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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Global Convergence of Splitting Methods for Nonconvex Composite Optimization II: The Proximal ADMM Sequence Is Bounded Under CoercivityResearch Paper

Motivation

The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) splits a problem of the form min⁡xh(x)+P(Mx)\min_x h(x) + P(\mathcal M x)minx​h(x)+P(Mx) into a sequence of simpler subproblems, one in which the nonsmooth term PPP enters only through its proximal map and one in which only the smooth term hhh appears. For convex problems its convergence theory is classical. In signal processing and statistics, however, the method is routinely run on nonconvex models, such as ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​- or ℓ1/2\ell_{1/2}ℓ1/2​-regularized least squares, where PPP is nonconvex and possibly discontinuous and convex theory does not apply.

Li and Pong (arXiv:1407.0753, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015) gave a convergence analysis of a proximal variant of the ADMM for this nonconvex setting. Their Theorem 1 shows that every cluster point of the iterates is a stationary point. That statement is only informative if cluster points exist. Theorem 2, the subject of this mission, gives conditions on hhh, PPP and M\mathcal MM under which the whole sequence of iterates is bounded, so that cluster points exist and Theorem 1 applies.

Setting

Let n,m≥0n, m \ge 0n,m≥0. The data are:

  • h:Rn→Rh : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}h:Rn→R, twice continuously differentiable with bounded Hessian ∇2h\nabla^2 h∇2h;
  • P:Rm→(−∞,+∞]P : \mathbb{R}^m \to (-\infty, +\infty]P:Rm→(−∞,+∞], proper (never −∞-\infty−∞, finite somewhere) and closed (lower semicontinuous);
  • M:Rn→Rm\mathcal M : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^mM:Rn→Rm linear, with adjoint M∗\mathcal M^*M∗;
  • a penalty β>0\beta > 0β>0 and a convex, twice continuously differentiable ϕ:Rn→R\phi : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}ϕ:Rn→R.

The augmented Lagrangian is

Lβ(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+β2∥Mx−y∥2,L_\beta(x, y, z) = h(x) + P(y) - \langle z, \mathcal M x - y\rangle + \frac{\beta}{2}\|\mathcal M x - y\|^2 ,Lβ​(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+2β​∥Mx−y∥2,

and the Bregman distance of ϕ\phiϕ is Dϕ(x1,x2)=ϕ(x1)−ϕ(x2)−⟨∇ϕ(x2),x1−x2⟩D_\phi(x_1, x_2) = \phi(x_1) - \phi(x_2) - \langle\nabla\phi(x_2), x_1 - x_2\rangleDϕ​(x1​,x2​)=ϕ(x1​)−ϕ(x2​)−⟨∇ϕ(x2​),x1​−x2​⟩. A sequence (xt,yt,zt)t≥0(x^t, y^t, z^t)_{t\ge 0}(xt,yt,zt)t≥0​ is generated by the proximal ADMM if, from arbitrary x0,z0x^0, z^0x0,z0,

yt+1∈Arg min⁡yLβ(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈Arg min⁡x{Lβ(x,yt+1,zt)+Dϕ(x,xt)},zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).y^{t+1} \in \operatorname*{Arg\,min}_y L_\beta(x^t, y, z^t), \quad x^{t+1} \in \operatorname*{Arg\,min}_x \{L_\beta(x, y^{t+1}, z^t) + D_\phi(x, x^t)\}, \quad z^{t+1} = z^t - \beta(\mathcal M x^{t+1} - y^{t+1}).yt+1∈yArgmin​Lβ​(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈xArgmin​{Lβ​(x,yt+1,zt)+Dϕ​(x,xt)},zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).

For a linear self-map T\mathcal TT, write ∥x∥T2=⟨x,Tx⟩\|x\|^2_{\mathcal T} = \langle x, \mathcal T x\rangle∥x∥T2​=⟨x,Tx⟩, and write ⪰\succeq⪰, ≻\succ≻ for the semidefinite and definite order of symmetric maps. Assumption 1 asks for σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0 with MM∗⪰σI\mathcal M\mathcal M^* \succeq \sigma\mathcal IMM∗⪰σI (so M\mathcal MM is surjective), bounds Q1⪰∇2h⪰Q2\mathcal Q_1 \succeq \nabla^2 h \succeq \mathcal Q_2Q1​⪰∇2h⪰Q2​, maps T1⪰T2⪰0\mathcal T_1 \succeq \mathcal T_2 \succeq 0T1​⪰T2​⪰0 with T12⪰[∇2ϕ]2⪰T22\mathcal T_1^2 \succeq [\nabla^2\phi]^2 \succeq \mathcal T_2^2T12​⪰[∇2ϕ]2⪰T22​, δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 with Q2+βM∗M+T2⪰δI\mathcal Q_2 + \beta\mathcal M^*\mathcal M + \mathcal T_2 \succeq \delta\mathcal IQ2​+βM∗M+T2​⪰δI, a bound Q3⪰[∇2h+∇2ϕ]2\mathcal Q_3 \succeq [\nabla^2 h + \nabla^2\phi]^2Q3​⪰[∇2h+∇2ϕ]2, and γ∈(0,1)\gamma \in (0,1)γ∈(0,1) with

δI+T2≻2σβ(1γQ3+11−γT12).\delta\mathcal I + \mathcal T_2 \succ \frac{2}{\sigma\beta}\Bigl(\frac1\gamma\mathcal Q_3 + \frac1{1-\gamma}\mathcal T_1^2\Bigr).δI+T2​≻σβ2​(γ1​Q3​+1−γ1​T12​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 11)

Suppose Assumption 1 holds and, with the same σ\sigmaσ and γ\gammaγ, there is 0<ζ<2βγ0 < \zeta < 2\beta\gamma0<ζ<2βγ with

h0:=inf⁡x{h(x)−1σζ∥∇h(x)∥2}>−∞.(29)h_0 := \inf_x\Bigl\{h(x) - \frac{1}{\sigma\zeta}\|\nabla h(x)\|^2\Bigr\} > -\infty. \tag{29}h0​:=xinf​{h(x)−σζ1​∥∇h(x)∥2}>−∞.(29)

Suppose that either (i) M\mathcal MM is invertible and lim inf⁡∥y∥→∞P(y)=∞\liminf_{\|y\|\to\infty} P(y) = \inftyliminf∥y∥→∞​P(y)=∞, or (ii) lim inf⁡∥x∥→∞h(x)=∞\liminf_{\|x\|\to\infty} h(x) = \inftyliminf∥x∥→∞​h(x)=∞ and inf⁡yP(y)>−∞\inf_y P(y) > -\inftyinfy​P(y)>−∞. Then

sup⁡t≥0 (∥xt∥+∥yt∥+∥zt∥)<∞.\sup_{t \ge 0}\ \bigl(\|x^t\| + \|y^t\| + \|z^t\|\bigr) < \infty .t≥0sup​ (∥xt∥+∥yt∥+∥zt∥)<∞.

Milestones

The milestones are the numbered displays of the paper's proof:

  • Eq. (13): M∗zt+1=∇h(xt+1)+∇ϕ(xt+1)−∇ϕ(xt)\mathcal M^* z^{t+1} = \nabla h(x^{t+1}) + \nabla\phi(x^{t+1}) - \nabla\phi(x^t)M∗zt+1=∇h(xt+1)+∇ϕ(xt+1)−∇ϕ(xt).
  • Eq. (20): the one-step estimate Lβ(wt+1)≤Lβ(wt)+12∥xt+1−xt∥2σβγQ3−δI−T22+12∥xt−xt−1∥2σβ(1−γ)T122L_\beta(w^{t+1}) \le L_\beta(w^t) + \tfrac12\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2_{\frac{2}{\sigma\beta\gamma}\mathcal Q_3 - \delta\mathcal I - \mathcal T_2} + \tfrac12\|x^t - x^{t-1}\|^2_{\frac{2}{\sigma\beta(1-\gamma)}\mathcal T_1^2}Lβ​(wt+1)≤Lβ​(wt)+21​∥xt+1−xt∥σβγ2​Q3​−δI−T2​2​+21​∥xt−xt−1∥σβ(1−γ)2​T12​2​ for t≥1t \ge 1t≥1.
  • Eq. (30): the merit quantity Lβ(wt)+12∥xt−xt−1∥2σβ(1−γ)T122L_\beta(w^t) + \tfrac12\|x^t - x^{t-1}\|^2_{\frac{2}{\sigma\beta(1-\gamma)}\mathcal T_1^2}Lβ​(wt)+21​∥xt−xt−1∥σβ(1−γ)2​T12​2​ stays below its value at t=1t = 1t=1.
  • Eq. (31): σ∥zt∥2≤1γ∥∇h(xt)∥2+11−γ∥xt−xt−1∥T122\sigma\|z^t\|^2 \le \frac1\gamma\|\nabla h(x^t)\|^2 + \frac1{1-\gamma}\|x^t - x^{t-1}\|^2_{\mathcal T_1^2}σ∥zt∥2≤γ1​∥∇h(xt)∥2+1−γ1​∥xt−xt−1∥T12​2​ for t≥1t \ge 1t≥1.
  • Eq. (32): a lower estimate of that value at t=1t = 1t=1 by μh(xt)+(1−μ)h0+cσ∥∇h(xt)∥2+P(yt)+β2∥Mxt−yt−zt/β∥2+…\mu h(x^t) + (1-\mu)h_0 + \frac{c}{\sigma}\|\nabla h(x^t)\|^2 + P(y^t) + \frac\beta2\|\mathcal M x^t - y^t - z^t/\beta\|^2 + \ldotsμh(xt)+(1−μ)h0​+σc​∥∇h(xt)∥2+P(yt)+2β​∥Mxt−yt−zt/β∥2+…, where c=1−μζ−12βγ>0c = \frac{1-\mu}{\zeta} - \frac{1}{2\beta\gamma} > 0c=ζ1−μ​−2βγ1​>0.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 supplies the existence of cluster points that Theorem 1 assumes. The two together give an unconditional statement: under Assumption 1, (29) and either coercivity condition, the proximal ADMM has a cluster point and every one of them is stationary. The hypotheses cover the models that motivate the paper. Least squares with a coercive nonconvex regularizer falls under case (i) with M=I\mathcal M = \mathcal IM=I, and a strongly convex quadratic hhh with a regularizer that is bounded below and a general surjective M\mathcal MM falls under case (ii) (Examples 4–6 of the paper). Boundedness is also a standing hypothesis of the paper's Theorem 3, the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz argument for convergence of the whole sequence.

Formalizing it. The result has been proved since 2015. As far as a search of the platform shows, neither it nor the underlying Lyapunov-type estimates for the ADMM has been machine-checked. This mission formalizes the known proof. The estimates (20), (30) and (31) are shared with the stationarity analysis of the same algorithm, so they serve any later formal work on nonconvex ADMM variants.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to bound the iterates by the monotone quantity of Eq. (30). That quantity involves LβL_\betaLβ​, which contains −⟨z,Mx−y⟩-\langle z, \mathcal M x - y\rangle−⟨z,Mx−y⟩ and is not bounded below a priori, so its decrease alone does not bound anything. The dual term has to be absorbed. It is controlled through ∇h(xt)\nabla h(x^t)∇h(xt) and the last primal step, and the part involving ∥∇h(xt)∥2\|\nabla h(x^t)\|^2∥∇h(xt)∥2 is then paid for out of hhh itself. Condition (29) exists to make exactly this trade possible, which is why it couples ζ\zetaζ to the γ\gammaγ of Assumption 1. The two cases then extract boundedness in opposite orders: (i) goes from yty^tyt through ztz^tzt to xtx^txt using invertibility of M\mathcal MM, and (ii) goes from xtx^txt through ztz^tzt to yty^tyt. In case (i) the lower bound on PPP that the argument needs is not assumed and must itself be derived from coercivity and lower semicontinuity.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces and values. Spaces are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m), and M\mathcal MM is a continuous linear map with Mathlib's adjoint. PPP, LβL_\betaLβ​ and every inequality containing them live in EReal, stated additively so that no extended-real subtraction occurs.
  • Assumption 1 is one definition with its witnesses σ,δ,γ,Q1,Q2,T1,T2,Q3\sigma, \delta, \gamma, \mathcal Q_1, \mathcal Q_2, \mathcal T_1, \mathcal T_2, \mathcal Q_3σ,δ,γ,Q1​,Q2​,T1​,T2​,Q3​ as explicit parameters, and ⪰\succeq⪰ is Mathlib's Loewner order on self-maps. ∥x∥T2\|x\|^2_{\mathcal T}∥x∥T2​ is ⟨x,Tx⟩\langle x, \mathcal T x\rangle⟨x,Tx⟩ for every T\mathcal TT, including indefinite ones.
  • Condition (29) takes ζ\zetaζ and a real lower bound h0h_0h0​ as parameters, with the same σ\sigmaσ and γ\gammaγ as Assumption 1.
  • The algorithm is a relation on sequences. An argmin is a global minimizer, not necessarily unique. x0x^0x0 and z0z^0z0 are free, and y0y^0y0 is unconstrained. No existence of minimizers is asserted.
  • Coercivity is stated in its ∀r ∃R\forall r\,\exists R∀r∃R form, and "invertible" is bijectivity of M\mathcal MM.
  • Boundedness means one radius for all three blocks and all t≥0t \ge 0t≥0.

Ruling out trivial versions. A formalization that bounds only xtx^txt, fixes γ\gammaγ or ζ\zetaζ to an example's values, lets (29) use a fresh γ\gammaγ, adds a lower bound on PPP in case (i), or assumes minimizers that make the sequence constant proves a different, weaker theorem, and is not the target.

Definitions needed. Proper and closed extended-valued functions, the Hessian as fderiv of gradient, the augmented Lagrangian, the Bregman distance, the proximal-ADMM relation and Assumption 1 are all provided. They mirror the definitions of the companion mission on cluster points of the same algorithm. A solver will need standard facts beyond them: first-order optimality for a differentiable function, the mean-value bound ∥∇ϕ(a)−∇ϕ(b)∥2≤∥a−b∥T122\|\nabla\phi(a) - \nabla\phi(b)\|^2 \le \|a-b\|^2_{\mathcal T_1^2}∥∇ϕ(a)−∇ϕ(b)∥2≤∥a−b∥T12​2​ from the Hessian sandwich, and strong convexity of the xxx-subproblem. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • G. Li and T. K. Pong, Global Convergence of Splitting Methods for Nonconvex Composite Optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015; preprint arXiv:1407.0753v6. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.0753 (DOI 10.1137/140998135)
  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato and J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 3(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000016
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte and B. F. Svaiter, Convergence of descent methods for semi-algebraic and tame problems, Math. Program. 137, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0484-9
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Global Convergence of Splitting Methods for Nonconvex Composite Optimization IV: Descent and Stationary Cluster Points of the Proximal Gradient MethodResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in statistics, signal processing and machine learning minimize a sum of a smooth loss and a nonsmooth regularizer: least squares with an ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ or ℓ1/2\ell_{1/2}ℓ1/2​ penalty, and constrained problems in which the regularizer is the indicator of a nonconvex set. The proximal gradient method (also called forward–backward splitting) is the standard first-order algorithm for such problems. Each step takes a gradient step on the smooth part and then applies the proximal mapping of the nonsmooth part, which for many nonconvex regularizers (hard thresholding, projection onto sparse vectors) has a closed form.

For a smooth part hhh whose gradient is LLL-Lipschitz, the classical analysis allows any constant step size β∈(0,1/L)\beta \in (0, 1/L)β∈(0,1/L), and every cluster point of the iterates is stationary; Li and Pong cite Bredies and Lorenz (Minimization of non-convex, non-smooth functionals by iterative thresholding, preprint, 2009) for this. Attouch, Bolte and Svaiter (Math. Program., 2013) added convergence of the whole sequence when h+Ph + Ph+P has the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz property. When hhh is nonconvex, however, LLL is governed by the most negative curvature of hhh as much as by the most positive one, and the admissible step sizes can be much smaller than the convex part of hhh alone would require.

Li and Pong (SIAM J. Optim., 2015; preprint arXiv:1407.0753v6) show that the concave part of hhh imposes no restriction on the step size: it suffices to bound the curvature of hhh after it has been offset by a convex function. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 4 of their paper. It is the fourth mission of a series on the paper; the first three treat its results on the alternating direction method of multipliers.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn with the Euclidean inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥. The problem is

min⁡x∈Rn  h(x)+P(x),\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n}\; h(x) + P(x),x∈Rnmin​h(x)+P(x),

under the paper's standing assumptions: h:Rn→Rh : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}h:Rn→R is twice continuously differentiable with a bounded Hessian ∇2h\nabla^2 h∇2h; P:Rn→(−∞,+∞]P : \mathbb{R}^n \to (-\infty, +\infty]P:Rn→(−∞,+∞] is proper (never −∞-\infty−∞, finite somewhere) and closed (lower semicontinuous); and for every τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 and uuu the proximal problem min⁡yτP(y)+12∥y−u∥2\min_y \tau P(y) + \frac12\|y - u\|^2miny​τP(y)+21​∥y−u∥2 has a minimizer. Neither hhh nor PPP is assumed convex.

A vector vvv is a regular subgradient of PPP at xxx (with P(x)<∞P(x) < \inftyP(x)<∞) if P(z)≥P(x)+⟨v,z−x⟩−ε∥z−x∥P(z) \ge P(x) + \langle v, z - x\rangle - \varepsilon\|z - x\|P(z)≥P(x)+⟨v,z−x⟩−ε∥z−x∥ for all zzz near xxx, for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0. The limiting subdifferential ∂P(x)\partial P(x)∂P(x) collects the limits v=lim⁡vtv = \lim v^tv=limvt of regular subgradients vtv^tvt at points xt→xx^t \to xxt→x with P(xt)→P(x)P(x^t) \to P(x)P(xt)→P(x). A point xxx is stationary if

0∈∇h(x)+∂P(x).0 \in \nabla h(x) + \partial P(x).0∈∇h(x)+∂P(x).

Given a step size β>0\beta > 0β>0 and an arbitrary starting point x0x^0x0, the proximal gradient method generates (xt)t≥0(x^t)_{t \ge 0}(xt)t≥0​ by

xt+1∈Arg min⁡x{⟨∇h(xt),x−xt⟩+12β∥x−xt∥2+P(x)}.(43)x^{t+1} \in \operatorname*{Arg\,min}_x \Bigl\{ \langle \nabla h(x^t), x - x^t\rangle + \frac{1}{2\beta}\|x - x^t\|^2 + P(x) \Bigr\}. \tag{43}xt+1∈xArgmin​{⟨∇h(xt),x−xt⟩+2β1​∥x−xt∥2+P(x)}.(43)

Any minimizer may be selected. A cluster point of (xt)(x^t)(xt) is the limit of a subsequence xtix^{t_i}xti​.

The step-size condition involves a convex function qqq and a constant ℓ>0\ell > 0ℓ>0 with

−ℓI⪯∇2h(x)+∇2q(x)⪯ℓIfor all x,(44)-\ell I \preceq \nabla^2 h(x) + \nabla^2 q(x) \preceq \ell I \quad \text{for all } x, \tag{44}−ℓI⪯∇2h(x)+∇2q(x)⪯ℓIfor all x,(44)

where ⪯\preceq⪯ is the Loewner order on symmetric linear maps.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

Suppose qqq is twice continuously differentiable and convex, ℓ>0\ell > 0ℓ>0, (44) holds, and (xt)(x^t)(xt) is generated by (43) with β∈(0,1/ℓ)\beta \in (0, 1/\ell)β∈(0,1/ℓ). Then

h(xt+1)+P(xt+1)≤h(xt)+P(xt)for all t,h(x^{t+1}) + P(x^{t+1}) \le h(x^t) + P(x^t) \quad \text{for all } t,h(xt+1)+P(xt+1)≤h(xt)+P(xt)for all t,

and every cluster point x∗x^*x∗ of (xt)(x^t)(xt), if one exists, satisfies 0∈∇h(x∗)+∂P(x∗)0 \in \nabla h(x^*) + \partial P(x^*)0∈∇h(x∗)+∂P(x∗).

The goal does not assert that a cluster point exists, nor that the whole sequence converges; both are false without further assumptions.

Milestones

In the order of the paper's proof:

  1. Eq. (3): robustness of ∂\partial∂ under xt→xx^t \to xxt→x, f(xt)→f(x)f(x^t) \to f(x)f(xt)→f(x), vt→vv^t \to vvt→v.
  2. Eq. (45): under (44), (h+q)(v)≤(h+q)(u)+⟨∇h(u)+∇q(u),v−u⟩+ℓ2∥v−u∥2(h+q)(v) \le (h+q)(u) + \langle \nabla h(u) + \nabla q(u), v - u\rangle + \frac{\ell}{2}\|v - u\|^2(h+q)(v)≤(h+q)(u)+⟨∇h(u)+∇q(u),v−u⟩+2ℓ​∥v−u∥2.
  3. Eq. (46): h(xt+1)+P(xt+1)≤h(xt)+P(xt)+(ℓ2−12β)∥xt+1−xt∥2h(x^{t+1}) + P(x^{t+1}) \le h(x^t) + P(x^t) + \bigl(\frac{\ell}{2} - \frac{1}{2\beta}\bigr)\|x^{t+1} - x^t\|^2h(xt+1)+P(xt+1)≤h(xt)+P(xt)+(2ℓ​−2β1​)∥xt+1−xt∥2.
  4. The summed bound after (46): (12β−ℓ2)∑t=0N−1∥xt+1−xt∥2+h(xN)+P(xN)≤h(x0)+P(x0)\bigl(\frac{1}{2\beta} - \frac{\ell}{2}\bigr)\sum_{t=0}^{N-1}\|x^{t+1} - x^t\|^2 + h(x^N) + P(x^N) \le h(x^0) + P(x^0)(2β1​−2ℓ​)∑t=0N−1​∥xt+1−xt∥2+h(xN)+P(xN)≤h(x0)+P(x0).
  5. Vanishing steps: if a cluster point exists, ∥xt+1−xt∥→0\|x^{t+1} - x^t\| \to 0∥xt+1−xt∥→0.
  6. Function-value convergence: if xti→x∗x^{t_i} \to x^*xti​→x∗, then P(xti+1)→P(x∗)P(x^{t_i+1}) \to P(x^*)P(xti​+1)→P(x∗).
  7. Eq. (47): 0∈∇h(xt)+1β(xt+1−xt)+∂P(xt+1)0 \in \nabla h(x^t) + \frac{1}{\beta}(x^{t+1} - x^t) + \partial P(x^{t+1})0∈∇h(xt)+β1​(xt+1−xt)+∂P(xt+1) for every ttt.

Significance

The result. For h=h1−h2h = h_1 - h_2h=h1​−h2​ a difference of convex C2C^2C2 functions with ∇h1\nabla h_1∇h1​ being L1L_1L1​-Lipschitz, (44) holds with q=h2q = h_2q=h2​ and ℓ=L1\ell = L_1ℓ=L1​, so the step size may be taken in (0,1/L1)(0, 1/L_1)(0,1/L1​) whatever the curvature of h2h_2h2​. For an indefinite quadratic h(x)=12⟨x,Qx⟩h(x) = \frac12\langle x, Qx\rangleh(x)=21​⟨x,Qx⟩ the admissible range becomes (0,1/λmax⁡(Q))(0, 1/\lambda_{\max}(Q))(0,1/λmax​(Q)) instead of (0,1/max⁡i∣λi(Q)∣)(0, 1/\max_i|\lambda_i(Q)|)(0,1/maxi​∣λi​(Q)∣), and for a concave quadratic every positive step size is admissible. Because the method is a descent method under this rule, its iterates stay in a sublevel set of h+Ph + Ph+P, so the sequence is bounded whenever h+Ph + Ph+P is coercive. The same estimates feed the whole-sequence convergence argument for Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz functions.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to the best of current knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires the limiting subdifferential of an extended-real-valued function, its closedness property (3), and a Fermat rule for a smooth-plus-nonsmooth sum, none of which is in Mathlib. These are reusable for any nonconvex first-order method analysed through cluster points.

Difficulty

The descent part rests on (45), a descent inequality for h+qh + qh+q whose Lipschitz constant is read off from a two-sided Hessian bound; the familiar descent lemma is stated for hhh alone and does not apply, since ∇h\nabla h∇h may have a much larger Lipschitz constant than ℓ\ellℓ.

The stationarity part is where the naive argument fails. Passing to the limit in (47) needs not only xti+1→x∗x^{t_i+1} \to x^*xti​+1→x∗ but also P(xti+1)→P(x∗)P(x^{t_i+1}) \to P(x^*)P(xti​+1)→P(x∗), because the limiting subdifferential is closed only under PPP-attentive convergence. Lower semicontinuity gives one inequality; the other must come from the minimizing property (43) compared against x∗x^*x∗. The objective may be +∞+\infty+∞ at x0x^0x0, so summability of the steps has to be extracted without assuming a finite starting value.

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). hhh and qqq are real-valued; PPP takes values in EReal, and every objective value h(x)+P(x)h(x) + P(x)h(x)+P(x) is compared in EReal, never through EReal.toReal. The Hessian is the derivative of the gradient map, a continuous linear self-map; the Loewner order is Mathlib's partial order A ≤ B ↔ (B - A).IsPositive, and both sides of (44) are kept. The regular subgradient is encoded in its ε\varepsilonε-neighbourhood form, and the limiting subdifferential requires all three convergences xt→xx^t \to xxt→x, P(xt)→P(x)P(x^t) \to P(x)P(xt)→P(x), vt→vv^t \to vvt→v. Stationarity is ∃w∈∂P(x), ∇h(x)+w=0\exists w \in \partial P(x),\ \nabla h(x) + w = 0∃w∈∂P(x), ∇h(x)+w=0. The update (43) is a relation on sequences: xt+1x^{t+1}xt+1 minimizes the bracket over all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, with no uniqueness and a free starting point. A cluster point is the limit of xφ(i)x^{\varphi(i)}xφ(i) for a strictly increasing φ\varphiφ.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: (44) is not replaced by "∇h\nabla h∇h is ℓ\ellℓ-Lipschitz", which is the classical special case q=0q = 0q=0; P(x0)<∞P(x^0) < \inftyP(x0)<∞, boundedness of the sequence and existence of a cluster point are not assumed; and a limiting subdifferential without P(xt)→P(x)P(x^t) \to P(x)P(xt)→P(x) is not used, since that would make stationarity a weaker statement.

Contributions welcome: the closedness (3) and the Fermat rule behind (47) for the limiting subdifferential, a descent lemma from a two-sided Hessian bound, and the telescoping and limit arguments of the proof.

Selected references

  • G. Li and T. K. Pong, Global convergence of splitting methods for nonconvex composite optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015. Preprint arXiv:1407.0753v6. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.0753 · https://doi.org/10.1137/140998135
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte and B. F. Svaiter, Convergence of descent methods for semi-algebraic and tame problems: proximal algorithms, forward–backward splitting, and regularized Gauss–Seidel methods, Math. Program. 137, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0484-9
  • K. Bredies and D. A. Lorenz, Minimization of non-convex, non-smooth functionals by iterative thresholding, preprint, 2009 (reference [9] of Li–Pong; no stable link recorded there).
  • R. T. Rockafellar and R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue: The Competitive Ratio of the Primal-Dual Allocation AlgorithmResearch Paper

Motivation

Search engines sell advertisement slots next to their results through ad-auctions. Advertisers bid on keywords, and each advertiser also sets a daily budget: the most it is willing to pay in a day. Queries arrive one at a time and each must be assigned to an advertiser at once, with no knowledge of the queries still to come. The seller's revenue from an advertiser is capped by its budget, so an allocation rule that ignores budgets can exhaust a high bidder early and forgo revenue that a more even allocation would have collected. The question is how much of the offline optimum an online rule can guarantee against every arrival sequence.

Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani and Vazirani (FOCS 2005 / J. ACM 2007) gave a deterministic algorithm whose competitive ratio tends to 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e when bids are small compared with budgets, and showed that no deterministic algorithm does better. Their algorithm builds on online bipartite matching (Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani, STOC 1990) and online bbb-matching (Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs, 2000). Buchbinder, Jain and Naor (ESA 2007) rederived the 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e bound with an online primal-dual algorithm, which gives the ratio in closed form for every value of the bid-to-budget ratio and extends to multiple slots, stochastic information, bounded degree and budget flexibility. This mission formalizes the basic algorithm of that paper and its Theorem 1.

Setting

There is a finite nonempty set III of buyers. Buyer iii has a known budget B(i)>0B(i) > 0B(i)>0. Products j=1,…,mj = 1, \dots, mj=1,…,m arrive one by one; when product jjj arrives, every buyer's bid b(i,j)≥0b(i,j) \ge 0b(i,j)≥0 on it is revealed. The bid-to-budget ratio is

Rmax⁡=max⁡i∈I, jb(i,j)B(i).R_{\max} = \max_{i \in I,\, j} \frac{b(i,j)}{B(i)} .Rmax​=i∈I,jmax​B(i)b(i,j)​.

A fractional allocation y(i,j)≥0y(i,j) \ge 0y(i,j)≥0 assigns fractions of products to buyers; the revenue from buyer iii is the minimum of ∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)\sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j)∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j) and B(i)B(i)B(i).

The offline fractional problem is the packing LP, which the paper calls the dual:

max⁡∑j∑ib(i,j) y(i,j)s.t.∑iy(i,j)≤1  ∀j,∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)≤B(i)  ∀i,y≥0.\max \sum_{j}\sum_{i} b(i,j)\,y(i,j) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_i y(i,j) \le 1 \ \ \forall j,\qquad \sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j) \le B(i)\ \ \forall i,\qquad y \ge 0 .maxj∑​i∑​b(i,j)y(i,j)s.t.i∑​y(i,j)≤1  ∀j,j∑​b(i,j)y(i,j)≤B(i)  ∀i,y≥0.

Its LP dual, the paper's primal, is the covering LP:

min⁡∑iB(i) x(i)+∑jz(j)s.t.b(i,j) x(i)+z(j)≥b(i,j)  ∀i,j,x,z≥0.\min \sum_i B(i)\,x(i) + \sum_j z(j) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad b(i,j)\,x(i) + z(j) \ge b(i,j)\ \ \forall i,j,\qquad x, z \ge 0 .mini∑​B(i)x(i)+j∑​z(j)s.t.b(i,j)x(i)+z(j)≥b(i,j)  ∀i,j,x,z≥0.

The Allocation Algorithm has a parameter c>1c > 1c>1 and starts from x≡0x \equiv 0x≡0. When product jjj arrives it takes a buyer iii maximizing b(i,j)(1−x(i))b(i,j)(1 - x(i))b(i,j)(1−x(i)). If x(i)≥1x(i) \ge 1x(i)≥1, the product is not sold. Otherwise it charges iii the minimum of b(i,j)b(i,j)b(i,j) and iii's remaining budget, sets y(i,j)←1y(i,j) \leftarrow 1y(i,j)←1 and z(j)←b(i,j)(1−x(i))z(j) \leftarrow b(i,j)(1 - x(i))z(j)←b(i,j)(1−x(i)), and updates

x(i)←x(i)(1+b(i,j)B(i))+b(i,j)(c−1) B(i).x(i) \leftarrow x(i)\Big(1 + \frac{b(i,j)}{B(i)}\Big) + \frac{b(i,j)}{(c-1)\,B(i)} .x(i)←x(i)(1+B(i)b(i,j)​)+(c−1)B(i)b(i,j)​.

Its revenue is the total amount charged.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every instance and every bound R>0R > 0R>0 with b(i,j)≤R B(i)b(i,j) \le R\,B(i)b(i,j)≤RB(i) for all i,ji, ji,j, the Allocation Algorithm run with c=(1+R)1/Rc = (1+R)^{1/R}c=(1+R)1/R, under any tie-breaking of the maximum, satisfies for every feasible y′y'y′ of the packing LP

Revenue  ≥  (1−1c)(1−R)∑j∑ib(i,j) y′(i,j).\mathrm{Revenue} \;\ge\; \Big(1 - \frac1c\Big)(1 - R)\sum_{j}\sum_{i} b(i,j)\,y'(i,j).Revenue≥(1−c1​)(1−R)j∑​i∑​b(i,j)y′(i,j).

With R=Rmax⁡R = R_{\max}R=Rmax​ this is the paper's statement that the algorithm is (1−1/c)(1−Rmax⁡)(1 - 1/c)(1 - R_{\max})(1−1/c)(1−Rmax​)-competitive; the fractional optimum bounds every integral offline allocation.

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 1 rests on three claims and three auxiliary facts, each a milestone:

  1. the inequality ln⁡(1+x)/x≥ln⁡(1+y)/y\ln(1+x)/x \ge \ln(1+y)/yln(1+x)/x≥ln(1+y)/y for 0<x≤y≤10 < x \le y \le 10<x≤y≤1;
  2. Claim (1): the final (x,z)(x, z)(x,z) is feasible for the covering LP;
  3. Claim (2): the covering cost of the run equals (1+1/(c−1))(1 + 1/(c-1))(1+1/(c−1)) times the packing value of the run's own yyy;
  4. Inequality (1): x(i)≥1c−1(c∑jb(i,j)y(i,j)/B(i)−1)x(i) \ge \frac{1}{c-1}\big(c^{\sum_j b(i,j) y(i,j)/B(i)} - 1\big)x(i)≥c−11​(c∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j)/B(i)−1) at every stage of the run;
  5. Claim (3): ∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)≤B(i)+max⁡jb(i,j)\sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j) \le B(i) + \max_j b(i,j)∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j)≤B(i)+maxj​b(i,j), and the amount charged to iii is at least (1−R)∑jb(i,j) y(i,j)(1 - R)\sum_j b(i,j)\,y(i,j)(1−R)∑j​b(i,j)y(i,j);
  6. weak duality for the LP pair above;

and, separately, the second sentence of Theorem 1,

lim⁡R→0+(1−1(1+R)1/R)(1−R)=1−1e.\lim_{R\to 0^+}\Big(1 - \frac{1}{(1+R)^{1/R}}\Big)(1-R) = 1 - \frac1e .R→0+lim​(1−(1+R)1/R1​)(1−R)=1−e1​.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives an explicit ratio for every value of Rmax⁡R_{\max}Rmax​, not only in the limit. It tends to the optimal deterministic ratio 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e as bids become small, and it quantifies how the guarantee degrades as single bids become a larger share of a budget. The primal-dual analysis is the template for the paper's later sections and for a line of work on online packing and covering problems, surveyed in Buchbinder and Naor's monograph The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach (Foundations and Trends in TCS, 2009).

The result is proved in the paper, and the proof is short. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof about an algorithm that is defined, not described: the run is computed by recursion from the instance, and the guarantee is proved for that run and every tie-breaking. A related private mission on the platform, The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach VI: Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue, states the monograph's Theorem 10.1, which is this theorem, in a form that takes the analysis's intermediate inequalities as hypotheses over arbitrary lists of won bids; the present mission states it for the algorithm itself. No machine-checked proof of Theorem 1 is known to this mission.

Difficulty

Each step of the proof is elementary; the difficulty is the bookkeeping of an online process. Claims (1) and (2) are statements about a single iteration that must be lifted to the whole run: Claim (1) uses that xxx only increases, and Claim (2) that each product is processed once. Inequality (1) is an induction over the iterations that allocate to one buyer, interleaved with iterations that allocate to others and is the only place where the value of ccc matters. Claim (3) needs a further invariant: the amount charged equals the minimum of the allocated bids and the budget.

A tempting shortcut is to take Inequality (1) and the "at most one undercharge" fact as hypotheses about some list of bids. That does not describe the algorithm and is not the theorem; here the only hypotheses are on the instance and on the tie-breaking rule.

Formalization scope

Buyers are a type I with [Fintype I] and [Nonempty I]; products are Fin m, whose order is the arrival order. Bids and budgets are real, with B(i)>0B(i) > 0B(i)>0 and b(i,j)≥0b(i,j) \ge 0b(i,j)≥0. The state of the algorithm records xxx, the amounts charged, yyy and zzz; one iteration is step, the run after kkk products is runPrefix, and revenue sums the charges of the final state. The tie-breaking rule is a function sel of the current xxx and the product, required to return a maximizer of b(i,j)(1−x(i))b(i,j)(1-x(i))b(i,j)(1−x(i)); the theorem holds for every such rule. The constant c=(1+R)1/Rc = (1+R)^{1/R}c=(1+R)1/R is a real power and requires R>0R > 0R>0. The theorem is stated for any bound RRR on the ratios, of which the exact maximum is one instance. Claims (1) and (2) are stated for every c>1c > 1c>1, which covers the paper's choice. The paper's inequality for ln⁡(1+x)/x\ln(1+x)/xln(1+x)/x allows x=0x = 0x=0, read as a limit; the Lean statement requires x>0x > 0x>0.

A statement over an unconstrained allocation, or one conditioned on the proof's own intermediate inequalities, would be trivially true or false; the targets here concern only the run the definitions compute.

The development needs finite sums, real powers and logarithms from Mathlib and an induction principle for the run. The LP pair and weak duality are reusable for the paper's extensions, and the run invariants for any primal-dual online algorithm with multiplicative updates. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are sharper variants, such as the exact-Rmax⁡R_{\max}Rmax​ form or the bound against integral allocations.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, J. Naor, Online Primal-Dual Algorithms for Maximizing Ad-Auctions Revenue, Algorithms – ESA 2007, LNCS 4698, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_24
  • A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Vazirani, AdWords and Generalized Online Matching, Journal of the ACM 54(5), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1284320.1284321
  • R. M. Karp, U. V. Vazirani, V. V. Vazirani, An Optimal Algorithm for On-line Bipartite Matching, STOC 1990. https://doi.org/10.1145/100216.100262
  • B. Kalyanasundaram, K. R. Pruhs, An Optimal Deterministic Algorithm for Online b-Matching, Theoretical Computer Science 233(1–2), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3975(99)00140-1
  • N. Buchbinder, J. Naor, The Design of Competitive Online Algorithms via a Primal-Dual Approach, Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 3(2–3), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000024
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Introduction to the Scenario Approach V: Support Sets Certify the Violation of Nonconvex Scenario SolutionsTextbook

Why certify nonconvex scenario solutions

The scenario approach replaces an optimization problem with uncertain constraints θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​, δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, by the program that enforces only NNN constraints Θδ1,…,ΘδN\Theta_{\delta_1},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_N}Θδ1​​,…,ΘδN​​ drawn at random from the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty. Its solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is then judged by its violation, the probability that a new instance δ\deltaδ is not satisfied. For convex programs in Rd\mathbb R^dRd the violation is controlled by the dimension ddd alone (Calafiore and Campi 2006; Campi and Garatti 2008), because a convex program has at most ddd support constraints. Many problems where the scenario approach is used in practice are not convex: control with quantized inputs, mixed-integer design, classification with nonconvex losses, and decisions over infinite-dimensional or unstructured sets. For those programs no a priori bound on the number of constraints that determine the solution exists.

Timeline, as recorded in Chapter 8 of Campi and Garatti's textbook:

  • 2006–2008: the violation of convex scenario solutions is bounded, and then characterized exactly, in terms of ddd.
  • 2018: the wait-and-judge theory (Campi and Garatti, Math. Programming 2018) evaluates the violation from the number of support constraints counted after solving the program; it extends to nonconvex programs but requires a nondegeneracy assumption.
  • 2018: Campi, Garatti and Ramponi (IEEE TAC 2018) prove a bound in terms of the size of any support set, with no convexity and no nondegeneracy assumption. This is the result formalized here, stated in the book as Eq. (8.15).

Setting

Let Θ\ThetaΘ be a generic set; it may be an infinite-dimensional space or a set with no algebraic structure. Let f:Θ→Rf:\Theta\to\mathbb Rf:Θ→R be a cost and Θδ⊆Θ\Theta_\delta\subseteq\ThetaΘδ​⊆Θ constraint sets indexed by δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, where Δ\DeltaΔ carries a probability P\mathbb PP. Neither fff nor the Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ is required to be convex. With a sample δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ drawn independently from P\mathbb PP, the scenario program is

min⁡θ∈Θf(θ)subject toθ∈⋂i=1,…,NΘδi,(8.12)\min_{\theta\in\Theta} f(\theta)\quad\text{subject to}\quad \theta\in\bigcap_{i=1,\dots,N}\Theta_{\delta_i},\tag{8.12}θ∈Θmin​f(θ)subject toθ∈i=1,…,N⋂​Θδi​​,(8.12)

and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ denotes its solution, assumed to exist and be unique for every sample.

The violation of a decision is V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}V(\theta)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\theta\notin\Theta_\delta\}V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​} (Definition 3.1).

A support set (Definition 8.8) is a subset {Θδi1,…,Θδik}\{\Theta_{\delta_{i_1}},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_{i_k}}\}{Θδi1​​​,…,Θδik​​​} of the constraints such that the program with only these constraints in place has the same solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ as the program with all constraints. The full set of constraints is always a support set; a support set need not be minimal (of smallest cardinality) or irreducible (with no removable element). Let σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ be the cardinality of the support set returned, for every sample, by some fixed algorithm.

Formalization targets

Goal: the support-set bound, Eq. (8.15)

For every function ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,1,\dots,N\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1] with ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1,

PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤∑k=0N−1(Nk) (1−ϵ(k))N−k.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\sum_{k=0}^{N-1}\binom Nk\,(1-\epsilon(k))^{N-k}.PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤k=0∑N−1​(kN​)(1−ϵ(k))N−k.

The level function ϵ\epsilonϵ is free: the statement is one inequality per admissible ϵ\epsilonϵ, and it holds for any algorithm producing support sets. This is the weakest form that carries the whole result.

Milestone: the level function for a confidence β\betaβ, Eq. (8.16)

For β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] let

ϵ(k)={1k=N,1−βN(Nk)N−kotherwise.\epsilon(k)=\begin{cases}1 & k=N,\\ 1-\sqrt[N-k]{\dfrac{\beta}{N\binom Nk}} & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}ϵ(k)=⎩⎨⎧​11−N−kN(kN​)β​​​k=N,otherwise.​

The arithmetic half states that ϵ\epsilonϵ maps {0,…,N}\{0,\dots,N\}{0,…,N} into [0,1][0,1][0,1], ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1, and the right-hand side of (8.15) equals β\betaβ (for N≥1N\ge1N≥1). The probabilistic half states PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\betaPN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β.

Significance

The result turns the size of a support set, a quantity observed after the program is solved, into a certificate on the violation of the solution, for any optimization or decision problem whose solution is determined by a subset of the data. With the choice (8.16), a user who finds a support set of size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ can assert V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗)V(\theta^*)\le\epsilon(\sigma^*)V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗) with confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β. The book's Figure 8.12 shows that ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) for β=10−6\beta=10^{-6}β=10−6 remains well below 111 for kkk up to a sizeable fraction of NNN. Because the algorithm that finds the support set is arbitrary, cheap heuristics that return non-minimal support sets still give valid, if weaker, guarantees. The result does not recover the tight convex bound (3.4); for convex programs the Chapter 3 theory remains sharper.

The statement is proved in [31] and is the probabilistic core of the sample-compression arguments of learning theory (Floyd and Warmuth 1995) in the form used by the scenario approach. To the best of available knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The platform's UnderstandingML.compression_bound proves a sample-compression bound for a fixed compression size with a different constant; it does not cover a data-dependent size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ or an arbitrary level function. A formal proof here provides a reusable bound for data-dependent support sets over arbitrary decision sets.

Difficulty

The natural first step is: condition on the support set being a particular index set III with ∣I∣=k|I|=k∣I∣=k, and argue that the solution is then a function of the kkk sampled constraints in III alone, while the other N−kN-kN−k samples are independent of it and must all be satisfied. The difficulty is that the event "the algorithm returns III" depends on all NNN samples, and the solution of the reduced program on III is defined only where that program has a unique solution; the decomposition of the probability therefore has to be carried out on sections of the product space, with a measurability argument for each piece. A second point is that σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is random and data-dependent: a bound for each fixed kkk does not directly give a bound at the random level ϵ(σ∗)\epsilon(\sigma^*)ϵ(σ∗), and the role of the condition ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1 must be accounted for at k=Nk=Nk=N.

Formalization scope

Lean representation and committed conventions:

  • Θ\ThetaΘ and Δ\DeltaΔ are arbitrary types with measurable structures; P\mathbb PP is a probability measure on Δ\DeltaΔ; a sample is ω : Fin N → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin N => P); indices run over 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1.
  • A subset of constraints is a Finset (Fin N); the reduced program with index set III has feasible set ⋂i∈IΘδi\bigcap_{i\in I}\Theta_{\delta_i}⋂i∈I​Θδi​​ (all of Θ\ThetaΘ for I=∅I=\emptysetI=∅).
  • The solution map θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is a parameter with the hypothesis that θ∗(ω)\theta^*(\omega)θ∗(ω) is the unique solution of the full program for every sample.
  • "Has the same solution" in Definition 8.8 means: the reduced program has a unique solution and it equals the unique solution of the full program. Existence of solutions is not assumed for reduced programs in general, only for those that are support sets.
  • The algorithm is an arbitrary map alg : (Fin N → Δ) → Finset (Fin N) returning a support set for every sample; σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is the cardinality of its output. The goal is universal over such maps.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ is a real function on N\mathbb NN with ϵ(k)∈[0,1]\epsilon(k)\in[0,1]ϵ(k)∈[0,1] for k≤Nk\le Nk≤N and ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1.
  • The violation is real-valued in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the probability of the event is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with ENNReal.ofReal of the real right-hand side.

Implicit hypotheses of the page, made explicit (the book states on p. 33 that measurability issues are glossed over): the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta):\theta\in\Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is measurable in Θ×Δ\Theta\times\DeltaΘ×Δ; the solution map is measurable; each event {ω:the algorithm returns J}\{\omega:\text{the algorithm returns }J\}{ω:the algorithm returns J} is measurable; θ∗\theta^*θ∗ exists and is unique for every sample; N≥1N\ge1N≥1 in the arithmetic half of (8.16).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the algorithm is not existentially quantified and is not the minimal support set, the reduced programs are not all assumed solvable (which would be unsatisfiable when fff has no unconstrained minimizer), and the support-set property requires uniqueness of the reduced solution, without which the bound is false.

Needed infrastructure: product measures on Fin N → Δ, splitting of such products along a subset of coordinates, and Fubini/Tonelli for sections. These pieces are reusable for other compression-type bounds. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on splitting Measure.pi over a Finset of coordinates.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018, §8.6, pp. 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, F. A. Ramponi, A general scenario theory for nonconvex optimization and decision making, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2018.2808446
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • S. Floyd, M. Warmuth, Sample compression, learnability, and the Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension, Machine Learning, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993593
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Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization I: Edmundson–Madansky Bounds for Independent Random Data and Simple RecourseTextbook

Motivation

In a two-stage stochastic linear program a decision xxx is taken before random data ξ\xiξ are observed, and a corrective recourse decision yyy is taken afterwards at a cost. The objective contains the expectation of an optimal value of a linear program, ∫Q(x,ξ(ω)) P(dω)\int Q(x,\xi(\omega))\,P(d\omega)∫Q(x,ξ(ω))P(dω), and for continuous or high-dimensional ξ\xiξ that integral cannot be evaluated exactly. Practical methods therefore replace ξ\xiξ by a discrete random vector and control the error by computable lower and upper bounds on the expected recourse cost. Chapter 2 of Ermoliev and Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988), by P. Kall, A. Ruszczyński and K. Frauendorfer, surveys these bounds as they were used in the codes of the time: Jensen's inequality from below, the Edmundson–Madansky inequality from above, and the special structure of simple recourse, where the expected cost is available in closed form.

Timeline. Jensen's inequality (1906) gives the lower bound for a convex integrand. A. Madansky, "Bounds on the expectation of a convex function of a multivariate random variable", Ann. Math. Statist. 30 (1959), and H. P. Edmundson (RAND report, 1956) gave the upper bound by the two-point law on the endpoints of an interval, and its product version for independent components. Kall and Stoyan (1982), Huang, Ziemba and Ben-Tal (1977), Frauendorfer and Kall (1988) developed partition refinement of both bounds, the scheme this chapter describes; Frauendorfer (1988) extended the upper bound to dependent data on boxes.

Setting

The two-stage problem (2.11) is: minimize ψ(x)=cTx+∫ΩQ(x,ξ(ω)) P(dω)\psi(x)=c^Tx+\int_\Omega Q(x,\xi(\omega))\,P(d\omega)ψ(x)=cTx+∫Ω​Q(x,ξ(ω))P(dω) subject to Ax=bAx=bAx=b, x≥0x\ge 0x≥0. The recourse cost Q(x,ξ)Q(x,\xi)Q(x,ξ) is the optimal value of the second-stage problem (2.12),

Q(x,ξ)=min⁡{qTy:Wy=h−Tx, y≥0},ξ=(q,h,T),Q(x,\xi)=\min\{q^Ty : Wy=h-Tx,\ y\ge 0\},\qquad \xi=(q,h,T),Q(x,ξ)=min{qTy:Wy=h−Tx, y≥0},ξ=(q,h,T),

with a deterministic m2×n2m_2\times n_2m2​×n2​ matrix WWW (fixed recourse), and Q=+∞Q=+\inftyQ=+∞ when (2.12) is infeasible. Throughout the chapter the book assumes complete recourse, {Wy:y≥0}=Rm2\{Wy:y\ge0\}=\mathbb R^{m_2}{Wy:y≥0}=Rm2​, and dual feasibility: for every realization of qqq some uuu satisfies WTu≤qW^Tu\le qWTu≤q. Under these assumptions QQQ is finite. The expected recourse function is Q(x)=∫Q(x,ξ(ω)) P(dω)\mathcal Q(x)=\int Q(x,\xi(\omega))\,P(d\omega)Q(x)=∫Q(x,ξ(ω))P(dω).

The Edmundson–Madansky law of an interval [a,b][a,b][a,b], a<ba<ba<b, with mean ξ0\xi^0ξ0 puts mass p1=(b−ξ0)/(b−a)p_1=(b-\xi^0)/(b-a)p1​=(b−ξ0)/(b−a) at aaa and p2=(ξ0−a)/(b−a)p_2=(\xi^0-a)/(b-a)p2​=(ξ0−a)/(b−a) at bbb (2.32). For a box Ξ=×j=1m[aj,bj]\Xi=\times_{j=1}^m[a_j,b_j]Ξ=×j=1m​[aj​,bj​] and means ξj0\xi^0_jξj0​, the vector ξ^\hat\xiξ^​ with independent components of these two-point laws sits at the vertex vvv with probability ∏jpj(vj)\prod_j p_j(v_j)∏j​pj​(vj​).

Simple recourse is the case W=[I,−I]W=[I,-I]W=[I,−I], q=[q+,q−]q=[q^+,q^-]q=[q+,q−] with qj++qj−≥0q^+_j+q^-_j\ge0qj+​+qj−​≥0, deterministic TTT and random hhh only. With χ=Tx\chi=Txχ=Tx the recourse cost splits into one-row costs Qj(χj,hj)=qj+(hj−χj)Q_j(\chi_j,h_j)=q^+_j(h_j-\chi_j)Qj​(χj​,hj​)=qj+​(hj​−χj​) if hj≥χjh_j\ge\chi_jhj​≥χj​, and qj−(χj−hj)q^-_j(\chi_j-h_j)qj−​(χj​−hj​) otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Edmundson–Madansky bound for independent components (p. 46)

If ξ\xiξ has independent components ξj∈[aj,bj]\xi_j\in[a_j,b_j]ξj​∈[aj​,bj​] with means ξj0\xi^0_jξj0​, and φ\varphiφ is convex on Ξ=×j[aj,bj]\Xi=\times_j[a_j,b_j]Ξ=×j​[aj​,bj​], then

Eφ(ξ)≤∑v∈vert Ξ(∏j=1mpj(vj))φ(v).E\varphi(\xi)\le\sum_{v\in\mathrm{vert}\,\Xi}\Big(\prod_{j=1}^m p_j(v_j)\Big)\varphi(v).Eφ(ξ)≤v∈vertΞ∑​(j=1∏m​pj​(vj​))φ(v).

The book applies it to φ=Q(x,⋅)\varphi=Q(x,\cdot)φ=Q(x,⋅); the goal is stated for every convex φ\varphiφ, with the explicit weights of (2.32).

Milestones

  1. Properties (b), (d), (e) of p. 40: Q(x,⋅)Q(x,\cdot)Q(x,⋅) is piecewise linear and convex in (h,T)(h,T)(h,T); Q(⋅,ξ)Q(\cdot,\xi)Q(⋅,ξ) is convex piecewise linear in xxx; the expected recourse function is finite and convex under finite second moments.
  2. The Jensen lower bound (2.26)–(2.27) on a partition (a published, proved theorem, reused).
  3. The dual-multiplier lower bound (2.30)–(2.31).
  4. The one-dimensional Edmundson–Madansky inequality (2.32)–(2.34).
  5. For simple recourse: separability (2.46)–(2.49), the closed form (2.51) of EQjEQ_jEQj​, and the bounds (2.55)–(2.56) from the one-block problem.

Significance

The upper bound is the half of the bounding scheme that is not automatic. Jensen's inequality needs only a mean; an upper bound on the expectation of a convex function needs a bounded support and, in the product form, independence. Together they give a certified interval for the optimal value of a two-stage problem, and repeated partitioning of the support shrinks that interval; this is the basis of the sequential approximation methods of §2.2.4 and of later codes. The dual-multiplier bound and the simple-recourse formulas are the pieces that make those intervals cheap to compute.

The results are classical and proved in the literature cited on the page. The one-dimensional Edmundson–Madansky inequality and the general extreme-point form of the upper bound (a measure on the extreme points reproducing the barycentre) are already formalized on Prove2Me in the Introduction to Stochastic Programming series, as is the partition Jensen bound. The product form for independent components is not: deriving it from the extreme-point form requires constructing the product kernel, which is the content of this mission. The recourse properties (b), (d), (e) for a general distribution with finite second moments, the dual-multiplier bound and the simple-recourse formulas are not formalized anywhere known to this mission.

Difficulty

The obvious argument inducts on the dimension, applying the one-dimensional inequality in one coordinate while the others are held fixed. That step needs the conditional law of the remaining coordinates given the first to be their unconditional law, i.e. independence expressed as a product decomposition of the joint law, and it needs φ\varphiφ with one coordinate replaced by an endpoint to remain convex on the lower-dimensional box and integrable. For dependent components the inequality is false with these weights: on [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2 with means (12,12)(\tfrac12,\tfrac12)(21​,21​) and φ(x,y)=(x−y)2\varphi(x,y)=(x-y)^2φ(x,y)=(x−y)2, the product law gives 12\tfrac1221​ while mass 12\tfrac1221​ at (1,0)(1,0)(1,0) and at (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) gives 111. The book's remark that the product law is extremal among all laws on Ξ\XiΞ with the given mean fails for this reason when m≥2m\ge2m≥2, and is not part of this mission.

For the recourse properties the difficulty is bookkeeping: QQQ is an extended-real optimal value, and finiteness, measurability in ω\omegaω and integrability must be derived from complete recourse, dual feasibility and the moment hypothesis rather than assumed.

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions from finite index types to R\mathbb RR (ι → ℝ), matrices are Mathlib Matrix, and random data live on a probability space (Ω, P). The recourse cost is an EReal infimum over the feasible set, so infeasibility gives +∞+\infty+∞ and unboundedness −∞-\infty−∞ exactly as on p. 39; theorems that integrate it carry complete recourse and dual feasibility, which make it finite. The expected recourse function integrates the real part of the recourse cost. Independence of the components is ProbabilityTheory.iIndepFun; the box is Set.pi univ (fun j => Icc (a j) (b j)), with aj<bja_j<b_jaj​<bj​, and values in the box are required almost surely. The upper bound is the explicit sum over Boolean vertex labels of products of the weights (2.32); no abstract extremal measure is used.

Conventions fixed where the page is silent or ambiguous:

  • Properties (b), (d), (e) are stated on all of Rn1\mathbb R^{n_1}Rn1​: under the standing complete-recourse assumption K2=Rn1K_2=\mathbb R^{n_1}K2​=Rn1​. "Convex piecewise linear" is rendered as a maximum of finitely many affine functions.
  • The book's hypothesis of finite second moments in (e) is kept as stated, componentwise.
  • The book writes QQQ for both Q(x,ξ)Q(x,\xi)Q(x,ξ) and Q(x)\mathcal Q(x)Q(x), and reuses Q~\tilde QQ~​, ψ~\tilde\psiψ~​ for different functions in (2.27) and (2.30)–(2.31); the Lean names are recourseCost, expectedRecourse and dualLowerBound.
  • In (2.51) a conditional mean on a null event is 000 in Lean; it always appears multiplied by that event's probability, so the formula is unchanged.
  • In (2.56) the minimum is a real infimum over the nonempty first-stage feasible set; attainment is not claimed.
  • No constant of the chapter is hidden behind O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅); all bounds are explicit.

A goal stated for affine φ\varphiφ (where it is an equality), or with ξ^\hat\xiξ^​ allowed to be any discrete law with the right mean, would be trivial or a different theorem; the weights are the products of (2.32), and independence of the components is a hypothesis.

A complete development needs: finite-dimensional LP duality with extended-real values (reusable across all recourse missions), measurability and integrability of optimal-value functions, the conditional-independence step for product measures, and the one-dimensional chord inequality. The partitioned upper bound (2.37) and the discrete reformulation (2.21), (2.28) are natural follow-up statements on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • P. Kall, A. Ruszczyński, K. Frauendorfer, "Approximation Techniques in Stochastic Programming", in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 2, pp. 33–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • A. Madansky, "Bounds on the expectation of a convex function of a multivariate random variable", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30 (1959), 743–746. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177706203
  • P. Kall, Stochastic Linear Programming, Springer 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-66252-2
  • R. J-B Wets, "Stochastic programs with fixed recourse: the equivalent deterministic program", SIAM Review 16 (1974), 309–339. https://doi.org/10.1137/1016053
  • K. Frauendorfer, "Solving SLP recourse problems with arbitrary multivariate distributions — the dependent case", Mathematics of Operations Research 13 (1988), 377–394. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.3.377
  • J. R. Birge, F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, Springer 1997, Ch. 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97617
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Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization III: Stochastic Quasi-Féjer Sequences and the Stochastic Quasigradient Projection MethodTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization problems in operations research have an objective that is an expectation, F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω)F^0(x)=E f^0(x,\omega)F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω), over a random parameter ω\omegaω whose distribution is known only through samples or is too complex to integrate. Two-stage stochastic programs, inventory and reliability models, and simulation-based design all have this form. Neither F0F^0F0 nor its subgradients can be evaluated exactly, but a random vector whose conditional mean is close to a subgradient is often cheap to compute: a sample subgradient of f0(⋅,ω)f^0(\cdot,\omega)f0(⋅,ω), or a finite-difference quotient of two sampled values.

Stochastic quasigradient (SQG) methods, developed by Ermoliev and co-workers in Kiev from the late 1960s, use such vectors in place of subgradients. They extend the stochastic approximation procedures of Robbins–Monro (1951) and Kiefer–Wolfowitz (1952) to nonsmooth convex objectives, general convex constraints, and directions whose conditional mean is biased by a vanishing amount. This mission formalizes the basic convergence theory of the simplest SQG method, the projection method, as presented by Yu. Ermoliev in Chapter 6 of the IIASA volume Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988).

Timeline (as cited in the chapter's bibliography).

  • 1951–1954: Robbins and Monro, Kiefer and Wolfowitz, Dvoretzky and Blum prove convergence of stochastic approximation for unconstrained smooth problems.
  • 1962–1967: Shor introduces the generalized gradient (subgradient) method; Ermoliev (Kibernetika 4, 1966) and Polyak (Soviet Math. Doklady 8, 1967) prove its convergence.
  • 1967–1969: Ermoliev and Nekrylova introduce stochastic subgradients; Ermoliev ("On the stochastic quasi-gradient method and stochastic quasi-Feyer sequences", Kibernetika 2, 1969) introduces stochastic quasi-Féjer sequences.
  • 1976: Ermoliev's monograph Stochastic Programming Methods (Nauka) contains the proof of Theorem 6.1 (p. 98).
  • 1988: the survey chapter formalized here presents the projection method, Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, and an efficiency estimate for the averaged iterate.

Setting

Let X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn be a nonempty convex compact set and F0:Rn→RF^0:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb RF0:Rn→R convex and continuous on XXX. The optimal set is X∗={x∈X:F0(x)≤F0(y) ∀y∈X}X^*=\{x\in X: F^0(x)\le F^0(y)\ \forall y\in X\}X∗={x∈X:F0(x)≤F0(y) ∀y∈X}. The projection onto XXX is πX(y)=argmin⁡{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}\pi_X(y)=\operatorname{argmin}\{\|y-x\|^2:x\in X\}πX​(y)=argmin{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}.

On a probability space, the stochastic quasigradient projection method produces random vectors x0,x1,…x^0,x^1,\dotsx0,x1,… by

xs+1=πX[xs−ρs ξ0(s)],s=0,1,…(6.11)x^{s+1}=\pi_X\big[x^s-\rho_s\,\xi^0(s)\big],\qquad s=0,1,\dots \tag{6.11}xs+1=πX​[xs−ρs​ξ0(s)],s=0,1,…(6.11)

where ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 is a step size and ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) a random direction. Write E{⋅∣x0,…,xs}E\{\cdot\mid x^0,\dots,x^s\}E{⋅∣x0,…,xs} for conditional expectation given the history σ(x0,…,xs)\sigma(x^0,\dots,x^s)σ(x0,…,xs). The direction is a stochastic quasigradient if, for every x∗∈X∗x^*\in X^*x∗∈X∗,

F0(x∗)−F0(xs)≥⟨E{ξ0(s)∣x0,…,xs}, x∗−xs⟩+γ0(s)a.s.,(6.12)F^0(x^*)-F^0(x^s)\ge\big\langle E\{\xi^0(s)\mid x^0,\dots,x^s\},\,x^*-x^s\big\rangle+\gamma_0(s)\quad\text{a.s.}, \tag{6.12}F0(x∗)−F0(xs)≥⟨E{ξ0(s)∣x0,…,xs},x∗−xs⟩+γ0​(s)a.s.,(6.12)

where the error γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) is a function of the history. If the conditional mean of ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) is a subgradient plus a bias b0(s)b^0(s)b0(s), then (6.12) holds with γ0(s)=−⟨b0(s),x∗−xs⟩\gamma^0(s)=-\langle b^0(s),x^*-x^s\rangleγ0(s)=−⟨b0(s),x∗−xs⟩ (6.13).

A sequence of random vectors z0,z1,…z^0,z^1,\dotsz0,z1,… is a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for Z⊆RnZ\subseteq\mathbb R^nZ⊆Rn if E∥z0∥2<∞E\|z^0\|^2<\inftyE∥z0∥2<∞ and there are random rs≥0r_s\ge0rs​≥0 with ∑sErs<∞\sum_s E r_s<\infty∑s​Ers​<∞ such that for all z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z

E{∥z−zs+1∥2∣z0,…,zs}≤∥z−zs∥2+rs.(6.14)E\{\|z-z^{s+1}\|^2\mid z^0,\dots,z^s\}\le\|z-z^s\|^2+r_s. \tag{6.14}E{∥z−zs+1∥2∣z0,…,zs}≤∥z−zs∥2+rs​.(6.14)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2

If, with probability 1, ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 and ∑sρs=∞\sum_s\rho_s=\infty∑s​ρs​=∞, and

∑s=0∞E{ρs∣γ0(s)∣+ρs2∥ξ0(s)∥2}<∞,(6.15)\sum_{s=0}^\infty E\{\rho_s|\gamma_0(s)|+\rho_s^2\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\}<\infty, \tag{6.15}s=0∑∞​E{ρs​∣γ0​(s)∣+ρs2​∥ξ0(s)∥2}<∞,(6.15)

then with probability 1 the iterates converge and lim⁡sxs∈X∗\lim_s x^s\in X^*lims​xs∈X∗.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 6.1 (a)–(c). For a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for ZZZ: ∥z−zs+1∥2\|z-z^{s+1}\|^2∥z−zs+1∥2 converges a.s. and E∥z−zs∥2E\|z-z^s\|^2E∥z−zs∥2 is bounded, for each z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z; accumulation points exist a.s. (for Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅); and a.s. ZZZ lies in the hyperplane equidistant from any two distinct accumulation points outside ZZZ.
  2. Eq. (6.13). Biased stochastic subgradients satisfy (6.12).
  3. One-step inequality (p. 145): E{∥x∗−xs+1∥2∣⋅}≤∥x∗−xs∥2+2ρs⟨E{ξ0(s)∣⋅},x∗−xs⟩+E{ρs2∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}E\{\|x^*-x^{s+1}\|^2\mid\cdot\}\le\|x^*-x^s\|^2+2\rho_s\langle E\{\xi^0(s)\mid\cdot\},x^*-x^s\rangle+E\{\rho_s^2\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\mid\cdot\}E{∥x∗−xs+1∥2∣⋅}≤∥x∗−xs∥2+2ρs​⟨E{ξ0(s)∣⋅},x∗−xs⟩+E{ρs2​∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅} for x∗∈Xx^*\in Xx∗∈X.
  4. Quasi-Féjer property (p. 145): the iterates of (6.11) form a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for X∗X^*X∗.
  5. Efficiency estimate (p. 147), for deterministic ρk\rho_kρk​ and xˉs=∑k≤sρkxk/∑k≤sρk\bar x^s=\sum_{k\le s}\rho_kx^k/\sum_{k\le s}\rho_kxˉs=∑k≤s​ρk​xk/∑k≤s​ρk​:
EF0(xˉs)−F0(x∗)≤(2∑k=0sρk)−1[E∥x∗−x0∥2+∑k=0sE(2ρk∣γ0(k)∣+ρk2∥ξ0(k)∥2)].E F^0(\bar x^s)-F^0(x^*)\le\Big(2\sum_{k=0}^s\rho_k\Big)^{-1}\Big[E\|x^*-x^0\|^2+\sum_{k=0}^s E\big(2\rho_k|\gamma_0(k)|+\rho_k^2\|\xi^0(k)\|^2\big)\Big].EF0(xˉs)−F0(x∗)≤(2k=0∑s​ρk​)−1[E∥x∗−x0∥2+k=0∑s​E(2ρk​∣γ0​(k)∣+ρk2​∥ξ0(k)∥2)].

Significance

Theorem 6.2 is the prototype convergence theorem for SQG methods. Its hypotheses allow random step sizes chosen from the history, nonsmooth objectives, and directions with a bias that vanishes fast enough; its conclusion is convergence of the iterates themselves to a single optimal point, not only convergence of function values or of dist⁡(xs,X∗)\operatorname{dist}(x^s,X^*)dist(xs,X∗). The later chapters of the same volume (adaptive step sizes, Chapters 17–18; nonstationary problems, §6.4) reuse the same framework. Theorem 6.1 isolates the probabilistic content in a form that applies to any algorithm with a quasi-Féjer inequality. The efficiency estimate gives a non-asymptotic accuracy bound for the averaged iterate.

The results are classical and proved in the literature: Theorem 6.1 in Ermoliev (1976, p. 98), Theorem 6.2 in this chapter (pp. 145–146). To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. Mathlib has conditional expectations and the a.s. martingale convergence theorem, but no Robbins–Siegmund-type almost-supermartingale lemma and no stochastic subgradient method. A formal proof of this mission would supply both.

Difficulty

The deterministic argument for projected subgradient methods compares ∥x∗−xs+1∥\|x^*-x^{s+1}\|∥x∗−xs+1∥ with ∥x∗−xs∥\|x^*-x^s\|∥x∗−xs∥ for a fixed x∗x^*x∗. In the stochastic setting this comparison holds only in conditional mean, with a perturbation rsr_srs​ that is random, and the distances converge only almost surely, with an exceptional null set that depends on x∗x^*x∗. Since X∗X^*X∗ is typically uncountable, "for every x∗x^*x∗, almost surely" does not immediately give "almost surely, for every x∗x^*x∗", and it is the second form that identifies a single limit. A second difficulty is that ∑ρs(F0(xs)−F0(x∗))<∞\sum\rho_s(F^0(x^s)-F^0(x^*))<\infty∑ρs​(F0(xs)−F0(x∗))<∞ only yields a subsequence along which F0F^0F0 approaches its minimum; passing from there to convergence of the whole sequence is exactly what part (c) of Theorem 6.1 is for.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The probability space is an arbitrary measurable space with a probability measure. πX\pi_XπX​ is a chosen minimizer of ∥y−x∥2\|y-x\|^2∥y−x∥2 over XXX (unique for nonempty closed convex XXX). The history is the σ\sigmaσ-algebra generated by x0,…,xsx^0,\dots,x^sx0,…,xs; ρs\rho_sρs​ and γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) are measurable with respect to it.
  • Directions ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) are integrable and random vectors are measurable; conditional expectations are Mathlib's condExp. The quasi-Féjer definition requires square integrability of every zsz^szs (implied by the book's definition when Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅), so no conditional expectation is taken of a non-integrable function.
  • X≠∅X\ne\emptysetX=∅ and x0∈Xx^0\in Xx0∈X are stated; Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅ is added in Theorem 6.1 (b), which is false without it.
  • γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) does not depend on x∗x^*x∗; the x∗x^*x∗-dependent error of (6.13) is dominated on a bounded XXX by ∥b0(s)∥diam⁡X\|b^0(s)\|\operatorname{diam}X∥b0(s)∥diamX.
  • (6.15) keeps its mixed form: ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 and ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞ almost surely, and a deterministic sum of expectations (lower Lebesgue integrals) finite.
  • Explicit constants. The book's "CCC" in the efficiency estimate is instantiated from its proof: 222 on ρk∣γ0(k)∣\rho_k|\gamma_0(k)|ρk​∣γ0​(k)∣ and 111 on ρk2∥ξ0(k)∥2\rho_k^2\|\xi^0(k)\|^2ρk2​∥ξ0(k)∥2. The unspecified CCC before the quasi-Féjer sentence is replaced by the existence of summable rsr_srs​.
  • Typo corrections. The one-step inequality on p. 145 prints ρsE{∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}\rho_sE\{\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\mid\cdot\}ρs​E{∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}; it is ρs2\rho_s^2ρs2​. The efficiency estimate on p. 147 omits EEE before the last sum; it is restored. "ρk\rho_kρk​ independent of (x0,…,xk)(x^0,\dots,x^k)(x0,…,xk)" is read as deterministic step sizes.
  • A trivializing formalization is excluded: the goal does not replace ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) by an exact subgradient, does not set γ0≡0\gamma_0\equiv0γ0​≡0, and concludes convergence of xsx^sxs to a point of X∗X^*X∗ rather than dist⁡(xs,X∗)→0\operatorname{dist}(x^s,X^*)\to0dist(xs,X∗)→0.
  • Reusable infrastructure: a Robbins–Siegmund lemma for nonnegative almost-supermartingales, the nonexpansiveness of πX\pi_XπX​, and Theorem 6.1 itself, which applies to any quasi-Féjer algorithm (Chapter 6 §6.4 and Chapters 17–18 of the same book). Contributions of these general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Yu. Ermoliev, "Stochastic Quasigradient Methods", in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 6, §6.1–6.2 (pp. 141–147). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • Yu. Ermoliev, "On the stochastic quasi-gradient method and stochastic quasi-Feyer sequences", Kibernetika 2 (1969) (in Russian; English translation in Cybernetics). Reference [3] of the chapter.
  • Yu. Ermoliev, Stochastic Programming Methods, Nauka, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian); Theorem 6.1 is on p. 98. Reference [5] of the chapter.
  • H. Robbins and D. Siegmund, "A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications", in J. S. Rustagi (ed.), Optimizing Methods in Statistics, Academic Press, 1971, 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, "A stochastic approximation method", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951) 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization V: Asymptotic Optimality of List Scheduling for the Machine Investment ProblemTextbook

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic integer programs combine the two hardest features of mathematical programming: uncertainty in the data and integrality of the decisions. Even evaluating the objective of such a program at a single first-stage decision requires the expected optimal value of an NP-hard combinatorial problem. Chapter 8 of Ermoliev and Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988), by A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and L. Stougie, argues that for many such problems the way forward is probabilistic analysis: the random optimal value of the second-stage problem often converges, after normalization, to a simple function of the problem parameters, and that function can replace the intractable expectation.

The chapter illustrates this on the machine investment problem: first buy mmm identical machines at cost ccc each, knowing only the distribution of the processing times of nnn jobs, then schedule the jobs once their processing times are revealed so as to minimize the makespan. This mission formalizes the chapter's analysis of that example: the almost sure asymptotics of the optimal makespan (8.13), its expectation version, and the asymptotic clairvoyance of the resulting two-stage heuristic.

Setting

Let p1,p2,…p_1, p_2, \dotsp1​,p2​,… be processing times: independent, identically distributed, nonnegative random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P) with mean μ=Ep1>0\mu = \mathbb E p_1 > 0μ=Ep1​>0 and finite second moment Ep12<∞\mathbb E p_1^2 < \inftyEp12​<∞. The instance with nnn jobs uses the first nnn of them.

An assignment of the nnn jobs to m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 identical machines is a map σ:{1,…,n}→{1,…,m}\sigma : \{1, \dots, n\} \to \{1, \dots, m\}σ:{1,…,n}→{1,…,m}. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipj\sum_{j : \sigma(j) = i} p_j∑j:σ(j)=i​pj​ and the makespan of σ\sigmaσ is its largest load. The minimum makespan is

Cn∗(m)=min⁡σmax⁡i=1,…,m∑j: σ(j)=ipj,C^*_n(m) = \min_{\sigma} \max_{i=1,\dots,m} \sum_{j:\ \sigma(j) = i} p_j ,Cn∗​(m)=σmin​i=1,…,mmax​j: σ(j)=i∑​pj​,

and the machine investment problem is to minimize Zn(m)=cm+E Cn∗(m)Z_n(m) = cm + \mathbb E\, C^*_n(m)Zn​(m)=cm+ECn∗​(m) over integers mmm (8.9).

List scheduling takes the jobs in the order 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n and assigns each to the first available machine, a machine of least current load (lowest index on ties). Its makespan is CnH(m)C^H_n(m)CnH​(m). Write Sn=∑j=1npjS_n = \sum_{j=1}^n p_jSn​=∑j=1n​pj​ and pmax⁡=max⁡j≤npjp_{\max} = \max_{j \le n} p_jpmax​=maxj≤n​pj​.

For §8.3, the estimate Zn′(m)=cm+nμ/mZ'_n(m) = cm + n\mu/mZn′​(m)=cm+nμ/m is minimized over integers by the heuristic first-stage decision mnH1m^{H1}_nmnH1​, the better of ⌊nμ/c⌋\lfloor\sqrt{n\mu/c}\rfloor⌊nμ/c​⌋ and ⌈nμ/c⌉\lceil\sqrt{n\mu/c}\rceil⌈nμ/c​⌉. A clairvoyant decision maker who sees the processing times first chooses mn∘(ω)≥1m^\circ_n(\omega) \ge 1mn∘​(ω)≥1 minimizing cm+Cn∗(m)cm + C^*_n(m)cm+Cn∗​(m).

Formalization targets

Goal: Eq. (8.13)

For machine counts m=m(n)≥1m = m(n) \ge 1m=m(n)≥1 with m(n)=O(n)m(n) = O(\sqrt n)m(n)=O(n​),

P{lim⁡n→∞Cn∗(m)nμ/m=1}=1.P\Bigl\{ \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{C^*_n(m)}{n\mu/m} = 1 \Bigr\} = 1 .P{n→∞lim​nμ/mCn∗​(m)​=1}=1.

The machine count is allowed to grow with nnn; this is the regime the first-stage heuristic lives in, since mnH1m^{H1}_nmnH1​ is of exact order n\sqrt nn​.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (8.10): the deterministic sandwich Sn/m≤Cn∗(m)≤CnH(m)≤Sn/m+pmax⁡S_n/m \le C^*_n(m) \le C^H_n(m) \le S_n/m + p_{\max}Sn​/m≤Cn∗​(m)≤CnH​(m)≤Sn​/m+pmax​, divided by nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m.
  2. Eq. (8.11): the strong law of large numbers, (Sn−nμ)/(nμ)→0(S_n - n\mu)/(n\mu) \to 0(Sn​−nμ)/(nμ)→0 almost surely (a published platform theorem).
  3. Lemma 8.1 (i): pmax⁡/n→0p_{\max}/\sqrt n \to 0pmax​/n​→0 almost surely.
  4. Eq. (8.12): m pmax⁡/(nμ)→0m\, p_{\max}/(n\mu) \to 0mpmax​/(nμ)→0 almost surely when m=O(n)m = O(\sqrt n)m=O(n​).
  5. Lemma 8.1 (ii): E pmax⁡/n→0\mathbb E\, p_{\max}/\sqrt n \to 0Epmax​/n​→0.
  6. p. 207: E Cn∗(m)/(nμ/m)→1\mathbb E\, C^*_n(m)/(n\mu/m) \to 1ECn∗​(m)/(nμ/m)→1 when m=O(n)m = O(\sqrt n)m=O(n​).
  7. p. 211, asymptotic clairvoyance: almost surely
lim⁡n→∞c mnH1+CnH2(mnH1)c mn∘+Cn∗(mn∘)=1,\lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{c\, m^{H1}_n + C^{H2}_n(m^{H1}_n)}{c\, m^\circ_n + C^*_n(m^\circ_n)} = 1 ,n→∞lim​cmn∘​+Cn∗​(mn∘​)cmnH1​+CnH2​(mnH1​)​=1,

where CnH2C^{H2}_nCnH2​ is the list-scheduling makespan.

Significance

Result (8.13) says that the optimal value of an NP-hard problem, rescaled, is almost surely asymptotic to the elementary function nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m of the data and the first-stage decision. Its expectation version replaces the intractable term E Cn∗(m)\mathbb E\,C^*_n(m)ECn∗​(m) in (8.9) by nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m, and the clairvoyance statement shows that the heuristic built on that replacement loses asymptotically nothing, not even against a decision maker with full information. The chapter presents the example as the template for vehicle routing and location problems preceded by an investment decision.

All results here are classical and proved in the literature cited by the chapter (Lemma 8.1 is quoted from Feller without proof; the chapter refers to Dempster et al. for the asymptotic optimality of the two-stage heuristic and to Lenstra et al. for the notion of asymptotic clairvoyance). None of them has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal model of identical-machine makespan scheduling and of list scheduling, the extreme-value estimates of Lemma 8.1 for square-integrable i.i.d. sequences, and the full chain from the strong law to (8.13).

Difficulty

The deterministic part is elementary on paper, but list scheduling is a recursively defined procedure, and its makespan bound has to be established for that recursion rather than for a picture like the chapter's Figure 8.3. The probabilistic core is Lemma 8.1: the strong law controls Sn/nS_n/nSn​/n, but the error term m pmax⁡/(nμ)m\, p_{\max}/(n\mu)mpmax​/(nμ) is of order pmax⁡/np_{\max}/\sqrt npmax​/n​ once mmm grows like n\sqrt nn​, and the strong law says nothing about maxima. With a fixed number of machines the whole statement would reduce to the strong law; the growth m(n)=O(n)m(n) = O(\sqrt n)m(n)=O(n​) is exactly where the second moment is needed. For the clairvoyance statement, the clairvoyant choice mn∘m^\circ_nmn∘​ is a random, unstructured minimizer, so its value must be bounded below without knowing where the minimum is attained.

Formalization scope

Processing times are one sequence p : ℕ → Ω → ℝ, 0-based (the book's pjp_jpj​ is p (j-1)), with each p j measurable, the family mutually independent (iIndepFun), identically distributed with p 0, pointwise nonnegative, p 0 ^ 2 integrable and ∫ p 0 = μ with μ > 0. Nonnegativity and μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 are not printed in the book; they are implicit in "processing times" and in the division by nμn\munμ. Machines are Fin m; a schedule is an assignment Fin n → Fin m, which is faithful because jobs are non-preemptive, machines identical and there are no precedence constraints.

The book writes "m=0(n)m = 0(\sqrt n)m=0(n​)"; this is read as mmm a function of nnn with m(n)≥1m(n) \ge 1m(n)≥1 and (fun n => (m n : ℝ)) =O[atTop] (fun n => √n). Stating (8.13) for a fixed mmm would trivialize it into the strong law and is ruled out. "Pr⁡{lim⁡⋯=1}=1\Pr\{\lim \dots = 1\} = 1Pr{lim⋯=1}=1" means that almost surely the limit exists and equals 111. Expectations are Bochner integrals of functions that are measurable and bounded by SnS_nSn​, hence integrable. List scheduling uses the index order and breaks ties towards the lowest machine index; both are admissible instances of the book's "arbitrary fixed order" and "first available machine". In the clairvoyance statement the minimum is over m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 (the book writes m∈Nm \in \mathbb Nm∈N; no machine cannot process any job, and the Lean value Cn∗(0)C^*_n(0)Cn∗​(0) is an empty-infimum convention). No explicit constants replace an O(·): the statements are limits and the O-hypothesis is carried as stated.

Out of scope: (8.14) and the p. 210 expectation statement, which need a positive density at 000 and whose proof the book calls "far from easy", and the dynamic programming recursion of §8.3.

Needed infrastructure: finite maxima and minima of measurable functions, extreme-value estimates for square-integrable i.i.d. sequences (Lemma 8.1), and Mathlib's strong law. The makespan and list-scheduling definitions are reusable for other identical-machine scheduling results; alternative proofs of Lemma 8.1 and sharper forms of the clairvoyance statement are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, "Stochastic Integer Programming", in Yu. Ermoliev, R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 8, pp. 201–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. 1, 3rd edition, Wiley, 1968 (cited by the chapter for Lemma 8.1).
  • M. A. H. Dempster, M. L. Fisher, L. Jansen, B. J. Lageweg, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, "Analysis of heuristics for stochastic programming: results for hierarchical scheduling problems", Mathematics of Operations Research 8 (1983) 525–537. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.525
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, "A framework for the design and analysis of hierarchical planning systems", Annals of Operations Research 1 (1984) 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01874451
  • R. L. Graham, "Bounds on multiprocessing timing anomalies", SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17 (1969) 416–429. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117039
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

Motivation

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this decision for thousands of items. The practical rule used everywhere is the order-up-to (base-stock) rule: bring the inventory position up to a fixed target level whenever it falls below it, and order nothing otherwise. Chapter 2 of the book justifies this rule for a single item with linear costs, following the dynamic-programming argument of Karlin and Scarf, and the rest of the book takes the rule as given.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak posed the periodic-review inventory problem as a dynamic program in 1951 (Econometrica). Bellman, Glicksberg and Gross showed in 1955 that with linear ordering cost and convex expected holding and shortage costs the optimal policy has a critical-number form (Management Science). Karlin and Scarf (1958) extended the analysis to a positive lead time, the setting of the book's Theorems 1–3. Veinott (1965) gave conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal in multi-product, nonstationary models (Management Science).

Setting

One item is stocked at one location. At the start of each period the inventory position yyy is observed and a quantity u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 is ordered; with lead time one period it arrives at the start of the next period. Demand in each period is independent of other periods and has a density ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) that is positive and continuous. Unmet demand is backordered. Costs are linear: ccc per unit ordered, hhh per unit on hand at the end of a period, bbb per unit backordered at the end of a period, and future costs are discounted by α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1). The one-period cost is

L(y)={h∫0y(y−x)g(x) dx+b∫y∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y>0,b∫0∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y≤0.L(y) = \begin{cases} h\displaystyle\int_0^y (y-x)g(x)\,dx + b\int_y^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y > 0,\\[1mm] b\displaystyle\int_0^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y \le 0. \end{cases}L(y)=⎩⎨⎧​h∫0y​(y−x)g(x)dx+b∫y∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,b∫0∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,​y>0,y≤0.​

The book assumes throughout that b>1−αα cb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\,cb>α1−α​c: the backorder cost outweighs the saving from deferring a purchase.

The nnn-period value functions are f1=Lf_1 = Lf1​=L and, for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2,

fn(y)=min⁡u≥0{c u+L(y)+α∫0∞fn−1(y+u−x) g(x) dx}.f_n(y) = \min_{u \ge 0}\Big\{ c\,u + L(y) + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}(y+u-x)\,g(x)\,dx \Big\}.fn​(y)=u≥0min​{cu+L(y)+α∫0∞​fn−1​(y+u−x)g(x)dx}.

An order uuu is optimal at yyy if it attains this minimum over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0. The order-up-to rule with level sss orders u(y)=max⁡{0,s−y}u(y) = \max\{0, s-y\}u(y)=max{0,s−y}. The marginal function of eq. (2.8) is Fn(w)=c+α∫0∞fn′(w−x) g(x) dxF_n(w) = c + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_n'(w-x)\,g(x)\,dxFn​(w)=c+α∫0∞​fn′​(w−x)g(x)dx. In Lean these are Model, Model.L, Model.f, Model.IsOptimalOrder, Model.IsOrderUpToOptimal and Model.F in the namespace ServiceParts.BaseStock.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18) in its nnn-period form

For every horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, either there is a real level sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ with

un∗(y)=max⁡{0, sn∗−y} optimal for every y,u_n^*(y) = \max\{0,\ s_n^* - y\} \ \text{optimal for every } y,un∗​(y)=max{0, sn∗​−y} optimal for every y,

or ordering nothing is optimal for every yyy (level −∞-\infty−∞); and there is N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 such that the level is real for all n≥Nn \ge Nn≥N. No value of sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is fixed: the goal asserts the shape of the optimal policy only.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. LLL is convex (p. 21).
  2. Every fnf_nfn​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, is convex (p. 19, property (c)).
  3. Every fnf_nfn​ is differentiable with −(c+b)≤fn′≤h/(1−α)-(c+b) \le f_n' \le h/(1-\alpha)−(c+b)≤fn′​≤h/(1−α) (p. 20).
  4. Property (b): given an optimal real level sss for horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, fn′=−c+L′f_n' = -c + L'fn′​=−c+L′ below sss and fn′=L′+α∫0∞fn−1′(⋅−x)g(x) dxf_n' = L' + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}'(\cdot - x)g(x)\,dxfn′​=L′+α∫0∞​fn−1′​(⋅−x)g(x)dx from sss on (p. 19).
  5. Given such a level, Fn(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0F_n(w) \to (1-\alpha)c - b\alpha < 0Fn​(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0 as w→−∞w \to -\inftyw→−∞ (p. 19).
  6. Property (a): optimal real levels are nondecreasing in the horizon, sn∗≤sn+1∗s_n^* \le s_{n+1}^*sn∗​≤sn+1∗​ (p. 18).

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-dimensional control problem, a choice of order quantity for every possible inventory position, to one number per period. Every later chapter of the book (Palm's theorem for (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) policies, METRIC-type stock level optimization, allocation in multi-echelon systems) parameterizes policies by such stock levels; this is where the book justifies that parameterization.

The result is classical and proved in many texts. On Prove2Me the mission produces a machine-checked finite-horizon version with a continuous demand density, including the calculus the proof needs: convexity of an expected cost defined by integrals against a density, differentiation under the integral sign in the recursion, and the one-sided behaviour of the value function at the order-up-to level. Existing platform results on base-stock optimality (Veinott's multi-product model, advance demand information) use different models and different arguments; none covers this recursion.

Difficulty

The argument is an induction on nnn whose hypothesis carries convexity, the derivative formula (b), and bounds on fn′f_n'fn′​. The delicate step is the existence of a finite root of FnF_nFn​: its limit at −∞-\infty−∞ depends on whether the previous level was finite. For n=1n = 1n=1 nothing is ordered and the limit is c−bαc - b\alphac−bα, which the assumption b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c does not make negative. The book's base case ("left to the reader") therefore fails when c>αbc > \alpha bc>αb: with α=12\alpha = \tfrac12α=21​, c=1c = 1c=1, b=32b = \tfrac32b=23​ the two-period problem never orders. The goal is corrected accordingly.

Two properties the book's induction also carries are not usable as printed. Property (d), fn′≤fn−1′f_n' \le f_{n-1}'fn′​≤fn−1′​, is false: for large yyy, fn′(y)f_n'(y)fn′​(y) approaches h(1+α+⋯+αn−1)h(1 + \alpha + \dots + \alpha^{n-1})h(1+α+⋯+αn−1), which increases with nnn. The second-derivative clause of property (c) fails at y=0y = 0y=0 whenever g(0+)>0g(0^+) > 0g(0+)>0. A solver cannot follow the printed induction step for step; property (a), which the book derives from (d), is true and is a milestone in its own right.

Formalization scope

  • Horizon. The book states Theorem 2 for "the optimal policy" without a horizon. Its proof is an induction on a finite horizon, and the passage n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ is left as a conjecture (p. 21). The goal is the finite-horizon theorem; no infinite-horizon value function is constructed.
  • Lead time. The proof sets τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 "to simplify notation"; so does the formalization. Theorem 1 (dependence on the inventory position only) and Theorem 3 (general τ\tauτ, whose level equation is the conjectured infinite-horizon one) are not stated.
  • Level −∞-\infty−∞. The goal allows "never order" as the order-up-to rule with level −∞-\infty−∞ and adds eventual finiteness; see Difficulty.
  • Added hypotheses. c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, h>0h > 0h>0 (the book uses lim⁡w→∞fn′(w−x)>0\lim_{w\to\infty} f_n'(w - x) > 0limw→∞​fn′​(w−x)>0), 0<α0 < \alpha0<α (the book divides by α\alphaα), and a finite mean ∫0∞x g(x) dx<∞\int_0^\infty x\,g(x)\,dx < \infty∫0∞​xg(x)dx<∞ (without it LLL is infinite). All are fields of Model, together with positivity and continuity of ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), ∫0∞g=1\int_0^\infty g = 1∫0∞​g=1, and b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c.
  • Minimum and derivatives. fnf_nfn​ is defined with the infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 of a nonnegative quantity; optimality is always against every u′≥0u' \ge 0u′≥0. Statements about fn′f_n'fn′​ assert differentiability (Differentiable, HasDerivAt) and do not read deriv as evidence of it.
  • Levels. The book's sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is "the unique solution of (2.6)"; milestones take any real level at which the order-up-to rule is optimal.

A recursion in which ordering is restricted to order-up-to rules, or in which fnf_nfn​ is defined through sn∗s_n^*sn∗​, would make the goal a tautology; here fnf_nfn​ is defined by minimization over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 and optimality is checked against all orders.

Needed infrastructure: convexity and differentiation of parametric integrals against a density on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and minimization of a differentiable convex function over a half-line. Both are reusable for the other stochastic inventory missions on the platform. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI).
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris and J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906814
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains V: Marginal Allocation and Risk PoolingTextbook

Motivation

Service parts networks (spare parts for aircraft, military systems, industrial equipment) hold stock at several echelons: a depot, intermediate stocking facilities, and bases or warehouses that face demand. Two questions recur in their planning. First, how should a given amount of stock be split among locations whose expected costs are convex in the stock they hold? Second, does adding an echelon, a depot that pools the demand of several warehouses, raise or lower the stock the system needs?

Chapter 7 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879), treats both. For the second it follows Eppen and Schrage (1981, reference [78] of the book): with normal demands, a depot that places orders every period and allocates stock so that all warehouses face the same stockout probability reduces the choice of system stock to a single critical-fractile equation. For the first, the chapter's multi-echelon pooling model (Section 7.3) evaluates nested cost functions of the form "holding and shortage cost plus the minimum over allocations of a sum of convex costs", and its appendix (Section 7.4) gives the marginal allocation algorithm AllocOpt that computes these minima exactly for every stock level at once.

Marginal analysis for separable convex resource allocation is classical (Fox, Management Science, 1966); the monograph of Ibaraki and Katoh (MIT Press, 1988) surveys it.

Setting

Allocation data (Section 7.4). There is a set M={1,…,Mˉ}M = \{1, \dots, \bar M\}M={1,…,Mˉ} of locations and an augmented set M0={0}∪MM_0 = \{0\} \cup MM0​={0}∪M. Each location m∈M0m \in M_0m∈M0​ has integer gridpoints 0=r0m<r1m<⋯<rn(m)m0 = r^m_0 < r^m_1 < \dots < r^m_{n(m)}0=r0m​<r1m​<⋯<rn(m)m​. For m∈Mm \in Mm∈M, the value cnmc^m_ncnm​ of a convex function is given at each gridpoint. The slopes (7.19) are c^nm=(cn+1m−cnm)/(rn+1m−rnm)\hat c^m_n = (c^m_{n+1} - c^m_n)/(r^m_{n+1} - r^m_n)c^nm​=(cn+1m​−cnm​)/(rn+1m​−rnm​) for n<n(m)n < n(m)n<n(m), and c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ repeats the last one. The piecewise linear approximation C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ of (7.20)–(7.21) interpolates the values cnmc^m_ncnm​ at the gridpoints and continues with slope c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ beyond the last one. A convex function fff on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ is also given.

The allocation optimization (7.22) asks, for each n∈N0={0,…,n(0)}n \in N_0 = \{0, \dots, n(0)\}n∈N0​={0,…,n(0)}, for

cn0=f(rn0)+min⁡{∑m∈MC~m(rm):rm≥0 integer, ∑m∈Mrm=rn0}.c^0_n = f(r^0_n) + \min\Bigl\{ \sum_{m \in M} \tilde C_m(r_m) : r_m \ge 0 \text{ integer},\ \sum_{m \in M} r_m = r^0_n \Bigr\}.cn0​=f(rn0​)+min{m∈M∑​C~m​(rm​):rm​≥0 integer, m∈M∑​rm​=rn0​}.

Algorithm AllocOpt (Definition 4) keeps a current gridpoint index n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) and allocation r∗(m)r^*(m)r∗(m) per location. For each increment rn0−rn−10r^0_n - r^0_{n-1}rn0​−rn−10​ of the target, it repeatedly gives units to a location m∗m^*m∗ whose current slope c^n∗(m∗)m∗\hat c^{m^*}_{n^*(m^*)}c^n∗(m∗)m∗​ is minimal, up to that location's next gridpoint, and records the accumulated cost.

Pooling system (Section 7.2.1). One depot supplies mmm warehouses. The demand djtd_{jt}djt​ at warehouse jjj in period ttt is normal with mean μj\mu_jμj​ and variance σj2\sigma_j^2σj2​, independent across periods and warehouses. The supplier-to-depot lead time is DDD periods, the depot-to-warehouse lead time AAA periods, and holding and backorder costs h,bh, bh,b are equal at all warehouses. Positions IjI_jIj​ are in balance when Φ((Ij−Aμj)/(A σj))\Phi((I_j - A\mu_j)/(\sqrt A\,\sigma_j))Φ((Ij​−Aμj​)/(A​σj​)) is the same for all jjj. For system inventory position sss, with Y0Y_0Y0​ the system demand over DDD periods and YjY_jYj​ the demand at jjj over the next A+1A + 1A+1 periods, the balanced allocation gives each warehouse a share proportional to σj\sigma_jσj​, and zjz_jzj​ is its end-of-period net inventory.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (correctness)

For every tie-breaking rule in its arg min steps, AllocOpt returns values cn0c^0_ncn0​ that satisfy (7.22) for every n∈N0n \in N_0n∈N0​: some feasible integer allocation attains cn0−f(rn0)c^0_n - f(r^0_n)cn0​−f(rn0​), and no feasible integer allocation does better.

Milestones

  1. Slope monotonicity (p. 178): c^nm≥c^n−1m\hat c^m_n \ge \hat c^m_{n-1}c^nm​≥c^n−1m​ for 0<n≤n(m)0 < n \le n(m)0<n≤n(m).
  2. Convexity of C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (proof of Proposition 2, p. 179).
  3. Remark 2 (p. 179): with the inner loop run only while the current slope is ≤0\le 0≤0, AllocOpt solves (7.22) with ∑mrm≤rn0\sum_m r_m \le r^0_n∑m​rm​≤rn0​.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 152): if the positions are in balance and
∑jdj,t−1≥max⁡i{∑j≠idj,t+D−1+di,t+D−1(1−∑jσjσi)},\sum_{j} d_{j,t-1} \ge \max_{i} \Bigl\{ \sum_{j \ne i} d_{j,t+D-1} + d_{i,t+D-1}\Bigl(1 - \frac{\sum_j \sigma_j}{\sigma_i}\Bigr)\Bigr\},j∑​dj,t−1​≥imax​{j=i∑​dj,t+D−1​+di,t+D−1​(1−σi​∑j​σj​​)},

then a nonnegative allocation of the arriving ∑jdj,t−1\sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​dj,t−1​ units restores balance. 5. Net inventory law (pp. 156–157): zjz_jzj​ is normal with mean (s−(D+A+1)∑iμi) σj/∑iσi(s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i)\,\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i(s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​)σj​/∑i​σi​ and variance (A+1)σj2+(σj/∑iσi)2D∑iσi2(A + 1)\sigma_j^2 + (\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i)^2 D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)σj2​+(σj​/∑i​σi​)2D∑i​σi2​. 6. Critical fractile (pp. 157–158): sss minimizes ∑jE[h(zj)++b(zj)−]\sum_j E[h (z_j)^+ + b (z_j)^-]∑j​E[h(zj​)++b(zj​)−] if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h), where

z=s−(D+A+1)∑iμi[(A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2]1/2.z = \frac{s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i}{\bigl[(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2\bigr]^{1/2}}.z=[(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​]1/2s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​​.

Significance

The goal certifies an algorithm that the chapter uses as a subroutine three times: in the pool cost (7.14), the subsystem cost (7.15) and the system cost (7.17), and hence in the claim of Section 7.3 that the system-wide cost function can be computed in time nlog⁡nn \log nnlogn in the number of locations. Because AllocOpt produces the whole vector (cn0)n∈N0(c^0_n)_{n \in N_0}(cn0​)n∈N0​​ in one pass, its correctness gives the nested value functions at every gridpoint of the next echelon, which is what allows the recursion up the echelons. The Eppen–Schrage milestones give the classical quantitative form of risk pooling: the system stock is set by one critical fractile, and the standard deviation term (A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​ is what the book compares with the single-warehouse and the decentralized systems.

On formalization: the book states Proposition 2 with a two-sentence argument and Remark 2 without proof. The Eppen–Schrage computations are displayed derivations. None of these results has a machine-checked proof on the platform. A verified AllocOpt, stated for an explicit algorithm rather than for an abstract greedy procedure, is reusable for any separable convex integer allocation with a sum constraint.

Difficulty

The usual greedy exchange argument assumes that units are allocated one at a time. AllocOpt allocates in blocks, up to the next gridpoint of the chosen location, and it carries its state across successive targets rn−10→rn0r^0_{n-1} \to r^0_nrn−10​→rn0​ without restarting. The proof must therefore show that the state after each outer step is itself an optimal allocation for the current target, and that block moves never step past a breakpoint where the arg min would change. The slopes can be negative, and the equality constraint forces allocation even when every marginal cost is positive. Remark 2 needs an additional argument: under the inequality constraint the loop may stop before uuu reaches zero, and that point is optimal only because the slopes are nondecreasing.

For the pooling results, the balanced allocation mixes the depot-lead-time demand Y0Y_0Y0​ of all warehouses with the local demand YjY_jYj​, and the Gaussian law of zjz_jzj​ rests on the independence of disjoint blocks of periods. The fractile statement requires strict monotonicity of each warehouse's expected cost derivative in sss, not only a first-order condition.

Formalization scope

  • Indices and types. Locations of MMM are Fin Mbar; gridpoints are integers, values and slopes real numbers; allocations are functions Fin Mbar → ℕ. The standing assumptions of Section 7.4 form the predicate WellFormed: Mˉ≥1\bar M \ge 1Mˉ≥1, n(m)≥1n(m) \ge 1n(m)≥1 for m∈Mm \in Mm∈M (a slope (7.19) needs two gridpoints), gridpoints starting at 000 and strictly increasing at every location of M0M_0M0​, each cnmc^m_ncnm​ the value of a function convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and fff convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞).
  • The minimum in (7.22) is stated as attainment plus a lower bound over the finite, nonempty set of feasible integer allocations, never as an unconstrained infimum.
  • Ties. The book's arg min fixes no tie-breaking rule. Results are stated for every selection rule that returns a minimizing location.
  • Termination. AllocOpt is a total Lean function. The inner loop is given more passes than it can use, so it always exits through its own condition.
  • Not stated. The operation count of Proposition 2, O((1+log⁡2Mˉ)∑m∈M0n(m))O((1 + \log_2 \bar M)\sum_{m \in M_0} n(m))O((1+log2​Mˉ)∑m∈M0​​n(m)), and Proposition 1 and Remark 1 (p. 177) are operation counts with no machine model and are left out.
  • Corrections. The first expected-cost display on p. 157 has + b∫−∞0z dFzj(z)+\,b\int_{-\infty}^0 z\,dF_{z_j}(z)+b∫−∞0​zdFzj​​(z), which is negative. The formalization uses b E[(zj)−]b\,E[(z_j)^-]bE[(zj​)−], as in the book's next display.
  • Pinnings. Lemma 3 is deterministic: the demands are arbitrary reals, and "in balance following the allocation" means that some xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 with ∑jxj=∑jdj,t−1\sum_j x_j = \sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​xj​=∑j​dj,t−1​ exists. The critical-fractile milestone is the characterization "minimizer if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h)" of the book's "can be found by setting".
  • Trivialization ruled out. The allocation problem (7.22) is defined independently of the algorithm, as a minimum over explicit integer allocations, and the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are built from the data by (7.19)–(7.21). Neither (7.22) nor the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are defined as, or required to agree with, what AllocOpt returns.
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the invariants of AllocOpt, in particular that after each outer step the allocation r∗r^*r∗ is feasible for rn0r^0_nrn0​ with cost zzz and all slopes to the left of n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) are at most those to the right. Also Gaussian sum lemmas over finite index sets and a general newsvendor first-order characterization.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • G. D. Eppen and L. Schrage, "Centralized ordering policies in a multi-warehouse system with lead times and random demand", in L. B. Schwarz (ed.), Multi-Level Production/Inventory Control Systems: Theory and Practice, Studies in the Management Sciences, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 51–67.
  • G. D. Eppen, "Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem", Management Science 25(5), 1979, 498–501. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
  • B. Fox, "Discrete optimization via marginal analysis", Management Science 13(3), 1966, 210–216. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.13.3.210
  • T. Ibaraki and N. Katoh, Resource Allocation Problems: Algorithmic Approaches, MIT Press, 1988.
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Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior I: Numerical Utility from the Axioms of Preference and MixtureTextbook

Motivation

Game theory as von Neumann and Morgenstern built it measures every outcome by a single number, the utility a player attaches to it, and combines those numbers linearly when an outcome is uncertain: a lottery that yields uuu with probability α\alphaα and vvv with probability 1−α1-\alpha1−α is worth α v(u)+(1−α) v(v)\alpha\,\mathrm v(u) + (1-\alpha)\,\mathrm v(v)αv(u)+(1−α)v(v). Every later chapter of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior uses this without comment, from the value of a zero-sum game to the characteristic function of a coalition. Section 3 of the book justifies it: it states axioms on preferences and on the combination of alternatives with probabilities, and claims that they force utility to be a number, unique up to the choice of a zero and a unit. The proof, announced in 3.6.1 as "somewhat lengthy", was added as the Appendix The Axiomatic Treatment of Utility in the second edition (1947).

The result, the expected utility theorem, is the foundation of decision theory under risk and of expected-payoff reasoning in game theory, statistics and operations research. The axiomatics were later recast by Marschak (1950), Herstein and Milnor (1953) in the language of mixture spaces (Herstein–Milnor). This mission formalizes the original statement and its original proof structure.

Setting

A system of utilities (3.6.1) is an abstract set UUU of entities u,v,w,…u, v, w, \dotsu,v,w,…, together with

  1. a relation u>vu > vu>v ("uuu is preferable to vvv"); write u<vu < vu<v for v>uv > uv>u;
  2. for every number α\alphaα with 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, an operation producing an element written αu+(1−α)v\alpha u + (1-\alpha) vαu+(1−α)v of UUU from u,v∈Uu, v \in Uu,v∈U.

The axioms are:

  • (3:A) >>> is a complete ordering: (3:A:a) for any u,vu, vu,v exactly one of u=vu = vu=v, u>vu > vu>v, u<vu < vu<v holds; (3:A:b) u>vu > vu>v, v>wv > wv>w imply u>wu > wu>w.
  • (3:B) Ordering and combining: (3:B:a) u<vu < vu<v implies u<αu+(1−α)vu < \alpha u + (1-\alpha)vu<αu+(1−α)v; (3:B:b) u>vu > vu>v implies u>αu+(1−α)vu > \alpha u + (1-\alpha)vu>αu+(1−α)v; (3:B:c) u<w<vu < w < vu<w<v implies αu+(1−α)v<w\alpha u + (1-\alpha)v < wαu+(1−α)v<w for some α\alphaα; (3:B:d) u>w>vu > w > vu>w>v implies αu+(1−α)v>w\alpha u + (1-\alpha)v > wαu+(1−α)v>w for some α\alphaα.
  • (3:C) Algebra of combining: (3:C:a) αu+(1−α)v=(1−α)v+αu\alpha u + (1-\alpha)v = (1-\alpha)v + \alpha uαu+(1−α)v=(1−α)v+αu; (3:C:b) α(βu+(1−β)v)+(1−α)v=γu+(1−γ)v\alpha(\beta u + (1-\beta)v) + (1-\alpha)v = \gamma u + (1-\gamma)vα(βu+(1−β)v)+(1−α)v=γu+(1−γ)v with γ=αβ\gamma = \alpha\betaγ=αβ.

All weights lie strictly between 000 and 111, and === is identity. The expression αu+(1−α)v\alpha u + (1-\alpha)vαu+(1−α)v is notation for an abstract operation: UUU carries no linear structure. The Appendix mostly writes the operation as (1−γ)u+γv(1-\gamma)u + \gamma v(1−γ)u+γv, and writes u≦vu \leqq vu≦v for "u=vu = vu=v or u<vu < vu<v". In the Lean development the system is the structure UtilitySystem U with fields gt and mix; S.cmb γ u v is (1−γ)u+γv(1-\gamma)u + \gamma v(1−γ)u+γv.

A numerical utility (3.5.1) is a map v:U→R\mathrm v : U \to \mathbb Rv:U→R with

(i)u>v  ⟹  v(u)>v(v),(ii)v((1−γ)u+γv)=(1−γ)v(u)+γ v(v)(0<γ<1).\text{(i)}\quad u > v \implies \mathrm v(u) > \mathrm v(v), \qquad \text{(ii)}\quad \mathrm v\big((1-\gamma)u + \gamma v\big) = (1-\gamma)\mathrm v(u) + \gamma\,\mathrm v(v) \quad (0<\gamma<1).(i)u>v⟹v(u)>v(v),(ii)v((1−γ)u+γv)=(1−γ)v(u)+γv(v)(0<γ<1).

Formalization targets

Goal: (A:V) and (A:W), p. 627

For every system of utilities satisfying (3:A)–(3:C):

∃ v:U→R with (i), (ii),and∀ v,v′ with (i), (ii): ∃ ω0>0, ω1, ∀w,  v′(w)=ω0 v(w)+ω1.\exists\, \mathrm v : U \to \mathbb R \ \text{with (i), (ii)}, \qquad\text{and}\qquad \forall\, \mathrm v, \mathrm v' \text{ with (i), (ii)}:\ \exists\, \omega_0 > 0,\ \omega_1,\ \forall w,\ \ \mathrm v'(w) = \omega_0\,\mathrm v(w) + \omega_1 .∃v:U→R with (i), (ii),and∀v,v′ with (i), (ii): ∃ω0​>0, ω1​, ∀w,  v′(w)=ω0​v(w)+ω1​.

The constants ω0,ω1\omega_0, \omega_1ω0​,ω1​ are chosen before www. No assumption on the size of UUU is made.

Milestones

The milestones follow the Appendix's own chain:

  • (A:A) if u<vu < vu<v and α<β\alpha < \betaα<β then (1−α)u+αv<(1−β)u+βv(1-\alpha)u + \alpha v < (1-\beta)u + \beta v(1−α)u+αv<(1−β)u+βv;
  • (A:B), (A:C) for u0<v0u_0 < v_0u0​<v0​, the map α↦(1−α)u0+αv0\alpha \mapsto (1-\alpha)u_0 + \alpha v_0α↦(1−α)u0​+αv0​ is a one-to-one, monotone map of (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) onto the utility interval u0<w<v0u_0 < w < v_0u0​<w<v0​;
  • (A:E), (A:F) the interval function fu0,v0f_{u_0,v_0}fu0​,v0​​ of (A:D) (value 000 at u0u_0u0​, 111 at v0v_0v0​, and the weight α\alphaα in between) is monotone and linear toward each endpoint, and is characterized by these properties;
  • (A:R), (A:S) for fixed u∗<v∗u^* < v^*u∗<v∗, the normalized mapping hhh with h(u∗)=0h(u^*) = 0h(u∗)=0, h(v∗)=1h(v^*) = 1h(v∗)=1, monotone, and linear on combinations of u<vu < vu<v, exists and is unique;
  • (A:T) (1−γ)u+γu=u(1-\gamma)u + \gamma u = u(1−γ)u+γu=u always;
  • (A:U) hhh is linear on all combinations, without the restriction u<vu < vu<v.

Significance

The theorem turns an ordinal preference over uncertain prospects into a cardinal scale on which expectation is meaningful. It is what licenses replacing a player's preferences by numerical payoffs whose mixtures are averaged, which the rest of the book, and most of game theory and stochastic optimization after it, assumes. The uniqueness part (A:W) states exactly how much freedom the scale has: a positive linear transformation, i.e. zero and unit may be fixed at will and nothing else.

The theorem has been proved many times since 1947, in textbooks and in the mixture-space literature, but the book's axiom system differs from the later ones (it uses a strict order with identity, strict monotony, and the two algebraic axioms (3:C) only). As far as the curators know, neither this axiom system nor the Appendix's derivation has a machine-checked proof, and Mathlib has no mixture-space or expected-utility module. The mission produces a checked proof of the original theorem under its original hypotheses and a reusable abstract mixture-space layer.

Difficulty

The obvious argument treats UUU as a convex set and αu+(1−α)v\alpha u + (1-\alpha)vαu+(1−α)v as a convex combination, then reads the utility off the segment between two reference points. None of that is available. The operation is formal, so identities that hold in a vector space, idempotence (1−γ)u+γu=u(1-\gamma)u + \gamma u = u(1−γ)u+γu=u included, must be derived from (3:B) and (3:C) alone; only one associativity rule (3:C:b), for a repeated right argument, is given. The correspondence between a utility interval and a numerical interval requires the continuity axioms (3:B:c), (3:B:d) and the completeness of the reals. The local scales on different intervals have to be fitted into one global function, and the linearity for pairs u>vu > vu>v and u=vu = vu=v has to be recovered from the case u<vu < vu<v.

Formalization scope

  • UUU is an arbitrary type (Type*); the relation is gt : U → U → Prop and the operation mix : OpenUnit → U → U → U, where OpenUnit is the subtype (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) of R\mathbb RR. mix α u v stands for αu+(1−α)v\alpha u + (1-\alpha)vαu+(1−α)v. The operation is not defined at α=0,1\alpha = 0, 1α=0,1 (3.6.1, footnote 4) and is not extended there.
  • Axiom (3:A:a) is stated literally ("exactly one of the three relations"), so the order is a strict total order and indifference is identity (A.1.2). The weak-order generalization of §66 is not this theorem.
  • Numbers are real numbers. Monotony is strict, as in (3:1:a).
  • Standing hypotheses: every item assumes (3:A)–(3:C), bundled in UtilitySystem. The items from (A:E) on assume fixed u0<v0u_0 < v_0u0​<v0​ or u∗<v∗u^* < v^*u∗<v∗ as explicit hypotheses, as the book does "from now on until we get to (A:V) and (A:W)"; the goal does not, since (A:V), (A:W) hold for every UUU.
  • The interval function fu0,v0f_{u_0,v_0}fu0​,v0​​ is a total Lean function; its value outside u0≦w≦v0u_0 \leqq w \leqq v_0u0​≦w≦v0​ is a placeholder that no statement uses.
  • A formalization in which UUU is a convex subset of a vector space, or a space of probability measures, assumes more than the book and makes (A:T) free; it does not count. Neither does a weak monotony, under which constant maps satisfy (A:V) and (A:W) fails.

A complete development needs only order theory and the completeness of the reals from Mathlib. The mixture-space layer (the structure, (A:A)–(A:C), (A:T)) is reusable for any later work on expected utility, including the generalization in §66 and 67 of the book. Proofs of any milestone, alternative routes to the goal (for instance through the Herstein–Milnor axioms, once shown to follow from (3:A)–(3:C)), and statements of the omitted intermediate results (A:G)–(A:Q) are all welcome.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), §3 and Appendix. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • I. N. Herstein, J. Milnor, An axiomatic approach to measurable utility, Econometrica 21 (1953), 291–297. https://doi.org/10.2307/1905540
  • J. Marschak, Rational behavior, uncertain prospects, and measurable utility, Econometrica 18 (1950), 111–141. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907264
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior II: Games with Perfect Information Are Strictly DeterminedTextbook

Motivation

Chess, checkers, Go and Backgammon share a feature that card games such as Poker lack: whenever a player moves, the player knows everything that has happened so far. von Neumann and Morgenstern call this perfect information and devote §15 of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) to it. Their result is that such a game, viewed as a zero-sum two-person game, is strictly determined: it has a value that each player can secure with a pure strategy, without any randomization. For Chess this means that exactly one of three statements is true: White can force a win, Black can force a win, or both can force at least a draw ((15:D:a)–(15:D:c)).

Timeline. Zermelo (1913, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels) showed for Chess that either one side can force a win or both can avoid losing; his argument is not phrased in terms of strategies and a value, and was later corrected and completed by König (1927) and Kalmár (1928/29). von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, §15) proved strict determinateness for every finite zero-sum two-person game with perfect information, including chance moves (15.7.1), and gave the explicit formula (15:12) for the value. Kuhn (1953, Extensive games and the problem of information, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28) recast games in tree form and extended the pure-strategy existence result to general-sum games with perfect information (subgame-perfect equilibria by backward induction).

Setting

A game tree Γ\GammaΓ is a finite rooted tree. Each leaf is a finished play π\piπ and carries the payoff F1(π)∈R\mathfrak F_1(\pi) \in \mathbb RF1​(π)∈R to player 1; player 2 receives −F1(π)-\mathfrak F_1(\pi)−F1​(π). Each internal node is a move M\mathfrak MM of one of three kinds kkk, with alternatives σ=1,…,α\sigma = 1, \dots, \alphaσ=1,…,α leading to subtrees Γσ\Gamma_\sigmaΓσ​:

  • k=0k = 0k=0, a chance move, where alternative σ\sigmaσ occurs with probability p(σ)≧0p(\sigma) \geqq 0p(σ)≧0, ∑σp(σ)=1\sum_\sigma p(\sigma) = 1∑σ​p(σ)=1;
  • k=1k = 1k=1, a personal move of player 1, with α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1;
  • k=2k = 2k=2, a personal move of player 2, with α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1.

A pure strategy τ1\tau_1τ1​ of player 1 is a complete plan choosing an alternative at every node of kind 1; τ2\tau_2τ2​ does the same at every node of kind 2. The normalized form H(τ1,τ2)\mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)H(τ1​,τ2​) is the expected payoff to player 1, the expectation being over the chance moves. With the maxima and minima taken over the finitely many pure strategies,

v1=Max⁡τ1Min⁡τ2H(τ1,τ2),v2=Min⁡τ2Max⁡τ1H(τ1,τ2).v_1 = \operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1} \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2), \qquad v_2 = \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2} \operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2).v1​=Maxτ1​​Minτ2​​H(τ1​,τ2​),v2​=Minτ2​​Maxτ1​​H(τ1​,τ2​).

Always v1≦v2v_1 \leqq v_2v1​≦v2​; the game is strictly determined when v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​ (14.4.2).

For a function f(σ1)f(\sigma_1)f(σ1​) of the alternatives of the first move M1\mathfrak M_1M1​, of kind k1k_1k1​, the operation Mσ1k1M^{k_1}_{\sigma_1}Mσ1​k1​​ of (15:8) is ∑σ1p1(σ1)f(σ1)\sum_{\sigma_1} p_1(\sigma_1) f(\sigma_1)∑σ1​​p1​(σ1​)f(σ1​), Max⁡σ1f(σ1)\operatorname{Max}_{\sigma_1} f(\sigma_1)Maxσ1​​f(σ1​) or Min⁡σ1f(σ1)\operatorname{Min}_{\sigma_1} f(\sigma_1)Minσ1​​f(σ1​) for k1=0,1,2k_1 = 0, 1, 2k1​=0,1,2. Applying these operations from the leaves back to the root gives the backward-induction value v(Γ)v(\Gamma)v(Γ).

Formalization targets

Goal: 15.6.1 with (15:12)

For every finite game tree Γ\GammaΓ,

v1=v2=v=Mσ1k1Mσ2k2(σ1)⋯Mσνkν(σ1,…,σν−1)F1(π(σ1,…,σν)).v_1 = v_2 = v = M^{k_1}_{\sigma_1} M^{k_2(\sigma_1)}_{\sigma_2} \cdots M^{k_\nu(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\nu-1})}_{\sigma_\nu} \mathfrak F_1(\pi(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_\nu)).v1​=v2​=v=Mσ1​k1​​Mσ2​k2​(σ1​)​⋯Mσν​kν​(σ1​,…,σν−1​)​F1​(π(σ1​,…,σν​)).

Both the equality v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​ and the value formula are part of the goal.

Milestones

  • (13:E): for finite nonempty domains and fff ranging over all functions of xxx, Max⁡xMin⁡fψ(x,f(x))=Min⁡fMax⁡xψ(x,f(x))\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_f \psi(x, f(x)) = \operatorname{Min}_f \operatorname{Max}_x \psi(x, f(x))Maxx​Minf​ψ(x,f(x))=Minf​Maxx​ψ(x,f(x)); and (13:G): Max⁡xMin⁡fψ(x,f(x))=Max⁡xMin⁡uψ(x,u)\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_f \psi(x, f(x)) = \operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_u \psi(x, u)Maxx​Minf​ψ(x,f(x))=Maxx​Minu​ψ(x,u).
  • (15:2)–(15:7): vk=Mσ1k1vσ1/kv_k = M^{k_1}_{\sigma_1} v_{\sigma_1/k}vk​=Mσ1​k1​​vσ1​/k​ for k=1,2k = 1, 2k=1,2, one milestone for each kind of first move, without assuming that any game is strictly determined.
  • (15:C:a): a game of length 000 is strictly determined with value www; (15:C:b): if every Γσ1\Gamma_{\sigma_1}Γσ1​​ is strictly determined, so is Γ\GammaΓ.
  • (15:13), (15:D:a)–(15:D:c): for games without chance moves whose plays end in 1,0,−11, 0, -11,0,−1, the value is one of these three numbers, and it decides which player can force a win or whether both can force a tie.

Significance

The theorem is the first existence result for the value of a class of games in pure strategies. It shows that the whole difficulty of the general zero-sum two-person game, the need for mixed strategies (§17), comes from imperfect information. It gives a construction as well as an existence proof: the value and optimal strategies are computed by backward induction, the procedure behind retrograde analysis of endgames, minimax search in game-playing programs, and the dynamic programming recursions of sequential decision problems with an adversary. The Chess trichotomy (15:D) is its best-known consequence.

Formalizing it adds a checked account of the passage from the extensive to the normalized form for a whole class of games, which the book carries out informally (15.4.2, 15.5.1: "the reader may verify it from the formalistic point of view"). The result is classical and fully proved in the book; the work is to formalize that proof on a tree model. Mathlib has saddle points (Order/SaddlePoint) and the minimax theorem for continuous functions (Topology/Sion), but no game trees, strategies of extensive games, or backward induction. No machine-checked version of this theorem with chance moves and the normalized form over complete plans is known to the mission.

Difficulty

The recursions (15:2)–(15:7) are not formal consequences of the definitions: v1v_1v1​ and v2v_2v2​ are extrema over whole plans of Γ\GammaΓ, while the right-hand sides are extrema over plans of the separate games Γσ1\Gamma_{\sigma_1}Γσ1​​. At a personal move of player 1, v2=Max⁡σ1vσ1/2v_2 = \operatorname{Max}_{\sigma_1} v_{\sigma_1/2}v2​=Maxσ1​​vσ1​/2​ requires interchanging a Min over player 2's plans, which are functions of player 1's first choice, with a Max over that choice: this is exactly (13:E), a max-min equality that fails for general functions of two variables and holds here because the minimizing variable is a function of the maximizing one. A proof that treats the Max over τ1\tau_1τ1​ and the Min over τ2\tau_2τ2​ as interchangeable without this step is circular.

A second difficulty is the strategy spaces themselves. A complete plan chooses at nodes the plan itself excludes, so the pure strategies of Γ\GammaΓ are not simply pairs of a first choice and one strategy of the chosen subgame; the identification the book uses in 15.5.1 has to be justified by showing that the extra coordinates do not change H\mathcal HH.

Formalization scope

A game is an inductive type GameTree with constructors leaf w, chance α p next hp hsum, move1 α hα next, move2 α hα next; alternatives are Fin α (numbered from 000). The conditions p≧0p \geqq 0p≧0, ∑p=1\sum p = 1∑p=1 and α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1 at personal moves are constructor fields, so every tree is a legitimate game. Pure strategies are dependent types Strategy1 t, Strategy2 t defined by recursion on the tree (complete plans), with Fintype and Nonempty instances; H\mathcal HH is payoff t τ₁ τ₂, the expected leaf payoff; v1, v2 are Finset.sup'/Finset.inf' over all strategies, so every Max and Min is attained.

Standing hypotheses and conventions taken from the book:

  • finite strategy sets and attained extrema (13.2.1, 14.1.1): finite trees with finitely many alternatives at every move;
  • perfect information, i.e. preliminarity equals anteriority (6.4.1, (15:B)): built into the tree model, which is the sequence of games (15:1);
  • zero-sum two-person (15.3.1): one payoff F1\mathfrak F_1F1​, player 2 receives −F1-\mathfrak F_1−F1​ and minimizes H\mathcal HH;
  • chance probabilities nonnegative and summing to one (15.4.2, 10.1.1); α≧1\alpha \geqq 1α≧1 at every move;
  • (15:D) additionally assumes no chance moves and outcomes 1,0,−11, 0, -11,0,−1 (15.7.1).

The book's formal model is the set-theoretic one of §§9–10, with partitions of the set of plays; the tree restates it for the perfect-information case and does not formalize §§9–10. The book fixes one length ν\nuν for all plays; trees with plays of different lengths contain the book's games as a special case, so the goal is at least as strong as the book's theorem.

Strategies are plans, never responses: a strategy of player 1 is fixed before play and cannot depend on player 2's strategy, which would make v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​ trivial. Chance moves are part of the goal; a version without them proves only the Chess case and is weaker than the book.

Reusable beyond this mission: the tree model, its strategy types and the normalized form, which later chapters on extensive games can import. Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, and a lemma identifying the strategies of Γ\GammaΓ with the book's recursive description (15.4.2, 15.5.1).

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §§6, 11, 13–15. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • E. Zermelo, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, Proc. Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, vol. II, 1913, pp. 501–504.
  • U. Schwalbe, P. Walker, Zermelo and the early history of game theory, Games and Economic Behavior 34 (2001), 123–137. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0794
  • H. W. Kuhn, Extensive games and the problem of information, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton, 1953, 193–216. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior III: Mixed Strategies, the Minimax Theorem and Good StrategiesTextbook

Motivation

A zero-sum two-person game in normalized form is a real matrix H(τ1,τ2)\mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)H(τ1​,τ2​): player 1 chooses a row τ1\tau_1τ1​, player 2 simultaneously chooses a column τ2\tau_2τ2​, and player 2 pays player 1 the amount H(τ1,τ2)\mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)H(τ1​,τ2​). Matrix games are the base case of non-cooperative game theory, the prototype of every minimax statement in optimization, statistics (Wald's decision theory) and online learning, and, through their equivalence with linear programming, a standard tool of operations research.

Chapter III of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; third edition 1953) gives the book's complete solution of these games. Timeline:

  • 1928. J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Math. Annalen 100, proves that every matrix game has a value in mixed strategies (the minimax theorem), by a topological argument. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • 1937. von Neumann's growth-model paper gives a second proof via a fixed-point argument, later generalized by Kakutani (1941).
  • 1938. J. Ville gives the first elementary proof, based on convexity.
  • 1944. The Theory of Games presents Ville's route: a theorem of the alternative for matrices (§16) yields the minimax theorem (17:6), from which §17 derives the structure of the sets of good strategies.
  • 1951. Gale, Kuhn and Tucker, and Dantzig, relate matrix games to linear-programming duality.

Setting

Player 1 has β1≥1\beta_1 \ge 1β1​≥1 pure strategies τ1\tau_1τ1​, player 2 has β2≥1\beta_2 \ge 1β2​≥1 pure strategies τ2\tau_2τ2​, and H\mathcal HH is an arbitrary real β1×β2\beta_1 \times \beta_2β1​×β2​ matrix (14.1.1). A mixed strategy of player 1 is a probability vector ξ\xiξ in the simplex

Sβ1={ξ∈Rβ1:ξτ1≥0, ∑τ1ξτ1=1},S_{\beta_1} = \Big\{ \xi \in \mathbb R^{\beta_1} : \xi_{\tau_1} \ge 0,\ \sum_{\tau_1} \xi_{\tau_1} = 1 \Big\},Sβ1​​={ξ∈Rβ1​:ξτ1​​≥0, τ1​∑​ξτ1​​=1},

and similarly η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​ for player 2. The pure strategy τ\tauτ is the coordinate vector δτ\delta^{\tau}δτ. The expected payoff is the bilinear form (17:2)

K(ξ,η)=∑τ1=1β1∑τ2=1β2H(τ1,τ2) ξτ1ητ2.K(\xi, \eta) = \sum_{\tau_1=1}^{\beta_1} \sum_{\tau_2=1}^{\beta_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\, \xi_{\tau_1} \eta_{\tau_2}.K(ξ,η)=τ1​=1∑β1​​τ2​=1∑β2​​H(τ1​,τ2​)ξτ1​​ητ2​​.

The good strategies of player 1 form the set Aˉ\bar AAˉ of those ξ∈Sβ1\xi \in S_{\beta_1}ξ∈Sβ1​​ at which Min⁡ηK(ξ,η)\operatorname{Min}_\eta K(\xi, \eta)Minη​K(ξ,η) assumes its maximum; those of player 2 form the set Bˉ\bar BBˉ of those η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​ at which Max⁡ξK(ξ,η)\operatorname{Max}_\xi K(\xi, \eta)Maxξ​K(ξ,η) assumes its minimum ((17:B:a), (17:B:b)). A saddle point of KKK is a pair with K(ξ′,η)≤K(ξ,η)≤K(ξ,η′)K(\xi', \eta) \le K(\xi, \eta) \le K(\xi, \eta')K(ξ′,η)≤K(ξ,η)≤K(ξ,η′) for all ξ′,η′\xi', \eta'ξ′,η′. With pure strategies alone one has v1=Max⁡τ1Min⁡τ2Hv_1 = \operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1}\operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2}\mathcal Hv1​=Maxτ1​​Minτ2​​H and v2=Min⁡τ2Max⁡τ1Hv_2 = \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2}\operatorname{Max}_{\tau_1}\mathcal Hv2​=Minτ2​​Maxτ1​​H; the game is specially strictly determined when v1=v2v_1 = v_2v1​=v2​.

For a general real function ϕ(x,y)\phi(x, y)ϕ(x,y) (§13) the same notions are Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ, Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMiny​Maxx​ϕ, saddle points, and the sets AϕA^\phiAϕ (maximizers of Min⁡yϕ\operatorname{Min}_y \phiMiny​ϕ) and BϕB^\phiBϕ (minimizers of Max⁡xϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \phiMaxx​ϕ), always under the book's standing hypothesis that these maxima and minima exist.

Formalization targets

Goal: (17:D), good strategies characterized by their supports

For all ξ∈Sβ1\xi \in S_{\beta_1}ξ∈Sβ1​​ and η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​: ξ∈Aˉ\xi \in \bar Aξ∈Aˉ and η∈Bˉ\eta \in \bar Bη∈Bˉ if and only if

ξτ1=0 whenever ∑τ2H(τ1,τ2)ητ2<max⁡τ1′∑τ2H(τ1′,τ2)ητ2,\xi_{\tau_1} = 0 \text{ whenever } \sum_{\tau_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\eta_{\tau_2} < \max_{\tau_1'} \sum_{\tau_2} \mathcal H(\tau_1', \tau_2)\eta_{\tau_2},ξτ1​​=0 whenever τ2​∑​H(τ1​,τ2​)ητ2​​<τ1′​max​τ2​∑​H(τ1′​,τ2​)ητ2​​, ητ2=0 whenever ∑τ1H(τ1,τ2)ξτ1>min⁡τ2′∑τ1H(τ1,τ2′)ξτ1.\eta_{\tau_2} = 0 \text{ whenever } \sum_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\xi_{\tau_1} > \min_{\tau_2'} \sum_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2')\xi_{\tau_1}.ητ2​​=0 whenever τ1​∑​H(τ1​,τ2​)ξτ1​​>τ2′​min​τ1​∑​H(τ1​,τ2′​)ξτ1​​.

The statement fixes no value and no constant; it says which pairs of mixed strategies are optimal.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (13:A*) Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ≤Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phi \le \operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ≤Miny​Maxx​ϕ.
  2. (13:D*) If Max⁡Min⁡=Min⁡Max⁡\operatorname{Max}\operatorname{Min} = \operatorname{Min}\operatorname{Max}MaxMin=MinMax, the saddle points of ϕ\phiϕ are exactly Aϕ×BϕA^\phi \times B^\phiAϕ×Bϕ.
  3. (17:A) Min⁡ηK(ξ,η)=Min⁡τ2∑τ1H(τ1,τ2)ξτ1\operatorname{Min}_\eta K(\xi, \eta) = \operatorname{Min}_{\tau_2} \sum_{\tau_1} \mathcal H(\tau_1, \tau_2)\xi_{\tau_1}Minη​K(ξ,η)=Minτ2​​∑τ1​​H(τ1​,τ2​)ξτ1​​, and dually for Max⁡ξ\operatorname{Max}_\xiMaxξ​.
  4. (16:C) For every matrix a(i,j)a(i, j)a(i,j) exactly one of: some x∈Smx \in S_mx∈Sm​ with ∑ja(i,j)xj≤0\sum_j a(i,j)x_j \le 0∑j​a(i,j)xj​≤0 for all iii; some w∈Snw \in S_nw∈Sn​ with ∑ia(i,j)wi>0\sum_i a(i,j)w_i > 0∑i​a(i,j)wi​>0 for all jjj.
  5. (16:F) The weak form with ≥0\ge 0≥0 in place of >0> 0>0.
  6. (17:6) The minimax theorem: a saddle point of KKK exists (already on the platform as AGT.zero_sum_minimax, proved).
  7. (17:C:f) ξ∈Aˉ\xi \in \bar Aξ∈Aˉ and η∈Bˉ\eta \in \bar Bη∈Bˉ iff ξ,η\xi, \etaξ,η is a saddle point of KKK.

After the goal: (17:E) the game is specially strictly determined iff each player has a pure good strategy.

Significance

(17:D) is the complementary-slackness description of the optimal strategy pairs of a matrix game: a good strategy puts weight only on pure strategies that are best replies to the opponent's good strategy, and conversely any pair of mutually supported best replies is optimal. It is the basis of support-enumeration methods for matrix games, of the equalizing arguments used to solve small games by hand (the book's Chapter IV applies it to Matching Pennies, Stone–Paper–Scissors and Poker), and of the rectangular structure Aˉ×Bˉ\bar A \times \bar BAˉ×Bˉ of the set of optimal pairs. (17:E) connects the mixed-strategy solution to the pure-strategy theory of §14 and to the perfect-information games of §15.

The results are classical and proved in the book. The minimax theorem itself is already machine-checked on the platform (AGT.zero_sum_minimax), and Mathlib contains Sion's minimax theorem and the basic saddle-point lemmas for extended-real functions on sets. This mission adds the book's own chain: the §13 saddle-point calculus under its standing attainment hypothesis, the theorems of the alternative (16:C) and (16:F) in the simplex-normalized form the book uses, the reduction (17:A) to pure strategies, and the characterizations (17:C:f), (17:D), (17:E) of good strategies, which are not on the platform in any form.

Difficulty

The "if" direction of (17:D) cannot be proved from the support conditions alone by local reasoning: that a pair of mutual best replies consists of good strategies uses that the value Max⁡ξMin⁡ηK\operatorname{Max}_\xi \operatorname{Min}_\eta KMaxξ​Minη​K equals Min⁡ηMax⁡ξK\operatorname{Min}_\eta \operatorname{Max}_\xi KMinη​Maxξ​K, i.e. the minimax theorem. Without that equality the "if" direction of (13:D*) fails (points of Aϕ×BϕA^\phi \times B^\phiAϕ×Bϕ exist but are not saddle points), so the calculus of §13 alone does not suffice. Likewise (16:C) is not a direct instance of the Farkas lemma forms on the platform: its alternatives are normalized to the simplex and the second one is strict, and both the existence and the mutual exclusion must be shown.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions, fixed throughout:

  • Pure strategies are Fin β₁, Fin β₂ (numbered from 000), the matrix is H : Fin β₁ → Fin β₂ → ℝ, and SβS_\betaSβ​ is Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ (Fin β).
  • Nonempty strategy sets (β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1, from "τ = 1, …, β" in 14.1.1): every theorem assumes 0 < β₁, 0 < β₂, or mixed strategies ξ∈Sβ1\xi \in S_{\beta_1}ξ∈Sβ1​​, η∈Sβ2\eta \in S_{\beta_2}η∈Sβ2​​, which force it. The theorems of the alternative assume n,m≥1n, m \ge 1n,m≥1 (a matrix with rows and columns).
  • Standing hypothesis of 13.2.1 ("we are restricting our considerations to such functions, for which Max and Min exist"): the §13 results (13:A*), (13:D*) are stated for an arbitrary ϕ:X×Y→R\phi : X \times Y \to \mathbb Rϕ:X×Y→R under the predicate MaxMinAttained φ, which says that Min⁡yϕ(x,y)\operatorname{Min}_y \phi(x, y)Miny​ϕ(x,y), Max⁡xϕ(x,y)\operatorname{Max}_x \phi(x, y)Maxx​ϕ(x,y), Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ and Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMiny​Maxx​ϕ are attained. (13:D*) also carries the hypothesis of 13.5.2 that saddle points exist, stated as Max⁡xMin⁡yϕ=Min⁡yMax⁡xϕ\operatorname{Max}_x \operatorname{Min}_y \phi = \operatorname{Min}_y \operatorname{Max}_x \phiMaxx​Miny​ϕ=Miny​Maxx​ϕ.
  • Max⁡\operatorname{Max}Max and Min⁡\operatorname{Min}Min are the real ⨆, ⨅; they are the book's attained values under the hypotheses above (compactness of the simplex and continuity of KKK for the mixed game). (17:A) asserts attainment explicitly (IsLeast, IsGreatest). "Does not assume its maximum at τ1\tau_1τ1​" in the goal is written without any Max operator.
  • Aˉ\bar AAˉ, Bˉ\bar BBˉ are defined as maximizers and minimizers directly from KKK, not through an assumed value v′v'v′.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: Aˉ\bar AAˉ and Bˉ\bar BBˉ are not taken as hypotheses or defined through the support conditions, strategy sets cannot be empty, and no Max over an empty or unbounded set occurs.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, especially (16:C) (from Mathlib's convex separation or from a platform Farkas lemma) and the bridge from AGT.zero_sum_minimax to (17:C:f). The §13 lemmas and the (17:A) reduction are reusable by any mission about matrix games or bilinear saddle points.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), §§13, 16, 17. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • J. Ville, "Sur la théorie générale des jeux où intervient l'habileté des joueurs", in É. Borel, Traité du calcul des probabilités et de ses applications, IV.2, Gauthier-Villars, 1938, 105–113.
  • S. Kakutani, "A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem", Duke Mathematical Journal 8 (1941), 457–459. https://doi.org/10.1215/S0012-7094-41-00838-4
  • D. Gale, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, "Linear programming and the theory of games", in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, 317–329.
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Convex OptimizationInformation TheoryLinear algebra+2·Captain: naimengye

Decoding by Linear Programming: Exact Recovery by ℓ1 Minimization under the Restricted Isometry ConditionResearch Paper

Motivation

Consider the classical error-correcting problem. An input vector f∈Rnf \in \mathbb{R}^nf∈Rn (the plaintext) is encoded as Af∈RmAf \in \mathbb{R}^mAf∈Rm by a coding matrix AAA with m>nm > nm>n, and an unknown, arbitrary vector of errors eee corrupts the result, so that only y=Af+ey = Af + ey=Af+e is observed. Can fff be recovered exactly, and by an algorithm whose running time is polynomial in mmm? Candès and Tao (2005) answer both questions at once: if a matrix FFF annihilating AAA satisfies a restricted orthonormality condition, then fff is the unique solution of the convex program min⁡g∥y−Ag∥ℓ1\min_g \|y - Ag\|_{\ell^1}ming​∥y−Ag∥ℓ1​, which is a linear program, whenever at most SSS entries of yyy are corrupted, whatever their positions and values. Read for the matrix FFF alone, the same theorem says that ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 minimization (basis pursuit) returns the sparsest solution of an underdetermined linear system. That statement is the mathematical core of compressed sensing, and the restricted isometry constants introduced in this paper became the standard tool of the field.

Timeline. Donoho and Huo (2001), followed by Elad–Bruckstein, Donoho–Elad and Gribonval–Nielsen, proved the equivalence of ℓ0\ell^0ℓ0 and ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 minimization for matrices formed by concatenating two orthonormal bases, for sparsity of order m\sqrt{m}m​, through incoherence. Candès, Romberg and Tao (2004) and Candès and Tao (2004) obtained recovery with overwhelming probability for random matrices at sparsity of order m/log⁡mm/\log mm/logm. Donoho (2004) showed for Gaussian matrices that a constant, unspecified fraction ρm\rho mρm of nonzero entries can be tolerated. The present paper (December 2004, published 2005) gives a deterministic sufficient condition, δS+θS,S+θS,2S<1\delta_S + \theta_{S,S} + \theta_{S,2S} < 1δS​+θS,S​+θS,2S​<1, valid for every matrix, and specializes it to Gaussian matrices with explicit numerical values of the tolerable fraction. Later work, for instance Candès (2008) with the condition δ2S<2−1\delta_{2S} < \sqrt{2} - 1δ2S​<2​−1, sharpened the sufficient condition; those later results are not part of this mission.

Setting

Let FFF be a real p×mp \times mp×m matrix with columns v1,…,vm∈Rpv_1, \dots, v_m \in \mathbb{R}^pv1​,…,vm​∈Rp, and let HHH be the linear span of these columns. For an index set T⊆{1,…,m}T \subseteq \{1,\dots,m\}T⊆{1,…,m} and real coefficients c=(cj)j∈Tc = (c_j)_{j \in T}c=(cj​)j∈T​, write FTc=∑j∈TcjvjF_T c = \sum_{j \in T} c_j v_jFT​c=∑j∈T​cj​vj​. A vector c∈Rmc \in \mathbb{R}^mc∈Rm is supported on TTT when cj=0c_j = 0cj​=0 for all j∉Tj \notin Tj∈/T; with this convention FTcF_T cFT​c is just the product FcFcFc. Norms are the Euclidean norm ∥c∥=(∑jcj2)1/2\|c\| = (\sum_j c_j^2)^{1/2}∥c∥=(∑j​cj2​)1/2 and the ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norm ∥c∥ℓ1=∑j∣cj∣\|c\|_{\ell^1} = \sum_j |c_j|∥c∥ℓ1​=∑j​∣cj​∣.

Definition 1.1. For an integer SSS, the SSS-restricted isometry constant δS\delta_SδS​ is the smallest quantity such that

(1−δS)∥c∥2≤∥FTc∥2≤(1+δS)∥c∥2(1 - \delta_S)\|c\|^2 \le \|F_T c\|^2 \le (1 + \delta_S)\|c\|^2(1−δS​)∥c∥2≤∥FT​c∥2≤(1+δS​)∥c∥2

for all TTT of cardinality at most SSS and all real coefficients (cj)j∈T(c_j)_{j \in T}(cj​)j∈T​. The S,S′S, S'S,S′-restricted orthogonality constant θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ is the smallest quantity such that

∣⟨FTc,FT′c′⟩∣≤θS,S′ ∥c∥ ∥c′∥|\langle F_T c, F_{T'} c' \rangle| \le \theta_{S,S'} \, \|c\| \, \|c'\|∣⟨FT​c,FT′​c′⟩∣≤θS,S′​∥c∥∥c′∥

for all disjoint T,T′T, T'T,T′ with ∣T∣≤S|T| \le S∣T∣≤S and ∣T′∣≤S′|T'| \le S'∣T′∣≤S′. The paper writes θS\theta_SθS​ for θS,S\theta_{S,S}θS,S​. These numbers measure how far the columns of FFF are from an orthonormal system when only linear combinations of at most SSS columns are considered.

The two optimization problems are

(P1)min⁡d∈Rm∥d∥ℓ1  subject to  Fd=f,(P1′)min⁡g∈Rn∥y−Ag∥ℓ1.(P_1)\quad \min_{d \in \mathbb{R}^m} \|d\|_{\ell^1} \ \text{ subject to } \ Fd = f, \qquad\qquad (P_1')\quad \min_{g \in \mathbb{R}^n} \|y - Ag\|_{\ell^1}.(P1​)d∈Rmmin​∥d∥ℓ1​  subject to  Fd=f,(P1′​)g∈Rnmin​∥y−Ag∥ℓ1​.

A vector is the unique minimizer of one of these problems when it is feasible and every other feasible vector has a strictly larger objective value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.5 (decoding by linear programming)

Let AAA be a real m×nm \times nm×n matrix of full rank with m>nm > nm>n, and FFF a real p×mp \times mp×m matrix with FA=0FA = 0FA=0. Let S≥1S \ge 1S≥1 satisfy

δS(F)+θS,S(F)+θS,2S(F)<1.(1.10)\delta_S(F) + \theta_{S,S}(F) + \theta_{S,2S}(F) < 1 . \tag{1.10}δS​(F)+θS,S​(F)+θS,2S​(F)<1.(1.10)

If y=Af+ey = Af + ey=Af+e where eee is supported on a set of size at most SSS, then fff is the unique minimizer of (P1′)(P_1')(P1′​).

Core: Theorem 1.4 (exact recovery by ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 minimization)

Let S≥1S \ge 1S≥1 satisfy (1.10) for FFF, and let ccc be supported on a set TTT with ∣T∣≤S|T| \le S∣T∣≤S. Then ccc is the unique minimizer of (P1)(P_1)(P1​) with f:=Fcf := Fcf:=Fc.

Theorem 1.5 is the companion of Theorem 1.4 for the decoding problem, and the mission's milestones are the four lemmas the paper proves on the way: Lemma 1.2 (the δ\deltaδ numbers control the θ\thetaθ numbers), Lemma 1.3 (uniqueness of sparse representations under δ2S<1\delta_{2S} < 1δ2S​<1), and the two dual sparse reconstruction properties, Lemma 2.1 (ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 version) and Lemma 2.2 (ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞ version).

Significance

The result. The guarantee is deterministic and uniform: one condition on FFF, checkable in principle from the matrix alone, ensures that a single linear program recovers every sufficiently sparse vector, with no probability of failure. In the decoding reading, a fixed fraction of the ciphertext can be corrupted arbitrarily and the plaintext is still recovered exactly by convex optimization. The paper shows in its Section 3 that Gaussian matrices satisfy (1.10) with overwhelming probability at explicit values of S/mS/mS/m, and in Section 5 that the same hypothesis yields near-optimal recovery of compressible signals from few measurements; both are consequences of the deterministic core formalized here.

Formalizing it. The theorems are proved in the paper, and no machine-checked proof of them exists. Prove2Me holds a formalization of a different restricted-isometry sufficient condition taken from a textbook (HighDimProb.SparseRecovery.rip_implies_exact_recovery); it uses a different definition of the isometry constant and a different hypothesis, so nothing there can be reused as is. This mission produces the definitions of δS\delta_SδS​ and θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ exactly as in Definition 1.1, the dual-certificate lemmas, and the two theorems, in a form that later missions on compressed sensing can import. The probabilistic Theorem 1.6, Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 1.7, and the compressible-signal Theorem 5.1, are not targets: see the scope section for why.

Difficulty

The whole proof rests on a dual certificate: a vector w∈Hw \in Hw∈H with ⟨w,vj⟩=sgn⁡(cj)\langle w, v_j \rangle = \operatorname{sgn}(c_j)⟨w,vj​⟩=sgn(cj​) for j∈Tj \in Tj∈T and ∣⟨w,vj⟩∣<1|\langle w, v_j \rangle| < 1∣⟨w,vj​⟩∣<1 for j∉Tj \notin Tj∈/T. Given such a www, the argument of Section 2.2 is a short chain of inequalities. The first idea every newcomer has is w=FT(FT∗FT)−1sgn⁡(c)w = F_T (F_T^* F_T)^{-1} \operatorname{sgn}(c)w=FT​(FT∗​FT​)−1sgn(c); this interpolates the signs on TTT and, by restricted orthogonality, its inner products off TTT are small in an ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 sense, but not in the ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞ sense required. That is exactly Lemma 2.1: the ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞ bound holds only outside an exceptional set of at most S′S'S′ indices. Lemma 2.2 removes the exceptional set by an infinite alternating iteration, prescribing values on the previous exceptional set while keeping the values on TTT fixed, and summing a geometrically convergent series.

Two points deserve attention from solvers. First, the paper's proof of Lemma 2.2 prescribes values on sets of size up to 2S2S2S (T0∪TnT_0 \cup T_nT0​∪Tn​) at each step, while the per-step factors it quotes, θS,2S/(1−δS)\theta_{S,2S}/(1-\delta_S)θS,2S​/(1−δS​), are what Lemma 2.1 gives for a set of size SSS; a proof of the printed constant in (2.4) has to account for this, and the hypothesis of Theorem 1.4 leaves room for a proof with slightly worse per-step factors. Second, Lemma 2.1 is printed with θS\theta_SθS​ in its ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 bound on the exceptional set, while the inequality (2.3) its proof establishes gives θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​; the mission states the lemma with θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​, which coincides with the printed form in the case S′=SS' = SS′=S used by Lemma 2.2.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Matrix (Fin p) (Fin m) ℝ; a coefficient vector on TTT is a vector in Fin m → ℝ supported on the finite set TTT, and FTcF_T cFT​c is F.mulVec c. The Euclidean and ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norms and the inner product are explicit finite sums, so every statement can be checked by hand against the paper. HHH is the span of the columns.

The constants δS\delta_SδS​ and θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ are the infimum of the set of nonnegative δ\deltaδ (resp. θ\thetaθ) satisfying the defining inequalities for all admissible sets and coefficients. This set is nonempty, closed and bounded below, so the infimum is attained and is the paper's smallest quantity; on the paper's domain the smallest such quantity is nonnegative, so the extra clause only fixes a harmless value in degenerate cases such as S=0S = 0S=0. The definitions are total in S,S′S, S'S,S′, and each theorem carries the paper's domain conditions (S≥1S \ge 1S≥1, and 2S≤m2S \le m2S≤m, 3S≤m3S \le m3S≤m or S+S′≤mS + S' \le mS+S′≤m as needed) as explicit hypotheses. The hypotheses are satisfiable, since a matrix with orthonormal columns has δS=θS,S′=0\delta_S = \theta_{S,S'} = 0δS​=θS,S′​=0, so none of the statements is vacuous.

"Unique minimizer" is a strict inequality against every competitor. "Full rank" for the m×nm \times nm×n matrix AAA with m>nm > nm>n is injectivity of g↦Agg \mapsto Agg↦Ag; both are standing assumptions of the paper's Section 1.1 and appear as hypotheses of Theorem 1.5. In Lemma 2.1, "a constant K>0K > 0K>0 depending only on δS\delta_SδS​" is a positive function of the real number δS\delta_SδS​, quantified before all other data.

Out of scope, with the reason for each: Theorem 1.6 refers to a threshold r∗(p,m)r^*(p,m)r∗(p,m) "given in Section 3.5", which the paper does not contain, and to "overwhelming probability" with unspecified constants; Lemma 3.1 is proved only for mmm and ppp "large enough", with an unspecified threshold and an o(1)o(1)o(1) term quoted from the literature; Corollary 1.7 rests on Theorem 1.6; Theorem 5.1 has an unspecified constant CCC and is explicitly not proved in the paper. A future mission can add these once precise statements are fixed.

Contributions that are welcome: proofs of the four milestone lemmas and of the two theorems; reusable lemmas on the attainment and monotonicity of the constants, on the Gram matrix FT∗FTF_T^* F_TFT∗​FT​ and its inverse under δS<1\delta_S < 1δS​<1, and on the duality inequality of Section 2.2. Statements that weaken the hypotheses (for instance to δ2S<2−1\delta_{2S} < \sqrt{2} - 1δ2S​<2​−1) belong to a separate mission.

Selected references

  • E. J. Candès and T. Tao, Decoding by linear programming, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51 (12), 2005, 4203–4215. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2005.858979 (arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0502327)
  • E. J. Candès, J. Romberg and T. Tao, Robust uncertainty principles: exact signal reconstruction from highly incomplete frequency information, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 52 (2), 2006. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0409186
  • E. J. Candès and T. Tao, Near optimal signal recovery from random projections: universal encoding strategies?, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 52 (12), 2006. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0410542
  • D. L. Donoho and X. Huo, Uncertainty principles and ideal atomic decomposition, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 47, 2001, 2845–2862. https://doi.org/10.1109/18.959265
  • S. S. Chen, D. L. Donoho and M. A. Saunders, Atomic decomposition by basis pursuit, SIAM J. Sci. Comput. 20, 1999, 33–61. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1064827596304010
  • E. J. Candès, The restricted isometry property and its implications for compressed sensing, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I 346, 2008, 589–592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crma.2008.03.014
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior IV: The Characteristic Function of a Zero-Sum n-Person GameTextbook

Motivation

Chapter VI of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) opens the general theory of zero-sum games with more than two players. The authors propose to describe everything that can be said about coalitions, compensations between partners and fights between coalitions through one numerical object, the characteristic function v(S)v(S)v(S): the amount a group of players SSS can secure for itself against all the others (25.2.1). The whole later theory of the book (imputations, domination, solutions, simple games, decomposition) is built on this set function, and the same object, under the name "coalitional game" or "TU game", is the starting point of cooperative game theory as a field (cores, Shapley value, nucleolus).

§§25–27 settle two foundational questions about it. First, which set functions arise as characteristic functions of actual games? Second, which characteristic functions describe the same strategic situation, and how is a canonical representative chosen? The answers (a complete characterization by three conditions, and the reduced form under strategic equivalence) are what later chapters, and much of the cooperative literature, use when they take "a characteristic function" as a primitive without reference to any game.

Setting

A zero-sum nnn-person game in normalized form Γ\GammaΓ (11.2.3, 25.1.3) has players k=1,…,nk = 1, \dots, nk=1,…,n. Player kkk chooses a pure strategy τk∈{1,…,βk}\tau_k \in \{1, \dots, \beta_k\}τk​∈{1,…,βk​}, βk≧1\beta_k \geqq 1βk​≧1, uninformed about the others' choices, and then receives the real amount Hk(τ1,…,τn)\mathcal H_k(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n)Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​), subject to (25:1)

∑k=1nHk(τ1,…,τn)≡0.\sum_{k=1}^n \mathcal H_k(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n) \equiv 0 .k=1∑n​Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​)≡0.

Let I={1,…,n}I = \{1, \dots, n\}I={1,…,n} and, for S⊆IS \subseteq IS⊆I, −S=I∖S-S = I \setminus S−S=I∖S. The book defines v(S)v(S)v(S) in 25.1.3 through a fictitious two-person game: all players of SSS form one composite player 1′1'1′, all players of −S-S−S another, 2′2'2′. The pure strategies of 1′1'1′ are the aggregates τS\tau^SτS (one choice τk\tau_kτk​ for each k∈Sk \in Sk∈S), those of 2′2'2′ are the aggregates τ−S\tau^{-S}τ−S, and 1′1'1′ receives (25:2)

H‾(τS,τ−S)=∑k∈SHk(τ1,…,τn).\overline{\mathcal H}(\tau^S, \tau^{-S}) = \sum_{k \in S} \mathcal H_k(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n).H(τS,τ−S)=k∈S∑​Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​).

A mixed strategy of 1′1'1′ is a probability vector ξ\xiξ on the set of all aggregates τS\tau^SτS, and one of 2′2'2′ is a probability vector η\etaη on the aggregates τ−S\tau^{-S}τ−S. With K(ξ,η)=∑τS,τ−SH‾(τS,τ−S) ξτSητ−SK(\xi, \eta) = \sum_{\tau^S, \tau^{-S}} \overline{\mathcal H}(\tau^S, \tau^{-S})\, \xi_{\tau^S} \eta_{\tau^{-S}}K(ξ,η)=∑τS,τ−S​H(τS,τ−S)ξτS​ητ−S​,

v(S)=Max⁡ξMin⁡ηK(ξ,η)=Min⁡ηMax⁡ξK(ξ,η).v(S) = \operatorname{Max}_\xi \operatorname{Min}_\eta K(\xi, \eta) = \operatorname{Min}_\eta \operatorname{Max}_\xi K(\xi, \eta).v(S)=Maxξ​Minη​K(ξ,η)=Minη​Maxξ​K(ξ,η).

The coalition therefore randomizes jointly: ξ\xiξ is one distribution over its members' strategy tuples, not a product of independent mixtures. The empty set and III are coalitions too (footnote 2, p. 241).

The three conditions of 25.3.1 on a set function vvv are

(25:3:a) v(⊖)=0,(25:3:b) v(−S)=−v(S),(25:3:c) v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T)  if S∩T=⊖.\text{(25:3:a)}\ v(\ominus) = 0, \qquad \text{(25:3:b)}\ v(-S) = -v(S), \qquad \text{(25:3:c)}\ v(S \cup T) \geqq v(S) + v(T) \ \text{ if } S \cap T = \ominus .(25:3:a) v(⊖)=0,(25:3:b) v(−S)=−v(S),(25:3:c) v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T)  if S∩T=⊖.

From 26.2 on, every set function satisfying them is called a characteristic function.

Two such functions are strategically equivalent (27.1) if v′(S)=v(S)+∑k∈Sαk0v'(S) = v(S) + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^0_kv′(S)=v(S)+∑k∈S​αk0​ for numbers αk0\alpha^0_kαk0​ with ∑kαk0=0\sum_k \alpha^0_k = 0∑k​αk0​=0 ((27:1), (27:2)). A function is reduced if all one-element coalitions have the same value, (27:3); with that common value written −γ-\gamma−γ, (27:5). A game is inessential if the reduced form of its characteristic function is ≡0\equiv 0≡0, and essential otherwise (27.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: the characterization of characteristic functions (26.2)

v satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c)  ⟺  ∃ Γ zero-sum n-person game with vΓ=v.v \text{ satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c)} \iff \exists\, \Gamma \text{ zero-sum } n\text{-person game with } v_\Gamma = v .v satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c)⟺∃Γ zero-sum n-person game with vΓ​=v.

The "only if" half is 25.3.1; the "if" half is 26.1.1, which requires a single game Γ\GammaΓ realizing vvv on every coalition simultaneously.

Milestones

  1. 25.3.1: every vΓv_\GammavΓ​ satisfies (25:3:a)–(25:3:c).
  2. (25:A): the three conditions are equivalent to v(S1)+⋯+v(Sp)≦0v(S_1) + \dots + v(S_p) \leqq 0v(S1​)+⋯+v(Sp​)≦0 on decompositions of III for p=1,2,3p = 1, 2, 3p=1,2,3, with equality for p=1,2p = 1, 2p=1,2.
  3. 26.1.1: every vvv satisfying (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) is vΓv_\GammavΓ​ for some game Γ\GammaΓ.
  4. (27:A): every characteristic function is strategically equivalent to exactly one reduced characteristic function, given by (27:2), (27:4).
  5. (27:7): for reduced vˉ\bar vvˉ and every ppp-element SSS, −pγ≦vˉ(S)≦(n−p)γ-p\gamma \leqq \bar v(S) \leqq (n-p)\gamma−pγ≦vˉ(S)≦(n−p)γ, with equality in the stated boundary cases.
  6. (27:B): inessential iff ∑jv((j))=0\sum_j v((j)) = 0∑j​v((j))=0; essential iff ∑jv((j))<0\sum_j v((j)) < 0∑j​v((j))<0.
  7. (27:C) and (27:D): inessential iff vvv is additive, v(S)≡∑k∈Sαk0v(S) \equiv \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^0_kv(S)≡∑k∈S​αk0​, equivalently iff (25:3:c) always holds with equality.

Significance

The characterization makes the three conditions (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) the complete axiomatics of zero-sum characteristic functions. Every later result in the book that is stated "for a characteristic function" (the solutions of the three-person game in §32, the simple games of Chapter X, the decomposition theory of Chapter IX) is thereby a result about zero-sum games, and conversely no further constraint on vvv is hidden in the game model. The reduced form of §27 cuts the parameter space of characteristic functions by nnn and turns essentiality into a sign condition, which is used throughout the rest of the book.

These results are proved in the book. As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows (queries on characteristic function, coalition, strategic equivalence, inessential, superadditive), none of them is formalized there; the existing cooperative-game definitions on the platform use other normalizations (v(∅)=0v(\emptyset) = 0v(∅)=0 only, no complementarity condition) and are not this object. The mission produces a machine-checked link between the non-cooperative model of an nnn-person game and the cooperative set function, including the book's explicit game construction behind 26.1.1.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction requires comparing values of different two-person games: (25:3:c) asks that the coalition S∪TS \cup TS∪T can guarantee as much as SSS and TTT separately, which rests on the coalition mixing jointly, and (25:3:b) needs the minimax theorem, since v(−S)v(-S)v(−S) is a Max-Min for the opposite side. The "if" direction is an existence claim: from an abstract vvv one must produce one finite game whose characteristic function matches vvv on all 2n2^n2n coalitions at once. Producing, for each SSS separately, a game with the right value vΓ(S)v_\Gamma(S)vΓ​(S) is easy and proves nothing. The §27 results are finite linear algebra over set functions, but the uniqueness in (27:A) and the boundary equalities in (27:7) depend on using all three conditions.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n (the book's 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n are 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1), coalitions are Finset (Fin n), −S-S−S is the complement Sᶜ, and set functions are Finset (Fin n) → ℝ. A game is a structure ZeroSumGame n with strategy sets Fin (β k), a field β k > 0 (finitely many and at least one pure strategy per player), real payoffs H τ k, and the zero-sum condition (25:1) as a field. An aggregate τS\tau^SτS is a dependent function on the members of SSS; mixed strategies are elements of Mathlib's stdSimplex, and the coalition's ξ\xiξ is a single distribution on aggregates, as in 25.1.3. The Max and Min in v(S)v(S)v(S) are written as ⨆/⨅ over the simplices; these are nonempty and the bilinear form is bounded on them, so no junk value arises. No lower bound on nnn is imposed: the book's statements remain true for n=0n = 0n=0 and n=1n = 1n=1, so dropping the implicit n≧1n \geqq 1n≧1 is a harmless strengthening.

Standing hypotheses instantiated in the statements: finiteness of the strategy sets and (25:1) (25.1.3) are part of ZeroSumGame; the §27 results carry (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) as a hypothesis, the book's standing assumption from 26.2 on ("characteristic function"); (27:7) carries reducedness (27:3) and the definition (27:5) of γ\gammaγ; strategic equivalence includes (27:1). The reduced form is the explicit function of (27:2), (27:4), with 1n\frac1nn1​ as a real division that only matters for n≧1n \geqq 1n≧1.

A trivializing reading of the goal, "for every SSS there is a game with vΓ(S)=v(S)v_\Gamma(S) = v(S)vΓ​(S)=v(S)", is excluded: the statement asks for one game Γ\GammaΓ with vΓ=vv_\Gamma = vvΓ​=v as functions. The coalition value is not the value under independent mixtures of the members, which is smaller in general and for which (25:3:c) can fail.

A complete development needs the minimax theorem for finite matrix games (the platform's AGT.zero_sum_minimax covers it for matrices indexed by Fin (m+1), and can be transported to the aggregate types), bookkeeping for splitting and joining strategy profiles along SSS and −S-S−S, and the construction of 26.1 with its zero-sum check. The profile-splitting lemmas and the value facts for coalition games are reusable for the book's Chapter XI (general games) and for any work on coalitional values of strategic games. Contributions welcome: the §27 milestones, which are self-contained, and the two directions of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), §§25–27, pp. 238–254. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320 (the minimax theorem used for v(S)v(S)v(S)). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • M. Maschler, E. Solan and S. Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, Ch. 16 (coalitional games with transferable utility). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511794216
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior VI: Splitting Sets and the Decomposition Partition of a GameTextbook

Motivation

Chapter IX of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior asks when a game played by many participants is really several separate games played side by side. The authors' motivation (41.1) is methodological: the general theory of the nnn-person game becomes unmanageable as nnn grows, and one way to gain insight into large games is to isolate classes of games that can be analysed exactly. The first such class consists of games whose players fall into groups that have no dealings with each other — the book's example is the internal economies of two countries whose connections are disregarded (41.2.4). Such a game is the composition of its constituents, and the question of the chapter is how to recognise a composite game from its characteristic function alone and how far a given game can be decomposed.

The answer (§43) is a structure theorem. The groups of players that can be split off form a Boolean algebra of sets; its atoms, the minimal splitting sets, form a partition of the set of players, the decomposition partition ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​; and every splitting set is a union of blocks of ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​. The book remarks (41.3.3) that the splitting condition (41:7) is exactly Carathéodory's criterion of measurability, transported from measures to characteristic functions. The mission formalizes §43, together with the criterion (42:G) of §42 on which it rests.

Setting

Let III be a finite set of players. A characteristic function is a real number v(S)v(S)v(S) for every subset S⊆IS \subseteq IS⊆I (every coalition, including the empty set ⊖\ominus⊖ and III). Write −S=I−S-S = I - S−S=I−S. From 42.4.1 on the book works in the domain of constant-sum games, whose characteristic functions are, by (42:D), exactly the functions satisfying

(42:6:a) v(⊖)=0,(42:6:b) v(S)+v(−S)=v(I),(42:6:c) v(S)+v(T)≦v(S∪T)  if S∩T=⊖.\text{(42:6:a)}\ v(\ominus) = 0,\qquad \text{(42:6:b)}\ v(S) + v(-S) = v(I),\qquad \text{(42:6:c)}\ v(S) + v(T) \leqq v(S \cup T)\ \text{ if } S \cap T = \ominus .(42:6:a) v(⊖)=0,(42:6:b) v(S)+v(−S)=v(I),(42:6:c) v(S)+v(T)≦v(S∪T)  if S∩T=⊖.

For J⊆IJ \subseteq IJ⊆I with complement K=I−JK = I - JK=I−J, the game is decomposable with respect to JJJ and KKK if there are constant-sum games Δ\DeltaΔ on the players JJJ and H\mathrm HH on the players KKK with v(R)=vΔ(R∩J)+vH(R∩K)v(R) = v_\Delta(R \cap J) + v_{\mathrm H}(R \cap K)v(R)=vΔ​(R∩J)+vH​(R∩K) for all R⊆IR \subseteq IR⊆I — formula (41:3). The JJJ-constituent Δ\DeltaΔ is the game on JJJ with vΔ(S)=v(S)v_\Delta(S) = v(S)vΔ​(S)=v(S) for S⊆JS \subseteq JS⊆J (41:4).

A splitting set (43.1) is a J⊆IJ \subseteq IJ⊆I satisfying (41:6),

v(S∪T)=v(S)+v(T)for S⊆J, T⊆I−J.v(S \cup T) = v(S) + v(T) \quad \text{for } S \subseteq J,\ T \subseteq I - J .v(S∪T)=v(S)+v(T)for S⊆J, T⊆I−J.

The game is indecomposable if ⊖\ominus⊖ and III are its only splitting sets (43.3.1). A minimal splitting set is a splitting set J≠⊖J \neq \ominusJ=⊖ none of whose proper subsets J′≠⊖J' \neq \ominusJ′=⊖ is splitting (43.3.2), and ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​ is the system of all minimal splitting sets. The game is inessential (42:F) if it is strategically equivalent to the zero game, i.e. v(S)+∑k∈Sαk0=0v(S) + \sum_{k \in S} \alpha^0_k = 0v(S)+∑k∈S​αk0​=0 for all SSS, for some reals αk0\alpha^0_kαk0​ (the transformation (42:5)).

Formalization targets

Goal: (43:F), (43:G), (43:H)

For every vvv satisfying (42:6:a)–(42:6:c):

J1≠J2∈ΠΓ⇒J1∩J2=⊖,⋃J∈ΠΓJ=I,K splitting  ⟺  K=J1∪⋯∪Jp, Ji∈ΠΓ.J_1 \neq J_2 \in \Pi_\Gamma \Rightarrow J_1 \cap J_2 = \ominus, \qquad \bigcup_{J \in \Pi_\Gamma} J = I, \qquad K \text{ splitting} \iff K = J_1 \cup \dots \cup J_p,\ J_i \in \Pi_\Gamma .J1​=J2​∈ΠΓ​⇒J1​∩J2​=⊖,J∈ΠΓ​⋃​J=I,K splitting⟺K=J1​∪⋯∪Jp​, Ji​∈ΠΓ​.

The goal combines the partition property and the characterization of all splitting sets; it is the book's own summary of §43.3 and does not presuppose that ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​ is a partition.

Milestones

In attack order: the criterion (42:G) (decomposability   ⟺  \iff⟺ (41:6)   ⟺  \iff⟺ (41:7)); the closure properties (43:A) (complements), (43:B) (⊖\ominus⊖, III), (43:C) (intersections and unions); (43:D) (splitting sets of a constituent) and (43:E) (a constituent is indecomposable iff its set is minimal); (43:F), (43:G) separately; (43:I) (a minimal splitting set is disjoint from, or inside, any splitting set); the restatement (43:H*) (KKK splits iff every block of ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​ lies inside or outside KKK); and the two extreme cases (43:J) (ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​ = all singletons iff the game is inessential) and (43:K) (ΠΓ={I}\Pi_\Gamma = \{I\}ΠΓ​={I} iff the game is indecomposable).

Significance

The decomposition partition is canonical: every constant-sum game splits uniquely into indecomposable constituents, and (43:E) identifies them as the constituents on the blocks of ΠΓ\Pi_\GammaΠΓ​. The two extreme cases (43:J), (43:K) show that inessentiality and indecomposability are opposite ends of one scale. Chapter IX uses this structure in §§44–47, where solutions of decomposable games are related to solutions of their constituents ((46:A)–(46:I)); a formal decomposition partition is the prerequisite for that later work, and a candidate follow-up mission.

The results are classical and proved in the book. The mission's contribution is a machine-checked version: a formal definition layer for splitting sets of a set function on a finite set, the Boolean-algebra closure, and the atomic decomposition. The combinatorial core — that the sets satisfying a Carathéodory-type additivity condition form a Boolean algebra of a finite set, whose atoms partition it — is reusable outside game theory (for instance for finitely additive decompositions of set functions). No machine-checked version of these results is known to exist; they are formalized here for the first time as far as a search of the platform shows.

Difficulty

The individual steps are elementary, but the obvious argument for the key closure property (43:C) fails: to show that J′∪J′′J' \cup J''J′∪J′′ is splitting one cannot simply add the identities (41:6) for J′J'J′ and for J′′J''J′′, since a pair S⊆J′∪J′′S \subseteq J' \cup J''S⊆J′∪J′′, T⊆I−(J′∪J′′)T \subseteq I - (J' \cup J'')T⊆I−(J′∪J′′) is not of the form those identities control, and J′∩J′′J' \cap J''J′∩J′′ may be nonempty — the book's footnote on p. 354 singles out overlapping splitting sets as the case its proof is really about. Likewise (43:D) is not a tautology: that a set self-contained within a self-contained set is self-contained in the whole game has to be proved (footnote 1, p. 355). Formally, the main work is bookkeeping of set identities and the passage between subsets of JJJ (players of the constituent) and subsets of III.

Formalization scope

  • Players. The set of players III is an arbitrary finite type ι with decidable equality (the book's I=(1,…,n)I = (1, \dots, n)I=(1,…,n); in Chapter IX players are also named 1′,…,k′,1′′,…,l′′1', \dots, k', 1'', \dots, l''1′,…,k′,1′′,…,l′′). Coalitions are Finset ι, −S-S−S and I−JI - JI−J are the complement Sᶜ in III, and vvv is a function Finset ι → ℝ.
  • Standing hypotheses. Every theorem assumes (42:6:a)–(42:6:c) (the structure IsConstantSum), the chapter's domain from 42.5.3 on ("in the remainder of this chapter we will continue to consider constant-sum games", p. 353). v(I)v(I)v(I) is arbitrary: the statements are not restricted to zero-sum games, which would be a weaker special case. (43:K) additionally assumes III nonempty ([Nonempty ι], the book's n≧1n \geqq 1n≧1); every other statement holds without it. (43:E) assumes J≠⊖J \neq \ominusJ=⊖, since the book's constituent is a game and has at least one player.
  • Characteristic functions only. Games are represented by their characteristic functions, as the book does throughout §§42–43 by (42:D). Decomposability quantifies over constant-sum characteristic functions vΔv_\DeltavΔ​, vHv_{\mathrm H}vH​ on the subtypes ↥J, ↥Jᶜ; the JJJ-constituent is vvv restricted to subsets of ↥J. Sums of sets are unions; "disjunct" is Disjoint.
  • Π_Γ. decompositionPartition v is the set of minimal splitting sets; that it is a partition is proved, not assumed. An aggregate of minimal splitting sets is a finite family A, its sum A.sup id; the empty aggregate gives ⊖\ominus⊖.
  • No trivialization. A definition of splitting sets that quantified over T⊆IT \subseteq IT⊆I instead of T⊆I−JT \subseteq I - JT⊆I−J, or complements taken in an ambient type larger than III, would change the theorems; here the complement is in the finite type of players itself. With III empty all statements except (43:K) hold trivially, and (43:K) carries the nonemptiness hypothesis.
  • Contributions welcome. Proofs of the milestones in the listed order; general Mathlib-style lemmas on Boolean subalgebras of Finset ι and their atoms, which would shorten (43:F)–(43:H).

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (page-for-page reprint of the 3rd edition, 1953), Chapter IX, §§41–43, pp. 339–357. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • C. Carathéodory, Vorlesungen über reelle Funktionen, Teubner, Leipzig–Berlin, 1918, Chapter V (the measurability criterion to which (41:7) corresponds, cited by the book on p. 343).
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior VII: Simple Games, Weighted Majorities and the Main Simple SolutionTextbook

Motivation

Many collective decisions are taken by coalitions that either carry the vote or do not: committees, legislatures, shareholder meetings, councils with weighted votes. In such a situation the only aim of a participant is to be part of a coalition that wins, and nothing is left to bargain about except the division of the prize inside the winning coalition. Chapter X of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944; 3rd ed. 1953) isolates exactly this class of zero-sum nnn-person games, the simple games, and studies their numerical description by weighted majorities and their finite main simple solutions.

The chapter is the origin of a large later literature: simple games and weighted voting games are the standard model of voting bodies in political science and social choice (for instance the Shapley–Shubik power index, 1954). The characterization of which simple games admit homogeneous weights, and the solutions they carry, starts here.

Setting

A zero-sum nnn-person game with players I={1,…,n}I = \{1, \dots, n\}I={1,…,n} is represented by its characteristic function vvv, a real function on the subsets of III with v(⊖)=0v(\ominus) = 0v(⊖)=0, v(−S)=−v(S)v(-S) = -v(S)v(−S)=−v(S) (−S-S−S the complement) and v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T)v(S \cup T) \geqq v(S) + v(T)v(S∪T)≧v(S)+v(T) for disjoint S,TS, TS,T. An imputation is a vector α⃗\vec\alphaα with αi≧v((i))\alpha_i \geqq v((i))αi​≧v((i)) and ∑iαi=0\sum_i \alpha_i = 0∑i​αi​=0; α⃗\vec\alphaα dominates β⃗\vec\betaβ​ if some nonempty SSS has ∑i∈Sαi≦v(S)\sum_{i\in S}\alpha_i \leqq v(S)∑i∈S​αi​≦v(S) and αi>βi\alpha_i > \beta_iαi​>βi​ for i∈Si \in Si∈S; a solution is a set VVV of imputations none of which dominates another and which dominates every imputation outside it (30.1.1). The game is inessential when its reduced form vanishes identically, essential otherwise.

A coalition SSS is flat if v(S)=∑k∈Sv((k))v(S) = \sum_{k\in S} v((k))v(S)=∑k∈S​v((k)). The losing coalitions LΓL_\GammaLΓ​ are the flat sets, and the winning coalitions WΓW_\GammaWΓ​ are the sets whose complement is flat. The game is simple if it is essential and every coalition is winning or losing. WmW^mWm denotes the minimal winning coalitions, those of which no proper subset wins.

Weights w1,…,wnw_1, \dots, w_nw1​,…,wn​ define the winning system W={S:∑i∈Swi>12∑iwi}W = \{S : \sum_{i\in S} w_i > \tfrac12 \sum_i w_i\}W={S:∑i∈S​wi​>21​∑i​wi​}, and under the conditions (50:B) (non-negative weights, no player with half the total weight, no ties) this is the weighted majority game [w1,…,wn][w_1,\dots,w_n][w1​,…,wn​]. The weights are homogeneous if the advantage aS=∑i∈Swi−∑i∈−Swia_S = \sum_{i\in S} w_i - \sum_{i\in -S} w_iaS​=∑i∈S​wi​−∑i∈−S​wi​ is the same for all SSS in WmW^mWm.

In §50 the game is taken in reduced form with γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, so v((i))=−1v((i)) = -1v((i))=−1. For numbers xi≧0x_i \geqq 0xi​≧0 and a coalition SSS let α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS give −1-1−1 to the players outside SSS and −1+xi-1 + x_i−1+xi​ to player iii in SSS. When the xix_ixi​ satisfy ∑i∈Sxi=n\sum_{i \in S} x_i = n∑i∈S​xi​=n for every S∈WmS \in W^mS∈Wm, the set VVV of all α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS, S∈WmS \in W^mS∈Wm, is a main simple solution.

Formalization targets

Goal: (50:K), p. 444

Every homogeneous weighted majority game possesses a main simple solution,\text{Every homogeneous weighted majority game possesses a main simple solution,}Every homogeneous weighted majority game possesses a main simple solution,

namely the set of α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS, S∈WmS \in W^mS∈Wm, with xi=nbwix_i = \frac{n}{b} w_ixi​=bn​wi​, b=12(∑iwi+a)b = \frac12(\sum_i w_i + a)b=21​(∑i​wi​+a), aaa the common advantage. Conversely, if xi≧0x_i \geqq 0xi​≧0 solve ∑i∈Sxi=n\sum_{i\in S} x_i = n∑i∈S​xi​=n on WmW^mWm, then wi=xiw_i = x_iwi​=xi​ are homogeneous weights for the game if and only if

∑i=1nxi<2n.\sum_{i=1}^n x_i < 2n .i=1∑n​xi​<2n.

Milestones

  1. (49:C) LΓL_\GammaLΓ​ contains the empty set and all one-element sets.
  2. (49:A) WΓ,LΓW_\Gamma, L_\GammaWΓ​,LΓ​ are mapped onto each other by complementation, WΓW_\GammaWΓ​ is closed under supersets, and LΓL_\GammaLΓ​ is closed under subsets.
  3. (49:B) WΓ∩LΓ=⊖W_\Gamma \cap L_\Gamma = \ominusWΓ​∩LΓ​=⊖ if and only if the game is essential. If the game is inessential, every set is both winning and losing.
  4. (49:F) The pairs W,LW, LW,L of simple games are exactly those satisfying (48:A:a)–(48:A:d) and (49:C).
  5. (50:A) The essential three-person game is simple: it is the direct majority game.
  6. (50:B) Non-negative weights define a winning system with (49:W*) if and only if (50:B:a), (50:B:b) hold.
  7. (50:D) aS>0a_S > 0aS​>0 on WWW, aS<0a_S < 0aS​<0 on LLL, and aS=0a_S = 0aS​=0 never occurs.
  8. (50:G) An imputation β⃗\vec\betaβ​ is undominated by V={α⃗S:S∈U}V = \{\vec\alpha^S : S \in U\}V={αS:S∈U} if and only if R(β⃗)∈U+R(\vec\beta) \in U^+R(β​)∈U+.
  9. (50:J) The exact criterion (50:8*), (50:9*) for VVV to be a solution.

Significance

The result links two descriptions of a simple game. One is numerical: a vector of weights, normalized by homogeneity. The other is game-theoretic: a finite solution in which each minimal winning coalition forms and divides a fixed total among its members. When the weights are homogeneous they are, up to scale, the shares in the main simple solution. When a main simple solution exists, its shares are homogeneous weights exactly under the inequality (50:20). The criterion (50:J) behind it is the chapter's general tool for deciding which systems of "profitable" minimal winning coalitions yield a finite solution. It is used again in the enumeration of simple games in §§51–55.

All of the results are proved in the book. As far as a search of the Prove2Me library shows (queries on simple game, weighted majority, winning coalition and stable set, 2026-09-28), none of them has been machine-checked. The only stable-set statements on the platform concern feasible payoff vectors of convex games, which is a different domain. The mission therefore asks for a formal proof of the known results, including the case analysis of §50.5–50.6, and in doing so it produces a reusable Lean theory of simple games and their winning systems.

Difficulty

The characterizations of §49 are set-theoretic, but they depend on superadditivity to show that subsets of flat sets are flat, and on the strategic-equivalence description of essentiality. The substantial part is (50:J). Deciding whether VVV is a solution means classifying every imputation β⃗\vec\betaβ​ by the set R(β⃗)R(\vec\beta)R(β​) where it meets the shares −1+xi-1 + x_i−1+xi​.

The natural first attempt is to check only the minimal winning coalitions. It fails, because domination can be exercised through any winning coalition. The book's argument has to exclude sets of U+U^+U+ with ∑i∈Txi<n\sum_{i\in T} x_i < n∑i∈T​xi​<n by producing infinitely many undominated imputations against a finite VVV. It also has to handle indifferent players with xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0, whose presence makes R(β⃗)R(\vec\beta)R(β​) larger than the coalition that generated β⃗\vec\betaβ​. For the converse half of the goal, the obstacle is the strict inequality a>0a > 0a>0: the equations (50:17) are linear and say nothing about it.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n (the book's player iii is index i−1i - 1i−1), coalitions are Finset (Fin n), and characteristic functions are Finset (Fin n) → ℝ. Imputations are vectors Fin n → ℝ, and systems of coalitions are Set (Finset (Fin n)). A game is identified with its characteristic function (by 26.1 every vvv satisfying (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) arises from a game). The theory is the "old" one of 30.1.1 (49.1.1), with no excess. The definitions of imputation, domination and solution are the same as in mission V of this series and are restated here, because a draft cannot import another draft.

The standing hypotheses, stated in each theorem where the book has them in force:

  • (25:3:a)–(25:3:c) on vvv in every theorem;
  • simplicity (essential + (49:1:b)) in (50:G), (50:J), (50:K);
  • the reduced form with γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, as v((i))=−1v((i)) = -1v((i))=−1 for all iii (50.4.1), in (50:G), (50:J), (50:K);
  • U⊆WmU \subseteq W^mU⊆Wm, (50:7) xi≧0x_i \geqq 0xi​≧0 and (50:8) ∑i∈Sxi=n\sum_{i\in S} x_i = n∑i∈S​xi​=n for S∈US \in US∈U (50.5.1) in (50:G), (50:J);
  • (50:B) on the weights in (50:D) and in the first half of (50:K);
  • non-negative weights in (50:B). The book states (50:B) for arbitrary real weights, but its "only if" direction is false without wi≧0w_i \geqq 0wi​≧0: [10,10,10,−110][10, 10, 10, -\tfrac1{10}][10,10,10,−101​] is a counterexample. The corrected statement is recorded in the item.

The numbers xix_ixi​ are given for every player. Players in no minimal winning coalition, for whom the book defines no xix_ixi​, do not affect any α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS. In the converse of (50:K) the derived weights are wi=xiw_i = x_iwi​=xi​ for every player.

The goal is not the bare solvability of (50:17). A statement that only asserted "xxx exists with (50:7), (50:17)" would reduce to linear algebra. The goal asserts that the set of α⃗S\vec\alpha^SαS is a solution in the sense of 30.1.1, with domination requiring a nonempty effective set, and it adds the converse equivalence with (50:20). The set VVV is built from WmW^mWm only, never from all of WWW.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the §49 milestones, which form a small reusable library on winning and losing systems; a proof of (50:G) and (50:J); and lemmas connecting WΓW_\GammaWΓ​ of a simple reduced game with the explicit formula (49:2), v(S)=n−∣S∣v(S) = n - |S|v(S)=n−∣S∣ on WWW and −∣S∣-|S|−∣S∣ on LLL.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary ed., Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), Chapter X, §§48–50, pp. 420–444. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik, "A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system", American Political Science Review 48 (1954) 787–792. https://doi.org/10.2307/1951053
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior VIII: Characteristic Functions of General n-Person GamesTextbook

Motivation

The theory of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; 3rd ed. 1953) rests on one object: the characteristic function v(S)v(S)v(S), the amount a coalition SSS of players can secure for itself whatever the other players do. For zero-sum nnn-person games, Chapter VI defines v(S)v(S)v(S) and proves (25.3.1 and 26.1.1) that the set functions arising this way are exactly those with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, v(−S)=−v(S)v(-S)=-v(S)v(−S)=−v(S) and superadditivity. Economic applications, however, are rarely zero-sum: exchange and production create value. Chapter XI extends the theory to general (non-zero-sum) games by adding a fictitious player who absorbs the total gain, and §57 answers the question that decides the scope of this extension: which set functions are characteristic functions of general games?

The answer, that these are exactly the superadditive set functions vanishing on the empty set, is the reason why the cooperative game theory that followed could take "a superadditive vvv with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0" as its primitive object, usually without any underlying strategic game.

Setting

A general nnn-person game Γ\GammaΓ in normalized form has players I={1,…,n}I=\{1,\dots,n\}I={1,…,n}. Player kkk chooses τk∈{1,…,βk}\tau_k\in\{1,\dots,\beta_k\}τk​∈{1,…,βk​} with βk≥1\beta_k\ge 1βk​≥1, without knowing the choices of the others, and receives the real amount Hk(τ1,…,τn)\mathcal H_k(\tau_1,\dots,\tau_n)Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​). No condition is imposed on ∑kHk\sum_k\mathcal H_k∑k​Hk​. The game is zero-sum if ∑k=1nHk≡0\sum_{k=1}^n\mathcal H_k\equiv 0∑k=1n​Hk​≡0.

The zero-sum extension Γ‾\overline\GammaΓ (56.2.2) adds a fictitious player n+1n+1n+1, who has no move and receives

Hn+1(τ1,…,τn)=−∑k=1nHk(τ1,…,τn).\mathcal H_{n+1}(\tau_1,\dots,\tau_n)=-\sum_{k=1}^n\mathcal H_k(\tau_1,\dots,\tau_n).Hn+1​(τ1​,…,τn​)=−k=1∑n​Hk​(τ1​,…,τn​).

Write I‾={1,…,n,n+1}\overline I=\{1,\dots,n,n+1\}I={1,…,n,n+1}. For S⊆I‾S\subseteq\overline IS⊆I, the coalition SSS and its complement ⊥S=I‾−S\bot S=\overline I-S⊥S=I−S play a zero-sum two-person game. The pure strategies of SSS are the tuples of choices of its real members. A mixed strategy ξ\xiξ of SSS is a single probability distribution over these tuples, so the members of a coalition randomize jointly, and likewise η\etaη for ⊥S\bot S⊥S. The payoff to SSS is ∑k∈SHk\sum_{k\in S}\mathcal H_k∑k∈S​Hk​. Then

v(S)=max⁡ξmin⁡ηK(ξ,η),v(S)=\max_\xi\min_\eta K(\xi,\eta),v(S)=ξmax​ηmin​K(ξ,η),

where KKK is the expected payoff to SSS. The function vvv on all S⊆I‾S\subseteq\overline IS⊆I is the extended characteristic function; its restriction to S⊆IS\subseteq IS⊆I is the restricted characteristic function (57.1). For a zero-sum game the restricted function is the characteristic function of Chapter VI.

Formalization targets

Goal: 57.3.4

For every nnn and every set function vvv on the subsets of III,

v is the restricted characteristic function of some general game  ⟺  v(∅)=0 and v(S∪T)≥v(S)+v(T) for S∩T=∅,v \text{ is the restricted characteristic function of some general game} \iff v(\emptyset)=0 \text{ and } v(S\cup T)\ge v(S)+v(T) \text{ for } S\cap T=\emptyset,v is the restricted characteristic function of some general game⟺v(∅)=0 and v(S∪T)≥v(S)+v(T) for S∩T=∅,

and for every set function vvv on the subsets of I‾\overline II,

v is the extended characteristic function of some general game  ⟺  v(∅)=0, v(⊥S)=−v(S), v superadditive.v \text{ is the extended characteristic function of some general game} \iff v(\emptyset)=0,\ v(\bot S)=-v(S),\ v \text{ superadditive}.v is the extended characteristic function of some general game⟺v(∅)=0, v(⊥S)=−v(S), v superadditive.

In each direction a single game realizes vvv on every set simultaneously; v(I)v(I)v(I) is not constrained.

Milestones

  1. (57:1:a)–(57:1:c): necessity of the extended conditions.
  2. (57:2:a), (57:2:c), (57:2:b): necessity of the restricted conditions, including v(−S)≤v(I)−v(S)v(-S)\le v(I)-v(S)v(−S)≤v(I)−v(S).
  3. 57.3.1: sufficiency of (57:2:a), (57:2:c).
  4. 57.3.3: sufficiency of (57:1:a)–(57:1:c).
  5. (57:G): for such vvv, v(−S)=−v(S)v(-S)=-v(S)v(−S)=−v(S) for all SSS holds iff v(S)+v(−S)=v(I)v(S)+v(-S)=v(I)v(S)+v(−S)=v(I) for all SSS and v(I)=0v(I)=0v(I)=0.
  6. (57:B): in a zero-sum game every one-element set of players is removable, meaning that some zero-sum game with the same characteristic function has payoffs that do not depend on that player's choice.
  7. (57:C): the set of all players is removable iff the game is inessential, i.e. v(S)=∑k∈Sαkv(S)=\sum_{k\in S}\alpha_kv(S)=∑k∈S​αk​.

Significance

The characterization fixes the domain of Chapter XI: every statement about solutions of general games is, by 57.3.4, a statement about superadditive set functions with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, and conversely every such function is attained by a strategic game. That converse justifies studying cooperative games abstractly. (57:G) separates the zero-sum and constant-sum subclasses inside this domain. (57:B) and (57:C) quantify how much of a player's strategic role survives when his moves are removed, which is the book's justification for the fictitious player.

Status: all results are proved in the book (1944). To our knowledge none of them is machine-checked; the Prove2Me catalog has superadditive and convex cooperative games, but none tied to a strategic game, and no characteristic function built from a minimax value. The work here is formalizing the known proofs.

Difficulty

Necessity reduces to the zero-sum theory applied to Γ‾\overline\GammaΓ, but still requires the minimax theorem for the coalition's two-person game and a careful treatment of joint mixing when two disjoint coalitions merge. Sufficiency requires building one finite game whose coalition values equal an arbitrary superadditive vvv exactly, for all 2n2^n2n coalitions at once. The obvious attempt, choosing payoffs coalition by coalition, fails because the payoffs are shared: a construction that gives SSS the right value can change the value of every set that overlaps SSS. The difficulty is to obtain the upper bound v(S)≤v0(S)v(S)\le v_0(S)v(S)≤v0​(S) for every SSS simultaneously. For the extended function there is a further difficulty. The fictitious player has no move, so the values on sets containing n+1n+1n+1 are forced by the others, and they must be reconciled with (57:1:b).

For (57:B), the target game must reproduce an arbitrary zero-sum characteristic function while one prescribed player's choice has no effect on any payoff.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n (book indices 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n become 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1); sets of players are Finset (Fin n). The extended domain I‾\overline II is Fin (n + 1) with the fictitious player Fin.last n, and ⊥S\bot S⊥S is the complement in Fin (n + 1). A game (GeneralGame n) has βk≥1\beta_k\ge1βk​≥1 strategies Fin (β k) per player and real payoffs; zero-sum is the predicate IsZeroSum. The fictitious player's single strategy is left out of the coalition's strategy tuples, which does not change the two-person game. Max and Min are ⨆/⨅ over Mathlib's stdSimplex on the coalition's strategy tuples (one joint distribution per coalition). Both simplices are nonempty and the payoff is bounded, so these are attained values and no junk value from an empty or unbounded supremum occurs.

Standing hypotheses and their instantiation:

  • finite strategy sets with βk≥1\beta_k\ge1βk​≥1 (11.2.3, 56.2.2): a field of GeneralGame;
  • "always assuming (57:2:a), (57:2:c)" for (57:G) (p. 537): an explicit hypothesis;
  • "zero-sum nnn-person game" in (57:A)–(57:C) (p. 533): the hypothesis Γ.IsZeroSum and the requirement that the replacement game Γ′\Gamma'Γ′ is zero-sum;
  • "no influence upon the course of the game" (57:A): all payoffs are independent of that player's variable, as in the proof of (57:C) on p. 534;
  • "inessential" (57:C): the additive form (57:13), which p. 534 calls "precisely the definition of inessentiality".

No normalization is imposed: v(I)v(I)v(I) is arbitrary and nothing is reduced. Every statement is made for all n≥0n\ge0n≥0; the book's n≥1n\ge1n≥1 is not needed, so this is a strengthening.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the characteristic function is defined from the game through the coalition's minimax value, so it is never a free parameter, and the existence claims must produce one game for all coalitions at once.

Needed infrastructure: finite zero-sum two-person games with joint mixed strategies over dependent product types; the minimax theorem ((17:6), on the platform as AGT.zero_sum_minimax for matrices); and product decompositions of coalition strategy tuples. The coalition-value API is reusable for any mission built on characteristic functions (Chapters VI, IX–XI). Contributions of this API as separate lemmas are welcome.

Not stated: (57:E*), (57:F*) (given without proof on p. 535), the open question (57:D), and (57:H), because the notion of a "dummy" it uses (from 46.9 and 56.3) is not defined on these pages.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §§56–57, pp. 504–537. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior IX: Solutions for Acyclic RelationsTextbook

Motivation

The solution concept of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) is defined from two ingredients: a set of imputations and a domination relation between them. A solution is a set of imputations that is internally stable (no member dominates another) and externally stable (every non-member is dominated by some member). In §65 of the book the authors observe that this definition never uses what imputations and domination actually are. They abstract it to an arbitrary set DDD and an arbitrary relation S\mathcal SS on DDD, and ask which properties of S\mathcal SS guarantee that exactly one solution exists.

The abstract notion is what graph theory now calls a kernel of a directed graph: draw an arc x→yx \to yx→y whenever xSyx\mathcal S yxSy; a solution is a set of vertices that is independent and absorbs every vertex outside it. Kernels appear in combinatorial game theory (the losing positions of a finite impartial game form a kernel of its move graph) and in the theory of preference and choice.

Timeline.

  • 1944 (1st ed.; 3rd ed. 1953, reprinted 2007): von Neumann and Morgenstern define solutions for an arbitrary relation (§65), show that a finite set with an acyclic relation has exactly one solution (65:X), and that acyclicity is necessary for every subset to have a unique solution (65:Z).
  • 1953: M. Richardson, Solutions of irreflexive relations, extends existence (not uniqueness) to finite relations without cycles of odd length.

Setting

Let DDD be an arbitrary set and S\mathcal SS an arbitrary relation on DDD; xSyx\mathcal S yxSy is read "xxx dominates yyy". A solution (in DDD for S\mathcal SS) is a set V⊆DV \subseteq DV⊆D with

(65:1)V={ y∈D:xSy holds for no x∈V }.\text{(65:1)}\qquad V = \{\, y \in D : x\mathcal S y \text{ holds for no } x \in V \,\}.(65:1)V={y∈D:xSy holds for no x∈V}.

For E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D, an element xxx is a maximum of EEE if x∈Ex \in Ex∈E and no y∈Ey \in Ey∈E has ySxy\mathcal S xySx; the set of maxima is EmE^mEm.

For m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, condition (Am)(A_m)(Am​) says: never x1Sx0,x2Sx1,…,xmSxm−1x_1\mathcal S x_0, x_2\mathcal S x_1, \dots, x_m\mathcal S x_{m-1}x1​Sx0​,x2​Sx1​,…,xm​Sxm−1​ with x0=xmx_0 = x_mx0​=xm​ and all xi∈Dx_i \in Dxi​∈D. The relation is acyclic if it satisfies every (Am)(A_m)(Am​), m=1,2,…m = 1, 2, \dotsm=1,2,…; in particular never xSxx\mathcal S xxSx. It is strictly acyclic if there is no infinite sequence x0,x1,x2,…x_0, x_1, x_2, \dotsx0​,x1​,x2​,… in DDD with xi+1Sxix_{i+1}\mathcal S x_ixi+1​Sxi​ for every iii. Property (65:K) says that every non-empty E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D has Em≠⊖E^m \ne \ominusEm=⊖. A partial ordering (65:B) is a transitive relation for which at most one of x=yx = yx=y, xSyx\mathcal S yxSy, ySxy\mathcal S xySx holds.

For the main theorem the book constructs a candidate solution by induction (65.7.1): A1=DA_1 = DA1​=D; Bi=AimB_i = A_i^mBi​=Aim​; CiC_iCi​ is the set of elements of AiA_iAi​ dominated by some element of BiB_iBi​; Ai+1=Ai−Bi−CiA_{i+1} = A_i - B_i - C_iAi+1​=Ai​−Bi​−Ci​. With i0i_0i0​ the first index for which Ai0=⊖A_{i_0} = \ominusAi0​​=⊖,

(65:2)V0=B1∪⋯∪Bi0−1.\text{(65:2)}\qquad V_0 = B_1 \cup \cdots \cup B_{i_0 - 1}.(65:2)V0​=B1​∪⋯∪Bi0​−1​.

In Lean the elements live in a type α, D V : Set α, and S : α → α → Prop with S x y meaning xSyx\mathcal S yxSy; the predicates are IsSolution D S V, maxima E S, IsAcyclic, IsStrictlyAcyclic, HasMaximaProperty, IsPartialOrdering, ConditionG, and the construction stageA, stageB, stageC, V0.

Formalization targets

Goal: (65:X)

If DDD is finite and S\mathcal SS is acyclic on DDD, then

∃! V: V is a solution in D for S,andV is a solution  ⟺  V=V0.\exists!\, V:\ V \text{ is a solution in } D \text{ for } \mathcal S, \qquad\text{and}\qquad V \text{ is a solution} \iff V = V_0 .∃!V: V is a solution in D for S,andV is a solution⟺V=V0​.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (65:I) For a partial ordering, a finite DDD satisfies (65:G): every non-maximal yyy is dominated by some maximum.
  2. (65:H) For a partial ordering of an arbitrary DDD: VVV is a solution   ⟺  \iff⟺ (65:G) holds and V=DmV = D^mV=Dm.
  3. (65:O:c) Strict acyclicity implies acyclicity; for finite DDD the two are equivalent.
  4. (65:P) (65:K)   ⟺  \iff⟺ strict acyclicity, for arbitrary DDD.
  5. (65:S) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, some AiA_iAi​ is empty.
  6. (65:V) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, every solution equals V0V_0V0​.
  7. (65:W) For finite DDD and acyclic S\mathcal SS, V0V_0V0​ is a solution.
  8. (65:Z) If every E⊆DE \subseteq DE⊆D has a unique solution in EEE for S\mathcal SS, then S\mathcal SS is acyclic on DDD.

Significance

The result itself. (65:X) is the most general of the book's three existence-and-uniqueness theorems for solutions (complete ordering, partial ordering, acyclic relation; 65.8.1). For games proper it has no direct application: the set of imputations of an essential game has no maxima, so (65:K) fails (65.9.1). Its role is to isolate a sufficient condition for a unique solution. With (65:Z), and applied to every subset of DDD, it characterizes the finite relations for which every subset has exactly one solution: exactly the acyclic ones (65.8.2). In graph language it is the statement that a finite directed acyclic graph has exactly one kernel. In combinatorial game theory this is the partition of the positions of a finite impartial game into P- and N-positions. The complete- and partial-ordering results (65:E)–(65:I) are the special cases the book treats first.

Formalizing it. The results are classical and fully proved in the book; to the best of our knowledge none of them is on the Prove2Me platform, and Mathlib has well-foundedness (WellFounded, RelEmbedding of ℕ) but no kernel or von Neumann–Morgenstern solution notion for an abstract relation. The mission produces machine-checked proofs of the book's §65 chain: the equivalence of (65:K) with strict acyclicity for arbitrary sets, the finite equivalence of acyclicity and strict acyclicity, the explicit construction of V0V_0V0​, and the characterization of 65.8.2.

Difficulty

Most of the individual steps are short. The work is in making the book's finite induction precise. The sets AiA_iAi​ are defined recursively and V0V_0V0​ refers to the first empty stage i0i_0i0​. The uniqueness proof (65:V) is a minimal-counterexample argument over the stage index, which moves between "smallest kkk with y∉Aky \notin A_ky∈/Ak​" and the disjoint decomposition (65:U) of DDD into the BiB_iBi​ and CiC_iCi​. A tempting shortcut, taking an arbitrary well-founded rank function instead of the book's construction, proves existence and uniqueness but not that the solution is the V0V_0V0​ of (65:2), which is part of the goal. For (65:P) and (65:O:c) the difficulty is the passage between finite cycles and infinite chains. Going from a chain in a finite set to a repetition needs a pigeonhole argument, and going from a set without maxima to a chain needs dependent choice.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. An ambient type α; D, E, V are Set α; the relation is S : α → α → Prop and is only ever consulted on elements of the set under consideration, so it is the book's relation on DDD (or its restriction to EEE). Finite and infinite sequences are functions ℕ → α.
  • Solutions. IsSolution D S V is the set equation (65:1) literally; it forces V⊆DV \subseteq DV⊆D. Uniqueness in the goal is ∃! over all V : Set α, not over a subtype; there is no degenerate reading in which the solution is fixed by construction.
  • Acyclicity. IsAcyclic D S requires (Am)(A_m)(Am​) for every m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, all cycle elements in DDD. The case m=0m = 0m=0 is excluded, as in the book (it would be unsatisfiable). This is equivalent to the absence of a Relation.TransGen loop inside DDD, but the book's form is stated.
  • Construction. Stages are indexed from 000: stageA D S k is the book's Ak+1A_{k+1}Ak+1​. V0 D S is the union of all BiB_iBi​, which equals B1∪⋯∪Bi0−1B_1 \cup \cdots \cup B_{i_0 - 1}B1​∪⋯∪Bi0​−1​ because every later BiB_iBi​ is empty.
  • Standing hypotheses instantiated. (65:S), (65:V), (65:W) and the goal (65:X) carry the hypotheses of 65.7.1, "DDD finite and S\mathcal SS acyclic" (for finite DDD equivalently strictly acyclic, i.e. (65:K)), as D.Finite and IsAcyclic D S. (65:H) and (65:I) carry the partial-ordering hypothesis (65:B:a), (65:B:b) of 65.5.1, and (65:I) also finiteness of DDD. (65:O:c), (65:P) and (65:Z) are for arbitrary DDD and S\mathcal SS, as 65.6.2 and 65.8.2 state. The empty DDD is allowed everywhere; there the unique solution is ⊖\ominus⊖.
  • Not stated. The infinite case of (65:X) and of (65:Y), which the book leaves open (65.7.1, 65.8.3, question (65:9)); the complete-ordering results (65:E), (65:F), which silently assume D≠⊖D \neq \ominusD=⊖; the counting statement (65:8).
  • Needed infrastructure. Finite-set induction and pigeonhole on Set.Finite, dependent choice for (65:P). The definitions are reusable for any later work on kernels of digraphs and on abstract stable sets. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 60th-anniversary edition, Princeton University Press, 2007 (reprint of the 3rd ed., 1953), §65, pp. 587–602. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829460
  • M. Richardson, Solutions of irreflexive relations, Annals of Mathematics 58 (1953), 573–590. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969755
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems I: Finite Horizon Optimality and Approximating SequencesTextbook

Motivation

Controlled queueing systems (admission control, routing, service-rate selection) are naturally modelled as Markov decision chains whose state is a buffer content and therefore ranges over a countably infinite set. Linn Sennott's Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems (Wiley, 1999, DOI 10.1002/9780470317037) develops the dynamic programming theory for exactly this setting: countable state space, finite action sets, nonnegative and possibly unbounded costs, and value functions that are allowed to be infinite. The book's computational method, the approximating sequence method (ASM), replaces the infinite chain by a sequence of finite truncations and asks when optimal values and policies of the truncations converge to those of the original chain.

This mission is the first of a series on the book. It covers Chapter 3, finite horizon optimization, together with the model of Chapter 2 and three results from Appendices A and B that the chapter uses. The finite horizon theory is the entry point: it is where the book's general policy class, its extended-valued cost criteria and its approximating sequences are first used together.

Setting

A Markov decision chain Δ\DeltaΔ has a countable state space SSS; for each i∈Si \in Si∈S a finite nonempty action set AiA_iAi​; a finite cost C(i,a)≥0C(i,a) \ge 0C(i,a)≥0; and for each a∈Aia \in A_ia∈Ai​ a transition distribution (Pij(a))j∈S(P_{ij}(a))_{j \in S}(Pij​(a))j∈S​. A history at time ttt is ht=(i0,a0,…,it−1,at−1,it)h_t = (i_0, a_0, \dots, i_{t-1}, a_{t-1}, i_t)ht​=(i0​,a0​,…,it−1​,at−1​,it​), and a general policy θ\thetaθ chooses the action at time ttt from a distribution θ(⋅∣ht)\theta(\cdot \mid h_t)θ(⋅∣ht​) on AitA_{i_t}Ait​​: it may use the whole history and may randomize. Stationary policies fff (f(i)∈Aif(i) \in A_if(i)∈Ai​) and deterministic Markov policies (a stationary policy for each time) are special cases.

Fix a finite terminal cost F≥0F \ge 0F≥0 and a discount factor 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1 (α=1\alpha = 1α=1 is the undiscounted case). The nnn horizon expected discounted cost of θ\thetaθ from initial state iii is

vθ,α,n(i)=∑t=0n−1αtEθ[C(Xt,At)∣X0=i]+αnEθ[F(Xn)∣X0=i],v_{\theta,\alpha,n}(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{n-1} \alpha^t E_\theta[C(X_t,A_t) \mid X_0 = i] + \alpha^n E_\theta[F(X_n) \mid X_0 = i],vθ,α,n​(i)=t=0∑n−1​αtEθ​[C(Xt​,At​)∣X0​=i]+αnEθ​[F(Xn​)∣X0​=i],

and the value function is vα,n(i)=inf⁡θvθ,α,n(i)v_{\alpha,n}(i) = \inf_\theta v_{\theta,\alpha,n}(i)vα,n​(i)=infθ​vθ,α,n​(i) over all general policies. Both may be +∞+\infty+∞. A policy is optimal for the nnn horizon if it attains vα,n(i)v_{\alpha,n}(i)vα,n​(i) at every iii. For n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 put uα,n(i,a)=C(i,a)+α∑jPij(a)vα,n−1(j)u_{\alpha,n}(i,a) = C(i,a) + \alpha \sum_j P_{ij}(a) v_{\alpha,n-1}(j)uα,n​(i,a)=C(i,a)+α∑j​Pij​(a)vα,n−1​(j) and let Bi(α,n)B_i(\alpha,n)Bi​(α,n) be the set of a∈Aia \in A_ia∈Ai​ minimizing it.

An approximating sequence (ΔN)N≥N0(\Delta_N)_{N \ge N_0}(ΔN​)N≥N0​​ has finite nonempty state spaces SNS_NSN​ increasing to SSS, the same actions and costs, and transition distributions Pij(a;N)P_{ij}(a;N)Pij​(a;N) on SNS_NSN​ converging to Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) as N→∞N \to \inftyN→∞. Its value functions are vα,nNv^N_{\alpha,n}vα,nN​. In an augmentation type approximating sequence, the probability Pir(a)P_{ir}(a)Pir​(a) of leaving SNS_NSN​ to rrr is redistributed over SNS_NSN​ by an augmentation distribution qj(i,a,r,N)q_j(i,a,r,N)qj​(i,a,r,N). Assumption FH(α\alphaα, nnn) requires lim sup⁡Nvα,nN(i)\limsup_N v^N_{\alpha,n}(i)limsupN​vα,nN​(i) to be finite and at most vα,n(i)v_{\alpha,n}(i)vα,n​(i) for every iii. A stationary policy eee is a limit point of stationary policies eNe^NeN if, along a subsequence, eNr(i)=e(i)e^{N_r}(i) = e(i)eNr​(i)=e(i) eventually for each iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2.3

For fixed n≥1n \ge 1n≥1,

(∀i: lim⁡N→∞vα,nN(i)=vα,n(i)<∞)  ⟺  FH(α,n),\Big(\forall i:\ \lim_{N\to\infty} v^N_{\alpha,n}(i) = v_{\alpha,n}(i) < \infty\Big) \iff \mathrm{FH}(\alpha,n),(∀i: N→∞lim​vα,nN​(i)=vα,n​(i)<∞)⟺FH(α,n),

and under either condition every limit point ene_nen​ of stationary policies enNe^N_nenN​ with enN(i)∈BiN(α,n)e^N_n(i) \in B^N_i(\alpha,n)enN​(i)∈BiN​(α,n) satisfies en(i)∈Bi(α,n)e_n(i) \in B_i(\alpha,n)en​(i)∈Bi​(α,n) for all i∈Si \in Si∈S.

Milestones

  1. Proposition A.1.1: a probability average of uuu is at least min⁡u\min uminu, with equality iff the distribution is concentrated on the minimizers.
  2. Theorem 3.1.2: the finite horizon optimality equation vα,n(i)=min⁡auα,n(i,a)v_{\alpha,n}(i) = \min_a u_{\alpha,n}(i,a)vα,n​(i)=mina​uα,n​(i,a), and the characterization of all optimal general policies.
  3. Corollary 3.1.4: choosing fn−t(i)∈Bi(α,n−t)f_{n-t}(i) \in B_i(\alpha,n-t)fn−t​(i)∈Bi​(α,n−t) yields an optimal deterministic Markov policy.
  4. Proposition 2.5.6: the augmentation (2.19) defines an approximating distribution.
  5. Lemma 3.2.2: vα,0N→vα,0v^N_{\alpha,0} \to v_{\alpha,0}vα,0N​→vα,0​ and lim inf⁡Nvα,nN≥vα,n\liminf_N v^N_{\alpha,n} \ge v_{\alpha,n}liminfN​vα,nN​≥vα,n​.
  6. Propositions B.3 and B.5: sequences of stationary policies, for Δ\DeltaΔ or for (ΔN)(\Delta_N)(ΔN​), have limit points.
  7. Propositions 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.4: three sufficient conditions for FH(α\alphaα, nnn), namely bounded costs, an augmentation sending excess probability to a finite set, and the augmentation inequality (3.20).

Significance

Theorem 3.1.2 is the finite horizon dynamic programming equation in the generality the rest of the book needs: the value function is an infimum over history-dependent randomized policies, and the equation holds with infinite values allowed. Its characterization of optimal policies is Bellman's principle of optimality in necessary-and-sufficient form. Corollary 3.1.4 shows that deterministic Markov policies suffice. The discounted chapter builds on these results, since its value function is the limit of finite horizon ones, and so does the value iteration algorithm of the average cost chapters.

Theorem 3.2.3 is the finite horizon case of the approximating sequence method. It says exactly when finite truncations give the right answer, and it reduces the question to Assumption FH, for which Section 3.3 gives checkable conditions. The same structure (a lim inf inequality, a lim sup assumption, a limit point of optimal truncated policies) recurs for the discounted and the average cost criteria in later chapters.

The results are proved in the book. None of them is formalized: the platform has finite horizon dynamic programming only for Markov policies, abstract monotone mappings or finite reward-maximizing MDPs, and nothing on approximating sequences. A formalization contributes a Lean model of Markov decision chains with general policies and extended-valued criteria, which the later missions of the series restate and can merge with this one.

Difficulty

The obvious proof of the optimality equation conditions on the first action and state and then applies the induction hypothesis to the rest of the trajectory. With general policies the rest of the trajectory is governed by a continuation policy that depends on the first state and action, and the decomposition of the path law into a first step and a continuation must be proved from the definition of the process, not assumed. Infinite values also make the "only if" direction delicate: a strict inequality between expected costs becomes an equality once both sides are infinite.

For approximating sequences, the natural idea is to pass to the limit in the optimality equation of ΔN\Delta_NΔN​. This fails in general. Example 3.2.1 of the book has lim⁡Nv1,2N(0)=2>1=v1,2(0)\lim_N v^N_{1,2}(0) = 2 > 1 = v_{1,2}(0)limN​v1,2N​(0)=2>1=v1,2​(0), because truncation moves probability onto states of high cost and dominated convergence is not available. Only the lim inf inequality holds for free, through a generalized Fatou lemma for approximating distributions. The lim sup side is exactly what Assumption FH supplies. The limit point argument then needs the compactness statement of Appendix B and the fact that a lim inf can be passed through a minimum over a finite set.

Formalization scope

The state space is a type S with [Countable S], the actions a type Act, and A i : Finset Act is nonempty. Costs are ℝ≥0, transition probabilities ℝ≥0∞ summing to 1 over S, and all values and expectations are in ℝ≥0∞, so infima over policies are lattice infima and +∞ is a genuine value. A history is the list of past state–action pairs, most recent first, with the current state, and a policy gives a distribution on A i for every history. Expectations are sums over histories of the path probabilities ∏θ(as∣hs)Pisis+1(as)\prod \theta(a_s \mid h_s) P_{i_s i_{s+1}}(a_s)∏θ(as​∣hs​)Pis​is+1​​(as​), which is the book's (2.6) and (2.9), not the dynamic programming recursion. The discount factor satisfies 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1 in every statement. An approximating sequence is indexed by N∈NN \in \mathbb NN∈N with a start level N0N_0N0​; its value functions are set to 000 for the finitely many NNN at which a given state is not yet in SNS_NSN​, which does not affect limits.

The optimality equation must not be made definitional by defining vθ,α,nv_{\theta,\alpha,n}vθ,α,n​ or vα,nv_{\alpha,n}vα,n​ through the recursion (3.2). The policy class must not be restricted to deterministic Markov policies either, since that would make the characterization in Theorem 3.1.2 a different statement. Theorem 3.1.2(ii)(2) is stated with the guard vα,n(i)<∞v_{\alpha,n}(i) < \inftyvα,n​(i)<∞; the book omits it, and without it the "only if" direction is false (see the item's note).

A complete development needs the first-step decomposition of the path law under a general policy, the generalized Fatou lemma for approximating distributions (Proposition A.2.5, a milestone of the Appendix A mission of this series), and lim inf / lim sup manipulations in ℝ≥0∞. The model definitions are reusable by every later mission of the series. Contributions are welcome at every milestone, including proofs of the definitional sanity facts (for instance vθ,α,0=Fv_{\theta,\alpha,0} = Fvθ,α,0​=F).

Selected references

  • Linn I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, John Wiley & Sons, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • Martin L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994 (the standard reference for finite horizon dynamic programming with history-dependent randomized policies).
  • Richard Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957.
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