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The OR Formalization Drive

Help us formalize the operations research literature in Lean.

645 completed missions

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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems II: The Optimal Order Quantity of the Stochastic (Q, r) Model Exceeds the EOQ by a Bounded GapResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard control rule for a single stocked item with random demand: whenever the inventory position falls to the reorder point rrr, an order of fixed size QQQ is placed. It is implemented in a large share of commercial inventory systems. Choosing the two parameters jointly has traditionally required numerical search (Hadley and Whitin, 1963; Federgruen and Zheng, 1992). In practice the order quantity is therefore often taken from the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) formula with backorders, and the reorder point is then set for the random demand.

Zheng (1992) turned this practice into a question with an exact answer: how does the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ of the stochastic model compare with the EOQ quantity Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ computed from the same cost data and the same mean demand? Its Theorem 2 answers it with a two-sided bound. This mission formalizes that theorem. Companion missions of the same series formalize the paper's cost bounds (Theorem 3), the flatness of the cost curve (Theorem 4) and the 1/81/81/8 bound on the cost of using the EOQ quantity (Theorem 5).

Setting

Demand arrives at rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 and replenishment orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L > 0L>0. Shortages are backordered. Holding costs accrue at rate h>0h > 0h>0 per unit held, backorder penalties at rate p>0p > 0p>0 per unit short, and every order costs K>0K > 0K>0. The leadtime demand DDD is a nonnegative random variable with law μ\muμ and mean E(D)=λL\mathbb{E}(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL. The expected inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is the newsvendor cost

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = \mathbb{E}\big[h(y - D)^+ + p(D - y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed, as in the paper, to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​.

For each Q>0Q > 0Q>0, let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be an optimal reorder point, i.e. a minimizer of c(Q,⋅)c(Q, \cdot)c(Q,⋅). The analysis runs through the curves

H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),H0(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QH(y) dy,H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q > 0),\quad H(0) = G(y^0),\qquad H_0(Q) = H(Q) - G(y^0),\qquad A(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy,H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),H0​(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H(y)dy,

and through the cost C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)) of order quantity QQQ with the reorder point set optimally. The optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ is the minimizer of CCC over Q>0Q > 0Q>0.

The EOQ model is the case of a constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y - \lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L - y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and the same construction gives rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, AdA_dAd​ and the optimal quantity

Qd∗=2λK(h+p)hp.Q^*_d = \sqrt{\frac{2\lambda K(h+p)}{hp}}.Qd∗​=hp2λK(h+p)​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 96)

For K>0K > 0K>0, let Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ be the positive solutions of

QH0(Q)=2λK,H0(Q)=Hd(Qd∗),∫0QH0(y) dy=λK.Q H_0(Q) = 2\lambda K,\qquad H_0(Q) = H_d(Q^*_d),\qquad \int_0^Q H_0(y)\,dy = \lambda K.QH0​(Q)=2λK,H0​(Q)=Hd​(Qd∗​),∫0Q​H0​(y)dy=λK.

Each has exactly one positive solution, and

Qd∗≤Q∗≤Qˉ,Qˉ≤Qˉ1,Qˉ≤Qˉ2.Q^*_d \le Q^* \le \bar Q,\qquad \bar Q \le \bar Q_1,\qquad \bar Q \le \bar Q_2.Qd∗​≤Q∗≤Qˉ​,Qˉ​≤Qˉ​1​,Qˉ​≤Qˉ​2​.

Moreover, with λ,L,h,p\lambda, L, h, pλ,L,h,p and the demand law fixed, K↦Qˉ1(K)−Qd∗(K)K \mapsto \bar Q_1(K) - Q^*_d(K)K↦Qˉ​1​(K)−Qd∗​(K) is nondecreasing on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞) and converges to a finite constant as K→∞K \to \inftyK→∞.

Milestones

The milestones are the paper's own numbered results that feed Theorem 2, listed in the order the argument uses them:

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 90): for Q>0Q > 0Q>0, rrr is optimal iff G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r + Q)G(r)=G(r+Q).
  2. Eq. (7) (p. 91): C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y) dy)/QC(Q) = (\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q.
  3. Lemma 4 (p. 91): HHH is increasing and convex with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  4. Lemma 6 (p. 92): AAA is increasing and convex, and Q=Q∗Q = Q^*Q=Q∗ iff A(Q)=λKA(Q) = \lambda KA(Q)=λK.
  5. Eqs. (18), (20) (p. 94): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ is optimal for the EOQ model.
  6. Lemma 7 (p. 95): H0≤Hd≤HH_0 \le H_d \le HH0​≤Hd​≤H and A≤AdA \le A_dA≤Ad​.
  7. Lemma 8 (p. 95): ∫0QH≥12QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥12QH0(Q)≥∫0QH0\int_0^Q H \ge \tfrac12 QH(Q) \ge A(Q) \ge \tfrac12 QH_0(Q) \ge \int_0^Q H_0∫0Q​H≥21​QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥21​QH0​(Q)≥∫0Q​H0​, with equalities for deterministic demand.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 says that the EOQ formula always underestimates the optimal order quantity when leadtime demand is random. The underestimate is bounded by Qˉ1−Qd∗\bar Q_1 - Q^*_dQˉ​1​−Qd∗​, a quantity that stays bounded however large the ordering cost is. So the relative error of the EOQ quantity vanishes as KKK grows. The first inequality, Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗, is also an ingredient of the paper's Theorem 3 (cost bounds) and Theorem 5 (the EOQ quantity raises costs by at most 1/81/81/8). The explicit bounds Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ bracket Q∗Q^*Q∗ and give a search interval for it.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved on paper since 1992. No machine-checked version of it, or of the continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost of Eq. (1), exists on this platform. The inventory items already here treat the discrete cost with integer order quantities, a normally distributed demand, or the EOQ without backorders. This mission provides a machine-checked version of the paper's optimality conditions for a general demand distribution. The paper's argument differentiates GGG twice, i.e. it tacitly assumes a density. The formal statements do not, so a formal proof must redo those steps with one-sided (convexity) arguments. The printed argument for the limit in part (b) shows only that a derivative tends to zero. A complete proof of convergence is part of the work.

Difficulty

The obvious route to Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗ compares the two cost curves CCC and CdC_dCd​ directly. It fails because C≥CdC \ge C_dC≥Cd​ pointwise, and a pointwise inequality between two convex functions says nothing about the order of their minimizers. The stochastic curve HHH is defined only implicitly, as GGG evaluated at a minimizer of a parametric integral, so its growth relative to the linear HdH_dHd​ has to be established before any comparison of order quantities. For part (b), a vanishing derivative does not imply convergence (log⁡K\log KlogK also has a vanishing derivative), so the printed proof of the limit does not go through as written.

Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) need not be differentiable. Every derivative in the paper's proofs (of rrr, HHH and AAA) must be replaced by monotonicity or chord arguments.

Formalization scope

The Lean development uses the namespace ZhengQR.OrderQty. Its conventions:

  • Parameters. λ,L,K,h,p\lambda, L, K, h, pλ,L,K,h,p are reals, all assumed strictly positive. K>0K > 0K>0 is implicit in the paper; at K=0K = 0K=0 the optimal quantity degenerates.
  • Demand. The law μ\muμ of DDD is a probability measure on R\mathbb{R}R that is integrable, has mean λL\lambda LλL and is carried by [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). No density is assumed, so discrete laws such as the Poisson of the paper's §4 are allowed.
  • Standing assumption. GGG has a unique global minimizer (p. 90). It is a hypothesis of every statement about the stochastic model.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, CCC, AAA, H0H_0H0​ and optimality of QQQ are defined for an arbitrary cost rate GGG and applied to both the newsvendor cost and GdG_dGd​. So Eqs. (18) and (20) are theorems, not definitions. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers, never solutions of Lemma 2's equation. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) minimizes ∫rr+QG\int_r^{r+Q}G∫rr+Q​G, which for Q>0Q > 0Q>0 has the same minimizers as c(Q,⋅)c(Q, \cdot)c(Q,⋅), so HHH, H0H_0H0​ and AAA do not depend on KKK.
  • Domains. HHH, H0H_0H0​ and AAA are used on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), ccc and CCC for Q>0Q > 0Q>0 only, and Q∗Q^*Q∗ is a Q>0Q > 0Q>0 minimizing CCC over (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞).
  • Readings of informal words.
    • Lemma 4's "increasing" and Lemma 6's "increasing/decreasing" mean strictly.
    • Lemma 4's "asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" means H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q \to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q′)−H(Q)≤hph+p(Q′−Q)H(Q') - H(Q) \le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q' - Q)H(Q′)−H(Q)≤h+php​(Q′−Q) for 0≤Q<Q′0 \le Q < Q'0≤Q<Q′.
    • "Qˉ=def{Q:… }\bar Q \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{Q : \dots\}Qˉ​=def{Q:…}" means the unique positive solution. The goal quantifies over every positive solution and separately asserts that exactly one exists.
    • Theorem 2's "increasing function of KKK" means nondecreasing, which is what the paper's proof establishes (a nonnegative derivative).
    • "Converges to a constant" means a finite real limit.
    • Lemma 8's "the leadtime demand is deterministic" means the EOQ model with cost rate GdG_dGd​.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The goal's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example by a deterministic leadtime demand). Existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗ (Lemma 6) and of Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ (the goal itself) is asserted, so neither the bounds nor the limit hold vacuously.

Infrastructure needed includes the following. Much of it is reusable for any single-item inventory model:

  • differentiation under the expectation, or one-sided substitutes, for GGG;
  • convexity of HHH as the inverse of the width of the sublevel sets of GGG;
  • the envelope identity behind Eq. (7);
  • elementary convex-analysis facts about chords.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, general lemmas on the newsvendor cost, and a complete convergence argument for part (b).

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • A. Federgruen, Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems III: Bounds between the Optimal Costs of the Stochastic (Q, r) Model and the EOQ ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy — order a fixed quantity QQQ whenever the inventory position falls to the reorder point rrr — is the textbook policy for a single item with random demand and a positive replenishment leadtime (Hadley and Whitin 1963). Its optimal parameters have no closed form, so practice routinely falls back on the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) model with backorders, whose optimum is explicit. How much the deterministic model misjudges the stochastic system's cost is therefore a practical question, and before Zheng (1992) it had been studied only numerically (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978).

Zheng's paper answers it analytically. This mission targets its Theorem 3, which brackets the optimal cost of the stochastic model by the optimal cost of the EOQ model with the same parameters.

Setting

Demands arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L>0L>0. Each order costs K>0K>0K>0; holding and backorder costs accrue at rates h>0h>0h>0 and p>0p>0p>0 per unit per unit time. The leadtime demand DDD is a nonnegative random variable with E(D)=λLE(D)=\lambda LE(D)=λL. The inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is the newsvendor cost

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y)=E\big[h(y-D)^+ + p(D-y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0.

For order quantity Q>0Q>0Q>0 and reorder point rrr, the long-run average cost is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ.c(Q,r)=\frac{\lambda K+\int_r^{r+Q}G(y)\,dy}{Q}.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​.

Let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be a reorder point minimizing c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅), and define H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q)) for Q>0Q>0Q>0, H(0)=G(y0)H(0)=G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0), and C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)). The optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ minimizes CCC over Q>0Q>0Q>0, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^*=C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗). Write H0(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0)H_0(Q)=H(Q)-G(y^0)H0​(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0) and

C0(Q)=λK+∫0QH0(y) dyQ,C_0(Q)=\frac{\lambda K+\int_0^Q H_0(y)\,dy}{Q},C0​(Q)=QλK+∫0Q​H0​(y)dy​,

the controllable cost, so that C(Q)=G(y0)+C0(Q)C(Q)=G(y^0)+C_0(Q)C(Q)=G(y0)+C0​(Q); C0∗=C0(Q∗)C^*_0=C_0(Q^*)C0∗​=C0​(Q∗). The constant G(y0)G(y^0)G(y0) is the newsboy cost.

The EOQ model is the same construction with demand constant at λL\lambda LλL: Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y)=h(y-\lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L-y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, with functions HdH_dHd​, CdC_dCd​, optimal quantity Qd∗=2λK(h+p)/(hp)Q^*_d=\sqrt{2\lambda K(h+p)/(hp)}Qd∗​=2λK(h+p)/(hp)​ and optimal cost Cd∗=Cd(Qd∗)C^*_d=C_d(Q^*_d)Cd∗​=Cd​(Qd∗​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 97)

C0∗≤Qd∗Q∗ Cd∗,Cd∗≤C∗≤G(y0)+Qd∗Q∗ Cd∗.C^*_0\le\frac{Q^*_d}{Q^*}\,C^*_d,\qquad C^*_d\le C^*\le G(y^0)+\frac{Q^*_d}{Q^*}\,C^*_d.C0∗​≤Q∗Qd∗​​Cd∗​,Cd∗​≤C∗≤G(y0)+Q∗Qd∗​​Cd∗​.

All three inequalities are part of the goal. The weaker remark after the proof, Cd∗≤C∗≤Cd∗+G(y0)C^*_d\le C^*\le C^*_d+G(y^0)Cd∗​≤C∗≤Cd∗​+G(y0), drops the factor Qd∗/Q∗Q^*_d/Q^*Qd∗​/Q∗ and is not the goal.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (7): C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y) dy)/QC(Q)=\big(\lambda K+\int_0^Q H(y)\,dy\big)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  2. Eq. (8): Q>0Q>0Q>0 is optimal iff H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q).
  3. Eqs. (13)–(15): C(Q)=G(y0)+C0(Q)C(Q)=G(y^0)+C_0(Q)C(Q)=G(y0)+C0​(Q), and H0(Q∗)=C0(Q∗)H_0(Q^*)=C_0(Q^*)H0​(Q∗)=C0​(Q∗).
  4. Lemma 6: A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QHA(Q)=QH(Q)-\int_0^QHA(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H is increasing and convex; Q=Q∗Q=Q^*Q=Q∗ iff A(Q)=λKA(Q)=\lambda KA(Q)=λK; Q∗Q^*Q∗ increases and r∗r^*r∗ decreases in KKK.
  5. Eqs. (18), (20): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q)=\frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ is the EOQ optimum.
  6. Lemma 8: ∫0QH≥12QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥12QH0(Q)≥∫0QH0\int_0^QH\ge\tfrac12QH(Q)\ge A(Q)\ge\tfrac12QH_0(Q)\ge\int_0^QH_0∫0Q​H≥21​QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥21​QH0​(Q)≥∫0Q​H0​, with equalities for deterministic demand.
  7. Eq. (22): Gd(y)≤G(y)G_d(y)\le G(y)Gd​(y)≤G(y) for all yyy.

Significance

Theorem 3 says that randomness of leadtime demand raises the total optimal cost above the EOQ's, yet the controllable part of that cost — the part the order quantity actually trades off — is smaller than the EOQ's cost, scaled by Qd∗/Q∗Q^*_d/Q^*Qd∗​/Q∗. Combined with Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d\le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗ (Theorem 2 of the paper), the gap C∗−Cd∗C^*-C^*_dC∗−Cd∗​ is at most the newsboy cost G(y0)G(y^0)G(y0), independent of KKK, so the EOQ cost is a good proxy when KKK is large relative to G(y0)G(y^0)G(y0). The same machinery yields the paper's Theorem 5, that using Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ in the stochastic model costs at most 1/81/81/8 more than the optimum.

The result was proved in 1992; no machine-checked proof is known to exist. Formalizing it requires the continuous (Q,r)(Q,r)(Q,r) model as a whole — optimal reorder points, the one-variable reduction through HHH, and the area function AAA — none of which is in Mathlib. The companion missions of this series formalize Theorems 2, 4 and 5 of the same paper on the same model.

Difficulty

The middle inequality compares minima of two different functions: Cd≤CC_d\le CCd​≤C pointwise follows from Jensen's inequality, but only after the reorder point of each model is chosen optimally, so the comparison has to pass through the definition of CCC as a minimum over rrr. The outer inequalities depend on Lemma 8, whose proof uses convexity of HHH and a slope comparison H′≤Hd′H'\le H_d'H′≤Hd′​ (Lemmas 4 and 7). The paper argues these through first and second derivatives of r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and GGG, which exist only when the leadtime demand has a smooth distribution; the formal statements assume no density, so a proof must either avoid derivatives or handle one-sided ones. Existence of optimal reorder points and of Q∗Q^*Q∗ is asserted in the paper without a separate argument.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace ZhengQR.CostBounds. The machinery (qrCost, reorderPt, idealPt, Hfun, Cfun, Afun, H0fun, C0fun, IsOptQty) is defined for an arbitrary G:R→RG:\mathbb R\to\mathbb RG:R→R and instantiated at the stochastic GGG and at GdG_dGd​. A structure QRModel holds the parameters, the demand distribution μ\muμ (a probability measure on R\mathbb RR) and the standing assumptions.

Conventions committed to:

  • Positivity of λ,L,K,h,p\lambda,L,K,h,pλ,L,K,h,p; D≥0D\ge0D≥0 almost surely; DDD integrable with E(D)=λLE(D)=\lambda LE(D)=λL; GGG has a unique minimizer (p. 90). No density is assumed.
  • r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is a chosen minimizer of c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅) over R\mathbb RR, not a solution of G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q); y0y^0y0 is a chosen minimizer of GGG. Both use junk value 000 when no minimizer exists, which never happens under the assumptions.
  • H(0)=G(y0)H(0)=G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0); statements about HHH and AAA are on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), about ccc, CCC, C0C_0C0​ for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  • "Optimal order quantity" means Q>0Q>0Q>0 and C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q)\le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q'>0Q′>0; the goal takes any such Q∗Q^*Q∗ and Lemma 6 states that exactly one exists, so the goal is not vacuous.
  • Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​ is Cd(Qd∗)C_d(Q^*_d)Cd​(Qd∗​), with Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ the explicit formula (20); milestone 5 proves it is the EOQ optimum. C0∗C^*_0C0∗​ is C0(Q∗)C_0(Q^*)C0​(Q∗), which equals min⁡Q>0C0\min_{Q>0}C_0minQ>0​C0​ by (13).
  • "Increasing" in Lemma 6 is read strictly, as the proof gives. Lemma 8 is stated for Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0; "deterministic" means μ\muμ is the Dirac mass at λL\lambda LλL.

A formalization in which Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​ were an arbitrary number, or Q∗Q^*Q∗ an arbitrary positive real, would make the goal false or empty; both are tied to the model above.

Needed infrastructure: existence of minimizers of convex coercive functions on R\mathbb RR, differentiation of parametric integrals ∫r(Q)r(Q)+QG\int_{r(Q)}^{r(Q)+Q}G∫r(Q)r(Q)+Q​G, and properties of the newsvendor cost (convexity, coercivity, Jensen). Most of it is reusable for any continuous-review inventory model. Proofs of any milestone, and of lemmas the paper uses but this mission does not list (Lemmas 2–5, 7), are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • P. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems IV: The (Q, r) Cost Is Flatter in the Order Quantity than the EOQ CostResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard replenishment rule of inventory theory: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, order a fixed order quantity QQQ. It is used in practice and taught in every operations management course, usually after the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) model, which is the same system with a constant demand stream.

Practitioners and textbooks rely on a robustness property of the EOQ: its cost is very insensitive to the choice of order quantity. If the order quantity is off by a factor α\alphaα, the cost rises only by the factor 12(α+1/α)\tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)21​(α+1/α); ordering 50% too much costs about 8% extra. The insensitivity of the stochastic (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) system to its control parameters had been observed numerically (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978), but, as Zheng notes, no analytical result on it was known.

Timeline:

  • 1963: Hadley and Whitin derive the (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost for Poisson demand.
  • 1986: Zipkin proves that the average backorders of a (Q,r)(Q,r)(Q,r) policy are jointly convex in (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) under continuous demand (Zipkin 1986).
  • 1992: Zheng derives simple optimality conditions for the continuous (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) model and compares it with the EOQ model under the same cost structure. One of the results is that the stochastic cost curve is flatter in the order quantity than the EOQ curve (Zheng 1992). This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Demands arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L>0L>0; all stockouts are backordered. Each order costs K>0K>0K>0; holding costs accrue at rate h>0h>0h>0 per unit in stock and penalty costs at rate p>0p>0p>0 per unit backordered. The leadtime demand D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 has distribution μ\muμ with finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL.

The inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = E\big[h(y-D)^+ + p(D-y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ,Q>0.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}, \qquad Q>0.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​,Q>0.

For fixed Q>0Q>0Q>0 let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be a reorder point minimizing c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅), and let

C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q)), \qquad H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q>0), \quad H(0) = G(y^0).C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).

CCC is the cost of the order quantity QQQ when the reorder point is always chosen optimally for it. An optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ minimizes CCC over Q>0Q>0Q>0, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^* = C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗).

The EOQ model is the same system with the constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y-\lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L-y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, CdC_dCd​ are the objects above at GdG_dGd​, with optimum Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ and Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

C(αQ∗)C∗≤12(α+1α)∀α>0.\frac{C(\alpha Q^*)}{C^*} \le \frac12\left(\alpha + \frac1\alpha\right) \qquad \forall \alpha>0.C∗C(αQ∗)​≤21​(α+α1​)∀α>0.

The goal holds for every demand distribution satisfying the standing assumptions and every optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗. Both regimes, α<1\alpha<1α<1 and α>1\alpha>1α>1, are included.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Eq. (7): ∫r(Q)r(Q)+QG=∫0QH\int_{r(Q)}^{r(Q)+Q} G = \int_0^Q H∫r(Q)r(Q)+Q​G=∫0Q​H, hence C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y)dy)/QC(Q) = \big(\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)dy\big)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  2. Lemma 4: HHH is increasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  3. Eq. (8): an optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗ exists, and Q>0Q>0Q>0 is optimal iff H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q) = C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q).
  4. Eq. (18): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, with rd(Q)=λL−hh+pQr_d(Q) = \lambda L - \frac{h}{h+p}Qrd​(Q)=λL−h+ph​Q.
  5. Lemma 7: H0(Q)≤Hd(Q)≤H(Q)H_0(Q) \le H_d(Q) \le H(Q)H0​(Q)≤Hd​(Q)≤H(Q) and A(Q)≤Ad(Q)A(Q)\le A_d(Q)A(Q)≤Ad​(Q), where H0=H−G(y0)H_0 = H - G(y^0)H0​=H−G(y0) and A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QHA(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q HA(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H.
  6. Eqs. (26)–(27): H(αQ)≤αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\le \alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≤αH(Q) for α>1\alpha>1α>1 and H(αQ)≥αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\ge\alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≥αH(Q) for 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1.
  7. Lemma 9: ∫QαQH(y) dy≤α2−12 QH(Q)\int_Q^{\alpha Q} H(y)\,dy \le \frac{\alpha^2-1}{2}\,Q H(Q)∫QαQ​H(y)dy≤2α2−1​QH(Q) for all α>0\alpha>0α>0, Q>0Q>0Q>0.

Significance

In the EOQ model the relative cost of a scaled order quantity is exactly Cd(αQd∗)/Cd∗=12(α+1/α)C_d(\alpha Q^*_d)/C^*_d = \tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)Cd​(αQd∗​)/Cd∗​=21​(α+1/α) (Eq. (25) of the paper). Theorem 4 shows that the stochastic system is at least as forgiving. The bound holds for every leadtime-demand distribution with a unique newsvendor minimizer, and it does not depend on the parameters KKK, hhh, ppp, λ\lambdaλ or LLL. Because the reorder point is re-optimized for each quantity, the bound applies to the practical question of how much a misestimated lot size costs when the safety stock is set correctly.

Together with the other results of the paper (the 1/81/81/8 bound for the EOQ heuristic and the bounds between Q∗Q^*Q∗ and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​, which are separate missions of this series), it gives a closed-form account of why the EOQ is a good heuristic for stochastic systems.

The result has a complete published proof. It has not been machine-checked. The work that remains is a formal proof for general distributions: the paper differentiates GGG and r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) twice, and a formal proof has to replace those derivatives with arguments that need no density.

Difficulty

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is defined through an inner minimization over the reorder point, so its shape in QQQ is controlled by the implicitly defined function H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q) = G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q)) rather than by GGG directly. The obvious approach would bound C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) with the reorder point fixed at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗). That approach is the wrong comparison: it bounds a larger quantity, and the resulting bound depends on the distribution.

The paper's proof uses three properties of HHH: that it is convex, that its slope never exceeds the EOQ slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p), and that it dominates HdH_dHd​. The paper obtains these from the derivatives r′(Q)r'(Q)r′(Q) and H′(Q)H'(Q)H′(Q) under a smooth demand distribution. Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is only an argmin and HHH need not be differentiable, so none of these three properties can be read off a derivative formula; the asymptotic slope in particular depends on the finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL and on the behaviour of GGG at ±∞\pm\infty±∞.

Formalization scope

The mission is set in Lean 4 with Mathlib. All objects are real valued.

  • Model. The structure QRModel bundles λ,L,K,h,p>0\lambda, L, K, h, p>0λ,L,K,h,p>0, a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb{R}R with integrable identity, ∫x dμ=λL\int x\,d\mu = \lambda L∫xdμ=λL, D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 almost surely, and the unique-minimizer hypothesis on GGG. K>0K>0K>0 is implicit in the paper and made explicit here. No density is assumed; deterministic and discrete demands are allowed, and the paper's own numerical study uses Poisson demand.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, H0H_0H0​, CCC and AAA are defined for an arbitrary cost rate and instantiated at GGG and at GdG_dGd​. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers; they are never defined by the equation G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q), which is a lemma of the paper. H(0)=G(y0)H(0) = G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0). Values at Q<0Q<0Q<0 (and of ccc, CCC at Q≤0Q\le 0Q≤0) are junk, and every statement restricts to Q>0Q>0Q>0 or Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0.
  • Readings of informal words. "Increasing" in Lemma 4 is strict on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), since the proof shows H′>0H'>0H′>0. "Asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" is stated as H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q\to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q2)−H(Q1)≤hph+p(Q2−Q1)H(Q_2)-H(Q_1)\le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q_2-Q_1)H(Q2​)−H(Q1​)≤h+php​(Q2​−Q1​) for 0≤Q1≤Q20\le Q_1\le Q_20≤Q1​≤Q2​. The chord bound is the derivative-free form of H′≤hp/(h+p)H'\le hp/(h+p)H′≤hp/(h+p) that the proofs of Lemmas 7–9 use. "The optimal order quantity" is IsOptQty Q, meaning Q>0Q>0Q>0 and C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q)\le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q'>0Q′>0. Its existence is asserted in the Eq. (8) milestone, so the goal is not vacuous. "∀α>0\forall\alpha>0∀α>0" is a real α>0\alpha>0α>0 with real division 1/α1/\alpha1/α. In Lemma 9 the integral ∫QαQ\int_Q^{\alpha Q}∫QαQ​ is oriented, as on the page.
  • Ruling out trivializations. C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) re-optimizes the reorder point for αQ∗\alpha Q^*αQ∗; holding it at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗) would be a different theorem. C∗>0C^*>0C∗>0 is a consequence of the model, not a hypothesis.

A complete development needs the following:

  • integrability and continuity of GGG;
  • existence of the optimal reorder point;
  • convexity of HHH;
  • the asymptotics G−Gd→0G - G_d\to 0G−Gd​→0 at ±∞\pm\infty±∞;
  • Jensen's inequality Gd≤GG_d\le GGd​≤G (Eq. (22));
  • existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗.

These facts about newsvendor cost functions are reusable in the other missions of this series. Contributions of any of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • P. H. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • H. M. Wagner, M. O'Hagan and B. Lundh, An Empirical Study of Exactly and Approximately Optimal Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(7):690–723, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.7.690
  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions II: A Nonadaptive Algorithm Achieves 1/3 of the OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Maximizing a submodular set function without constraints contains Max Cut, Max Directed Cut, maximum facility location and several graph and hypergraph cut problems as special cases, and it appears in operations research wherever a value exhibits diminishing returns but is not monotone (profit that combines coverage with a cost, for example). These problems are NP-hard, so the question is which fraction of the optimum an efficient algorithm can guarantee when the function is accessible only through a value oracle that returns f(S)f(S)f(S) for a queried set SSS.

Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (SIAM J. Comput. 40(4), 2011) gave the first constant-factor approximation algorithms for maximizing a general nonnegative submodular function. The simplest of them returns a uniformly random set and achieves 1/41/41/4 of the optimum; this mission is about the next one, a nonadaptive algorithm: it decides all of its oracle queries before seeing any answer, then computes a set from the answers. Such an algorithm can be run in one round of parallel queries. The paper shows that this restricted access already beats 1/41/41/4 and reaches 1/31/31/3.

Timeline. For Max Directed Cut, a random cut achieves 1/41/41/4. Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (FOCS 2007; journal version 2011) proved 1/41/41/4 for a random set and 1/31/31/3 nonadaptively for general nonnegative submodular functions, 1/31/31/3 and 2/52/52/5 by adaptive local search, and that 1/21/21/2 requires exponentially many queries. Buchbinder, Feldman, Naor and Schwartz (FOCS 2012, SIAM J. Comput. 2015) later reached the optimal 1/21/21/2 with a randomized double-greedy algorithm.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite ground set with n=∣X∣≥1n = |X| \ge 1n=∣X∣≥1 elements. A function f:2X→Rf : 2^X \to \mathbb{R}f:2X→R is submodular (Definition 1.1) if

f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X.f(S \cup T) + f(S \cap T) \le f(S) + f(T) \qquad \text{for all } S, T \subseteq X .f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X.

Throughout, fff is nonnegative, the paper's standing assumption, and OPT=max⁡S⊆Xf(S)OPT = \max_{S \subseteq X} f(S)OPT=maxS⊆X​f(S).

For p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1], X(p)X(p)X(p) denotes the random subset of XXX containing each element independently with probability ppp; R=X(1/2)R = X(1/2)R=X(1/2) is a uniformly random subset. For a set A⊆XA \subseteq XA⊆X, A(p)A(p)A(p) is the analogous random subset of AAA. The averaged marginal value of an element (Definition 2.4) is

ω(x)=E[f(R∪{x})−f(R∖{x})],R=X(1/2).\omega(x) = \mathbf{E}\big[f(R \cup \{x\}) - f(R \setminus \{x\})\big], \qquad R = X(1/2).ω(x)=E[f(R∪{x})−f(R∖{x})],R=X(1/2).

Algorithm NA (p. 1139):

  1. by random sampling, compute estimates ω~(x)\tilde\omega(x)ω~(x) with ∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2|\tilde\omega(x) - \omega(x)| < OPT/n^2∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2 for all xxx, with high probability;
  2. independently, sample R=X(1/2)R = X(1/2)R=X(1/2);
  3. with probability 8/98/98/9 return RRR;
  4. with probability 1/91/91/9 return A={x∈X:ω~(x)>0}A = \{x \in X : \tilde\omega(x) > 0\}A={x∈X:ω~(x)>0}.

Given the estimates, the expected value NA returns is 89 E[f(X(1/2))]+19f(A)\tfrac89\,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] + \tfrac19 f(A)98​E[f(X(1/2))]+91​f(A).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.6 in the explicit form of its proof

For every nonnegative submodular fff and every estimate ω~\tilde\omegaω~ with ∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2|\tilde\omega(x) - \omega(x)| < OPT/n^2∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2 for all xxx,

89 E[f(X(1/2))]+19 f({x:ω~(x)>0}) ≥ (13−49n) OPT.\frac89\,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] + \frac19\, f\big(\{x : \tilde\omega(x) > 0\}\big) \ \ge\ \Big(\frac13 - \frac{4}{9n}\Big)\, OPT .98​E[f(X(1/2))]+91​f({x:ω~(x)>0}) ≥ (31​−9n4​)OPT.

The printed theorem says "at least (1/3−o(1)) OPT(1/3 - o(1))\,OPT(1/3−o(1))OPT"; the term 4/(9n)4/(9n)4/(9n) is what the proof establishes (p. 1140, last display).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.2: E[g(A(p))]≥(1−p) g(∅)+p g(A)\mathbf{E}[g(A(p))] \ge (1-p)\,g(\emptyset) + p\,g(A)E[g(A(p))]≥(1−p)g(∅)+pg(A) for submodular ggg.
  2. Lemma 2.3: E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]≥(1−p)(1−q)f(∅)+p(1−q)f(A)+(1−p)qf(B)+pqf(A∪B)\mathbf{E}[f(A(p) \cup B(q))] \ge (1-p)(1-q) f(\emptyset) + p(1-q) f(A) + (1-p)q f(B) + pq f(A \cup B)E[f(A(p)∪B(q))]≥(1−p)(1−q)f(∅)+p(1−q)f(A)+(1−p)qf(B)+pqf(A∪B) for independently sampled, possibly overlapping A,BA, BA,B.
  3. For B=X∖AB = X \setminus AB=X∖A and any CCC: f(A)+f(B∩C)+f(B∪C)≥f(C)f(A) + f(B \cap C) + f(B \cup C) \ge f(C)f(A)+f(B∩C)+f(B∪C)≥f(C).
  4. If ω≤OPT/n2\omega \le OPT/n^2ω≤OPT/n2 on BBB: E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≤E[f(R)]+OPT/(2n)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cup (B \cap C))] \le \mathbf{E}[f(R)] + OPT/(2n)E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≤E[f(R)]+OPT/(2n).
  5. E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≥14f(B∩C)+14f(C)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cup (B \cap C))] \ge \tfrac14 f(B \cap C) + \tfrac14 f(C)E[f(R∪(B∩C))]≥41​f(B∩C)+41​f(C).
  6. If ω≥−OPT/n2\omega \ge -OPT/n^2ω≥−OPT/n2 on AAA and B=X∖AB = X \setminus AB=X∖A: E[f(R)]≥E[f(R∩(B∪C))]−OPT/(2n)\mathbf{E}[f(R)] \ge \mathbf{E}[f(R \cap (B \cup C))] - OPT/(2n)E[f(R)]≥E[f(R∩(B∪C))]−OPT/(2n).
  7. E[f(R∩(B∪C))]≥14f(C)+14f(B∪C)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cap (B \cup C))] \ge \tfrac14 f(C) + \tfrac14 f(B \cup C)E[f(R∩(B∪C))]≥41​f(C)+41​f(B∪C).

Milestones 3–7 are the displayed steps of the proof of Theorem 2.6, stated for arbitrary sets where the page's argument does not use the optimality of CCC.

Significance

The theorem shows that nonadaptive access, a fixed batch of polynomially many value queries followed by a computation, suffices for a 1/31/31/3-approximation of unconstrained nonnegative submodular maximization, strictly better than the 1/41/41/4 of any algorithm that must return one of its queried sets (the paper shows 1/41/41/4 is optimal in that class, §4.2). The quantity ω\omegaω generalizes the in-degree/out-degree test for Max Directed Cut to arbitrary submodular functions, and Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 are general sampling inequalities for submodular functions that the paper reuses for its adaptive smooth local search.

Formalizing it produces machine-checked versions of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 as statements about exact finite averages, a reusable expectation operator on product-distributed random subsets, and a checked version of the 1/31/31/3 argument with its explicit error term. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it has been formalized in a proof assistant.

Difficulty

The two regimes the proof separates, "AAA is already good" and "one of f(B∩C)f(B \cap C)f(B∩C), f(B∪C)f(B \cup C)f(B∪C) is large", must be tied to the value of a uniformly random set, whereas the elements of AAA and BBB are chosen from estimated averages, not from the optimal set CCC. The natural attempt, comparing f(R)f(R)f(R) with f(C)f(C)f(C) element by element, fails because fff is not monotone: adding elements of CCC to RRR can decrease the value. The accuracy OPT/n2OPT/n^2OPT/n2 of the estimates must also be propagated through a sum over up to nnn elements, which is where the error term 4/(9n)4/(9n)4/(9n) comes from. The sampling lemmas require handling expectations over pairs of independent random subsets of possibly overlapping sets.

Formalization scope

  • The ground set is a Fintype X with DecidableEq, assumed Nonempty, so n=∣X∣≥1n = |X| \ge 1n=∣X∣≥1 and the divisions by nnn and n2n^2n2 are genuine; sets are Finset X; fff is real valued with nonnegativity ∀S, 0≤f(S)\forall S,\ 0 \le f(S)∀S, 0≤f(S) as an explicit hypothesis. Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 are stated for real fff with no sign condition, as printed.
  • OPTOPTOPT is Finset.univ.sup' _ f, the true maximum over all subsets.
  • Every expectation over an independently sampled random set is the exact finite sum F(x)=∑Sf(S)∏i∈Sxi∏i∉S(1−xi)F(x) = \sum_{S} f(S)\prod_{i \in S} x_i \prod_{i \notin S}(1 - x_i)F(x)=∑S​f(S)∏i∈S​xi​∏i∈/S​(1−xi​); X(1/2)X(1/2)X(1/2) is x≡1/2x \equiv 1/2x≡1/2. Expectations over two independent samples (Lemma 2.3) are the corresponding iterated sums. Sampling probabilities carry the hypotheses 0≤p,q≤10 \le p, q \le 10≤p,q≤1.
  • The goal quantifies over every estimate ω~\tilde\omegaω~ satisfying the printed accuracy ∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2|\tilde\omega(x) - \omega(x)| < OPT/n^2∣ω~(x)−ω(x)∣<OPT/n2 (strict), with A={x:ω~(x)>0}A = \{x : \tilde\omega(x) > 0\}A={x:ω~(x)>0} (strict). The "with high probability" of NA's first step is this hypothesis; the sampling estimate that makes it likely (Lemma 2.5, a Chernoff-bound argument) is not part of the goal. When OPT=0OPT = 0OPT=0 the hypothesis is unsatisfiable, but then f≡0f \equiv 0f≡0 and nothing is lost.
  • The left-hand side is exactly the mixture 89 E[f(X(1/2))]+19f(A)\tfrac89\,\mathbf{E}[f(X(1/2))] + \tfrac19 f(A)98​E[f(X(1/2))]+91​f(A). A statement with the maximum of the two terms, with exact values ω~=ω\tilde\omega = \omegaω~=ω, or with the o(1)o(1)o(1) replaced by an existential constant or a limit, is a different (and weaker or stronger) theorem and does not close this mission.
  • Printed slip corrected: in the second display on p. 1140, the "===" before −∣A∖C∣ OPT/(2n2)-|A \setminus C|\,OPT/(2n^2)−∣A∖C∣OPT/(2n2) should be "≥\ge≥"; milestone 6 states the inequality.

Welcome contributions: proofs of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 (reusable for mission IV of this series), the identity E[f(R∪{x})−f(R)]=12ω(x)\mathbf{E}[f(R \cup \{x\}) - f(R)] = \tfrac12\omega(x)E[f(R∪{x})−f(R)]=21​ω(x), and general lemmas about the operator FFF (splitting a uniform random set along a partition).

Selected references

  • U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions, SIAM J. Comput. 40(4):1133–1153, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/090779346
  • N. Buchbinder, M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, SIAM J. Comput. 44(5):1384–1402, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1137/130929205
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 1: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Motivation

Public school districts in many US cities let families rank schools and then assign seats by a centralized procedure. Each school has a limited number of seats, and state or local law gives some students priority at some schools, for example for a sibling already enrolled or for living within walking distance. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003; published in the American Economic Review 93(3), 2003) framed this as a mechanism design problem and showed that the mechanism then used in Boston rewards families who misreport their preferences. They proposed two replacements with written proofs of their properties. This mission covers the second one, the top trading cycles mechanism, and its two properties: every outcome is Pareto efficient, and no student can gain by misreporting.

The paper drew on earlier results for simpler allocation problems:

  • 1974: Shapley and Scarf introduce housing markets and Gale's top trading cycles algorithm, in which each agent owns one house.
  • 1977: Roth and Postlewaite show the algorithm finds the unique core allocation of a housing market.
  • 1982: Roth proves the core mechanism for housing markets is strategy-proof.
  • 1999: Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez adapt the algorithm to house allocation with existing tenants and prove strategy-proofness.
  • 2000: Pápai introduces hierarchical exchange rules, a wider class that includes these mechanisms.
  • 2003: the paper formalized here extends the algorithm to schools with capacities and school-specific priorities (Propositions 3 and 4).

Setting

A school choice problem consists of a finite set III of students, a finite set SSS of schools, a capacity qs∈Nq_s \in \mathbb Nqs​∈N for each school, a strict preference PiP_iPi​ of each student over all schools, and a strict priority ordering ≻s\succ_s≻s​ of each school over all students. The standing assumption is that there is no shortage of seats:

∣I∣≤∑s∈Sqs.|I| \le \sum_{s\in S} q_s .∣I∣≤s∈S∑​qs​.

Preferences are rankings: Pi(s)∈{0,…,∣S∣−1}P_i(s)\in\{0,\dots,|S|-1\}Pi​(s)∈{0,…,∣S∣−1} is the rank of sss for student iii, with rank 000 the favourite. Priorities are rankings of students in the same way, with rank 000 the highest priority. A matching is a map μ:I→S\mu : I\to Sμ:I→S with #{i:μ(i)=s}≤qs\#\{i:\mu(i)=s\}\le q_s#{i:μ(i)=s}≤qs​ for every school sss. A matching μ\muμ is Pareto efficient if no other matching ν\nuν gives every student a weakly better school (Pi(ν(i))≤Pi(μ(i))P_i(\nu(i))\le P_i(\mu(i))Pi​(ν(i))≤Pi​(μ(i))) and some student a strictly better one.

A direct mechanism maps the reported preference profile, together with the fixed priorities and capacities, to a matching. It is strategy-proof if no student can ever obtain a school she strictly prefers by changing her own report while the others keep theirs.

The top trading cycles algorithm keeps a counter csc_scs​ of free seats at each school, starting at qsq_sqs​. A school is remaining while cs>0c_s>0cs​>0. At each step every remaining student points to her favourite remaining school, and every remaining school points to the remaining student with the highest priority for it. A cycle is a list (s1,i1,…,sk,ik)(s_1,i_1,\dots,s_k,i_k)(s1​,i1​,…,sk​,ik​) of distinct schools and students in which s1s_1s1​ points to i1i_1i1​, i1i_1i1​ points to s2s_2s2​, and so on, and iki_kik​ points to s1s_1s1​. Every student on a cycle is assigned the school she points to and is removed. Each school on a cycle loses one seat. All cycles present at a step are cleared at that same step. The top trading cycles mechanism TTC(q,≻,P)\mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,P)TTC(q,≻,P) returns the resulting assignment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4 (strategy-proofness)

For all capacities with no shortage, all priorities, every profile PPP, every student iii and every alternative report QiQ_iQi​, student iii is assigned schools s=TTC(q,≻,P)(i)s = \mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,P)(i)s=TTC(q,≻,P)(i) and s′=TTC(q,≻,(Qi,P−i))(i)s' = \mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,(Q_i,P_{-i}))(i)s′=TTC(q,≻,(Qi​,P−i​))(i), and

Pi(s)≤Pi(s′).P_i(s) \le P_i(s') .Pi​(s)≤Pi​(s′).

Milestones

  1. At every step at which some student remains, there is a cycle (Section II.B, p. 15).
  2. After ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ steps no student remains, and the outcome is a matching (Section II.B, p. 16).
  3. Lemma (Appendix, pp. 28–29): if student iii is still remaining at the beginning of a step under two different reports of her own, the remaining students and the remaining schools at that point are the same under both reports.
  4. Proposition 3 (p. 17): the outcome is a Pareto efficient matching with respect to the reported profile.
  5. When all schools share one priority ordering π\piπ, the mechanism equals the serial dictatorship induced by π\piπ (Section II.B, p. 16).

Significance

Strategy-proofness means truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for every student. Families need no information about other families' reports. Under the Boston mechanism, ranking a popular school first can cost a student her priority at her second choice. Proposition 3 separates the top trading cycles mechanism from the Gale–Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism, which is also strategy-proof but can select Pareto dominated matchings.

The results are proved in the paper, in short prose arguments in its Appendix. To the best of our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof. The platform already has the housing-market version, AGT.ttc_strategyproof, but that statement covers one house per agent with the mechanism characterised as the core. Capacities, school priorities and the step-by-step algorithm are absent from it. This mission produces a checked account of the algorithm with capacities and counters, together with its termination and invariance properties.

Difficulty

The paper's argument moves from the step at which student iii leaves under one report to the step at which she leaves under another. It relies on the claim that the cycles formed before either step are unaffected by iii's report. Informally, iii is not on a cycle yet, so what she points to does not matter. Formally, "the same cycles form" requires comparing two runs of a simultaneous-clearing procedure step by step. At each step one has to show that the set of cycles, and hence the counters and the remaining schools, agree, even though iii points to different schools in the two runs. Reasoning about a single cycle at a time does not work, because the algorithm clears all cycles of a step at once. Termination is also not immediate: without the no-shortage condition the algorithm can leave students unassigned. Seats are counted with multiplicity, so a school can stay in the market for several steps.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace SchoolChoice.TTC. Students and schools are arbitrary finite types with decidable equality; the set of students may be empty. Capacities are q : S → ℕ, and a school of capacity zero is never remaining. A preference is a bijection S ≃ Fin (card S) and a priority is a bijection I ≃ Fin (card I), in both cases with rank 0 the best. Strictness and completeness of both therefore hold by construction, and every school is acceptable. A state of the algorithm consists of the remaining students, the counters and the assignments made so far. run q pri P t is the state after t completed steps, which is the beginning of the paper's Step t + 1. The mechanism ttc q pri P : I → Option S reads off the assignment after card I steps. Every theorem assumes card I ≤ ∑ s, q s.

The algorithm is a concrete, deterministic definition that clears all cycles at every step. The mechanism is not defined as "some Pareto efficient matching" or characterised by properties, since that would make Proposition 3 trivial. The goal asserts that both outcomes exist, so an unassigned outcome cannot satisfy it vacuously. The misreport, the other students' reports and the priorities are all universally quantified.

A complete development needs termination of the algorithm, a combinatorial account of the pointing graph (cycles in a finite functional graph), and the step-by-step invariance argument of the Lemma. The last two are reusable for the type-specific quota variant and for other trading-cycle mechanisms. Contributions of intermediate lemmas are welcome: counter invariants such as "the sum of the counters is at least the number of remaining students", monotonicity of the remaining sets, and the fact that a student on a cycle receives her favourite remaining school.

Selected references

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0203-18, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8057T27
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, American Economic Review 93(3), 729–747, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf, On Cores and Indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1), 23–37, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
  • Alvin E. Roth and Andrew Postlewaite, Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics 4(2), 131–137, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0
  • Alvin E. Roth, Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Economics Letters 9(2), 127–132, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, House Allocation with Existing Tenants, Journal of Economic Theory 88(2), 233–260, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553
  • Szilvia Pápai, Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange, Econometrica 68(6), 1403–1433, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166
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Analysis of Generalized Pattern Searches: Nonnegative Clarke Derivatives at Limits of Refining SubsequencesResearch Paper

Motivation

Generalized pattern search (GPS) is a class of derivative-free methods for minimizing a function that can only be evaluated, not differentiated. Such objectives arise in engineering design, where one evaluation is an expensive simulation that may fail and return no value at all. The helicopter rotor design problem of Booker et al. is one example: no value was returned for roughly 66% of the trial points (Booker et al., 1999). A method for such problems has to tolerate objectives that are discontinuous or take the value +∞+\infty+∞.

Earlier convergence theory for GPS assumed continuous differentiability of the objective on a neighbourhood of the level set. Torczon established it for unconstrained problems (SIAM J. Optim. 7, 1997), and Lewis and Torczon extended it to bound constraints (1999) and to finitely many linear constraints (SIAM J. Optim. 10, 2000). Audet and Dennis (SIAM J. Optim. 13, 2003) replaced these analyses with a single argument. Its conclusions are local and are graded by the smoothness of the objective at the limit point only, through Clarke's generalized directional derivative. That paper is the source of this mission. Its analysis is the basis of the later mesh adaptive direct search (MADS) theory (Audet, Dennis, SIAM J. Optim. 17, 2006).

Setting

The problem is

min⁡x∈Ωf(x),f:Rn→R∪{+∞},Ω={x∈Rn:ℓ≤Ax≤u},\min_{x\in\Omega} f(x),\qquad f:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\},\qquad \Omega=\{x\in\mathbb R^n:\ell\le Ax\le u\},x∈Ωmin​f(x),f:Rn→R∪{+∞},Ω={x∈Rn:ℓ≤Ax≤u},

with A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n and ℓ≤u\ell\le uℓ≤u in (R∪{±∞})m(\mathbb R\cup\{\pm\infty\})^m(R∪{±∞})m. The algorithm works with the barrier function fΩf_\OmegafΩ​, equal to fff on Ω\OmegaΩ and to +∞+\infty+∞ elsewhere.

The algorithm uses a finite set of directions D=GZˉD=G\bar ZD=GZˉ, the columns dj=Gzˉjd_j=G\bar z_jdj​=Gzˉj​ of the product of a nonsingular G∈Rn×nG\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}G∈Rn×n and an integer matrix Zˉ∈Zn×p\bar Z\in\mathbb Z^{n\times p}Zˉ∈Zn×p. The directions form a positive spanning set: their nonnegative combinations give all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn. At iteration kkk, with iterate xkx_kxk​ and mesh size parameter Δk>0\Delta_k>0Δk​>0, the mesh is Mk={xk+ΔkDz:z∈Z+p}M_k=\{x_k+\Delta_k Dz: z\in\mathbb Z_+^{p}\}Mk​={xk​+Δk​Dz:z∈Z+p​}. A poll set {xk+Δkd:d∈Dk}\{x_k+\Delta_k d: d\in D_k\}{xk​+Δk​d:d∈Dk​} is drawn from a positive spanning subset Dk⊆DD_k\subseteq DDk​⊆D. Each iteration ends in one of two ways:

  1. Improved mesh point. Some xk+1∈Mk∩Ωx_{k+1}\in M_k\cap\Omegaxk+1​∈Mk​∩Ω with fΩ(xk+1)<fΩ(xk)f_\Omega(x_{k+1})<f_\Omega(x_k)fΩ​(xk+1​)<fΩ​(xk​) was found, by the free SEARCH step or by the poll. Then Δk+1=τwkΔk\Delta_{k+1}=\tau^{w_k}\Delta_kΔk+1​=τwk​Δk​ with 0≤wk≤w+0\le w_k\le w^+0≤wk​≤w+.
  2. Mesh local optimizer. fΩ(xk)≤fΩ(xk+Δkd)f_\Omega(x_k)\le f_\Omega(x_k+\Delta_k d)fΩ​(xk​)≤fΩ​(xk​+Δk​d) for every d∈Dkd\in D_kd∈Dk​. Then xk+1=xkx_{k+1}=x_kxk+1​=xk​ and Δk+1=τwkΔk\Delta_{k+1}=\tau^{w_k}\Delta_kΔk+1​=τwk​Δk​ with w−≤wk≤−1w^-\le w_k\le-1w−≤wk​≤−1.

Here τ>1\tau>1τ>1 is rational and w−≤−1≤0≤w+w^-\le-1\le 0\le w^+w−≤−1≤0≤w+ are integers. The assumptions are A1 fΩ(x0)<∞f_\Omega(x_0)<\inftyfΩ​(x0​)<∞, A2 AAA is rational, and A3 all iterates lie in a compact set. A refining subsequence is an infinite set of mesh local optimizers {xk}k∈K\{x_k\}_{k\in K}{xk​}k∈K​ along which Δk→0\Delta_k\to 0Δk​→0 (Definition 3.5). For fff Lipschitz near x^\hat xx^, Clarke's derivative is

f∘(x^;d)=lim sup⁡y→x^, t↓0f(y+td)−f(y)t.f^\circ(\hat x;d)=\limsup_{y\to\hat x,\ t\downarrow 0}\frac{f(y+td)-f(y)}{t}.f∘(x^;d)=y→x^, t↓0limsup​tf(y+td)−f(y)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.7

Assume A1–A3. Let x^\hat xx^ be the limit of a refining subsequence, and let d∈Dd\in Dd∈D be a direction polled at a feasible point xk+Δkdx_k+\Delta_k dxk​+Δk​d for infinitely many kkk in the subsequence. If fff is Lipschitz near x^\hat xx^, then

f∘(x^;d) ≥ 0.f^\circ(\hat x;d)\ \ge\ 0 .f∘(x^;d) ≥ 0.

Milestones on the way

  • Theorem 3.1: the iterates have a limit point, lim⁡kf(xk)\lim_k f(x_k)limk​f(xk​) exists and dominates fff at lower semicontinuity limit points, and all continuity limit points share one value.
  • Lemma 3.2: min⁡u≠v∈Mk∥u−v∥≥Δk/∥G−1∥\min_{u\ne v\in M_k}\|u-v\|\ge\Delta_k/\|G^{-1}\|minu=v∈Mk​​∥u−v∥≥Δk​/∥G−1∥ for every norm giving nonzero integer vectors norm at least 111.
  • Lemma 3.3: Δk≤Δ0τr+\Delta_k\le\Delta_0\tau^{r^+}Δk​≤Δ0​τr+ for some positive integer r+r^+r+.
  • Proposition 3.4: lim inf⁡k→∞Δk=0\liminf_{k\to\infty}\Delta_k=0liminfk→∞​Δk​=0.
  • Theorem 3.6: a convergent refining subsequence exists.

Corollaries

  • Theorem 3.9: if Ω=Rn\Omega=\mathbb R^nΩ=Rn and fff is strictly differentiable at x^\hat xx^, then ∇f(x^)=0\nabla f(\hat x)=0∇f(x^)=0.
  • Theorem 3.14: if the poll sets conform to the boundary of Ω\OmegaΩ (Definition 3.13) and fff is strictly differentiable at x^\hat xx^, then ∇f(x^)Tw≥0\nabla f(\hat x)^Tw\ge 0∇f(x^)Tw≥0 on the tangent cone TΩ(x^)T_\Omega(\hat x)TΩ​(x^) and −∇f(x^)∈NΩ(x^)-\nabla f(\hat x)\in N_\Omega(\hat x)−∇f(x^)∈NΩ​(x^). So x^\hat xx^ is a KKT point.

Significance

Theorem 3.7 gives a first-order conclusion at a limit point from a local hypothesis at that point alone. It does not require smoothness elsewhere, finiteness of fff elsewhere, or continuity. It turns the heuristic "the method stopped improving on ever finer meshes" into a statement about generalized derivatives. The unconstrained stationarity result (Theorem 3.9) and the linearly constrained KKT result (Theorem 3.14) follow from it, and they recover the Torczon and Lewis–Torczon theorems under weaker smoothness assumptions. The chain Lemma 3.2 → Lemma 3.3 → Proposition 3.4 → Theorem 3.6 shows that the goal's hypothesis is always met. Every run satisfying A1 and A3 has a refining subsequence, which rests on the rationality of τ\tauτ and on the integer structure of DDD.

All results in this mission are proved in the source paper. None of them has, to the best of our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. The mission contributes a formal model of the GPS algorithm class as a class of runs, a formal Clarke directional derivative, and checked proofs of the mesh-refinement chain and the main theorem.

Difficulty

Given a refining subsequence, the goal is a comparison of limsups: the poll inequalities give nonnegative difference quotients at the points (xk,Δk)(x_k,\Delta_k)(xk​,Δk​), which converge to (x^,0+)(\hat x,0^+)(x^,0+). The difficulty lies in two places. First, the objective is extended-valued, and the barrier hides fff at infeasible poll points, where the poll inequality fΩ(xk)≤+∞f_\Omega(x_k)\le+\inftyfΩ​(xk​)≤+∞ says nothing. The hypothesis on ddd has to supply feasibility, and the Lipschitz hypothesis has to supply finiteness near x^\hat xx^. Second, the existence of refining subsequences is not a compactness argument alone. Coarsening is allowed, so Δk\Delta_kΔk​ need not decrease, and with an irrational τ\tauτ or a direction set that is not an integer lattice image (for instance D=[−1,+π]D=[-1,+\pi]D=[−1,+π] in R\mathbb RR) the meshes can be dense and lim inf⁡Δk\liminf\Delta_kliminfΔk​ can be positive. The lattice argument behind Proposition 3.4 is where the integrality hypotheses are used.

Formalization scope

Points of Rn\mathbb R^nRn are Fin n → ℝ, fff takes values in WithTop ℝ, and the bounds ℓ,u\ell,uℓ,u are EReal-valued, so m=0m=0m=0 gives Ω=Rn\Omega=\mathbb R^nΩ=Rn. The barrier is defined by cases, never by extended addition. Directions are the columns of G * Zbar indexed by Fin p, and DkD_kDk​ is a Finset (Fin p). A GPS run is a structure of sequences xk,Δk,Dk,wkx_k,\Delta_k,D_k,w_kxk​,Δk​,Dk​,wk​ and a per-iteration predicate "mesh local optimizer", subject to exactly the two update rules above, Δ0>0\Delta_0>0Δ0​>0, rational τ>1\tau>1τ>1 and the exponent bounds. The SEARCH step, the choice of DkD_kDk​ and the exponents are left free, since the paper allows any strategy. A subsequence is a strictly increasing map K:N→NK:\mathbb N\to\mathbb NK:N→N. The Clarke derivative of a real function is an EReal-valued limit superior along y→x^y\to\hat xy→x^, t→0+t\to 0^+t→0+. "fff Lipschitz near x^\hat xx^" means that fff agrees near x^\hat xx^ with a real function Lipschitz there, and the conclusions are stated for every such function. Strict differentiability is the directional notion of Section 3.4 of the paper.

The goal is not trivialized by an empty run class: Theorem 3.6, on the same class, asserts that refining subsequences exist. The mesh-local-optimizer branch requires the complete poll inequality over DkD_kDk​. The Clarke limit superior cannot take a default value. The direction ddd must be polled at feasible points infinitely often, which is the paper's "fff was evaluated".

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on positive spanning sets, lattice points in compact sets, and the Clarke derivative (for instance, that it equals ∇f(x^)Td\nabla f(\hat x)^Td∇f(x^)Td under strict differentiability).

Selected references

  • C. Audet, J. E. Dennis Jr., Analysis of Generalized Pattern Searches, SIAM J. Optim. 13(3):889–903, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400378742
  • V. Torczon, On the Convergence of Pattern Search Algorithms, SIAM J. Optim. 7(1):1–25, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623493250780
  • R. M. Lewis, V. Torczon, Pattern Search Methods for Linearly Constrained Minimization, SIAM J. Optim. 10(3):917–941, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623497331373
  • F. H. Clarke, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis, Wiley, 1983; reprinted SIAM Classics in Applied Mathematics 5, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971309
  • A. J. Booker, J. E. Dennis Jr., P. D. Frank, D. B. Serafini, V. Torczon, M. W. Trosset, A rigorous framework for optimization of expensive functions by surrogates, Structural Optimization 17:1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01197559
  • C. Audet, J. E. Dennis Jr., Mesh Adaptive Direct Search Algorithms for Constrained Optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 17(1):188–217, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1137/040603371
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 2: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism with Type-Specific Quotas Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Motivation

Many US school districts assign children to public schools centrally. Each family ranks the schools. Each school ranks the children by priority, which is set by state or local law (siblings, walking distance, a lottery). A procedure then turns these rankings into an assignment. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003; published in the American Economic Review 93(3), 2003) cast this as a mechanism design problem. They showed that the mechanisms then in use in Boston, Columbus and Minneapolis gave families reasons to misreport their preferences. They proposed two alternatives: the student-optimal stable mechanism of Gale and Shapley, and a school-choice version of Shapley and Scarf's top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism.

Many districts also operate under controlled choice: court-ordered or voluntary rules that keep the racial or ethnic composition of each school within bounds. In Minneapolis, for instance, a 100-seat school could admit at most 75 majority and at most 55 minority students (paper, Section III). Such rules are implemented as type-specific quotas. Section III.B of the paper modifies TTC to respect these quotas. It proves that the modified mechanism keeps both properties that recommend TTC: it wastes nothing beyond what the quotas force (constrained efficiency, Proposition 6), and truth-telling is a dominant strategy (strategy-proofness, Proposition 7). This mission formalizes those two results.

Setting

There is a finite set III of students and a finite set SSS of schools. School sss has a capacity qsq_sqs​, and the total number of seats suffices: ∣I∣≤∑sqs|I|\le\sum_s q_s∣I∣≤∑s​qs​. Each student iii has a strict preference over all schools, encoded as a ranking Pi:S→{0,…,∣S∣−1}P_i : S\to\{0,\dots,|S|-1\}Pi​:S→{0,…,∣S∣−1} with rank 000 the favourite. Each school sss has a strict priority ranking over all students, with rank 000 the highest priority. Each student belongs to exactly one type τ(i)\tau(i)τ(i), and school sss has a type quota qstq_s^tqst​ for each type ttt.

An assignment ν\nuν gives each student a school or nothing (∅\varnothing∅, worse than every school). It satisfies the controlled choice constraints if every school sss receives at most qsq_sqs​ students, and at most qstq_s^tqst​ students of each type ttt. An assignment μ\muμ is constrained efficient if no assignment satisfying the constraints makes every student weakly better off and some student strictly better off.

The top trading cycles mechanism with type-specific quotas, TTCq\mathrm{TTC}^qTTCq, runs in steps. Each school keeps a counter csc_scs​ (initially qsq_sqs​) and one type counter cstc_s^tcst​ for each type (initially qstq_s^tqst​). A school is removed when csc_scs​ reaches zero. At each step:

  • every remaining student points to her favourite remaining school with room for her type, that is, with cs>0c_s>0cs​>0 and csτ(i)>0c_s^{\tau(i)}>0csτ(i)​>0;
  • every remaining school points to its highest-priority remaining student, whatever her type;
  • every student on a cycle of this graph is assigned the school she points to and leaves;
  • that school's counter and its counter for her type each drop by one.

A direct mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever gain by misreporting her preference, whatever the others report.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7 (p. 23)

For every student iii, every profile PPP of announced preferences and every alternative report QiQ_iQi​,

TTCq(Qi,P−i)(i)=s′  ⟹  TTCq(P)(i)=s with Pi(s)≤Pi(s′).\mathrm{TTC}^q(Q_i,P_{-i})(i)=s' \implies \mathrm{TTC}^q(P)(i)=s \text{ with } P_i(s)\le P_i(s').TTCq(Qi​,P−i​)(i)=s′⟹TTCq(P)(i)=s with Pi​(s)≤Pi​(s′).

This holds for all capacities without shortage, all quotas, all types and all priorities. The priorities are fixed data, not reported.

Milestones

  1. Section III.B, Step 1 (p. 22). At every step there is at least one cycle, after the convention below has removed the students who cannot point.
  2. The Lemma (Appendix, pp. 28–29; declared valid for the modified mechanism on p. 30). Fix the other students' reports, and suppose student iii is still present at the beginning of a step under two different reports of hers. Then the two runs have the same remaining students and the same counters at that point.
  3. Proposition 6 (p. 23). TTCq(P)\mathrm{TTC}^q(P)TTCq(P) satisfies the controlled choice constraints and is constrained efficient with respect to PPP.

Significance

Strategy-proofness is what lets a district publish a simple instruction: rank the schools in your true order. A strategy-proof mechanism does not reward families who can afford to gather information and game the system. Proposition 7 shows that this guarantee survives the addition of flexible diversity quotas, which many districts are legally bound to impose. Proposition 6 shows that the quotas cost nothing beyond the losses they themselves cause. Both results were proved in 2003 by pen and paper. The published proof of Proposition 7 is a short adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4 (strategy-proofness of plain TTC). It rests on a lemma about how the algorithm's intermediate states depend on one student's report.

To our knowledge neither result has a machine-checked proof. The related platform theorem AGT.ttc_strategyproof concerns the Shapley–Scarf housing market, where every agent owns one house and the mechanism selects the core. It does not cover capacities, priorities or quotas. A formal proof here would check the adaptation that the paper leaves to the reader, and would give a reusable formal model of cycle-clearing allocation algorithms with multiple counters.

Difficulty

The algorithm clears all cycles of a step at once, and a student's report changes the graph at every step she is present. The paper's argument compares two whole runs of the algorithm, under the true report and under a misreport, step by step. That comparison needs precise control of which parts of the state a single student's report can influence, and when. A local argument about one step does not suffice. The student's outcome can depend on cycles that form several steps after the two runs could first have diverged.

With quotas, the pointing graph also depends on the type counters. A school can be present but closed to one type, and a school points to its best remaining student even when it has no room for her type. The comparison must therefore track the type counters as well as the set of remaining schools. Efficiency cannot be read off step by step against unrestricted matchings either: every competing assignment must satisfy both the capacity and the quota constraints.

Formalization scope

Students, schools and types are finite types; no nonemptiness is assumed. Preferences and priorities are bijective rankings onto Fin, so strictness is built in. Rank 000 is the favourite or the highest priority. The no-shortage condition ∣I∣≤∑sqs|I|\le\sum_s q_s∣I∣≤∑s​qs​ appears in every theorem, as the standing assumption of Section I. No relation between qsq_sqs​ and qstq_s^tqst​ is imposed, which generalises the paper.

The algorithm is a concrete, total definition: a state with remaining students, counters, type counters and partial assignments, a step map that clears all cycles simultaneously, and ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ iterations. run … t is the state at the beginning of the paper's Step t+1t+1t+1.

The paper's step is undefined when a remaining student has no remaining school with room for her type. She cannot point, and the promised cycle may not exist. The formalization adopts one convention: at the beginning of each step, such a stuck student is removed unassigned, and her outcome is ∅\varnothing∅, ranked below every school. Counters only decrease, so a stuck student stays stuck. Whenever nobody gets stuck, the algorithm is exactly the paper's, and when every quota is at least the capacity it is plain TTC. The goal and Proposition 6 are stated for assignments that may leave students unassigned. When everyone is assigned, they coincide with the paper's statements over matchings.

The formalization does not add a hypothesis that the run never gets stuck. Such a hypothesis would restrict the algorithm's own behaviour and could make the theorems vacuous. Nor may strategy-proofness be weakened to comparisons at the truthful profile only: the others' reports and the misreport are arbitrary.

Contributions welcome: invariants of the step map (counters bounded by the initial values, assigned students leave for good), the cycle-existence lemma for functional graphs on finite sets, and the comparison lemma. These pieces are shared with the plain-TTC mission of this series.

Selected references

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0203-18, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8057T27
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, American Economic Review 93(3), 729–747, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf, On Cores and Indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1), 23–37, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
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The Theory of Dynamic Programming: The Index Rule for Bellman's Stochastic Gold-Mining ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

Richard Bellman's survey The theory of dynamic programming (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (1954), 503–515, DOI 10.1090/s0002-9904-1954-09848-8) introduced dynamic programming to a general mathematical audience. It states the principle of optimality (§2, p. 504): "An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decisions are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decisions", and derives from it the functional equations of finite and infinite stochastic decision processes, (4.2) and (5.1) (p. 506).

The survey illustrates the method on a small number of worked examples. The second of them, §8 "Stochastic gold mining" (pp. 508–509), is the one with a sharp answer: a two-armed sequential allocation problem with an absorbing failure state, whose optimal policy is a simple index rule. It is an early instance of the allocation-index phenomenon later made general by Gittins and Jones (1974) and Gittins (1979), and the paper itself notes (p. 509) that the rule "is not valid generally in more complicated decision processes", citing a counterexample of Karlin and Shapiro. The full treatment is in Bellman's RAND report R-245 and his 1957 book Dynamic Programming.

Setting

Two gold mines, Anaconda (AAA) and Bonanza (BBB), hold amounts x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 of gold. A single machine can be used in either mine. A use in Anaconda succeeds with probability ppp: it then mines a fraction rrr of the gold currently in Anaconda and the machine stays undamaged. With probability 1−p1-p1−p it mines nothing and the machine is destroyed. Bonanza behaves the same way with probability qqq and fraction sss. While the machine works, the operator chooses the next mine; the aim is to maximize the expected amount mined before the machine is destroyed.

The only information the operator ever receives is that the machine still works. A policy is therefore a choice sequence σ=(σ0,σ1,… )∈{A,B}N\sigma = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \dots) \in \{A, B\}^{\mathbb N}σ=(σ0​,σ1​,…)∈{A,B}N: the mine for use number nnn, applied if uses 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 succeeded. With ana_nan​, bnb_nbn​ the numbers of AAA- and BBB-uses among the first nnn, use nnn collects gn=rx(1−r)ang_n = r x (1-r)^{a_n}gn​=rx(1−r)an​ if σn=A\sigma_n = Aσn​=A and gn=sy(1−s)bng_n = s y (1-s)^{b_n}gn​=sy(1−s)bn​ if σn=B\sigma_n = Bσn​=B, and does so with probability ∏k=0nπσk\prod_{k=0}^{n} \pi_{\sigma_k}∏k=0n​πσk​​ (πA=p\pi_A = pπA​=p, πB=q\pi_B = qπB​=q). The expected return is

J(σ;x,y)=∑n≥0(∏k=0nπσk)gn,J(\sigma; x, y) = \sum_{n \ge 0} \Big(\prod_{k=0}^{n} \pi_{\sigma_k}\Big) g_n ,J(σ;x,y)=n≥0∑​(k=0∏n​πσk​​)gn​,

and Bellman's (8.1) defines the optimal return

f(x,y)=sup⁡σJ(σ;x,y).f(x, y) = \sup_\sigma J(\sigma; x, y).f(x,y)=σsup​J(σ;x,y).

In Lean these are expectedReturn p q r s σ x y and optimalReturn p q r s x y in the namespace BellmanTheoryDP.GoldMining.

Formalization targets

Milestone: the functional equation (8.2), p. 508

f(x,y)=max⁡{p [rx+f((1−r)x,y)], q [sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]}.f(x, y) = \max\Big\{ p\,[r x + f((1-r)x, y)],\ q\,[s y + f(x, (1-s)y)] \Big\}.f(x,y)=max{p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)], q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]}.

Goal: the decision rule (8.3), p. 509, corrected

Write VA=p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)]V_A = p[rx + f((1-r)x, y)]VA​=p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)] and VB=q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]V_B = q[sy + f(x, (1-s)y)]VB​=q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)] for the two branches of (8.2). For 0<p,q,r,s<10 < p, q, r, s < 10<p,q,r,s<1 and x,y≥0x, y \ge 0x,y≥0:

prx1−p>qsy1−q⇒VA>VB,prx1−p<qsy1−q⇒VA<VB,prx1−p=qsy1−q⇒VA=VB.\frac{prx}{1-p} > \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A > V_B, \qquad \frac{prx}{1-p} < \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A < V_B, \qquad \frac{prx}{1-p} = \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A = V_B .1−pprx​>1−qqsy​⇒VA​>VB​,1−pprx​<1−qqsy​⇒VA​<VB​,1−pprx​=1−qqsy​⇒VA​=VB​.

The paper prints the rule with (1−r)(1-r)(1−r) and (1−s)(1-s)(1−s) in the denominators:

a. For prx/(1−r)>qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) > qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)>qsy/(1−s), choose A, b. For prx/(1−r)<qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) < qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)<qsy/(1−s), choose B, c. For prx/(1−r)=qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) = qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)=qsy/(1−s), choose either.

and glosses it as "the locus of points where immediate expected gain over immediate expected loss is the same for both choices". The immediate expected loss is the probability of destroying the machine, 1−p1-p1−p (resp. 1−q1-q1−q), not 1−r1 - r1−r. As printed the rule is false: with p=1/2p = 1/2p=1/2, r=0.9r = 0.9r=0.9, q=0.9q = 0.9q=0.9, s=0.1s = 0.1s=0.1, x=1x = 1x=1, y=2y = 2y=2 the printed indices are 4.5>0.24.5 > 0.24.5>0.2, but VA≈0.924<VB≈1.055V_A \approx 0.924 < V_B \approx 1.055VA​≈0.924<VB​≈1.055. The mission's goal is the corrected rule, the one the paper describes in words.

Companion: the index policy is optimal, p. 509

"Using this prescription, f(x,y)f(x, y)f(x,y) may be computed recurrently": the choice sequence σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ generated by applying the corrected rule to the current amounts at every use satisfies J(σ∗;x,y)=f(x,y)J(\sigma^*; x, y) = f(x, y)J(σ∗;x,y)=f(x,y).

Significance

The decision rule reduces an optimization over infinite sequences to comparing two explicit numbers, one per mine, each depending only on that mine's own data. This is the defining property of an index policy, and gold mining is one of the earliest problems where it was observed. The functional equation (8.2) is the concrete form, for this process, of the infinite-horizon equation (5.1) that the paper states formally.

Formalizing the example yields a complete machine-checked instance of the principle of optimality for an infinite-horizon stochastic process whose state space (the amounts left in the two mines) is infinite, where the supremum over policies is not attained trivially and the finite-horizon recursion does not apply directly. It also records, with a checked statement, the correction of the misprint in (8.3). No machine-checked proof of (8.2) or (8.3) is known to exist.

Difficulty

The equation (8.2) looks immediate, and the paper calls it "easily seen". The informal argument treats fff as the value of an optimal policy, but fff is a supremum over infinite sequences that need not be attained a priori, and the return of a sequence is an infinite series. The finite-horizon recursion (4.2) does not apply as it stands, because the process has no last stage and its state space, the amounts left in the two mines, is infinite.

The rule (8.3) compares the two optimal continuations f((1−r)x,y)f((1-r)x, y)f((1−r)x,y) and f(x,(1−s)y)f(x, (1-s)y)f(x,(1−s)y), which are themselves unknown. A comparison of the one-step gains alone does not decide it, as the misprinted rule shows. Parts a and b are strict preferences, so it is not enough to show that one choice is at least as good as the other.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. The mines are a two-element inductive type Mine; a policy is a function ℕ → Mine (ChoiceSeq). All quantities are real numbers. Randomized policies are mixtures of choice sequences and give no larger return, so they are not modelled. No restriction to stationary or Markov policies is made: fff is the supremum over all sequences.
  • Parameter ranges. The paper does not state them. The theorems assume 0<p,q,r,s<10 < p, q, r, s < 10<p,q,r,s<1 and x,y≥0x, y \ge 0x,y≥0 (zero amounts allowed). p,q<1p, q < 1p,q<1 keeps the indices prx/(1−p)prx/(1-p)prx/(1−p), qsy/(1−q)qsy/(1-q)qsy/(1−q) well defined.
  • Series and supremum. JJJ is a real tsum and fff a real iSup. For the parameter ranges above the terms are nonnegative, the partial sums are bounded by x+yx + yx+y, and the family is bounded above, so neither Lean default value (0 for a divergent series or an unbounded supremum) arises; this is stated as the auxiliary theorem expectedReturn_le_add.
  • Survival indexing. The gold of use nnn is counted only if use nnn itself succeeds, so the survival product runs over k≤nk \le nk≤n.
  • The misprint. The goal and the index policy use (1−p)(1-p)(1−p), (1−q)(1-q)(1−q) in place of the printed (1−r)(1-r)(1−r), (1−s)(1-s)(1−s). The printed rule appears only as the quotation above.
  • No trivializing encoding. fff is defined as the supremum of expected returns over all choice sequences, per (8.1); it is not defined as a solution of (8.2), as the value of the index policy, or as a limit of value iteration, any of which would make the milestone or the goal true by definition.
  • Auxiliary theorems (not from the paper). The bound 0≤J≤x+y0 \le J \le x + y0≤J≤x+y with summability, the one-step unrolling J(σ)=p[rx+J(σ′;(1−r)x,y)]J(\sigma) = p[rx + J(\sigma'; (1-r)x, y)]J(σ)=p[rx+J(σ′;(1−r)x,y)] when σ0=A\sigma_0 = Aσ0​=A (and symmetrically), and the single-mine values f(x,0)=prx/(1−p(1−r))f(x, 0) = prx/(1 - p(1-r))f(x,0)=prx/(1−p(1−r)), f(0,y)=qsy/(1−q(1−s))f(0, y) = qsy/(1-q(1-s))f(0,y)=qsy/(1−q(1−s)) are included as footholds. They are not milestones.
  • Related platform content. AllocationIndices.two_discount_index_policy_optimal (Gittins et al., Theorem 3.4) concerns Markov bandits whose rewards are discounted by ata^tat at global time ttt; gold mining multiplies by the success probability of each use of the mine used, so it is a different model and is not reused. BertsekasDP.dp_algorithm_optimality is finite-horizon and does not give (8.2).

Contributions welcome: proofs of the auxiliary theorems, of (8.2), of the decision rule, and of the optimality of the index policy.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, The theory of dynamic programming, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (1954), no. 6, 503–515. https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1954-09848-8
  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957.
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
  • J. C. Gittins, K. D. Glazebrook, R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470980033
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Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies I: Subjective Mixed Equilibria of Two-Person Games Have Objective PayoffsResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical non-cooperative game theory randomizes with objective, independent devices: each player spins a private wheel whose odds everyone agrees on. Aumann's 1974 paper (doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) asks what changes when the randomizing events are ordinary events of the world, about which players may hold different subjective probabilities and may be differently informed. The paper introduced correlated equilibrium, and it also separates two effects that the classical model fuses: subjectivity (players disagree about probabilities) and correlation (players peg their choices on common or dependent events).

This mission formalizes the paper's result on subjectivity without correlation. Example 2.3 of the paper exhibits a three-person game in which strategies pegged on subjective but mutually secret events form an equilibrium that every player prefers to every classical mixed equilibrium. Proposition 5.1 shows that this cannot happen with two players.

Setting

A game has a finite set N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} of players, a finite set SiS_iSi​ of pure strategies for each player, a finite set XXX of outcomes and an outcome function ggg from S=×i∈NSiS=\times_{i\in N}S_iS=×i∈N​Si​ onto XXX. Player iii has a utility ui:X→Ru_i:X\to\mathbb Rui​:X→R; write hi(a)=ui(g(a))h_i(a)=u_i(g(a))hi​(a)=ui​(g(a)) for a∈Sa\in Sa∈S.

A randomizing structure consists of a set Ω\OmegaΩ of states of the world with a σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB of events, a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field Ji⊆B\mathcal J_i\subseteq\mathcal BJi​⊆B for each player (the events iii is informed about), and a probability measure pip_ipi​ on B\mathcal BB for each player (the subjective probability of iii). A strategy of iii is a map si:Ω→Sis_i:\Omega\to S_isi​:Ω→Si​ whose level sets {si=a}\{s_i=a\}{si​=a} lie in Ji\mathcal J_iJi​. For a profile s=(s1,…,sn)s=(s_1,\dots,s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​) of strategies the payoff of iii is

Hi(s)=∫Ωhi(s(ω)) dpi(ω),H_i(s)=\int_\Omega h_i\big(s(\omega)\big)\,dp_i(\omega),Hi​(s)=∫Ω​hi​(s(ω))dpi​(ω),

computed under player iii's own beliefs. An equilibrium point is a profile sss with Hi(s)≥Hi(s1,…,ti,…,sn)H_i(s)\ge H_i(s_1,\dots,t_i,\dots,s_n)Hi​(s)≥Hi​(s1​,…,ti​,…,sn​) for every player iii and every strategy tit_iti​ of iii.

An event AAA is iii-secret if A∈JiA\in\mathcal J_iA∈Ji​ and every other player jjj regards AAA as independent of every event in the σ\sigmaσ-field generated by the Jk\mathcal J_kJk​, k≠ik\ne ik=i: pj(A∩B)=pj(A)pj(B)p_j(A\cap B)=p_j(A)p_j(B)pj​(A∩B)=pj​(A)pj​(B). A strategy is mixed if its level sets are iii-secret, and objective if each level set has the same probability under every pjp_jpj​. A measure is non-atomic on a σ\sigmaσ-field R\mathcal RR if every event of R\mathcal RR of positive measure contains an event of R\mathcal RR of strictly smaller positive measure; a roulette is a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field of B\mathcal BB on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic. Throughout, Assumption II holds: every player iii has a σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of iii-secret events on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic.

For distributions σi\sigma_iσi​ on SiS_iSi​ the classical payoff is Fi(σ)=∑a∈Shi(a)∏jσj(aj)F_i(\sigma)=\sum_{a\in S}h_i(a)\prod_j\sigma_j(a_j)Fi​(σ)=∑a∈S​hi​(a)∏j​σj​(aj​), and σ\sigmaσ is a Nash equilibrium point if no player gains by switching to another distribution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.1 (p. 78)

Let n=2n=2n=2 and assume

p1(B)=0  ⟺  p2(B)=0for every B∈B.(5.2)p_1(B)=0\iff p_2(B)=0\qquad\text{for every }B\in\mathcal B.\tag{5.2}p1​(B)=0⟺p2​(B)=0for every B∈B.(5.2)

Then for every equilibrium point sss in mixed strategies there is an equilibrium point ttt in objective mixed strategies with

H(s)=H(t).H(s)=H(t).H(s)=H(t).

The game need not be zero-sum.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 7.1 (p. 81): in a roulette R\mathcal RR, for events B1,…,BlB^1,\dots,B^lB1,…,Bl and α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], there is an objective A∈RA\in\mathcal RA∈R with pi(A)=αp_i(A)=\alphapi​(A)=α and pi(A∩Bk)=pi(A)pi(Bk)p_i(A\cap B^k)=p_i(A)p_i(B^k)pi​(A∩Bk)=pi​(A)pi​(Bk) for all i,ki,ki,k.
  2. Lemma 4.1 (p. 77): every distribution σi\sigma_iσi​ on SiS_iSi​ is realised by an objective mixed strategy sis_isi​ with p{si=a}=σi(a)p\{s_i=a\}=\sigma_i(a)p{si​=a}=σi​(a).
  3. Lemma 7.3 (p. 82): if every sjs_jsj​, j≠ij\ne ij=i, is mixed, then pi{s=a}=pi{si=ai} pi{sj=aj ∀j≠i}=∏jpi{sj=aj}p_i\{s=a\}=p_i\{s_i=a_i\}\,p_i\{s_j=a_j\ \forall j\ne i\}=\prod_j p_i\{s_j=a_j\}pi​{s=a}=pi​{si​=ai​}pi​{sj​=aj​ ∀j=i}=∏j​pi​{sj​=aj​}.
  4. Corollary 7.4 (p. 83): mixed strategies are independent under every pkp_kpk​.
  5. Proposition 4.3 (p. 77): {F(σ):σ Nash}={H(s):s an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}\{F(\sigma):\sigma\text{ Nash}\}=\{H(s): s\text{ an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}\}{F(σ):σ Nash}={H(s):s an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}.

Significance

The result. Proposition 5.1 isolates correlation as the source of the new equilibrium payoffs of the subjective model in two-person games: disagreement about probabilities alone, with strategies pegged on secret events, reproduces only payoffs already achievable by classical mixed strategies (by Proposition 4.3, only Nash equilibrium payoffs). The paper uses it to explain Example 2.9, where two zero-sum players both expect more than the value, as an effect of subjectivity combined with correlation. Proposition 4.3 is the bridge that embeds classical Nash theory in the subjective model; with Nash's theorem it gives existence of equilibrium points in every game.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of them has been machine-checked. The mission produces a reusable measure-theoretic model of randomized strategies with private information and subjective beliefs (secret events, mixed and objective strategies, roulettes), a non-atomicity notion relative to a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field, and the Lyapunov-type construction of Lemma 7.1, none of which exists in Mathlib at the pinned revision.

Difficulty

The equilibrium conditions quantify over all strategies of the deviator, i.e. all Ji\mathcal J_iJi​-measurable maps, and the deviator may know events on which the opponent's mixed strategy is pegged. The obvious computation of H1(t1,s2)H_1(t_1,s_2)H1​(t1​,s2​) as a sum of products of marginal probabilities is valid only because the opponent's strategy is pegged on secret events, which is the content of Lemma 7.3; for correlated strategies it fails, and Example 2.9 shows the proposition then fails. A second obstacle is that the replacement t1t_1t1​ must reproduce player 2's beliefs about s1s_1s1​, while player 1's own equilibrium condition is stated under p1p_1p1​; condition (5.2) is what transfers "aaa is played with positive probability" from one player's beliefs to the other's. Constructing objective strategies with prescribed probabilities (Lemmas 7.1 and 4.1) needs the convexity of the range of a non-atomic vector measure (Lyapunov's theorem), which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Players are a finite type (Fin 2 in the goal, players 1,2↦0,11,2\mapsto 0,11,2↦0,1); the SiS_iSi​ and XXX are finite types, and ggg is surjective. The σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB is an explicit parameter mΩ of the structure RandomizingStructure ι Ω mΩ, which carries the Ji\mathcal J_iJi​ and the probability measures pip_ipi​. Probabilities are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued Mathlib measures. Utilities and pip_ipi​ are data (Assumption I is used only to compare lotteries by expected utility; the uniqueness of pip_ipi​ is not encoded). HiH_iHi​ is a Bochner integral; for strategy profiles the integrand has finitely many values and is measurable, hence integrable. Non-atomicity on a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field is defined directly; Mathlib's NoAtoms (singletons are null) would trivialize Assumption II and is not used. "Mixed" means pegged on the family of all iii-secret events, not on the σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of Assumption II. Classical distributions, FiF_iFi​ and Nash equilibrium points are AGT.IsLottery, AGT.expectedPayoff and AGT.IsMixedNash from the published definition agt_games.

A formalization that restricted deviations to mixed or objective strategies, or dropped "mixed" from the hypothesis on sss, would state a different theorem and is ruled out.

Useful contributions: Lyapunov's convexity theorem for finite-dimensional non-atomic vector measures (or the special case needed for Lemma 7.1), the factorization of Lemma 7.3, and the payoff identities used in the proof of Proposition 4.3. The model definitions are shared in meaning with the companion mission on two-person zero-sum games.

Selected references

  • R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974) 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
  • J. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
  • A. Liapounoff, Sur les fonctions-vecteurs complètement additives, Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR Ser. Mat. 4 (1940) 465–478.
  • L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, 1954.
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Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 1: Threshold Purchasing Policies under Contingent PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark the remaining stock down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them who would buy at the premium price instead wait, trading a lower price against the risk that the item sells out and against the decline of their own valuation over the season. How forward-looking ("strategic") customers respond to a markdown policy is the first question any model of such pricing has to answer, because the seller's optimal prices depend on it.

Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) model a seller with a fixed inventory, Poisson arrivals of customers with heterogeneous, exponentially declining valuations, and two pricing regimes: contingent pricing, where the discount depends on the inventory left at the markdown time, and announced fixed discounts. The first step of their analysis of contingent pricing is Theorem 1: whatever the other customers do, a customer's best response is a threshold rule on his current valuation, with a threshold that rises as the markdown approaches. Their numerical study of equilibria and of the value of price commitment (§§4.2–7) is built on this reduction.

Setting

A seller holds QQQ units over a season [0,H][0, H][0,H] split at a fixed time TTT with 0<T≤H0 < T \le H0<T≤H. On [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) the premium price p1p_1p1​ applies. At time TTT the seller observes the remaining inventory QT∈{0,1,…,Q}Q_T \in \{0, 1, \dots, Q\}QT​∈{0,1,…,Q} and charges the discount menu price p2(QT)p_2(Q_T)p2​(QT​), where p2(q)≤p1p_2(q) \le p_1p2​(q)≤p1​ for q=1,…,Qq = 1, \dots, Qq=1,…,Q. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ and valuation Vj(t)=Vje−αtV_j(t) = V_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​(t)=Vj​e−αt at time ttt, with a common decline factor α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

A customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T either buys immediately at p1p_1p1​ or waits until TTT, when he requests a unit if the discounted price leaves him a nonnegative surplus. Waiting is uncertain in two ways: the remaining inventory QTQ_TQT​ is random, and when fewer units remain than customers request them, units are rationed at random. A belief is a probability mass function π\piπ of QTQ_TQT​ on {0,…,Q}\{0, \dots, Q\}{0,…,Q} together with allocation probabilities a(q)=Pr⁡{A∣QT=q}∈[0,1]a(q) = \Pr\{\mathcal A \mid Q_T = q\} \in [0,1]a(q)=Pr{A∣QT​=q}∈[0,1], a(0)=0a(0) = 0a(0)=0, where A\mathcal AA is the event that the customer is allocated a unit. It is determined by the other customers' strategies, which are arbitrary.

With δ=e−α(T−t)\delta = e^{-\alpha(T-t)}δ=e−α(T−t), the expected surplus of waiting of a customer with current valuation ψ\psiψ is

Wt(ψ)=EQT ⁣[max⁡{ψδ−p2(QT),0}⋅1{A∣QT}]=∑q=0Qπ(q) a(q) max⁡{ψδ−p2(q),0}.W_t(\psi) = \mathrm E_{Q_T}\!\left[\max\{\psi\delta - p_2(Q_T), 0\}\cdot \mathbf 1\{\mathcal A \mid Q_T\}\right] = \sum_{q=0}^{Q}\pi(q)\,a(q)\,\max\{\psi\delta - p_2(q), 0\}.Wt​(ψ)=EQT​​[max{ψδ−p2​(QT​),0}⋅1{A∣QT​}]=q=0∑Q​π(q)a(q)max{ψδ−p2​(q),0}.

The paper's purchase rule (p. 344): buy immediately iff the current surplus V(t)−p1V(t) - p_1V(t)−p1​ is nonnegative and at least Wt(V(t))W_t(V(t))Wt​(V(t)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 and Corollary 1

Assume p1≥0p_1 \ge 0p1​≥0, and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or ∑qπ(q)a(q)<1\sum_q \pi(q)a(q) < 1∑q​π(q)a(q)<1. For every t∈[0,T)t \in [0,T)t∈[0,T) the equation

ψ−p1=Wt(ψ)(2)\psi - p_1 = W_t(\psi) \tag{2}ψ−p1​=Wt​(ψ)(2)

has a unique solution ψ(t)≥p1\psi(t) \ge p_1ψ(t)≥p1​; a customer arriving at ttt buys immediately under the purchase rule if and only if V(t)≥ψ(t)V(t) \ge \psi(t)V(t)≥ψ(t); and the threshold function ψ:[0,T)→[p1,∞)\psi : [0, T) \to [p_1, \infty)ψ:[0,T)→[p1​,∞) is nondecreasing in ttt.

Milestones

  1. The right-hand side of (2) is nonnegative and nondecreasing in ψ\psiψ, with increments bracketed by δ Pr⁡{ψδ≥p2(QT),A}\delta\,\Pr\{\psi\delta \ge p_2(Q_T), \mathcal A\}δPr{ψδ≥p2​(QT​),A} at the two endpoints, and this slope is below one.
  2. Equation (2) has a unique solution ψ≥p1\psi \ge p_1ψ≥p1​.

Significance

Theorem 1 reduces a customer's strategy, a function of arrival time and valuation, to one threshold function ψ\psiψ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T). The segment sizes ΛI,ΛS,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_S, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛS​,ΛW​,ΛL​ of §4.2, the seller's menu problem (3), the equilibrium iteration (4) and the closed form of Proposition 2 are all written in terms of ψ\psiψ; without Theorem 1 none of them is defined. Corollary 1, that the threshold rises toward the markdown, is what the paper calls "useful in our analyses below"; the customer segments of Figure 1 are drawn with it.

The result is proved in the paper, with a short appendix argument. No machine-checked version exists. The mission produces a formal statement and proof of the reduction for an arbitrary belief, which fixes the exact hypotheses under which it holds: the paper's slope bound needs either valuation decline (α>0\alpha > 0α>0) or imperfect availability, and the monotonicity of the threshold needs a nonnegative premium price. A formal WtW_tWt​ and threshold are the starting point for formalizing the equilibrium and pricing results of the paper.

Difficulty

The mathematics is one-dimensional. The difficulty is in stating it exactly. WtW_tWt​ is piecewise linear with a kink wherever ψδ\psi\deltaψδ crosses a menu price, so the paper's derivative is only a one-sided derivative, and the uniqueness argument has to use increments. The paper's bound "slope <1< 1<1" is false when α=0\alpha = 0α=0 and a unit is allocated with certainty; then (2) has either no finite solution or a half-line of them. The threshold's monotonicity in ttt rests on Wt(ψ)W_t(\psi)Wt​(ψ) increasing in ttt for fixed ψ\psiψ, which needs ψ≥0\psi \ge 0ψ≥0; with a negative premium price the threshold can decrease. The naive reading of "optimal to use a threshold" as an abstract fixed-point fact about any monotone function with slope below one discards the model and is not the goal.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace SeasonalPricing.Contingent. Time, prices and valuations are real numbers. The belief is a pair pmf alloc : ℕ → ℝ restricted to {0, …, Q} (IsInventoryBelief), not a random variable on a probability space; only the law of (QT,1{A})(Q_T, \mathbf 1\{\mathcal A\})(QT​,1{A}) enters (2). The menu is p2 : ℕ → ℝ with p2(q)≤p1p_2(q) \le p_1p2​(q)≤p1​ required on {1,…,Q}\{1, \dots, Q\}{1,…,Q} only; p2(0)p_2(0)p2​(0) never matters because a(0)=0a(0) = 0a(0)=0. The belief does not depend on the arrival time, as in Eq. (4) of the paper. waitingSurplus is WtW_tWt​ with e−α(T−t)e^{-\alpha(T-t)}e−α(T−t) written Real.exp (-(α * (T - t))); buysNow is the purchase rule, stated on the current valuation V(t)V(t)V(t).

Readings of the paper's words:

  • "the unique solution" of (2): existence and uniqueness of a real ψ≥p1\psi \ge p_1ψ≥p1​ (∃!). The paper's "ψ∈[p1,∞]\psi \in [p_1, \infty]ψ∈[p1​,∞]" includes ∞\infty∞ only in the case excluded by the added hypothesis.
  • "it is optimal to base purchasing decisions on a threshold function": the purchase rule of p. 344 holds exactly when V(t)≥ψ(t)V(t) \ge \psi(t)V(t)≥ψ(t).
  • "derivative … <1< 1<1": a two-sided bracket on increments of WtW_tWt​, with right slope δPr⁡{ψδ≥p2(QT),A}\delta\Pr\{\psi\delta \ge p_2(Q_T), \mathcal A\}δPr{ψδ≥p2​(QT​),A}, below one.
  • "increasing" (Corollary 1): nondecreasing (MonotoneOn), since ψ\psiψ is constant on an initial interval whenever no menu price is reachable (p. 347).

Added hypotheses, both named in the statements: α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or ∑qπ(q)a(q)<1\sum_q \pi(q)a(q) < 1∑q​π(q)a(q)<1, the one hypothesis the paper's proof uses without stating it; and p1≥0p_1 \ge 0p1​≥0, the model's convention that prices are nonnegative. Only the branch 0≤t<T0 \le t < T0≤t<T of the threshold θ\thetaθ is stated: for t≥Tt \ge Tt≥T the paper's θ(t)=p2\theta(t) = p_2θ(t)=p2​ is the model's rule for late customers. The belief enters through the explicit sum; a formalization with an unspecified monotone WWW, or with ψ(t)\psi(t)ψ(t) defined by choice inside a definition, is not the target.

No new library is needed beyond finite sums, max and Real.exp. A lemma on unique roots of ψ↦ψ−c−f(ψ)\psi \mapsto \psi - c - f(\psi)ψ↦ψ−c−f(ψ) for fff with increments bounded by k(ψ′−ψ)k(\psi' - \psi)k(ψ′−ψ), k<1k < 1k<1, is reusable. Proofs of the milestones and the goal, in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • X. Su, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior, Management Science 53(5):726–741, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
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Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 2: A Threshold Nash Equilibrium under Announced Fixed-Discount PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them wait, and the seller's pricing problem becomes a game between the seller and a population of forward-looking (strategic) customers. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 10(3), 2008) study this game in a model with limited inventory, stochastic arrivals and valuations that decline over the season, under two classes of seller policies: contingent pricing, where the discount depends on the inventory left, and announced fixed-discount pricing, where the seller commits to both prices upfront. Their numerical study (§7.3) compares the two classes and finds that precommitment can raise expected revenue by up to about 8%.

That comparison needs, for every announced price path, the customers' equilibrium response. Theorem 2 of the paper (p. 348) supplies it: a threshold purchasing policy, pinned down by a scalar fixed-point equation for the probability that a waiting customer is served. This mission formalizes Theorem 2. A companion mission of the same series formalizes Theorem 1, the contingent-pricing counterpart.

Setting

A seller has Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 units to sell over a season [0,H][0, H][0,H], split at a fixed time TTT with 0<T≤H0 < T \le H0<T≤H. Customers arrive by a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ drawn from a continuous distribution FFF (tail Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F), and at time ttt values the product at Vj(t)=Vje−αtV_j(t) = V_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​(t)=Vj​e−αt, where the decline factor α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 is common to all customers.

Under an announced price path the seller commits to a premium price p1p_1p1​ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) and a discount price p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ from TTT on; p2p_2p2​ does not depend on the remaining inventory. Customers know the initial inventory but not the current one.

A customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T buys immediately if and only if (i) the current surplus V(t)−p1V(t) - p_1V(t)−p1​ is nonnegative and (ii) it is at least the expected surplus of waiting,

ω⋅max⁡{V(T)−p2,0},\omega\cdot\max\{V(T) - p_2, 0\},ω⋅max{V(T)−p2​,0},

where ω\omegaω is the probability that a unit will be allocated to the customer at time TTT. Units left at TTT are rationed at random among the customers who request one.

For a threshold function ψ\psiψ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) the paper defines three segment rates: ΛI(ψ)\Lambda_I(\psi)ΛI​(ψ), the expected number of customers who buy at p1p_1p1​; ΛS(ψ,p1,p2)\Lambda_S(\psi, p_1, p_2)ΛS​(ψ,p1​,p2​), those who could buy at p1p_1p1​ but wait and want to buy at p2p_2p2​; and ΛW(p1,p2)\Lambda_W(p_1, p_2)ΛW​(p1​,p2​), those whose valuation was below p1p_1p1​ and who want to buy at p2p_2p2​. Each is λ\lambdaλ times an integral over [0,T][0, T][0,T] of Fˉ\bar FFˉ at scaled prices (p. 345). With P(x∣Λ)P(x \mid \Lambda)P(x∣Λ) the Poisson probabilities, the allocation probability of qqq units is

A(q∣Λ)=∑y=0∞qmax⁡{1+y,q} P(y∣Λ).A(q \mid \Lambda) = \sum_{y=0}^{\infty} \frac{q}{\max\{1+y, q\}}\,P(y \mid \Lambda).A(q∣Λ)=y=0∑∞​max{1+y,q}q​P(y∣Λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 348)

For w∈[0,1]w \in [0,1]w∈[0,1] let

ψA(t)=max⁡{p1,p1−wp21−we−α(T−t)},0≤t<T,(7)\psi_A(t) = \max\left\{p_1, \frac{p_1 - wp_2}{1 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)}}\right\},\qquad 0 \le t < T, \tag{7}ψA​(t)=max{p1​,1−we−α(T−t)p1​−wp2​​},0≤t<T,(7)

and suppose www solves

w=∑x=0Q−1P(x∣ΛI(ψA))⋅A(Q−x∣ΛS(ψA,p1,p2)+ΛW(p1,p2)).(8)w = \sum_{x=0}^{Q-1} P\big(x \mid \Lambda_I(\psi_A)\big)\cdot A\big(Q-x \mid \Lambda_S(\psi_A, p_1, p_2) + \Lambda_W(p_1, p_2)\big). \tag{8}w=x=0∑Q−1​P(x∣ΛI​(ψA​))⋅A(Q−x∣ΛS​(ψA​,p1​,p2​)+ΛW​(p1​,p2​)).(8)

Then, when all other customers use ψA\psi_AψA​ (so that a waiting customer is served with the probability on the right of (8)), every customer arriving at t∈[0,T)t \in [0, T)t∈[0,T) buys immediately if and only if V(t)≥ψA(t)V(t) \ge \psi_A(t)V(t)≥ψA​(t): the symmetric threshold profile is a Nash equilibrium.

Milestones: the two cases of the proof (p. 358)

  1. If e−α(T−t)≤p2/p1e^{-\alpha(T-t)} \le p_2/p_1e−α(T−t)≤p2​/p1​, the threshold is p1p_1p1​.
  2. If e−α(T−t)>p2/p1e^{-\alpha(T-t)} > p_2/p_1e−α(T−t)>p2​/p1​, the threshold is (p1−wp2)/(1−we−α(T−t))≥p1(p_1 - wp_2)/(1 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)}) \ge p_1(p1​−wp2​)/(1−we−α(T−t))≥p1​.

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces the customers' equilibrium under an announced path to a single scalar www. Everything downstream in §5 and §7 rests on it: the seller's expected revenue πA/S(p1,p2)\pi_{A/S}(p_1, p_2)πA/S​(p1​,p2​) (p. 348) is written in terms of ψA\psi_AψA​, the seller's optimal announced path maximizes it, and the comparison between announced and contingent pricing uses the resulting value πA/S∗\pi^*_{A/S}πA/S∗​. The theorem also explains the qualitative prediction of the model: the threshold exceeds p1p_1p1​ exactly when the announced discount is deep relative to the decline of valuations, and it rises with the perceived availability www.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of our search it has no machine-checked proof. A formal development contributes the model objects (segment rates for threshold policies, the allocation probability for random rationing among Poisson requesters) in a form reusable by the rest of the series and by other strategic-customer pricing models, and a checked proof of the equilibrium property. The existence of a solution to (8) is not proved in the paper and is a natural further target.

Difficulty

The best-response part of the argument is elementary once the availability is known. The substance of the statement lies in the availability itself: the probability that a waiting customer is served is not a free parameter but the one generated, through (8), by the other customers' use of the same threshold. A formalization must connect the segment rates, the Poisson counts and random rationing into one expression and keep the fixed-point coupling between www and ψA\psi_AψA​ intact; dropping it turns the theorem into a one-line inequality about an arbitrary www. The division by 1−we−α(T−t)1 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)}1−we−α(T−t) also degenerates when w=1w = 1w=1 and α=0\alpha = 0α=0, and has to be excluded explicitly.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in namespace SeasonalPricing.Announced. Conventions:

  • Time is real; base valuations have law μ : Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure μ, FFF = ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ, and continuity of FFF (the paper's "continuous distribution") is a hypothesis of the goal. No support condition on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) is imposed; the statement quantifies over every real base valuation VVV.
  • ΛI,ΛS,ΛW\Lambda_I, \Lambda_S, \Lambda_WΛI​,ΛS​,ΛW​ are interval integrals over [0,T][0, T][0,T] exactly as printed. P(x∣Λ)=e−ΛΛx/x!P(x \mid \Lambda) = e^{-\Lambda}\Lambda^x/x!P(x∣Λ)=e−ΛΛx/x! is written out; A(q∣Λ)A(q\mid\Lambda)A(q∣Λ) is the infinite series (tsum) as printed, not its closed form.
  • availability is the right-hand side of (8), with ψA\psi_AψA​ built from www by (7).

Readings of the paper's informal words:

  • "Nash equilibrium" is read as the best-response property the paper's proof checks: against the availability generated by (8), the immediate-purchase rule of p. 344 coincides with the threshold ψA\psi_AψA​ at every t∈[0,T)t \in [0, T)t∈[0,T) and every valuation. The paper defines no strategy space beyond threshold rules.
  • "www is a solution to (8)": the theorem is conditional on a solution; its existence is neither assumed elsewhere nor claimed. The conditional statement has content only when (8) has a solution, which the paper does not prove.
  • www as a likelihood: 0≤w≤10 \le w \le 10≤w≤1 is a hypothesis (it also follows from (8)).
  • Added hypothesis: α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or w<1w < 1w<1, which keeps 1−we−α(T−t)>01 - we^{-\alpha(T-t)} > 01−we−α(T−t)>0 for t<Tt < Tt<T; the paper's formula is undefined when it fails. In the milestones the same condition appears as we−α(T−t)<1we^{-\alpha(T-t)} < 1we−α(T−t)<1, and 0<p10 < p_10<p1​ is added so that p2/p1p_2/p_1p2​/p1​ is meaningful.
  • The rule on [T,H][T, H][T,H] (buy at TTT iff V(T)>p2V(T) > p_2V(T)>p2​) is part of the model and is not restated; HHH does not enter the statements.

A formalization in which www is an arbitrary number in [0,1][0,1][0,1], not tied to (8), is ruled out: it is the best-response lemma alone, not Theorem 2. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and the goal; lemmas such as 0≤A(q∣Λ)≤10 \le A(q\mid\Lambda) \le 10≤A(q∣Λ)≤1 and summability of its series; the closed form of A(q∣Λ)A(q \mid \Lambda)A(q∣Λ) printed on p. 346; and an existence result for (8).

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • X. Su, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior, Management Science 53(5):726–741, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667
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Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 3: Optimal Contingent-Pricing Revenue with Myopic Customers and Exponential ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of seasonal goods (fashion, electronics, holiday items) sell a fixed stock over a short season and routinely cut prices toward its end. A markdown of this kind segments the market over time: customers with high valuations buy early at a premium price, and customers with lower valuations are served later at a discount price. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) study how much such two-price schemes are worth when customers arrive over time, differ in their valuations, and may or may not anticipate the discount.

To measure the value of price segmentation, the paper compares every two-price scheme with the best fixed-price policy, a single price held for the whole season. Its benchmark is the case of myopic customers, who never delay a purchase strategically. Proposition 3 of the paper computes this benchmark in closed form in the simplest nontrivial setting: exponentially distributed valuations that do not decline over the season, and unlimited inventory. The resulting formula explains the pattern of the paper's Table 1, where the benefit of segmentation grows with the heterogeneity of valuations and with a late discount time.

Setting

A seller offers a product during the season [0,H][0, H][0,H]; throughout this mission H=1H = 1H=1, so time is measured as a fraction of the season. Customers arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ drawn independently from a distribution FFF with tail Fˉ(x)=1−F(x)\bar F(x) = 1 - F(x)Fˉ(x)=1−F(x), and values the product at Vje−αtV_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​e−αt at time ttt, where α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 is the decline factor. The paper reparametrizes it as ρ=e−αH\rho = e^{-\alpha H}ρ=e−αH, the fraction of the base valuation left at the end of the season.

In the numerical study, FFF is a Gamma law with mean μ\muμ and coefficient of variation ccc (standard deviation over mean): shape 1/c21/c^21/c2 and rate 1/(μc2)1/(\mu c^2)1/(μc2). The paper sets μ=1\mu = 1μ=1. For c=1c = 1c=1 this is the exponential law with mean one, Fˉ(x)=e−x\bar F(x) = e^{-x}Fˉ(x)=e−x for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0.

A contingent two-price policy posts the premium price p1p_1p1​ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T), where 0<T≤10 < T \le 10<T≤1 is fixed, and a discount price p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ from time TTT on. A myopic customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T buys at p1p_1p1​ if his valuation is at least p1p_1p1​; otherwise he waits and buys at TTT if his valuation is then at least p2p_2p2​. Customers arriving at or after TTT buy if their valuation is at least p2p_2p2​. The numbers of customers in these groups are Poisson with means

ΛI(p1)=λ∫0TFˉ(p1eαt) dt,ΛW(p1,p2)=λ∫0T[Fˉ(min⁡{p1eαt,p2eαT})−Fˉ(p1eαt)]dt,ΛL(p2)=λ∫THFˉ(p2eαt) dt.\Lambda_I(p_1) = \lambda\int_0^T \bar F(p_1 e^{\alpha t})\,dt, \quad \Lambda_W(p_1,p_2) = \lambda\int_0^T \big[\bar F(\min\{p_1e^{\alpha t}, p_2e^{\alpha T}\}) - \bar F(p_1e^{\alpha t})\big]dt, \quad \Lambda_L(p_2) = \lambda\int_T^H \bar F(p_2e^{\alpha t})\,dt .ΛI​(p1​)=λ∫0T​Fˉ(p1​eαt)dt,ΛW​(p1​,p2​)=λ∫0T​[Fˉ(min{p1​eαt,p2​eαT})−Fˉ(p1​eαt)]dt,ΛL​(p2​)=λ∫TH​Fˉ(p2​eαt)dt.

With unlimited inventory, the expected revenue of the policy is

RC/N(p1,p2)=p1ΛI(p1)+p2(ΛW(p1,p2)+ΛL(p2)),R_{C/N}(p_1, p_2) = p_1\Lambda_I(p_1) + p_2\big(\Lambda_W(p_1,p_2) + \Lambda_L(p_2)\big),RC/N​(p1​,p2​)=p1​ΛI​(p1​)+p2​(ΛW​(p1​,p2​)+ΛL​(p2​)),

and the expected revenue of a single price ppp is RF(p)=p λ∫0HFˉ(peαt) dtR_F(p) = p\,\lambda\int_0^H \bar F(p e^{\alpha t})\,dtRF​(p)=pλ∫0H​Fˉ(peαt)dt (Eq. (9) of the paper). The optimal values are πC/N∗=max⁡p2≤p1RC/N(p1,p2)\pi^*_{C/N} = \max_{p_2 \le p_1} R_{C/N}(p_1,p_2)πC/N∗​=maxp2​≤p1​​RC/N​(p1​,p2​) and πF∗=max⁡pRF(p)\pi^*_F = \max_p R_F(p)πF∗​=maxp​RF​(p).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

Suppose c=1c = 1c=1, ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 and Q/λ→∞Q/\lambda \to \inftyQ/λ→∞ (unlimited inventory), with μ=1\mu = 1μ=1 and H=1H = 1H=1. Then

πC/N∗=(λe−1)⋅eT/e=πF∗⋅eT/e.\pi^*_{C/N} = (\lambda e^{-1})\cdot e^{T/e} = \pi^*_F \cdot e^{T/e}.πC/N∗​=(λe−1)⋅eT/e=πF∗​⋅eT/e.

Both maxima are attained. The goal states the two optimal values; it does not fix the optimal prices.

Milestones from the paper's proof

  1. The reduced problem: for 0≤p2≤p10 \le p_2 \le p_10≤p2​≤p1​, RC/N(p1,p2)=p2⋅λe−p2+(p1−p2)⋅λTe−p1R_{C/N}(p_1,p_2) = p_2\cdot\lambda e^{-p_2} + (p_1-p_2)\cdot\lambda T e^{-p_1}RC/N​(p1​,p2​)=p2​⋅λe−p2​+(p1​−p2​)⋅λTe−p1​.
  2. Its solution: over p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ the maximum is λe−1+T/e\lambda e^{-1+T/e}λe−1+T/e, attained exactly at p1∗=2−T/e≥1p_1^* = 2 - T/e \ge 1p1∗​=2−T/e≥1, p2∗=p1∗−1≤1p_2^* = p_1^* - 1 \le 1p2∗​=p1∗​−1≤1.
  3. The fixed-price optimum (a supporting item of the goal, stated in the proof on pp. 358–359): p∗=μ=1p^* = \mu = 1p∗=μ=1 is the unique optimal single price and πF∗=λe−1\pi^*_F = \lambda e^{-1}πF∗​=λe−1.

Significance

Proposition 3 gives the relative benefit of contingent pricing over a single price, eT/e−1e^{T/e} - 1eT/e−1, as a function of the discount time alone. It increases in TTT and is largest at T=1T = 1T=1, where it equals e1/e−1≈44.46%e^{1/e} - 1 \approx 44.46\%e1/e−1≈44.46%. This is the paper's analytic anchor for its numerical findings: segmentation is most valuable when valuations are heterogeneous and customers are carried to the discount at little cost, and a late discount exposes more customers to the premium price. Under strategic customers the same quantity serves as an upper bound on the benefit of segmentation (§6.1 of the paper).

The result is proved in the paper, in a short appendix argument that states the reduced problem and its solution without the calculus. No machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it produces a reusable Lean encoding of the paper's segment rates ΛI,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛW​,ΛL​ as integrals of a valuation tail, a Gamma valuation law through Mathlib's gammaMeasure, and a complete verification that the integral model reduces to the two-variable problem and that the stated prices are its unique maximizer.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to write the revenue in closed form and set the gradient to zero. Two steps of that route are not automatic. First, the reduction requires evaluating the three integrals with the piecewise tail of the exponential law, including the min⁡\minmin inside ΛW\Lambda_WΛW​, and the reduced formula is valid only for nonnegative prices; negative prices must be handled separately in the model itself, where the tail equals one. Second, the reduced objective p2λe−p2+(p1−p2)λTe−p1p_2\lambda e^{-p_2} + (p_1-p_2)\lambda T e^{-p_1}p2​λe−p2​+(p1​−p2​)λTe−p1​ is not concave on the region p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​, so a stationary point is not automatically a global maximizer, and the boundary p2=p1p_2 = p_1p2​=p1​ and unbounded directions have to be ruled out. Uniqueness of the maximizer, which the paper asserts, fails at T=0T = 0T=0 and needs T>0T > 0T>0.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace SeasonalPricing.MyopicExp. Time, prices and rates are real numbers. The season is [0,1][0, 1][0,1] with 0<T≤10 < T \le 10<T≤1 and λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Integrals are interval integrals. The valuation tail is gammaValuationTail μ c x = 1 - cdf (gammaMeasure (1/c^2) (1/(μ c^2))) x, used at μ=c=1\mu = c = 1μ=c=1. The hypothesis ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 is decayRatio α 1 = 1 with α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

Readings of the paper's informal words:

  • "Q/λ→∞Q/\lambda \to \inftyQ/λ→∞" is read as unlimited inventory: the truncated Poisson mean N(q,Λ)N(q,\Lambda)N(q,Λ) of §4.2 is replaced by Λ\LambdaΛ and stock-outs never occur. This is what the proof computes, what p. 348 writes as Q=∞Q = \inftyQ=∞, and what §7.1 calls inventory that is "practically unlimited". A limit of finite-inventory optimal revenues is not stated.
  • "max" is an attained maximum (IsGreatest), not a supremum.
  • The optimum is taken over all real prices with p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​, as printed; the paper never restricts signs, and negative prices are never optimal in the model.
  • The seller's discount at TTT is a best response to p1p_1p1​ in the paper (R(q∣p1)R(q \mid p_1)R(q∣p1​), p. 349). With unlimited inventory it does not depend on the realized sales, and the nested maximum equals the joint maximum over (p1,p2)(p_1, p_2)(p1​,p2​), which is what the goal states.
  • "The solution … is" (milestone 2) and "the optimal single price is given by p∗=μ=1p^* = \mu = 1p∗=μ=1" (the fixed-price item) are read as unique maximizers.

The Gamma density printed on p. 349 has the exponent 1/(sc2−1)1/(sc^2-1)1/(sc2−1), a misprint for 1/c2−11/c^2 - 11/c2−1; at c=1c = 1c=1 the exponent is 000 either way.

A trivializing formalization would state the goal on the reduced two-variable function, dropping the model: the goal here is about RC/NR_{C/N}RC/N​ built from ΛI,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛW​,ΛL​ and the Gamma tail, and about RFR_FRF​ built from Eq. (9). The platform's BuyingToBundle.monopolyRevenue (definition monopoly_pricing) is a related object, sup⁡pp ν([p,∞))\sup_p p\,\nu([p,\infty))supp​pν([p,∞)); with ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 and H=1H = 1H=1, πF∗\pi^*_FπF∗​ equals λ\lambdaλ times it for the exponential law, but it is a supremum without arrivals or time and is not reused.

Contributions welcome: closed forms of the segment rates for the exponential tail, a general lemma that negative prices are dominated, and the two-variable maximization.

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • D. Besanko and W. L. Winston, Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers, Management Science 36(5):555–567, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
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CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Subject to Resource Constraints: Classification and Complexity I: Unit-Time Chains on Two Identical Machines with One Unit Resource Are Strongly NP-hardResearch Paper

Resource constraints and the easy/hard borderline in scheduling

Machine scheduling asks how to assign jobs to machines over time so that a criterion such as the makespan Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​, the time at which the last job completes, is as small as possible. In practice jobs also compete for scarce resources beyond the machines themselves: tools, operators, memory, power. Błażewicz, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (DAM 1983) extended the standard three-field classification α∣β∣γ\alpha\mid\beta\mid\gammaα∣β∣γ of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (1979) by a resource field resλσρres\lambda\sigma\rhoresλσρ. They then settled the complexity of every problem with parallel identical or uniform machines, unit-time jobs, precedence constraints and the Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​ criterion. Their Fig. 2 separates the maximal polynomially solvable problems from the minimal NP-hard ones, and it has been the reference map for resource-constrained scheduling since.

Brief timeline of the problems involved:

  • 1975. Garey and Johnson (SIAM J. Comput. 4) show that P2∣res⋯ ,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res\cdots, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res⋯,pj​=1∣Cmax​ is solvable in polynomial time via matchings, and that P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P3\mid res1\cdot\cdot, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ and P2∣res1⋅⋅,tree,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res1\cdot\cdot, tree, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res1⋅⋅,tree,pj​=1∣Cmax​ are NP-hard in the strong sense, by reduction from 3-PARTITION.
  • 1976. Ullman (Complexity of sequencing problems, in Coffman, ed., Computer & Job/Shop Scheduling Theory, Wiley) gives strong NP-hardness of P2∣res111,prec,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res111, prec, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res111,prec,pj​=1∣Cmax​ under arbitrary precedence constraints.
  • 1983. Błażewicz, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan prove Theorem 7: chains suffice. Two identical machines, one resource of size one, requirements in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} and chain-like precedence already give a strongly NP-hard problem. The result dominates both earlier two-machine results.

Setting

There are nnn jobs J1,…,JnJ_1,\dots,J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ and mmm machines M1,…,MmM_1,\dots,M_mM1​,…,Mm​. Every job has processing time 111 on every machine, each machine handles at most one job at a time, and jobs are not preempted. There are lll resources; resource RhR_hRh​ has a positive integer size shs_hsh​, the amount available at any time, and job JjJ_jJj​ has a nonnegative integer requirement rhjr_{hj}rhj​, the amount it holds throughout its execution. A directed acyclic graph HHH on the jobs gives the precedence constraints: if HHH has a path from jjj to kkk (Jj→JkJ_j\to J_kJj​→Jk​), then JjJ_jJj​ must complete before JkJ_kJk​ starts. The precedence is chain-like when every vertex of HHH has indegree and outdegree at most one.

A schedule gives each job a machine and a real start time SjS_jSj​; the job occupies [Sj,Sj+1)[S_j, S_j+1)[Sj​,Sj​+1) and completes at Cj=Sj+1C_j = S_j+1Cj​=Sj​+1. It is feasible if jobs on one machine do not overlap, precedence is respected, and at every time ttt the jobs running at ttt require at most shs_hsh​ of each resource RhR_hRh​. The makespan is Cmax⁡=max⁡jCjC_{\max} = \max_j C_jCmax​=maxj​Cj​.

The problem P2∣res111,chain,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P2\mid res111, chain, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P2∣res111,chain,pj​=1∣Cmax​ restricts this to m=2m=2m=2, one resource (λ=1\lambda=1λ=1) of size 111 (σ=1\sigma=1σ=1), every requirement at most 111 (ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1), and chain-like precedence. The problem P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P3\mid res1\cdot\cdot, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ has m=3m=3m=3, one resource of arbitrary size and requirements, and no precedence.

3-PARTITION: given ttt, a positive integer bbb and positive integers a1,…,a3ta_1,\dots,a_{3t}a1​,…,a3t​ with ∑jaj=tb\sum_j a_j = tb∑j​aj​=tb and 14b<aj<12b\tfrac14 b<a_j<\tfrac12 b41​b<aj​<21​b, can {1,…,3t}\{1,\dots,3t\}{1,…,3t} be split into ttt disjoint 3-element sets SiS_iSi​ with ∑j∈Siaj=b\sum_{j\in S_i}a_j=b∑j∈Si​​aj​=b?

A problem is NP-hard in the strong sense if it remains NP-hard when every number of the instance is written in unary.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

3-PARTITION is NP-hard in the strong sense  ⟹  P2∣res111, chain, pj=1∣Cmax⁡ is NP-hard in the strong sense.\text{3-PARTITION is NP-hard in the strong sense} \;\Longrightarrow\; P2\mid res111,\ chain,\ p_j=1\mid C_{\max}\ \text{is NP-hard in the strong sense.}3-PARTITION is NP-hard in the strong sense⟹P2∣res111, chain, pj​=1∣Cmax​ is NP-hard in the strong sense.

The hypothesis is Garey and Johnson's theorem on 3-PARTITION, which the paper cites and does not prove. The conclusion concerns the decision version: given an instance and y∈Ny\in\mathbb Ny∈N, is there a feasible schedule with Cmax⁡≤yC_{\max}\le yCmax​≤y?

Milestones

  1. Proof of Theorem 4, the saturation equivalence. For positive bbb, aja_jaj​ with ∑jaj=tb\sum_j a_j=tb∑j​aj​=tb, the P3∣res1⋅⋅P3\mid res1\cdot\cdotP3∣res1⋅⋅ instance with 3t3t3t unit jobs, resource size bbb and requirements aja_jaj​ has a feasible schedule with Cmax⁡≤tC_{\max}\le tCmax​≤t iff the 3-PARTITION instance has a solution.
  2. Theorem 4 (Garey and Johnson). Under the same hypothesis as the goal, P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj=1∣Cmax⁡P3\mid res1\cdot\cdot, p_j=1\mid C_{\max}P3∣res1⋅⋅,pj​=1∣Cmax​ is NP-hard in the strong sense.
  3. Proof of Theorem 7, "if". A 3-PARTITION solution yields a feasible schedule of the constructed two-machine instance with Cmax⁡=2tbC_{\max}=2tbCmax​=2tb.
  4. Proof of Theorem 7, "only if". A feasible schedule of the constructed instance with Cmax⁡≤2tbC_{\max}\le 2tbCmax​≤2tb yields a 3-PARTITION solution.

Significance

Theorem 7 is the sharpest hardness result of the paper's classification. Without resources, two-machine unit-time scheduling with arbitrary precedence is polynomial (Coffman and Graham, Acta Inform. 1972); without precedence, it is polynomial under arbitrary resources (Theorem 1 of the paper). The theorem shows that combining the weakest nontrivial versions of both constraints, chains and one unit resource, already crosses the borderline. The paper's §4.1 extends the same reduction to the ∑Cj\sum C_j∑Cj​ and Lmax⁡L_{\max}Lmax​ criteria.

On the formal side, the mission provides a machine-checked model of resource-constrained scheduling with real start times, a definition of NP-hardness in the strong sense on top of the platform's Turing-machine formalization of P\mathrm PP and NP\mathrm{NP}NP, and 3-PARTITION as a reusable source problem. As far as the platform's corpus shows, none of Theorems 4 and 7, 3-PARTITION, or strong NP-hardness has been formalized before. Both theorems are proved in the literature; what remains is to formalize the reductions and their polynomial running time.

Difficulty

The combinatorial heart is the "only if" direction: a schedule of length 2tb2tb2tb must be shown to be rigid. Start times are arbitrary reals, so the first obstacle is to show that both machines are busy throughout [0,2tb)[0,2tb)[0,2tb), that the chain LLL forces unit spacing, and that the primed jobs of the chains Kj′K'_jKj′​ can only run in the intervals the chain LLL leaves free of the resource. Only after this is established can the index sets SiS_iSi​ be read off. Arguing on integer time slots from the start is not enough: the model allows fractional start times, and ruling them out is part of the proof.

The second obstacle is the complexity layer. NP-hardness is stated with respect to polynomial-time many-one reductions computed by one-tape Turing machines. The reduction from 3-PARTITION therefore has to be implemented and its running time bounded on unary codes. The constructed instance has 4tb4tb4tb jobs, which is polynomial in the unary length of the 3-PARTITION instance; this is exactly why the reduction proves hardness in the strong sense.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Jobs are Fin n and machines Fin m, 0-based. Only identical machines with unit processing times are modelled. Start times are real, execution intervals are half-open, and the resource constraint is imposed at every real time. Precedence is the transitive closure of the arc list of HHH. Cmax⁡=0C_{\max}=0Cmax​=0 for an empty instance.
  • Decision version. Thresholds yyy are natural numbers; this narrower class makes the hardness statement stronger.
  • Encoding. An instance is described by its list of numbers (n,m,ln,m,ln,m,l, the sizes, the requirements row by row, the number of arcs and the arcs, then yyy). The unary language is the set of unary codes of yes-instances over a two-letter alphabet. No pairing function is used. The class conditions (two machines, one unit resource, requirements at most one, chain-like acyclic HHH) are part of the yes-predicate.
  • Strong sense. Strong NP-hardness is NP-hardness of the unary language. This is equivalent to Garey and Johnson's definition, which bounds the largest number by a polynomial in the instance length.
  • Cited hypothesis. The goal and Theorem 4 assume strong NP-hardness of 3-PARTITION (with 14b<aj<12b\tfrac14 b<a_j<\tfrac12 b41​b<aj​<21​b) and nothing else. Stating the goal as a bare reduction between the two languages, or adding P≠NP\mathrm P\ne\mathrm{NP}P=NP, would not be Theorem 7.
  • Constructions. The two scheduling instances built from a 3-PARTITION instance are explicit definitions following the page, not arbitrary instances with a property.
  • Reuse. The scheduling model and the strong-NP-hardness layer are shared with the other missions of this series; 3-PARTITION serves any strong NP-hardness proof by number partitioning.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the four milestones; a formalized polynomial-time implementation of the reduction on unary codes; general lemmas about composing polynomial-time reductions on the one-tape machine model.

Selected references

  • J. Błażewicz, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Scheduling subject to resource constraints: classification and complexity, Discrete Applied Mathematics 5 (1983) 11–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(83)90012-4
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Complexity results for multiprocessor scheduling under resource constraints, SIAM J. Comput. 4 (1975) 397–411. https://doi.org/10.1137/0204035
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979.
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Ann. Discrete Math. 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • J. D. Ullman, Complexity of sequencing problems, in: E. G. Coffman, Jr., ed., Computer & Job/Shop Scheduling Theory, Wiley, 1976, 139–164.
  • E. G. Coffman, Jr., R. L. Graham, Optimal scheduling for two-processor systems, Acta Informatica 1 (1972) 200–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00288685
  • S. Cook, The P versus NP problem, Clay Mathematics Institute official problem description.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities I: Beale's Simplex Method for a Convex Quadratic Function TerminatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Quadratic programming, the minimization of a convex quadratic function subject to linear constraints, is the simplest nonlinear extension of linear programming. It arises in least-squares estimation with sign constraints, in portfolio selection, and as the subproblem solved at each iteration of Newton-type methods for general smooth convex programs. E. M. L. Beale's 1955 paper (DOI 10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x) gave one of the first finite algorithms for it by extending Dantzig's simplex method: the method keeps the simplex tableau and adds free variables, linear functions of the original variables with no sign restriction, along which the quadratic stops decreasing.

Timeline:

  • 1951: Dantzig publishes the simplex method for linear programming.
  • 1952: Charnes introduces ε-perturbations to resolve degeneracy in the simplex method.
  • 1955: Beale extends the simplex method to convex quadratic objectives and proves that the iteration terminates (§3 of the paper; the result formalized here).
  • 1959: Beale's "On quadratic programming" (Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 6) develops the method further; Wolfe's simplex method for quadratic programming (Econometrica 27) appears the same year.

Setting

There are nnn restricted variables xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 satisfying mmm linearly independent linear equations, and a convex quadratic objective CCC. The iteration keeps N=n−mN = n - mN=n−m nonbasic variables z1,…,zNz_1, \dots, z_Nz1​,…,zN​, each either a restricted variable or a free variable, and writes every restricted variable as an affine function of them:

xh=ah0+∑l=1Nahlzl.(2.3)x_h = a_{h0} + \sum_{l=1}^{N} a_{hl} z_l. \qquad (2.3)xh​=ah0​+l=1∑N​ahl​zl​.(2.3)

A restricted variable that is not nonbasic is basic. The associated solution sets every zl=0z_l = 0zl​=0, so xh=ah0x_h = a_{h0}xh​=ah0​. The objective is written as

C=∑k=0N∑l=0Ncklzkzl,z0=1,(3.1)C = \sum_{k=0}^{N} \sum_{l=0}^{N} c_{kl} z_k z_l, \qquad z_0 = 1, \qquad (3.1)C=k=0∑N​l=0∑N​ckl​zk​zl​,z0​=1,(3.1)

with (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​) symmetric. Thus c00c_{00}c00​ is the value of CCC at the associated solution and 2ck02c_{k0}2ck0​ is its linear coefficient in zkz_kzk​. The number of nonbasic free variables is sss.

One step chooses a nonbasic zpz_pzp​ that can profitably be altered: a free one with cp0≠0c_{p0} \ne 0cp0​=0 if there is one, otherwise a restricted one with cp0<0c_{p0} < 0cp0​<0. It orients zpz_pzp​ so that it is to be increased, and increases it from 000. It stops at the first of two events. Either a basic variable xqx_qxq​ reaches 000 (the ratio test (2.4)), and then xqx_qxq​ becomes nonbasic in place of zpz_pzp​. Or CCC stops decreasing where the free variable ur=cp0+∑lcplzlu_r = c_{p0} + \sum_l c_{pl} z_lur​=cp0​+∑l​cpl​zl​ vanishes (3.2), and then uru_rur​ becomes nonbasic in place of zpz_pzp​. The coefficients are then transformed by substituting for zpz_pzp​ (eqs. (3.4)–(3.6)). CCC is in standard form when it has no linear term in any free variable.

Formalization targets

Goal: the iteration terminates

From a tableau with symmetric (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​), positive semidefinite quadratic block (ckl)k,l≥1(c_{kl})_{k,l \ge 1}(ckl​)k,l≥1​ and consistent labels, there is no infinite run

T0→T1→T2→⋯T_0 \to T_1 \to T_2 \to \cdotsT0​→T1​→T2​→⋯

of steps along which every basic variable stays strictly positive in the associated solution. No bound on the number of steps is claimed, as in the paper.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (3.7): the closed form of the transformed matrix, its symmetry, and the invariance ∑cklzkzl=∑ckl′′zk′zl′\sum c_{kl} z_k z_l = \sum c''_{kl} z'_k z'_l∑ckl​zk​zl​=∑ckl′′​zk′​zl′​.
  2. Lemma 1: when a free variable enters, its row and column vanish off the diagonal, the index 000 included.
  3. Lemma 2: a slot whose row and column vanish off the diagonal keeps this property when another free variable enters.
  4. The optimality criterion (p. 175): if no nonbasic variable can profitably be altered and CCC is convex, then c00c_{00}c00​ is the minimum over the feasible region.
  5. In standard form, c00≤C(z)c_{00} \le C(z)c00​≤C(z) for every zzz with the restricted nonbasic variables at 000.
  6. CCC decreases at every step: c00′<c00c'_{00} < c_{00}c00′​<c00​.
  7. A finite run never returns to a standard form with the same set of restricted nonbasic variables.
  8. If CCC is not in standard form and s=s0s = s_0s=s0​, then within s0s_0s0​ steps either standard form is reached or sss drops, and sss never exceeds s0s_0s0​ on the way.

Significance

The theorem makes Beale's method an algorithm: a finite procedure that ends either at an optimal tableau (milestone 4) or with a ray along which CCC decreases without bound. This finiteness is what later active-set methods for quadratic programming inherit.

The result was proved in 1955. What remains is to formalize it: a machine-checked account of a simplex-type method whose state includes variables that are created during the run and later discarded. Mathlib has no simplex-type algorithm for quadratic programming, and no machine-checked proof of this theorem is known. The pivot algebra (3.4)–(3.7) and the tableau model are reusable for other pivoting methods for quadratic programs.

Difficulty

The argument for linear programming does not carry over. There, the objective strictly decreases and a basis is a subset of a finite set of columns, so no basis repeats. Here each step may create a new free variable, and nothing bounds the number of distinct free variables that can occur. Tableaux are therefore not drawn from a finite set, and a strictly decreasing objective alone does not give termination. The paper states this itself: "there is no obvious limit to the number of free variables that may be involved". The difficulty is to bound the number of steps between returns to a well-behaved tableau, and this depends both on the rule that free variables are chosen first and on how the coefficient matrix evolves under repeated pivots.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. The nonbasic variables occupy fixed slots Fin (N+1). Slot 0 is z0=1z_0 = 1z0​=1; the nonbasic slot k : Fin N is index k.succ. A pivot stores the new nonbasic variable in the slot of the variable it replaces, so the paper's index qqq in (3.4)–(3.7) is that slot. The tableau holds the labels (restricted xjx_jxj​ or free), the rows of all nnn restricted variables (a nonbasic one has the unit row), and (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​). Free variables carry no row, as in the paper.
  • The pivot. pivotC is computed literally from (3.5) and then (3.6). Rows are transformed by the same substitution, as the paper states.
  • The step. The step is a relation. It allows any profitable choice of zpz_pzp​ subject to the free-first rule, and at a tie either outcome. No pricing rule is fixed, since the paper fixes none.
  • Convexity. Convexity of CCC is the symmetry of (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​) plus positive semidefiniteness of the block (ckl)k,l≥1(c_{kl})_{k,l \ge 1}(ckl​)k,l≥1​, assumed on the initial tableau.
  • Added hypothesis. The one hypothesis not on the page is that every basic restricted variable is strictly positive in the associated solution of every tableau of the run. It replaces Charnes's ε-perturbations, by which the paper ensures "the ah0a_{h0}ah0​ are always positive, and not zero". Positivity is required of basic variables only; nonbasic variables are 000 in the associated solution.
  • Out of scope. The link to the original equations (2.1) and phase 1 (artificial variables, the M-method) are not formalized: the iteration starts from a tableau already in the form (2.3).
  • Ruling out a trivial goal. A step relation that never fires, or a positivity hypothesis that no tableau can meet after a step, would make the goal trivially true. A sorry-free check exhibits a convex instance with consistent labels, a step, and positive basic variables before and after it.

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The algebraic milestones 1–3 are self-contained.

Selected references

  • E. M. L. Beale, On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 17(2):173–184, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x
  • A. Charnes, Optimality and Degeneracy in Linear Programming, Econometrica 20(2):160–170, 1952. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907845
  • G. B. Dantzig, Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities, in T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, pp. 339–347.
  • E. M. L. Beale, On Quadratic Programming, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 6(3):227–243, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800060305
  • P. Wolfe, The Simplex Method for Quadratic Programming, Econometrica 27(3):382–398, 1959. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909468
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Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue: Exponential Stationary Density under Normal Reflection (Proposition 2)Research Paper

Motivation

A make-to-stock manufacturer who also sells on a spot market must decide, at every moment, whether to keep producing and whether to accept or reject incoming orders at the prevailing price. Caldentey and Wein (Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue, Operations Research 54(5), 2006) study this problem in heavy traffic. The limit is a two-dimensional singular control problem for a diffusion: the inventory level and the logarithm of the price move jointly as a correlated Brownian motion, and the controls push the inventory only when it reaches one of two free boundaries. The optimal boundaries are characterized by an elliptic free-boundary problem that the authors could not solve in closed form.

The paper's way forward is an approximation: change the direction of reflection on the boundary so that the stationary distribution of the controlled process becomes an explicit exponential. Proposition 2 states that exponential form, and it turns the free-boundary problem into a calculus-of-variations problem for the two boundary curves. Explicit stationary densities of reflected diffusions in two dimensions are rare; the classical condition for an exponential stationary density of a reflected Brownian motion, and the characterization of the stationary law by a basic adjoint relation, are due to Harrison and Williams, Multidimensional reflected Brownian motions having exponential stationary distributions, Annals of Probability 15, 1987, the reference the paper cites. This mission formalizes the analytic core of Proposition 2: the exponential density satisfies that relation for the reflection field the proposition singles out.

Setting

Points of the plane are (x,y)(x,y)(x,y), with xxx the inventory level and yyy the logarithm of the price. The limiting process (X,Y)(\mathcal X,\mathcal Y)(X,Y) has drift (θ,0)(\theta,0)(θ,0) and covariance matrix

Σ=(σ2σδϱσδϱδ2),σ>0, δ>0, −1<ϱ<1,\Sigma=\begin{pmatrix}\sigma^2&\sigma\delta\varrho\\ \sigma\delta\varrho&\delta^2\end{pmatrix},\qquad \sigma>0,\ \delta>0,\ -1<\varrho<1,Σ=(σ2σδϱ​σδϱδ2​),σ>0, δ>0, −1<ϱ<1,

so its generator is

Γ=θ∂∂x+σ22∂2∂x2+σδϱ∂2∂x ∂y+δ22∂2∂y2.\Gamma=\theta\frac{\partial}{\partial x}+\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2}+\sigma\delta\varrho\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x\,\partial y}+\frac{\delta^2}{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial y^2}.Γ=θ∂x∂​+2σ2​∂x2∂2​+σδϱ∂x∂y∂2​+2δ2​∂y2∂2​.

Two curves bound the region where the process lives: the rejection boundary x=η(y)x=\eta(y)x=η(y) (below it, orders are rejected) and the idleness boundary x=ξ(y)x=\xi(y)x=ξ(y) (above it, production stops). For ymin⁡<ymax⁡y_{\min}<y_{\max}ymin​<ymax​ the region is

Ω={(x,y): ymin⁡<y<ymax⁡, η(y)<x<ξ(y)},\Omega=\{(x,y):\ y_{\min}<y<y_{\max},\ \eta(y)<x<\xi(y)\},Ω={(x,y): ymin​<y<ymax​, η(y)<x<ξ(y)},

and its boundary splits into four pieces: x=η(y)x=\eta(y)x=η(y), x=ξ(y)x=\xi(y)x=ξ(y), y=ymin⁡y=y_{\min}y=ymin​, y=ymax⁡y=y_{\max}y=ymax​. Write n⃗\vec nn for the inward unit normal on ∂Ω\partial\Omega∂Ω and dldldl for arc length. A reflection field v⃗\vec vv on ∂Ω\partial\Omega∂Ω gives the direction in which the process is pushed back into Ω\OmegaΩ. The basic adjoint relation (BAR) of the paper, equation (43), is

∫ΩΓf πΩ ds+12∫∂Ωv⃗⋅∇f πΩ dl=0for all test functions f,\int_\Omega \Gamma f\,\pi_\Omega\,ds+\frac12\int_{\partial\Omega}\vec v\cdot\nabla f\,\pi_\Omega\,dl=0\quad\text{for all test functions } f,∫Ω​ΓfπΩ​ds+21​∫∂Ω​v⋅∇fπΩ​dl=0for all test functions f,

and the paper cites Harrison and Williams for the fact that the stationary distribution πΩ\pi_\OmegaπΩ​ of the reflected process satisfies it. Proposition 2 introduces the eigen-decomposition Σ=V′EV\Sigma=V'EVΣ=V′EV (VVV a rotation whose rows are eigenvectors, EEE diagonal), the whitening map T=E−1/2VT=E^{-1/2}VT=E−1/2V and Ω∗=T(Ω)\Omega^*=T(\Omega)Ω∗=T(Ω), and assumes that Tv⃗T\vec vTv is normal to ∂Ω∗\partial\Omega^*∂Ω∗. The exponents are

mx=2θσ2(1−ϱ2),my=−2ϱθσδ(1−ϱ2).(47)m_x=\frac{2\theta}{\sigma^2(1-\varrho^2)},\qquad m_y=\frac{-2\varrho\theta}{\sigma\delta(1-\varrho^2)}.\tag{47}mx​=σ2(1−ϱ2)2θ​,my​=σδ(1−ϱ2)−2ϱθ​.(47)

Formalization targets

Goal: the exponential density satisfies the BAR under conormal reflection

For η,ξ\eta,\xiη,ξ continuously differentiable with η<ξ\eta<\xiη<ξ on [ymin⁡,ymax⁡][y_{\min},y_{\max}][ymin​,ymax​], π(x,y)=emxx+myy\pi(x,y)=e^{m_xx+m_yy}π(x,y)=emx​x+my​y, and every C2C^2C2 function fff on R2\mathbb R^2R2,

∫ΩΓf  π ds+12∫∂Ω(Σn⃗)⋅∇f  π dl=0.\int_\Omega \Gamma f\;\pi\,ds+\frac12\int_{\partial\Omega}(\Sigma\vec n)\cdot\nabla f\;\pi\,dl=0 .∫Ω​Γfπds+21​∫∂Ω​(Σn)⋅∇fπdl=0.

The boundary integral is written out on the four pieces, with n⃗ dl\vec n\,dlndl equal to (1,−η′(y)) dy(1,-\eta'(y))\,dy(1,−η′(y))dy, (−1,ξ′(y)) dy(-1,\xi'(y))\,dy(−1,ξ′(y))dy, (0,1) dx(0,1)\,dx(0,1)dx and (0,−1) dx(0,-1)\,dx(0,−1)dx respectively. The normalizing constant is left out because the relation is linear in π\piπ.

Milestones

  1. The interior equation: Γ∗π=−θπx+σ22πxx+σδϱ πxy+δ22πyy=0\Gamma^*\pi=-\theta\pi_x+\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\pi_{xx}+\sigma\delta\varrho\,\pi_{xy}+\frac{\delta^2}{2}\pi_{yy}=0Γ∗π=−θπx​+2σ2​πxx​+σδϱπxy​+2δ2​πyy​=0 everywhere.
  2. The zero-flux identity: 12Σ∇π=(θ,0) π\frac12\Sigma\nabla\pi=(\theta,0)\,\pi21​Σ∇π=(θ,0)π everywhere.
  3. The meaning of the hypothesis: with T=E−1/2VT=E^{-1/2}VT=E−1/2V, (Tv)⋅(Tw)=v⋅Σ−1w(Tv)\cdot(Tw)=v\cdot\Sigma^{-1}w(Tv)⋅(Tw)=v⋅Σ−1w, and for n≠0n\neq0n=0, TvTvTv is orthogonal to TTT of every vector orthogonal to nnn exactly when vvv is a multiple of Σn\Sigma nΣn.
  4. The normalizing constant: π\piπ is integrable on Ω\OmegaΩ and a unique KΩ>0K_\Omega>0KΩ​>0 makes KΩπK_\Omega\piKΩ​π integrate to one.

Significance

For the operations model, Proposition 2 is what makes the problem computable. Once the stationary density is explicit, the long-run average cost of any pair of boundary curves is an explicit integral, and optimizing over (η,ξ)(\eta,\xi)(η,ξ) becomes a variational problem with Euler–Lagrange equations; the paper's proposed policy and its numerical comparisons all rest on it.

For formalization, the mission produces a machine-checked version of a statement whose proof the paper does not contain (it is in an online companion) and whose hypothesis is stated only in words. The formal statements fix exactly which reflection field makes the claim true, which the prose leaves ambiguous. None of the statements has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof anywhere; the result itself is classical in spirit (an integration by parts on a planar region), but no divergence theorem on a region between two graphs with an anisotropic operator is currently available as a ready-made statement.

Difficulty

The interior equation and the zero-flux identity are finite computations with the exponential. The difficulty is the goal: it is an integration-by-parts identity on a curved planar region with an anisotropic second-order operator. The obvious first step, "apply Green's identity", presupposes a divergence theorem on a region bounded by two graphs x=η(y)x=\eta(y)x=η(y), x=ξ(y)x=\xi(y)x=ξ(y) and two horizontal segments, with the boundary integral written in the parametrization of each piece and the orientation of every normal tracked. Mathlib has the divergence theorem on rectangular boxes, not on such regions, and the moving limits η(y)\eta(y)η(y), ξ(y)\xi(y)ξ(y) are exactly where the terms in η′\eta'η′ and ξ′\xi'ξ′ of the boundary integral come from.

The second trap is the reflection field. The page describes the modification as substituting the inward unit normal n⃗\vec nn for v⃗\vec vv; with v⃗=n⃗\vec v=\vec nv=n the identity is false as soon as Σ\SigmaΣ is not a multiple of the identity (on a random instance the residual is of order one). Only the conormal field Σn⃗\Sigma\vec nΣn, which is what the hypothesis of Proposition 2 selects, gives a true statement.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace MakeToStockRM.ExpDensity. The plane is ℝ × ℝ with the inventory first; partial derivatives are Fréchet derivatives applied to (1, 0) and (0, 1), and the mixed partial is ∂x(∂yf)\partial_x(\partial_y f)∂x​(∂y​f). Parameters satisfy σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, δ>0\delta>0δ>0, ∣ϱ∣<1|\varrho|<1∣ϱ∣<1; θ\thetaθ is any real number, and θ=0\theta=0θ=0 (then π≡1\pi\equiv1π≡1) is allowed.

This is the analytic, pinned-down content of Proposition 2. The identification "the BAR characterizes the stationary law of the reflected diffusion" (Harrison–Williams 1987) is out of scope: Mathlib has no reflected Brownian motion. Relative to the page, the formalization commits to the following:

  • The reflection field is v⃗=Σn⃗\vec v=\Sigma\vec nv=Σn with n⃗\vec nn the inward unit normal and dldldl arc length. The hypothesis "Tv⃗T\vec vTv is normal to ∂Ω∗\partial\Omega^*∂Ω∗" fixes only the direction of v⃗\vec vv (milestone 3); the length Σn⃗\Sigma\vec nΣn is the one for which the BAR holds. The page's phrase "substituting the inward unit normal n⃗\vec nn for v⃗\vec vv" is inconsistent with the proposition's own hypothesis and is not followed.
  • The boundary curves are C1C^1C1 on R\mathbb RR with η<ξ\eta<\xiη<ξ on [ymin⁡,ymax⁡][y_{\min},y_{\max}][ymin​,ymax​], and ymin⁡<ymax⁡y_{\min}<y_{\max}ymin​<ymax​, so Ω\OmegaΩ is a nonempty bounded region; the paper assumes this implicitly.
  • Test functions are all C2C^2C2 functions on R2\mathbb R^2R2, which are bounded with bounded derivatives on the closure of Ω\OmegaΩ (the paper's "twice continuous and bounded").
  • The constant KΩK_\OmegaKΩ​ is dropped from the goal and treated in milestone 4.

The goal quantifies over every C2C^2C2 test function; restricting to functions supported inside Ω\OmegaΩ would delete the boundary term and reduce the goal to milestone 1, and that trivialization is ruled out. The second half of Proposition 2 ("(45)–(46) is equivalent to (48)–(49)"), Proposition 1, the heavy-traffic limit, the HJB equation and the proposed policy are not formalized: their normalizations or proofs are only in the online companion.

A complete development needs a divergence theorem on regions between two C1C^1C1 graphs, which is reusable for any planar PDE statement on such regions. Contributions of that lemma, and of the four milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Caldentey, L. M. Wein, Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue, Operations Research 54(5):859–875, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0289
  • J. M. Harrison, R. J. Williams, Multidimensional reflected Brownian motions having exponential stationary distributions, Annals of Probability 15(1):115–137, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176992259
  • F. John, Partial Differential Equations, 4th ed., Springer, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9333-7
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities II: Optimality Conditions for the Sum of the Largest Linear FormsResearch Paper

Motivation

In 1955 E. M. L. Beale showed how Dantzig's simplex method, which was built for linear objectives, can be carried over to certain nonlinear convex objectives that are minimized subject to linear inequalities (Beale 1955). Section 4 of that paper treats one such objective: the sum of the ttt largest of a set of ggg linear forms. Beale's motivation comes from the theory of games: "if the enemy has to choose ttt out of a set of ggg possible actions, and LfL_fLf​ represents his average gain through using the fffth", then the defender wants to minimize the sum of the ttt largest LfL_fLf​.

The same objective can be written as a linear program. One introduces a bound uuu and requires every sum of ttt forms to be at most uuu. That formulation has (gt)\binom{g}{t}(tg​) constraints, which is unwieldy once t>1t>1t>1 and ggg is large. Beale's alternative works with the nonlinear objective directly, and he needs a test that tells him when the current basic solution is already optimal. This mission formalizes that test, Theorem 1 of the paper.

The objective reappears in later work under other names: the sum of the kkk largest components of a vector, the "top-kkk sum", and kkk times the conditional value-at-risk of an empirical distribution. Beale's paper is an early source for its optimality conditions.

Setting

There are real variables zlz_lzl​, indexed by lll in a finite set (possibly empty), and u1,…,usu_1,\dots,u_su1​,…,us​. Two linear forms in these variables are given,

A=A0+∑lAlzl+∑f=1sφfuf,L0=c00+∑lc0lzl+∑f=1sθfuf,A=A_0+\sum_l A_l z_l+\sum_{f=1}^{s}\varphi_f u_f,\qquad L_0=c_{00}+\sum_l c_{0l} z_l+\sum_{f=1}^{s}\theta_f u_f,A=A0​+l∑​Al​zl​+f=1∑s​φf​uf​,L0​=c00​+l∑​c0l​zl​+f=1∑s​θf​uf​,

together with sss further forms

Lf=L0−uf(f=1,…,s).L_f=L_0-u_f\qquad(f=1,\dots,s).Lf​=L0​−uf​(f=1,…,s).

For an integer τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 the objective is

C=A+(sum of the τ largest of L0,L1,…,Ls).C=A+\bigl(\text{sum of the }\tau\text{ largest of }L_0,L_1,\dots,L_s\bigr).C=A+(sum of the τ largest of L0​,L1​,…,Ls​).

The sum of the τ\tauτ largest of s+1s+1s+1 numbers is the largest total of any τ\tauτ of them. Ties do not make it ambiguous.

The feasible region is fixed by a set FFF of indices. The variables zlz_lzl​ with l∈Fl\in Fl∈F and all the ufu_fuf​ are free, and every other zlz_lzl​ is restricted to zl≥0z_l\ge0zl​≥0. At the origin z=0z=0z=0, u=0u=0u=0 all s+1s+1s+1 forms are equal to c00c_{00}c00​, so the origin is where CCC fails to be differentiable. In Beale's algorithm the origin is the current basic solution: the ufu_fuf​ measure how far the "borderline" forms sit from a chosen critical form, and AAA collects the forms that are certainly among the largest.

Write al=Al+τc0la_l=A_l+\tau c_{0l}al​=Al​+τc0l​ and wf=φf+τθfw_f=\varphi_f+\tau\theta_fwf​=φf​+τθf​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (a), p. 179

For τ≤s\tau\le sτ≤s, CCC is minimized over the feasible region when all the zlz_lzl​ and ufu_fuf​ vanish if and only if

al≥0 for all l,al=0 for all l∈F,0≤wf≤1 for all f,τ−1≤∑f=1swf≤τ.(4.5)\begin{aligned} &a_l\ge0\ \text{for all } l, \qquad a_l=0\ \text{for all } l\in F,\\ &0\le w_f\le1\ \text{for all } f,\qquad \tau-1\le\sum_{f=1}^{s}w_f\le\tau . \end{aligned}\tag{4.5}​al​≥0 for all l,al​=0 for all l∈F,0≤wf​≤1 for all f,τ−1≤f=1∑s​wf​≤τ.​(4.5)

"Minimized" means a global minimum: C(0,0)≤C(z,u)C(0,0)\le C(z,u)C(0,0)≤C(z,u) at every feasible point.

Milestones

  1. Convexity (p. 179). CCC is a convex function of (z,u)(z,u)(z,u) for τ≤s+1\tau\le s+1τ≤s+1.
  2. Descent rules (second half of Theorem 1 (a), p. 179). When a condition of (4.5) fails, a stated move of one variable, or of all ufu_fuf​ together, lowers CCC below C(0,0)C(0,0)C(0,0) for every small enough step. There are six moves: zl↑z_l\uparrowzl​↑ if al<0a_l<0al​<0; zl↓z_l\downarrowzl​↓ if al>0a_l>0al​>0 and l∈Fl\in Fl∈F; uf↑u_f\uparrowuf​↑ if wf<0w_f<0wf​<0; uf↓u_f\downarrowuf​↓ if wf>1w_f>1wf​>1; all uf↑u_f\uparrowuf​↑ if ∑wf<τ−1\sum w_f<\tau-1∑wf​<τ−1; all uf↓u_f\downarrowuf​↓ if ∑wf>τ\sum w_f>\tau∑wf​>τ.
  3. The rearrangement identity (proof of Theorem 1 (a), p. 180). If 1≤τ≤s1\le\tau\le s1≤τ≤s, u1′≤⋯≤us′u'_1\le\dots\le u'_su1′​≤⋯≤us′​ and uτ′≤0u'_\tau\le0uτ′​≤0, then
C=A0+τc00+∑lalzl′+∑f=1τ(wf−1)(uf′−uτ′)+∑f=τ+1swf(uf′−uτ′)+{∑f=1swf−τ}uτ′.C=A_0+\tau c_{00}+\sum_l a_l z'_l+\sum_{f=1}^{\tau}(w_f-1)(u'_f-u'_\tau)+\sum_{f=\tau+1}^{s}w_f(u'_f-u'_\tau)+\Bigl\{\sum_{f=1}^{s}w_f-\tau\Bigr\}u'_\tau .C=A0​+τc00​+l∑​al​zl′​+f=1∑τ​(wf​−1)(uf′​−uτ′​)+f=τ+1∑s​wf​(uf′​−uτ′​)+{f=1∑s​wf​−τ}uτ′​.
  1. Theorem 1 (b) (p. 180). For τ=s+1\tau=s+1τ=s+1, the origin is a minimum if and only if (4.5) holds and wf=1w_f=1wf​=1 for every fff. Otherwise some value of ufu_fuf​ with the sign opposite to wf−1w_f-1wf​−1 lowers CCC.

Significance

Theorem 1 is the optimality test of Beale's simplex method for the sum-of-largest objective. The algorithm on pp. 178–179 changes nonbasic variables one at a time. When no single change is profitable it applies Theorem 1: either (4.5) holds and the current solution is optimal, or one of the six descent rules names the variable to change next. The test is exact even though the objective is not differentiable at the current point. It is a closed-form description of the subdifferential of a top-τ\tauτ sum at a point where all the forms tie. The theorem is also the base case of the multi-group generalization that Beale mentions on p. 181.

The paper proves Theorem 1 by hand. To our knowledge neither the theorem nor the rearrangement identity behind it has been formalized in any proof assistant. The mission produces:

  • a checked statement and proof of the test, including the degenerate cases τ=0\tau=0τ=0 and s=0s=0s=0, which the paper does not discuss separately;
  • the boundary case τ=s+1\tau=s+1τ=s+1;
  • a reusable Lean definition of the sum of the τ\tauτ largest entries of a finite real family, with its convexity.

Difficulty

Necessity, the "only if" direction, is the part the paper calls obvious: each descent rule changes CCC linearly for small steps. Two features still have to be handled explicitly. The step must be small only in rule-dependent ways, and the ordering of the forms changes along the moves of rules 4 and 6.

Sufficiency is where the work lies. The naive argument, "the directional derivative in every coordinate direction is non-negative, so the origin is a minimum", fails because CCC is not differentiable at the origin. Nonnegative derivatives along the coordinate axes do not control mixed directions in which several ufu_fuf​ move by different amounts, which reorders the forms. Which τ\tauτ forms are the largest then depends on the point, and the paper settles the configurations in which L0L_0L0​ is among the τ\tauτ largest by an informal appeal to the "essential symmetry" between L0L_0L0​ and the other forms. A formal proof cannot leave that appeal informal: the forms are parametrised relative to L0L_0L0​ (each LfL_fLf​ is L0−ufL_0-u_fL0​−uf​), so the symmetry is a change of variables that has to be written down and shown to preserve (4.5).

Formalization scope

  • Data. The variables are z : Fin r → ℝ (any r, including 000) and u : Fin s → ℝ. The paper's ufu_fuf​ for f=1,…,sf=1,\dots,sf=1,…,s is Lean's u f for f=0,…,s−1f=0,\dots,s-1f=0,…,s−1. The coefficients (A0,Al,φf,c00,c0l,θf)(A_0,A_l,\varphi_f,c_{00},c_{0l},\theta_f)(A0​,Al​,φf​,c00​,c0l​,θf​) form a structure Forms r s.
  • Forms. The family L0,…,LsL_0,\dots,L_sL0​,…,Ls​ is Fin (s+1) → ℝ, with index 000 for L0L_0L0​ and index f.succ for L0−ufL_0-u_fL0​−uf​. The free set FFF is a Finset (Fin r), and τ\tauτ is a natural number cast to R\mathbb RR wherever it multiplies a coefficient.
  • Sum of the largest. sumLargest τ v is the maximum over τ\tauτ-element subsets SSS of ∑i∈Svi\sum_{i\in S}v_i∑i∈S​vi​ (Finset.sup' over powersetCard). It is the junk 000 for τ\tauτ larger than the number of entries, a case no statement uses.
  • Minimality. "Minimized when all variables vanish" is the global statement C(0,0)≤C(z,u)C(0,0)\le C(z,u)C(0,0)≤C(z,u) for all (z,u)(z,u)(z,u) with zl≥0z_l\ge0zl​≥0 for l∉Fl\notin Fl∈/F. It is not a local minimum, and the sign constraints on restricted zlz_lzl​ are kept: they are why the first condition of (4.5) is an inequality.
  • Descent. "CCC can be decreased by moving xxx from zero" is a strict decrease for all step sizes in some interval (0,ε)(0,\varepsilon)(0,ε), with every other variable at zero.
  • No trivialization. The goal is an equivalence with no hypothesis beyond τ≤s\tau\le sτ≤s. Neither direction can be satisfied vacuously, and the cases τ=0\tau=0τ=0 and s=0s=0s=0 are included, as on the page.
  • Added hypotheses. The rearrangement milestone assumes τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1, because the paper's uτ′u'_\tauuτ′​ does not exist at τ=0\tau=0τ=0. Its second line uses c0lc_{0l}c0l​ where the page misprints clc_lcl​.

Needed infrastructure:

  • basic lemmas on sumLargest: its value at a constant family, at a family sorted by a monotone shift, and under adding a common constant;
  • the change of variables behind the paper's symmetry between L0L_0L0​ and the other forms.

These lemmas are reusable for any top-kkk-sum or empirical-CVaR objective. Contributions are welcome at any level: lemmas about sumLargest, any of the milestones, or an alternative sufficiency proof through convexity and one-sided directional derivatives.

Not in scope: the pivoting rules (4.2)–(4.4), the degeneracy discussion on pp. 180–181, and the multi-group generalization, which the paper says is "cumbersome to state" and does not state.

Selected references

  • E. M. L. Beale, On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 17(2), 173–184, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x
  • G. B. Dantzig, A. Orden and P. Wolfe, The generalized simplex method for minimizing a linear form under linear inequality restraints, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 5(2), 183–195, 1955. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1955.5.183
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, Journal of Risk 2(3), 21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities III: The Expected Cost of a Linear Program with Random Coefficients Is ConvexResearch Paper

Motivation

A linear program is solved with known data, but in planning problems the data are often only known in distribution when the main decision is taken: demands, yields and requirements are revealed later, and a corrective action is taken after they are. E. M. L. Beale's 1955 paper On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities formulates this situation in its §5, "Linear Programming with Random Coefficients", as what is now called a two-stage stochastic linear program with recourse. Beale's motivating example is the transportation problem of Hitchcock (1941) with random requirements at the destinations, where every unit of shortage or excess incurs a loss. The same model was put forward in the same year by Dantzig, Linear Programming under Uncertainty (Management Science, 1955), as the paper's note added in proof acknowledges.

Timeline:

  • 1955. Beale (§5, Theorems 2 and 3) and Dantzig independently introduce two-stage linear programs with random data; Beale proves that the expected cost is convex in the first-stage decision, and that the cost is convex in the random data for fixed decision.
  • 1967. Walkup and Wets, Stochastic Programs with Recourse, study the domain of the expected recourse function and its properties under fixed recourse.
  • 1974. Wets, Stochastic Programs with Fixed Recourse: The Equivalent Deterministic Program, gives the systematic treatment of convexity, finiteness and polyhedrality of the expected recourse function, now textbook material (Birge and Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, Ch. 3).

Setting

Constants c∈Rnc\in\mathbb R^nc∈Rn, f∈Rpf\in\mathbb R^pf∈Rp and an m×pm\times pm×p matrix D=(dik)D=(d_{ik})D=(dik​) are given. The data A=(αij)A=(\alpha_{ij})A=(αij​), an m×nm\times nm×n matrix, and β∈Rm\beta\in\mathbb R^mβ∈Rm are random variables on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P): their distribution is known when the first-stage decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn, x≥0x\ge0x≥0, is chosen, and their values are known when the second-stage decision y∈Rpy\in\mathbb R^py∈Rp, y≥0y\ge0y≥0, is chosen. The cost is

C=c′x+f′y,Ax+Dy=β.(5.3),(5.4)C=c'x+f'y,\qquad Ax+Dy=\beta. \qquad(5.3),(5.4)C=c′x+f′y,Ax+Dy=β.(5.3),(5.4)

For a right-hand side b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm the second-stage value is

Q(b)=min⁡{f′y:y≥0, Dy=b},Q(b)=\min\{f'y : y\ge0,\ Dy=b\},Q(b)=min{f′y:y≥0, Dy=b},

and for fixed data the cost of a first-stage decision is C(x)=c′x+Q(β−Ax)C(x)=c'x+Q(\beta-Ax)C(x)=c′x+Q(β−Ax). The expected cost is

E(C)(x)=∫Ω(c′x+Q(β(ω)−A(ω)x)) dP(ω).E(C)(x)=\int_\Omega \bigl(c'x+Q(\beta(\omega)-A(\omega)x)\bigr)\,dP(\omega).E(C)(x)=∫Ω​(c′x+Q(β(ω)−A(ω)x))dP(ω).

The problem is to choose x≥0x\ge0x≥0 minimising E(C)E(C)E(C). In Lean the value is secondStageValue D f b, the cost is cost c f D A β x, and the expected cost is expectedCost P c f D A β x, all in the namespace BealeConvexMin.RandomLP.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 182)

Assume that for every x≥0x\ge0x≥0 the second-stage minimum is attained for almost every outcome and that ω↦C(x,ω)\omega\mapsto C(x,\omega)ω↦C(x,ω) is integrable. Then

E(C)(λ1x1+λ2x2)≤λ1E(C)(x1)+λ2E(C)(x2)(x1,x2≥0, λ1,λ2≥0, λ1+λ2=1),E(C)(\lambda_1x_1+\lambda_2x_2)\le\lambda_1E(C)(x_1)+\lambda_2E(C)(x_2)\qquad(x_1,x_2\ge0,\ \lambda_1,\lambda_2\ge0,\ \lambda_1+\lambda_2=1),E(C)(λ1​x1​+λ2​x2​)≤λ1​E(C)(x1​)+λ2​E(C)(x2​)(x1​,x2​≥0, λ1​,λ2​≥0, λ1​+λ2​=1),

that is, E(C)E(C)E(C) is convex on the non-negative orthant. The statement fixes no distribution class: it is claimed for any known distribution of (A,β)(A,\beta)(A,β).

Milestones

  1. Pointwise convexity (last display of the proof of Theorem 2, p. 182): for fixed data (A,β)(A,\beta)(A,β), with the minimum attained at every x≥0x\ge0x≥0,
C(λ1x1+λ2x2)≤λ1C(x1)+λ2C(x2).C(\lambda_1x_1+\lambda_2x_2)\le\lambda_1C(x_1)+\lambda_2C(x_2).C(λ1​x1​+λ2​x2​)≤λ1​C(x1​)+λ2​C(x2​).
  1. Theorem 3 (p. 182): for fixed xxx, the cost (A,β)↦c′x+Q(β−Ax)(A,\beta)\mapsto c'x+Q(\beta-Ax)(A,β)↦c′x+Q(β−Ax) is jointly convex on every convex set of data on which the second-stage minimum is attained.
  2. Eqs. (5.5)–(5.6) (p. 182): for a finitely supported distribution, A=ArA=A_rA=Ar​ and β=βr\beta=\beta_rβ=βr​ with probability prp_rpr​, the value E(C)(x)E(C)(x)E(C)(x) is the minimum of c′x+∑rprf′yrc'x+\sum_r p_r f'y_rc′x+∑r​pr​f′yr​ over non-negative yry_ryr​ with Arx+Dyr=βrA_rx+Dy_r=\beta_rAr​x+Dyr​=βr​ for all rrr; minimising E(C)E(C)E(C) is then a linear program.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 is the basic structural fact of two-stage stochastic linear programming: the first-stage problem is a convex program in xxx, whatever the distribution of the data. It is what makes local optimality global for the first-stage problem, what justifies cutting-plane and decomposition methods that approximate E(C)E(C)E(C) from below by supporting hyperplanes, and what makes sample-average approximations convex programs. Theorem 3, joint convexity in the data, gives through Jensen's inequality the comparison between the stochastic problem and its mean-value problem that Beale draws on p. 182. The discrete reformulation (5.5)–(5.6) is the deterministic-equivalent linear program used for finitely many scenarios.

Formalizing it. The theorems are proved in the paper, and their content is classical. The mission produces machine-checked statements of the model with its implicit hypotheses made explicit (attainment of the second stage, integrability of the cost), and proofs of the three results in Lean. The platform already has related statements in other models (finite scenario sets with extended-real recourse, and a complete-recourse, finite-second-moment version); none has Beale's hypotheses, and none states convexity of c′x+E Qc'x+E\,Qc′x+EQ for an arbitrary distribution.

Difficulty

The mathematics is short; the difficulty is in the encoding. The second-stage value is a minimum that may fail to exist: the second stage may be infeasible for some xxx and some outcomes, or unbounded below. A real-valued infimum then takes an arbitrary default value, and convexity would become a statement about that default. Similarly, the mean value only exists when the cost is integrable. A faithful statement has to carry attainment and integrability exactly where the paper tacitly assumes them, on the domain x≥0x\ge0x≥0 the paper uses, and no stronger condition (such as complete recourse or moment bounds) that the paper does not make. In the discrete reformulation, the minimum over the whole family (yr)r(y_r)_r(yr​)r​ has to be matched with the probability-weighted sum of per-scenario minima.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, inner products dotProduct, and y≥0y\ge0y≥0 is the componentwise order. The random data are functions A : Ω → Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ and β : Ω → Fin m → ℝ on a measurable space with a probability measure P; no measurability of the data is assumed beyond integrability of the cost.
  • The second-stage value is the real infimum of f′yf'yf′y over the feasible set. It equals 000 on an infeasible or unbounded-below second stage, so each theorem assumes attainment of the minimum where it is evaluated (the paper's "value of yyy that minimizes CCC"). The goal assumes attainment for almost every outcome at every x≥0x\ge0x≥0.
  • E(C)E(C)E(C) is the Bochner integral, which is 000 for a non-integrable integrand, so the goal assumes integrability of C(x,⋅)C(x,\cdot)C(x,⋅) at every x≥0x\ge0x≥0 (the paper's "mean value E(C)E(C)E(C)").
  • Convexity is claimed on {x:x≥0}\{x : x\ge0\}{x:x≥0}, the paper's domain, not on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn. Theorem 3 is stated for fixed non-negative xxx (the model's first-stage domain) and on every convex set of data on which the minimum is attained, since the paper names no domain.
  • A formalization in which the value is an unconstrained infimum without attainment, or the expectation is taken without integrability, is trivially convex on the region where the default values apply and does not state Beale's theorem; such variants are ruled out.
  • Reusable beyond this mission: basic facts on the optimal value of a parametric linear program in its right-hand side and cost data, and convexity of integrals of pointwise-convex integrands. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal, and alternative formulations in extended reals, are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. M. L. Beale, On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 17(2):173–184, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x
  • G. B. Dantzig, Linear Programming under Uncertainty, Management Science 1(3–4):197–206, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1.3-4.197
  • F. L. Hitchcock, The Distribution of a Product from Several Sources to Numerous Localities, Journal of Mathematics and Physics 20:224–230, 1941. https://doi.org/10.1002/sapm1941201224
  • D. W. Walkup and R. J.-B. Wets, Stochastic Programs with Recourse, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 15(5):1299–1314, 1967. https://doi.org/10.1137/0115113
  • R. J.-B. Wets, Stochastic Programs with Fixed Recourse: The Equivalent Deterministic Program, SIAM Review 16(3):309–339, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1137/1016053
  • J. R. Birge and F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0237-4
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On Polyhedral Approximations of the Second-Order Cone I: A Compact Polyhedral Approximation of the Lorentz ConeResearch Paper

Motivation

Conic quadratic programs (second-order cone programs) minimize a linear objective subject to linear constraints and constraints of the form ∥Aℓx−bℓ∥2≤cℓTx−dℓ\|A_\ell x-b_\ell\|_2\le c_\ell^Tx-d_\ell∥Aℓ​x−bℓ​∥2​≤cℓT​x−dℓ​. They model robust linear programs with ellipsoidal uncertainty, truss topology design, contact problems with Coulomb friction, and convex quadratically constrained quadratic programs. In theory they are no harder than linear programs of the same size; in practice, linear programming software handles far larger instances than conic quadratic solvers did at the time of writing (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski 2001, pp. 193–195). This raises a question about geometry rather than algorithms: can a second-order cone be replaced by a polyhedral cone of moderate size without losing much accuracy?

The obvious answer — circumscribe the cone by a polyhedral cone with many facets — fails: the number of facets must grow exponentially in the dimension, even for constant accuracy. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski showed that auxiliary variables change the picture completely: a projection of a polyhedral cone can approximate the Lorentz cone with size only O(kln⁡(1/ε))O(k\ln(1/\varepsilon))O(kln(1/ε)). The construction is now standard; it underlies, for instance, the lifted linear-programming branch-and-bound algorithm for mixed-integer conic quadratic programs of Vielma, Ahmed & Nemhauser 2008.

Setting

For y∈Rky\in\mathbb R^ky∈Rk let ∥y∥2=y12+⋯+yk2\|y\|_2=\sqrt{y_1^2+\dots+y_k^2}∥y∥2​=y12​+⋯+yk2​​. The (k+1)(k+1)(k+1)-dimensional Lorentz cone is

Lk={(y,t)∈Rk×R∣t≥∥y∥2}.L^k=\{(y,t)\in\mathbb R^k\times\mathbb R\mid t\ge\|y\|_2\}.Lk={(y,t)∈Rk×R∣t≥∥y∥2​}.

Fix ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. A polyhedral ε\varepsilonε-approximation of LkL^kLk is a linear map

Π(y,t,u):Rk×R×Rp→Rq\Pi(y,t,u):\mathbb R^k\times\mathbb R\times\mathbb R^{p}\to\mathbb R^{q}Π(y,t,u):Rk×R×Rp→Rq

such that

  1. if (y,t)∈Lk(y,t)\in L^k(y,t)∈Lk, there is u∈Rpu\in\mathbb R^pu∈Rp with Π(y,t,u)≥0\Pi(y,t,u)\ge0Π(y,t,u)≥0 (componentwise);
  2. if Π(y,t,u)≥0\Pi(y,t,u)\ge0Π(y,t,u)≥0 for some uuu, then ∥y∥2≤(1+ε)t\|y\|_2\le(1+\varepsilon)t∥y∥2​≤(1+ε)t.

Equivalently, the polyhedral cone {(y,t,u)∣Π(y,t,u)≥0}\{(y,t,u)\mid\Pi(y,t,u)\ge0\}{(y,t,u)∣Π(y,t,u)≥0} projects onto a cone lying between LkL^kLk and its (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε)-extension. The size of the approximation is p+qp+qp+q: the number of auxiliary variables plus the number of linear inequalities (an equation counts as two).

The construction in the paper uses a tower of variables: for k=2θk=2^\thetak=2θ, the coordinates y1,…,yky_1,\dots,y_ky1​,…,yk​ form generation 000, each consecutive pair of generation ℓ−1\ell-1ℓ−1 has a successor in generation ℓ\ellℓ (yiℓy_i^\ellyiℓ​ has parents y2i−1ℓ−1,y2iℓ−1y_{2i-1}^{\ell-1},y_{2i}^{\ell-1}y2i−1ℓ−1​,y2iℓ−1​), and the single variable of generation θ\thetaθ is ttt. It also uses an explicit linear system (8) in variables ξj,ηj\xi^j,\eta^jξj,ηj, j=0,…,νj=0,\dots,\nuj=0,…,ν, with trigonometric coefficients cos⁡(π/2j+1)\cos(\pi/2^{j+1})cos(π/2j+1), sin⁡(π/2j+1)\sin(\pi/2^{j+1})sin(π/2j+1), tan⁡(π/2ν+1)\tan(\pi/2^{\nu+1})tan(π/2ν+1), whose accuracy is δ(ν)=1/cos⁡(π/2ν+1)−1\delta(\nu)=1/\cos(\pi/2^{\nu+1})-1δ(ν)=1/cos(π/2ν+1)−1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1

There is an absolute constant CCC such that for every positive integer kkk and every ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1], LkL^kLk admits a polyhedral ε\varepsilonε-approximation with

pk+qk≤C kln⁡2ε.p_k+q_k\le C\,k\ln\frac{2}{\varepsilon}.pk​+qk​≤Cklnε2​.

The constant is not fixed; the goal asserts only the order of growth, which is what the paper claims.

Milestones

  1. §2, Eq. (5). For k=2θk=2^\thetak=2θ, θ≥1\theta\ge1θ≥1: (y,t)(y,t)(y,t) extends to a tower solving [y2i−1ℓ−1]2+[y2iℓ−1]2≤yiℓ\sqrt{[y_{2i-1}^{\ell-1}]^2+[y_{2i}^{\ell-1}]^2}\le y_i^\ell[y2i−1ℓ−1​]2+[y2iℓ−1​]2​≤yiℓ​ for all i,ℓi,\elli,ℓ if and only if ∥y∥2≤t\|y\|_2\le t∥y∥2​≤t.
  2. §2, Eqs. (6)–(7). Placing polyhedral εℓ\varepsilon_\ellεℓ​-approximations of L2L^2L2 on every level of the tower yields a polyhedral approximation of LkL^kLk with 1+ε=∏ℓ=1θ(1+εℓ)1+\varepsilon=\prod_{\ell=1}^\theta(1+\varepsilon_\ell)1+ε=∏ℓ=1θ​(1+εℓ​).
  3. Proposition 2.1 (i), (ii) and Eq. (9). System (8) is a polyhedral δ(ν)\delta(\nu)δ(ν)-approximation of L2L^2L2, and δ(ν)=O(4−ν)\delta(\nu)=O(4^{-\nu})δ(ν)=O(4−ν).
  4. Proof of Theorem 1.1, system (10), property 3. System (8) with parameter νℓ\nu_\ellνℓ​ on level ℓ\ellℓ of the tower approximates L2θL^{2^\theta}L2θ with quality β=∏ℓ=1θ1/cos⁡(π/2νℓ+1)−1\beta=\prod_{\ell=1}^\theta 1/\cos(\pi/2^{\nu_\ell+1})-1β=∏ℓ=1θ​1/cos(π/2νℓ​+1)−1.
  5. Proof of Theorem 1.1, choice of νℓ\nu_\ellνℓ​. With νℓ=⌊c ℓln⁡(2/ε)⌋\nu_\ell=\lfloor c\,\ell\ln(2/\varepsilon)\rfloorνℓ​=⌊cℓln(2/ε)⌋: β≤ε\beta\le\varepsilonβ≤ε and ∑ℓ2θ−ℓνℓ≤C 2θln⁡(2/ε)\sum_\ell 2^{\theta-\ell}\nu_\ell\le C\,2^\theta\ln(2/\varepsilon)∑ℓ​2θ−ℓνℓ​≤C2θln(2/ε).

Significance

The theorem shows that conic quadratic constraints are, up to a factor logarithmic in the accuracy, no more expensive to express as linear constraints than they are in their native form. Consequences listed in the paper include approximating convex quadratically constrained quadratic programs, robust counterparts of linear programs with ellipsoidal uncertainty, and problems with low-dimensional cones (Coulomb friction, k≤3k\le3k≤3; truss design, k≤2k\le2k≤2) by linear programs of comparable size. Together with the matching lower bound of §3 of the same paper (a separate mission of this series), it pins down the size of the best polyhedral approximation up to constants. The recursive halving of dimensions through the tower of 3-dimensional cones is a reusable device for other rotation-invariant cones.

The result is proved in the paper; as far as is known it has not been machine-checked. This mission produces a formal proof of the construction, including the trigonometric estimate δ(ν)=O(4−ν)\delta(\nu)=O(4^{-\nu})δ(ν)=O(4−ν) and the explicit linear encoding with its size count. Explicit values of the absolute constants are welcome as additional results.

Difficulty

The planar estimate is the core. Part (ii) of Proposition 2.1 must hold for every solution of the inequality system (8), not only for the solution one would write down for a given point of L2L^2L2; an argument that tracks only the intended solution proves part (i) and nothing about part (ii). The accuracy must also come out as 1/cos⁡(π/2ν+1)−11/\cos(\pi/2^{\nu+1})-11/cos(π/2ν+1)−1, geometric in ν\nuν; a bound that decays only polynomially in ν\nuν would give size poly(1/ε)\mathrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon)poly(1/ε) instead of ln⁡(1/ε)\ln(1/\varepsilon)ln(1/ε). The naive idea of approximating LkL^kLk directly by tangent hyperplanes is ruled out by the exponential facet count mentioned above; the auxiliary variables are indispensable. The second difficulty is bookkeeping: packaging k−1k-1k−1 copies of system (8) on a tower of depth θ=log⁡2k\theta=\log_2 kθ=log2​k into a single linear map, counting its variables and inequalities exactly, handling kkk that is not a power of two, and summing the accuracies so that the total size is O(kln⁡(2/ε))O(k\ln(2/\varepsilon))O(kln(2/ε)) rather than O(kln⁡kln⁡(1/ε))O(k\ln k\ln(1/\varepsilon))O(klnkln(1/ε)).

Formalization scope

  • Vectors of Rk\mathbb R^kRk are Fin k → ℝ. The norm ∥y∥2\|y\|_2∥y∥2​ is written out as eucNorm y = Real.sqrt (∑ i, y i ^ 2); the norm Mathlib attaches to Fin k → ℝ is the sup norm, under which the cone would be polyhedral and the theorem trivial.
  • A polyhedral approximation is an R\mathbb RR-linear map (Fin k → ℝ) × ℝ × (Fin p → ℝ) →ₗ[ℝ] (Fin q → ℝ) and ≥0\ge0≥0 is the componentwise order. Linearity is essential: with an arbitrary map, Π(y,t)=t−∥y∥2\Pi(y,t)=t-\|y\|_2Π(y,t)=t−∥y∥2​ would be an exact approximation with p=0p=0p=0, q=1q=1q=1. Affine maps are not allowed either; the paper's approximations are homogeneous.
  • The paper's absolute constants O(1)O(1)O(1) are existential constants quantified before kkk, ε\varepsilonε and θ\thetaθ. The goal requires k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1], as in the paper; ln⁡\lnln is Real.log.
  • System (8) and system (10) are stated as propositions with the absolute values written out; their parameters ν\nuν, νℓ\nu_\ellνℓ​ are required to be positive integers, as in the paper (at ν=0\nu=0ν=0 the coefficient tan⁡(π/2)\tan(\pi/2)tan(π/2) would be evaluated as 000 by Lean).
  • Tower variables are indexed Y ℓ i with 0-based i, so the parents of Y ℓ i are Y (ℓ-1) (2i) and Y (ℓ-1) (2i+1); the milestones on (6)–(7) and (10) are stated on solution sets rather than on an explicit linear map. The size counts of (10) (properties 1–2) are not separate milestones; the arithmetic milestone on νℓ\nu_\ellνℓ​ records the bound on ∑ℓ2θ−ℓνℓ\sum_\ell 2^{\theta-\ell}\nu_\ell∑ℓ​2θ−ℓνℓ​ to which they reduce.
  • δ(ν)=O(1/4ν)\delta(\nu)=O(1/4^\nu)δ(ν)=O(1/4ν) is stated as ∃C>0, ∀ν≥1, δ(ν)≤C/4ν\exists C>0,\ \forall\nu\ge1,\ \delta(\nu)\le C/4^\nu∃C>0, ∀ν≥1, δ(ν)≤C/4ν.

A complete development needs: elementary trigonometry of π/2j\pi/2^{j}π/2j (available in Mathlib), rotations in the plane, finite products and sums over {1,…,θ}\{1,\dots,\theta\}{1,…,θ}, and a way to assemble many small linear systems into one linear map with an exact count of rows and columns. The last piece, and the tower of variables with the reduction from arbitrary kkk to a power of two, are reusable for other lifted polyhedral approximations. Contributions of any milestone, of explicit linear encodings of (8) and (10), and of the extension from k=2θk=2^\thetak=2θ to all kkk are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, On Polyhedral Approximations of the Second-Order Cone, Mathematics of Operations Research 26(2):193–205, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.26.2.193.10561
  • J. P. Vielma, S. Ahmed and G. L. Nemhauser, A lifted linear programming branch-and-bound algorithm for mixed-integer conic quadratic programs, INFORMS Journal on Computing 20(3):438–450, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.1070.0256
  • A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, Robust convex optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 23(4):769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  • A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization, SIAM, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718829
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A Three-Operator Splitting Scheme and its Optimization Applications 1: Weak and Strong Convergence of the Three-Operator Splitting IterationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in convex optimization, variational inequalities and signal processing reduce to a monotone inclusion: find a point xxx at which the sum of several monotone operators contains 000. When the sum has two terms, the classical operator-splitting methods (Douglas–Rachford, forward–backward, forward–backward–forward) solve it by iterating a fixed-point map that uses each operator separately, through its resolvent or through a forward (explicit) step. Problems with three terms, for instance a smooth loss plus two nonsmooth regularizers or constraints, are common in practice, and before 2015 no fixed-point map was known that handled three operators one at a time without a product-space reformulation.

Davis and Yin (Set-Valued Var. Anal. 25 (2017) 829–858; preprint arXiv:1504.01032) introduced such a map, now called Davis–Yin three-operator splitting. It contains Douglas–Rachford splitting (C=0C = 0C=0) and forward–backward splitting (B=0B = 0B=0) as special cases, and it has become a standard building block of first-order methods for composite optimization. This mission formalizes Section 2 of the paper: the fixed-point encoding, the averagedness of the map, and the weak and strong convergence of the resulting iteration.

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space. A set-valued operator A:H→2HA : H \to 2^HA:H→2H is monotone if ⟨x−y,u−v⟩≥0\langle x - y, u - v\rangle \ge 0⟨x−y,u−v⟩≥0 for all u∈Axu \in Axu∈Ax, v∈Ayv \in Ayv∈Ay, and maximal monotone if its graph is not properly contained in the graph of another monotone operator. Its domain is dom⁡(A)={x:Ax≠∅}\operatorname{dom}(A) = \{x : Ax \ne \emptyset\}dom(A)={x:Ax=∅} and the zero set of an operator MMM is zer⁡(M)={x:0∈Mx}\operatorname{zer}(M) = \{x : 0 \in Mx\}zer(M)={x:0∈Mx}. A single-valued C:H→HC : H \to HC:H→H is β\betaβ-cocoercive (β>0\beta > 0β>0) if β∥Cx−Cy∥2≤⟨Cx−Cy,x−y⟩\beta\|Cx - Cy\|^2 \le \langle Cx - Cy, x - y\rangleβ∥Cx−Cy∥2≤⟨Cx−Cy,x−y⟩ for all x,yx, yx,y.

Problem (1.1) is: given maximal monotone A,BA, BA,B and β\betaβ-cocoercive CCC, find

x∈Hwith0∈Ax+Bx+Cx.x \in H \quad\text{with}\quad 0 \in Ax + Bx + Cx .x∈Hwith0∈Ax+Bx+Cx.

For γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 the resolvent JγA=(I+γA)−1J_{\gamma A} = (I + \gamma A)^{-1}JγA​=(I+γA)−1 is the map with x∈JγAx+γA(JγAx)x \in J_{\gamma A}x + \gamma A(J_{\gamma A}x)x∈JγA​x+γA(JγA​x). The Davis–Yin operator (Eq. (1.2)) is

T:=JγA∘(2JγB−I−γC∘JγB)+I−JγB.T := J_{\gamma A} \circ (2J_{\gamma B} - I - \gamma C \circ J_{\gamma B}) + I - J_{\gamma B}.T:=JγA​∘(2JγB​−I−γC∘JγB​)+I−JγB​.

Algorithm 1 starts from z0∈Hz^0 \in Hz0∈H and, for relaxation parameters λk>0\lambda_k > 0λk​>0, iterates

xBk=JγB(zk),xAk=JγA(2xBk−zk−γCxBk),zk+1=zk+λk(xAk−xBk),x_B^k = J_{\gamma B}(z^k),\qquad x_A^k = J_{\gamma A}(2x_B^k - z^k - \gamma Cx_B^k),\qquad z^{k+1} = z^k + \lambda_k(x_A^k - x_B^k),xBk​=JγB​(zk),xAk​=JγA​(2xBk​−zk−γCxBk​),zk+1=zk+λk​(xAk​−xBk​),

so that zk+1=(1−λk)zk+λkTzkz^{k+1} = (1 - \lambda_k)z^k + \lambda_k Tz^kzk+1=(1−λk​)zk+λk​Tzk. A sequence converges weakly, uk⇀uu_k \rightharpoonup uuk​⇀u, if ⟨uk,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩\langle u_k, y\rangle \to \langle u, y\rangle⟨uk​,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩ for every y∈Hy \in Hy∈H.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (Main convergence theorem)

Fix ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon \in (0,1)ε∈(0,1), γ∈(0,2βε)\gamma \in (0, 2\beta\varepsilon)γ∈(0,2βε), α=1/(2−ε)\alpha = 1/(2-\varepsilon)α=1/(2−ε) and λk∈(0,1/α)\lambda_k \in (0, 1/\alpha)λk​∈(0,1/α) with ∑kτk=∞\sum_k \tau_k = \infty∑k​τk​=∞, where τk=λk(1−λk)+λk(1−α)/α\tau_k = \lambda_k(1-\lambda_k) + \lambda_k(1-\alpha)/\alphaτk​=λk​(1−λk​)+λk​(1−α)/α, and inf⁡kλk>0\inf_k \lambda_k > 0infk​λk​>0. If Fix⁡T≠∅\operatorname{Fix} T \ne \emptysetFixT=∅, there is z∗∈Fix⁡Tz^* \in \operatorname{Fix} Tz∗∈FixT with zk⇀z∗z^k \rightharpoonup z^*zk⇀z∗ and

CxBk→Cx∗  (∀x∗∈zer⁡(A+B+C)),xBk⇀JγB(z∗)∈zer⁡(A+B+C),xAk⇀JγB(z∗),Cx_B^k \to Cx^* \ \ (\forall x^* \in \operatorname{zer}(A+B+C)),\qquad x_B^k \rightharpoonup J_{\gamma B}(z^*) \in \operatorname{zer}(A+B+C),\qquad x_A^k \rightharpoonup J_{\gamma B}(z^*),CxBk​→Cx∗  (∀x∗∈zer(A+B+C)),xBk​⇀JγB​(z∗)∈zer(A+B+C),xAk​⇀JγB​(z∗),

and if AAA or BBB is uniformly monotone on every nonempty bounded subset of its domain, or CCC is demiregular at every zero of A+B+CA + B + CA+B+C, then xBkx_B^kxBk​ and xAkx_A^kxAk​ converge strongly to a common point of zer⁡(A+B+C)\operatorname{zer}(A + B + C)zer(A+B+C).

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: Lemma 2.1 (the identities for one application of TTT), Lemma 2.2 (zer⁡(A+B+C)=JγB(Fix⁡T)\operatorname{zer}(A+B+C) = J_{\gamma B}(\operatorname{Fix} T)zer(A+B+C)=JγB​(FixT)), Lemma 2.3 (inequality (2.1)), Proposition 2.1 (TTT is 2β/(4β−γ)2\beta/(4\beta-\gamma)2β/(4β−γ)-averaged, inequality (2.2)), Remark 2.1 (the strengthened inequality (2.4)), Corollary 2.1 Parts 1–3 (Fejér monotonicity, vanishing residual, weak convergence of zkz^kzk), Corollary 2.1 Part 4 (the residual rates ∥Tzk−zk∥2≤∥z0−z∗∥2/(τ‾(k+1))\|Tz^k - z^k\|^2 \le \|z^0 - z^*\|^2/(\underline\tau(k+1))∥Tzk−zk∥2≤∥z0−z∗∥2/(τ​(k+1)) and o(1/(k+1))o(1/(k+1))o(1/(k+1))), and Eqs. (2.6)–(2.7) (the per-step descent inequality and its summed form).

Significance

Theorem 2.1 is the basic convergence guarantee for three-operator splitting: it certifies that the computable sequences xBkx_B^kxBk​, xAkx_A^kxAk​, not only the auxiliary sequence zkz^kzk, approach a solution of (1.1). In infinite dimensions this is the delicate part: for Douglas–Rachford splitting (C=0C = 0C=0) weak convergence of the shadow sequence JγB(zk)J_{\gamma B}(z^k)JγB​(zk) was only established by Svaiter in 2011. The result underlies the convergence of the many algorithms obtained from it by specialization (Douglas–Rachford, forward–backward, and the three-block methods of Section 4 of the paper), and the averagedness coefficient of Proposition 2.1 reduces, for B=0B = 0B=0, to the best known one for forward–backward splitting.

All statements of this mission are proved in the paper, partly by appeal to Bauschke and Combettes' monograph (Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann convergence, the demiclosedness of maximal monotone graphs). None of them has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has no maximal monotone operators, resolvents, averaged maps or Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann theorem. The mission therefore produces both a formal proof of the Davis–Yin theorem and a first body of monotone-operator theory in Lean.

Difficulty

The fixed-point part is standard once TTT is known to be averaged: Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann theory and Opial's argument give zk⇀z∗z^k \rightharpoonup z^*zk⇀z∗. The obstacle is transferring this to xBk=JγB(zk)x_B^k = J_{\gamma B}(z^k)xBk​=JγB​(zk). Resolvents are nonexpansive but not weakly continuous, so zk⇀z∗z^k \rightharpoonup z^*zk⇀z∗ does not imply JγB(zk)⇀JγB(z∗)J_{\gamma B}(z^k) \rightharpoonup J_{\gamma B}(z^*)JγB​(zk)⇀JγB​(z∗); the naive argument fails at exactly this step. Identifying the weak cluster points of xBkx_B^kxBk​ requires a closedness property of sums of maximal monotone operators under mixed weak and strong convergence, fed by the strong convergence of CxBkCx_B^kCxBk​, which in turn needs the extra term of (2.4) that (2.2) discards. Strong convergence in Part 2 needs yet another argument for each of the three alternative hypotheses.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is an arbitrary real Hilbert space (NormedAddCommGroup, InnerProductSpace ℝ, CompleteSpace); a finite-dimensional space would identify weak and strong convergence and change the theorems.
  • Operators A,BA, BA,B are H → Set H; CCC is single-valued H → H. The resolvents are not constructed: JA,JBJ_A, J_BJA​,JB​ are maps satisfying the resolvent inclusion γ−1(x−Jx)∈A(Jx)\gamma^{-1}(x - Jx) \in A(Jx)γ−1(x−Jx)∈A(Jx), which for maximal monotone operators determines them uniquely and exists by Minty's theorem.
  • Weak convergence is ⟨uk,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩\langle u_k, y\rangle \to \langle u, y\rangle⟨uk​,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩ for every yyy; strong convergence is norm convergence. Iterates are indexed from 000.
  • The printed hypothesis α=1/(2−ε)<2β/(4β−γ)\alpha = 1/(2-\varepsilon) < 2\beta/(4\beta-\gamma)α=1/(2−ε)<2β/(4β−γ) of Corollary 2.1 and Theorem 2.1 contradicts γ<2βε\gamma < 2\beta\varepsilonγ<2βε (it is a typo for >>>) and is not assumed. The printed τk=(1−λk/α)λk/α\tau_k = (1-\lambda_k/\alpha)\lambda_k/\alphaτk​=(1−λk​/α)λk​/α is replaced by the τk\tau_kτk​ of the proof (p. 836), a weaker hypothesis.
  • Uniform monotonicity uses a nondecreasing φ:[0,∞)→[0,+∞]\varphi : [0,\infty) \to [0,+\infty]φ:[0,∞)→[0,+∞] with φ(0)=0\varphi(0) = 0φ(0)=0 that vanishes only at 000, as the proof requires; with φ≡0\varphi \equiv 0φ≡0 allowed, Part 2(a) would be false.
  • The O-constant of Corollary 2.1 Part 4 is explicit, ∥z0−z∗∥2/τ‾\|z^0 - z^*\|^2/\underline\tau∥z0−z∗∥2/τ​, and the little-ooo is stated as (k+1)∥Tzk−zk∥2→0(k+1)\|Tz^k - z^k\|^2 \to 0(k+1)∥Tzk−zk∥2→0. Eq. (2.7) is stated with a uniform lower bound λ‾≤λi\underline\lambda \le \lambda_iλ​≤λi​ in place of the printed λk\lambda_kλk​, with summability part of the conclusion.
  • A formalization with TTT an arbitrary averaged map, with resolvents replaced by arbitrary nonexpansive maps, or with the contradictory comparison of α\alphaα kept as a hypothesis would make the theorem vacuous or different; all three are ruled out.

A complete development needs the basic theory of monotone operators (monotonicity of resolvents' graphs, firm nonexpansiveness of resolvents, weak-to-strong closedness of maximal monotone graphs), Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann iteration with Opial's lemma, and weak sequential compactness of bounded sets in Hilbert space. All of this is reusable far beyond this mission, and contributions of any of these pieces as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Davis and W. Yin, A Three-Operator Splitting Scheme and its Optimization Applications, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 25 (2017) 829–858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-017-0421-z
  • H. H. Bauschke and P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9467-7
  • B. F. Svaiter, On weak convergence of the Douglas–Rachford method, SIAM J. Control Optim. 49 (2011) 280–287. https://doi.org/10.1137/100788100
  • D. Davis and W. Yin, Convergence rate analysis of several splitting schemes, in: Splitting Methods in Communication, Imaging, Science, and Engineering, Springer, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.4834
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Polyhedral Approximations of the Second-Order Cone III: Closeness of the Relaxed Feasible SetResearch Paper

Motivation

Conic quadratic problems (also called second-order cone programs) arise directly in applications such as contact problems with Coulomb friction, and a wide range of nonlinear convex problems can be rewritten in this form (Lobo, Vandenberghe, Boyd and Lebret 1998). Interior-point methods solve them in polynomial time, but around 2000 the available software for conic quadratic problems handled far fewer variables than linear programming software. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (2001) therefore asked whether a conic quadratic problem can be replaced by a linear program of comparable size. Their construction replaces each second-order cone by a polyhedral cone that is exact up to a factor 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε. The feasible set of the resulting linear program, projected back to the original variables, lies between the feasible set of the original problem and that of its ε\varepsilonε-relaxation.

This sandwich is only useful if the relaxed problem is close to the original one, and in general it is not: the paper notes that (CQP) can be infeasible while every relaxation with ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 is feasible. Proposition 4.1 of the paper, the target of this mission, gives a sufficient condition under which the two feasible sets are O(ε)O(\varepsilon)O(ε)-close.

Setting

For y∈Rky\in\mathbb R^ky∈Rk let ∥y∥2=yTy\|y\|_2=\sqrt{y^Ty}∥y∥2​=yTy​ be the Euclidean norm. A conic quadratic problem in the variable x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn is

(CQP)min⁡x{eTx∣Ax≥b, ∥Aℓx−bℓ∥2≤cℓTx−dℓ, ℓ=1,…,m},\text{(CQP)}\qquad \min_x\bigl\{e^Tx \bigm| Ax\ge b,\ \|A_\ell x-b_\ell\|_2\le c_\ell^Tx-d_\ell,\ \ell=1,\dots,m\bigr\},(CQP)xmin​{eTx​Ax≥b, ∥Aℓ​x−bℓ​∥2​≤cℓT​x−dℓ​, ℓ=1,…,m},

where AAA is a k0×nk_0\times nk0​×n matrix and b∈Rk0b\in\mathbb R^{k_0}b∈Rk0​ (the inequality Ax≥bAx\ge bAx≥b is componentwise), and for each ℓ\ellℓ the matrix AℓA_\ellAℓ​ is kℓ×nk_\ell\times nkℓ​×n, bℓ∈Rkℓb_\ell\in\mathbb R^{k_\ell}bℓ​∈Rkℓ​, cℓ∈Rnc_\ell\in\mathbb R^ncℓ​∈Rn and dℓ∈Rd_\ell\in\mathbb Rdℓ​∈R. For ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 the ε\varepsilonε-relaxation is

(CQPε)min⁡x{eTx∣Ax≥b, ∥Aℓx−bℓ∥2≤(1+ε)[cℓTx−dℓ], ℓ=1,…,m}.\text{(CQP}_\varepsilon)\qquad \min_x\bigl\{e^Tx \bigm| Ax\ge b,\ \|A_\ell x-b_\ell\|_2\le (1+\varepsilon)\bigl[c_\ell^Tx-d_\ell\bigr],\ \ell=1,\dots,m\bigr\}.(CQPε​)xmin​{eTx​Ax≥b, ∥Aℓ​x−bℓ​∥2​≤(1+ε)[cℓT​x−dℓ​], ℓ=1,…,m}.

Feas(P)\mathrm{Feas}(P)Feas(P) denotes the feasible set of a problem (P)(P)(P); in Lean these are feas P and feasRelaxed P ε, subsets of Fin n → ℝ, for a problem datum P : CQP n k₀ m.

Two conditions on (CQP) are used.

  1. Strict feasibility: there are xˉ\bar xxˉ and r>0r>0r>0 with Axˉ≥bA\bar x\ge bAxˉ≥b and ∥Aℓxˉ−bℓ∥2≤[cℓTxˉ−dℓ]−r\|A_\ell\bar x-b_\ell\|_2\le[c_\ell^T\bar x-d_\ell]-r∥Aℓ​xˉ−bℓ​∥2​≤[cℓT​xˉ−dℓ​]−r for every ℓ\ellℓ (IsStrictlyFeasible P x̄ r).
  2. Semiboundedness: there is RRR such that every feasible xxx of (CQP) satisfies cℓTx−dℓ≤Rc_\ell^Tx-d_\ell\le RcℓT​x−dℓ​≤R for every ℓ\ellℓ (IsSemibounded P R).

Put γ(ε)=Rε/r\gamma(\varepsilon)=R\varepsilon/rγ(ε)=Rε/r.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.1

If (CQP) has m≥1m\ge1m≥1 conic constraints and is strictly feasible and semibounded, then for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with γ(ε)<1\gamma(\varepsilon)<1γ(ε)<1,

γ(ε)xˉ+(1−γ(ε)) Feas(CQPε) ⊆ Feas(CQP) ⊆ Feas(CQPε).(14)\gamma(\varepsilon)\bar x+(1-\gamma(\varepsilon))\,\mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP}_\varepsilon)\ \subseteq\ \mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP})\ \subseteq\ \mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP}_\varepsilon). \tag{14}γ(ε)xˉ+(1−γ(ε))Feas(CQPε​) ⊆ Feas(CQP) ⊆ Feas(CQPε​).(14)

The left-hand side is the image of Feas(CQPε)\mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP}_\varepsilon)Feas(CQPε​) under y↦γ(ε)xˉ+(1−γ(ε))yy\mapsto\gamma(\varepsilon)\bar x+(1-\gamma(\varepsilon))yy↦γ(ε)xˉ+(1−γ(ε))y, not a Minkowski sum.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof in order.

  1. The right inclusion Feas(CQP)⊆Feas(CQPε)\mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP})\subseteq\mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP}_\varepsilon)Feas(CQP)⊆Feas(CQPε​) for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.
  2. For y∈Feas(CQPε)y\in\mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP}_\varepsilon)y∈Feas(CQPε​) and tℓ=cℓTy−dℓt_\ell=c_\ell^Ty-d_\elltℓ​=cℓT​y−dℓ​, every δ∈[0,1]\delta\in[0,1]δ∈[0,1] with δ≥εtℓ/(r+εtℓ)\delta\ge\varepsilon t_\ell/(r+\varepsilon t_\ell)δ≥εtℓ​/(r+εtℓ​) for all ℓ\ellℓ makes xδ=(1−δ)y+δxˉx_\delta=(1-\delta)y+\delta\bar xxδ​=(1−δ)y+δxˉ feasible for (CQP).
  3. Under semiboundedness, the same δ\deltaδ satisfies (1−δ)tℓ≤R(1-\delta)t_\ell\le R(1−δ)tℓ​≤R for all ℓ\ellℓ.
  4. If δ=εt/(r+εt)\delta=\varepsilon t/(r+\varepsilon t)δ=εt/(r+εt) with t≥0t\ge0t≥0, (1−δ)t≤R(1-\delta)t\le R(1−δ)t≤R and γ(ε)<1\gamma(\varepsilon)<1γ(ε)<1, then t≤R/(1−γ(ε))t\le R/(1-\gamma(\varepsilon))t≤R/(1−γ(ε)) and δ≤γ(ε)\delta\le\gamma(\varepsilon)δ≤γ(ε).

Significance

The result. Proposition 4.1 turns the qualitative sandwich "exact ⊆ polyhedral ⊆ relaxed" into a quantitative statement. When a problem is strictly feasible with margin rrr and its conic right-hand sides are bounded by RRR on the feasible set, the relaxed feasible set, shrunk towards xˉ\bar xxˉ by 1−γ(ε)1-\gamma(\varepsilon)1−γ(ε), lies inside the exact one. The error of the relaxation is thus controlled by γ(ε)=Rε/r\gamma(\varepsilon)=R\varepsilon/rγ(ε)=Rε/r, which is linear in ε\varepsilonε. Together with the paper's main theorem, that a polyhedral ε\varepsilonε-approximation of the Lorentz cone with O(kln⁡(1/ε))O(k\ln(1/\varepsilon))O(kln(1/ε)) variables and inequalities exists, this measures how well a linear program of moderate size approximates the conic problem. The paper uses it this way for the examples in its introduction.

The formalization. The proposition is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. This mission produces a Lean formalization of conic quadratic problems and their relaxations with the Euclidean norm, together with the strict feasibility and semiboundedness conditions and the proof. The Lorentz-cone approximation results of the same paper are the subject of the companion missions I and II of this series.

Difficulty

The right inclusion is immediate. The left inclusion does not follow from convexity alone. A relaxed-feasible point yyy may violate every conic constraint of (CQP), and nothing about yyy bounds how far it is from Feas(CQP)\mathrm{Feas}(\mathrm{CQP})Feas(CQP). The needed information comes from semiboundedness, which constrains only feasible points of (CQP). That hypothesis therefore cannot be applied to yyy itself, and the shrink factor γ(ε)\gamma(\varepsilon)γ(ε) must be obtained without any bound on cℓTy−dℓc_\ell^Ty-d_\ellcℓT​y−dℓ​ given in advance. The obvious attempt, bounding the violation at yyy by εR\varepsilon RεR, fails for exactly this reason.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors of Rn\mathbb R^nRn are Fin n → ℝ; the mmm conic constraints are indexed by Fin m (0-based) with a dependent family of matrices (ℓ : Fin m) → Matrix (Fin (k ℓ)) (Fin n) ℝ, so the row sizes kℓk_\ellkℓ​ may differ. The norm is written out as eucNorm y = √(∑ i, y i ^ 2); Mathlib's norm on Fin k → ℝ is the sup norm and is not used.
  • Only feasible sets are compared; the objective eee is carried as data but plays no role.
  • Correction 1. In hypothesis (i) the page prints [cℓTx−dℓ]−r[c_\ell^Tx-d_\ell]-r[cℓT​x−dℓ​]−r without the bar over xxx. The proof uses cℓTxˉ−dℓ−rc_\ell^T\bar x-d_\ell-rcℓT​xˉ−dℓ​−r, which is what IsStrictlyFeasible states.
  • Correction 2. The goal assumes m≥1m\ge1m≥1, which the paper leaves implicit. With m=0m=0m=0, semiboundedness is vacuous and RRR may be negative, so γ(ε)<0\gamma(\varepsilon)<0γ(ε)<0. Then the map y↦γxˉ+(1−γ)yy\mapsto\gamma\bar x+(1-\gamma)yy↦γxˉ+(1−γ)y extrapolates beyond yyy and can leave {Ax≥b}\{Ax\ge b\}{Ax≥b}. An example is n=1n=1n=1, A=[1]A=[1]A=[1], b=0b=0b=0, xˉ=1\bar x=1xˉ=1, y=0y=0y=0, R=−1R=-1R=−1, r=ε=1r=\varepsilon=1r=ε=1. For m≥1m\ge1m≥1 the hypotheses force R≥r>0R\ge r>0R≥r>0.
  • ε\varepsilonε ranges over all ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with γ(ε)<1\gamma(\varepsilon)<1γ(ε)<1, as in the paper; it is not restricted to (0,1](0,1](0,1].
  • The second milestone is stated for every δ∈[0,1]\delta\in[0,1]δ∈[0,1] that dominates all ratios εtℓ/(r+εtℓ)\varepsilon t_\ell/(r+\varepsilon t_\ell)εtℓ​/(r+εtℓ​), rather than only for the paper's δ=max⁡ℓ\delta=\max_\ellδ=maxℓ​. This includes the paper's case.
  • The goal cannot be satisfied trivially. The strict feasibility and semiboundedness hypotheses are jointly satisfiable (for example n=m=1n=m=1n=m=1, the constraint ∣x∣≤1|x|\le 1∣x∣≤1 written as ∥x∥2≤1\|x\|_2\le 1∥x∥2​≤1, xˉ=0\bar x=0xˉ=0, r=1r=1r=1, R=1R=1R=1), and the conclusion is the full two-sided inclusion with the paper's γ(ε)\gamma(\varepsilon)γ(ε), not the existence of some contraction factor.
  • Needed infrastructure: Euclidean-norm convexity (the triangle inequality and homogeneity for eucNorm, or a transfer to EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k)) and linearity of Matrix.mulVec and dotProduct. A convexity lemma for feas P would be reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of it are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, On Polyhedral Approximations of the Second-Order Cone, Mathematics of Operations Research 26(2):193–205, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.26.2.193.10561
  • M. S. Lobo, L. Vandenberghe, S. Boyd and H. Lebret, Applications of Second-Order Cone Programming, Linear Algebra and its Applications 284:193–228, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3795(98)10032-0
  • Yu. Nesterov and A. Nemirovski, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
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