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The OR Formalization Drive

A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.

Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.

4812 missions

Missions

576–600 of 4812
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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint vs. Separate Crowdsourcing Contests: The Separate Contest Has the Higher Expected Best Random Factor, and the Joint Contest Induces Higher Equilibrium EffortResearch Paper

Firms increasingly outsource innovation to crowdsourcing contests: a firm posts a design or software problem, many independent solvers submit solutions, and the best one wins a prize. Platforms such as Topcoder, 99designs and Kaggle run thousands of such contests, and a recurring design question is whether a project with several attributes (say, a logo's…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

We Are on the Way: Analysis of On-Demand Ride-Hailing Systems: In the One-Direction Approximation, the No-Call Mechanism Never Has a Longer Average Waiting Time Than the Call MechanismResearch Paper

On-demand ride-hailing platforms replaced street-hailing on the promise that matching a passenger to a car at the moment of the request shortens the wait. Feng, Kong and Wang (SSRN 2960991, later published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0880) ask whether that is true in a stylized model and find that it need not be:…

14 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers II: Every Innovation Equilibrium Is a Downstream Duopoly, Boundary or InteriorResearch Paper

In industries built on a key component sold by one dominant supplier, such as smartphone chipsets, the supplier's contract terms shape how much its downstream customers innovate. Some suppliers require their customers to cross-license their own patents to each other as a condition of buying the component, so that each manufacturer's innovation also improves…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity II: With a Secondary Market, Liquid LPs Stay Out of the Primary Market Below a Threshold and Their Capital Share Pins Down the Discount to NAVResearch Paper

Private equity funds ask investors to commit capital before the timing of their own cash needs is known. If an investor needs liquidity before the fund pays out, selling a partnership claim can be more useful than holding it to maturity. The price at which such claims trade therefore affects both the return investors demand when a fund is raised and the way…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Economic Advantage: A Quantum Computing Firm Can Out-Invest a Cheaper-to-Scale Classical Rival in Subgame-Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Quantum algorithms can reduce the work needed for some computations, but a provider also has to build hardware capable of serving a market. Bova, Goldfarb, and Melko model these two costs separately in Quantum Economic Advantage. Their question is whether a quantum provider can choose more market-creating investment than a classical rival even when building…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition and Collaboration on Fundraising for Short-Term Disaster Response: The Impact on Earmarking and Performance I: Existence and KKT Characterization of the Competition EquilibriumResearch Paper

In the days after a sudden-onset disaster, several humanitarian organizations (HOs) appeal to the same pool of donors. Donors increasingly want to earmark their gifts (restrict them to a programme, region or item), and HOs can offer more or less of that control. Earmarked money is less useful in the response: renegotiating restrictions costs time and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity I: Debt Financing Has a Unique Break-Even Repayment Between the Set-Up Cost and the Maximal Monopoly Profit, and the Entrepreneur Earns the Venture's NPVResearch Paper

Since 2017, billions of dollars have been raised through the issuance of crypto-assets, many of them tokens: digital claims on a future product or service, issued before the product exists. Malinova and Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity (SSRN 3286825; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4882), ask when such a pre-sale is a better way to…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies II: With Personalized Pricing by the Manufacturer, Dual Distribution Is Optimal Iff β > β_PZ(α), and β_PU(α) > β_PP(α)Research Paper

A manufacturer can sell directly to consumers and also supply an independent retailer. The retailer reaches consumers for whom its distribution service is more valuable, but its presence can also force the manufacturer to lower direct-channel prices. Jullien, Reisinger and Rey study when the additional sales justify dual distribution under different…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Social Media and News: Content Bundling and News Quality II: Negotiated Content Bundling Raises News Quality over the Benchmark iff c > β/Λ and over Unilateral Bundling iff c > c†Research Paper

Social platforms show news articles to their users without sending them to the publisher's site. Publishers argue that this diverts readers and advertising revenue, and so weakens their incentive to invest in journalism. Several regulators have responded by requiring dominant platforms to negotiate payments with news publishers: France transposed the EU…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
Numerical AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Primal-Dual Method for Nonconvex Constrained Optimization Based on the Augmented Lagrangian 4: Metric Subregularity of ∂L_γ Implies the VP-EB Error BoundResearch Paper

Many problems in signal processing, statistics and engineering design have the form of a nonconvex, possibly nonsmooth objective subject to nonlinear equality constraints. Zhu, Zhao and Zhang (arXiv:2007.12219v1, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) propose NAPP-AL, a first-order primal-dual method that takes one linearized step on…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization II: Under O-Learning, the Cheap-Signaling Separating Equilibrium Exists If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΛResearch Paper

Firms that customize products, especially in business-to-business and service markets, need to learn what each customer wants before designing for that customer. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (SSRN 3994319; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025) compares two ways a seller can learn a customer's preference.…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Softening Competition Through Unilateral Sharing of Customer Data: For Every Monotone-Hazard-Rate Distribution, Sharing Data on [z^N, b′] Makes Both Firms Strictly Better OffResearch Paper

Large platforms that also sell their own products (Amazon, JD.com, app stores) hold detailed data on consumers and sometimes share part of it with the independent sellers they compete with. The usual view in the personalized-pricing literature is that information is a competitive weapon: a firm that knows more about consumers can price discriminate and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low VI: A BIC-Type Choice of the Model Size Yields Oracle Inequalities for the Expected Prediction ErrorResearch Paper

Best subset selection fits a linear model using at most kkk of ppp available predictors: it minimizes the residual sum of squares ∥y−Xβ∥2\|y-X\beta\|^2∥y−Xβ∥2 over all β\betaβ with at most kkk nonzero coordinates. It is the classical benchmark for sparse regression, and mixed-integer optimization has made it computable at scales that used to be out of reach (Bertsimas, King &…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On-Demand Delivery from Stores: Dynamic Dispatching and Routing with Random Demand II: A Route Whose Reduced Cost Exceeds ub − φ(RF1) Is in No Optimal Solution of the Routing Subproblem SF1Research Paper

Grocery chains and restaurants that promise delivery within an hour or less must decide, at each dispatch epoch, which drivers to send out and along which routes. Liu and Luo (arXiv:2107.13058v3; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023) model this as a finite-horizon dynamic program and solve its per-period approximation with a logic-based…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization IV: The A-Learning Threshold Δ Exceeds the O-Learning Threshold Λ If and Only If γ < max{2s/(2s+k), (√(s²+4sk) − s)/(2k)}Research Paper

A seller who customizes products for buyers must learn what each buyer wants, and buyers have private information about how much they value quality. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025; author copy SSRN 3994319) compares two ways of learning those preferences. Under A-Learning ("asking")…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? IV: When Pricing Postponement Helps or Hurts the Retailer, the Supplier and the ConsumersResearch Paper

Production in agriculture, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and many other industries suffers from random yield: only a random fraction of a planned production run turns out usable. When a retailer buys from such a supplier, someone in the chain bears the risk that less arrives than was ordered. Geng, Guo, Xiao and Yang (SSRN 3546872; Manufacturing & Service…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 4: The Price of Anarchy Is Not Uniformly Hölder Continuous and No Game Has the Whole Space as a Hölder NeighborhoodResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game measures how much total cost is lost when a continuum of selfish users routes traffic instead of a central planner. Worst-case bounds on the PoA over classes of cost functions are classical: 4/34/34/3 for affine costs and Θ(β/ln⁡β)\Theta(\beta/\ln\beta)Θ(β/lnβ) for polynomial costs of degree at most β\betaβ (Roughgarden and…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 5: For Small Total Demand the Price of Anarchy Exceeds 1 by at Most an Explicit Multiple of the Total DemandResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio between the total travel cost at a Wardrop equilibrium, where every traveller uses a cheapest route, and the minimum total cost a central planner could achieve. Worst-case bounds on the PoA are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002), but traffic studies observe that the empirical PoA…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryNumber Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 4: For Primes p_i Near 2^(λa_i), ∏p_i Has a Divisor in [⌈L⌉, ⌊U⌋] iff the a_i Split into Two Equal-Sum PartsResearch Paper

The RangeDivisor problem asks whether an integer has a divisor in a specified short interval. It is the decision problem connecting number theory to the two item periodic joint replenishment model studied by Schulz and Telha. Their Appendix starts with Partition, the problem of splitting a list of positive integers into two groups of equal sum, and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 3: Mod-Cut&Choose Always Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium and Every One Is MMS and EFXResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different tastes so that nobody has a strong reason to complain. Fairness notions such as envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and the maximin share (MMS) have been studied extensively as algorithmic targets: given the agents' valuations, compute an allocation satisfying the…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Number TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 3: M Has a Divisor in [L, U] iff an Explicit Two-Item Periodic JRP Instance Has a Plan of Cost at Most L + U + 2M²(M + 1)Research Paper

The joint replenishment problem (JRP) is the multi-item extension of the economic order quantity (EOQ) model. Each item is reordered periodically and pays its own ordering and holding costs, and a joint ordering cost is shared by items ordered at the same time. Before this work no hardness result was known for the periodic JRP (p. 10), even though no exact…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Breaking the Sample Size Barrier in Model-Based Reinforcement Learning with a Generative Model 2: The Conservative Model-Based Policy Is ε-Optimal w.p. 1−δ at the Sample Size of Theorem 1Research Paper

Reinforcement learning with a generative model (a simulator that returns an independent next state for any queried state–action pair) is the standard setting for measuring how many samples are needed to plan in an unknown Markov decision process. The simplest algorithm is model-based planning: query each pair NNN times, build the empirical transition kernel,…

19 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information I: ProxyLabel with a Width Estimate ω′ ≥ ω/c Is e^c(ω′+1)/(1−1/k)^{k−1}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

In the classical secretary problem, candidates arrive one at a time in uniformly random order, and a decision maker must accept or reject each one irrevocably. The decision maker sees exact scores, or at least a total ranking of the candidates seen so far. In hiring, admissions and procurement the observed scores are often biased: evaluations of candidates…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 3: The Marketplace Bans Buyer–Seller Communication Above Π*/(v − c), Below η_L When q > c/(v − Π*), and Always When q Is Close to OneResearch Paper

Online marketplaces match buyers with sellers and charge a fee per transaction. Once a buyer has found a seller on the platform, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central concern for service marketplaces such as Upwork, Thumbtack or AngelList, and…

17 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Strategies in Network Markets: Under Potential Maximization the Equilibrium Quality Equates Marginal Cost to n Times the Harmonic-Mean Valuation Times the Uniform Average of ∂f(i,q)/∂qResearch Paper

A firm that sells a network good (a platform, a communication service, a standard) faces consumers whose benefit from buying grows with the number of other buyers. When these network effects are strong, the buying decisions form a coordination game: everybody buying and nobody buying can both be equilibria at the same price and quality. The firm's choice of…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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