losses, the ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ constraint, and indicators of polyhedral or algebraic sets. Remark 4(1) isolates the only property actually used, the KL property of LβL_\betaLβ​, so the result extends to any class of functions for which that property is known (for instance, globally subanalytic or o-minimal definable data).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper and, as far as is known, formalized nowhere. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the paper's convergence argument, a Lean definition of the KL property with the correct convention for empty subdifferentials, and a semi-algebraic set predicate over MvPolynomial. Milestone 8 is a published theorem of real algebraic geometry and nonsmooth analysis (Bolte–Daniilidis–Lewis 2007) that the paper quotes without proof; it is part of what a complete development of the goal requires.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to invoke the abstract convergence theorem of Attouch–Bolte–Svaiter for descent methods. It does not apply: its sufficient-decrease hypothesis requires LβL_\betaLβ​ to drop by a multiple of ∥xt+1−xt∥2+∥yt+1−yt∥2+∥zt+1−zt∥2\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2+\|y^{t+1}-y^t\|^2+\|z^{t+1}-z^t\|^2∥xt+1−xt∥2+∥yt+1−yt∥2+∥zt+1−zt∥2, while the ADMM only guarantees a drop proportional to ∥xt+1−xt∥2\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2∥xt+1−xt∥2 (Remark 4(2)). The relative-error bound (35) is likewise in terms of the xxx-step alone, and relating the yyy- and zzz-blocks back to the xxx-block uses the surjectivity of M\mathcal MM and the specific structure of the multiplier update. The neighbourhood on which the KL inequality holds is a neighbourhood of the full triple, whereas the trajectory is controlled only in xxx.

The semi-algebraic part has a separate difficulty: showing that LβL_\betaLβ​ is semi-algebraic needs closure of semi-algebraic sets under projection (the Tarski–Seidenberg theorem), and the KL property of semi-algebraic functions needs the Łojasiewicz inequality for subanalytic or semi-algebraic functions. Mathlib has neither.

Formalization scope

Spaces are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); M\mathcal MM is a continuous linear map and M∗\mathcal M^*M∗ its adjoint. PPP and LβL_\betaLβ​ take values in EReal, never passed through toReal except where the value is provably finite. ⪰\succeq⪰ is Mathlib's Loewner order on self-maps; the Hessian is fderiv ℝ (gradient h). The ADMM is the proximal-ADMM relation with ϕ=0\phi=0ϕ=0; argmin steps are "value at most the value anywhere", with no uniqueness; y0y^0y0 is unconstrained. The triple space is the nested L2L^2L2 product, so its inner product is the sum of the block inner products.

The KL inequality is stated for every v∈∂f(x)v\in\partial f(x)v∈∂f(x), which encodes dist⁡(0,∅)=+∞\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=+\inftydist(0,∅)=+∞. Writing it with Metric.infDist 0 (∂f x) would give dist⁡(0,∅)=0\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=0dist(0,∅)=0 and make the KL property fail at every point with empty subdifferential, so that "semi-algebraic implies KL" becomes false and the goal becomes a statement about a different notion. The KL property is required only at points of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f, only on a neighbourhood and only for values in (f(x^),f(x^)+η)(f(\hat x),f(\hat x)+\eta)(f(x^),f(x^)+η); φ\varphiφ is differentiable only on the open interval. Semi-algebraicity of an extended-valued function is that of its graph over its real values. η\etaη is a positive real, which is equivalent to the paper's η∈(0,∞]\eta\in(0,\infty]η∈(0,∞].

The hypotheses ϕ=0\phi=0ϕ=0 and T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0 are part of the theorem, not a simplification: the analogous statement for the proximal ADMM is open (Remark 4(3)). The cluster point is assumed, not derived.

Needed infrastructure: calculus of the limiting subdifferential (a smooth-plus-separable sum rule), the Tarski–Seidenberg theorem, and the Łojasiewicz/KL inequality for semi-algebraic functions. The last two are reusable far beyond this mission; contributions toward them, and toward the analytic core (milestones 1–6), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Li, T. K. Pong, Global convergence of splitting methods for nonconvex composite optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.0753 (v6 is the cited version)
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, P. Redont, A. Soubeyran, Proximal alternating minimization and projection methods for nonconvex problems: an approach based on the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz inequality, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0449
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, B. F. Svaiter, Convergence of descent methods for semi-algebraic and tame problems, Math. Program. 137, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0484-9
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, The Łojasiewicz inequality for nonsmooth subanalytic functions with applications to subgradient dynamical systems, SIAM J. Optim. 17(4), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644641
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games II: Equilibrium Adoption Rates of Information Systems Are the Minimizers of the Equilibrium PotentialResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers private, noisy signals about the state of the road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, their subscribers act on different information, and the congestion each population experiences depends on how all of them route. A question then arises for transport planners and for the information providers themselves: if travelers are free to choose which system to subscribe to, which market shares of the competing systems are stable?

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021; preprint arXiv:1808.10590) model this situation as a Bayesian routing game with heterogeneous information and answer the question exactly: the equilibrium adoption rates are the minimizers of a convex function of the population sizes, the equilibrium value of a weighted potential. This mission formalizes that characterization (Theorem 4 of the paper) together with the results its proof rests on. A companion mission (Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I) formalizes the paper's other main result, the sign and monotonicity of the relative value of information between two populations.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ) has a single origin–destination pair, a finite set of edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR (each route a set of edges), and a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS. Travelers of total demand D>0D>0D>0 are split into populations i∈Ii\in\mathcal Ii∈I, one per TIS; population iii has size λiD\lambda^iDλiD, where the size vector λ\lambdaλ lies in the simplex Δ={λ:λi≥0, ∑iλi=1}\Delta=\{\lambda:\lambda^i\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda^i=1\}Δ={λ:λi≥0, ∑i​λi=1}. Each population receives a signal (its type) tit^iti from a finite set Ti\mathcal T^iTi; states and type profiles t=(ti)it=(t^i)_it=(ti)i​ are drawn from a common prior π∈Δ(S×T)\pi\in\Delta(\mathcal S\times\mathcal T)π∈Δ(S×T). Edge eee in state sss has cost ces(w)c^s_e(w)ces​(w) at load www, positive, strictly increasing and differentiable.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population and type a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand over routes, with ∑rqri(ti)=λiD\sum_rq^i_r(t^i)=\lambda^iD∑r​qri​(ti)=λiD; these form the polytope Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ). It induces route flows fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and edge loads we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). A traveler of population iii with signal tit^iti forms the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti) and evaluates the expected route cost E[cr(q)∣ti]=∑s,t−i∑e∈rβi(s,t−i∣ti) ces(we(t))\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]=\sum_{s,t^{-i}}\sum_{e\in r}\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)\,c^s_e(w_e(t))E[cr​(q)∣ti]=∑s,t−i​∑e∈r​βi(s,t−i∣ti)ces​(we​(t)). A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a q∈Q(λ)q\in\mathcal Q(\lambda)q∈Q(λ) in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is

Ci∗(λ)=∑ti∈TiPr⁡(ti)min⁡r∈RE[cr(q∗)∣ti].C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i\in\mathcal T^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_{r\in\mathcal R}\mathbb E[c_r(q^*)\mid t^i].Ci∗(λ)=ti∈Ti∑​Pr(ti)r∈Rmin​E[cr​(q∗)∣ti].

The weighted potential is Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz, and Ψ(λ)=min⁡q∈Q(λ)Φ(q)\Psi(\lambda)=\min_{q\in\mathcal Q(\lambda)}\Phi(q)Ψ(λ)=minq∈Q(λ)​Φ(q) is its equilibrium value. In route-flow form, Φ^(f)\widehat\Phi(f)Φ(f) is the same expression in terms of fff; route flows satisfy linear constraints (14a)–(14c) (a separability condition across populations, total demand DDD, nonnegativity) and one information impact constraint per population, J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, where J^i(f)=D−∑rmin⁡tifr(ti,t^−i)\widehat J^i(f)=D-\sum_r\min_{t^i}f_r(t^i,\widehat t^{-i})Ji(f)=D−∑r​minti​fr​(ti,t−i) measures how much of the demand reacts to population iii's signal. Let F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† be the set of minimizers of Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ subject to (14a)–(14c) only, and

Λ†={λ∈Δ: ∃f†∈F†, J^i(f†)≤λiD  ∀i}.\Lambda^\dagger=\{\lambda\in\Delta:\ \exists f^\dagger\in\mathcal F^\dagger,\ \widehat J^i(f^\dagger)\le\lambda^iD\ \ \forall i\}.Λ†={λ∈Δ: ∃f†∈F†, Ji(f†)≤λiD  ∀i}.

In the two-stage game, travelers first choose a TIS, inducing λ\lambdaλ, and then play Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ). A size vector is a vector of equilibrium adoption rates if no traveler gains by switching TIS:

λi>0 ⟹ Ci∗(λ)=min⁡j∈ICj∗(λ)∀i∈I.(31)\lambda^i>0\ \Longrightarrow\ C^{i*}(\lambda)=\min_{j\in\mathcal I}C^{j*}(\lambda)\qquad\forall i\in\mathcal I.\tag{31}λi>0 ⟹ Ci∗(λ)=j∈Imin​Cj∗(λ)∀i∈I.(31)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

For every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

(31) holds  ⟺  λ∈Λ†.(31)\ \text{holds}\iff\lambda\in\Lambda^\dagger .(31) holds⟺λ∈Λ†.

With the existence of a BWE for every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ, this is the paper's statement that the set of equilibrium adoption rates is Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ†.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1. qqq is a BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ) iff qqq minimizes Φ\PhiΦ over Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ); the equilibrium edge load w∗(λ)w^*(\lambda)w∗(λ) is unique.
  2. Proposition 2. A route flow in the flow polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ) ((14a)–(14c) plus all information impact constraints) is an equilibrium flow iff it minimizes Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ).
  3. Lemma 5. Ψ\PsiΨ is convex on Δ\DeltaΔ, and with zij=ei−ejz^{ij}=e_i-e_jzij=ei​−ej​ and Vij∗=Cj∗−Ci∗V^{ij*}=C^{j*}-C^{i*}Vij∗=Cj∗−Ci∗,
lim⁡ϵ→0+Ψ(λ+ϵzij)−Ψ(λ)ϵ=−D Vij∗(λ).\lim_{\epsilon\to0^+}\frac{\Psi(\lambda+\epsilon z^{ij})-\Psi(\lambda)}{\epsilon}=-D\,V^{ij*}(\lambda).ϵ→0+lim​ϵΨ(λ+ϵzij)−Ψ(λ)​=−DVij∗(λ).
  1. Proposition 5. Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† is convex, Λ†=argmin⁡λ∈ΔΨ(λ)\Lambda^\dagger=\operatorname{argmin}_{\lambda\in\Delta}\Psi(\lambda)Λ†=argminλ∈Δ​Ψ(λ), and the equilibrium edge load equals the size-independent load w†w^\daggerw† of F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† iff λ∈Λ†\lambda\in\Lambda^\daggerλ∈Λ†.

A separate item states the existence of a BWE for every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 reduces a question about a two-stage game with a continuum of travelers and private signals to the minimization of one convex function over a simplex. It shows that the stable market shares form a convex set, generally not a single point, so each system's equilibrium adoption rate ranges over an interval; and that this set is determined by the joint information environment of all systems, not by each system's signal alone. On ˆ\Lambda^\daggerˆ the equilibrium edge load does not depend on the shares at all, which identifies when changes in market shares leave congestion unchanged.

Formalizing it. The proofs of Theorem 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 5 are in the paper's online e-companion, and Lemma 5 relies on sensitivity results for parametric convex programs cited from the literature. No part of this development has, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A complete formalization would produce a verified potential-game characterization of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria with heterogeneous information and a verified directional-derivative formula for the optimal value of a parametric convex program; nothing comparable is currently on the platform (the existing Wardrop development covers complete information only).

Difficulty

The direction "λ∈Λ†\lambda\in\Lambda^\daggerλ∈Λ† implies (31)" is not a pointwise statement about costs: it follows from Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† being the argmin of Ψ\PsiΨ together with the formula linking directional derivatives of Ψ\PsiΨ to cost differences. Both are hard. The derivative formula (26) is a statement about the optimal value of a convex program whose feasible set moves with λ\lambdaλ; its standard proofs pass through uniqueness of Lagrange multipliers, which fails exactly at the degenerate size vectors (λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0) that Theorem 4 must cover, since an unused TIS is a legitimate outcome. The identity Λ†=argmin⁡Ψ\Lambda^\dagger=\operatorname{argmin}\PsiΛ†=argminΨ needs the route-flow reformulation (Proposition 2), in which the size vector enters only through the information impact constraints, and the uniqueness of the minimizing edge load. The natural first idea, comparing population costs directly at a given equilibrium, gives no handle on which size vectors make them equal.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace BayesRouting.Adoption. Populations, types, states, edges and routes are finite types; type spaces and the route set are nonempty; routes are edge sets. The game is a structure whose fields include the paper's standing assumptions: the prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and each cost is positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable (on all of R\mathbb RR, which loses no generality). One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. Without it the equilibrium edge load need not be unique and the beliefs can be undefined; it excludes the paper's Example 2(i) (perfectly correlated signals).

Conventions: size vectors range over the probability simplex; Ψ\PsiΨ is the infimum of Φ\PhiΦ over Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ) and is only compared at points of the simplex (outside it the feasible set can be empty and the value is a default); Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of the paper's (7), well defined when λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0; J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum over reference profiles, which equals the paper's value on flows satisfying (14a); equilibrium statements are made for every BWE rather than for "the" equilibrium; F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† and similar sets are argmin sets. Lemma 5 is stated for the directions zijz^{ij}zij with λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0 (otherwise λ+ϵzij\lambda+\epsilon z^{ij}λ+ϵzij leaves the simplex); λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0 is allowed.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the existence of a BWE is its own item, so "for every BWE" is not vacuous, and Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† is defined by (30) from the flow problem (28), not as the argmin of Ψ\PsiΨ, so the goal is not a restatement of Proposition 5.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: KKT conditions for convex programs with linear constraints, convexity of integrals of increasing functions, compactness arguments for existence of minimizers, and one-sided directional derivatives of optimal-value functions. The last two are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any item, and of auxiliary lemmas such as Proposition 1 of the paper (feasible route flows form the polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. E. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999 (preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.10590)
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential games with continuous player sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and concavity properties of the optimal value function in parametric nonlinear programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00938592
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually lowers a driver's expected travel cost in equilibrium, and how this advantage depends on how many drivers use each system. More information for one population also changes the congestion everybody else faces, so the answer is not simply "more information is better".

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1), 2021) answer this question for nonatomic routing games with heterogeneous, possibly correlated information. Their model builds on the weighted potential game framework of Sandholm (2001) and on sensitivity analysis of convex programs. This mission formalizes their Section 5 result: for any two populations the sign of the relative value of information is determined by which of three explicitly computable size regimes the population sizes lie in, and the relative value decreases as one population grows at the expense of the other.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game has a finite set of populations I\mathcal II, one per TIS, a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS, and for each population iii a finite nonempty type space Ti\mathcal T^iTi of signals. A common prior π\piπ is a probability distribution on S×T\mathcal S\times\mathcal TS×T, T=∏iTi\mathcal T=\prod_i\mathcal T^iT=∏i​Ti. A network with a single origin–destination pair has edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR; each edge has a state-dependent cost cesc^s_eces​ that is positive, strictly increasing and differentiable. The total demand is D>0D>0D>0, and population iii carries the fraction λi\lambda^iλi of it, with λi≥0\lambda^i\ge0λi≥0 and ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda^i=1∑i​λi=1.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population iii and type tit^iti a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand λiD\lambda^iDλiD over routes. It induces the route flow fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and the edge load we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). With the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti), type tit^iti evaluates route rrr by its expected cost E[cr(q)∣ti]\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]E[cr​(q)∣ti]. A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a feasible qqq in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is Ci∗(λ)=∑tiPr⁡(ti)min⁡rE[cr(q)∣ti]C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_r\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]Ci∗(λ)=∑ti​Pr(ti)minr​E[cr​(q)∣ti] at a BWE qqq.

The game has a weighted potential Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz; its minimum over feasible profiles is the equilibrium potential value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ). For two populations i≠ji\ne ji=j, the direction zijz^{ij}zij moves demand share from jjj to iii, and ∣λ−ij∣|\lambda^{-ij}|∣λ−ij∣ is the total share of the other populations. The impact of information J^i(f)\widehat J^i(f)Ji(f) measures how much of population iii's demand is moved by its signal. Two thresholds λ‾i≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi are computed from the optimal set Fij,†\mathcal F^{ij,\dagger}Fij,† of an auxiliary convex program over route flows in which the separate information constraints of iii and jjj are merged. They define three regimes: Λ1ij\Lambda^{ij}_1Λ1ij​ (λi<λ‾i\lambda^i<\underline\lambda^iλi<λ​i), Λ2ij\Lambda^{ij}_2Λ2ij​ (λ‾i≤λi≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi≤λi) and Λ3ij\Lambda^{ij}_3Λ3ij​ (λi>λ‾i\lambda^i>\overline\lambda^iλi>λi). The relative value of information is Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=C^{j*}(\lambda)-C^{i*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For i≠ji\ne ji=j and admissible λ\lambdaλ (in the simplex with λi,λj>0\lambda^i,\lambda^j>0λi,λj>0), and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij,V^{ij*}(\lambda)>0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_1,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)=0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_2,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)<0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_3,Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij​,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij​,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij​,

and Vij∗V^{ij*}Vij∗ is nonincreasing along zijz^{ij}zij: Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda+\varepsilon z^{ij})\le V^{ij*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ) for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with both endpoints admissible.

Milestones

The route to the goal follows the paper: Lemma 1 (weighted potential), Lemma 2 (strict convexity of the edge-load potential), Theorem 1 (equilibria are the minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ; unique edge load), Lemma 3 (unique Lagrange multipliers), Proposition 1 (the feasible route flows form a polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Proposition 2 (equilibrium route flows minimize Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Lemma 4 (0≤λ‾i≤λ‾i≤1−∣λ−ij∣0\le\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^i\le1-|\lambda^{-ij}|0≤λ​i≤λi≤1−∣λ−ij∣), Theorem 2 (equilibrium flows in each regime), Proposition 3 (Ψ\PsiΨ decreases, stays constant, increases along zijz^{ij}zij in the three regimes) and Lemma 5 (Ψ\PsiΨ is convex and directionally differentiable, and Vij∗(λ)=−1D∇zijΨ(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=-\frac1D\nabla_{z^{ij}}\Psi(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=−D1​∇zij​Ψ(λ)).

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a population has an advantage over another exactly when it is the minor population of the pair, relative to thresholds that depend only on the other populations' sizes. Both populations face the same equilibrium cost in the middle regime. It gives a procedure for comparing two information systems without computing equilibria for each size vector: solve one convex program, read off two thresholds, and locate λi\lambda^iλi. The paper's Section 6 uses the same machinery, through Lemma 5, to characterize the equilibrium adoption rates of information systems.

The paper proves these results with the main proofs in the article and the sensitivity-analysis lemmas (Lemmas EC.1–EC.4) in its e-companion. None of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization requires a Lean account of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, of the equivalence between equilibria and a convex program, and of directional derivatives of the optimal value of a parametric convex program. Parts of this are reusable for any nonatomic routing or congestion game.

Difficulty

The equilibrium strategy profile is not unique and changes discontinuously with λ\lambdaλ. Differentiating equilibrium costs in λ\lambdaλ directly therefore fails. The paper instead works with the optimal value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ), whose one-sided directional derivative is expressed through Lagrange multipliers. That requires a sensitivity theorem for convex programs whose constraints depend affinely on the parameter, together with uniqueness of multipliers, which fails for populations of size zero. The regime analysis also needs a characterization of the route flows that are induced by feasible strategy profiles. That set is described by the nonlinear-looking constraint J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, a minimum over types inside a sum over routes. Strict monotonicity of Ψ\PsiΨ in the side regimes needs the tightness of an information constraint at every equilibrium, not only at one.

Formalization scope

The model is a Lean structure BayesRouting.VOI.Game over finite types of populations, type spaces, states, edges and routes. Routes are given by their edge sets, and the directed-graph structure is not used. Type spaces and the route set are nonempty. The prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and costs are positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable on R\mathbb RR. One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. It makes beliefs well defined and the equilibrium edge load unique, and it excludes perfectly correlated signals.

Conventions: Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of eq. (7), which does not divide by λiD\lambda^iDλiD. J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum of eq. (16) over the reference profile, so that J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD is exactly (14d). Ψ\PsiΨ and the thresholds are sInf/sSup over sets that are nonempty and compact for size vectors in the simplex, and every statement keeps size vectors there. Statements about "the" equilibrium are stated for every BWE, and existence of a BWE is a separate item, so they are not vacuous. The thresholds are defined from the optimal set of the auxiliary program, not assumed as parameters. Taking them as parameters constrained only by Lemma 4 would give a different theorem.

Disclosed deviations: Lemma 2's C2C^2C2 clause assumes C1C^1C1 costs; Lemma 3 is stated for populations of positive size; Lemma 5 assumes λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0; Proposition 3 is stated with strict monotonicity in the side regimes, as used in the proof of Theorem 3. Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: interval-integral potentials of monotone costs, KKT theory for polyhedral constraints, and directional derivatives of parametric optimal values.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Directional Differentiability of the Optimal Value Function in a Nonlinear Programming Problem, in Sensitivity, Stability and Parametric Analysis (Mathematical Programming Studies 21), Springer, 1984, pp. 213–226.
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and Concavity Properties of the Optimal Value Function in Parametric Nonlinear Programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design V: The Randomly Biased Min Work Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful 7/4-Approximation for Two AgentsResearch Paper

Motivation

Algorithmic mechanism design, introduced by Nisan and Ronen (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001), studies optimization problems whose input is held by self-interested agents. Each agent reports its private data to a protocol, and the protocol must choose an output and payments so that reporting the truth is in every agent's interest while the chosen output is close to optimal.

The paper's test case is task scheduling on unrelated machines: kkk tasks must be assigned to nnn agents, agent iii needs time tjit^i_jtji​ for task jjj, and the goal is to minimize the make-span. For deterministic mechanisms the paper shows that truthfulness is costly: the MinWork mechanism achieves ratio nnn, and no mechanism achieves a ratio below 222 (Theorem 4.6). Section 4.4 asks whether randomization helps and answers yes for two agents: a randomized mechanism, truthful for every outcome of its coins, achieves expected ratio 7/4<27/4 < 27/4<2.

Timeline.

  • 1979: Roberts characterizes weighted (affine) maximizers; the weighted Vickrey–Groves–Clarke (VGC) mechanisms are truthful.
  • 1999: Lehmann supplies the case analysis that improves the authors' original bound of 1.8231.8231.823 to 7/47/47/4 (acknowledged on p. 182).
  • 2001: Nisan and Ronen publish the randomly biased min work mechanism and Theorem 4.16.

Setting

There are two agents, 111 and 222, and kkk tasks. A type vector t=(t1,t2)t = (t^1, t^2)t=(t1,t2) gives, for each agent iii and task jjj, the positive time tjit^i_jtji​ agent iii needs for task jjj. An allocation xxx assigns each task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. The make-span of xxx is

g(x,t)=max⁡i∈{1,2}∑j∈xitji.g(x, t) = \max_{i \in \{1,2\}} \sum_{j \in x^i} t^i_j .g(x,t)=i∈{1,2}max​j∈xi∑​tji​.

A direct mechanism receives declared types ddd and returns an allocation x(d)x(d)x(d) and payments pi(d)p^i(d)pi(d) handed to the agents. Agent iii with true type tit^iti gets utility pi(d)−∑j∈xi(d)tjip^i(d) - \sum_{j \in x^i(d)} t^i_jpi(d)−∑j∈xi(d)​tji​. The mechanism is truthful if declaring the true type maximizes an agent's utility whatever the other agent declares, and strongly truthful if in addition every false declaration is strictly worse for some declaration of the other agent.

A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms; its objective is the expected make-span. It is universally truthful if every mechanism in its support is truthful, and universally strongly truthful if moreover truth-telling is the only strategy dominant in every mechanism of the support.

The biased min work mechanism with parameters β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1 and s∈{1,2}ks \in \{1,2\}^ks∈{1,2}k treats each task jjj separately. With i=sji = s_ji=sj​ the favoured agent and i′=3−ii' = 3 - ii′=3−i the other: if tji≤β⋅tji′t^i_j \le \beta \cdot t^{i'}_jtji​≤β⋅tji′​, task jjj goes to iii, who is paid β⋅tji′\beta \cdot t^{i'}_jβ⋅tji′​; otherwise it goes to i′i'i′, who is paid β−1⋅tji\beta^{-1} \cdot t^i_jβ−1⋅tji​. The randomly biased min work mechanism draws sss uniformly from {1,2}k\{1,2\}^k{1,2}k and uses β=4/3\beta = 4/3β=4/3. Its expected make-span is

Es g(xs(t),t)=12k∑s∈{1,2}kg(xs(t),t).\mathbb{E}_s\, g(x_s(t), t) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{s \in \{1,2\}^k} g(x_s(t), t).Es​g(xs​(t),t)=2k1​s∈{1,2}k∑​g(xs​(t),t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.16

For every kkk: the randomly biased min work mechanism is universally strongly truthful, and for every positive type vector ttt and every allocation yyy,

12k∑s∈{1,2}kg(xs(t),t)≤74 g(y,t).\frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{s \in \{1,2\}^k} g(x_s(t), t) \le \frac74\, g(y, t).2k1​s∈{1,2}k∑​g(xs​(t),t)≤47​g(y,t).

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.2 (Roberts): for positive weights βi\beta^iβi, a mechanism whose output maximizes ∑iβivi(ti,o)\sum_i \beta^i v^i(t^i, o)∑i​βivi(ti,o) and whose payments are pi=1βi∑j≠iβjvj(tj,o)+hi(t−i)p^i = \frac{1}{\beta^i}\sum_{j \ne i}\beta^j v^j(t^j, o) + h^i(t^{-i})pi=βi1​∑j=i​βjvj(tj,o)+hi(t−i) is truthful.
  • Lemma 4.15: for every β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1 and every sss, the biased min work mechanism is strongly truthful.
  • Lemma 4.17: the randomly biased min work mechanism is universally strongly truthful.
  • Claim 4.19, part 5: allocating two tasks independently at random gives an expected make-span no larger than allocating their merge at random.
  • Reduced case (Fig. 2, Cases 1–3): for a,b,c,d≥0a, b, c, d \ge 0a,b,c,d≥0 with a+c=43b+da + c = \frac43 b + da+c=34​b+d,
14(max⁡(a+b+c+43d,0)+max⁡(a+b+c,d)+max⁡(a+b+43d,43c)+max⁡(a+b,43c+d))≤74(a+c).\tfrac14\Big(\max(a+b+c+\tfrac43 d, 0) + \max(a+b+c, d) + \max(a+b+\tfrac43 d, \tfrac43 c) + \max(a+b, \tfrac43 c + d)\Big) \le \tfrac74 (a+c).41​(max(a+b+c+34​d,0)+max(a+b+c,d)+max(a+b+34​d,34​c)+max(a+b,34​c+d))≤47​(a+c).
  • Lemma 4.18: the 7/47/47/4 bound on the expected make-span.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.16 separates randomized from deterministic truthful mechanisms for scheduling two unrelated machines: 7/47/47/4 against the deterministic lower bound of 222. The notion of truthfulness it uses is the strong one, dominance for every coin outcome, so the separation does not rest on agents being risk-neutral or knowing the distribution. Later work on truthful randomized scheduling, and on the gap between deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms, starts from this construction.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formalization produces a checked definition of universal truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, a checked weighted VGC theorem usable for any affine-maximizer mechanism, and a checked version of the reduction argument (Claim 4.19), which the paper states in five informal instance transformations, one of them a limiting argument.

Difficulty

Truthfulness reduces to one task at a time, where the mechanism is a weighted VGC mechanism; the difficulty lies in the approximation bound. A naive task-by-task comparison with the optimum fails: the bound is on a maximum of two loads averaged over 2k2^k2k coin vectors, and the maximum does not decompose over tasks. The paper reduces an arbitrary instance to four tasks through transformations that each move the ratio in one direction, and the reduced instance still needs a three-way case analysis. Making the reduction rigorous is the main work: part 1 of Claim 4.19 replaces a ratio "arbitrarily close to β\betaβ" by β\betaβ, and under the mechanism's tie rule a task with ratio exactly β\betaβ is allocated by the coin rather than to the efficient agent.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin 2 (agent 111 is 0, agent 222 is 1); the other agent is other i = 1 - i. Tasks are Fin k; allocations are functions Fin k → Fin 2. The statements hold for every kkk, including k=0k = 0k=0.
  • Types are positive: every truthfulness quantifier ranges over positive declarations, true types and misreports, and the approximation bound is stated on positive type vectors. The reduced-case and merging milestones are pure real inequalities with nonnegative times, since the paper represents missing tasks by zero times.
  • Payments are handed to the agent; utility is quasi-linear.
  • The make-span is a finite maximum (Finset.sup') over the two agents. The expected make-span is the average over all 2k2^k2k vectors sss, which is exactly the expectation of Definition 15 for the uniform distribution; no measure theory is used.
  • Universal (strong) truthfulness quantifies over all s∈{1,2}ks \in \{1,2\}^ks∈{1,2}k, the support of the uniform distribution. Truthfulness in expectation over sss is weaker and is not the notion stated.
  • The tie rule of Fig. 1 (≤\le≤: ties go to the favoured agent) is kept.
  • The goal fixes β=4/3\beta = 4/3β=4/3; only Lemma 4.15 is stated for every β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1. The ratio is compared with every allocation yyy, not with one fixed allocation, and the average is over all sss, not the best sss.
  • Roberts' theorem is stated for arbitrary output sets, type sets and valuations, with positive weights.
  • "Polynomial time computable" in Theorem 4.16 is not formalized; running time is out of scope.
  • Claim 4.19 (the reduction to the four-task case) is not a separate item beyond its part 5, because its parts are instance transformations with a limiting step, not a single statement; a solver may formalize the reduction in any form that proves Lemma 4.18.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and reusable lemmas on averages of maxima over product coin spaces.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • K. Roberts, The characterization of implementable choice rules, in J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North-Holland, 1979, pp. 321–349.
  • T. Groves, Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Efficient Approximation Scheme for the One-Dimensional Bin-Packing Problem I: ALGORITHM 1, Linear Grouping with LP Rounding, Is an Asymptotic Approximation SchemeResearch Paper

Motivation

One-dimensional bin packing asks for the fewest unit-capacity bins that hold a given list of items with sizes in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). It is the model behind cutting stock (cutting rolls of paper or steel to ordered widths), memory and file allocation, and batch scheduling on identical machines, and it is NP-hard. Its algorithmic study is therefore about approximation: how close to the optimum a polynomial-time algorithm can guarantee to come.

  • 1961–1963: Gilmore and Gomory introduce the configuration linear program for cutting stock and solve it by column generation (Gilmore–Gomory 1961).
  • 1974: Johnson, Demers, Ullman, Garey and Graham analyse First Fit and related heuristics, with asymptotic ratio 17/1017/1017/10 and 11/911/911/9 (Johnson et al. 1974).
  • 1981: Fernandez de la Vega and Lueker give the first asymptotic approximation scheme, packing within (1+ε) OPT(I)+1(1+\varepsilon)\,OPT(I) + 1(1+ε)OPT(I)+1 bins in time linear in nnn for fixed ε\varepsilonε, using elimination of small pieces and linear grouping (Fernandez de la Vega–Lueker 1981).
  • 1982: Karmarkar and Karp replace the enumeration of configurations by an approximate solution of the configuration LP and a rounding step, obtaining an additive term polynomial in 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε (this mission), and, with geometric grouping, OPT(I)+O(log⁡2OPT(I))OPT(I) + O(\log^2 OPT(I))OPT(I)+O(log2OPT(I)) (Karmarkar–Karp 1982).
  • 2013–2017: Rothvoß and then Hoberg–Rothvoß improve the additive term to O(log⁡OPT⋅log⁡log⁡OPT)O(\log OPT \cdot \log\log OPT)O(logOPT⋅loglogOPT) and O(log⁡OPT)O(\log OPT)O(logOPT) (Hoberg–Rothvoß 2017).

Setting

An instance III is a finite multiset of piece sizes, each in the open interval (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). Write n(I)n(I)n(I) for the number of pieces, m(I)m(I)m(I) for the number of distinct sizes, and SIZE(I)SIZE(I)SIZE(I) for the sum of all sizes. A packing of III is a finite multiset of bins, each a multiset of sizes, whose union is exactly III and in which every bin has total size at most 111. Its cost is the number of bins, and OPT(I)OPT(I)OPT(I) is the minimum cost.

A configuration of III is a nonempty multiset of sizes occurring in III with total at most 111. With btb_tbt​ the number of pieces of size ttt and atca_{tc}atc​ the number of occurrences of ttt in configuration ccc, the fractional bin-packing problem is the linear program

min⁡ 1⋅xs.t.x≥0,∑catcxc≥bt  for every size t,\min\ \mathbf 1\cdot x\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x\ge 0,\qquad \sum_c a_{tc}x_c \ge b_t\ \ \text{for every size } t,min 1⋅xs.t.x≥0,c∑​atc​xc​≥bt​  for every size t,

whose optimal value is LIN(I)LIN(I)LIN(I). A basic feasible solution is an extreme point of its feasible region.

For instances I,JI,JI,J, write I≤JI\le JI≤J if there is a one-to-one map fff from the pieces of III into the pieces of JJJ with x≤f(x)x\le f(x)x≤f(x). Linear grouping with parameter kkk sorts III non-increasingly, cuts it into groups G1,…,GqG_1,\dots,G_qG1​,…,Gq​ of kkk consecutive pieces (the last possibly shorter), rounds every piece of GiG_iGi​ up to the largest size of GiG_iGi​ to get Gi′G_i'Gi′​, and outputs J=⋃i≥2Gi′J = \bigcup_{i\ge 2} G_i'J=⋃i≥2​Gi′​ and J′=G1J' = G_1J′=G1​.

ALGORITHM 1 takes III and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0: (1) discard the pieces of size ≤max⁡(1/n(I),ε/2)\le \max(1/n(I), \varepsilon/2)≤max(1/n(I),ε/2), leaving JJJ; (2) apply linear grouping to JJJ with k=⌈n(J)ε2⌉k = \lceil n(J)\varepsilon^2\rceilk=⌈n(J)ε2⌉, giving KKK and K′K'K′; (3) put each piece of K′K'K′ in its own bin; (4) obtain from a Fractional Bin-Packing subroutine a basic feasible solution xxx of the LP of KKK with 1⋅x≤LIN(K)+1\mathbf 1\cdot x\le LIN(K)+11⋅x≤LIN(K)+1; (5) round xxx to a packing of KKK with at most 1⋅x+(m(K)+1)/2\mathbf 1\cdot x + (m(K)+1)/21⋅x+(m(K)+1)/2 bins; (6) shrink the pieces back to obtain a packing of JJJ; (7) insert the discarded pieces, opening a new bin only when a piece fits nowhere. A(I)A(I)A(I) is the cost of the resulting packing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, as its proof establishes it

A(I)≤(1+2ε) OPT(I)+12ε2+3for every ε>0, every instance I, every run of ALGORITHM 1.A(I) \le (1+2\varepsilon)\,OPT(I) + \frac{1}{2\varepsilon^2} + 3 \qquad\text{for every } \varepsilon>0,\ \text{every instance } I,\ \text{every run of ALGORITHM 1.}A(I)≤(1+2ε)OPT(I)+2ε21​+3for every ε>0, every instance I, every run of ALGORITHM 1.

The additive term depends on ε\varepsilonε only, so ALGORITHM 1 is an asymptotic approximation scheme. The paper prints the factor 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε, which fails for ALGORITHM 1 as printed (see Formalization scope); running the algorithm with ε/2\varepsilon/2ε/2 gives the paper's main result (4), A(I)≤(1+ε)OPT(I)+O(ε−2)A(I)\le(1+\varepsilon)OPT(I)+O(\varepsilon^{-2})A(I)≤(1+ε)OPT(I)+O(ε−2), stated as a separate corollary with the explicit term 2/ε2+32/\varepsilon^2+32/ε2+3.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: OPT(I)≤2 SIZE(I)+1OPT(I)\le 2\,SIZE(I)+1OPT(I)≤2SIZE(I)+1.
  2. Lemma 2: SIZE(I)≤LIN(I)≤OPT(I)≤LIN(I)+m(I)+12SIZE(I)\le LIN(I)\le OPT(I)\le LIN(I)+\frac{m(I)+1}{2}SIZE(I)≤LIN(I)≤OPT(I)≤LIN(I)+2m(I)+1​.
  3. Corollary 1: every basic feasible solution xxx can be rounded to a packing of cost ≤1⋅x+m(I)+12\le \mathbf 1\cdot x + \frac{m(I)+1}{2}≤1⋅x+2m(I)+1​.
  4. Lemma 3: inserting pieces of size ≤g/2\le g/2≤g/2 last, with new bins only when necessary, costs at most max⁡(A,(1+g) OPT(I)+1)\max(A, (1+g)\,OPT(I)+1)max(A,(1+g)OPT(I)+1).
  5. Monotonicity: I≤JI\le JI≤J implies OPTOPTOPT, LINLINLIN and SIZESIZESIZE do not decrease.
  6. Lemma 4: linear grouping loses at most kkk in OPTOPTOPT, LINLINLIN and SIZESIZESIZE.
  7. Proof steps (ii)–(iii) (corrected): k≤2ε OPT(I)+1k\le 2\varepsilon\,OPT(I)+1k≤2εOPT(I)+1.
  8. Proof step (iv): m(K)≤1/ε2m(K)\le 1/\varepsilon^2m(K)≤1/ε2.
  9. Proof step (vii): 1⋅x≤OPT(I)+1\mathbf 1\cdot x\le OPT(I)+11⋅x≤OPT(I)+1.
  10. Proof step (viii) (corrected): the packing of Step 6 has at most (1+2ε)OPT(I)+12ε2+52(1+2\varepsilon)OPT(I)+\frac{1}{2\varepsilon^2}+\frac52(1+2ε)OPT(I)+2ε21​+25​ bins.

Significance

The result showed that the configuration LP, of exponential size in general, can be used for a guaranteed approximation: its value is within (m+1)/2(m+1)/2(m+1)/2 of the integer optimum, and grouping reduces mmm at small cost. The same template (eliminate small items, group, solve the configuration LP, round a basic solution, reinsert) underlies later schemes for bin packing, cutting stock, bin packing with cardinality constraints and scheduling, and the LP-based analysis is the starting point of the Rothvoß and Hoberg–Rothvoß improvements.

The theorems are proved in the literature; none of them has a machine-checked proof on the platform or, to our knowledge, in Mathlib. This mission produces a checked analysis of the algorithm, including a correction: the printed approximation factor is not valid for the algorithm as printed, and the checked statement records the factor its proof yields. The definitions (instances, packings, the configuration LP, basic solutions, the order I≤JI\le JI≤J, any-fit insertion) are reusable for the second mission of the series and for other bin-packing results.

Difficulty

The Lean statements are short, but several proofs need linear-programming structure that is not in Mathlib in this form. Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 use that an extreme point of {x≥0, Ax≥b}\{x\ge0,\ Ax\ge b\}{x≥0, Ax≥b} has at most as many nonzero coordinates as there are rows of AAA; the configuration LP is indexed by a finite but implicitly described set of multisets. Monotonicity of LINLINLIN under I≤JI\le JI≤J ("clearly" in the paper) requires transporting a fractional solution across a piece-to-piece matching whose images are types, not pieces. The existence of a run requires an optimal basic feasible solution of the configuration LP. Lemma 3 concerns an insertion process with unrestricted order and bin choice, so its bound has to hold for every execution, not for one greedy rule.

Formalization scope

  • Sizes are real numbers in the open interval (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); the paper says "a rational number between 0 and 1". Real sizes generalize rational ones; the open interval is what the paper's arguments use.
  • Instances are Multiset ℝ; packings are Multiset (Multiset ℝ) with join equal to the instance, bin loads at most 111, empty bins allowed and counted. OPTOPTOPT is a natural-number infimum over a set that is always nonempty.
  • LP solutions are Multiset ℝ →₀ ℝ supported on configurations. LINLINLIN is a real infimum over a set that is nonempty (singleton configurations) and bounded below by 000. "Basic" is the extreme-point property; the bound on the number of nonzero coordinates is a consequence, not the definition.
  • The Fractional Bin-Packing subroutine is modelled by its contract only (§5, p. 315): any basic feasible solution of cost at most LIN(K)+1LIN(K)+1LIN(K)+1. The ellipsoid method of §6 is not modelled.
  • ALGORITHM 1 is a relation Alg1Run ε I P: PPP is a possible output. Every open choice is quantified: the subroutine's output, the packing of Step 5 (any packing within the stated bound), the size reduction of Step 6 (bin by bin), and the insertion of Step 7 (any order, any fitting bin). The goal holds for every run, and a separate item states that a run exists, so the goal is not vacuous.
  • The paper's O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) in result (4) is replaced by the explicit 2/ε2+32/\varepsilon^2+32/ε2+3.
  • Corrected statements. The printed Theorem 3 bound (1+ε)OPT(I)+12ε2+3(1+\varepsilon)OPT(I)+\frac{1}{2\varepsilon^2}+3(1+ε)OPT(I)+2ε21​+3 fails: for ε=1/10\varepsilon=1/10ε=1/10 and 19 00019\,00019000 pieces of size 0.0510.0510.051, some run uses 118011801180 bins while the bound is 115311531153. The failing step is (ii), SIZE(J)≥ε n(J)SIZE(J)\ge\varepsilon\,n(J)SIZE(J)≥εn(J), since Step 1 discards only pieces ≤ε/2\le\varepsilon/2≤ε/2. Steps (ii)–(iii) and (viii) are stated with 2ε2\varepsilon2ε; step (iv) is stated as m(K)≤1/ε2m(K)\le 1/\varepsilon^2m(K)≤1/ε2 because its first link m(K)≤n(K)/km(K)\le n(K)/km(K)≤n(K)/k fails when the last group is short.
  • Running time (Theorem 3's first half, Corollary 1's time bound, the function TTT) is out of scope.
  • Trivializations are ruled out: "some packing has at most the bound" is not the goal; the goal constrains every output of the algorithm, and the packing property of that output is part of its conclusion.

Proofs of any item are welcome; Lemma 2, Corollary 1 and the monotonicity display are the most reusable.

Selected references

  • N. Karmarkar, R. M. Karp, An Efficient Approximation Scheme for the One-Dimensional Bin-Packing Problem, Proc. 23rd FOCS (SFCS 1982), IEEE, pp. 312–320. https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.1982.61
  • W. Fernandez de la Vega, G. S. Lueker, Bin packing can be solved within 1+ε in linear time, Combinatorica 1 (1981) 349–355. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579456
  • P. C. Gilmore, R. E. Gomory, A Linear Programming Approach to the Cutting-Stock Problem, Operations Research 9 (1961) 849–859. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.9.6.849
  • D. S. Johnson, A. Demers, J. D. Ullman, M. R. Garey, R. L. Graham, Worst-Case Performance Bounds for Simple One-Dimensional Packing Algorithms, SIAM J. Comput. 3 (1974) 299–325. https://doi.org/10.1137/0203025
  • R. Hoberg, T. Rothvoß, A Logarithmic Additive Integrality Gap for Bin Packing, Proc. SODA 2017, 2616–2625. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611974782.172
16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXXV: Gross Substitutes and Equilibrium PricesTextbook

Motivation

This mission continues chapter 11's account of the M♮-concave/M♮-convex exchange-economy model begun in mission 14-economic-equilibrium, placing seven of that chunk's own results that were previously left out-of-cone: the two gross-substitutes-style characterizations of M♮-concavity (§11.3), the transfer theorem that lifts an equilibrium of the continuous relaxation to one for indivisible commodities (§11.4), and the explicit polyhedral description of the equilibrium price set together with its feasibility criterion (§11.5).

Setting

Mission 14-economic-equilibrium built the exchange-economy vocabulary this mission redeclares in full (UDom, ArgMaxBot/ArgMinTop, PriceShift/PriceShiftConvex, DemandSet/SupplySet, IsEquilibrium, MNaturalConcave, IsMNaturalConvexSet, the concave/convex closures ConcaveClosureR/ConvexClosureR and their continuous analogues ContDemandSet/ContSupplySet/ IsContEquilibrium) and placed the qualitative structural theorems (Theorems 11.1-11.3, 11.4, 11.16-11.18, 11.23-11.24). This mission adds the gross-substitutes axioms (−M♮-GS[Z], the price-monotonicity property NegGS, and −M♮-SWGS[Z], its one-price-at-a-time refinement NegSWGS), the M♮-convex-set transfer machinery connecting a continuous equilibrium to a discrete one, and the equilibrium price polyhedron built from the three bound families ℓ(j), u(j), u(i,j) (Eqs. (11.40)-(11.42)) that make Theorem 11.16's qualitative L♮-convex-polyhedron fact concrete and linear-programming-checkable.

Formalization targets

Goal: The equilibrium price set is the explicit L♮-convex polyhedron (11.43) (Theorem 11.21)

For a fixed allocation (x,y), the set P* of all equilibrium price vectors is an L♮-convex polyhedron and equals the polyhedron cut out by max{0,ℓ(j)} ≤ p(j) ≤ u(j) and p(j)-p(i) ≤ u(i,j). Chosen as goal: it is the sharpest structural result of chapter 11's computation section, upgrading Theorem 11.16's qualitative fact to a concrete description, and is what Theorem 11.22 (also placed) builds on directly.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 11.5 and Theorem 11.6 characterize M♮-concavity via the gross-substitutes and stepwise gross-substitutes properties, completing chapter 11's suite of M♮-concavity characterizations begun with Theorem 11.4 (mission 14). Theorem 11.15 is the general transfer theorem (continuous equilibrium ⟹ discrete equilibrium) that mission 14's own Theorem 11.14 invokes as a special case. Theorem 11.22 gives the feasibility criterion for the existence of an equilibrium price vector, the mission's second theorem built on the equilibrium price polyhedron.

Significance

Together with mission 14-economic-equilibrium, this mission completes the book's account of how M♮-concavity/convexity — a purely combinatorial exchange condition — reproduces, and sharpens, the classical gross-substitutes theory of competitive equilibrium for economies with indivisible goods: existence transfers from the continuous relaxation, and the equilibrium price set itself has a description exact enough to reduce to a linear feasibility question. None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account (attributed in the book's own notes to Danilov-Koshevoy- Lang and Murota-Tamura for the gross-substitutes theorems, and to Murota-Tamura for the equilibrium price polyhedron); this mission contributes a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Two of this chunk's seven BRIEF.md results are not drafted this pass, for a disclosed time- budget reason rather than any faithfulness failure: Proposition 11.19 and Theorem 11.20 require the H,L-indexed bipartite MSFP2 flow-network vocabulary (separate vertex sets V+_e, V+_l, V-_h, an M-convex/M-concave-combining flow objective) that neither this mission nor mission 14 builds, and building it in proportion to placing exactly these two results was judged disproportionate to the remaining time in this pass; see HARD.md and STATUS.md. This is explicitly not a hard exclusion — both results are well-posed and provable from the book's own complete proofs — and is recorded as an honest scope limitation for a future pass. Theorem 11.22's own trailing algorithmic remark (that equilibrium prices can be found via a shortest-path computation, yielding a polynomial-time equilibrium-checking algorithm) is a computational/ complexity claim outside this series' propositional-formalization methodology and is omitted; the mathematical "iff feasibility" content is placed in full. See HARD.md.

Formalization scope

Ground set K is a Fintype with DecidableEq; consumer/producer index sets H, L are Fintypes (Nonempty where the price-bound formulas (11.40)-(11.42) need a nonempty sup'/inf' range). All base vocabulary is redeclared fresh from mission 14-economic-equilibrium's own definitions, since this draft cannot import that sibling mission. The gross-substitutes axioms are formalized directly from their defining inequalities (Eqs. preceding (11.19) and following, and p.331); the equilibrium price polyhedron's bound families ℓ(j)/u(j)/u(i,j) are formalized literally from Eqs. (11.40)-(11.42), extracting each WithBot ℝ/WithTop ℝ operand to ℝ before subtracting (since WithBot ℝ carries no subtraction instance). Two results (Proposition 11.19, Theorem 11.20) are not drafted this pass for the disclosed time-budget reason above; one result (Theorem 11.22's trailing algorithmic remark) is scoped out as computational content. Contributions completing any of the five sorrys, or building the MSFP2 vocabulary to place Proposition 11.19/Theorem 11.20 in a follow-up mission, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • V. Danilov, G. Koshevoy, K. Murota, "Discrete convexity and equilibria in economies with indivisible goods and money," Mathematical Social Sciences, 41 (2001), pp. 251-273 [33] (origin of the gross-substitutes characterization, Theorem 11.6).
  • K. Murota, A. Tamura, "Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics," Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 20 (2003), pp. 257-277 [160] (origin of the equilibrium price polyhedron, Theorems 11.20-11.22).
41 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment: For Any Positive Holding Cost the Buyer Withholds Strategic Inventory When the Direct Selling Cost Is Just Below 5/6, at Total Holding Cost Below 11/72Research Paper

Motivation

Two strategic levers shape the balance of power between a manufacturer and the retailer that resells its product. The first is strategic inventory: a buyer that orders more than it sells today, and carries the surplus into the next period, weakens the supplier's leverage over tomorrow's wholesale price. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that in a two-period channel the buyer withholds inventory exactly when its unit holding cost is below α/4\alpha/4α/4. The second is supplier encroachment: a supplier that can sell directly to consumers competes with its own buyer. Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (Marketing Science 2007) showed that the threat of encroachment can lower wholesale prices and benefit both parties.

Guan, Gurnani, Geng and Luo, Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment (MSOM 2019), combine the two levers in one game. Their headline qualitative finding is Proposition 4.2. When the supplier's direct channel is costly, but not quite too costly to use, the buyer keeps withholding inventory at every finite holding cost. This contrasts with the α/4\alpha/4α/4 cutoff of Anand et al. This mission formalizes that proposition, together with the equilibrium characterizations of Appendix A on which it rests.

Setting

There is one supplier and one buyer, two periods, deterministic demand and complete information. In each period the market price is p=α−qp = \alpha - qp=α−q, where qqq is the total quantity sold in that period and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 is the demand intercept. The buyer pays a per-unit holding cost h≥0h \ge 0h≥0 on inventory carried into period 2. The supplier pays a per-unit direct selling cost s≥0s \ge 0s≥0. All other costs and the salvage value are zero. The moves are:

  1. The supplier quotes a wholesale price w1≥0w_1 \ge 0w1​≥0.
  2. The buyer orders Q1Q_1Q1​ and sells q1q_1q1​, with 0≤q1≤Q10 \le q_1 \le Q_10≤q1​≤Q1​. It carries the inventory I=Q1−q1I = Q_1 - q_1I=Q1​−q1​ into period 2.
  3. The supplier quotes w2≥0w_2 \ge 0w2​≥0.
  4. The buyer orders Q2≥0Q_2 \ge 0Q2​≥0 and sells q2q_2q2​, with 0≤q2≤I+Q20 \le q_2 \le I + Q_20≤q2​≤I+Q2​.
  5. Having observed everything, the supplier sells qs≥0q_s \ge 0qs​≥0 directly. The period-2 price is α−q2−qs\alpha - q_2 - q_sα−q2​−qs​.

The total profits are

Πb=(α−q1)q1−w1Q1−hI+(α−q2−qs)q2−w2Q2,Πs=w1Q1+w2Q2+(α−q2−qs−s)qs.\Pi_b = (\alpha - q_1)q_1 - w_1 Q_1 - hI + (\alpha - q_2 - q_s)q_2 - w_2 Q_2, \qquad \Pi_s = w_1 Q_1 + w_2 Q_2 + (\alpha - q_2 - q_s - s)q_s .Πb​=(α−q1​)q1​−w1​Q1​−hI+(α−q2​−qs​)q2​−w2​Q2​,Πs​=w1​Q1​+w2​Q2​+(α−q2​−qs​−s)qs​.

A strategy profile assigns an action to every history at which a player moves. It is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if, at every feasible history, the mover's prescribed action is feasible and no feasible alternative, followed by the profile afterwards, raises the mover's total profit. The equilibrium path is the outcome the profile generates; the equilibrium inventory is III on that path. Following the paper (§4), the goal theorem sets α=1\alpha = 1α=1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.2

With α=1\alpha = 1α=1,

∀h>0  ∃ϵ>0  ∀s∈(56−ϵ,56):an SPE exists, and every SPE has I>0 and hI<1172.\forall h > 0\ \ \exists \epsilon > 0\ \ \forall s \in \big(\tfrac56 - \epsilon, \tfrac56\big):\quad \text{an SPE exists, and every SPE has } I > 0 \text{ and } hI < \tfrac{11}{72}.∀h>0  ∃ϵ>0  ∀s∈(65​−ϵ,65​):an SPE exists, and every SPE has I>0 and hI<7211​.

Here ϵ\epsilonϵ may depend on hhh, and the bound 11/7211/7211/72 applies at the same (h,s)(h, s)(h,s).

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Stage-3 best response (§3.1.1): in every SPE, the supplier sells qs=(α−q2−s)+/2q_s = (\alpha - q_2 - s)^+/2qs​=(α−q2​−s)+/2 at every history.
  2. Eq. (1) (§3.1.1): with no inventory, the buyer's period-2 quantity is the four-branch function qb(w)q_b(w)qb​(w) of the period-2 wholesale price www.
  3. Proposition 4.1, existence half: an SPE exists for every h≥0h \ge 0h≥0 and s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.
  4. Region 8 (Tables A.1 and A.4): for h<h11h < h_{11}h<h11​ with s3≤s<5α/6s_3 \le s < 5\alpha/6s3​≤s<5α/6, or for h<α/4h < \alpha/4h<α/4 with 5α/6≤s<α5\alpha/6 \le s < \alpha5α/6≤s<α, every SPE has I=5(α−4h)/34I = 5(\alpha - 4h)/34I=5(α−4h)/34 and the path of Table A.4.
  5. Region 7, second part (Tables A.1 and A.3): for h11<h<h10h_{11} < h < h_{10}h11​<h<h10​ and s3≤s<5α/6s_3 \le s < 5\alpha/6s3​≤s<5α/6, every SPE has I=I∗=(2α−3s+x)/2I = I^* = (2\alpha - 3s + x)/2I=I∗=(2α−3s+x)/2 and the path of Table A.3.
  6. Region 10, second part (Tables A.1 and A.4): for h>h7h > h_7h>h7​ and 2α/3<s<5α/62\alpha/3 < s < 5\alpha/62α/3<s<5α/6, every SPE has I=0I = 0I=0.

The thresholds xxx, s3s_3s3​, h7h_7h7​, h10h_{10}h10​, h11h_{11}h11​ are explicit algebraic functions of sss, given in Appendix A.

Significance

Proposition 4.2 separates the combined model from the two models it merges. Without a direct channel, inventory disappears once h≥α/4h \ge \alpha/4h≥α/4. With a direct channel, a threat of encroachment that is only barely credible keeps inventory alive at every holding cost. The total holding cost nevertheless stays below a constant, because the inventory shrinks as hhh grows. Milestone 6 shows the flip side: for a fixed s<5α/6s < 5\alpha/6s<5α/6, a large enough hhh removes the inventory. This is why the window ϵ\epsilonϵ must depend on hhh.

The paper's proofs are in an online appendix that is not reproduced in the article. The article itself gives the equilibrium only as tables. A formal development would supply a checked backward-induction proof of those tables in the regions near s=5α/6s = 5\alpha/6s=5α/6. It would also give a machine-checked SPE framework for multi-stage pricing-and-quantity games in supply chains, which none of the following exists for: Stackelberg pricing, sequential quantity competition, or dual-channel encroachment. No part of this paper has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The equilibrium is found by backward induction through five stages. Each stage's value function is only piecewise smooth, because the supplier's direct-channel response (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ switches on and off. As a result the buyer's period-2 profit has kinks, the supplier's period-2 profit as a function of III has several local maxima, and the period-1 problems must compare branches whose boundaries are the irrational thresholds of Appendix A. The obvious approach, solving the first-order conditions stage by stage, fails at the kinks. At some region boundaries it also misses that the supplier is indifferent between two first-period prices, which makes the equilibrium path change discontinuously. Proposition 4.2 then needs uniform control of h7h_7h7​, h10h_{10}h10​ and h11h_{11}h11​ as s↑5/6s \uparrow 5/6s↑5/6, where the denominator 3s−2−x3s - 2 - x3s−2−x of h7h_7h7​ tends to 000.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Strategies are functions of the full history, not Markov rules in III. IsSPE imposes optimality at every feasible history, including off-path ones. All actions are real numbers; wholesale prices and quantities are nonnegative, with q1≤Q1q_1 \le Q_1q1​≤Q1​ and q2≤I+Q2q_2 \le I + Q_2q2​≤I+Q2​.
  • Normalization. The goal instantiates α=1\alpha = 1α=1 as the paper does from §4 on. The milestones keep a general α>0\alpha > 0α>0.
  • Uniqueness is not stated. Proposition 4.1's uniqueness claim is false for strategy profiles: after the off-path price w2=0w_2 = 0w2​=0, every order Q2≥q2−IQ_2 \ge q_2 - IQ2​≥q2​−I is optimal. The goal and the region milestones therefore quantify over every SPE and carry existence as a separate conjunct.
  • Corrected hypotheses.
    • The printed s3=((37−365)/34+4/6)α≈1.28αs_3 = (\sqrt{(37 - 3\sqrt{65})/34} + 4/6)\alpha \approx 1.28\alphas3​=((37−365​)/34​+4/6)α≈1.28α is replaced by (37−365/34+4/6)α≈0.772α(\sqrt{37 - 3\sqrt{65}}/34 + 4/6)\alpha \approx 0.772\alpha(37−365​​/34+4/6)α≈0.772α, which matches the paper's "≈0.77".
    • Eq. (1) excludes the corner w=0w = 0w=0, s<α/3s < \alpha/3s<α/3, where its second branch is wrong.
    • Region 8 drops its boundary h=h11h = h_{11}h=h11​ and Region 7 drops h=h10h = h_{10}h=h10​, because the equilibrium path switches there and need not be unique.
  • Ruled-out trivialization. The inventory in the goal is the inventory on the path of an SPE of the game above. It is not the closed form 5(1−4h)/345(1 - 4h)/345(1−4h)/34 or I∗I^*I∗ from the tables, and the regional characterization is not a hypothesis. Otherwise the goal would reduce to algebra about the thresholds.
  • Infrastructure and contributions. The definitions Game, IsSPE and Thresholds are shared by every statement. Welcome contributions include:
    • lemmas on maximizing concave piecewise-quadratic functions on half-lines;
    • a reusable backward-induction lemma for finite-stage games with real action sets;
    • interval-arithmetic facts about xxx, h7h_7h7​, h10h_{10}h10​ and h11h_{11}h11​ near s=5/6s = 5/6s=5/6;
    • proofs of the paper's other regions.

Selected references

  • T. Guan, H. Gurnani, X. Geng, Y. Luo, Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 21(3):536–555, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0705
  • K. Anand, R. Anupindi, Y. Bassok, Strategic Inventories in Vertical Contracts, Management Science 54(10):1792–1804, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0894
  • A. Arya, B. Mittendorf, D. Sappington, The Bright Side of Supplier Encroachment, Marketing Science 26(5):651–659, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0280
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXXI: The Potential Criterion for Network FlowsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 9 is where discrete convex analysis meets classical network flow theory: the minimum cost flow problem's three hallmark properties — an optimality criterion by potentials, an optimality criterion by negative cycles, and integrality of optimal solutions — are shown to survive, in a precise and increasingly general form, first for arbitrary polyhedral convex costs (MCFP3), then for the M-convex submodular flow problem (MSFP2/MSFP3), the chapter's own combinatorial generalization of the classical problem. This mission places the potential criterion (Theorem 9.4) and its cascade of six corollaries and generalizations, the block of results this book's own text uses to carry every other result in the chapter.

Setting

A digraph G = (V,A) with tail/head maps ∂⁺,∂⁻ : A → V. A flow ξ : A → R has boundary ∂ξ(v) = Σ{ξ(a) : ∂⁺a=v} − Σ{ξ(a) : ∂⁻a=v}. A potential p : V → R has coboundary δp(a) = p(∂⁺a) − p(∂⁻a). The minimum cost flow problem MCFP3 minimizes Γ₃(ξ) = Σₐ fₐ(ξ(a)) + f(∂ξ) over flows, for polyhedral convex arc costs fₐ : R → R∪{+∞} and boundary cost f : Rⱽ → R∪{+∞}; MCFP0 is its linear-cost, fixed-supply special case. The M-convex submodular flow problem MSFP3 is MCFP3 with f additionally M-convex; MSFP2 is its linear-arc-cost special case.

Formalization targets

Goal: The potential criterion for MCFP3 (Theorem 9.4)

For a feasible flow ξ, ξ is optimal for MCFP3 iff there is a potential p with ξ(a) a minimizer of the reduced arc cost fₐ[δp(a)] for every arc and ∂ξ a minimizer of the reduced boundary cost f[−p]; and any such optimal potential characterizes optimality of every feasible flow. This is the hub result of the whole chunk: the book states Theorem 9.14 is "immediate" from it, and every other placed result either specializes it directly or builds on that specialization.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 9.5 reformulates MCFP0's optimality as the absence of a negative cycle in an auxiliary network; Theorem 9.6 gives MCFP0's primal and dual integrality, the latter identifying the optimal-potential set as an L-convex polyhedron. Theorem 9.14 specializes the goal to MSFP3; Theorem 9.15 upgrades this to a full polyhedral and integrality structure theorem for MSFP3's optimal-flow-boundary and optimal-potential sets (M2-convex and L-convex polyhedra respectively); Theorem 9.16 is the integer-flow analogue, with the boundary set now literally M2-convex and the integer-optimal-potential set literally L-convex. Theorems 9.18 and 9.20 give the negative-cycle reformulation for MSFP2, real and integer flows respectively, generalizing Theorem 9.5 by admitting a third class of auxiliary arcs governed by the M-convex boundary cost's directional derivative (or its discrete difference, in the integer case).

Significance

This is the chapter's demonstration that M-convexity is not merely an abstract combinatorial axiom but the exact structural hypothesis under which classical network-flow duality survives intact: every one of the four "nice properties" the book opens the chapter with (potentials, negative cycles, integrality, efficient algorithms) is preserved verbatim in the M-convex generalization, and this mission's eight results are the proof of that claim for the first three. The chunk's own internal dependency structure — one foundational theorem (9.4) from which every other placed result descends by specialization or direct generalization — is itself characteristic of how this book organizes its combinatorial machinery around a single convex- analytic core.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of network flow duality under M-convexity (sections 9.1, 9.4, and 9.5). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, extending the platform's coverage of chapter 9 begun in mission 12-network-flows (which covered §9.1.1-9.1.2 and §9.3, the feasibility and max-flow min-cut results, deliberately leaving this block for later apparatus); no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The eight results span real- and integer-flow versions of two nested problem hierarchies (MCFP0 ⊂ MCFP3, MSFP2 ⊂ MSFP3) and two distinct optimality certificates (potentials, negative cycles), which this mission handles by building one shared apparatus — FeasibleFlowMCFP3, Gamma3, OptimalFlowMCFP3, IsOptimalPotential — that MCFP0 and MSFP3 both instantiate (MCFP0 literally as the linear-cost/singleton-boundary special case of Eq. (9.11)), and one shared generic cycle/negative-cycle apparatus (IsCycle, CycleLength, HasNegativeCycle) instantiated three times with different auxiliary-arc types (A⊕A for MCFP0, A⊕A⊕(V×V) for MSFP2's extra Cξ arcs governed by the boundary cost's directional derivative). "Primal integral" and "dual integral" polyhedral convex functions (the book's own C[Z|R→R]/C[R→R|Z] notation, used in Theorem 9.15) needed a modeling decision, since the book's own definition of these classes lies outside this chunk's page range; see Formalization scope.

Formalization scope

Ground-set vertices V and arcs A are Fintype with DecidableEq. All base M-/L-convexity vocabulary is redeclared from prior missions in this series. "Primal integral" (C[Z|R→R], M[Z|R→R]) is formalized as integer effective domain (IsDomainIntegerArc/IsDomainIntegerR); "dual integral" (C[R→R|Z], M[R→R|Z]) is formalized as the existence of an integer subgradient at every domain point (IsDualIntegralArc/IsDualIntegralR) — a standard equivalent characterization for polyhedral convex functions, and a deliberate modeling choice recorded in MODERATION_NOTES.md rather than a literal transcription of the book's own (out-of-range) definition of these two notation classes. All eight numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed in full, with no partial-coverage scope reduction. Contributions completing any of the eight sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 9.15 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Network Flows and Monotropic Optimization, Wiley, 1984 [178] (the classical potential/Fenchel-duality framework this mission's Theorem 9.4 adapts).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (the Lagrange duality and negative-cycle theory of section 9.5 this mission's Theorems 9.18 and 9.20 draw from).
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXIX: M2-Convex and L2-Convex FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

Mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality opened chapter 8's account of M2-convex functions — sums of M-convex functions — proving their domains and minimizers are M2-convex and that they are integrally convex. This mission completes that program and builds its exact mirror for L2-convex functions (integer infimal convolutions of L-convex functions), the class that appears on the opposite side of Edmonds's intersection theorem's min-max relation from M2-convexity. It proves optimality and proximity theorems for both classes, shows their subdifferentials add (a discrete analogue of the classical subdifferential sum rule), derives how the Legendre-Fenchel transform interacts with the sum/infimal-convolution operation, and — the technically hardest result in the whole cluster — establishes that L♮₂-convex functions are integrally convex, by a genuinely different and more intricate argument than the M2-side analogue required.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. A function g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} is L2-convex if g=g1□g2g = g_1 \square g_2g=g1​□g2​, the integer infimal convolution g1□g2(p)=inf⁡{g1(p1)+g2(p2):p1+p2=p}g_1\square g_2(p) = \inf\{g_1(p_1)+g_2(p_2) : p_1+p_2=p\}g1​□g2​(p)=inf{g1​(p1​)+g2​(p2​):p1​+p2​=p}, of two L-convex functions g1,g2g_1, g_2g1​,g2​; L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex if the summands are L♮^\natural♮-convex. An M2-convex function is a sum f1+f2f_1+f_2f1​+f2​ of two M-convex functions (mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality). The integer subdifferential ∂Zf(x)\partial_{\mathbb Z} f(x)∂Z​f(x) and real subdifferential ∂Rf(x)\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)∂R​f(x) generalize the subgradient set to integer- and real-valued perturbation directions respectively.

Formalization targets

Goal: L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions are integrally convex (Theorem 8.42)

Every L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex function is integrally convex, and in particular every L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex set is integrally convex. The book's own proof is the most intricate argument in this cluster: given ppp in the Minkowski sum D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​ of two L-convex sets, it constructs an explicit representation of ppp as a convex combination of finitely many integer points of D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​, all lying in ppp's own integral neighborhood, via the sorted fractional-part values of a chosen decomposition p=p1+p2p=p_1+p_2p=p1​+p2​ — a genuinely different technique from the M2-side analogue (Theorem 8.31), whose proof is a two-line consequence of convex extensibility.

Supporting structural targets

Eleven further results build the M2-/L2-convex theory in parallel. Theorems 8.33-8.34 give the M2-optimality criterion (a nonnegative-sum condition over cyclic exchange families) and its scaling-based proximity theorem; Theorem 8.35 shows subdifferentials of a sum of M♮^\natural♮- convex functions add, and that subdifferentials of M2-/M2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions are L2-/L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex; Theorem 8.36 computes the conjugate of a sum as the infimal convolution of conjugates, with biconjugacy recovering the original sum. Propositions 8.39-8.41 transfer L-(natural-)convexity from summands to the domain and minimizer set of an L2-convex function, and give the precise attainment condition under which a linearly-perturbed infimal convolution's minimizer set splits additively. Theorems 8.43-8.44 give the L2-optimality and L2-proximity theorems, the exact L-side mirrors of Theorems 8.33-8.34; Theorem 8.45 mirrors Theorem 8.35 for subdifferentials of an infimal convolution; and Theorem 8.46 (found by direct reading, immediately following 8.45 and explicitly named by the book as 8.36's counterpart) shows biconjugacy for L♮^\natural♮-convex infimal convolutions.

Significance

The M2-/L2-convex function classes are where discrete convex analysis's abstract machinery meets concrete combinatorial optimization: Edmonds's matroid intersection theorem and its generalizations are literally statements about M2-convex minimization, with the L2-convex side supplying the dual bound. Theorem 8.35's subdifferential additivity is the discrete analogue of the classical Moreau-Rockafellar sum rule, and its proof (via the M-convex intersection theorem, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i) shows the sum rule holding without the constraint-qualification technicalities the continuous theory needs — a case where the discrete theory is cleaner than its continuous ancestor. Theorem 8.42's harder, dedicated proof technique is itself informative: it demonstrates that L2-convexity's combinatorial structure is not a routine transcription of the M2-convex case, foreshadowing the book's broader theme that M- and L-convexity, while conjugate, are not interchangeable in how their proofs actually work.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the sum/infimal-convolution closure properties of M-convex and L-convex functions, continuing chapter 8's duality program into its most combinatorially concrete corner. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including one result (Theorem 8.46) the platform's own automated extractor missed, extending the shared Lean vocabulary (InfConv, L2Convex, M2ConvexSet) mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality began; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal would try to adapt the M2-side integral-convexity proof (a direct appeal to convex extensibility) verbatim; the book's own proof shows this does not work, requiring instead a from-scratch construction: decompose p=p1+p2p=p_1+p_2p=p1​+p2​, take fractional parts a1=p1−⌊p1⌋a_1 = p_1-\lfloor p_1\rfloora1​=p1​−⌊p1​⌋ and a2=⌈p2⌉−p2a_2=\lceil p_2\rceil-p_2a2​=⌈p2​⌉−p2​, sort their combined distinct values, build threshold sets exactly as in the Lovász-extension construction, and verify each resulting integer point qi=⌊p1⌋+χU1i+⌈p2⌉−χU2iq_i = \lfloor p_1\rfloor+\chi_{U_{1i}}+\lceil p_2\rceil-\chi_{U_{2i}}qi​=⌊p1​⌋+χU1i​​+⌈p2​⌉−χU2i​​ both lies in D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​ (via L-convex-set closure properties, Theorem 5.10) and in ppp's integral neighborhood (a case split on whether p(v)p(v)p(v) is itself an integer) — a genuinely multi-stage combinatorial argument with no single-inequality shortcut, unlike almost every other result in this mission.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; M2-/L2-convex functions are (V→ℤ)→WithTop ℝ. All twelve numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed, with no partial-coverage scope reduction needed — every clause of every result, including all three parts of Theorems 8.35 and 8.45 and the full cyclic-exchange condition of Theorems 8.33-8.34, is stated in full. One numbered result nominally in this chunk's page range, Theorem 8.32, is not re-placed here: it was already found and placed as a milestone in mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality, whose own page range overlaps this chunk's by one page (PDF245) — see HARD.md. "g1□g2 > −∞" hypotheses are omitted rather than translated, since WithTop ℝ has no −∞ element to violate. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared verbatim from mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another; ConvexConjugate is redeclared from mission 10-conjugacy-i. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 8.35 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "Extreme points of a generalized polymatroid," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 152 (2005), pp. 268-278 [153] (the L2-convex integral-convexity proof this mission's goal is drawn from).
  • K. Murota and A. Tamura, "Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics," Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 20 (2003), pp. 257-277 [162] (the M2-proximity theorem, Theorem 8.34).
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXVIII: The Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 8 is where discrete convex analysis explains why it needed two separate notions — M-convexity (exchangeability) and L-convexity (submodularity) — rather than one. The answer is conjugacy: under the classical Legendre-Fenchel transform, the two classes turn out to be exactly dual to each other, the discrete analogue of the fact that convex analysis's transform is self-dual within a single class of convex functions. Mission 10-conjugacy-i proved the integer-lattice version of this fact (Theorem 8.12) but explicitly deferred the polyhedral version — Theorem 8.4, the chapter's own headline "Conjugacy theorem" — noting it needed a real-variable M-/L-convex-function layer the series had not yet built. That layer now exists, built across missions 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions. This mission proves Theorem 8.4 and its companions: the polar-cone correspondence it induces, its nonpolyhedral generalization, the separation and Fenchel-duality theorems for M♮-/L♮-convex functions, and the basic theory of M2-convex functions (sums of M-convex functions), which the Edmonds intersection theorem's own combinatorics is built from.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡x[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x [\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)]f∙(p)=supx​[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]. A polyhedral convex function fff is M-convex (f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R]) if it satisfies (M-EXC[R]); ggg is L-convex (g∈L[R→R]g \in L[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]g∈L[R→R]) if it satisfies (SBF[R]) and (TRF[R]). A concave function hhh is always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h, an ordinary convex function, so every "f≥hf \ge hf≥h" hypothesis is restated as "f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0" — an equivalent formulation avoiding any need to represent −∞-\infty−∞ in the codomain. A polyhedral cone's polar is C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}C^\circ = \{y : \langle y,x\rangle \le 0\ \forall x \in C\}C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}. A function is M2-convex if it is the sum of two M-convex functions.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjugacy theorem (Theorem 8.4)

The classes of polyhedral M-convex functions and polyhedral L-convex functions are in one-to-one correspondence under the Legendre-Fenchel transform: f∈M⇒f∙∈Lf \in M \Rightarrow f^\bullet \in Lf∈M⇒f∙∈L, g∈L⇒g∙∈Mg \in L \Rightarrow g^\bullet \in Mg∈L⇒g∙∈M, and the transform is an involution (f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g) on each class, with the identical statement for the M♮^\natural♮/L♮^\natural♮ variants. This is the theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i deferred, citing exactly the missing infrastructure this series has since built.

Supporting structural targets

Twelve further results build the surrounding theory. Proposition 8.2 gives the easy two-variable case of the general submodularity-preservation fact (Theorem 8.1, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i); Proposition 8.3 is the technical minimizer-difference lemma the goal's harder direction is built from. Theorem 8.5 derives the M-convex/L-convex cone polarity from the goal, and Theorem 8.6 extends the correspondence beyond the polyhedral case to general closed proper convex functions. Proposition 8.14 and Theorems 8.15-8.16 build the separation theory for M♮-/L♮-convex and concave function pairs, with integral witnesses when the functions are integer valued; Theorem 8.21 (parts 1-2) derives the Fenchel-type strong-duality equality these separation theorems make possible. Propositions 8.29-8.30 and Theorem 8.31 (plus Theorem 8.32, found by direct reading immediately after 8.31) build the basic theory of M2-convex functions: their domains and minimizer sets are M2-convex, they are integrally convex, and their global optimality reduces to a finite local check.

Significance

The goal is the theorem that retroactively explains this entire series' two-track structure: missions 20-25 (M-convex sets and functions) and 08/21/26-28 (L-convex sets and functions) are not two independent theories that happen to share techniques — they are conjugate images of each other, so every theorem proved on one side has a dual counterpart automatically available on the other via Theorem 8.4. This is made concrete immediately: Theorem 8.5's cone polarity and the diagram the book draws connecting M0[R]M_0[\mathbb R]M0​[R], 0L[R→R]0L[\mathbb R\to\mathbb R]0L[R→R], and submodular set functions S[R]S[\mathbb R]S[R] (already correspondences this series proved independently, in missions 24-ch06d-mconvexfunctions and 28-ch07d-lconvexfunctions) are shown to be facets of one single conjugacy fact rather than three separate coincidences. The separation and Fenchel duality theorems (8.15, 8.16, 8.21) are the discrete analogues of the two theorems every convex optimization course opens with, and the book is explicit that they are not corollaries of the classical versions plus convex extensibility — they carry genuinely combinatorial content, specializing to Frank's discrete separation theorem and Edmonds's intersection theorem as examples the book itself gives.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the duality at the heart of discrete convex analysis, the reason the theory needed two dual notions rather than one. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing a theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i explicitly left for a future session once the necessary polyhedral apparatus existed, and including one result (Theorem 8.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal's harder direction (L⇒M) would try to verify the exchange inequality for g∙g^\bulletg∙ directly from the definition of the transform; the book's actual proof instead identifies the exchange inequality with a statement about weighted minimizers of ggg itself via Proposition 8.3 (the minimizer-difference bound), converting a claim about the conjugate function into a claim about ggg's own combinatorial structure — a genuine change of perspective, not a direct calculation. Proposition 8.3's own proof is the hardest single argument in this block: it derives the minimizer-difference bound by a contradiction argument that constructs an explicit pair of "worse" minimizers via a join/meet perturbation and derives a strict inequality from Theorem 7.29's translation inequality — a multi-step combinatorial argument with no direct shortcut.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; convex functions are WithTop ℝ valued throughout (never EReal, except for the Legendre-Fenchel transform itself, whose defining supremum/infimum can genuinely be infinite). All thirteen numbered results found in this chunk's page range — the twelve in BRIEF.md's own table plus Theorem 8.32 — are placed, with one documented scope reduction: Theorem 8.21 states only its real-attainment parts (1)-(2), not the integer-attainment refinement of parts (3)-(4), which needs a separate argument no other result in this chunk requires — see HARD.md. Concave functions hhh are always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h and every inequality f≥hf \ge hf≥h restated as f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0, avoiding WithTop ℝ negation entirely. This chunk's own BRIEF.md inherited the chapters-4-7 page-offset boilerplate (printed = PDF −-− 19); chapter 8 uses offset 18, confirmed against the PDF's own footers — every citation here uses the corrected offset. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared from missions 10-conjugacy-i, 20-ch04b-mconvexsets, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets, 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions, and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the thirteen sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 8.3 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 [152] (the polyhedral M-/L-convex conjugacy theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
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Discrete Convex Analysis IX: The Discrete Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

The Legendre-Fenchel transform is the single most structurally important operation in convex analysis: for a proper closed convex function fff, its conjugate f∙(p)=sup⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x \{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)\}f∙(p)=supx​{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)} is again proper closed convex, and the transform is an involution — f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet} = ff∙∙=f. This one fact underlies duality theory across optimization: every strong-duality theorem is, at bottom, a statement about conjugate pairs. Chapters 6 and 7 of this book developed M-convex and L-convex functions as if they were two separate theories, each with its own exchange axiom, optimality criterion, and proximity theorem. Chapter 8 reveals they were never separate: the Legendre-Fenchel transform, suitably discretized, is a bijection between the two classes. This mission formalizes that discrete conjugacy theorem together with its classical real-valued precursor and a genuine function-level generalization of Edmonds's intersection theorem, completing the picture that chunks 06 through 09 built the two halves of.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈RV}f^\bullet(p) = \sup\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x) : x \in \mathbb R^V\}f∙(p)=sup{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈RV}; fff is submodular if f(x)+f(y)≥f(x∨y)+f(x∧y)f(x)+f(y) \ge f(x\vee y)+f(x\wedge y)f(x)+f(y)≥f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) and supermodular under the reverse inequality. For f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞}, the discrete Legendre-Fenchel transform restricts the same supremum formula to p∈ZVp \in \mathbb Z^Vp∈ZV: f∙(p)=sup⁡{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈ZV}f^\bullet(p) = \sup\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x) : x \in \mathbb Z^V\}f∙(p)=sup{⟨p,x⟩−f(x):x∈ZV} for p∈ZVp \in \mathbb Z^Vp∈ZV — a genuinely different object from the real-valued transform, since the supremum is now over integer xxx only, and the codomain is checked back against the discrete M-/L-convexity axioms of chunks 06–09. The integer biconjugate f∙∙f^{\bullet\bullet}f∙∙ is the transform applied twice. fff is integer valued if every finite value it takes is an integer (the classes M[Z→Z]M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M[Z→Z], L[Z→Z]L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L[Z→Z] of the goal theorem are exactly the M-/L-convex functions with this property).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.12 (the discrete conjugacy theorem)

(1) The classes M[Z→Z]M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M[Z→Z] and L[Z→Z]L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L[Z→Z] are in one-to-one correspondence under the discrete Legendre-Fenchel transform: for f∈M[Z→Z]f \in M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]f∈M[Z→Z] and g∈L[Z→Z]g \in L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]g∈L[Z→Z], f∙∈L[Z→Z]f^\bullet \in L[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]f∙∈L[Z→Z], g∙∈M[Z→Z]g^\bullet \in M[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]g∙∈M[Z→Z], f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, and g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g. (2) The same correspondence holds between M♮[Z→Z]M^\natural[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]M♮[Z→Z] and L♮[Z→Z]L^\natural[\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Z]L♮[Z→Z].

Milestones: Theorem 8.1, Proposition 8.11, Theorem 8.17

Theorem 8.1: the conjugate of a real-valued submodular function is always supermodular — the classical warm-up, and evidence that submodularity/supermodularity is not symmetric under conjugation on its own (the converse fails). Proposition 8.11: the integer biconjugate recovers fff at any point with a nonempty integer subdifferential — the fact that makes discrete biconjugation meaningful at all. Theorem 8.17 (the M-convex intersection theorem): a point jointly minimizes a sum of two M♮^\natural♮-convex functions if and only if a single linear functional separately certifies it as a minimizer of each perturbed function — the function-level generalization of chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem for M-convex sets.

Significance

The result itself. The discrete conjugacy theorem is, in the book's own words, "the unifying result of the entire book": every theorem proved separately for M-convex functions (chunks 06–07) has an exact mirror for L-convex functions (chunks 08–09) precisely because the Legendre-Fenchel transform carries one class to the other. Theorem 8.17's function-level Edmonds generalization shows the payoff directly — the classical matroid-intersection-style min-max duality of chunk 04 was never really about sets; it is a special case (indicator functions) of a duality that holds for the whole class of M-convex functions.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for conjugate functions, discrete conjugacy, or this generality of intersection theorem. This mission gives the first formal statement of the discrete conjugacy theorem, distinguishing it carefully from its real-valued (polyhedral) precursor, Theorem 8.4 — a genuinely different, harder theorem this mission does not draft (see Formalization scope), since the integer bijection needs the M-/L-proximity theorems of chunks 06–09 to control integrality under convex extension, while the real-valued case does not.

Difficulty

The obvious approach — try to prove the discrete conjugacy theorem directly by mimicking the real-valued proof (Theorem 8.4) with ℤ in place of ℝ everywhere — fails, because the real-valued proof's key step (Proposition 8.3, an infimal-convolution argument comparing arg min sets of perturbed polyhedral functions) has no immediate discrete analogue: a discrete arg min need not vary continuously with the perturbation the way a polyhedral one does. The book's actual strategy instead routes through the convex extension of the discrete function (chunk 06/08's bridge to chapter 3's integral convexity), applies the already-proved real-valued conjugacy theorem to the extension, and then must separately argue that the resulting conjugate, restricted back to integer points, is again integer-valued and satisfies the discrete exchange axiom — an argument that needs different treatment depending on whether the original function's domain is bounded or unbounded (an exhaustion argument via restriction to a growing integer interval, invoking chunk 06's proximity theorem to control convergence). Skipping this discreteness argument and treating the real-valued theorem as if it settled the integer case would silently discard exactly the chapter's own point.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq. ConvexConjugate (the discrete transform) has domain and codomain both (V → ℤ) → WithTop ℝ, obtained by taking the defining supremum in EReal (a complete lattice, so it is always total) and projecting back via a new FromEReal map — this is what lets the biconjugate f•• typecheck as an equality of functions of the same type as f. ConvexConjugateR (the real-valued transform, used only by the milestone Theorem 8.1) is a separate object with no shared code, per the explicit warning against conflating the two transforms; the two never appear in the same item.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would draft only the real-valued case (Theorem 8.4) as if it were the discrete theorem, or would silently allow WithTop ℝ's subtraction-avoidance convention to change which values are compared; neither is done. Theorem 8.4 itself (the polyhedral conjugacy theorem) is not drafted in this mission at all — it would require a fresh, otherwise-unused polyhedral M-/L-convex-function layer on Rⱽ that no other item here needs (see MODERATION_NOTES.md). The M-/L-separation theorems (8.15, 8.16) and the Fenchel-type duality theorem (8.21) are likewise left for a follow-on mission; contributions building the polyhedral bridge or the separation theorems, which depend on machinery this mission establishes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Markov Decision Processes XIX: Theory of Optimal Stopping ProblemsTextbook

Motivation

A gambler watching a sequence unfold has to decide, at each moment and knowing only the past, whether to take what is on the table or wait for something better. That is the whole of optimal stopping, and it is one of the few problems in stochastic control with a clean and completely general answer: the value of the problem is the smallest superharmonic function dominating the immediate payoff. Snell (1952) proved the martingale form; the dynamic-programming form is due to Chow, Robbins and Siegmund. It is the structure behind the pricing of American options, the secretary problem, sequential hypothesis testing, and the bandit problems of Chapter 5.

Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 10 (Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011) derives this from their own Markov-decision machinery rather than from martingale theory, which makes the whole development elementary and self-contained: a stopping problem is a Markov Decision Problem whose action space is {continue, stop}, so Chapter 2's finite-horizon theory and Chapter 7's unbounded-horizon theory apply to it verbatim. The chapter then runs the resulting theory on three classical problems and solves each one in closed form.

Setting

The problem. A Markov process (X_n) on a Borel space E is observed. A stopping time is a random time τ with {τ ≤ n} ∈ F_n — "upon observing the process until time n we can decide whether or not τ has already occurred". Stopping at τ collects

Rτ:=∑k=0τ−1ck(Xk)+gτ(Xτ),R_\tau := \sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} c_k(X_k) + g_\tau(X_\tau),Rτ​:=k=0∑τ−1​ck​(Xk​)+gτ​(Xτ​),

a running reward c_k while continuing and a stopping reward g_τ at the end, and the problem is to find V_N^*(x) := sup_{τ ≤ N} E_x[R_τ] (10.1). Assumption (B_N) — finiteness of the supremum of the positive parts — is what makes this well posed.

The reduction (Theorem 10.1.2). Take A = {0,1}, let a = 0 mean continue and a = 1 mean stop, and make the transition law uncontrollable on continuation and absorbing on stopping. A policy π = (f_0,…,f_{N-1}) induces the stopping time τ_π = inf{n | f_n(X_n) = 1} ∧ N, and conversely every stopping time is a history-dependent policy. The theorem says the two suprema agree: the extra history buys nothing.

The recursion (Theorems 10.1.3, 10.1.5). The Bellman operator becomes a two-branch maximum,

Tv(x)=max⁡{g(x), c(x)+β∫v(x′)QX(dx′∣x)},\mathcal{T}v(x) = \max\Big\{g(x),\ c(x) + \beta\int v(x')Q^X(dx'|x)\Big\},Tv(x)=max{g(x), c(x)+β∫v(x′)QX(dx′∣x)},

with no action variable left in it. In the stationary case J_0 = g, J_n = \mathcal{T}J_{n-1}; the J_n increase, the sets S_n^* = {J_n = g} shrink — "the tendency to stop is non-decreasing as time goes by" — and the optimal rule is "stop on first entry into S_{N-n}^*".

The unbounded horizon (§10.2). Now the reward is discounted, R_τ = Σ β^k c(X_k) + β^τ g(X_τ) for τ < ∞, the value is V_∞^*(x) = sup_{τ<∞} E_x[R_τ], and there is no terminal condition to induct from. Three candidate values present themselves: V_∞^*; G = sup_π liminf_n J_{nπ}, a supremum over policies of limits of finite-horizon values; and J = lim_n J_n, which exists by monotonicity. Theorem 10.2.2, the goal, says all three coincide, that the common value solves J = \mathcal{T}J and satisfies 0-free bounds, and — the characterization — that it is the smallest c-superharmonic function majorizing g.

Turning the value into a rule (Theorems 10.2.3, 10.2.7, Corollaries 10.2.6, 10.2.8). Knowing the value is not knowing when to stop. Theorem 10.2.3 produces the stopping region as S^* = {J = g} = {d ≥ 0} where d = lim_n d_n, under two conditions that Corollary 10.2.6 then gives three checkable sufficient conditions for. Theorem 10.2.7 is the practical one, the One-Step-Look-Ahead Rule: if the set where stopping now beats stopping one step later is closed under the transition law, then the myopic rule is globally optimal. Corollary 10.2.8 adds monotonicity and gets a threshold.

Three applications (§10.3). The house seller who receives i.i.d. offers and pays maintenance on each rejection should accept the first offer above an explicit threshold, obtained as the maximiser of a one-dimensional function (Theorem 10.3.1). The secretary problem's value function is computed exactly (Proposition 10.3.2), giving the classical rule — reject the first k^*, then take the first leader — with success probability (k^*/N)h(k^*) and k^*(N)/N → 1/e (Theorem 10.3.3). And when the offers' distribution has an unknown parameter, MTP_2 of the likelihood propagates into monotonicity of the value in the information state (Theorem 10.3.4), with a fully explicit solution for the exponential/Inverse-Gamma conjugate pair (Theorem 10.3.6).

What is being asked

Formalize Theorem 10.2.2 in full: the three-way equality of V_∞^*, G and J, the fixed point equation, and — the part that carries the theorem — minimality among all functions that are both c-superharmonic and above g. Asserting only that J is such a function, or only one of the two conditions, is a strictly weaker and different claim.

The twelve milestones are the rest of the chapter, in attack order: the reduction and the two recursions, then the unbounded-horizon apparatus, then the three worked problems.

The stopping-time apparatus is built rather than assumed — the chain's law pinned by its finite-dimensional distributions, stopping times valued in ℕ ∪ {∞}, rewards vanishing at ∞ — because every theorem here is the identification of a supremum over stopping times with something computable, and carrying the value as an abstract function would make them vacuous. Every supremum is taken as a least upper bound against an explicit set of achievable values rather than by sSup, so that a set unbounded above is not silently given the value 0.

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Markov Decision Processes XVIII: Terminal Wealth in Jump Markets and Trade ExecutionTextbook

Motivation

Two problems in this mission, both about markets that do not behave the way the textbook Black–Scholes market does, and both solved by the same technique.

The first is portfolio choice in a pure jump market. Prices move by jumps at the epochs of a Poisson process, not by continuous Brownian fluctuation. This is not a technical variation: the market is incomplete, there is no replicating portfolio, and the machinery of stochastic analysis that makes the diffusion case tractable is unavailable. What is available instead is that the wealth process is piecewise deterministic — between jumps it follows an ODE, and all the randomness is in when the jumps happen and how big they are. Chapter 8's technique embeds such a process in its jump chain and turns the continuous-time control problem into a discrete-time Markov Decision Model with infinite horizon; Chapter 7's contracting theory then solves that.

The second is trade execution in an illiquid market. An agent must sell a large block of shares by a deadline. Placing the whole order at once moves the price against them, and in a traditional order book other participants can see the intention and trade against it — so the order goes to a dark pool, where there is no order book and matches arrive at random. The agent can only sell when a counterparty happens to appear, and whatever is unsold at the deadline must be dumped on the traditional market at once. The question is how much to offer at each opportunity.

The two problems have opposite curvature — the first is a concave maximisation of utility, the second a convex minimisation of cost — and the section is a good demonstration that the same embedding technique handles both, with each problem's structure entering only through which set of functions the value function is sought in.

Setting

The jump market (§9.3). The bond is S⁰_t = e^{ρt}; the risky assets follow dS^k_t = S^k_{t-}(μ_k dt + dC^k_t) where C_t = Σ_{n≤N_t} Y_n is a compound Poisson process of intensity λ whose jumps Y_n are supported in (-1,∞)^d, which keeps prices positive. Short-sellings are prohibited, so the admissible fractions of wealth form the compact set 𝒰 = {u ≥ 0, u·e ≤ 1}, and the wealth follows

dXt=Xt−((ρ+πt⋅(μ−ρe))dt+πtdCt).(9.10)dX_t = X_{t-}\big((\rho + \pi_t\cdot(\mu-\rho e))dt + \pi_t dC_t\big). \tag{9.10}dXt​=Xt−​((ρ+πt​⋅(μ−ρe))dt+πt​dCt​).(9.10)

The investor maximises E^π_{tx}[U(X_T)] for a strictly increasing, strictly concave U.

The embedded model's state is (t,x) — a jump time and the wealth just after it — and its action is a whole control path α : [0,T] → 𝒰, followed until the next jump. Between jumps the wealth is φ^α_t(x) = x exp(∫₀^t (ρ + α_s·(μ-ρe))ds) (9.13), and the transition kernel is substochastic: with probability e^{-λ(T-t)} no further jump arrives before the horizon, and the reward r(t,x,α) = e^{-λ(T-t)}U(φ^α_{T-t}(x)) is collected instead.

The trade execution model (§9.4). A Poisson process of intensity λ delivers the trading epochs; selling a shares costs C(a) with C strictly increasing and strictly convex (the discrete form (9.19)), C(0) = 0; the inventory X_t = x₀ - ∫₀^t π_s dN_s is what remains, and C(X_T) is the terminal dump. Here the flow is uncontrolled — the inventory does not move between epochs — which makes the embedded model simpler.

What is being asked

The goal is Theorem 9.3.4, the main result for the terminal wealth problem, in all six of its parts: the value function is the limit of the value iteration and lies in IM_cv; it is the unique fixed point of the dynamic programming operator there; value iteration converges at the explicit geometric rate α_b^n/(1-α_b); there exists an optimal Markov portfolio strategy given by a single decision rule; policy iteration holds; and Howard's policy improvement algorithm holds. Parts a)–c) describe the value; parts d)–f) produce the strategy, and a formalization of the first three alone would omit the entire control half of the theorem.

The seven milestones are the rest of §9.3–9.4: the reduction from continuous to discrete time, the bounding function and its explicit contraction modulus, the invocation of Chapter 7's Structure Theorem, the iff-characterization of when holding only the bond is optimal, the stability of the value and of the optimal policies under perturbation of the utility, and then the trade execution problem's own bounding function and its monotone, unit-Lipschitz optimal execution rate.

Two formalization conventions run through everything here. The operator of §9.3 is a supremum over a space of control paths, and since Mathlib's sSup of a set unbounded above is 0 — with an unbounded reward that is a live risk, not a formality — it is carried as a relation defined by least upper bounds against explicit sets of achievable values, with its iterates a chain of such relations. And the continuous-time side is built, not assumed: Theorem 9.3.1 is the identification of the continuous-time value with the discrete-time one, so the law of the embedded jump chain is pinned by the one-step conditional law the book displays, and the terminal wealth is read off that chain.

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Markov Decision Processes XVII: Random-Horizon Consumption-Investment and the De Finetti Dividend ProblemTextbook

Motivation

An insurance company collects premia and pays claims each period; the difference is a random, signed quantity that can push the company's risk reserve up or down. At the start of every period, before that period's premia and claims are realized, the company's owners may pay themselves a dividend out of the current reserve — but once the reserve goes negative the company is ruined and stops operating for good. How should the owners time and size these payments to maximize the total expected discounted dividend paid out before ruin? This is the classical De Finetti dividend problem, one of risk theory's oldest optimization questions, and Chapter 9 §9.2 of Bäuerle and Rieder's Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance (Springer, 2011) solves its fully discrete-time version by identifying the exact combinatorial shape of the optimal policy — not just proving one exists. This mission also covers §9.1, a different application of Chapter 7's contracting theory to a consumption-investment problem whose planning horizon is itself random rather than fixed or infinite.

Setting

The dividend model is a stationary Markov Decision Model on the integers: the state x∈Zx \in \mathbb Zx∈Z is the current risk reserve, the action a∈{0,1,…,x}a \in \{0,1,\dots,x\}a∈{0,1,…,x} (for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0; only a=0a=0a=0 is available once ruined) is the dividend paid, the reward is r(x,a):=ar(x,a):=ar(x,a):=a, and the reserve evolves by i.i.d. increments ZnZ_nZn​ (premia minus claims) after the dividend is deducted. Because the reward is bounded by an explicit function of the state (Lemma 9.2.2), Chapter 7's general existence theory applies directly, and the value function J∞J_\inftyJ∞​ satisfies a genuine Bellman equation. The chapter's real content begins once existence is established: Theorem 9.2.3 pins down enough analytic structure of J∞J_\inftyJ∞​ and its largest-maximizing policy f∗f^*f∗ (monotonicity, a Lipschitz-type inequality, and a self-consistency identity) to drive a purely combinatorial argument that f∗f^*f∗'s shape is a finite alternation of "pay nothing" and "pay down to a fixed level" intervals — a band-policy (Definition 9.2.5). Section 9.1's random-horizon consumption-investment model reuses the same Chapter 7 machinery in a different setting: the usual (c,a)(c,a)(c,a) (consumption, portfolio) decision each period, but where the horizon itself ends after each period with probability 1−p1-p1−p, making the effective one-period discount βp\beta pβp rather than β\betaβ.

Formalization targets

The goal, Theorem 9.2.9, states the section's main claim in one sentence: the stationary policy (f∗,f∗,… )(f^*,f^*,\dots)(f∗,f∗,…) is optimal and is a band-policy. Short as it is stated, its proof assembles every earlier result of the section. The milestones supply that assembly, in order: Lemma 9.2.2 gives the model's bounding function and the resulting integrability/convergence facts; Theorem 9.2.3 gives the value-function bounds and the self-consistency identity f∗(x−f∗(x))=0f^*(x-f^*(x))=0f∗(x−f∗(x))=0; Corollary 9.2.4 checks the two sign-definite degenerate cases directly from Theorem 9.2.3; Proposition 9.2.6 proves the top threshold ξ:=sup⁡{x∣f∗(x)=0}\xi := \sup\{x \mid f^*(x)=0\}ξ:=sup{x∣f∗(x)=0} is finite (not merely well-defined) and that f∗f^*f∗ is a simple barrier above it; Proposition 9.2.8 proves the increment property below ξ\xiξ that forces each band's shape; and Theorem 9.2.10 (a postscript refinement, stated after the goal) shows the wave lengths are bounded once the reserve's downward jumps are themselves bounded, collapsing to a single barrier-policy in the extreme case. Theorem 9.1.1, the random-horizon consumption-investment verification theorem, is included as a full item but is not a milestone of this goal, since its content and proof belong to a different, disjoint model — see Difficulty.

Significance

Band-policies and the discrete-time De Finetti dividend problem have no substrate anywhere in Mathlib or on the platform, and the result is a genuinely deep, classical one: a discrete-time analogue of the continuous-time De Finetti barrier-strategy theory, obtained here by pure dynamic-programming argument rather than the stochastic-calculus techniques the continuous-time theory usually relies on. The mission is explicit that the goal's conclusion is the general band-policy structure, not the strictly weaker barrier-policy special case that Theorem 9.2.10 b) proves only under an extra hypothesis (bounded downward jumps) — stating the goal with a barrier-policy conclusion instead would understate what Theorem 9.2.9 actually proves.

Difficulty

The central formalization challenge is Definition 9.2.5's own combinatorial intricacy: a band-policy is specified by an alternating chain of thresholds 0≤c0<d1≤c1<d2≤⋯≤dn≤cn0 \le c_0 < d_1 \le c_1 < d_2 \le \dots \le d_n \le c_n0≤c0​<d1​≤c1​<d2​≤⋯≤dn​≤cn​ with a positive-width gap condition on every wave, and the policy's four piecewise branches case-split on which wave (if any) the current state falls into. This mission renders it existentially over the witnessing (n,c,d)(n,c,d)(n,c,d) rather than as one closed-form function, a faithful but more verbose transcription that avoids conflating the different branch conditions. A second difficulty is Proposition 9.2.6's own finiteness claim: ξ\xiξ is a supremum over a subset of N0\mathbb N_0N0​ that could, in principle, be unbounded, and Mathlib's convention for sSup over the naturals returns a finite junk value (000) even for an unbounded set — using it directly would silently trivialize "ξ<∞\xi<\inftyξ<∞" into a claim that is true regardless of the proposition's actual mathematical content. This mission instead states the proposition by exhibiting the finite value of ξ\xiξ directly, so that "ξ\xiξ is finite" survives as genuine content that the theorem's proof must establish. A third difficulty is scope: Theorem 9.1.1's random-horizon consumption-investment model shares no state space, action space, or definitions with the dividend model of the goal, despite both appearing in this chunk's assigned page range; it is formalized as a genuine application of a locally-restated copy of Chapter 7's contracting theory, but is excluded from the milestone list proper since it plays no role in the goal's own proof.

Formalization scope

The dividend model's transition law is built from Mathlib's PMF (probability mass function) type on Z\mathbb ZZ, which supplies the "probabilities sum to one" fact automatically rather than as a separate hypothesis. J_\infty, \delta, and every finite-horizon value function throughout this mission use this whole book series' Filter.limsup-of-truncations convention for infinite-horizon reward, restated locally (own namespace copy, per this series' file-ownership boundary) from chunk 07a's identical apparatus rather than imported. The consumption-investment model of §9.1 is formalized with the number of risky assets ddd as an explicit type parameter and its admissible-portfolio and domain restrictions as separate, citable fields rather than folded silently into the reward or transition definitions.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • B. De Finetti, "Su un'impostazione alternativa della teoria collettiva del rischio", Transactions of the XVth International Congress of Actuaries, 1957 (the original continuous-time dividend problem this chapter's discrete-time analogue is modeled on).
  • H. Schmidli, Stochastic Control in Insurance, Springer, 2008 (cited by Remark 9.2.1 for the reduction from a continuous dividend-payout action space to the integer setting used throughout this section).
  • H. U. Gerber, "Games of economic survival with discrete- and continuous-income processes", Operations Research, 1972 (an early discrete-time treatment of the same class of problems, in the spirit this chapter's own model follows).
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis VI: Quasi M-Convex Functions and the Quasi-Proximity TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Convexity is normally defined additively — a function's value at a mixture is bounded by the mixture of its values — but many of the properties that make convexity useful in optimization (a local minimum is global, level sets are well-behaved) survive under a much weaker, purely ordinal notion: quasi-convexity, which compares function values rather than adding them. A nondecreasing rescaling of a convex function is generally not convex, but it is always quasi-convex — so a theory built only on ordinal comparisons automatically covers every such rescaling for free, at the cost of a more delicate proof architecture (since the algebraic cancellations available to additive convexity are no longer available).

Chapter 6's second half asks exactly how far this idea extends in the discrete setting: does the M-convexity exchange axiom have an ordinal, quasi-convex relaxation that still supports the same strong minimization theory — an optimality criterion, a minimizer-cut lemma, and, most significantly, a proximity theorem with the same explicit distance bound? This mission formalizes the chapter's answer: yes, and the relevant relaxed class, functions satisfying condition (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), is large enough to include every strictly increasing rescaling of an M-convex function, a class the M-convex theory of chunk 06 alone says nothing about.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set and f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞} with nonempty effective domain. Building on chunk 06's M-convex exchange axiom (M-EXC[Z]), this chapter introduces several ordinal relaxations. fff is weakly quasi M-convex, satisfying (QMw), if for every pair of distinct points x,y∈dom⁡fx, y \in \operatorname{dom} fx,y∈domf there exist uuu in the positive support and vvv in the negative support of x−yx - yx−y with f(x−χu+χv)≤f(x)f(x - \chi_u + \chi_v) \le f(x)f(x−χu​+χv​)≤f(x) or f(y+χu−χv)≤f(y)f(y + \chi_u - \chi_v) \le f(y)f(y+χu​−χv​)≤f(y) — an "or" where (M-EXC[Z]) demands an additive inequality. Two further conditions restrict attention to points of different function value and sharpen the conclusion to a three-way trichotomy (strictly better on one side, or exactly tied on both): (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) quantifies universally over uuu (as in (M-EXC[Z])), while (SSQM≠,w_{\ne,w}=,w​) quantifies existentially over both uuu and vvv (as in (QMw)). The linear perturbation of fff by p:V→Rp : V \to \mathbb Rp:V→R is f[p](x)=f(x)−⟨p,x⟩f[p](x) = f(x) - \langle p, x \ranglef[p](x)=f(x)−⟨p,x⟩.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.78 (the quasi M-proximity theorem)

Let fff satisfy (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣, α\alphaα a positive integer. If xα∈dom⁡fx_\alpha \in \operatorname{dom} fxα​∈domf satisfies f(xα)≤f(xα+α(χv−χu))f(x_\alpha) \le f(x_\alpha + \alpha(\chi_v - \chi_u))f(xα​)≤f(xα​+α(χv​−χu​)) for all u,v∈Vu, v \in Vu,v∈V, then arg⁡min⁡f≠∅\arg\min f \ne \emptysetargminf=∅ and there is x∗∈arg⁡min⁡fx^* \in \arg\min fx∗∈argminf with ∥xα−x∗∥∞≤(n−1)(α−1)\|x_\alpha - x^*\|_\infty \le (n-1)(\alpha - 1)∥xα​−x∗∥∞​≤(n−1)(α−1) — verbatim the same conclusion, and the same exact bound, as chunk 06's Theorem 6.37(1), now established for the strictly larger class satisfying (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) rather than the M-convex exchange axiom itself.

Milestones: Theorems 6.68(2), 6.76, 6.77

Theorem 6.68(2): fff satisfies (M-EXC[Z]) if and only if every linear perturbation f[p]f[p]f[p] satisfies (QMw) — quantifying exactly how much weaker (QMw) is pointwise, and how the gap closes once quantified over every perturbation. Theorem 6.76 (the quasi M-optimality criterion): the direct analogue of chunk 06's Theorem 6.26 for the quasi-convexity classes — a purely pairwise local check still characterizes global (or, in the (QMw) case, strict unique) optimality. Theorem 6.77 (the quasi M-minimizer cut): chunk 06's Theorem 6.28 continues to hold verbatim when its M-convexity hypothesis is replaced by (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) — the structural fact the proximity theorem's proof is built from survives the relaxation intact.

Significance

The result itself. The proximity theorem is the result algorithms actually use: a scaling algorithm for minimizing quasi-convex functions of this kind inherits exactly the same correctness guarantee, with exactly the same distance bound, as the M-convex case — this is a genuine broadening of chapter 10's algorithmic reach, not a restatement dressed in weaker hypotheses. Every strictly increasing scalar transformation of an M-convex objective (a common modeling device — re-expressing a cost in utility units, or applying a monotone risk measure) now falls under a proximity theorem, whereas prior to this chapter's relaxation such a transformation would generally destroy M-convexity itself and leave optimization theory silent on the transformed problem.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for quasi M-convexity in any of its forms. Formalizing Theorem 6.78 requires first pinning down (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) exactly (there are six closely related axiom variants in this section of the book, only three of which — (QMw), (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), (SSQM≠,w_{\ne,w}=,w​) — are needed for this mission's chosen results), and this mission also captures, via Theorem 6.68(2), the precise sense in which these relaxed conditions are strictly weaker than plain M-convexity while remaining tightly connected to it.

Difficulty

The natural first instinct, given how close the quasi-convexity axioms look to (M-EXC[Z]), is to try to prove Theorem 6.78 by directly imitating chunk 06's proof of Theorem 6.37 line by line. This mostly works — the proof structure (fix a target coordinate, build a chain of strictly decreasing values via repeated exchange steps, bound the chain's length using the scaled hypothesis) survives verbatim — but every step that chunk 06's proof took by adding two instances of the exchange inequality together must be replaced by an ordinal argument, since (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) only ever asserts a disjunction of value comparisons, never an additive inequality relating four function values simultaneously the way (M-EXC[Z])'s f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−χu+χv)+f(y+χu−χv)f(x)+f(y) \ge f(x-\chi_u+\chi_v)+f(y+\chi_u-\chi_v)f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−χu​+χv​)+f(y+χu​−χv​) does. The book's proof handles this by working with strict inequalities and the trichotomy structure of (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) directly rather than algebraic cancellation — the same overall architecture, but every arithmetic step rebuilt as a case analysis on which disjunct of (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) fires.

Formalization scope

This mission builds directly on chunk 06's published items (CharVec, SuppPos, SuppNeg, DomZ, MExchangeAxiom, ArgMin), per the platform's textbook convention that a later chapter of the same book imports an earlier one's definitions rather than redrafting them; its own namespace DiscreteConvex.MConvexFunctions.Quasi nests under chunk 06's DiscreteConvex.MConvexFunctions accordingly. Δf(z;v,u) (Eq. (6.2)) is never reified as a separate object; every occurrence is unfolded directly into an f-value comparison, avoiding WithTop ℝ subtraction throughout, consistent with chunk 06's own convention.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would silently strengthen (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) back to plain M-convexity (making this mission redundant with chunk 06's Theorem 6.37) or loosen the exact bound (n−1)(α−1)(n-1)(\alpha-1)(n−1)(α−1) to an unspecified function of n,αn, \alphan,α; neither is done. Six axiom variants appear in this section of the book ((QM), (SSQM), (QMw), (SSQMw_ww​), (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), (SSQM≠,w_{\ne,w}=,w​)); only the three actually needed by this mission's four items are drafted, and Theorem 6.68's first part (an implication chain among the other three) is left out — see MODERATION_NOTES.md. Contributions building the polyhedral M-convex-function bridge (§6.11–6.12, Theorems 6.59–6.64), the level-set characterizations (Theorems 6.72, 6.74), or the scaled quasi M-minimizer cut (Theorem 6.79, the direct generalization of Theorem 6.77 drafted here) are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • M. Avriel, W. E. Diewert, S. Schaible, I. Zang, Generalized Concavity, Plenum Press, 1988.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes XV: Optimal Play in Red-and-Black and the Gittins IndexTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 7's abstract machinery — contracting Markov Decision Models, the Structure Theorem, value iteration with an explicit convergence rate — earns its keep by solving concrete problems. Section 7.6 works through four kinds of application: a return to the classical cash-balance inventory problem, now over an infinite horizon; the "red-and-black" gambling problem, where a player tries to reach a target fortune before going bankrupt; and, most substantially, the infinite-horizon two-armed bandit, where the general theory reveals something genuinely surprising — the qualitatively optimal policy can be computed one arm at a time.

Setting

Every application here specializes the general infinite-horizon, contracting-model machinery of chunks 07a/07b to a concrete transition structure. The cash-balance model orders inventory up to a level aaa at linear cost, incurs a holding/shortage cost, then absorbs a random demand. The red-and-black model bets a fraction of a bounded fortune on a biased coin, absorbing at bankruptcy or at the target. The bandit model reconsiders the Beta-Bernoulli two-armed bandit of chunk 05b, now over an infinite horizon with a genuine discount β<1\beta<1β<1: the key new tool is the K-stopping problem, a fictitious single-arm decision problem where, at every stage, the decision maker may either pull the arm or retire with a fixed payment KKK. The Gittins index I(m,n)I(m,n)I(m,n) is the smallest such payment at which retiring immediately is already as good as continuing.

Formalization targets

The goal, Theorem 7.6.10, is the Gittins index theorem for this book's two-armed bandit: always pulling the arm with the higher index is optimal for the full infinite-horizon problem. The milestones build the machinery it needs — the index's definition (Definition 7.6.5) and its equivalent representation as a supremum over stopping times (Theorem 7.6.6), the K-stopping value function's monotonicity/convexity/differentiability properties (Proposition 7.6.7), the index's optimal-stopping-set and indifference characterizations (Corollary 7.6.8), the two-arm joint stopping value's parallel structure (Proposition 7.6.9), and a fixed-point recasting useful for computation (Proposition 7.6.11) — plus, independently, the cash-balance and casino-game applications (Theorems 7.6.1-7.6.4), which use the general theory but not the bandit-specific machinery.

Significance

The Gittins index theorem's real content, emphasized by the book's own remark, is not merely that an optimal policy exists but how little computation it needs: instead of solving one optimization problem over the bandit's full four-dimensional joint state space N02×N02\mathbb N_0^2 \times \mathbb N_0^2N02​×N02​, the decision maker solves two independent two-dimensional single-arm problems and compares two numbers. This mission's formalization of the goal is built specifically to keep that separation visible — each arm's index is computed from a single, shared KStoppingValue structure applied to that arm's own state alone, never from a function that happens to take the whole joint state as an argument. The proof route here (via the K-stopping problem's explicit fixed-point characterization, Definition 7.6.5 and Proposition 7.6.11) is a genuinely different construction from the platform's existing Gittins-index theorems (BanditAlgorithm.gittins_index_theorem and related), which are built via Whittle's retirement/charge-accounting argument — checked directly and found to define the index differently enough that this mission drafts its own theorems rather than treat that construction as prior art.

Difficulty

The K-stopping value function J(m,n;K)J(m,n;K)J(m,n;K) and the two-arm joint value J~(x;K)\tilde J(x;K)J~(x;K) are both genuine fixed points of an infinite-horizon Bellman equation with no finite backward recursion to fall back on (the "stopping" option, rather than a terminal condition, is what makes the horizon infinite); this mission bundles them as data satisfying their own defining fixed-point equations, the same convention this series uses throughout for such objects. A second difficulty is Theorem 7.6.6's supremum over stopping times: without a canonical path measure for the underlying Markov chain (not built anywhere in this series), the two expectations the theorem compares are represented as data satisfying the positivity a genuine expectation must have, over an explicit, elementary notion of stopping time (a function of the whole observed path, adapted in the sense that whether it has fired by time nnn depends only on the path up to nnn) — a faithful, if representational, rendering of the theorem's genuinely path-dependent content.

Formalization scope

The cash-balance model (Theorem 7.6.1) explicitly cites chunk 02d's finite-horizon critical-level sequences as a hypothesis rather than re-deriving them, since this mission's own content is the infinite-horizon extension, not a second proof of the finite-horizon theory those sequences come from. The casino-game theorems (7.6.2-7.6.4) state optimality for the specific, named timid and bold strategies, not for an unnamed "some optimal policy" — the theorems' entire content is that these particular policies, not merely some optimal one, are best in their regime. The bandit model's posterior mean and Bayes-update operator are kept identical in substance to chunk 05b's finite-horizon Beta-Bernoulli model (restated, since chunks cannot import each other's Lean), so a reader can see this section is solving the same underlying statistical model, now over an infinite horizon.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • J. C. Gittins, "Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 1979 (the original index construction this section's K-stopping-problem approach reformulates).
  • P. Whittle, "Multi-armed bandits and the Gittins index," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 1980 (the retirement-option construction the platform's existing Gittins theorems use, a different proof route from this chunk's own).
  • L. E. Dubins and L. J. Savage, How to Gamble If You Must: Inequalities for Stochastic Processes, McGraw-Hill, 1965 (the classical red-and-black problem, Theorems 7.6.2-7.6.4).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy II: Equilibrium Exists When Every Consumer Can Supply Productive LaborResearch Paper

Motivation

A competitive equilibrium is a list of production plans, consumption plans and prices at which every firm maximizes profit, every consumer maximizes utility within the budget, and no market has excess demand. Whether such prices exist at all is the consistency question behind general equilibrium theory, the welfare theorems, and applied equilibrium models used in policy analysis. Arrow and Debreu gave the first proof of existence for a model with production, private ownership and general convex preferences (Econometrica 22, 1954), using Debreu's existence theorem for abstract economies (PNAS 38, 1952).

Their Theorem I assumes that every consumer initially holds a positive amount of every commodity (Assumption IV.a). The authors call this "clearly unrealistic" (p. 280): a household does not hold every good, and most households own little beyond their labor. Theorem II, the subject of this mission, removes that assumption. It only asks that every consumer be able to supply some type of labor that is always productive of a commodity everyone desires. This is the version of the existence theorem that allows a wage-earner economy.

Timeline. Wald (1935–36) proved existence for special production models. Nash (1950) proved existence of equilibrium points for finite games, and Debreu (1952) extended it to abstract economies, in which each player's feasible set depends on the others' choices. Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved Theorems I and II. McKenzie's independent existence proof was published the same year (Econometrica 22, 1954).

Setting

There are lll commodities, nnn producers and mmm consumers; vectors live in Rl\mathbb R^lRl and x≦yx\leqq yx≦y is componentwise. Producer jjj has a production set YjY_jYj​. Consumer iii has a consumption set XiX_iXi​, a utility uiu_iui​ on XiX_iXi​, an endowment ζi\zeta_iζi​ and profit shares αij\alpha_{ij}αij​. Write Y=∑jYjY=\sum_jY_jY=∑j​Yj​, X=∑iXiX=\sum_iX_iX=∑i​Xi​, ζ=∑iζi\zeta=\sum_i\zeta_iζ=∑i​ζi​, and let P={p≧0, ∑hph=1}P=\{p\geqq0,\ \sum_hp_h=1\}P={p≧0, ∑h​ph​=1} be the price simplex. A competitive equilibrium (x1∗,…,xm∗,y1∗,…,yn∗,p∗)(x_1^*,\dots,x_m^*,y_1^*,\dots,y_n^*,p^*)(x1∗​,…,xm∗​,y1∗​,…,yn∗​,p∗) satisfies four conditions. Each yj∗y_j^*yj∗​ maximizes p∗⋅yjp^*\cdot y_jp∗⋅yj​ on YjY_jYj​. Each xi∗x_i^*xi∗​ maximizes uiu_iui​ on {xi∈Xi:p∗⋅xi≤p∗⋅ζi+∑jαijp∗⋅yj∗}\{x_i\in X_i: p^*\cdot x_i\le p^*\cdot\zeta_i+\sum_j\alpha_{ij}p^*\cdot y_j^*\}{xi​∈Xi​:p∗⋅xi​≤p∗⋅ζi​+∑j​αij​p∗⋅yj∗​}. The price vector satisfies p∗∈Pp^*\in Pp∗∈P. Finally z∗=∑xi∗−∑yj∗−ζ≦0z^*=\sum x_i^*-\sum y_j^*-\zeta\leqq0z∗=∑xi∗​−∑yj∗​−ζ≦0 and p∗⋅z∗=0p^*\cdot z^*=0p∗⋅z∗=0.

The assumptions of Theorem II are as follows. I: production sets are closed, convex and contain 000; Y∩Ω={0}Y\cap\Omega=\{0\}Y∩Ω={0} (no output without input); Y∩(−Y)={0}Y\cap(-Y)=\{0\}Y∩(−Y)={0} (no reversible production). II: each XiX_iXi​ is closed, convex and bounded below. III: uiu_iui​ is continuous, has no satiation point, and satisfies ui(tx+(1−t)x′)>ui(x′)u_i(tx+(1-t)x')>u_i(x')ui​(tx+(1−t)x′)>ui​(x′) whenever ui(x)>ui(x′)u_i(x)>u_i(x')ui​(x)>ui​(x′) and 0<t<10<t<10<t<1. IV.b: shares are nonnegative and sum to one for each firm. Two sets of commodities are defined from the data. The set D\mathcal DD contains the commodities always desired by every consumer: from any xi∈Xix_i\in X_ixi​∈Xi​, adding some positive amount of the commodity stays in XiX_iXi​ and raises uiu_iui​. The set P\mathcal PP contains the types of productive labor: for every y∈Yy\in Yy∈Y, (a) yh≤0y_h\le0yh​≤0, and (b) some y′∈Yy'\in Yy′∈Y satisfies yh′′≥yh′y'_{h'}\ge y_{h'}yh′′​≥yh′​ for all h′≠hh'\ne hh′=h and yh′′′>yh′′y'_{h''}>y_{h''}yh′′′​>yh′′​ for some h′′∈Dh''\in\mathcal Dh′′∈D. The remaining assumptions are:

  • IV′.a: each consumer has some xi∈Xix_i\in X_ixi​∈Xi​ with xi≦ζix_i\leqq\zeta_ixi​≦ζi​ and xhi<ζhix_{hi}<\zeta_{hi}xhi​<ζhi​ for some h∈Ph\in\mathcal Ph∈P;
  • V: some x∈Xx\in Xx∈X and y∈Yy\in Yy∈Y satisfy xh<yh+ζhx_h<y_h+\zeta_hxh​<yh​+ζh​ for every hhh;
  • VI: D≠∅\mathcal D\ne\emptysetD=∅;
  • VII: P≠∅\mathcal P\ne\emptysetP=∅.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem II (§4.5, p. 281)

Assumptions I–III, IV′, V–VII ⟹ ∃ (x∗,y∗,p∗) satisfying Conditions 1–4.\text{Assumptions I–III, IV}',\ \text{V–VII}\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,(x^*,y^*,p^*)\ \text{satisfying Conditions 1–4.}Assumptions I–III, IV′, V–VII ⟹ ∃(x∗,y∗,p∗) satisfying Conditions 1–4.

Milestones (§5, pp. 282–287)

They follow the paper's proof. Let π=∣P∣\pi=|\mathcal P|π=∣P∣ and Pε={p∈P:ph≥ε ∀h∈P}P^\varepsilon=\{p\in P: p_h\ge\varepsilon\ \forall h\in\mathcal P\}Pε={p∈P:ph​≥ε ∀h∈P} for 0<ε≤1/(2π)0<\varepsilon\le1/(2\pi)0<ε≤1/(2π). Let EεE^\varepsilonEε be the abstract economy in which consumers maximize utility under budget constraints, producers maximize profit, and a market participant chooses p∈Pεp\in P^\varepsilonp∈Pε to maximize p⋅zp\cdot zp⋅z. The milestones are:

  1. §5.0 (1). On PεP^\varepsilonPε every consumer can spend strictly less than p⋅ζip\cdot\zeta_ip⋅ζi​.
  2. §5.1.1 (5). Equilibrium points of EεE^\varepsilonEε satisfy x∗−y∗≦ζ′x^*-y^*\leqq\zeta'x∗−y∗≦ζ′ for a vector ζ′\zeta'ζ′ independent of ε\varepsilonε.
  3. §5.2.0. The attainable sets relative to ζ′\zeta'ζ′ are bounded.
  4. §5.2.1. The truncated economy E~ε\tilde E^\varepsilonE~ε has an equilibrium point.
  5. §5.2.2 (3)–(5). An equilibrium point of E~ε\tilde E^\varepsilonE~ε is one of EεE^\varepsilonEε.
  6. §5.3.0 (2). If ph∗>εp^*_h>\varepsilonph∗​>ε for all h∈Ph\in\mathcal Ph∈P, the point is a competitive equilibrium.
  7. §5.3.2 (1). Limits of equilibrium points as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0 are quasi-equilibria for consumers.
  8. §5.3.4 (3). If the floors bind, some desired commodity has limit price 000.
  9. §5.3.4 (6). If the floors bind, limit consumption minimizes expenditure over XiX_iXi​.
  10. §5.3.5. For some ε\varepsilonε the floor does not bind.

Significance

Theorem II is the existence theorem for a competitive economy in which consumers may own nothing but their labor. It shows that the survival assumption IV.a can be traded for conditions on labor, desirability and the possibility of an overall excess supply. Section 5.3.3 of the paper also isolates the quasi-equilibrium, in which utility maximization under the budget is replaced by cost minimization at a given utility level. That notion is used in later existence and welfare arguments.

The theorem has been proved since 1954; this mission does not reopen it. The work here is the machine-checked proof. The companion mission on Theorem I formalizes the shared model and Debreu's lemma. As of September 2026 neither theorem has a Lean formalization on the platform, and Mathlib contains no general equilibrium theory.

Difficulty

The obvious approach reuses the proof of Theorem I: build the abstract economy of consumers, producers and a price-choosing participant, and apply Debreu's lemma. That fails at the boundary of the price simplex. Without IV.a, a consumer's cheapest point in XiX_iXi​ can cost as much as the endowment at some prices, so the budget correspondence is not continuous there and the lemma does not apply. The paper therefore keeps prices of productive labor at least ε\varepsilonε and must then show that the floor does not bind for some ε\varepsilonε. That is a limit argument as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0 which uses Assumptions V, VI and VII together, and each of the milestones 7–9 is a step of it. Debreu's lemma itself needs a Kakutani-type fixed point theorem for correspondences, which Mathlib does not provide.

Formalization scope

Commodity vectors are Fin l → ℝ. Consumers are indexed by Fin m and producers by Fin n. The inner product is ⬝ᵥ. The paper's x<yx<yx<y is strict in every component and is written componentwise, never as Lean's < on functions. D\mathcal DD and P\mathcal PP are computed from the economy, not supplied as parameters. Utilities are total functions, but every assumption on uiu_iui​ quantifies over XiX_iXi​ only. "Maximizes" is membership plus an inequality against every feasible alternative; no supremum is used. EEE, EεE^\varepsilonEε and E~ε\tilde E^\varepsilonE~ε are built by one constructor over the players Fin m ⊕ Fin n ⊕ Unit. The vector ζ′\zeta'ζ′ takes the lower bounds ξi\xi_iξi​ of Assumption II as an explicit argument. The milestones of §5.3 are stated for the limit of a sequence of equilibrium points, which is how the paper constructs them. Assumption V is dropped from every milestone except §5.3.5 and the goal. With V, the case assumption of §5.3.1 is contradictory and those milestones would hold vacuously.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out as follows. The assumptions are satisfiable with IV.a failing: a sorry-free check covers two goods, one consumer who owns nothing and can only supply labor, and one firm turning labor into the desired good. The goal therefore does not hold vacuously.

Needed infrastructure includes a Kakutani fixed point theorem or Debreu's lemma, compactness of truncated action sets, and sequential compactness arguments in Rl\mathbb R^lRl. AGT.brouwer_fixed_point is on the platform and can serve as a starting point. The lemma is reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, to the lemma, or to the boundedness results shared with Theorem I are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, Econometrica 22(3), 265–290, 1954. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907353
  • G. Debreu, A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38(10), 886–893, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.38.10.886
  • L. W. McKenzie, On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems, Econometrica 22(2), 147–161, 1954. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907352
  • J. F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36(1), 48–49, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XVII: Fenchel Duality and Linear-Programming IntegralityTextbook

Motivation

Duality is the organizing principle of convex optimization: a minimization problem's optimal value equals a maximization problem's optimal value, and this coincidence, rather than being a lucky accident, follows from a separating-hyperplane argument that applies whenever the two problems' feasible regions are shaped compatibly enough. Werner Fenchel formalized this in the 1950s for pairs of convex and concave functions related by the Legendre-Fenchel transform, and the resulting Fenchel duality theorem specializes, for linear objectives over polyhedral feasible regions, to linear programming duality — the fact, central to the entire theory of combinatorial optimization, that a linear program's optimal value can always be certified from above and below by a pair of primal and dual feasible solutions. Murota's Discrete Convex Analysis (SIAM, 2003) collects this classical machinery, together with the integrality theory that lets it produce combinatorial (integer-valued) certificates rather than merely real ones, as the technical foundation the rest of the book builds its discrete theory on top of.

Setting

For f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞}, the epigraph is epi⁡f={(x,Y):Y≥f(x)}\operatorname{epi} f = \{(x,Y) : Y \ge f(x)\}epif={(x,Y):Y≥f(x)}, and fff is convex iff epi⁡f\operatorname{epi} fepif is a convex set; fff is proper if additionally its effective domain dom⁡f={x:f(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom} f = \{x : f(x) < +\infty\}domf={x:f(x)<+∞} is nonempty, and closed if epi⁡f\operatorname{epi} fepif is topologically closed. A function h:Rn→R∪{−∞}h : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb R \cup \{-\infty\}h:Rn→R∪{−∞} is concave, proper, closed analogously via its hypograph. The convex conjugate is f∙(p)=sup⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)\}f∙(p)=supx​{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}, and the concave conjugate h∘(p)=inf⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−h(x)}h^\circ(p) = \inf_x\{\langle p,x\rangle - h(x)\}h∘(p)=infx​{⟨p,x⟩−h(x)}. The relative interior ri⁡S\operatorname{ri} SriS of a set SSS is the interior of SSS relative to its affine hull. A function is polyhedral if its epigraph (or hypograph) is a finite intersection of half-spaces. Given an m×nm \times nm×n matrix AAA, b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc \in \mathbb R^nc∈Rn, the primal and dual linear programs are min⁡{c⊤x:Ax=b, x≥0}\min\{c^\top x : Ax=b,\ x\ge0\}min{c⊤x:Ax=b, x≥0} and max⁡{b⊤y:A⊤y≤c}\max\{b^\top y : A^\top y \le c\}max{b⊤y:A⊤y≤c}, with feasible regions PPP, DDD. A matrix is totally unimodular if every square submatrix has determinant 000, 111, or −1-1−1. A discrete set S⊆ZnS \subseteq \mathbb Z^nS⊆Zn is hole free if S=Sˉ∩ZnS = \bar S \cap \mathbb Z^nS=Sˉ∩Zn, where Sˉ\bar SSˉ is the convex hull of SSS's real embedding; the discrete Minkowski sum is S1+S2={x1+x2:x1∈S1,x2∈S2}S_1+S_2 = \{x_1+x_2 : x_1\in S_1, x_2\in S_2\}S1​+S2​={x1​+x2​:x1​∈S1​,x2​∈S2​}.

Formalization targets

Goal (Theorem 3.6, Fenchel duality). For proper convex fff and proper concave hhh satisfying at least one of four alternative conditions — a relative-interior condition on dom⁡f∩dom⁡h\operatorname{dom} f \cap \operatorname{dom} hdomf∩domh, a polyhedrality condition on the same, or the analogous pair of conditions on dom⁡f∙∩dom⁡h∘\operatorname{dom} f^\bullet \cap \operatorname{dom} h^\circdomf∙∩domh∘ together with closedness of fff, hhh —

inf⁡x{f(x)−h(x)}=sup⁡p{h∘(p)−f∙(p)},\inf_x\{f(x)-h(x)\} = \sup_p\{h^\circ(p)-f^\bullet(p)\},xinf​{f(x)−h(x)}=psup​{h∘(p)−f∙(p)},

with the extremum on the appropriate side attained whenever the common value is finite. This is the mission's capstone: the four alternative hypotheses make it the most broadly applicable statement of the four convex-duality results in this mission, each of the other three being either a special case in substance (Theorem 3.5, separation, which 3.6 is proved from) or a literal specialization to linear data (Theorem 3.10, LP duality).

Supporting milestones. Theorem 3.2 (biconjugation: f∙f^\bulletf∙ is always closed proper convex, and g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g for closed proper convex ggg); Theorem 3.5 (the separation theorem for convex/concave functions, under two of Theorem 3.6's four hypotheses); Theorem 3.9 (the Farkas lemma, equality form); Theorem 3.10 (LP duality: weak duality, strong duality with attainment, and complementary slackness); Theorem 3.13 (total unimodularity of the constraint matrix guarantees an integral optimal solution whenever an optimal solution exists); Proposition 3.14 (an explicit potential function certifying a minimum-weight bipartite perfect matching, via the totally unimodular incidence-matrix LP); and Proposition 3.16 (for a translation-invariant family of hole-free discrete sets, the property that discrete disjointness implies closure disjointness is equivalent to the discrete Minkowski sum matching the integer points of the closures' Minkowski sum).

Significance

Fenchel duality is the single result from which the separation theorem, LP duality, and (via the totally-unimodular incidence matrix of a bipartite graph) the combinatorial duality underlying weighted bipartite matching all descend, in one unbroken chain of specialization; formalizing this chain in one mission exhibits that structure directly, rather than treating each result as an independent fact. Proposition 3.16 plays a different role: it is the chapter's warning that naive discrete analogues of convexity (hole-freeness) do not automatically inherit convexity's good closure properties under Minkowski sums, which is exactly the gap the book's later M-convexity and L-convexity machinery is built to close — this mission's Proposition 3.16 is therefore the motivating negative result for the rest of the book's positive theory, not a loose end. So far as a platform search shows, no existing formalization matches this chunk's specific combination of extended-valued (possibly ±∞\pm\infty±∞) functions, the four-alternative Fenchel duality hypothesis, or the bipartite-matching-via-total-unimodularity argument; the one related platform result (VectorSpaceOpt.fenchel_duality, from Luenberger) is for real-valued functions on general normed spaces under a single relative-interior-and-solidness hypothesis, a different generality from the extended-valued, four-hypothesis statement here.

Difficulty

The naive approach to Theorem 3.6 tries to prove the duality gap is zero directly from the definitions of the two conjugates, which only gives the easy inequality inf⁡≥sup⁡\inf \ge \supinf≥sup (a one-line computation, shown in the book's own proof in three lines); the substantive content is the reverse inequality, and it genuinely fails without a constraint-qualification hypothesis like (a1)-(b2) — Example 3.8 in the book exhibits a convex/concave pair with inf⁡=0≠−1=sup⁡\inf = 0 \ne -1 = \supinf=0=−1=sup when none of the four conditions hold. The book's actual route reduces Theorem 3.6 to the separation theorem (Theorem 3.5) applied to fff shifted down by the (assumed finite) infimum, which produces the separating affine function directly; this is why Theorem 3.5, although logically a special case in spirit, earns its own milestone rather than being subsumed silently.

Formalization scope

All convex and concave functions are represented uniformly as (V → ℝ) → EReal-valued (Fintype V), rather than mixing WithTop ℝ for convex and WithBot ℝ for concave functions, so that Theorem 3.2's biconjugate — whose properness is a conclusion, not an assumption — has a well-defined codomain without extra casts. Convexity is defined via the epigraph being a convex subset of the ordinary real vector space (V→R)×R(V\to\mathbb R)\times\mathbb R(V→R)×R (Mathlib's Convex ℝ), following the book's own equivalent characterization, rather than unfolding the direct inequality definition, which would require a extended-arithmetic scalar-multiplication convention (0\cdot(+\infty)=0) that Mathlib does not provide for EReal. The relative interior is defined directly from the book's own metric-ball-intersected-with-affine-hull description, since Mathlib has no relative-interior primitive at the pinned revision. Polyhedra are finite intersections of explicit half-spaces. A bipartite perfect matching is represented as a bijection between the two vertex sides restricted to the edge set — a faithful, not narrower, representation since every perfect matching between equal-size parts arises this way. The formalization does not trivialize: Theorem 3.6's four hypotheses are carried in full (not reduced to the easiest single case), and no result is stated only for finite-valued (never ±∞\pm\infty±∞) functions, which would discard the entire point of the extended-value convex-analysis framework this chapter sets up for the rest of the book. Infrastructure needed beyond Mathlib's Convex, Matrix, and EReal API: all epigraph/hypograph, conjugate, relative-interior, and polyhedral apparatus is defined fresh in DiscreteConvex.IntegralConvexityB; a contribution proving any of the seven milestones independently, or supplying Mathlib-quality relative-interior lemmas, would be a natural entry point.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003, DOI 10.1137/1.9780898718508, Chapter 3.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970.
  • A. Schrijver, Theory of Linear and Integer Programming, Wiley, 1986.
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