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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: naimengye

Markov Decision Processes III: The Average Reward Optimality Equation for Unichain ModelsTextbook

Motivation

When a system is controlled indefinitely and decisions are frequent — a router admitting packets, a queue accepting jobs, a machine being maintained — discounting future rewards is often unjustified, and what matters is the long-run average reward per period. Puterman's Chapter 8 (doi:10.1002/9780470316887) develops the theory of this criterion, and its central object is a single equation, the average reward optimality equation 0=max⁡a∈As{r(s,a)−g+∑jp(j∣s,a)h(j)−h(s)}0=\max_{a\in A_s}\{r(s,a)-g+\sum_jp(j\mid s,a)h(j)-h(s)\}0=maxa∈As​​{r(s,a)−g+∑j​p(j∣s,a)h(j)−h(s)}, whose unknowns are a scalar gain ggg and a bias function hhh. For unichain models, in which every stationary policy generates a Markov chain with one recurrent class, this equation determines the optimal gain and an optimal stationary policy. The results go back to Howard (Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960) for the recurrent case and to Blackwell (Discrete dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33, 1962, doi:10.1214/aoms/1177704593) and Derman for the general finite case; Puterman's Section 8.4 proves them through the discounted theory of mission II, by letting the discount factor tend to one.

Setting

The model is stationary (Assumption 8.0.1): a finite set SSS of states, for each sss a finite nonempty set AsA_sAs​ of actions, a reward r(s,a)r(s,a)r(s,a) and transition probabilities p(j∣s,a)p(j\mid s,a)p(j∣s,a), none depending on the decision epoch. A policy π∈ΠHR\pi\in\Pi^{HR}π∈ΠHR may randomize and may depend on the whole history; the deterministic stationary policy d∞d^\inftyd∞ applies the decision rule d:S→Ad:S\to Ad:S→A at every epoch. Its transition matrix is Pd(i,j)=p(j∣i,d(i))P_d(i,j)=p(j\mid i,d(i))Pd​(i,j)=p(j∣i,d(i)).

For a policy π\piπ, vN+1π(s)=Esπ[∑t=1Nr(Xt,Yt)]v^\pi_{N+1}(s)=\mathbb E^\pi_s[\sum_{t=1}^Nr(X_t,Y_t)]vN+1π​(s)=Esπ​[∑t=1N​r(Xt​,Yt​)] is the expected reward over NNN epochs. Since the limit of N−1vN+1π(s)N^{-1}v^\pi_{N+1}(s)N−1vN+1π​(s) need not exist (Example 8.1.1), the chapter works with the lim sup and lim inf average rewards g+π(s)g^\pi_+(s)g+π​(s) and g−π(s)g^\pi_-(s)g−π​(s), and with g±∗(s)=sup⁡πg±π(s)g^*_\pm(s)=\sup_{\pi}g^\pi_\pm(s)g±∗​(s)=supπ​g±π​(s). A policy π∗\pi^*π∗ is average optimal when g−π∗(s)≥g+π(s)g^{\pi^*}_-(s)\ge g^\pi_+(s)g−π∗​(s)≥g+π​(s) for all sss and π\piπ, the strongest of the three criteria of Section 8.1.2.

The optimality residual is B(g,h)(s)=max⁡a∈As{r(s,a)−g+∑jp(j∣s,a)h(j)−h(s)}B(g,h)(s)=\max_{a\in A_s}\{r(s,a)-g+\sum_jp(j\mid s,a)h(j)-h(s)\}B(g,h)(s)=maxa∈As​​{r(s,a)−g+∑j​p(j∣s,a)h(j)−h(s)}, and the optimality equation is B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0. A decision rule is hhh-improving when it attains max⁡a∈As{r(s,a)+∑jp(j∣s,a)h(j)}\max_{a\in A_s}\{r(s,a)+\sum_jp(j\mid s,a)h(j)\}maxa∈As​​{r(s,a)+∑j​p(j∣s,a)h(j)} at every state. A transition matrix is unichain when it consists of a single recurrent class plus a possibly empty set of transient states, and the MDP is unichain when PdP_dPd​ is unichain for every deterministic decision rule.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 8.4.5 (printed p. 361)

For a finite unichain model: (a) some deterministic stationary policy is average optimal; (b) the optimality equation B(g∗,h∗)=0B(g^*,h^*)=0B(g∗,h∗)=0 has a solution, and (d) its scalar satisfies g+∗(s)=g−∗(s)=g∗g^*_+(s)=g^*_-(s)=g^*g+∗​(s)=g−∗​(s)=g∗ for every sss; (c) for every solution, every h∗h^*h∗-improving decision rule gives an average optimal stationary policy.

Theorem 8.4.1 (printed p. 356)

If B(g,h)≤0B(g,h)\le 0B(g,h)≤0 then g≥g+∗g\ge g^*_+g≥g+∗​; if B(g,h)≥0B(g,h)\ge 0B(g,h)≥0 then g≤sup⁡dg−d∞≤g−∗g\le\sup_{d}g^{d^\infty}_-\le g^*_-g≤supd​g−d∞​≤g−∗​; if B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0 then g+∗=g−∗=gg^*_+=g^*_-=gg+∗​=g−∗​=g.

Theorem 8.4.3 (printed p. 358)

In a finite unichain model B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0 has a solution, and every solution has the same ggg.

Theorem 8.4.4 (printed p. 361)

If B(g∗,h∗)=0B(g^*,h^*)=0B(g∗,h∗)=0 and d∗d^*d∗ is h∗h^*h∗-improving, then (d∗)∞(d^*)^\infty(d∗)∞ is average optimal.

Significance

Theorem 8.4.1(c) is what the source calls "one of the most important results for average reward models": a solution of the optimality equation with constant ggg pins down the optimal gain under every criterion at once, so that in finite unichain models the three optimality criteria of Section 8.1.2 coincide. Theorem 8.4.3 guarantees such a solution exists, and Theorem 8.4.4 reads an optimal policy off it. Together, Theorem 8.4.5 reduces the infinite-horizon average reward problem over all history-dependent randomized policies to a finite system of equations in (g,h)(g,h)(g,h), which is what policy iteration, value iteration and linear programming solve in Sections 8.5 to 8.8.

The results are classical and proved. Formalizing them fixes the chain-structure hypothesis in a checkable form and pins down which criterion "average optimal" means, two places where the literature is loose. The platform's MarkovDecisionProcesses series has the finite-horizon (mission I) and discounted (mission II) models; this mission adds the undiscounted stationary model, the gains, and the unichain classification, on which Chapter 9's multichain optimality equations and Chapter 10's sensitive discount optimality can be built.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Theorem 8.4.3 is to take the discounted optimal value vλ∗v^*_\lambdavλ∗​ of mission II and let λ↑1\lambda\uparrow 1λ↑1. It fails as stated because vλ∗v^*_\lambdavλ∗​ blows up like (1−λ)−1(1-\lambda)^{-1}(1−λ)−1; what converges is the Laurent expansion vλd∞=(1−λ)−1ge+h+o(1)v^{d^\infty}_\lambda=(1-\lambda)^{-1}ge+h+o(1)vλd∞​=(1−λ)−1ge+h+o(1) of the value of a fixed stationary policy, Corollary 8.2.4, and that expansion needs the limiting matrix Pd∗P_d^*Pd∗​ and the deviation matrix HPdH_{P_d}HPd​​ of a unichain chain. So the proof must first develop the Markov chain theory of Section 8.2 and Appendix A, choose a subsequence of discount factors along which one policy is discount optimal (possible because DMDD^{MD}DMD is finite), and only then pass to the limit in the discounted optimality equation.

Theorem 8.4.1 looks elementary and hides the analytic step: iterating ge≥rd+(Pd−I)hge\ge r_d+(P_d-I)hge≥rd​+(Pd​−I)h along an arbitrary history-dependent policy and dividing by NNN requires the telescoping term N−1(PNπ−I)hN^{-1}(P^\pi_N-I)hN−1(PNπ​−I)h to vanish, which uses boundedness of hhh, and requires the reduction from history-dependent randomized to Markov randomized policies (Theorem 8.1.2). For Theorem 8.4.4 the step is Corollary 8.2.7, that rd−ge+(Pd−I)h=0r_d-ge+(P_d-I)h=0rd​−ge+(Pd​−I)h=0 forces the gain of d∞d^\inftyd∞ to be ggg, which is the multiplication by Pd∗P_d^*Pd∗​ that annihilates (Pd−I)(P_d-I)(Pd​−I).

The traps are in the definitions. Recurrence and the unichain property must be stated so that the source's Example 8.4.3 comes out as the book says — the policy using a1,1a_{1,1}a1,1​ has the absorbing state s2s_2s2​ as its single recurrent class — and the optimality residual must use the lim sup / lim inf gains, since a definition through a limit that need not exist would be a junk value on the policies of Example 8.1.1.

Formalization scope

State and action spaces are Fintypes and admissible actions are nonempty Finsets, as in missions I and II; the stationary model is a new structure because mission II's DiscountedMDP bundles a discount factor, and carries the same data otherwise. Policies are history-dependent and randomized, so "average optimal" has its full strength; a stationary policy is the deterministic one built from a decision rule. Expected total reward is defined by the policy evaluation recursion, as in the earlier missions, rather than through a measure on trajectories.

Gains are Filter.limsup and Filter.liminf of N−1vN+1π(s)N^{-1}v^\pi_{N+1}(s)N−1vN+1π​(s) on R\mathbb RR; these are the source's because the sequence is bounded by max⁡∣r∣\max|r|max∣r∣, and the suprema g±∗g^*_\pmg±∗​ over the nonempty family of policies are genuine real suprema for the same reason. The residual B(g,h)B(g,h)B(g,h) is a Finset.sup' over the admissible actions. Recurrence is "every state reachable from iii reaches iii" and unichain is "any two recurrent states communicate", the definitions of Appendix A for finite chains, applied to PdP_dPd​ for every admissible deterministic decision rule.

Restrictions relative to the printed text, all noted in the items: Theorem 8.4.1 is stated for finite SSS where the source says countable, since the chapter's standing assumption and the model are finite; the gain gd∞g^{d^\infty}gd∞ of a stationary policy in (8.4.5) is written as its lim inf gain, which equals it; and the chain ge=g∗=g+∗=g−∗ge=g^*=g^*_+=g^*_-ge=g∗=g+∗​=g−∗​ of (8.4.6) is stated through g+∗g^*_+g+∗​ and g−∗g^*_-g−∗​, since g∗g^*g∗ presupposes existing limits. Nothing is trivialized: the existential in Theorem 8.4.5(a) has to produce a decision rule, and B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0B(g,h)=0 with a junk maximum is impossible since every AsA_sAs​ is nonempty. Welcome contributions beyond the milestones: Theorem 8.1.2 (reduction to Markov policies), Corollary 8.2.7 (the gain of a stationary policy from the evaluation equations), and the equivalence of the three optimality criteria in finite models.

Selected references

  • Martin L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994, Chapter 8. doi:10.1002/9780470316887
  • Ronald A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • David Blackwell, Discrete dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33 (1962). doi:10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • Cyrus Derman, Finite State Markovian Decision Processes, Academic Press, 1970.
  • Paul J. Schweitzer and Awi Federgruen, The functional equations of undiscounted Markov renewal programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 3 (1978). doi:10.1287/moor.3.4.308
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Inventory Control IV: Reorder Points under Normally Distributed DemandTextbook

Where the reorder point comes from

Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control fixes the batch quantity QQQ from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 asks the question that deterministic models cannot answer: with demand random and a replenishment lead-time LLL, when should the next batch be ordered? Under a continuous review (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy the answer is a single number, the reorder point RRR, and Sections 5.3 through 5.9 are one sustained computation of what a given RRR buys. The chapter's own capstone is Eq. (5.67): if backorders are charged at b1b_1b1​ per unit and time unit and stock at hhh, the cost-minimizing reorder point is exactly the one whose fill rate is b1/(h+b1)b_1/(h+b_1)b1​/(h+b1​). The book calls the relationship "even more striking" than its discrete counterpart, and it is used in practice in both directions: a backorder cost prescribes a service level, and a chosen service level reveals the backorder cost a planner is implicitly assuming (Eq. 5.68).

Setting

An order for a fixed batch quantity Q>0Q > 0Q>0 is triggered whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus outstanding orders minus backorders) falls to the reorder point RRR, and it arrives LLL time units later. Demand is continuous and normally distributed; the demand over a lead-time has mean μ′\mu'μ′ and standard deviation σ′>0\sigma' > 0σ′>0. Two modelling facts from the book are taken as the definition of the steady state. First (Sect. 5.3.1), the inventory position IPIPIP is uniformly distributed on [R,R+Q][R, R+Q][R,R+Q]; the book proves this for compound Poisson demand (Proposition 5.1) and adopts it as an accurate approximation for continuous demand. Second (Sect. 5.3.2, Eq. 5.35), the inventory level a lead-time later is the inventory position now minus the demand in between,

IL(t+L)  =  IP(t)−D(t,t+L),IL(t+L) \;=\; IP(t) - D(t, t+L),IL(t+L)=IP(t)−D(t,t+L),

with the two terms independent. The law of ILILIL is therefore the image of the product of a uniform and a normal law under subtraction, and everything in the chapter is a functional of it:

  • the distribution function F(x)=Pr⁡[IL≤x]F(x) = \Pr[IL \le x]F(x)=Pr[IL≤x] and its density fff;
  • the ready rate S3=Pr⁡[IL>0]S_3 = \Pr[IL > 0]S3​=Pr[IL>0], which for continuous demand equals the fill rate S2S_2S2​, the fraction of demand met from stock on hand;
  • the expected cost rate C(R)=E[h (IL)++b1 (IL)−]C(R) = \mathbb{E}\big[h\,(IL)^{+} + b_1\,(IL)^{-}\big]C(R)=E[h(IL)++b1​(IL)−], holding cost on positive stock and backorder cost on negative stock, Eq. (5.56).

The closed forms run through the standard normal loss function G(x)=∫x∞(v−x)φ(v) dvG(x) = \int_x^\infty (v-x)\varphi(v)\,\mathrm{d}vG(x)=∫x∞​(v−x)φ(v)dv of Eq. (5.40), published with the newsboy mission and reused here, and through its integral, the second loss function H(x)=∫x∞G(v) dvH(x) = \int_x^\infty G(v)\,\mathrm{d}vH(x)=∫x∞​G(v)dv of Eq. (5.64). Both are tabulated in the book's Appendix 2, and both recur in Chapters 6, 9 and 10.

Formalization targets

Goal — Eq. (5.67)

For h,b1,Q,σ′>0h, b_1, Q, \sigma' > 0h,b1​,Q,σ′>0 and any μ′\mu'μ′, a reorder point RRR minimizes CCC over R\mathbb{R}R if and only if

S2(R)  =  S3(R)  =  b1h+b1.S_2(R) \;=\; S_3(R) \;=\; \frac{b_1}{h + b_1}.S2​(R)=S3​(R)=h+b1​b1​​.

The biconditional carries both halves of the book's sentence: the stationary point is the optimum ("the optimal RRR is obtained for dC/dR=0\mathrm{d}C/\mathrm{d}R = 0dC/dR=0") and the optimum is stationary ("in the optimal solution we have S2=S3=b1/(h+b1)S_2 = S_3 = b_1/(h+b_1)S2​=S3​=b1​/(h+b1​)").

Supporting targets

In the order the chapter builds them: Eq. (5.41), G′=Φ−1G' = \Phi - 1G′=Φ−1, with GGG decreasing and convex; Eq. (5.39), the distribution function by conditioning on the inventory position; Eq. (5.42), its closed form F(x)=σ′Q[G(R−x−μ′σ′)−G(R+Q−x−μ′σ′)]F(x) = \frac{\sigma'}{Q}[G(\frac{R-x-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - G(\frac{R+Q-x-\mu'}{\sigma'})]F(x)=Qσ′​[G(σ′R−x−μ′​)−G(σ′R+Q−x−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.43), the density; Eq. (5.52), the fill rate 1−σ′Q[G(R−μ′σ′)−G(R+Q−μ′σ′)]1 - \frac{\sigma'}{Q}[G(\frac{R-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - G(\frac{R+Q-\mu'}{\sigma'})]1−Qσ′​[G(σ′R−μ′​)−G(σ′R+Q−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.55), the expected backorders E(B)\mathbb{E}(B)E(B) covered by one batch, and Eq. (5.54), that 1−E(B)/Q1 - \mathbb{E}(B)/Q1−E(B)/Q is the same fill rate; integrability of the cost rate and the mean E(IL)=R+Q/2−μ′\mathbb{E}(IL) = R + Q/2 - \mu'E(IL)=R+Q/2−μ′; Eq. (5.63), E(IL)−=∫−∞0F\mathbb{E}(IL)^{-} = \int_{-\infty}^0 FE(IL)−=∫−∞0​F; Eq. (5.64), the closed form of HHH and H′=−GH' = -GH′=−G; Eq. (5.65), the cost C=h(R+Q/2−μ′)+(h+b1)σ′2Q[H(R−μ′σ′)−H(R+Q−μ′σ′)]C = h(R + Q/2 - \mu') + (h+b_1)\frac{\sigma'^2}{Q}[H(\frac{R-\mu'}{\sigma'}) - H(\frac{R+Q-\mu'}{\sigma'})]C=h(R+Q/2−μ′)+(h+b1​)Qσ′2​[H(σ′R−μ′​)−H(σ′R+Q−μ′​)]; Eq. (5.66), dC/dR=−b1+(h+b1)S2\mathrm{d}C/\mathrm{d}R = -b_1 + (h+b_1)S_2dC/dR=−b1​+(h+b1​)S2​; and the convexity of CCC in RRR.

Significance

The result itself. The reorder point is the one parameter of an (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy that stochastic demand actually decides, and Eq. (5.67) says that deciding it by cost and deciding it by service level are the same decision, with an explicit dictionary between the two. That is why the book can present service-level constraints (Sect. 5.7) and shortage costs (Sect. 5.9) as interchangeable ways of specifying the same thing, and why it warns, immediately after Eq. (5.67), that the equivalence is only valid when QQQ is given: with an ordering cost and a joint optimization of RRR and QQQ it fails, which is Chapter 6's problem.

The intermediate formulas have independent standing. Eq. (5.42) is the single expression from which every service measure of the chapter is computed, and Eq. (5.65) is the cost function that Chapter 6 extends by an ordering cost, Eq. (6.10), and optimizes iteratively. The second loss function HHH returns in the periodic-review fill rate of Eq. (5.86) and in the two-echelon batch-ordering model of Sect. 10.5.

Formalizing it. Nothing here is open; the value is that the steady-state model becomes an explicit measure, so that formulas the book obtains by manipulating integrals whose existence it never questions become theorems about that measure. Integrability of the cost rate is a target of its own for exactly that reason. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious route is the book's, and it is not the hard part: once FFF is known in closed form, every later identity is calculus on GGG and HHH. The work is upstream of that. The distribution function (5.39) is a conditioning argument over the product measure, a Fubini step in which the inner probability is a Gaussian tail; the density (5.43) is a derivative of a parameter-dependent integral; and Eq. (5.63) exchanges the order of two integrals over an unbounded region, which needs integrability of ILILIL itself. The derivative (5.66) is then obtained from the closed form (5.65), not by differentiating under an expectation, which is what makes the goal reachable: CCC is a smooth function of RRR with an explicitly increasing derivative, and Eq. (5.67) follows from strict convexity together with the fact that the fill rate is a continuous, strictly increasing function of RRR ranging over (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). A solver who starts from the expectation and tries to differentiate it directly will meet the kink of x+x^{+}x+ at 000 and a dominated-convergence argument; the integrated route avoids both.

Formalization scope

The inventory position is rqPosition R Q, Lebesgue measure conditioned on [R,R+Q][R, R+Q][R,R+Q]; the lead-time demand is newsboyDemand m s, Mathlib's gaussianReal m (s^2).toNNReal from the newsboy mission, with m=μ′m = \mu'm=μ′ and s=σ′s = \sigma's=σ′; and rqLevel R Q m s is the pushforward of their product under (u,d)↦u−d(u, d) \mapsto u - d(u,d)↦u−d. Two lemmas in the definition file record that both are probability measures when Q>0Q > 0Q>0. The distribution function, ready rate and cost are the measure of (−∞,x](-\infty, x](−∞,x], the measure of (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and a Bochner integral against this law.

Every statement assumes Q>0Q > 0Q>0 and σ′>0\sigma' > 0σ′>0. At Q=0Q = 0Q=0 the conditioned measure is the zero measure and every integral is 000, so a statement without the hypothesis would be true and empty; at σ′=0\sigma' = 0σ′=0 the demand is a point mass and FFF has jumps. The mean μ′\mu'μ′ is unrestricted, as none of the formulas depends on its sign, and reorder points may be negative, which the book explicitly allows in Sect. 5.8. Costs hhh and b1b_1b1​ are positive in every statement that involves them, and E(B)\mathbb{E}(B)E(B) is stated for Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 because its closed form holds there.

Two trivializing readings are ruled out. The cost is not defined as a formula in HHH but as an expectation, so the closed form (5.65) has content; and because Lean's Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, integrability of the cost rate is stated as a theorem rather than assumed, otherwise a zero cost would make every reorder point optimal. The goal quantifies optimality over all real competing reorder points, not a neighbourhood.

A complete development needs Gaussian tail integrals, differentiation of parameter-dependent integrals, Fubini on a product of a bounded interval with the line, and the strict monotonicity of the Gaussian distribution function. The loss functions GGG and HHH and the inventory-level law are reusable across the rest of the series; contributions that establish the same identities for an arbitrary continuous lead-time demand with a finite mean, where Eqs. (5.39), (5.63) and (5.66) hold verbatim, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • George Hadley and Thomson M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
  • Yu-Sheng Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1), 1992, pp. 87-103. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • Kaj Rosling, Inventory Cost Rate Functions with Nonlinear Shortage Costs, Operations Research 50(6), 2002, pp. 1007-1017. DOI 10.1287/opre.50.6.1007.346
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Inventory Control V: Joint Optimization of Reorder Point and Batch QuantityTextbook

Two decisions that are usually taken separately

An (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy has two parameters. Chapter 4 of Axsäter's Inventory Control chooses the batch quantity QQQ from a deterministic model, and Chapter 5 chooses the reorder point RRR from a stochastic one with QQQ held fixed; the book presents this two-step practice as an adequate approximation. Section 6.1 asks what is lost by it and shows how to optimize both parameters jointly in one stochastic model. For discrete demand the answer, due to Federgruen and Zheng (1992), is an algorithm of remarkable simplicity: increase QQQ one unit at a time, keep the reorder point optimal along the way by a one-line rule, and stop at the first QQQ for which the cost goes up. The claim that this stopping rule finds the global optimum over all pairs (R,Q)(R, Q)(R,Q) is the capstone of Sect. 6.1.1.1 and the goal of this mission. The same idea is reused in the book for (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies (Sect. 6.1.1.2) and, in continuous form, for normally distributed demand (Sect. 6.1.2).

Setting

An item is controlled by a continuous review (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy with integral reorder point RRR and batch quantity Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1. Demand is discrete and stationary; the lead-time demand D(L)D(L)D(L) takes values in the nonnegative integers with probabilities pj=Pr⁡[D(L)=j]p_j = \Pr[D(L) = j]pj​=Pr[D(L)=j] and has a finite mean μ′\mu'μ′. The average demand per unit of time is μ\muμ. Costs are a holding cost hhh and a shortage cost b1b_1b1​, both per unit and time unit, and an ordering cost AAA per batch.

The building block is the cost of an (S−1,S)(S-1,S)(S−1,S) policy that keeps the inventory position at a fixed integer kkk. By the standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 the inventory level a lead-time later is k−D(L)k - D(L)k−D(L), and the average holding and shortage cost rate is (Eq. 6.3)

g(k)  =  −b1 (k−μ′)+(h+b1)∑j=1kj Pr⁡[D(L)=k−j].g(k) \;=\; -b_1\,(k - \mu') + (h + b_1)\sum_{j=1}^{k} j\,\Pr[D(L) = k - j].g(k)=−b1​(k−μ′)+(h+b1​)j=1∑k​jPr[D(L)=k−j].

Under the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy the inventory position is uniformly distributed on {R+1,…,R+Q}\{R+1, \dots, R+Q\}{R+1,…,R+Q} (Proposition 5.1), so the total average cost rate is (Eq. 6.4)

C(R,Q)  =  AμQ+1Q∑k=R+1R+Qg(k),C(R, Q) \;=\; \frac{A\mu}{Q} + \frac{1}{Q}\sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q} g(k),C(R,Q)=QAμ​+Q1​k=R+1∑R+Q​g(k),

and C(Q)=min⁡RC(R,Q)C(Q) = \min_R C(R,Q)C(Q)=minR​C(R,Q) (Eq. 6.5), attained at an optimal reorder point R∗(Q)R^{*}(Q)R∗(Q). The ready rate S3(R)=Pr⁡[IL>0]=1Q∑k=R+1R+QPr⁡[D(L)≤k−1]S_3(R) = \Pr[IL > 0] = \frac{1}{Q}\sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q}\Pr[D(L) \le k-1]S3​(R)=Pr[IL>0]=Q1​∑k=R+1R+Q​Pr[D(L)≤k−1] links the cost to service: raising the reorder point by one unit changes the cost by −b1+(h+b1)S3(R+1)-b_1 + (h + b_1)S_3(R+1)−b1​+(h+b1​)S3​(R+1) (Eq. 5.60).

Formalization targets

Goal — the Federgruen-Zheng stopping rule is optimal

Let Q∗≥1Q^{*} \ge 1Q∗≥1 be the smallest batch quantity with C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗)C(Q^{*}+1) \ge C(Q^{*})C(Q∗+1)≥C(Q∗) and let R∗R^{*}R∗ be an optimal reorder point for Q∗Q^{*}Q∗. Then

C(R∗,Q∗)  ≤  C(R,Q)for all R∈Z, Q≥1.C(R^{*}, Q^{*}) \;\le\; C(R, Q) \qquad\text{for all } R \in \mathbb{Z},\ Q \ge 1.C(R∗,Q∗)≤C(R,Q)for all R∈Z, Q≥1.

Supporting targets

The increment identity g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1+(h+b1)Pr⁡[D(L)≤k]g(k+1) - g(k) = -b_1 + (h+b_1)\Pr[D(L) \le k]g(k+1)−g(k)=−b1​+(h+b1​)Pr[D(L)≤k]; convexity of ggg on Z\mathbb{Z}Z together with g(k)→∞g(k) \to \inftyg(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞|k| \to \infty∣k∣→∞; Eq. (5.60) and the convexity of C(⋅,Q)C(\cdot, Q)C(⋅,Q) in RRR; Eq. (5.61), that the largest RRR with S3(R)≤b1/(h+b1)S_3(R) \le b_1/(h+b_1)S3​(R)≤b1​/(h+b1​) is optimal for its QQQ; existence of an optimal RRR for every QQQ; the recursion (6.6)-(6.7), R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)}R^{*}(Q+1) \in \{R^{*}(Q) - 1, R^{*}(Q)\}R∗(Q+1)∈{R∗(Q)−1,R∗(Q)} chosen by comparing g(R∗(Q))g(R^{*}(Q))g(R∗(Q)) with g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)g(R^{*}(Q)+Q+1)g(R∗(Q)+Q+1), and C(Q+1)=C(Q)QQ+1+min⁡{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}1Q+1C(Q+1) = C(Q)\frac{Q}{Q+1} + \min\{g(R^{*}(Q)), g(R^{*}(Q)+Q+1)\}\frac{1}{Q+1}C(Q+1)=C(Q)Q+1Q​+min{g(R∗(Q)),g(R∗(Q)+Q+1)}Q+11​; the equivalence C(Q+1)≥C(Q)  ⟺  min⁡{⋅}≥C(Q)C(Q+1) \ge C(Q) \iff \min\{\cdot\} \ge C(Q)C(Q+1)≥C(Q)⟺min{⋅}≥C(Q) and the monotonicity of that minimum in QQQ; and the existence of some QQQ at which the costs stop decreasing.

Significance

The result itself. Joint optimization typically enlarges the batch and lowers the reorder point relative to the two-step procedure, and the book's Example 6.1 puts the resulting cost saving at a few percent. The Federgruen-Zheng procedure makes the exact joint optimum for discrete demand as cheap to compute as the two-step approximation, because each step of the recursion evaluates ggg at two points. It is the exact benchmark against which the book's approximate techniques for normal demand (Sects. 6.1.2 and 6.1.3) are judged, and its structural core, that the optimal window of QQQ consecutive inventory positions grows one neighbour at a time, is the discrete-convexity fact behind the whole of Sect. 6.1.

Formalizing it. The mathematics is settled. What the mission produces is a Lean development in which the steps the book marks "evident" and "obvious" are separate statements: that the recursion preserves optimality, that the marginal cost of enlarging the batch is monotone, and that a minimum over RRR exists at all. None of the statements has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea, to argue that C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is convex in QQQ and stop at its first increase, does not work as stated: C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is a minimum over RRR of a ratio and is not convex in general. What is true, and what the proof uses, is that the marginal cost (Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q)(Q+1)C(Q+1) - QC(Q)(Q+1)C(Q+1)−QC(Q) is nondecreasing, because it equals the smaller of the two ggg-values adjacent to the optimal window. Establishing the recursion (6.6) is where discrete convexity is needed: one must show that the best window of Q+1Q+1Q+1 consecutive positions is obtained from the best window of QQQ by adding a neighbour, which fails for non-convex ggg. The window sums R↦∑k=R+1R+Qg(k)R \mapsto \sum_{k=R+1}^{R+Q} g(k)R↦∑k=R+1R+Q​g(k) are themselves convex in RRR with increments g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1)g(R+Q+1) - g(R+1)g(R+Q+1)−g(R+1), and the argument compares a competing window with the optimal one through the end terms. The remaining steps are finite algebra and an induction on QQQ from Q∗Q^{*}Q∗.

Formalization scope

A DiscreteDemand is a function p:N→Rp : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}p:N→R with p≥0p \ge 0p≥0, ∑p=1\sum p = 1∑p=1 and a summable first moment; Pr⁡[D(L)≤k]\Pr[D(L) \le k]Pr[D(L)≤k] is a finite sum over 0≤j≤k0 \le j \le k0≤j≤k, empty for k<0k < 0k<0. The reorder point ranges over Z\mathbb{Z}Z and the batch quantity over N\mathbb{N}N, with Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 assumed in every statement because Lean's division by 000 is 000. Convexity of a function on Z\mathbb{Z}Z is stated as nondecreasing increments, and divergence as Tendsto g (cocompact ℤ) atTop.

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) enters the goal as a function CQ together with the hypothesis that CQ Q is the least value of R↦C(R,Q)R \mapsto C(R, Q)R↦C(R,Q); the stopping index Q∗Q^{*}Q∗ is characterized by the two conditions that define "the smallest QQQ with C(Q+1)≥C(Q)C(Q+1) \ge C(Q)C(Q+1)≥C(Q)", and R∗R^{*}R∗ by optimality at Q∗Q^{*}Q∗. That these objects exist is the content of two separate items, so the goal is not vacuous: a minimum over RRR exists for every QQQ because g→∞g \to \inftyg→∞, and the costs cannot decrease forever because the average of the QQQ smallest values of ggg tends to infinity. The positivity of AAA and μ\muμ is the book's setting and is assumed where it appears.

The uniform inventory position of Proposition 5.1, which needs the book's assumption that not all demands are multiples of an integer larger than one, is taken as given in the cost formula (6.4), as the book does; the proposition itself is the subject of the next mission of this series. The definitions are reusable for the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimization of Sect. 6.1.1.2 and for the multi-echelon batch-ordering results of Sect. 10.5; contributions formalizing the Zheng-Federgruen (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) algorithm on top of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.9.1 and 6.1.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Yu-Sheng Zheng and Awi Federgruen, Finding Optimal (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) Policies Is About as Simple as Evaluating a Single Policy, Operations Research 39(4), 1991, pp. 654-665. DOI 10.1287/opre.39.4.654
  • Paul Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000.
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Inventory Control VI: Optimality of (R, Q) Policies When Ordering in BatchesTextbook

Why the policy class is not up for debate

Every model in Chapters 5 and 6 of Axsäter's Inventory Control assumes at the outset that the ordering policy is of (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) or (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) type. Section 6.2 asks whether better policies exist and answers, for the case in which there are no ordering costs but every order must be a multiple of a fixed batch quantity QQQ, that none do: Proposition 6.1, "an (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy is optimal", with a proof the book attributes to Chen (2000). For Q=1Q = 1Q=1 it is the optimality of an order-up-to-SSS policy in the absence of ordering costs, and for continuous or Poisson demand it transfers to (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies, which are then the same thing. The proposition is the one place in the book where a policy is compared against every feasible alternative rather than against other members of its own family, and its proof is short enough to be given in full, which makes it the natural capstone of Chapter 6.

Setting

Demand is compound Poisson: customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ\lambdaλ and each demands an integral number of units, with sizes D0,D1,…D_0, D_1, \dotsD0​,D1​,… independent and identically distributed with law fff on the positive integers, independent of the arrival process. The book's standing assumption that not all demands are multiples of some integer larger than one is kept. Writing TnT_nTn​ for the nnn-th arrival time, N(t)N(t)N(t) for the number of arrivals by time ttt and Sn=D0+⋯+Dn−1S_n = D_0 + \dots + D_{n-1}Sn​=D0​+⋯+Dn−1​, the total demand by time ttt is SN(t)S_{N(t)}SN(t)​.

The replenishment lead-time LLL is constant and D(L)D(L)D(L), the demand over a lead-time, has law DDD. A holding cost h>0h > 0h>0 and a shortage cost b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0 per unit and time unit are charged. There are no ordering costs, but all orders must be multiples of a given batch quantity Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 and can only be triggered by customer demands. A policy is therefore any rule mmm that decides at each demand epoch how many batches to order; with initial position y0y_0y0​ the inventory position evolves as yn+1=yn−Dn+mnQy_{n+1} = y_n - D_n + m_nQyn+1​=yn​−Dn​+mn​Q (Eq. 6.22), and yt=yN(t)y_t = y_{N(t)}yt​=yN(t)​.

The standard argument of Sect. 5.3.2 gives the cost rate at time t+Lt + Lt+L as

g(yt),g(k)=−b1(k−μ′)+(h+b1)∑j=1kj Pr⁡[D(L)=k−j],g(y_t), \qquad g(k) = -b_1(k - \mu') + (h+b_1)\sum_{j=1}^{k} j\,\Pr[D(L) = k - j],g(yt​),g(k)=−b1​(k−μ′)+(h+b1​)j=1∑k​jPr[D(L)=k−j],

the expected holding-plus-shortage cost rate of an inventory level k−D(L)k - D(L)k−D(L) (Eq. 6.20), which is convex in kkk with g(k)→∞g(k) \to \inftyg(k)→∞ as ∣k∣→∞|k| \to \infty∣k∣→∞. The band cost is gˉ(y)=∑j=1Qg(y+j)\bar g(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{Q} g(y+j)gˉ​(y)=∑j=1Q​g(y+j) and RRR denotes an integer minimizing gˉ\bar ggˉ​. The (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy orders, as soon as the position is at or below RRR, the smallest number of batches that brings it above RRR; its position lives in the band {R+1,…,R+Q}\{R+1, \dots, R+Q\}{R+1,…,R+Q} from the first order on. The performance measure is the long-run average cost rate 1T∫0Tg(yt−L) dt\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g(y_{t-L})\,\mathrm{d}tT1​∫0T​g(yt−L​)dt as T→∞T \to \inftyT→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal — Proposition 6.1

Almost surely, (1) for every policy mmm and every y0y_0y0​,

lim inf⁡T→∞1T∫0Tg(yt−Lm) dt  ≥  gˉ(R)Q,\liminf_{T\to\infty} \frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g\big(y^{m}_{t-L}\big)\,\mathrm{d}t \;\ge\; \frac{\bar g(R)}{Q},T→∞liminf​T1​∫0T​g(yt−Lm​)dt≥Qgˉ​(R)​,

and (2) the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy attains it:

1T∫0Tg(yt−L(R,Q)) dt  ⟶  gˉ(R)Q.\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g\big(y^{(R,Q)}_{t-L}\big)\,\mathrm{d}t \;\longrightarrow\; \frac{\bar g(R)}{Q}.T1​∫0T​g(yt−L(R,Q)​)dt⟶Qgˉ​(R)​.

Supporting targets

Lemma 6.1, that x↦g(z+xQ)x \mapsto g(z + xQ)x↦g(z+xQ) is convex and minimized at the representative of zzz in the band; the closed form of the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) position, y0−Sny_0 - S_ny0​−Sn​ until the first order and the band representative of y0−Sny_0 - S_ny0​−Sn​ afterwards; the uniform occupation of the band by the reduced process yt′y_t'yt′​, the book's "the steady state distribution can be shown to be uniform", and its consequence that the long-run average of g(yt′)g(y_t')g(yt′​) is gˉ(R)/Q\bar g(R)/Qgˉ​(R)/Q; Proposition 5.1 in the same ergodic form for the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy; and the two halves of the goal as separate statements.

Significance

The result itself. Proposition 6.1 is what licenses the two-parameter policies on which the rest of the book's single-echelon theory is built, and it does so for the practically important case of batch ordering (pallets, containers, production lots). Its proof also explains why the policy works: the only quantity a policy controls is the residue class of the inventory position modulo QQQ, which no policy can influence, and the position within that class, which the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy always sets to the cheapest possible value. The book extends the same reasoning to other cost structures and to periodic review.

Formalizing it. The proposition is a theorem about the class of all policies, and the book's proof is pathwise: Lemma 6.1 compares any policy with the reduced process instant by instant, and an ergodic statement about the reduced process does the rest. Formalizing it therefore forces the policy class, the demand process and the long-run average to be written down exactly, which the book never does. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The pointwise comparison is elementary once Lemma 6.1 is available, and Lemma 6.1 is discrete convexity. The difficulty is entirely in the ergodic statement: that the reduced position yt′=y_t' = yt′​= (the band representative of y0−SN(t)y_0 - S_{N(t)}y0​−SN(t)​) spends a fraction 1/Q1/Q1/Q of the time at each point of the band, almost surely. In discrete time this is the convergence of occupation frequencies for an irreducible random walk on Z/QZ\mathbb{Z}/Q\mathbb{Z}Z/QZ with step law fff modulo QQQ, where irreducibility is exactly the aperiodicity assumption on fff, and the book's double-stochasticity argument (Eq. 5.33-5.34) identifies the uniform law as stationary. Passing to continuous time adds the exponential holding times: the time average is the arrival average weighted by i.i.d. holding times independent of the walk, which a strong law of large numbers turns back into the discrete statement. Mathlib has the strong law and the exponential law but no ergodic theorem for finite Markov chains, so that is the groundwork a solver must build. The naive route through the stationary distribution of the embedded chain at demand epochs is not enough on its own: for pure Poisson demand that chain is periodic, and the book itself notes it.

Formalization scope

A CompoundPoissonDemand on a probability space packages the rate, the size law with f0=0f_0 = 0f0​=0 and the aperiodicity condition, and two sequences of random variables, the gaps and the sizes, with their laws (expMeasure lam, the given pmf), independence within each sequence, and independence between the sequences. Arrival times are partial sums of the gaps, count t is the supremum of {n:Tn≤t}\{n : T_n \le t\}{n:Tn​≤t}, and cumDemand n is the partial sum of the sizes. A policy is a function m : ℕ → Ω → ℕ with no measurability requirement; ipPath and ipAt are the position after the nnn-th demand and at time ttt; rqIP and rqOrders are the (R,Q)(R,Q)(R,Q) policy, with a theorem identifying rqOrders as a policy in the general sense. avgCost is 1T∫0Tg(yt−L) dt\frac{1}{T}\int_0^T g(y_{t-L})\,\mathrm{d}tT1​∫0T​g(yt−L​)dt with ys=y0y_s = y_0ys​=y0​ for s<0s < 0s<0. The cost function ggg is sPolicyCost from the previous mission, applied to a DiscreteDemand that the hypotheses tie to the process as the law of the demand in (0,L](0, L](0,L].

Conventions: Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1, L≥0L \ge 0L≥0, h,b1>0h, b_1 > 0h,b1​>0; RRR is any minimizer of gˉ\bar ggˉ​ (it exists by the divergence of ggg, proved in the previous mission); y0y_0y0​ is arbitrary. count and the interval integral take junk values on the null set where arrivals do not tend to infinity, which the almost-sure conclusions absorb. "lim inf⁡≥c\liminf \ge climinf≥c" is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, eventually ≥c−ε\ge c - \varepsilon≥c−ε", avoiding a liminf on R\mathbb{R}R that could be junk.

Two readings that would trivialize the goal are excluded: the lower bound is over every rule, not over stationary or measurable ones, and the achievability half is a genuine limit, not a bound. The demand model and the occupation-frequency theorems are reusable for Proposition 10.1 and the batch-ordering models of Sect. 10.5; contributions establishing the ergodic theorem for irreducible chains on a finite cyclic group are welcome and would close most of this mission.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sects. 5.3.1 and 6.2.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Fangruo Chen, Optimal Policies for Multi-Echelon Inventory Problems with Batch Ordering, Operations Research 48(3), 2000, pp. 376-389. DOI 10.1287/opre.48.3.376.12427
  • Awi Federgruen and Yu-Sheng Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 808-813. DOI 10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • Evan L. Porteus, Foundations of Stochastic Inventory Theory, Stanford University Press, 2002.
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory V: The Bullwhip EffectTextbook

Why orders swing more than sales

Procter & Gamble observed in the 1990s that the orders its distributors placed for diapers were far more variable than the retail sales of diapers, and that its own orders to suppliers were more variable still, although the end demand for diapers is about as stable as demand gets. The phenomenon, a growing amplification of variability as one moves upstream in a supply chain, is the bullwhip effect. Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997) argued that it is not a symptom of irrational behaviour: four rational responses of an inventory manager to their own environment each produce it. Chapter 13 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) makes three of the four quantitative, following Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) for demand signal processing, Lee et al. for the rationing game, and Cachon (1999) for order batching. This mission formalizes those three models and the theorems the chapter proves about them.

Setting

Demand signal processing. A retailer faces a demand process DtD_tDt​, t∈Zt \in \mathbb{Z}t∈Z, that follows the stationary first-order autoregressive model

Dt=d+ρDt−1+ϵt,D_t = d + \rho D_{t-1} + \epsilon_t,Dt​=d+ρDt−1​+ϵt​,

with a constant d≥0d \ge 0d≥0, a correlation constant −1<ρ<1-1 < \rho < 1−1<ρ<1, and errors ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ that are independent N(0,σ2)N(0, \sigma^2)N(0,σ2) variables, each independent of the demands before period ttt. In steady state every DtD_tDt​ has the law N(d/(1−ρ), σ2/(1−ρ2))N\big(d/(1-\rho),\ \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)\big)N(d/(1−ρ), σ2/(1−ρ2)). The retailer replenishes with a lead time of LLL periods under a base-stock policy but does not know the demand parameters, so it estimates the lead-time demand from a moving average of the previous m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 demands:

μ^tL=Lm∑i=1mDt−i,σ^etL=C1m∑i=1met−i2,et=Dt−μ^t1,\hat\mu^L_t = \frac{L}{m}\sum_{i=1}^m D_{t-i}, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C\sqrt{\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^m e_{t-i}^2}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat\mu^1_t,μ^​tL​=mL​i=1∑m​Dt−i​,σ^etL​=Cm1​i=1∑m​et−i2​​,et​=Dt​−μ^​t1​,

and sets the base-stock level St=μ^tL+zασ^etLS_t = \hat\mu^L_t + z_\alpha \hat\sigma^L_{et}St​=μ^​tL​+zα​σ^etL​, where zαz_\alphazα​ is a safety factor. The book writes the constant in σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ as CLρC_{L\rho}CLρ​ and does not give its form; here it is a free parameter CCC. Each period the retailer orders Qt=St−St−1+Dt−1Q_t = S_t - S_{t-1} + D_{t-1}Qt​=St​−St−1​+Dt−1​, which may be negative. In Lean the process is the structure AR1Demand, whose fields are the parameters, the errors, the demands, the recursion, the independence properties and the stationary law; muHat, err, sigmaHat, baseStock and order are the five quantities above.

Order batching. NNN retailers face independent N(μ,σ2)N(\mu, \sigma^2)N(μ,σ2) demands in every period and each orders once every R≥1R \ge 1R≥1 periods, the order being its demand over the previous RRR periods. The supplier's order in a given period is the total ordered by the retailers whose ordering day falls in that period. Three patterns are compared: random ordering, in which each retailer's day is uniform over the RRR days, so the number XXX of retailers ordering on a given day is binomial(N,1/R)(N, 1/R)(N,1/R); positively correlated ordering, in which all retailers order on the same day, so X=NX = NX=N with probability 1/R1/R1/R and 000 otherwise; and balanced ordering, in which the retailers are spread as evenly as possible, so with N=MR+kN = MR + kN=MR+k, 0≤k<R0 \le k < R0≤k<R, XXX is M+1M+1M+1 with probability k/Rk/Rk/R and MMM otherwise. The structure BatchOrders P N R mu sigma carries the demands, the ordering count XXX independent of them, and supplierOrder, the sum of the last RRR demands of retailers 1,…,X1, \dots, X1,…,X; each pattern enters a theorem as a hypothesis on the law of XXX.

Rationing game. Two identical retailers face single-period demand with distribution function FFF, holding cost hhh and stockout penalty ppp, so the newsvendor quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ satisfies F(Q∗)=p/(h+p)F(Q^*) = p/(h+p)F(Q∗)=p/(h+p). With probability rrr the supplier can deliver only A1<2Q∗A_1 < 2Q^*A1​<2Q∗ units in total and allocates them pro rata to the orders, retailer 1 receiving A1Q1/(Q1+Q2)A_1 Q_1/(Q_1 + Q_2)A1​Q1​/(Q1​+Q2​); with probability 1−r1 - r1−r supply is unlimited. Retailer 1's expected cost when the retailers order Q1Q_1Q1​ and Q2Q_2Q2​ is

g1(Q1)=(1−r) nv(Q1)+r nv ⁣(A1Q1Q1+Q2),g_1(Q_1) = (1-r)\,\mathrm{nv}(Q_1) + r\,\mathrm{nv}\!\Big(\frac{A_1 Q_1}{Q_1 + Q_2}\Big),g1​(Q1​)=(1−r)nv(Q1​)+rnv(Q1​+Q2​A1​Q1​​),

with nv\mathrm{nv}nv the newsvendor cost; this is rationingCost.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 13.2, demand signal processing

Var[Qt]Var[Dt]  ≥  1+(2Lm+2L2m2)(1−ρm),\frac{\mathrm{Var}[Q_t]}{\mathrm{Var}[D_t]} \;\ge\; 1 + \Big(\frac{2L}{m} + \frac{2L^2}{m^2}\Big)(1 - \rho^m),Var[Dt​]Var[Qt​]​≥1+(m2L​+m22L2​)(1−ρm),

with equality when zα=0z_\alpha = 0zα​=0. This is bullwhip_signal_processing. The bound exceeds 111 whenever L>0L > 0L>0, whatever the value of ρ\rhoρ: a lead time and a moving-average forecast are enough to produce the effect.

Supporting targets

The chapter's own route to the goal, each a milestone: the steady-state moments (13.2) to (13.4), E[Dt]=d/(1−ρ)\mathbb{E}[D_t] = d/(1-\rho)E[Dt​]=d/(1−ρ), Var[Dt]=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}[D_t] = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var[Dt​]=σ2/(1−ρ2) and Cov[Dt,Dt−k]=ρkVar[Dt]\mathrm{Cov}[D_t, D_{t-k}] = \rho^k \mathrm{Var}[D_t]Cov[Dt​,Dt−k​]=ρkVar[Dt​]; the identity Qt=(1+L/m)Dt−1−(L/m)Dt−m−1+zα(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L)Q_t = (1 + L/m) D_{t-1} - (L/m) D_{t-m-1} + z_\alpha(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})Qt​=(1+L/m)Dt−1​−(L/m)Dt−m−1​+zα​(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​); Lemma 13.1, Cov[Dt−i,σ^etL]=0\mathrm{Cov}[D_{t-i}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}] = 0Cov[Dt−i​,σ^etL​]=0 for 1≤i≤m1 \le i \le m1≤i≤m; the vanishing of the cross term (13.12); and the variance of the demand part, (1+(2L/m+2L2/m2)(1−ρm))Var[Dt]\big(1 + (2L/m + 2L^2/m^2)(1 - \rho^m)\big)\mathrm{Var}[D_t](1+(2L/m+2L2/m2)(1−ρm))Var[Dt​].

Order batching, Theorem 13.4: under the three patterns the supplier's order has mean NμN\muNμ and

Var[Qtc]≥Var[Qtr]≥Var[Qtb]≥Nσ2,\mathrm{Var}[Q^c_t] \ge \mathrm{Var}[Q^r_t] \ge \mathrm{Var}[Q^b_t] \ge N\sigma^2,Var[Qtc​]≥Var[Qtr​]≥Var[Qtb​]≥Nσ2,

through the three variance formulas Nσ2+μ2N(R−1)N\sigma^2 + \mu^2 N(R-1)Nσ2+μ2N(R−1), Nσ2+μ2N2(R−1)N\sigma^2 + \mu^2 N^2 (R-1)Nσ2+μ2N2(R−1) and Nσ2+μ2k(R−k)N\sigma^2 + \mu^2 k(R-k)Nσ2+μ2k(R−k).

The rationing game, Theorem 13.3: if Q>0Q > 0Q>0 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is, QQQ minimizes g1g_1g1​ over positive order quantities when the other retailer orders QQQ, then Q>Q∗Q > Q^*Q>Q∗.

Significance

The three theorems are the quantitative core of the chapter. Theorem 13.2 is the single-stage building block that Theorems 13.6 and 13.7 later iterate along a serial chain, giving the product-form and the exponential lower bounds on the amplification at stage kkk; its comparative statics, the bound decreasing in mmm and increasing in LLL, are the basis of the remedies the chapter recommends (shorter lead times, smoother forecasts, sharing point-of-sale data). Theorem 13.4 ranks the ordering patterns and justifies the advice to balance ordering days when batching cannot be avoided. Theorem 13.3 shows that pro-rata rationing alone inflates orders; the book is careful to note that inflated orders are not by themselves inflated variances, and that the variance statement for this model is due to Rong, Shen and Snyder (2017).

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book's proofs of Theorems 13.2 and 13.4 are complete but informal, and the proof of Lemma 13.1 is omitted with a citation to Ryan's 1997 thesis; formalizing it requires a self-contained argument. The variance decomposition of QtQ_tQt​ and the conditioning argument for Theorem 13.4 are reusable for the multistage results of Sect. 13.2.5, which are natural follow-up missions on the same definitions.

Difficulty

The obvious computation of Var[Qt]\mathrm{Var}[Q_t]Var[Qt​] expands the order into its demand part and its safety-stock part and hopes the cross term disappears. It does, but not for a reason visible in the formulas: σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ is a square root of a sum of squares of forecast errors, a nonlinear function of m+mm + mm+m demands, and its covariance with a single demand is zero only because the errors are jointly Gaussian with mean zero and σ^\hat\sigmaσ^ is an even function of them, so the covariance is the expectation of an odd function of a centred Gaussian vector. That is Lemma 13.1, and the vanishing of the cross term needs two further covariances, Cov[Dt−1,σ^e,t−1L]\mathrm{Cov}[D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1}]Cov[Dt−1​,σ^e,t−1L​] and Cov[Dt−m−1,σ^etL]\mathrm{Cov}[D_{t-m-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}]Cov[Dt−m−1​,σ^etL​], which the book reduces to the lemma through the recursion (the second reduction divides by ρ\rhoρ) but which hold for every ρ\rhoρ by the same symmetry. A solver must set up the joint Gaussian structure of the demand vector and prove the odd-function argument; nothing in Mathlib does this directly.

The second obstacle is that the moments (13.2) to (13.4) are not assumed but derived: the structure carries the stationary law of each DtD_tDt​ and the independence of ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ from the past, and the autocovariance ρkVar[Dt]\rho^k \mathrm{Var}[D_t]ρkVar[Dt​] has to be obtained from the recursion by induction on the lag, with integrability supplied by the Gaussian laws.

For Theorem 13.4 the work is the conditioning on XXX: given X=xX = xX=x the supplier's order is a sum of xRxRxR independent normals, so its conditional mean is xRμxR\muxRμ and conditional variance xRσ2xR\sigma^2xRσ2, and the total variance is E[Var[Q∣X]]+Var[E[Q∣X]]\mathbb{E}[\mathrm{Var}[Q \mid X]] + \mathrm{Var}[\mathbb{E}[Q \mid X]]E[Var[Q∣X]]+Var[E[Q∣X]]. The order is defined by a sum over retailers i<Xi < Xi<X, so the independence of XXX from the demands has to be used through the indicator structure rather than through a conditional-expectation library result.

For Theorem 13.3 the argument is a first-order condition. It requires that the newsvendor cost be differentiable with derivative (h+p)F(y)−p(h+p)F(y) - p(h+p)F(y)−p, which holds when FFF is continuous, and that the symmetric equilibrium be an interior minimizer, which is why Q>0Q > 0Q>0 and the minimization over Q1>0Q_1 > 0Q1​>0 are hypotheses.

Formalization scope

Time is indexed by Z\mathbb{Z}Z so that Dt−m−1D_{t-m-1}Dt−m−1​ exists for every ttt. AR1Demand asserts the recursion for every outcome, the independence of the whole error family, the independence of ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ from (Ds)s<t(D_s)_{s < t}(Ds​)s<t​, and the stationary law of every DtD_tDt​; these are the "steady-state" assumptions the book makes in words. The structure is satisfiable: the stationary Gaussian AR(1) process on a full-measure set of error sequences has all these properties. The constant CLρC_{L\rho}CLρ​ is a free real parameter CCC; no theorem depends on its value.

The goal divides by Var[Dt]\mathrm{Var}[D_t]Var[Dt​], which is σ2/(1−ρ2)>0\sigma^2/(1-\rho^2) > 0σ2/(1−ρ2)>0 under the structure's hypotheses σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0 and ∣ρ∣<1|\rho| < 1∣ρ∣<1, so the ratio is a genuine quotient. Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance and covariance are used; both are the ordinary real quantities for square-integrable variables, which every variable here is, σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ included.

In BatchOrders the demands are indexed by Fin N × Fin R, the count XXX is a natural-valued random variable bounded by NNN and independent of the demand family, and supplierOrder sums the RRR demands of retailers 1,…,X1, \dots, X1,…,X, the book's "without loss of generality" choice. The laws of XXX are hypotheses on point probabilities P.real {ω | X ω = j}; with R≥1R \ge 1R≥1 each of the three families of hypotheses is satisfiable by a structure with the corresponding law. The subtractions R−1R - 1R−1 and R−kR - kR−k are real.

In the rationing game the demand law is a probability measure on R\mathbb{R}R whose distribution function is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞); the newsvendor loss is assumed integrable at every order quantity. The pro-rata allocation uses Lean's total division, which is never at 000 in the theorem since Q1+Q2>0Q_1 + Q_2 > 0Q1​+Q2​>0.

Beyond the ten milestones, the multistage Theorems 13.6 and 13.7 and the centralized-information bound of Theorem 13.5 are welcome as extensions on the same AR1Demand.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan and S. Whang, Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect, Management Science 43(4), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan and D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the bullwhip effect in a simple supply chain: the impact of forecasting, lead times, and information, Management Science 46(3), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • G. P. Cachon, Managing supply chain demand variability with scheduled ordering policies, Management Science 45(6), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.6.843
  • Y. Rong, Z.-J. M. Shen and L. V. Snyder, The impact of ordering behavior on order-quantity variability: a study of forward and reverse bullwhip effects, Naval Research Logistics 64(1), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21757
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VI: Pooling and FlexibilityTextbook

Pooling as a design principle

A firm that holds inventory in five warehouses needs more safety stock than one that holds the same inventory in one warehouse, because the demands of five regions do not all run high at once. Eppen (1979) made this precise for a multi-location newsvendor and gave it its name, the risk-pooling effect. Chapter 7 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) follows the same idea through three settings in which pooling happens without physical consolidation: two retailers who ship stock to each other after seeing demand (transshipments, after Tagaras 1989), and plants that can each make more than one product (process flexibility, after Jordan and Graves 1995). The chapter's capstone is the theorem of Simchi-Levi and Wei (2012) that, among designs in which every plant makes two products and every product is made at two plants, a single long chain through all of them is best. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with that theorem as its goal.

Setting

Risk pooling. NNN distribution centers face normally distributed per-period demands Di∼N(μi,σi2)D_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)Di​∼N(μi​,σi2​) with correlation coefficients ρij\rho_{ij}ρij​, and each runs a base-stock policy with holding cost hhh and backorder cost ppp per unit per period, so its optimal expected cost is the optimal newsvendor cost optNvCost h p D, the infimum over base-stock levels SSS of E[h(S−D)++p(D−S)+]\mathbb{E}[h(S - D)^+ + p(D - S)^+]E[h(S−D)++p(D−S)+]. Merging the centers gives one facing the total demand, normal with mean ∑iμi\sum_i \mu_i∑i​μi​ and variance σ02=∑i∑jσiσjρij\sigma_0^2 = \sum_i \sum_j \sigma_i \sigma_j \rho_{ij}σ02​=∑i​∑j​σi​σj​ρij​ (pooledVariance).

Transshipments. Two retailers i,ji, ji,j with base-stock levels Si,SjS_i, S_jSi​,Sj​ face independent demands. After demand is observed, under complete pooling the retailer with a surplus sends the retailer with a shortage Yji=min⁡{Sj−Dj, Di−Si}Y_{ji} = \min\{S_j - D_j,\ D_i - S_i\}Yji​=min{Sj​−Dj​, Di​−Si​} units (transship), and nothing moves otherwise. The type-1 service level is the probability of no stockout, αi0=Pr⁡[Di≤Si]\alpha^0_i = \Pr[D_i \le S_i]αi0​=Pr[Di​≤Si​] without and αi=Pr⁡[Di−Si≤Yji]\alpha_i = \Pr[D_i - S_i \le Y_{ji}]αi​=Pr[Di​−Si​≤Yji​] with transshipments; the type-2 service level is the fill rate, one minus expected unmet demand over expected demand, βi0\beta^0_iβi0​ and βi\beta_iβi​ likewise.

Process flexibility. A flexibility design on nnn products and nnn plants is a set EEE of (product, plant) pairs, an edge (i,j)(i, j)(i,j) meaning plant jjj can make product iii. Given a demand realization ddd and a common plant capacity CCC, the performance P(d,E)P(d, E)P(d,E) (perf) is the maximum sales obtainable by assigning production along the edges of EEE without exceeding any capacity or demand, the linear program (7.22) to (7.26). A balanced system (BalancedSystem) has equal capacities and an exchangeable demand vector, one whose joint law is invariant under permutations of the products, and [E]=E[P(D,E)][E] = \mathbb{E}[P(D, E)][E]=E[P(D,E)] is the expected performance (expPerf). The named designs are the dedicated design Dn={(i,i)}D_n = \{(i, i)\}Dn​={(i,i)}, the long chain CnC_nCn​ in which plant jjj also makes product j+1j + 1j+1 (and plant nnn makes product 111), the open chain LkL_kLk​ obtained from CkC_kCk​ by deleting the edge (1,k)(1, k)(1,k), and LknL^n_kLkn​, the open chain on the first kkk pairs together with the dedicated edges of the rest. A 2-flexibility design (TwoFlex) is one in which every product has exactly two plants and every plant exactly two products; CnC_nCn​ is one, and so is any union of disjoint shorter chains.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.9

For a balanced system of size n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 with exchangeable demand,

Cn∈arg⁡max⁡A∈F2[A],C_n \in \arg\max_{A \in \mathcal{F}_2} [A],Cn​∈argA∈F2​max​[A],

that is, CnC_nCn​ is a 2-flexibility design and [A]≤[Cn][A] \le [C_n][A]≤[Cn​] for every 2-flexibility design AAA. This is long_chain_optimal.

Supporting targets

The chapter's route to the goal: Lemma 7.5, supermodularity of sales in the flexible edges of the long chain for every realization, P(d,E)+P(d,E∖{α,β})≥P(d,E∖{α})+P(d,E∖{β})P(d, E) + P(d, E \setminus \{\alpha, \beta\}) \ge P(d, E \setminus \{\alpha\}) + P(d, E \setminus \{\beta\})P(d,E)+P(d,E∖{α,β})≥P(d,E∖{α})+P(d,E∖{β}) for E⊆CnE \subseteq C_nE⊆Cn​; Corollary 7.6, the same in expectation; Lemma 7.7, the increments [Lk+1n]−[Lkn][L^n_{k+1}] - [L^n_k][Lk+1n​]−[Lkn​] are nondecreasing in kkk, ending with [Cn]−[Lnn][C_n] - [L^n_n][Cn​]−[Lnn​]; and Lemma 7.8, [Cn]=n([Ln]−[Ln−1])[C_n] = n([L_n] - [L_{n-1}])[Cn​]=n([Ln​]−[Ln−1​]).

Risk pooling, Theorem 7.1: gC∗≤gD∗g^*_C \le g^*_DgC∗​≤gD∗​, the optimal cost of the merged center is at most the sum of the optimal costs of the separate ones, with the covariance inequality ∑i∑jσiσjρij≤∑iσi\sqrt{\sum_i\sum_j \sigma_i\sigma_j\rho_{ij}} \le \sum_i \sigma_i∑i​∑j​σi​σj​ρij​​≤∑i​σi​ as a separate lemma.

Transshipments, Theorems 7.2 to 7.4: αi=αi0+∣∂E[Yji]/∂Si∣\alpha_i = \alpha^0_i + |\partial\mathbb{E}[Y_{ji}]/\partial S_i|αi​=αi0​+∣∂E[Yji​]/∂Si​∣, βi=βi0+E[Yji]/E[Di]\beta_i = \beta^0_i + \mathbb{E}[Y_{ji}]/\mathbb{E}[D_i]βi​=βi0​+E[Yji​]/E[Di​], and all four post-transshipment service levels are nondecreasing in SiS_iSi​.

Significance

Theorem 7.9 is the analytical answer to a question that had been settled only by simulation: Jordan and Graves reported that one chain through all plants achieves nearly twice the sales benefit of three short chains with the same number of edges, and Simchi-Levi and Wei proved that no arrangement of the same edge budget does better. It is the justification for the chaining guideline used in automotive and semiconductor capacity planning, and Lemma 7.8, which expresses the long chain through open chains, is what makes the long chain's performance computable by a greedy pass. Theorem 7.1 is the quantitative basis for consolidation decisions and for postponement, since a generic product is pooled inventory. Theorems 7.2 to 7.4 quantify what transshipments buy in service, which is the argument for allowing them despite their cost.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Lemma 7.7, Lemma 7.8 and Theorem 7.9 in full given Lemma 7.5, which it cites to Simchi-Levi and Wei, and omits the proofs of Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 and the identity (7.30) behind Lemma 7.8. Formalizing Lemma 7.5 and (7.30) means formalizing the structure of maximum flows on a cycle, which is reusable for the later results of Simchi-Levi and Wei on the long chain's performance relative to full flexibility and for the multi-echelon flexibility models the chapter cites.

Difficulty

The obvious approach to Theorem 7.9 is to compare CnC_nCn​ with an arbitrary 2-flexibility design directly. Nothing in the definitions supports that: the two designs share no structure beyond their degree sequences. The book's argument instead routes everything through the long chain's own edges. Lemma 7.5 gives supermodularity only for subsets of CnC_nCn​, and the decomposition of an arbitrary 2-flexibility design into disjoint cycles, each a relabeled long chain on a subsystem, is what allows the comparison. A solver must therefore prove that a 2-regular bipartite graph is a disjoint union of even cycles, that exchangeability makes every relabeling of a cycle worth the same as CnjC_{n_j}Cnj​​ on its subsystem, and that the performance of a disjoint union is the sum of the performances of its parts.

Lemma 7.5 itself is where the combinatorics lives. It says that on the cycle CnC_nCn​ the maximum flow is supermodular in the flexible edges, and the proof in Simchi-Levi and Wei goes through the structure of augmenting paths on a cycle. The natural first idea, that supermodularity follows from some general property of maximum flows, is false: maximum flow is not supermodular in arbitrary edge sets, and the lemma is specific to subsets of a single cycle.

Lemma 7.7 is where exchangeability is used, and it is used in a way that is easy to state and tedious to formalize: removing the edge (2,1)(2, 1)(2,1) from Lk+1nL^n_{k+1}Lk+1n​ leaves a design that is LknL^n_kLkn​ only after the pair 111 is moved to the end, so the argument needs the invariance of [E][E][E] under relabeling the products and plants by a common permutation. The book notes that Lemma 7.7, unlike Lemma 7.5, is false realization by realization.

For the transshipment theorems, the book differentiates a density formula by Leibniz's rule. Under the weaker hypothesis stated here, laws without atoms and with finite means, the derivative of E[Yji]\mathbb{E}[Y_{ji}]E[Yji​] in SiS_iSi​ has to be obtained by dominated convergence from the pointwise derivative of a piecewise-linear function whose kinks lie on null sets.

Formalization scope

perf is a supremum over a set of reals, nonempty because y=0y = 0y=0 is feasible when d≥0d \ge 0d≥0 and C≥0C \ge 0C≥0, and bounded by ∑idi\sum_i d_i∑i​di​; the demand is nonnegative for every outcome and the capacity nonnegative in BalancedSystem, and Lemma 7.5 carries these as hypotheses. The supremum is attained, but the definition does not assert it. Expected performance is a Lebesgue integral; the demand is integrable by assumption and P(d,E)P(d, E)P(d,E) is 111-Lipschitz in ddd, so the integrand is integrable, and a solver must prove this measurability rather than assume it.

Exchangeability is the equality of the laws of (Dσ(i))i(D_{\sigma(i)})_i(Dσ(i)​)i​ and (Di)i(D_i)_i(Di​)i​ for every permutation σ\sigmaσ. Designs are finite sets of pairs of Fin n; the chains are defined with finRotate, so indices wrap modulo nnn and the closing edge of CnC_nCn​ is (1,n)(1, n)(1,n) in the book's numbering, which is the edge its proofs and Figure 7.3(c) use. Lemma 7.8 involves open chains on subsystems of sizes nnn and n−1n - 1n−1; these are designs on Fin k evaluated on the first kkk coordinates of the demand (subDemand, subPerf).

Theorem 7.1 states the optimal costs as infima of the newsvendor cost over all base-stock levels, on Mathlib's gaussianReal; a nonpositive pooled variance gives a degenerate law, for which the inequality still holds, so the statement is not trivialized by that convention. The transshipment theorems take the two demand laws as probability measures on R\mathbb{R}R with no atoms (Theorem 7.2) and finite, positive means; the quantity YjiY_{ji}Yji​ is defined for all outcomes and the service levels are probabilities and expectations under the product law.

The definition module is shared by all eleven items. Beyond the milestones, formalizing the identity (7.30) as its own lemma and the disjoint-union additivity of perf would be natural contributions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 7. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • G. D. Eppen, Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem, Management Science 25(5), 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
  • G. Tagaras, Effects of pooling on the optimization and service levels of two-location inventory systems, IIE Transactions 21(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1080/07408178908966208
  • W. C. Jordan and S. C. Graves, Principles on the benefits of manufacturing process flexibility, Management Science 41(4), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.4.577
  • D. Simchi-Levi and Y. Wei, Understanding the performance of the long chain and sparse designs in process flexibility, Operations Research 60(5), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1082
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Inventory Control VII: Multi-Echelon Lot Sizing and Roundy's 98 % ApproximationTextbook

Batch quantities that cannot be chosen one site at a time

Chapter 9 of Axsäter's Inventory Control opens with the observation that in a multi-echelon system it is not optimal to choose batch quantities installation by installation: the batch at one site is the demand pattern of the next site upstream. Even with constant customer demand the exact optimum can be complicated, and the book's Example 9.4 shows a four-stage serial system whose optimal batch at one stage alternates between two values over time. Roundy (1985, 1986) showed that this complexity can be avoided at a guaranteed price: restrict every batch quantity to be a power of two times a common basic quantity, nested from stage to stage, and the best such policy costs at most 2 % more than the optimum. The book presents the result for a serial system and remarks that the same approach handles assembly and distribution systems and, in Sect. 7.3.1.2, joint replenishments. It is the capstone of Chapter 9 and the multi-echelon payoff of the powers-of-two analysis of Chapter 7.

Setting

A serial system has NNN installations; installation iii produces item iii from one unit of item i+1i+1i+1, item NNN is obtained from an outside supplier, and item 1 faces a constant, continuous final demand ddd. Lead-times are zero, shortages are not allowed, production is instantaneous, and each batch quantity QiQ_iQi​ is constant over time. Installation iii has an ordering cost AiA_iAi​ per batch and an echelon holding cost eie_iei​ per unit and time unit, charged on the echelon stock (the stock at installation iii and everything downstream), so that the cost per time unit is the sum of NNN single-item costs of the chapter 4 form,

C(Q)  =  ∑i=1N(eiQi2+AidQi)(Eq. 9.17).C(Q) \;=\; \sum_{i=1}^{N}\Big(e_i\frac{Q_i}{2} + A_i\frac{d}{Q_i}\Big) \qquad\text{(Eq. 9.17).}C(Q)=i=1∑N​(ei​2Qi​​+Ai​Qi​d​)(Eq. 9.17).

The book first works out the two-level case, where the optimum has Q2=kQ1Q_2 = kQ_1Q2​=kQ1​ for a positive integer kkk, the cost (9.9) is the EOQ cost with modified parameters A1+A2/kA_1 + A_2/kA1​+A2​/k and e1+ke2e_1 + ke_2e1​+ke2​, and the best kkk is found from k∗=A2e1/(A1e2)k^{*} = \sqrt{A_2e_1/(A_1e_2)}k∗=A2​e1​/(A1​e2​)​ by a rounding rule.

For NNN stages, Roundy's constraints (9.16) require Qi=2kiQi−1Q_i = 2^{k_i}Q_{i-1}Qi​=2ki​Qi−1​ with nonnegative integers kik_iki​, so that every solution is nested. The relaxed constraints (9.18) require only Qi−1≤QiQ_{i-1} \le Q_iQi−1​≤Qi​; they are implied by (9.16), the relaxed problem is convex with linear constraints, and its solution QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel is computed by aggregating consecutive stages whose cost ratios Ai/eiA_i/e_iAi​/ei​ decrease. Roundy's solution rounds QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel to Qi=2miqQ_i = 2^{m_i}qQi​=2mi​q for a basic quantity qqq, chosen as in Proposition 7.2.

Formalization targets

Goal — Roundy's 98 % approximation

For d>0d > 0d>0, Ai>0A_i > 0Ai​>0, ei>0e_i > 0ei​>0 and any minimizer QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel of CCC over positive batch quantities satisfying (9.18), there exist q>0q > 0q>0 and integers m1≤⋯≤mNm_1 \le \dots \le m_Nm1​≤⋯≤mN​ such that Qi=2miqQ_i = 2^{m_i}qQi​=2mi​q satisfies (9.16) and

C(2mq)  ≤  12 ln⁡2 C(Qrel).C\big(2^{m}q\big) \;\le\; \frac{1}{\sqrt 2\,\ln 2}\,C\big(Q^{\mathrm{rel}}\big).C(2mq)≤2​ln21​C(Qrel).

Supporting targets

The two-level results of Sect. 9.2.1: the equivalence of the installation and echelon cost forms (9.6) and (9.9); the optimal Q1Q_1Q1​ and cost (9.10)-(9.11) for a given kkk; the closed form and convexity of C(k)2C(k)^2C(k)2 (9.12) and the real minimizer k∗k^{*}k∗ (9.13); and the integer rounding rule with its corollary that A1/e1≥A2/e2A_1/e_1 \ge A_2/e_2A1​/e1​≥A2​/e2​ forces k=1k = 1k=1. For NNN stages: existence of the relaxed optimum; the aggregation lemma, that Ai/ei<Ai−1/ei−1A_i/e_i < A_{i-1}/e_{i-1}Ai​/ei​<Ai−1​/ei−1​ forces Qirel=Qi−1relQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_i = Q^{\mathrm{rel}}_{i-1}Qirel​=Qi−1rel​; that (9.16) implies (9.18), so the relaxed optimum bounds every powers-of-two policy from below; and that rounding to the nearest power of two times qqq is monotone and lands within a factor 2\sqrt 22​.

Significance

The result itself. Roundy's theorem replaces an intractable lot-sizing problem by a closed-form computation with a provable 2 % guarantee, and the policies it produces are the nested, periodic schedules that production planning wants anyway. In Example 9.4 the rounding with q=1q = 1q=1 is already within 0.7 % of the relaxed bound. The two-level analysis has its own use: the modified parameters A1+A2/kA_1 + A_2/kA1​+A2​/k and e1+ke2e_1 + ke_2e1​+ke2​ are what the Blackburn-Millen heuristic of Sect. 9.3.2 feeds to the Wagner-Whitin algorithm under time-varying demand, and the condition A1/e1≥A2/e2A_1/e_1 \ge A_2/e_2A1​/e1​≥A2​/e2​ tells when a two-stage system collapses to one stage.

Formalizing it. The book proves the bound in a paragraph that leans on three earlier results: Proposition 7.2 for the rounding, the Lagrangean relaxation for the lower bound, and the aggregation algorithm for the structure of QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel. Formalizing it makes explicit what the paragraph glosses: that the multipliers vanish off tight constraints, that equal quantities round to equal quantities, and that the comparison class is the class of nested constant-batch policies. The published Proposition 7.2 (pot_two_percent) and the mean value 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(\sqrt 2\ln 2)1/(2​ln2) are cited as reference items. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, rounding QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel item by item and invoking Proposition 7.2 for each, does not work: Proposition 7.2 bounds the rounded cost relative to each item's unconstrained optimum, and QirelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_iQirel​ is generally not that optimum. The proof must pass through the Lagrangean relaxation (9.19)-(9.20), under which QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel is the unconstrained optimum for the modified holding costs ei′=ei−2λi+2λi+1e_i' = e_i - 2\lambda_i + 2\lambda_{i+1}ei′​=ei​−2λi​+2λi+1​, apply Proposition 7.2 there, and transfer the bound back using complementary slackness: the multiplier λi\lambda_iλi​ is positive only where Qirel=Qi−1relQ^{\mathrm{rel}}_i = Q^{\mathrm{rel}}_{i-1}Qirel​=Qi−1rel​, and equal quantities round to equal quantities, so the correction terms λi(Qi−Qi−1)\lambda_i(Q_i - Q_{i-1})λi​(Qi​−Qi−1​) vanish for both QrelQ^{\mathrm{rel}}Qrel and its rounding. A solver therefore needs the KKT conditions for this convex program, or an equivalent direct argument through the aggregation structure (within an aggregate all quantities are equal and their sum is an EOQ problem). The two-level statements and the rounding lemma are elementary.

Formalization scope

Stages are indexed by Fin N; the cost is serialCost A e d Q = ∑ i, eoqCost (A i) d (e i) (Q i) with eoqCost imported from the chapter 4 definitions, and the two-level cost is eoqCost (A1 + A2/k) d (e1 + k e2) Q1 by definition, so the published eoq_optimal and eoq_cost_at_eoq apply to it directly. SerialNested and SerialPowerOfTwo are the constraints (9.18) and (9.16) on consecutive indices; for N≤1N \le 1N≤1 both hold vacuously and the goal is Proposition 7.2 for one item. potRound q Q is ⌊log⁡2(Q/q)+12⌋\lfloor \log_2(Q/q) + \tfrac12\rfloor⌊log2​(Q/q)+21​⌋.

All theorems assume d,Ai,ei>0d, A_i, e_i > 0d,Ai​,ei​>0 and positive batch quantities. The book says "nonnegative ordering and echelon holding costs"; strict positivity is needed for the relaxed problem to have a solution at all (ei=0e_i = 0ei​=0 or Ai=0A_i = 0Ai​=0 sends the optimal QiQ_iQi​ to ∞\infty∞ or 000), and it is what the book's own examples satisfy. The relaxed optimum enters the goal as a hypothesis, with existence stated separately; uniqueness is not used. The constant is the exact 1/(2ln⁡2)1/(\sqrt 2\ln 2)1/(2​ln2).

Two readings are excluded. The bound is not against an arbitrary nested QQQ, for which it would be false, but against the relaxed optimum; and the comparison class is stated as nested constant-batch policies, the class the relaxed problem bounds directly, not the book's larger class of time-varying policies, which would need a dynamic model. The definitions are reusable for assembly systems and for the joint replenishment problem of Sect. 7.3.1.2, whose Roundy analysis is the same with a fictive item 0 of zero holding cost; contributions in that direction are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sect. 9.2. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Robin Roundy, 98%-Effective Integer-Ratio Lot-Sizing for One-Warehouse Multi-Retailer Systems, Management Science 31(11), 1985, pp. 1416-1430. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1416
  • Robin Roundy, A 98%-Effective Lot-Sizing Rule for a Multi-Product, Multi-Stage Production/Inventory System, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(4), 1986, pp. 699-727. DOI 10.1287/moor.11.4.699
  • John A. Muckstadt and Robin O. Roundy, Analysis of Multistage Production Systems, in: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 4, Elsevier, 1993, pp. 59-131. DOI 10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80182-4
  • Peter L. Jackson, William L. Maxwell and John A. Muckstadt, The Joint Replenishment Problem with a Powers-of-Two Restriction, IIE Transactions 17(1), 1985, pp. 25-32. DOI 10.1080/07408178508975268
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VII: Multiechelon Inventory ModelsTextbook

One stage at a time

A serial supply chain is the simplest multiechelon system: a retailer orders from a warehouse, which orders from a plant, which orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock. Only the retailer sees customer demand, only the retailer pays a stockout penalty, and every stage pays to hold inventory. Choosing how much each stage should hold looks like a joint optimization over all stages at once, because an upstream stockout delays every downstream replenishment. Clark and Scarf (1960) showed that it is not: measured in echelon terms, the optimal policy is a base-stock policy at every stage, and the optimal levels can be found one stage at a time from the customer upward, each step a single-variable convex minimization. Chapter 6 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) presents the infinite-horizon form of that result as its Theorem 6.3, the bounds of Shang and Song (2003) that make the levels cheap to approximate, and the contrasting guaranteed-service model of Graves and Willems (2000), in which stages quote delivery times rather than fill rates and the optimal safety stocks are all-or-nothing. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with Theorem 6.3 as its goal.

Setting

Stages are numbered 1,…,N1, \dots, N1,…,N from the customer upward. Stage jjj has a local holding cost hj′h'_jhj′​ per unit per period; its echelon holding cost is hj=hj′−hj+1′h_j = h'_j - h'_{j+1}hj​=hj′​−hj+1′​ with hN+1′=0h'_{N+1} = 0hN+1′​=0, so that hj′=∑i≥jhih'_j = \sum_{i \ge j} h_ihj′​=∑i≥j​hi​ (localHolding, echelonHolding). Stage jjj's echelon consists of stages j,j−1,…,1j, j-1, \dots, 1j,j−1,…,1, and its echelon on-hand inventory IjI_jIj​ (echelonOnHand) is all on-hand and in-transit stock in that echelon. Stage 1 pays a stockout cost ppp per unit per period. Orders placed by stage jjj arrive after a lead time LjL_jLj​ if stage j+1j+1j+1 can ship them; DjD_jDj​ denotes the lead-time demand at stage jjj.

An echelon base-stock policy gives each stage a level SjS_jSj​ and orders to keep its echelon inventory position at SjS_jSj​. The chapter derives, from conservation of flow, a recursion that evaluates the expected cost of any echelon base-stock vector SSS (csBar, csHat, csG):

gˉ0(x)=(p+h1′)x−,g^j(x)=hjx+gˉj−1(x),gj(y)=E[g^j(y−Dj)],gˉj(x)=gj(min⁡{Sj,x}),\bar g_0(x) = (p + h'_1)x^-, \qquad \hat g_j(x) = h_j x + \bar g_{j-1}(x), \qquad g_j(y) = \mathbb{E}[\hat g_j(y - D_j)], \qquad \bar g_j(x) = g_j(\min\{S_j, x\}),gˉ​0​(x)=(p+h1′​)x−,g^​j​(x)=hj​x+gˉ​j−1​(x),gj​(y)=E[g^​j​(y−Dj​)],gˉ​j​(x)=gj​(min{Sj​,x}),

and the expected cost of the system under SSS is gN(SN)g_N(S_N)gN​(SN​). The term gˉj\bar g_jgˉ​j​ is the implicit penalty function: it charges stage j+1j+1j+1 for the downstream consequences of running short. A vector is sequentially optimal (CSSequential) when each SjS_jSj​ minimizes gjg_jgj​, which depends only on S1,…,Sj−1S_1, \dots, S_{j-1}S1​,…,Sj−1​.

The Shang-Song bounds compare gjg_jgj​ with the cost of the jjj-stage truncated system when all its local holding costs are set to one value, hjh_jhj​ for the lower bound and ∑k≤jhk\sum_{k \le j} h_k∑k≤j​hk​ for the upper (ssLower, ssUpper). With equal holding costs all stock is held at stage 1, so each bound is a single-stage newsvendor cost for the demand D~j=D1+⋯+Dj\tilde D_j = D_1 + \dots + D_jD~j​=D1​+⋯+Dj​ over the cumulative lead time (tildeLaw) with stockout cost p+hj+1′p + h'_{j+1}p+hj+1′​, plus the holding cost of the stock in transit to stages 1,…,j−11, \dots, j-11,…,j−1, whose mean is E[D1]+⋯+E[Dj−1]\mathbb{E}[D_1] + \dots + \mathbb{E}[D_{j-1}]E[D1​]+⋯+E[Dj−1​] (pipelineMean).

In the guaranteed-service model each stage iii has a processing time TiT_iTi​, quotes a committed service time SiS_iSi​ to its customer, and receives an inbound time SIi=Si+1SI_i = S_{i+1}SIi​=Si+1​ from its supplier (gsInbound), SINSI_NSIN​ being external. Demand is bounded, so the stage can meet every order within SiS_iSi​ by holding safety stock kSIi+Ti−Sik\sqrt{SI_i + T_i - S_i}kSIi​+Ti​−Si​​ with k=zασk = z_\alpha\sigmak=zα​σ, and the holding cost is g(S)=∑ihikSIi+Ti−Sig(S) = \sum_i h_i k \sqrt{SI_i + T_i - S_i}g(S)=∑i​hi​kSIi​+Ti​−Si​​ (gsCost) over the feasible times 0≤Si≤SIi+Ti0 \le S_i \le SI_i + T_i0≤Si​≤SIi​+Ti​ (GSFeasible).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.3

For echelon holding costs hj≥0h_j \ge 0hj​≥0, stockout cost p≥0p \ge 0p≥0 and lead-time demands of finite mean, if S∗S^*S∗ is sequentially optimal then for every echelon base-stock vector SSS,

gN(SN∗∣S∗)  ≤  gN(SN∣S),g_N(S^*_N \mid S^*) \;\le\; g_N(S_N \mid S),gN​(SN∗​∣S∗)≤gN​(SN​∣S),

and gN(SN∗∣S∗)g_N(S^*_N \mid S^*)gN​(SN∗​∣S∗) is the optimal cost. This is clark_scarf_sequential.

Supporting targets

Proposition 6.1, ∑jhjIj=∑jhj′(Ij′+ITj−1)\sum_j h_j I_j = \sum_j h'_j (I'_j + IT_{j-1})∑j​hj​Ij​=∑j​hj′​(Ij′​+ITj−1​); the stage-1 identities (6.29) and (6.30), that g1g_1g1​ is a newsvendor cost with penalty p+h2′p + h'_2p+h2′​ and its minimizer solves F1(S1∗)=(p+h2′)/(h1+p+h2′)F_1(S^*_1) = (p + h'_2)/(h_1 + p + h'_2)F1​(S1∗​)=(p+h2′​)/(h1​+p+h2′​); convexity of every gjg_jgj​ under sequential optimality; existence of a sequentially optimal vector when hj>0h_j > 0hj​>0 and p>0p > 0p>0; Theorem 6.4, gjl≤gj≤gjug^l_j \le g_j \le g^u_jgjl​≤gj​≤gju​, and Sjl≤Sj∗≤SjuS^l_j \le S^*_j \le S^u_jSjl​≤Sj∗​≤Sju​ where SjuS^u_jSju​ minimizes gjlg^l_jgjl​ and SjlS^l_jSjl​ minimizes gjug^u_jgju​ (the book's pairing, p. 200); and Theorem 6.5, that in the guaranteed-service serial system with s1=0s_1 = 0s1​=0 every optimal Si∗S^*_iSi∗​ is 000 or Si+1∗+TiS^*_{i+1} + T_iSi+1∗​+Ti​.

Theorem 6.2, the optimality of echelon base-stock policies among all policies, is stated in the book without a model of the policy space and is not a target here; Theorem 6.3 is the optimization it licenses.

Significance

Theorem 6.3 is what Zipkin calls the fundamental equations of supply chain theory. It reduces a joint optimization over NNN coupled levels to NNN one-dimensional convex problems, and every exact method and most heuristics for serial and assembly systems, Rosling's reduction of assembly systems to serial ones included, run through it. Theorem 6.4 turns the recursion into closed-form bounds and the Shang-Song heuristic, which the book reports as accurate to within a fraction of a percent. Theorem 6.5 explains the shape of optimal safety stock placement under guaranteed service and why its dynamic program only needs to examine endpoints.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves none of them in full: Theorem 6.3 is asserted after an informal derivation, Theorem 6.4 is cited, and Proposition 6.1 and Theorem 6.5 are left as exercises. Formalizing the recursion's convexity and the exchange argument behind Theorem 6.3 produces a reusable treatment of the implicit penalty function; the concavity-on-a-polytope argument for Theorem 6.5 is reusable for the tree systems of Sect. 6.3.5.

Difficulty

The obvious attack on Theorem 6.3, differentiating the system cost in each SjS_jSj​, fails immediately: the cost depends on SjS_jSj​ through min⁡{Sj,x}\min\{S_j, x\}min{Sj​,x} inside nested expectations and is not convex in SSS jointly. The argument that works is an induction along the recursion, comparing gj(⋅∣S)g_j(\cdot \mid S)gj​(⋅∣S) with gj(⋅∣S∗)g_j(\cdot \mid S^*)gj​(⋅∣S∗) pointwise. Its key step is that, for the convex gj(⋅∣S∗)g_j(\cdot \mid S^*)gj​(⋅∣S∗) minimized at Sj∗S^*_jSj∗​, the value gj(min⁡{Sj∗,x})g_j(\min\{S^*_j, x\})gj​(min{Sj∗​,x}) is the least value of gjg_jgj​ on (−∞,x](-\infty, x](−∞,x], so that any other truncation point can only cost more. That step needs convexity of gj(⋅∣S∗)g_j(\cdot \mid S^*)gj​(⋅∣S∗), which needs gˉj−1(⋅∣S∗)\bar g_{j-1}(\cdot \mid S^*)gˉ​j−1​(⋅∣S∗) convex, which needs Sj−1∗S^*_{j-1}Sj−1∗​ to be a minimizer; for an arbitrary SSS the functions gˉj(⋅∣S)\bar g_j(\cdot \mid S)gˉ​j​(⋅∣S) are not convex, and the induction must carry both vectors at once.

Integrability is a second, silent obstacle. Each gjg_jgj​ is an expectation of translates of g^j\hat g_jg^​j​; the recursion preserves Lipschitz continuity with a constant growing with the costs, and finite means are exactly what make every integral in the recursion a genuine expectation rather than Lean's default value zero.

Theorem 6.4 requires relating the recursion, in which demands enter one stage at a time, to a single newsvendor cost in the sum D~j\tilde D_jD~j​, which is a convolution; the inequalities come from the structure of (6.31) in the two extreme holding-cost profiles and are not obvious from the recursion's formulas. Theorem 6.5 is a statement about every minimizer, not the existence of an extreme one, so the proof must show the cost is strictly concave along every feasible direction that changes a net lead time and then classify the vertices of the feasible region.

Formalization scope

Stages are indexed by natural numbers 1,…,N1, \dots, N1,…,N; the cost functions take total functions on N\mathbb{N}N and never read values outside that range. The recursion is defined for every vector SSS, so the theorem compares values of one family of functions rather than a separately defined system cost; the identification of gN(SN∣S)g_N(S_N \mid S)gN​(SN​∣S) with the steady-state expected cost of the physical system is the book's derivation and is not restated. Expectations are Lebesgue integrals under the lead-time demand laws, assumed to be probability measures on R\mathbb{R}R with finite means. Sequential optimality is a hypothesis of the goal; a separate target shows it is satisfiable when hj>0h_j > 0hj​>0 and p>0p > 0p>0, so the goal is not vacuous.

The bounding functions of Theorem 6.4 keep the holding cost of pipeline stock that the truncated cost (6.31) charges. The book omits that constant when it writes their minimizers, which it does not affect, but part (a) compares values, and without the constant the upper bound fails already in the book's own Example 6.1. For part (b) the minimizers of the bounding functions are asserted to exist and to bracket Sj∗S^*_jSj∗​; when the fractiles of D~j\tilde D_jD~j​ are unique these are the book's quantile values. Theorem 6.5 is stated over real service times; because the feasible region's vertices are integral when the data are, every integer-optimal vector is optimal over the reals, so the real statement contains the book's integer program (6.38) to (6.42). Proposition 6.1 is stated with IT0=0IT_0 = 0IT0​=0 built into the echelon sum.

The definition module is shared by all nine items. The dynamic program (6.43) to (6.44) for guaranteed-service serial systems and the tree-system algorithm of Sect. 6.3.6 are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 6. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem, Management Science 6(4), 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
  • K. H. Shang and J.-S. Song, Newsvendor bounds and heuristic for optimal policies in serial supply chains, Management Science 49(5), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.5.618.15147
  • S. C. Graves and S. P. Willems, Optimizing strategic safety stock placement in supply chains, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(1), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2.1.68.23267
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Inventory Control VIII: The Clark-Scarf Decomposition for a Serial SystemTextbook

Safety stock in a chain

Chapter 10 of Axsäter's Inventory Control turns to reorder points and safety stocks in multi-echelon systems, where the installations cannot be treated separately: a large stock downstream lets an upstream site run lean, and a long upstream lead-time argues for stock at the top. The best-known exact technique for serial systems is the decomposition of Clark and Scarf (1960), which the book presents in the infinite-horizon form of Federgruen and Zipkin (1984). It is also where the echelon stock measure comes from. The section's argument is short and self-contained, and its conclusion is a complete description of the optimal policy for a two-level serial system: order-up-to levels at both installations, one of them a newsboy solution, the other the minimizer of a convex function in which upstream shortages appear as an induced cost. It is the capstone of Chapter 10.

Setting

Installation 1 faces normally distributed period demand with mean μ\muμ and standard deviation σ\sigmaσ, independent across periods, so the demand over nnn periods, D(n)D(n)D(n), is normal with mean nμn\munμ and standard deviation n σ\sqrt n\,\sigman​σ. Installation 1 replenishes from installation 2 with lead-time L1L_1L1​ periods; installation 2 replenishes from an outside supplier with infinite supply and lead-time L2L_2L2​. Demand that cannot be met is backordered. Costs per unit and period are echelon holding costs e1,e2≥0e_1, e_2 \ge 0e1​,e2​≥0, so the installation holding costs are h1=e1+e2h_1 = e_1 + e_2h1​=e1​+e2​ and h2=e2h_2 = e_2h2​=e2​, and a shortage cost b1b_1b1​ at installation 1; there are no ordering costs. Events in a period occur in the order: installation 2 orders, its delivery arrives, installation 1 orders, its delivery arrives, demand, cost evaluation.

Consider an arbitrary period ttt. After ordering, installation 2 has an echelon inventory position y2y_2y2​, and by the standard argument its echelon stock in period t+L2t + L_2t+L2​ is y2−D(L2)y_2 - D(L_2)y2​−D(L2​). Installation 1 then orders, realizing an echelon position y1y_1y1​ that cannot exceed what is available: y1≤y2−D(L2)y_1 \le y_2 - D(L_2)y1​≤y2​−D(L2​) (Eq. 10.1). Its inventory level after the demand in period t+L2+L1t + L_2 + L_1t+L2​+L1​ is y1−D(L1+1)y_1 - D(L_1+1)y1​−D(L1​+1). The expected period costs are C2=h2 E(y2−D(L2)−y1)C_2 = h_2\,\mathbb{E}(y_2 - D(L_2) - y_1)C2​=h2​E(y2​−D(L2​)−y1​) at installation 2 and C1=h1 E(y1−D(L1+1))++b1 E(y1−D(L1+1))−C_1 = h_1\,\mathbb{E}(y_1 - D(L_1+1))^{+} + b_1\,\mathbb{E}(y_1 - D(L_1+1))^{-}C1​=h1​E(y1​−D(L1​+1))++b1​E(y1​−D(L1​+1))− at installation 1, and the book reallocates the term −h2y1-h_2y_1−h2​y1​ to obtain

C~2(y2)=h2(y2−μ2′),C~1(y1)=e1y1−h1μ1′′+(h1+b1) E(y1−D(L1+1))−,\tilde C_2(y_2) = h_2(y_2 - \mu_2'), \qquad \tilde C_1(y_1) = e_1y_1 - h_1\mu_1'' + (h_1 + b_1)\,\mathbb{E}\big(y_1 - D(L_1+1)\big)^{-},C~2​(y2​)=h2​(y2​−μ2′​),C~1​(y1​)=e1​y1​−h1​μ1′′​+(h1​+b1​)E(y1​−D(L1​+1))−,

with μ2′=L2μ\mu_2' = L_2\muμ2′​=L2​μ and μ1′′=(L1+1)μ\mu_1'' = (L_1+1)\muμ1′′​=(L1​+1)μ. As a function of a free y^1\hat y_1y^​1​, C~1\tilde C_1C~1​ is the newsboy-type function C^1\hat C_1C^1​ of Eq. (10.6), minimized at the level S1=y^1∗S_1 = \hat y_1^{*}S1​=y^​1∗​ given by the fractile equation (10.8). Passing everything available up to S1S_1S1​ to installation 1, y1=min⁡{S1,y2−D(L2)}y_1 = \min\{S_1, y_2 - D(L_2)\}y1​=min{S1​,y2​−D(L2​)}, gives the total cost C^2(y2)\hat C_2(y_2)C^2​(y2​) of Eq. (10.9), whose minimizer S2=y2∗S_2 = y_2^{*}S2​=y2∗​ is the order-up-to level of installation 2.

Formalization targets

Goal — the decomposition

With S1S_1S1​ from (10.8) and S2S_2S2​ a minimizer of C^2\hat C_2C^2​: for every y2y_2y2​ and every allocation rule aaa with a(u)≤y2−ua(u) \le y_2 - ua(u)≤y2​−u and finite expected cost,

C^2(S2)  ≤  E[C~2(y2)+C~1(a(D(L2)))],\hat C_2(S_2) \;\le\; \mathbb{E}\big[\tilde C_2(y_2) + \tilde C_1(a(D(L_2)))\big],C^2​(S2​)≤E[C~2​(y2​)+C~1​(a(D(L2​)))],

and the order-up-to policy (S1,S2)(S_1, S_2)(S1​,S2​) attains C^2(S2)\hat C_2(S_2)C^2​(S2​).

Supporting targets

Eq. (10.3), the stage-1 period cost through the expected backorders; the reallocation (10.4)-(10.5), which leaves the total unchanged; the closed form (10.6) of C^1\hat C_1C^1​ through the loss function GGG; the convexity of C^1\hat C_1C^1​, its derivative (10.7), and the fractile characterization (10.8) of its minimizers; the pointwise rule that min⁡{S1,y2−u}\min\{S_1, y_2 - u\}min{S1​,y2​−u} is the cheapest feasible y1y_1y1​; the identity (10.9); and the convexity of C^2\hat C_2C^2​ (Problem 10.1) with the existence of its minimizer when e2>0e_2 > 0e2​>0.

Significance

The result itself. The decomposition reduces a two-dimensional stochastic control problem to two one-dimensional convex problems solved in sequence, from downstream to upstream, and it identifies the optimal policy class. The downstream level S1S_1S1​ is a newsboy solution with overage cost e1e_1e1​, the value added, and underage cost e2+b1e_2 + b_1e2​+b1​, and it is independent of the upstream installation altogether; the upstream level S2S_2S2​ sees the downstream installation only through the induced shortage cost, the last term of (10.9). The book notes the extensions the argument admits, to more echelons, to batch ordering at the top, and, via Rosling's equivalence, to assembly systems, and its Sect. 10.1.2 adapts it, now only approximately, to distribution systems under the balance assumption. Example 10.1 shows the typical outcome: the optimal average stock at the upstream installation is slightly negative.

Formalizing it. The section's mathematics is a chain of expectations under Gaussian laws and two convexity arguments. Formalizing it fixes what "optimal" means, a per-period comparison against every allocation rule, and separates the two convexity claims the book makes in one clause each. Nothing here is open; no statement has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The pointwise allocation rule and the newsboy fractile are the same arguments as in the newsboy mission. The two places where work is needed are the identity (10.9), an expectation of a piecewise function split at u=y2−S1u = y_2 - S_1u=y2​−S1​, and the convexity of C^2\hat C_2C^2​, which requires seeing that x↦C^1(min⁡{S1,x})x \mapsto \hat C_1(\min\{S_1, x\})x↦C^1​(min{S1​,x}) is convex precisely because S1S_1S1​ is a minimizer of the convex C^1\hat C_1C^1​ (for any other cut-off the function is not convex), and that convexity is preserved by integrating against the law of D(L2)D(L_2)D(L2​), which needs the integrability of the linearly growing C^1\hat C_1C^1​. Existence of S2S_2S2​ then follows from the growth of C^2\hat C_2C^2​ at both ends, which comes from the asymptotics of the loss function: G(z)→0G(z) \to 0G(z)→0 as z→∞z \to \inftyz→∞ and G(z)+z→0G(z) + z \to 0G(z)+z→0 as z→−∞z \to -\inftyz→−∞.

Formalization scope

D(n)D(n)D(n) is csDemand mu sigma n, the Gaussian law newsboyDemand (n μ) (√n σ) from the newsboy mission, so the loss function GGG and its closed form are reused as references. The costs are parametrized by e1,e2,b1e_1, e_2, b_1e1​,e2​,b1​ with h1=e1+e2h_1 = e_1 + e_2h1​=e1​+e2​ and h2=e2h_2 = e_2h2​=e2​ written out; C~1\tilde C_1C~1​, C~2\tilde C_2C~2​, the pre-reallocation period cost and C^2\hat C_2C^2​ are Bochner integrals against these laws. Every statement assumes σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0; the goal and the convexity statements assume e1,e2≥0e_1, e_2 \ge 0e1​,e2​≥0 and b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0, the book's cost signs. L2=0L_2 = 0L2​=0 is allowed and makes D(L2)D(L_2)D(L2​) a point mass, which is the setting of the book's Problem 10.2.

S1S_1S1​ enters as any solution of the fractile equation (10.8) and S2S_2S2​ as any minimizer of C^2\hat C_2C^2​; the other items show that both exist when e1,e2>0e_1, e_2 > 0e1​,e2​>0. When e1=0e_1 = 0e1​=0 the fractile is 111, no S1S_1S1​ exists, and the goal is vacuous, which is faithful: the book observes that then S1→∞S_1 \to \inftyS1​→∞ and installation 2 never carries stock. Symmetrically, when e2=0e_2 = 0e2​=0 and L2≥1L_2 \ge 1L2​≥1, C^2\hat C_2C^2​ decreases towards its infimum without attaining it, so no S2S_2S2​ exists and the goal is again vacuous: with free upstream holding the optimal y2y_2y2​ is unbounded. Allocation rules are arbitrary functions of the realized D(L2)D(L_2)D(L2​) with an integrability hypothesis; without it Lean's integral of a non-integrable cost would be 000 and could undercut C^2(S2)\hat C_2(S_2)C^2​(S2​), which is negative in Example 10.1's stage-1 term.

What is not modelled is the infinite-horizon dynamic problem: the book's optimality claim is made period by period, and the passage to the stationary policy rests on the remark that the outside supplier has infinite supply, so the same y2y_2y2​ can be chosen in every period. The definitions are reusable for the three-echelon extension and for the distribution system of Sect. 10.1.2; contributions formalizing Problem 10.2 (L2=0L_2 = 0L2​=0) as a first step are welcome.

Selected references

  • Sven Axsäter, Inventory Control, 3rd edition, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 225, Springer, 2015, Sect. 10.1.1. DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15729-0
  • Andrew J. Clark and Herbert Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4), 1960, pp. 475-490. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • Awi Federgruen and Paul Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4), 1984, pp. 818-836. DOI 10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • Kaj Rosling, Optimal Inventory Policies for Assembly Systems under Random Demands, Operations Research 37(4), 1989, pp. 565-579. DOI 10.1287/opre.37.4.565
  • Geert-Jan van Houtum, Karl Inderfurth and Willem H. M. Zijm, Materials Coordination in Stochastic Multi-Echelon Systems, European Journal of Operational Research 95(1), 1996, pp. 1-23. DOI 10.1016/0377-2217(96)00080-8
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory VIII: Supply Chain ContractsTextbook

Why the newsvendor orders too little

A retailer facing uncertain single-period demand and buying from a supplier at a wholesale price orders less than the two of them together would want. The reason is not irrationality but incentives: the retailer bears the whole cost of unsold stock while the supplier collects a margin on every unit ordered, so each party marks up its own cost and the combined markup, Spengler's (1950) double marginalization, depresses the order. Pasternack (1985) showed that a buyback credit for unsold units, priced correctly, realigns the retailer with the chain, and Cachon (2003) surveys the contracts that followed. Chapter 14 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops this as a Stackelberg game on the newsvendor model: the supplier sets contract terms, the retailer sets the order quantity. This mission formalizes the chapter's seven theorems, with the buyback allocation theorem, which shows that buyback both coordinates the chain and can divide its profit in any proportion, as the goal.

Setting

Demand DDD is a random variable with law on R\mathbb{R}R and mean μ\muμ. The retail price is rrr; the supplier's and retailer's per-unit costs are csc_scs​ and crc_rcr​ with c=cs+cr<rc = c_s + c_r < rc=cs​+cr​<r; lost sales cost the two parties goodwill penalties psp_sps​ and prp_rpr​ with p=ps+prp = p_s + p_rp=ps​+pr​; unsold units salvage for v<crv < c_rv<cr​ (ContractData). With S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] the expected sales (expSales) and I(Q)=Q−S(Q)I(Q) = Q - S(Q)I(Q)=Q−S(Q) the expected leftover (expLeftover), a transfer payment T(Q)T(Q)T(Q) from retailer to supplier determines the two profits (retailerProfit, supplierProfit),

πr(Q)=(r−v+pr)S(Q)−(cr−v)Q−prμ−T(Q),πs(Q)=psS(Q)−csQ−psμ+T(Q),\pi_r(Q) = (r - v + p_r)S(Q) - (c_r - v)Q - p_r\mu - T(Q), \qquad \pi_s(Q) = p_s S(Q) - c_s Q - p_s\mu + T(Q),πr​(Q)=(r−v+pr​)S(Q)−(cr​−v)Q−pr​μ−T(Q),πs​(Q)=ps​S(Q)−cs​Q−ps​μ+T(Q),

whose sum Π(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ\Pi(Q) = (r - v + p)S(Q) - (c - v)Q - p\muΠ(Q)=(r−v+p)S(Q)−(c−v)Q−pμ (chainProfit) is independent of the contract. The chain-optimal quantity Q0Q_0Q0​ maximizes Π\PiΠ; the retailer's and supplier's optimal quantities Qr∗Q^*_rQr∗​, Qs∗Q^*_sQs∗​ maximize their own profits. A contract coordinates the chain when Qr∗=Qs∗=Q0Q^*_r = Q^*_s = Q_0Qr∗​=Qs∗​=Q0​, stated here as equality of the sets of maximizers, and is a coordinating contract type when some choice of its parameters does this with both profits positive.

The four contracts are their transfer payments. Wholesale price: T=wQT = wQT=wQ. Buyback: T=wQ−b I(Q)T = wQ - b\,I(Q)T=wQ−bI(Q), the supplier crediting bbb per unsold unit, with 0≤b≤r−v+pr0 \le b \le r - v + p_r0≤b≤r−v+pr​ and w=w(b)w = w(b)w=w(b) of (14.22). Revenue sharing: the retailer keeps a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of sales and salvage revenue, T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q)T = (w + (1-\phi)v)Q + (1-\phi)(r - v)S(Q)T=(w+(1−ϕ)v)Q+(1−ϕ)(r−v)S(Q), with w=w(ϕ)w = w(\phi)w=w(ϕ) of (14.34). Quantity flexibility: the supplier reimburses the retailer's loss w+cr−vw + c_r - vw+cr​−v on unsold units up to δQ\delta QδQ, T=wQ−(w+cr−v)∫(1−δ)QQF(t) dtT = wQ - (w + c_r - v)\int_{(1-\delta)Q}^{Q} F(t)\,dtT=wQ−(w+cr​−v)∫(1−δ)QQ​F(t)dt, with w=w(δ)w = w(\delta)w=w(δ) of (14.46). For buyback, λ=(r−v+pr−b)/(r−v+p)\lambda = (r - v + p_r - b)/(r - v + p)λ=(r−v+pr​−b)/(r−v+p) is the retailer's share of the chain profit (buybackShare), and b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ (buybackB1, buybackB2) are the credits at which one party earns everything.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14.5

Under buyback with w(b)w(b)w(b) at the chain-optimal Q0Q_0Q0​, the retailer's profit is decreasing and the supplier's increasing in b∈[0,r−v+pr]b \in [0, r - v + p_r]b∈[0,r−v+pr​], with 0<b1<b2<r−v+pr0 < b_1 < b_2 < r - v + p_r0<b1​<b2​<r−v+pr​ and

πr(Q0,w(b1),b1)=Π(Q0),πs(Q0,w(b2),b2)=Π(Q0),\pi_r(Q_0, w(b_1), b_1) = \Pi(Q_0), \qquad \pi_s(Q_0, w(b_2), b_2) = \Pi(Q_0),πr​(Q0​,w(b1​),b1​)=Π(Q0​),πs​(Q0​,w(b2​),b2​)=Π(Q0​),

the supplier losing money for b<b1b < b_1b<b1​, both earning positive profit for b1<b<b2b_1 < b < b_2b1​<b<b2​, and the retailer losing money for b>b2b > b_2b>b2​. This is buyback_allocation.

Supporting targets

Equation (14.8), Q0Q_0Q0​ maximizes Π\PiΠ iff Fˉ(Q0)=(c−v)/(r−v+p)\bar F(Q_0) = (c - v)/(r - v + p)Fˉ(Q0​)=(c−v)/(r−v+p); Theorem 14.1, the wholesale price contract coordinates iff w=cs−c−vr−v+ppsw = c_s - \frac{c-v}{r-v+p}p_sw=cs​−r−v+pc−v​ps​, at which the supplier's profit is negative; Theorem 14.2, Qr∗<Q0Q^*_r < Q_0Qr∗​<Q0​ whenever w>csw > c_sw>cs​; Theorem 14.3, for IGFR demand the supplier's induced profit πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)) is unimodal; the identities (14.27) and (14.28), πr=λΠ+μ(λp−pr)\pi_r = \lambda\Pi + \mu(\lambda p - p_r)πr​=λΠ+μ(λp−pr​) and its complement under buyback; Theorem 14.4, buyback with w(b)w(b)w(b) coordinates; Theorem 14.6, revenue sharing with w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) coordinates; Theorem 14.7, quantity flexibility with w(δ)w(\delta)w(δ) makes Q0Q_0Q0​ optimal for the retailer.

Significance

The chapter's theorems are the analytical basis of contract design in newsvendor supply chains. Theorem 14.1 and 14.2 make double marginalization precise: coordination by price alone is possible only at a price the supplier rejects, and any acceptable price makes the retailer under-order. Theorem 14.3 is what lets the supplier optimize the wholesale price at all, and is the reason the IGFR class of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is standard in the field. Theorems 14.4 to 14.6 show that buyback and revenue sharing coordinate and, through the share λ\lambdaλ, that the chain profit can be split arbitrarily, so a coordinating contract can be made acceptable to both parties. Theorem 14.7 shows the limits: quantity flexibility coordinates the retailer but not necessarily the supplier.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 14.1, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6 and 14.7 and leaves 14.2 as an exercise. The formalization of the fractile characterization and of the affine profit identities is reusable for the many contract types (sales rebates, quantity discounts) the chapter cites but does not analyze.

Difficulty

The wholesale price results are first-order conditions on concave functions, and the difficulty is entirely in the analysis: S(Q)=E[min⁡{Q,D}]S(Q) = \mathbb{E}[\min\{Q, D\}]S(Q)=E[min{Q,D}] has derivative Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) for every QQQ when FFF is continuous, which is a differentiation under the integral that has to be carried out for a Lipschitz integrand and an arbitrary law, and the maximizers of the concave profit must then be identified with the solutions of the fractile equation, including existence by the intermediate value theorem. Theorem 14.1's "only if" direction requires that a coincidence of maximizer sets pins the fractile and hence the price, which is where strict monotonicity of FFF enters.

Theorem 14.3 is the delicate one. The obvious approach, concavity of πs(Q,w(Q))\pi_s(Q, w(Q))πs​(Q,w(Q)), fails: the book stresses the function is not concave in general. The proof is a sign-change argument on the derivative (14.16), which is Fˉ(Q)\bar F(Q)Fˉ(Q) times a bracket that IGFR makes decreasing, minus a constant; one must show the derivative is positive near 000, eventually negative, and crosses zero exactly once, and that the last needs both Fˉ\bar FFˉ strictly decreasing and the bracket positive at the crossing. Working with a density in Mathlib means relating the withDensity law to the distribution function throughout.

The buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility theorems are algebra once the right identity is found: πr\pi_rπr​ is an affine function of Π\PiΠ with slope λ\lambdaλ. The formalization must handle the boundary cases the book glosses over, where λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 or λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1 and one party is indifferent among all quantities, so "the same QQQ maximizes" holds only in one direction. Theorem 14.5 also needs Π(Q0)≤μ(r−c)\Pi(Q_0) \le \mu(r - c)Π(Q0​)≤μ(r−c), a Jensen-type bound S(Q)≤min⁡{Q,μ}S(Q) \le \min\{Q, \mu\}S(Q)≤min{Q,μ}, for b1>0b_1 > 0b1​>0, and the ordering b1<b2b_1 < b_2b1​<b2​ needs Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, which the book's proof does not isolate.

Formalization scope

Demand is an arbitrary probability law on R\mathbb{R}R with finite mean, not assumed nonnegative; the book's own examples use normal demand. Optimal quantities are maximizers over all of R\mathbb{R}R (IsMaxOn … Set.univ), and coordination is the coincidence of maximizer sets, with the degenerate endpoints of the parameter ranges stated as one-directional. Where the book uses a density, continuity of the distribution function (NullSingletonClass) is assumed instead, except in Theorem 14.3, where the density fff is explicit, continuous on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (so the exponential law is included), positive on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), and IGFR on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞). Strict monotonicity of FFF on R\mathbb{R}R is never assumed, since it would rule out every nonnegative demand law. Theorem 14.1 assumes ps>0p_s > 0ps​>0 and a positive chain optimum, Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p)\bar F(0) > (c - v)/(r - v + p)Fˉ(0)>(c−v)/(r−v+p), both implicit in the book's proof.

The transfer payments are functions of QQQ and the profits are defined for every QQQ, so the theorems compare values of one family of functions; the book's Fˉ\bar FFˉ is 1−F1 - F1−F with Mathlib's cdf, and the quantity flexibility integral is an interval integral. Theorem 14.5 takes Π(Q0)>0\Pi(Q_0) > 0Π(Q0​)>0, μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and ps,pr>0p_s, p_r > 0ps​,pr​>0 as hypotheses. Without positive goodwill costs its strict inequalities 0<b10 < b_10<b1​ and b2<r−v+prb_2 < r - v + p_rb2​<r−v+pr​ fail (at ps=0p_s = 0ps​=0, b1=0b_1 = 0b1​=0; at pr=0p_r = 0pr​=0, b2=r−v+prb_2 = r - v + p_rb2​=r−v+pr​).

The definition module is shared by all eleven items. The equivalence (14.42)-(14.43) of revenue sharing and buyback, the supplier's stationarity under quantity flexibility (Problem 14.11) and the allocation results for revenue sharing (14.40)-(14.41) are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts, Management Science 51(1), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
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The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management I: Single-Resource Capacity ControlTextbook

Which fares to open, and when to close them

An airline sells one flight, a hotel one night, a car-rental firm one day of one car: a fixed capacity, perishable at a deadline, sold to customers who arrive over time and are willing to pay different amounts. Chapter 2 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) is the theory of that single resource. Its three models answer the same question with increasing generality: Littlewood's two-class rule, the nnn-class static model and its dynamic-arrival version give the seller a protection level per class, a booking limit or a bid price, all three equivalent; the discrete-choice model, in which customers buy down when a cheaper fare is open, replaces classes by offer sets and shows that only the efficient sets, ordered by their purchase probability, are ever offered, with a higher set the more capacity or the less time remains. This mission formalizes that last result, Theorem 2.3, together with the structural results of the two earlier models that it generalizes.

Setting

Static model. Classes 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n with prices p1≥⋯≥pn≥0p_1 \ge \dots \ge p_n \ge 0p1​≥⋯≥pn​≥0 arrive in stages, lowest class first, with demands DjD_jDj​ distributed on N\mathbb NN. With xxx units left at stage jjj the seller observes DjD_jDj​ and accepts u≤min⁡{Dj,x}u \le \min\{D_j, x\}u≤min{Dj​,x} units; the value function is the Bellman equation (2.3), Vj(x)=E[max⁡u{pju+Vj−1(x−u)}]V_j(x) = \mathbb E[\max_u \{p_j u + V_{j-1}(x-u)\}]Vj​(x)=E[maxu​{pj​u+Vj−1​(x−u)}], V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 (staticValue), and ΔVj(x)=Vj(x)−Vj(x−1)\Delta V_j(x) = V_j(x) - V_j(x-1)ΔVj​(x)=Vj​(x)−Vj​(x−1) is the marginal value of capacity. The protection level yj∗=max⁡{x:pj+1<ΔVj(x)}y_j^* = \max\{x : p_{j+1} < \Delta V_j(x)\}yj∗​=max{x:pj+1​<ΔVj​(x)} (protLevel), the booking limit bj∗=C−yj−1∗b_j^* = C - y_{j-1}^*bj∗​=C−yj−1∗​ (bookLimit) and the bid price πj+1(x)=ΔVj(x)\pi_{j+1}(x) = \Delta V_j(x)πj+1​(x)=ΔVj​(x) (bidPrice) define the three controls of Theorem 2.1.

Dynamic model. Over TTT periods at most one request arrives per period, of class jjj with probability λj(t)\lambda_j(t)λj​(t); the value function (2.17) is Vt(x)=Vt+1(x)+E[max⁡u∈{0,1}(R(t)−ΔVt+1(x))u]V_t(x) = V_{t+1}(x) + \mathbb E[\max_{u \in \{0,1\}} (R(t) - \Delta V_{t+1}(x))u]Vt​(x)=Vt+1​(x)+E[maxu∈{0,1}​(R(t)−ΔVt+1​(x))u] (dynValue), with time-dependent protection levels (2.19), booking limits (2.20) and bid prices (2.18).

Choice model. When the set SSS of classes is open an arriving customer buys class j∈Sj \in Sj∈S with probability Pj(S)P_j(S)Pj​(S); Q(S)=∑j∈SPj(S)Q(S) = \sum_{j \in S} P_j(S)Q(S)=∑j∈S​Pj​(S) is the purchase probability and R(S)=∑j∈SPj(S)pjR(S) = \sum_{j \in S} P_j(S) p_jR(S)=∑j∈S​Pj​(S)pj​ the expected revenue (purchaseProb, expRevenue). The value function (2.26) is Vt(x)=max⁡Sλt(R(S)−Q(S)ΔVt+1(x))+Vt+1(x)V_t(x) = \max_{S} \lambda_t (R(S) - Q(S)\Delta V_{t+1}(x)) + V_{t+1}(x)Vt​(x)=maxS​λt​(R(S)−Q(S)ΔVt+1​(x))+Vt+1​(x) (choiceValue). A set TTT is inefficient (Definition 2.1, IsInefficient) if a randomization α\alphaα over the subsets has ∑Sα(S)Q(S)≤Q(T)\sum_S \alpha(S) Q(S) \le Q(T)∑S​α(S)Q(S)≤Q(T) and ∑Sα(S)R(S)>R(T)\sum_S \alpha(S) R(S) > R(T)∑S​α(S)R(S)>R(T), and efficient otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.3

In every period with capacity left, some efficient set maximizes (2.26); and, the efficient sets being ordered by QQQ, the largest optimal set is nondecreasing in the remaining capacity xxx and nondecreasing in the period ttt: choice_optimal_policy. Monotonicity is stated as "every efficient optimal set at (t,x)(t, x)(t,x) is matched by one at (t,x′)(t, x')(t,x′), x′≥xx' \ge xx′≥x, with at least as large a purchase probability", and likewise in ttt.

Supporting targets

Littlewood's rule (2.1), ΔV1(x)=p1P(D1≥x)\Delta V_1(x) = p_1 \mathbb P(D_1 \ge x)ΔV1​(x)=p1​P(D1​≥x) and the acceptance criterion; Proposition 2.1, the marginal values of the static model are decreasing in xxx and increasing in the stages remaining; Theorem 2.1, nested protection levels, nested booking limits and bid-price tables each attain the Bellman maximum at every stage; Proposition 2.2 and Theorem 2.2, the same two results for the dynamic model, with marginal values now decreasing in time; Proposition 2-2.A.4 of the appendix, the marginal values of the choice model are decreasing in xxx and in ttt; Proposition 2.3, an inefficient set is never optimal; and the ordering of efficient sets, Q(S)≤Q(S′)Q(S) \le Q(S')Q(S)≤Q(S′) implies R(S)≤R(S′)R(S) \le R(S')R(S)≤R(S′) when S′S'S′ is efficient.

The continuous-demand optimality conditions (2.9) of Sect. 2.2.2.3, stated without proof, the computational and heuristic methods of Sects. 2.2.3-2.2.4, the overbooking models of Sect. 2.7 and the nested-policy characterization of Sect. 2.6.2.5 are not targets.

Significance

Theorem 2.3 is the structural result behind choice-based revenue management: it reduces the 2n2^n2n offer sets to the efficient frontier of (Q(S),R(S))(Q(S), R(S))(Q(S),R(S)), orders that frontier, and shows the optimal policy walks up it as capacity grows or the deadline nears. It was the analytical core of Talluri and van Ryzin's (2004) choice-model paper and is the reason the efficient sets, not the fare classes, are the unit of control when customers substitute between fares. The static and dynamic results, from Littlewood (1972) and Brumelle and McGill (1993) to Lee and Hersh (1993), are the foundation of every airline seat inventory control system; the equivalence of protection levels, booking limits and bid prices is what lets the same optimal policy be implemented on any of the three kinds of reservation system. None of these results has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The two marginal-value propositions are inductions in which the inductive step is the discrete concavity of a max-plus convolution, Lemma 2-2.A.1 of the appendix: x↦max⁡0≤a≤m{ap+g(x−a)}x \mapsto \max_{0 \le a \le m}\{ap + g(x-a)\}x↦max0≤a≤m​{ap+g(x−a)} is concave when ggg is, which in Lean requires reasoning about the argmax on N\mathbb NN and the truncated subtraction. The static model's expectation is a tsum against a pmf, so every step also needs summability of a bounded family. The protection-level theorems then need the down-set structure of {x:pj+1<ΔVj(x)}\{x : p_{j+1} < \Delta V_j(x)\}{x:pj+1​<ΔVj​(x)} under monotonicity of ΔVj\Delta V_jΔVj​, and the three controls have to be shown to coincide unit by unit. For the choice model, Proposition 2.3 is a one-line convexity argument once ΔV≥0\Delta V \ge 0ΔV≥0 is known, and the monotonicity in Theorem 2.3 is a monotone comparative-statics argument on the objective R(S)−Q(S)ΔR(S) - Q(S)\DeltaR(S)−Q(S)Δ, which is easy in Δ\DeltaΔ but must be combined with Proposition 2-2.A.4 in both xxx and ttt; the existence of an efficient maximizer uses Proposition 2.3 and the finiteness of the subsets.

Formalization scope

Capacities, stages and periods are natural numbers, the value functions recurse on the stage or on the number of periods to go, and the book's ranges (x≤Cx \le Cx≤C, t≤Tt \le Tt≤T, j≤nj \le nj≤n) are hypotheses of the theorems. Demand in the static model is a pmf on N\mathbb NN rather than a random variable, so the expectation in (2.3) is a tsum; the dynamic model's expectation over R(t)R(t)R(t) is written out, including the no-arrival term, which vanishes under nonnegative prices. The choice model is defined by its compact form (2.26), and the maximization includes the empty offer set. Optimality of a control means attaining the inner maximum of the Bellman equation at every state, which is what the book's proofs establish. The bid-price control is formalized with the bid price πj+1(x+1−z)\pi_{j+1}(x + 1 - z)πj+1​(x+1−z) of the zzz-th unit allocated; the book prints x−zx - zx−z, which is one unit off from (2.5). The appendix's Proposition 2-2.A.4 prints its time monotonicity in the reverse direction; the formal statement is the direction consistent with Proposition 2.2 and Theorem 2.3. The ordering of efficient sets is stated with non-strict inequalities, since Definition 2.1 admits ties in revenue.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 2. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
  • S. L. Brumelle and J. I. McGill, Airline seat allocation with multiple nested fare classes, Operations Research 41(1), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.127
  • T. C. Lee and M. Hersh, A model for dynamic airline seat inventory control with multiple seat bookings, Transportation Science 27(3), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.27.3.252
  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • C. J. Lautenbacher and S. Stidham, The underlying Markov decision process in the single-leg airline yield-management problem, Transportation Science 33(2), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.33.2.136
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The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management II: OverbookingTextbook

How far to oversell

Every airline, hotel and car-rental firm sells more reservations than it has capacity, because some customers cancel or do not show. Chapter 4 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) is the theory of that decision. Its static models pick one overbooking limit from the show distribution; its dynamic model, a simplification of Chatwin's (1998), follows reservations, cancellations and refunds period by period and proves that the optimal control is still a limit, one that declines toward the deadline and falls when more demand is expected; and its substitutable-capacity model, from Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004), sets joint limits for several classes whose oversold customers can be moved between resources, showing the expected net revenue is concave in each limit and submodular across them. This mission formalizes the chapter's four propositions and the corollary the book draws from the last.

Setting

Dynamic overbooking (Sect. 4.3.1). With yyy reservations on hand in period ttt, DtD_tDt​ new requests arrive; the firm books up to x∈[y,y+Dt]x \in [y, y + D_t]x∈[y,y+Dt​] at revenue p(t)p(t)p(t) each, and every reservation survives the period with probability qtq_tqt​, a cancellation refunding r(t)r(t)r(t). At the deadline T+1T + 1T+1 the firm pays the convex denied-service cost c(y−C)c(y - C)c(y−C) on reservations beyond capacity CCC, Eq. (4.11). The recursion is vt+1(x)=E[Vt+1(Zt(x))−(x−Zt(x)) r(t)]v_{t+1}(x) = \mathbb E[V_{t+1}(Z_t(x)) - (x - Z_t(x))\,r(t)]vt+1​(x)=E[Vt+1​(Zt​(x))−(x−Zt​(x))r(t)] with Zt(x)∼Bin(x,qt)Z_t(x) \sim \mathrm{Bin}(x, q_t)Zt​(x)∼Bin(x,qt​) and Vt(y)=E[max⁡y≤x≤y+Dt{vt+1(x)+(x−y) p(t)}]V_t(y) = \mathbb E[\max_{y \le x \le y + D_t}\{v_{t+1}(x) + (x - y)\,p(t)\}]Vt​(y)=E[maxy≤x≤y+Dt​​{vt+1​(x)+(x−y)p(t)}] (value, postValue). The greatest optimal overbooking limit x∗(t)x^*(t)x∗(t) (overbookingLimit) is the largest level at which vt+1(x)+x p(t)v_{t+1}(x) + x\,p(t)vt+1​(x)+xp(t) is at least its value at every smaller level, an element of N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞}; the limit policy books min⁡{y+Dt,max⁡{y,x∗}}\min\{y + D_t, \max\{y, x^*\}\}min{y+Dt​,max{y,x∗}} (limitPolicy).

Substitutable capacity (Sect. 4.5). Classes j=1,…,nj = 1, \dots, nj=1,…,n hold yjy_jyj​ reservations and are overbooked to levels xjx_jxj​; in the service period Zj∼Poisson(qjxj)Z_j \sim \mathrm{Poisson}(q_j x_j)Zj​∼Poisson(qj​xj​) customers show and are assigned to resources i=1,…,mi = 1, \dots, mi=1,…,m of capacities CiC_iCi​, or to the virtual resource 000 (denied service), at net benefit hjih_{ji}hji​, by the transportation problem (TP) with value V(z,C)V(z, C)V(z,C) (serviceValue). The expected net revenue (4.21) is G(x)=p⊤(x−y)−E[s⊤(x−Z(x))]+E[V(Z(x),C)]G(x) = p^\top(x - y) - \mathbb E[s^\top(x - Z(x))] + \mathbb E[V(Z(x), C)]G(x)=p⊤(x−y)−E[s⊤(x−Z(x))]+E[V(Z(x),C)] (expNetRevenue), and jointLimit is the greatest optimal limit of one class with the others fixed.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.4

With Poisson show demands, GGG has decreasing first differences in every direction: G(x+ei+ej)−G(x+ei)≤G(x+ej)−G(x)G(x + e_i + e_j) - G(x + e_i) \le G(x + e_j) - G(x)G(x+ei​+ej​)−G(x+ei​)≤G(x+ej​)−G(x) for all xxx and all classes i,ji, ji,j, which is component-wise concavity (i=ji = ji=j) and submodularity (i≠ji \ne ji=j): joint_overbooking_concave_submodular.

Supporting targets

Proposition 4.1, with a convex denied-service cost the limit policy with the greatest optimal limit attains the maximum of the recursion at every state; Proposition 4.2, under qt(p(t)−p(t+1))+(1−qt)(p(t)−r(t))≥0q_t(p(t) - p(t+1)) + (1 - q_t)(p(t) - r(t)) \ge 0qt​(p(t)−p(t+1))+(1−qt​)(p(t)−r(t))≥0 the greatest optimal limits decline with time; Proposition 4.3, stochastically larger demand to come gives limits that are no larger; and the corollary of Sect. 4.5.2, the greatest optimal limit of class iii is nonincreasing in the level of any other class.

The static overbooking models of Sect. 4.2 (binomial, normal and Gram-Charlier approximations, Type 1 and Type 2 service levels), the net-bookings heuristics of Sect. 4.3.2, the combined capacity-control models of Sect. 4.4 and the stochastic-gradient algorithm of Appendix 4.A carry no numbered results and are not targets.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 is the structural fact that makes joint overbooking of related resources tractable: concavity gives each class a critical booking level and submodularity makes those levels move in opposite directions, so a stochastic-gradient or coordinate search on the limits is well behaved, and the pattern of Example 4.5, overbooking an early flight aggressively because its oversold passengers can be moved to later ones, is a consequence rather than a heuristic. The dynamic propositions are the theoretical support for the overbooking curves that reservation systems post, limits that fall as departure approaches, and they quantify the sense in which a static model, which ignores future demand, overbooks too much. The proof of Proposition 4.4 passes through the discrete concavity of the transportation problem's value in its supply vector, an M-natural-concavity fact in the sense of Murota, and the Poisson-expectation identity for second differences; none of this has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The dynamic model needs the concavity of VtV_tVt​ on N\mathbb NN to be propagated through two operations, the binomial thinning x↦E[V(Bin(x,q))]x \mapsto \mathbb E[V(\mathrm{Bin}(x, q))]x↦E[V(Bin(x,q))] and the windowed maximum y↦max⁡y≤x≤y+Dg(x)y \mapsto \max_{y \le x \le y + D} g(x)y↦maxy≤x≤y+D​g(x), both of which preserve discrete concavity but require explicit manipulation of binomial sums and of the argmax; Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 then compare greatest maximizers of concave sequences through lower bounds on marginal values, with the value ∞\infty∞ handled in ℕ∞. The substitutable-capacity goal is harder: the value of (TP) as a function of the integer supply vector must be shown to have decreasing differences, which is the submodularity of a max-weight transportation value in its supplies, a linear programming duality argument (or Murota's M-natural-concavity of min-cost flow), and the Poisson expectation of it, a tsum over Nn\mathbb N^nNn, must be differenced in two coordinates using the identity E[f(Nμ+δ)]−E[f(Nμ)]\mathbb E[f(N_{\mu + \delta})] - \mathbb E[f(N_\mu)]E[f(Nμ+δ​)]−E[f(Nμ​)] for Poisson pmfs. The linear terms of GGG cancel in second differences and the refund term is linear in xxx.

Formalization scope

Periods are natural numbers with value t the value with T+1−tT + 1 - tT+1−t periods to go, and the book's ranges 1≤t≤T1 \le t \le T1≤t≤T are hypotheses. The denied-service cost is normalized, c(0)=0c(0) = 0c(0)=0 and c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, as a cost "penalizing denied service" is. Convexity of the sequence alone is not enough, because (4.11) never reads c(0)c(0)c(0). Demands are pmfs on N\mathbb NN and cancellations exact binomial sums. The greatest optimal limit lives in N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞} because a mild denied-service cost can make accepting every request optimal, in which case the book's critical value is +∞+\infty+∞; the limit policy then accepts everything. Proposition 4.3 is stated for two demand families ordered by first-order stochastic dominance rather than a parametrized family. In the substitutable-capacity model the virtual resource is uncapacitated, the book's "finite but very high" C0C_0C0​ taken as infinite so that (TP) is feasible for every Poisson realization, and (TP) is over real assignments, whose optimum at integer supplies is integral. Eq. (4.21) is printed with −E[V(Z(x),C)]-\mathbb E[V(Z(x), C)]−E[V(Z(x),C)]; VVV being the maximum net benefit, the expected net revenue adds it, and the definition uses +++, without which Proposition 4.4 fails numerically on every sampled instance.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 4. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • R. E. Chatwin, Multiperiod airline overbooking with a single fare class, Operations Research 46(6), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.46.6.805
  • I. Karaesmen and G. J. van Ryzin, Overbooking with substitutable inventory classes, Operations Research 52(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0079
  • M. Rothstein, OR and the airline overbooking problem, Operations Research 33(2), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.2.237
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory IX: Facility Location ModelsTextbook

Where to put the warehouses

Choosing where to open distribution centers is the strategic decision that fixes a supply chain's shape for years. The basic model, the uncapacitated fixed-charge location problem (UFLP) of Balinski (1965), trades the fixed cost of opening sites against the cost of transporting demand from open sites to customers. It is NP-hard, yet routinely solved to optimality, and the reason is a fact about its relaxations: the LP relaxation is unusually tight, and Lagrangian relaxation, which Cornuejols, Fisher and Nemhauser (1977) brought to location problems, gives the same bound with a subproblem solvable by inspection. Chapter 8 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) develops the UFLP, its Lagrangian relaxation and Erlenkotter's (1978) DUALOC dual-ascent method, then the p-median problem with Hakimi's (1965) node-optimality theorem and the covering models. This mission formalizes the chapter's numbered results, with the equality of the Lagrangian and LP bounds as its goal.

Setting

Customers i∈Ii \in Ii∈I have demands hih_ihi​; candidate sites j∈Jj \in Jj∈J have fixed costs fjf_jfj​; shipping one unit from jjj to iii costs cijc_{ij}cij​. A solution opens sites (xj∈{0,1}x_j \in \{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1}) and assigns demand fractions (yij≥0y_{ij} \ge 0yij​≥0, ∑jyij=1\sum_j y_{ij} = 1∑j​yij​=1, yij≤xjy_{ij} \le x_jyij​≤xj​); its cost is ∑jfjxj+∑i∑jhicijyij\sum_j f_j x_j + \sum_i \sum_j h_i c_{ij} y_{ij}∑j​fj​xj​+∑i​∑j​hi​cij​yij​ (uflpCost, UFLPFeasible). The optimal value is z∗z^*z∗ (uflpOpt); relaxing xj∈{0,1}x_j \in \{0,1\}xj​∈{0,1} to 0≤xj≤10 \le x_j \le 10≤xj​≤1 gives the LP relaxation with value zLPz_{LP}zLP​ (uflpLP).

Lagrangian relaxation removes the assignment constraints and charges λi\lambda_iλi​ per unit of violation. For fixed multipliers λ\lambdaλ the subproblem (UFLP-LRλ_\lambdaλ​) minimizes ∑jfjxj+∑i∑j(hicij−λi)yij+∑iλi\sum_j f_j x_j + \sum_i\sum_j (h_i c_{ij} - \lambda_i) y_{ij} + \sum_i \lambda_i∑j​fj​xj​+∑i​∑j​(hi​cij​−λi​)yij​+∑i​λi​ over yij≤xjy_{ij} \le x_jyij​≤xj​, xxx binary, y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 (lagrObjective, LagrFeasible), with value zLR(λ)z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​(λ) (zLR). It separates by site: the benefit of opening jjj is βj=∑imin⁡{0,hicij−λi}\beta_j = \sum_i \min\{0, h_i c_{ij} - \lambda_i\}βj​=∑i​min{0,hi​cij​−λi​} (benefit), and jjj is opened iff βj+fj<0\beta_j + f_j < 0βj​+fj​<0. The best bound is the Lagrangian dual value zLR=max⁡λzLR(λ)z_{LR} = \max_\lambda z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​=maxλ​zLR​(λ) (zLRbest).

DUALOC works with the condensed dual of the LP relaxation, whose variables viv_ivi​ satisfy ∑imax⁡{0,vi−c^ij}≤fj\sum_i \max\{0, v_i - \hat c_{ij}\} \le f_j∑i​max{0,vi​−c^ij​}≤fj​ with c^ij=hicij\hat c_{ij} = h_i c_{ij}c^ij​=hi​cij​. A dual solution vvv and a site set J+J^+J+ form a primal-dual pair (PDP) when these constraints are tight on J+J^+J+ and every customer has a site in J+J^+J+ with c^ij≤vi\hat c_{ij} \le v_ic^ij​≤vi​; the primal solution opens J+J^+J+ and assigns each customer to its nearest open site j+(i)j^+(i)j+(i) (NearestIn, primalX, primalY).

For the p-median problem on a network, the customers are the nodes, ddd is the shortest-path distance between nodes, and a facility may sit at position ttt along an edge (u,w)(u, w)(u,w) of length ℓ\ellℓ, at distance min⁡{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ}\min\{d(i,u) + t\ell, d(i,w) + (1-t)\ell\}min{d(i,u)+tℓ,d(i,w)+(1−t)ℓ} from node iii (NetPoint, netDist). The p-center problem minimizes the largest distance from a customer to its nearest of ppp open sites; pCenterValue c p is its optimal value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 8.2

For every instance with at least one candidate site,

zLP  =  zLR  =  sup⁡λzLR(λ).z_{LP} \;=\; z_{LR} \;=\; \sup_\lambda z_{LR}(\lambda).zLP​=zLR​=λsup​zLR​(λ).

This is lagrangian_equals_lp.

Supporting targets

Theorem 8.1, the closed form zLR(λ)=∑jmin⁡{0,βj+fj}+∑iλiz_{LR}(\lambda) = \sum_j \min\{0, \beta_j + f_j\} + \sum_i \lambda_izLR​(λ)=∑j​min{0,βj​+fj​}+∑i​λi​ with its optimal solution; the bounds (8.16) zLR(λ)≤z∗z_{LR}(\lambda) \le z^*zLR​(λ)≤z∗ and (8.19) zLP≤zLR≤z∗z_{LP} \le z_{LR} \le z^*zLP​≤zLR​≤z∗; Theorem 8.3, the variable-fixing tests; Lemma 8.4, the DUALOC duality gap zP+−zD+=∑i∑j∈J+,j≠j+(i)max⁡{0,vi−c^ij}z^+_P - z^+_D = \sum_i \sum_{j \in J^+, j \ne j^+(i)} \max\{0, v_i - \hat c_{ij}\}zP+​−zD+​=∑i​∑j∈J+,j=j+(i)​max{0,vi​−c^ij​}; Lemma 8.6, the characterization of complementary slackness violations; Theorem 8.7, Hakimi's theorem that some ppp nodes are optimal among all ppp-point sets; Lemma 8.8, the equivalence between the ppp-center value being at most rrr and a set cover of radius rrr with at most ppp sites. Proposition 8.5, which concerns the output of a specific procedure, is not a target.

Significance

Corollary 8.2 explains the behavior of every Lagrangian location code: the bound cannot beat the LP bound, so its value lies in the ease of the subproblem and in extensions to nonlinear location models (the location model with risk pooling of Chapter 12) where no LP is available. Theorem 8.1 is the subproblem solution those codes use; Theorem 8.3 is the variable-fixing device of Daskin, Snyder and others that shrinks branch-and-bound trees. Lemmas 8.4 and 8.6 are the analytical core of DUALOC, the method that made large UFLP instances solvable in the 1970s. Hakimi's theorem is the reason the ppp-median problem is a discrete problem at all, and Lemma 8.8 is the reason ppp-center problems are solved by bisection over covering problems rather than by their weak MIP formulation.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 8.1 and 8.3 and Lemma 8.6, cites Corollary 8.2 to Appendix D and Theorem 8.7 to Hakimi, and leaves Lemmas 8.4 and 8.8 as exercises. The formal treatment of the integrality property and of Lagrangian duality for a linear objective over a product of boxes is reusable for the p-median and capacitated variants the chapter goes on to discuss.

Difficulty

The goal is an LP duality statement in disguise, and the obvious idea, that zLR(λ)z_{LR}(\lambda)zLR​(λ) is the dual function of the LP relaxation, is exactly what needs proof. Two facts must be established: that for fixed λ\lambdaλ the subproblem over binary xxx has the same value as over x∈[0,1]x \in [0,1]x∈[0,1], because after the optimal yyy is substituted the objective is linear in xxx; and that the supremum over λ\lambdaλ of the resulting concave piecewise-linear function equals the LP minimum. The second is strong duality for a linear program, which Mathlib does not provide ready-made; it has to be obtained either through a Farkas-type argument or by exhibiting, for the LP optimum, a multiplier vector that attains it, which for this problem can be read off the LP dual. The book proves none of this; it invokes Lemma D.3.

The bounds (8.16) and (8.19) are easier but not free: the infima and suprema defining z∗z^*z∗, zLPz_{LP}zLP​ and zLRz_{LR}zLR​ must be shown attained, which needs finiteness of the binary choices and compactness of the assignment polytope. Theorem 8.3 depends on the value of the subproblem with one variable forced, which is Theorem 8.1 applied to a modified instance. Hakimi's theorem needs a concavity argument in each point's position and a bookkeeping step, since moving several points to nodes may merge them and the result must still have exactly ppp nodes. Lemma 8.8 is combinatorial and short once the ppp-center value is identified with a minimum over ppp-subsets.

Formalization scope

Customers and sites are Fin n and Fin m; demands, costs and fixed costs are arbitrary reals, as the book's formulations are, and the theorems that need it assume m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. Optimal values are infima or suprema of the sets of attainable objective values, all of which are nonempty and bounded under the stated hypotheses. The Lagrangian dual value is a supremum over all real multiplier vectors, so Corollary 8.2 asserts in particular that the supremum equals the attained LP value.

The DUALOC statements take the nearest-facility assignment j+(i)j^+(i)j+(i) as a function a with the defining property, so ties are resolved by the hypothesis, and the complementary slackness violation is written exactly as (8.51) with (x+,y+)(x^+, y^+)(x+,y+) substituted. Hakimi's theorem is stated for a family of ppp points with repetition allowed, which is stronger than for a set. It assumes what the book's network supplies: the node distances satisfy the triangle inequality, since they are shortest-path distances, and every edge carrying a point is at least as long as the distance between its endpoints. The argument needs both: they make the ends of an edge coincide with its nodes, and without them a point on a short fictitious edge can beat every node. The set covering value in Lemma 8.8 is expressed through the existence of a cover with at most ppp sites rather than as a natural-number infimum, whose value 000 on infeasible instances would falsify the equivalence.

The definition module is shared by all ten items. The Lagrangian relaxation of the ppp-median problem (Sect. 8.3.2.2), the continuous knapsack subproblem of the capacitated problem, and Proposition 8.5 on the dual-ascent procedure are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • M. L. Balinski, Integer programming: methods, uses, computation, Management Science 12(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.253
  • G. Cornuejols, M. L. Fisher and G. L. Nemhauser, Location of bank accounts to optimize float, Management Science 23(8), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.23.8.789
  • D. Erlenkotter, A dual-based procedure for uncapacitated facility location, Operations Research 26(6), 1978. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.6.992
  • S. L. Hakimi, Optimum distribution of switching centers in a communication network and some related graph theoretic problems, Operations Research 13(3), 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.13.3.462
  • A. M. Geoffrion, Lagrangean relaxation for integer programming, Mathematical Programming Study 2, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0120690
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory X: Supply UncertaintyTextbook

When the supplier is the risk

Every model in the earlier chapters of this series treats demand as the uncertain quantity and supply as given. Chapter 9 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) reverses the roles: demand is deterministic and the supplier fails. A disruption is a binary event, modeled as a two-state Markov process between up and down periods, during which nothing can be ordered. The chapter's thesis, from Snyder and Shen (2006), is that supply uncertainty is a mirror image of demand uncertainty: the optimal base-stock level has the same critical-fractile form as the newsvendor solution but with the fractile taken over the disruption-length distribution (Tomlin 2006), and consolidation, which pools demand risk, now does nothing to expected cost and multiplies its variance, the risk-diversification effect of Schmitt, Sun, Snyder and Shen (2015). The chapter closes with the reliable fixed-charge location problem of Snyder and Daskin (2005). This mission formalizes the chapter's theorems on disruptions, with the risk-diversification theorem as its goal.

Setting

A supplier that is up is disrupted next period with probability α\alphaα; one that is down recovers with probability β\betaβ. The disruption chain records 000 when the supplier is up and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 in the nnn-th consecutive period of a disruption; its stationary distribution is π0=β/(α+β)\pi_0 = \beta/(\alpha+\beta)π0​=β/(α+β) and πn=αβα+β(1−β)n−1\pi_n = \frac{\alpha\beta}{\alpha+\beta}(1-\beta)^{n-1}πn​=α+βαβ​(1−β)n−1 (disruptionPmf), with distribution function F(n)=∑i≤nπiF(n) = \sum_{i \le n}\pi_iF(n)=∑i≤n​πi​ (disruptionCdf).

A single location faces demand ddd per period, pays hhh per unit held and ppp per unit backordered per period, and follows a base-stock policy: it orders up to SSS in every up period and nothing in down periods. In the nnn-th period of a disruption it has S−(n+1)dS - (n+1)dS−(n+1)d units on hand or backordered, so its cost is g^(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+\hat g(S, n) = h[S-(n+1)d]^+ + p[(n+1)d - S]^+g^​(S,n)=h[S−(n+1)d]++p[(n+1)d−S]+ (periodCost), and the expected cost per period is g(S)=∑nπng^(S,n)g(S) = \sum_n \pi_n \hat g(S, n)g(S)=∑n​πn​g^​(S,n) (meanCost), with variance V(S)V(S)V(S) over the disruption state (varCost). The critical fractile γ=p/(p+h)\gamma = p/(p+h)γ=p/(p+h) and F−1(γ)F^{-1}(\gamma)F−1(γ), the smallest nnn with F(n)≥γF(n) \ge \gammaF(n)≥γ, determine the optimal level.

In the reliable fixed-charge location problem (RFLP), sites fail independently with probability qqq and each customer is assigned to a chain of facilities: its level-rrr facility serves it when the rrr closer facilities are disrupted, until it is assigned to an emergency facility uuu that never fails and charges the penalty θi\theta_iθi​. The objective (9.61) is fixed cost plus expected transportation cost, with coefficients ψijr=hicijqr(1−q)\psi_{ijr} = h_i c_{ij} q^r (1-q)ψijr​=hi​cij​qr(1−q) (rflpPsi, rflpCost) under the constraints (9.62)-(9.67) (RFLPFeasible).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.9

For NNN identical locations and the centralized location formed by merging them (demand NdNdNd):

SC∗=NS∗,gC∗=gD∗=Ng∗,VC∗=NVD∗=N2V∗,S^*_C = NS^*, \qquad g^*_C = g^*_D = Ng^*, \qquad V^*_C = N V^*_D = N^2 V^*,SC∗​=NS∗,gC∗​=gD∗​=Ng∗,VC∗​=NVD∗​=N2V∗,

that is, an optimal single-location level SSS scales to the optimal centralized level NSNSNS, the centralized expected cost at NSNSNS is NNN times the single-location cost, and its variance is N2N^2N2 times the single-location variance. This is risk_diversification.

Supporting targets

Lemma 9.2, the stationary distribution and distribution function of the disruption chain; Lemma 9.4, that the optimal base-stock level is a multiple of ddd; Theorem 9.5, S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h))S^* = d + dF^{-1}(p/(p+h))S∗=d+dF−1(p/(p+h)), as the least minimizer of ggg; and Theorem 9.10, that in every optimal RFLP solution consecutive backup assignments are ordered by cost. Theorem 9.3, the optimality of base-stock policies, is cited by the book to Song and Zipkin without a model of the policy space and is not a target; Proposition 9.1 and the multisupplier results of Sect. 9.4 are left for a later mission, as discussed below.

Significance

Theorem 9.5 is the supply-side newsvendor formula: it says exactly how much inventory buys protection against disruptions of a given length, and it underlies the disruption models used in practice for raw-material buffers. Theorem 9.9 is the chapter's central insight and the reason supply and demand uncertainty call for opposite strategies: pooling reduces expected cost under demand uncertainty but only redistributes risk under supply uncertainty, concentrating it. Its three identities are what a risk-averse planner needs to compare the two designs by a mean-variance criterion. Theorem 9.10 is what lets the RFLP be formulated without ordering constraints and solved by Lagrangian relaxation like the UFLP.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 9.5 and the identities behind Theorem 9.9, sketches Lemma 9.4, and leaves Lemma 9.2 and Theorem 9.10 as exercises. The formal treatment of the piecewise-linear cost ggg and its finite differences is reusable for the yield-uncertainty and multi-supplier models of the same chapter.

Difficulty

The cost ggg is an infinite series whose terms grow linearly in nnn against a geometric weight, so every statement about it begins with summability, and the finite-difference identity Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p]\Delta g(S) = d[(h+p)F(S/d - 1) - p]Δg(S)=d[(h+p)F(S/d−1)−p] requires exchanging a difference with a sum. Theorem 9.5 then needs the convexity and piecewise linearity of ggg to pass from a sign condition on slopes at multiples of ddd to a global minimum over all real SSS, and the identification of the least minimizer needs the slopes to be strictly negative below S∗S^*S∗. The obvious idea, treating the problem as a discrete newsvendor over multiples of ddd, is only half of the argument: it does not by itself exclude non-multiple minimizers, which is what Lemma 9.4 asserts.

Lemma 9.2 is elementary but the stationary equations involve a series over all down states, and the proof must establish summability before manipulating it. Theorem 9.9's scaling identities are termwise, but the optimality transfer in part 1 requires the scaling to preserve minimizers, which follows from the cost identity holding for every SSS.

Theorem 9.10 is an exchange argument on a binary program with layered constraints. The delicate case is the emergency facility: swapping it into a lower level is infeasible, and the correct move is to promote it and drop the later assignment, which changes the constraints for every higher level; the argument must show feasibility of the modified solution level by level.

Formalization scope

The disruption distribution is given by Lemma 9.2's formula rather than defined as the stationary distribution, and Lemma 9.2 shows it satisfies the stationary equations; the theorems assume 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1 and 0<β≤10 < \beta \le 10<β≤1, under which every series is a geometric series times a polynomial and is summable. The quantity F−1(γ)F^{-1}(\gamma)F−1(γ) enters Theorem 9.5 as a natural number kkk characterized by F(k)≥γF(k) \ge \gammaF(k)≥γ and F(n)<γF(n) < \gammaF(n)<γ for n<kn < kn<k, which exists since F(n)→1>γF(n) \to 1 > \gammaF(n)→1>γ; the conclusion asserts both optimality and leastness of d+dkd + dkd+dk among all real levels.

Theorem 9.9 is stated as the scaling of the single-location functions; the decentralized totals Ng∗Ng^*Ng∗ and NV∗NV^*NV∗ are the mean and variance of a sum of NNN independent copies, which the book asserts rather than derives, and are not modeled separately. In the RFLP, levels are indexed by Fin m, the emergency facility is a designated index uuu whose data satisfy the book's conventions through the hypotheses, and demands are positive with 0<q<10 < q < 10<q<1, both needed: with q=0q = 0q=0 or hi=0h_i = 0hi​=0 backup assignments are free and any order is optimal.

The EOQ with disruptions (Proposition 9.1) is a renewal-reward derivation without a formal model of the renewal process in the book, and the multisupplier newsvendor of Sect. 9.4 (Lemma 9.6, Theorems 9.7 and 9.8) rests on differentiability conditions the book defers to Dada et al. and on a lemma it leaves as an exercise; both are natural extensions on the same definitions rather than targets here.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 9. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • B. Tomlin, On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks, Management Science 52(5), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0515
  • A. J. Schmitt, S. A. Sun, L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Centralization versus decentralization: risk pooling, risk diversification, and supply chain disruptions, Omega 52, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2014.10.010
  • L. V. Snyder and M. S. Daskin, Reliability models for facility location: the expected failure cost case, Transportation Science 39(3), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.1040.0107
  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Supply and demand uncertainty in multi-echelon supply chains, working paper, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1080.0224
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: naimengye

The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management III: Dynamic PricingTextbook

Prices that respond to inventory

A retailer marking down a seasonal line, an airline raising fares as seats sell, a manufacturer pricing while restocking: each sets prices over time against a finite and changing inventory. Chapter 5 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) collects the structural theory of that problem. Without replenishment, the Bernoulli-arrival model of Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) gives a marginal value of capacity that falls with inventory and with time, hence prices that jump up at each sale and drift down between sales, and the deterministic fluid model bounds it from above. With replenishment, the model of Federgruen and Heching (1999) has a jointly concave and supermodular continuation value, from which the base-stock, posted-price policy follows: below a base-stock level order up to it and post a fixed price, above it order nothing and discount, more the higher the inventory. This mission formalizes those results with Proposition 5.3 as the goal.

Setting

Bernoulli demand (Sect. 5.2.2.2). One customer arrives per period with a random willingness to pay; the firm's decision is the demand rate d∈[0,1]d \in [0, 1]d∈[0,1], the probability of a sale at the inverse-demand price p(t,d)p(t, d)p(t,d), with revenue rate r(t,d)=d p(t,d)r(t, d) = d\,p(t, d)r(t,d)=dp(t,d) (revenueRate). The value function (5.12) is Vt(x)=max⁡d{r(t,d)−d ΔVt+1(x)}+Vt+1(x)V_t(x) = \max_{d}\{r(t, d) - d\,\Delta V_{t+1}(x)\} + V_{t+1}(x)Vt​(x)=maxd​{r(t,d)−dΔVt+1​(x)}+Vt+1​(x), VT+1=0V_{T+1} = 0VT+1​=0, Vt(0)=0V_t(0) = 0Vt​(0)=0 (bernoulliValue), and ΔVt(x)=Vt(x)−Vt(x−1)\Delta V_t(x) = V_t(x) - V_t(x-1)ΔVt​(x)=Vt​(x)−Vt​(x−1) (bernoulliDelta). The deterministic model (5.1) maximizes ∑tr(t,d(t))\sum_t r(t, d(t))∑t​r(t,d(t)) over rates with ∑td(t)≤C\sum_t d(t) \le C∑t​d(t)≤C (deterministicValue).

Pricing with replenishment (Sect. 5.3.2). Inventory may be negative (backorders). In period ttt with inventory xxx the firm orders up to y≥xy \ge xy≥x at unit cost ctc_tct​, chooses a rate d∈[0,dˉ]d \in [0, \bar d]d∈[0,dˉ], sells the random demand D(t,d,ξt)=at(ξt) d+bt(ξt)D(t, d, \xi_t) = a_t(\xi_t)\,d + b_t(\xi_t)D(t,d,ξt​)=at​(ξt​)d+bt​(ξt​) (additive, multiplicative or mixed noise), and pays the convex cost hth_tht​ on ending inventory. The value function (5.20) is Vt(x)=sup⁡y≥x, d{r(t,d)−ct(y−x)+Gt+1(y,d)}V_t(x) = \sup_{y \ge x,\, d}\{r(t, d) - c_t(y - x) + G_{t+1}(y, d)\}Vt​(x)=supy≥x,d​{r(t,d)−ct​(y−x)+Gt+1​(y,d)} with the continuation value Gt+1(y,d)=E[Vt+1(y−D(t,d,ξt))−ht(y−D(t,d,ξt))]G_{t+1}(y, d) = \mathbb E[V_{t+1}(y - D(t, d, \xi_t)) - h_t(y - D(t, d, \xi_t))]Gt+1​(y,d)=E[Vt+1​(y−D(t,d,ξt​))−ht​(y−D(t,d,ξt​))] (ReplPricing.value, contValue). Assumption 7.2, marginal revenue decreasing, is the concavity of r(t,⋅)r(t, \cdot)r(t,⋅).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.3

For every period, Gt+1G_{t+1}Gt+1​ is jointly concave on R×[0,dˉ]\mathbb R \times [0, \bar d]R×[0,dˉ], VtV_tVt​ is concave on R\mathbb RR, and Gt+1G_{t+1}Gt+1​ has increasing differences in (y,d)(y, d)(y,d), the supermodularity that the book states through its partial derivatives: replenishment_concave_supermodular.

Supporting targets

Proposition 5.2, the marginal value of capacity in the Bernoulli model decreases in ttt and in xxx; the upper bound of Sect. 5.2.2.3, the optimal deterministic revenue dominates the optimal expected stochastic revenue; and the base-stock, posted-price structure of Sect. 5.3.2.1, derived from Proposition 5.3: below the unconstrained optimum y0y^0y0 order up to it and use d0d^0d0, above it order nothing and use a rate at least d0d^0d0 that is nondecreasing in the inventory.

Proposition 5.1 and Lemma 5-5.A.1 (the continuous-demand model without replenishment) are not targets; see the formalization scope. The deterministic sections (efficient prices, discrete price sets), the asymptotic optimality of the deterministic heuristic, the infinite-horizon stationary problem and the multiproduct and finite-population models carry no numbered results.

Significance

Proposition 5.3 is the structural core of joint pricing and inventory control: joint concavity makes the period problem a concave program, and supermodularity is what turns its solution into a policy, the base-stock, posted-price rule that Federgruen and Heching showed optimal and that later work on pricing with inventory builds on. Proposition 5.2 is the reason optimal dynamic prices in the stochastic single-item model rise at every sale and fall while inventory sits, the behaviour of Figure 5.5, and the deterministic upper bound is what justifies the fluid model as a benchmark and a heuristic, the pattern quantified in Table 5.6. None of these has a machine-checked proof; the replenishment result in particular needs the interplay of concavity, expectation and partial maximization on all of R\mathbb RR.

Difficulty

Proposition 5.2 is an induction whose step compares suprema over the rate interval, with the boundary condition Vt(0)=0V_t(0) = 0Vt​(0)=0 breaking the recursion at x=1x = 1x=1 and requiring r(t,0)=0r(t, 0) = 0r(t,0)=0. The deterministic bound is an induction on periods that uses the concavity of the deterministic value in the inventory (a concave program's value) to absorb the two branches of the Bernoulli recursion. The goal needs: integrability and continuity of Vt+1(y−D)−ht(y−D)V_{t+1}(y - D) - h_t(y - D)Vt+1​(y−D)−ht​(y−D) under bounded noise; that the expectation of a concave function of an affine map is jointly concave, and its increasing differences from those of the concave integrand; that a partial supremum of a jointly concave function over the convex feasible set {y≥x}\{y \ge x\}{y≥x} is concave in xxx; and the boundedness of the objective so that every supremum is a real number. The base-stock item is the segment argument that moves an unconstrained maximizer onto the boundary y=xy = xy=x and a monotone comparative-statics argument on the supermodular objective, with maxima attained by continuity on the compact rate interval.

Formalization scope

Periods are natural numbers with value t the value with T+1−tT + 1 - tT+1−t periods to go, the maxima are suprema, and the book's ranges are hypotheses. The demand is affine in the rate, which is the additive and multiplicative models the book names; with a merely convex demand (Assumption 5.1) the joint concavity of Proposition 5.3 fails when Vt+1−htV_{t+1} - h_tVt+1​−ht​ is not monotone, and the noise has bounded support, strengthening Assumption 7.6. The partial-derivative statements (iii)-(iv) are in difference form. Proposition 5.1 is not formalized: its model (5.11) evaluates Vt+1(x−D)V_{t+1}(x - D)Vt+1​(x−D) at negative inventories the model does not define while truncating revenue at xxx, and its Lemma 5-5.A.1 (joint concavity of r+r^+r+) is false as stated, its Hessian argument mistaking an indefinite matrix for a negative definite one; a counterexample is in the mission's check. The deterministic model restricts rates to [0,1][0, 1][0,1], the rates the Bernoulli model can realize.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • G. Gallego and G. J. van Ryzin, Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons, Management Science 40(8), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • A. Federgruen and A. Heching, Combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty, Operations Research 47(3), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.3.454
  • W. Elmaghraby and P. Keskinocak, Dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations, Management Science 49(10), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1287.17315
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: naimengye

The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management IV: AuctionsTextbook

Why a reserve price, and why it does not matter which auction

Airlines selling last seats, Priceline's name-your-own-price, procurement of supply contracts: Chapter 6 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) treats auctions as pricing mechanisms and asks what revenue they earn and how to design them. Its centre is Myerson's (1981) theory for independent private values: whatever the mechanism, so long as bidders with higher valuations are more likely to win and the lowest type gains nothing, the firm's expected revenue is the expected virtual value ∑iJ(vi)yi(v)\sum_i J(v_i) y_i(v)∑i​J(vi​)yi​(v) of the winners, with J(v)=v−(1−F(v))/f(v)J(v) = v - (1 - F(v))/f(v)J(v)=v−(1−F(v))/f(v) (Theorem 6.1, the revenue equivalence theorem). Maximizing that expression pointwise gives the optimal auction: the standard first- or second-price auction with a reserve price v∗v^*v∗ at the zero of JJJ (Theorem 6.2). This mission formalizes the second-price form of Theorem 6.2 as its goal, with the dominant-strategy and first-price equilibria of the informal analysis, Theorem 6.1, the optimal allocation and Proposition 6.1 on list prices as supporting results.

Setting

NNN customers have i.i.d. valuations on [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ] with a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing distribution FFF and positive density fff (PrivateValues, IsRegular); the joint law is the product measure (joint). A direct-revelation mechanism (Mechanism) maps reported valuations to allocations yi(v)∈{0,1}y_i(v) \in \{0, 1\}yi​(v)∈{0,1}, at most CCC units in total, and payments pi(v)p_i(v)pi​(v). For a report www by customer iii, Pi(w)P_i(w)Pi​(w) is the win probability, Ri(w)R_i(w)Ri​(w) the expected payment and Si(w)=wPi(w)−Ri(w)S_i(w) = w P_i(w) - R_i(w)Si​(w)=wPi​(w)−Ri​(w) the surplus (winProb, expPayment, expSurplus); incentive compatibility, Si(w)≥wPi(w′)−Ri(w′)S_i(w) \ge w P_i(w') - R_i(w')Si​(w)≥wPi​(w′)−Ri​(w′), is the equilibrium condition of the direct mechanism (IsIncentiveCompatible). The chapter's mechanisms are the CCC-unit second-price auction with reserve price rrr (secondPriceReserve: the CCC highest valuations above rrr win and pay the larger of rrr and the highest losing valuation), the list-price mechanism for N≤CN \le CN≤C (listPrice), and the single-unit first-price auction with its equilibrium bid b∗(v)=v−∫0vP(s) ds/P(v)b^*(v) = v - \int_0^v P(s)\,ds / P(v)b∗(v)=v−∫0v​P(s)ds/P(v), P=FN−1P = F^{N-1}P=FN−1 (firstPriceBid).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2

With JJJ strictly increasing (Assumption 7.2) and v∗v^*v∗ its zero, the CCC-unit second-price auction with reserve price v∗v^*v∗ is a feasible, incentive-compatible mechanism with monotone allocations and zero surplus at zero, and its expected revenue is at least that of every such mechanism: reserve_price_auction_optimal.

Supporting targets

Bidding one's valuation is dominant in the second-price auction (Sect. 6.2.2.1); the bid (6.4) solves the first-order condition (6.3), is a symmetric equilibrium of the first-price auction and shades below the valuation (Sect. 6.2.2.2); Theorem 6.1, revenue equals expected virtual surplus and each expected payment is wPi(w)−∫0wPiw P_i(w) - \int_0^w P_iwPi​(w)−∫0w​Pi​; the pointwise optimal allocation of Sect. 6.2.5; and Proposition 6.1, a list price at v∗v^*v∗ is optimal when N≤CN \le CN≤C.

Proposition 6.2 (asymptotic optimality of list prices, a law-of-large-numbers statement about scaled auctions), the first-price form of Theorem 6.2 with its equilibrium (6.9) stated without proof, and the dynamic, replenishment and network auctions of Sects. 6.3-6.5 (Propositions 6.3-6.11, from Vulcano, van Ryzin and Maglaras and from Cooper and Menich) are not targets of this mission.

Significance

Theorem 6.1 is the tool that lets revenue be computed from allocations alone, which is why the first- and second-price auctions of Examples 6.1-6.3 earn the same (N−1)/(N+1)(N-1)/(N+1)(N−1)/(N+1) and why any dynamic pricing scheme that ends with the same winners earns the same as the optimal auction (Sect. 6.2.6.3). Theorem 6.2 says a firm with private-value customers cannot do better than a standard auction with the right reserve price, and Proposition 6.1 that with enough capacity a list price already does it: auctions are a small-numbers phenomenon. These are the foundations on which the chapter's dynamic auctions and the list-price comparisons of Sects. 6.3-6.4 rest, and Myerson's optimal auction has no machine-checked proof in its multi-unit form.

Difficulty

Theorem 6.1 is an envelope argument in measure-theoretic clothing: incentive compatibility gives the two-sided inequalities of Appendix 6.A, monotonicity of PiP_iPi​ makes SiS_iSi​ convex with derivative PiP_iPi​ almost everywhere, so Si(w)=∫0wPiS_i(w) = \int_0^w P_iSi​(w)=∫0w​Pi​, and then an integration by parts against the density converts ∫(wPi(w)−Si(w))f(w) dw\int (w P_i(w) - S_i(w)) f(w)\,dw∫(wPi​(w)−Si​(w))f(w)dw into ∫J(w)Pi(w)f(w) dw\int J(w) P_i(w) f(w)\,dw∫J(w)Pi​(w)f(w)dw; the win probabilities are integrals over a product measure with one coordinate replaced, and Fubini is needed to return to E[J(vi)yi(v)]\mathbb E[J(v_i) y_i(v)]E[J(vi​)yi​(v)]. The goal then needs the reserve-price auction shown incentive compatible (a dominant-strategy argument on the threshold payment), measurable, monotone and with zero surplus at zero, and the pointwise optimal allocation integrated. The first-price item is calculus on an interval integral with a vanishing denominator at 000 and a monotone comparative-statics argument for the equilibrium inequality.

Formalization scope

Mechanisms are direct-revelation mechanisms on [0,vˉ]N[0, \bar v]^N[0,vˉ]N, as the book reduces to in Sect. 6.2.3.1; expectations over the other customers are integrals over the joint law with customer iii's coordinate overwritten by the report. Payments are assumed bounded on reports in [0,vˉ]N[0, \bar v]^N[0,vˉ]N (not on all of RN\mathbb R^NRN, where the second-price payment is unbounded) and the rules measurable. Ties in the second-price auction are broken by index, a null event, and when every customer wins the losing supremum is 000 so the winner pays the reserve. Theorem 6.2 is stated for the second-price auction; the first-price version with reserve price, whose equilibrium (6.9) the book asserts without proof, is left out and noted. Optimality is over mechanisms satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6.1 and incentive compatibility, which is the class the book compares against. The virtual value's zero v∗v^*v∗ is a parameter with J(v∗)=0J(v^*) = 0J(v∗)=0 rather than the maximum of (6.8), which under strict monotonicity is the same point.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 6. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. G. Riley and W. F. Samuelson, Optimal auctions, American Economic Review 71(3), 1981. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1802786
  • P. Klemperer, Auction theory: a guide to the literature, Journal of Economic Surveys 13(3), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00083
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1), 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • E. Maskin and J. Riley, Optimal multi-unit auctions, in The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Oxford University Press, 1989.
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XI: The Traveling Salesman ProblemTextbook

The problem every routing model contains

A salesman must visit nnn cities and return home by the shortest route. The traveling salesman problem is the prototype of combinatorial optimization: easy to state, NP-hard (Karp 1972), and solved to optimality on instances with tens of thousands of nodes by branch-and-cut. In a supply chain it is the core of every vehicle routing model and of the location-routing models of the chapters that follow. Chapter 10 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) covers the symmetric metric TSP, in which distances satisfy the triangle inequality: the cutting planes of branch-and-cut (comb inequalities), the construction heuristics with their worst-case guarantees, culminating in Christofides' (1976) 3/2-approximation, and the lower bounds of Little et al. and of Held and Karp (1970). This mission formalizes those results, with Christofides' theorem as its goal.

Setting

Nodes are N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} with distances cijc_{ij}cij​ that are symmetric, nonnegative, zero on the diagonal and satisfy the triangle inequality cij≤cik+ckjc_{ij} \le c_{ik} + c_{kj}cij​≤cik​+ckj​ (IsMetric). A tour is a visiting order τ\tauτ of all the nodes, of length z(τ)=∑kc(τk,τk+1)z(\tau) = \sum_k c(\tau_k, \tau_{k+1})z(τ)=∑k​c(τk​,τk+1​) with indices mod nnn (tourLength); z∗z^*z∗ is the least tour length (optTourLength). A tour has an edge set (tourEdges), and for a node set SSS the counts of tour edges inside SSS and leaving SSS (edgesWithin, edgesLeaving) are the sums ∑i,j∈Sxij\sum_{i,j \in S} x_{ij}∑i,j∈S​xij​ and ∑i∈S,j∉Sxij\sum_{i \in S, j \notin S} x_{ij}∑i∈S,j∈/S​xij​ of the integer programming formulation. A comb is a handle HHH with an odd number s≥3s \ge 3s≥3 of pairwise disjoint teeth, each meeting both HHH and its complement (IsComb); when every tooth has exactly two nodes the comb is a 2-matching configuration.

The nearest neighbor heuristic always moves to a nearest unvisited node (IsNearestNeighborTour); the nearest insertion heuristic grows a partial tour by inserting the unvisited node nearest to it at the cheapest position (IsNearestInsertionRun, with cycleLength and distToTour). The minimum spanning tree heuristic doubles an MST (IsMST, graphWeight), takes an Eulerian tour of the doubled tree and shortcuts it, visiting the nodes in order of first appearance (IsShortcut). Christofides' heuristic instead adds to the MST a minimum-weight perfect matching on its odd-degree nodes (oddNodes, IsMinMatchingOn) before taking the Eulerian tour. A 1-tree rooted at rrr is a spanning tree on the other nodes plus two edges at rrr (Is1Tree); the revised distances cij′=cij+λi+λjc'_{ij} = c_{ij} + \lambda_i + \lambda_jcij′​=cij​+λi​+λj​ (revisedCost) define the Held-Karp bound.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10.13

For every metric instance, every minimum spanning tree T∗T^*T∗, every minimum-weight perfect matching MMM on the odd-degree nodes of T∗T^*T∗, every Eulerian tour of T∗+MT^* + MT∗+M and its shortcut τ\tauτ,

z(τ)  ≤  32 z∗.z(\tau) \;\le\; \tfrac{3}{2}\, z^*.z(τ)≤23​z∗.

This is christofides_bound.

Supporting targets

Theorem 10.1, the reduced-matrix bound ∑iρi+∑jκj≤z∗\sum_i \rho_i + \sum_j \kappa_j \le z^*∑i​ρi​+∑j​κj​≤z∗; Theorem 10.2, Proposition 10.3 and Theorem 10.4, the 2-matching and comb inequalities valid for every tour; Theorem 10.6, zNN≤12(⌈log⁡2n⌉+1)z∗z_{NN} \le \frac{1}{2}(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil + 1) z^*zNN​≤21​(⌈log2​n⌉+1)z∗; Theorem 10.7, zNI≤2z∗z_{NI} \le 2z^*zNI​≤2z∗; Lemma 10.9, z(T∗)≤z∗z(T^*) \le z^*z(T∗)≤z∗; Theorem 10.10, Euler's theorem; Theorem 10.11, zMST≤2z∗z_{MST} \le 2z^*zMST​≤2z∗; Lemma 10.12, the handshaking lemma; Lemma 10.15, the 1-tree bound; Lemma 10.16, the revised distance identities; Theorem 10.17, the Held-Karp bound. Theorem 10.5 (no constant-factor approximation unless P = NP), Theorem 10.8 and the second part of Theorem 10.6 (tightness instances), Lemma 10.14 (Euclidean tours do not cross), Lemma 10.18 (the integrality gap) and Theorem 10.19 (the Beardwood-Halton-Hammersley asymptotics) are not targets.

Significance

Christofides' bound was the best approximation guarantee for the metric TSP for over forty years, until the 3/2−10−363/2 - 10^{-36}3/2−10−36 of Karlin, Klein and Oveis Gharan (2021), and it is the reference point against which every heuristic in the chapter is measured: nearest neighbor has no constant bound, nearest insertion and the MST heuristic achieve 222, Christofides 3/23/23/2. The comb inequalities are the cuts that make branch-and-cut work, and the Held-Karp bound is the lower bound that tells a practitioner how far a heuristic tour is from optimal. Theorem 10.1 is the historical bounding rule of the first branch-and-bound algorithm.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorems 10.2, 10.11, 10.13 and 10.17 and Proposition 10.3 and Lemma 10.9, cites Theorems 10.6, 10.7 and 10.10, and leaves Theorem 10.4 and Lemmas 10.12 and 10.16 as exercises. The formal infrastructure for tours, shortcutting and Eulerian walks is reusable for the vehicle routing chapter.

Difficulty

Christofides' argument has three steps and each has a formal obstacle. The MST bound is a spanning-path argument that needs the removal of an edge from a tour to yield a tree, in Mathlib's terms a connected acyclic subgraph of the complete graph. The matching bound is the subtle one: the optimal tour shortcut to the odd-degree nodes, of length at most z∗z^*z∗ by the triangle inequality, is an even cycle whose alternate edges form two perfect matchings on those nodes, the cheaper of which costs at most z∗/2z^*/2z∗/2; formalizing the decomposition of a cycle on an even node set into two matchings, and the shortcut's length bound, is the bulk of the work. The final step, that shortcutting an Eulerian walk does not lengthen it, is an induction along the walk using the triangle inequality on the skipped stretches, and it needs the first-occurrence order to be handled explicitly.

The obvious approach to the heuristic bounds, comparing the heuristic tour directly with the optimal tour, fails; every proof goes through a spanning tree. For nearest insertion the tree is Prim's, grown in the same order as the insertions, and the bound charges each insertion cost to a tree edge; for nearest neighbor the argument of Rosenkrantz et al. bounds the sum of the kkk largest steps by 2z∗2z^*2z∗ for each kkk and sums a geometric series, which is where the logarithm comes from.

The comb inequalities are counting arguments on degrees, but the general comb of Theorem 10.4 needs the case analysis of how a tour enters and leaves each tooth. Euler's theorem in the sufficiency direction is Hierholzer's construction, which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Tours are permutations of Fin n, so a tour is an ordering rather than an edge set, and every tie-breaking of a heuristic is covered by a predicate on its output rather than by an algorithm. Graphs are Mathlib SimpleGraphs on Fin n; the multigraphs of the two tree heuristics are represented by closed walks with prescribed edge multisets, and shortcutting is the first-occurrence order along the walk's node sequence. All degree and edge-set computations use classical decidability. Theorems on tours assume n≥3n \ge 3n≥3 where a tour must have distinct edges, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 otherwise.

Theorem 10.1 is stated for the reduction of the full off-diagonal matrix, because the book's upper-triangular version is false: a random metric instance violates it, since the last row and first column of a triangular matrix are empty and the two edges at a node need not be one row and one column entry. The full-matrix version is the statement of Little et al. It is stated for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, because a one-node "tour" is a self-loop that no off-diagonal entry constrains.

Theorem 10.4 is stated with the comb inequality's right-hand side corrected to ∣H∣+∑k(∣Tk∣−1)−12(s+1)|H| + \sum_k(|T_k| - 1) - \tfrac{1}{2}(s+1)∣H∣+∑k​(∣Tk​∣−1)−21​(s+1), the standard form. The book prints +12(s−1)+\tfrac{1}{2}(s-1)+21​(s−1), which contradicts its own 2-matching special case (10.15) and is weaker by sss. The corrected statement implies the printed one.

The 111-tree root is an explicit node rrr, the book's node 111. The nearest insertion run is a sequence of lists indexed by iteration, and the theorem compares the nnn-th list's closed length with z∗z^*z∗; a run always exists, so the hypothesis is satisfiable.

The definition module is shared by all fifteen items. Theorem 10.8 and Problem 10.12 (tightness of the bounds of 222), the second part of Theorem 10.6, and Lemma 10.18 on the integrality gap are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 10. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • N. Christofides, Worst-case analysis of a new heuristic for the travelling salesman problem, Report 388, GSIA, Carnegie Mellon University, 1976; reprinted in Operations Research Forum 3, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43069-021-00101-z
  • D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns and P. M. Lewis II, An analysis of several heuristics for the traveling salesman problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(3), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
  • M. Held and R. M. Karp, The traveling-salesman problem and minimum spanning trees, Operations Research 18(6), 1970. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.18.6.1138
  • J. D. C. Little, K. G. Murty, D. W. Sweeney and C. Karel, An algorithm for the traveling salesman problem, Operations Research 11(6), 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.6.972
  • M. Grötschel and M. W. Padberg, On the symmetric travelling salesman problem I and II, Mathematical Programming 16, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582116
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XII: The Vehicle Routing ProblemTextbook

Many vehicles, one depot

The vehicle routing problem asks for the cheapest set of delivery routes from a depot to a set of customers when each vehicle can carry only so much. It generalizes the traveling salesman problem, which is the case of a single vehicle of unlimited capacity, and it is the operational problem behind every distribution fleet. Exact methods reach a few hundred customers; the questions that shape fleet design are structural: how does the optimal routing cost compare with the cost of a single grand tour, and how does it grow with the number of customers? Haimovich and Rinnooy Kan (1985) answered both for unit demands by bounding the optimal cost above and below in terms of the optimal TSP tour and the average distance to the depot. Chapter 11 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) presents that result with its full proof as Theorem 11.6, and it is the goal of this mission.

Setting

Nodes are the depot 000 and customers 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n, with distances cijc_{ij}cij​ that are symmetric, nonnegative and satisfy the triangle inequality (VRPMetric). Every customer has demand 111 and every vehicle capacity CCC, so a route is a sequence of at most CCC distinct customers, served by one vehicle that leaves the depot, visits them in order and returns; its length is routeCost c L. A solution is a family of routes visiting every customer exactly once (IsVRPSolution), with total length solutionCost; the number of routes is free. The optimal VRP value z∗z^*z∗ (vrpOpt c C) is the least total length, the optimal TSP value zTz_TzT​ (tspOpt c) is the least length of a single route through all customers, and cˉ\bar ccˉ (avgDepotDist) is the average distance from the depot to a customer.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11.6

For every metric instance with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 customers and capacity C≥1C \ge 1C≥1,

max⁡{2nCcˉ, zT}  ≤  z∗  ≤  2⌈nC⌉cˉ+(1−1C)zT.\max\Big\{2\frac{n}{C}\bar c,\ z_T\Big\} \;\le\; z^* \;\le\; 2\Big\lceil\frac{n}{C}\Big\rceil\bar c + \Big(1 - \frac{1}{C}\Big)z_T.max{2Cn​cˉ, zT​}≤z∗≤2⌈Cn​⌉cˉ+(1−C1​)zT​.

This is vrp_tsp_bounds.

Supporting targets

The three steps of the book's proof: the radial bound 2nCcˉ≤z∗2\frac{n}{C}\bar c \le z^*2Cn​cˉ≤z∗, obtained route by route from the triangle inequality and the capacity; the routing bound zT≤z∗z_T \le z^*zT​≤z∗; and the iterated optimal tour partition bound (11.59), that for any tour Γ\GammaΓ through all customers some partition of its customer sequence into ⌈n/C⌉\lceil n/C\rceil⌈n/C⌉ consecutive routes costs at most 2⌈n/C⌉cˉ+(1−⌈n/C⌉/n) z(Γ)2\lceil n/C\rceil\bar c + (1 - \lceil n/C\rceil/n)\,z(\Gamma)2⌈n/C⌉cˉ+(1−⌈n/C⌉/n)z(Γ).

The chapter's other numbered results are not targets: Proposition 11.1 (state-space relaxation of the routing dynamic program) and Theorem 11.2 (the capacitated comb inequality, proof omitted, which needs the bin-packing function v(S)v(S)v(S)), and Theorems 11.3, 11.5, 11.7 and Lemma 11.4 (almost-sure asymptotics of random instances and the location-based heuristic), whose proofs the book cites.

Significance

Theorem 11.6 is the quantitative link between routing and the two things a planner can estimate without solving anything: the TSP length, which grows like n\sqrt{n}n​ for random customers, and the average depot distance. It says that the VRP cost is the TSP cost plus a radial term 2cˉ2\bar c2cˉ per vehicle, and that this decomposition is exact up to a factor bounded by the capacity. The radial term explains Theorem 11.7, that the optimal cost grows linearly in nnn for fixed capacity, and the tour partition heuristic in the proof is a practical route-first-cluster-second method with a provable guarantee. The bounds are the basis of the continuous approximation formulas used in strategic distribution design.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves Theorem 11.6 in full. The formal treatment of routes as lists and of the averaging argument over rotations of a tour is reusable for the capacitated heuristics of Sect. 11.3.

Difficulty

The upper bound is an averaging argument that is easy to state and fiddly to formalize: for each of the nnn rotations of the tour's customer sequence, the sequence is cut into blocks of CCC, and one must count, across all rotations, how often each customer is the first or last of a block and how often each tour edge is cut. The counts, ℓ=⌈n/C⌉\ell = \lceil n/C\rceilℓ=⌈n/C⌉ each, hold only after the rotations are indexed carefully, and the passage from the average to the best rotation needs the sum of the nnn solution costs computed exactly.

The lower bound has two parts with different flavors. The radial part needs, for each route, that the closed route from the depot is at least twice the largest depot distance among its customers, which is the triangle inequality applied along the route, followed by an averaging step that uses the capacity. The routing part is a shortcutting argument: the routes of a solution concatenate into a closed walk that revisits the depot, and removing the repeated depot visits must not increase the length. The obvious idea, that a VRP solution is itself a tour, is false, and the shortcut has to be constructed.

Formalization scope

Routes are lists of customers, solutions are lists of routes, and the feasibility predicate requires nonempty routes of length at most CCC avoiding the depot, with the concatenation of all routes a duplicate-free list containing every customer. Costs use the closed walk through the depot followed by the route. The optimal values are infima of finite nonempty sets of reals, nonempty because singleton routes are feasible when C≥1C \ge 1C≥1. The ceiling ⌈n/C⌉\lceil n/C\rceil⌈n/C⌉ is Mathlib's Nat.ceil of the real quotient. The number of vehicles is unrestricted, as the section assumes; the fixed-fleet version of the problem is not modeled.

The TSP value zTz_TzT​ is defined as the least route cost over all orderings of the customers, so no separate tour model is needed and the mission does not depend on the TSP mission of this series.

The definition module is shared by all five items. Problem 11.18 (tightness of both bounds) and Theorem 11.7 for deterministic instance families are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 11. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • M. Haimovich and A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Bounds and heuristics for capacitated routing problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 10(4), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.527
  • P. Toth and D. Vigo (eds.), Vehicle Routing: Problems, Methods, and Applications, 2nd ed., SIAM, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973594
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The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management V: CompetitionTextbook

When competing firms settle on prices and allocations

Revenue management is practised by firms that compete: airlines matching fares while allocating seats, retailers ordering stock and then pricing to clear it, hotels protecting rooms for late high-paying guests. Chapter 8 of Talluri and van Ryzin's The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2004) surveys the economics behind these situations: monopoly pricing and mechanism design, the Coase problem, advance-purchase discounts, and oligopoly in quantities (Cournot), in prices (Bertrand, Bertrand–Edgeworth with capacities), in newsvendor capacities and in RM allocations. Most of its numbered results are quoted from the literature; what the book itself establishes is a family of equilibrium arguments built on Talluri's equilibrium graph: when each firm's best response moves monotonically with the rival's action, following best-response arcs must end in an equilibrium pair. This mission formalizes those arguments, with Proposition 8.3, existence of an equilibrium in offer sets under the multinomial-logit choice model, as the goal.

Setting

A two-firm game on finite chains of strategies has payoffs u1,u2u_1, u_2u1​,u2​, best responses and pure Nash equilibria (IsBestResponse1, IsNashEquilibrium); its equilibrium graph has no crossing arcs (NoCrossing1) when best-response arcs (k2,k1)(k_2, k_1)(k2​,k1​), (l2,l1)(l_2, l_1)(l2​,l1​) with k2<l2k_2 < l_2k2​<l2​ always have k1≤l1k_1 \le l_1k1​≤l1​. The chapter's games are: the RM duopoly of Sect. 8.4.1.3, two firms with capacity CCC and fares pL<pHp_L < p_HpL​<pH​ whose high-fare demand spills over to the rival beyond its protection level (spilloverDemand), each firm answering with Littlewood's protection level (littlewoodResponse); the duopoly newsvendor of Example 8.16 with effective demands R1=D1+(D2−x2)+R_1 = D_1 + (D_2 - x_2)^+R1​=D1​+(D2​−x2​)+ (effectiveDemand); linear Cournot (cournotPayoff); Bertrand–Edgeworth price competition with capacity CCC per firm, linear demand and efficient rationing (beSales, bePayoff, IsBEEquilibrium); the advance-purchase model of Sect. 8.3.6 (peakLoadRevenue, advancePurchaseRevenue); and the one-period offer-set game of Sect. 8.4.3.2, where a firm offering its first kkk products earns g(Ck)/(W1(k)+W2(l)+w0)g(C_k)/(W_1(k) + W_2(l) + w_0)g(Ck​)/(W1​(k)+W2​(l)+w0​) with g(Ck)=∑j≤kwj(pj−Δ)−w0δg(C_k) = \sum_{j \le k} w_j(p_j - \Delta) - w_0\deltag(Ck​)=∑j≤k​wj​(pj​−Δ)−w0​δ (OfferFirm, offerPayoff1, CaseI, CaseII).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8.3

If both firms are in Case I (g(G∗)≥0g(G^*) \ge 0g(G∗)≥0) or both in Case II (g<0g < 0g<0 on every complete set), the offer-set game has a pure-strategy equilibrium in complete sets: mnl_offer_set_equilibrium.

Supporting targets

The equilibrium-graph lemma, monotone best responses for both firms give an equilibrium (Sect. 8.4.1.3); Proposition 8.1, Littlewood responses in the RM duopoly are monotone in the rival's protection level, and the resulting equilibrium of the RM duopoly game; Example 8.16, duopoly newsvendor capacities total at least the monopoly capacity; Example 8.15, the symmetric Cournot equilibrium and its price; Theorem 8.5 (i)-(ii), the pure-strategy Bertrand–Edgeworth equilibria; and the advance-purchase comparison of Sect. 8.3.6, w2<w^w_2 < \hat ww2​<w^ and VAPD(w^)≥Vpeak(w2)V_{APD}(\hat w) \ge V_{peak}(w_2)VAPD​(w^)≥Vpeak​(w2​).

Not targets: Theorems 8.1-8.2 (the Coase problem, subgame-perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game, proofs in von der Fehr and Kühn), Theorem 8.3 (Harris–Raviv priority pricing, stated with a garbled price formula), Theorem 8.4 (existence via quasiconcavity, cited), Theorem 8.5 (iii), 8.6 and 8.7-8.8 (mixed-strategy and supergame equilibria of Kreps and Scheinkman and Benoit and Krishna), Proposition 8.2 and Proposition 8.4 (the dynamic offer-set game under condition (8.32), proved in Talluri's paper), and the Kreps–Scheinkman derivation of Sect. 8.4.1.6, which rests on Theorem 8.6.

Significance

The equilibrium graph is the chapter's own contribution: a bipartite picture of best responses on chains in which monotonicity, the absence of crossing arcs, forces an equilibrium. It is the finite, combinatorial form of the monotone comparative-statics route to Nash equilibrium (Tarski's fixed point on a chain), and it is what makes RM allocation games tractable: the two-class duopoly with Littlewood responses always has an equilibrium, and the offer-set duopoly does whenever the two firms face the same sign of ggg, while Example 8.18 shows a best-response cycle when they do not. The Bertrand–Edgeworth, Cournot and newsvendor results are the benchmarks the book uses to interpret RM competition: capacity constraints soften Bertrand's zero-profit outcome, competing in allocations tends to raise total capacity above the monopoly level, and advance-purchase discounts dominate peak-load pricing as a self-selection mechanism. None of these has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The lemma and the goal are fixed-point arguments on finite chains: the largest best response is a monotone map of the rival's index, the composition of two monotone (or two antitone) maps on a finite chain has a fixed point, and for the offer-set game the monotonicity itself must be extracted from the ratio structure g(Ck)/(W(k)+a)g(C_k)/(W(k) + a)g(Ck​)/(W(k)+a) as in the appendix's inequalities (8.A.3)-(8.A.5), separately in the two cases. Proposition 8.1 is a monotonicity of tail probabilities under the pointwise order of effective demands. Example 8.16 is a short probabilistic argument that needs the identity {D>x1+x2}={R1>x1}∩{R2>x2}\{D > x_1 + x_2\} = \{R_1 > x_1\} \cap \{R_2 > x_2\}{D>x1​+x2​}={R1​>x1​}∩{R2​>x2​} and the strict monotonicity of the tail. Theorem 8.5 requires computing efficient-rationing sales for every unilateral deviation from a symmetric profile, through the recursive definition of residual demand, and a quadratic inequality for upward deviations in part (ii). The advance-purchase item reduces to the identity VAPD(w)−Vpeak(w)=(1−α)wV_{APD}(w) - V_{peak}(w) = (1 - \alpha)wVAPD​(w)−Vpeak​(w)=(1−α)w and the strict decrease of the first-order-condition function.

Formalization scope

Products, protection levels and complete sets are natural numbers; the offer-set game's strategies are the complete sets C1,…,CnC_1, \dots, C_nC1​,…,Cn​ of the book, and its payoff is (8.31) up to the positive factor λ\lambdaλ and the terms independent of both offer sets. Prices decreasing in the product index are a hypothesis, as the nested-by-revenue order of Sect. 8.4.3.2. The RM duopoly is modeled through Littlewood's response, as the book's appendix argues, rather than through expected revenues. Efficient rationing is defined recursively over the firms priced strictly below a given firm, with equal sharing among firms at the same price. Example 8.16 is stated with the equilibrium conditions (8.23) and the strictly increasing distribution of aggregate demand as hypotheses. The advance-purchase item takes the first-order conditions (8.13) and (8.15) and the book's uniqueness assumption as hypotheses, the latter as (v−w)−F(w)/f(w)(v - w) - F(w)/f(w)(v−w)−F(w)/f(w) strictly decreasing in www (the page prints "increasing", but its footnote identifies it with the monotone marginal-revenue assumption, which is decreasing in the waiting cost). Theorem 8.5 is stated for its pure-strategy parts (i) and (ii) only.

Selected references

  • K. T. Talluri and G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer, 2004, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • D. M. Kreps and J. A. Scheinkman, Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes, Bell Journal of Economics 14(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003636
  • S. A. Lippman and K. F. McCardle, The competitive newsboy, Operations Research 45(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.1.54
  • S. Netessine and R. A. Shumsky, Revenue management games: horizontal and vertical competition, Management Science 51(5), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0356
  • I. L. Gale and T. J. Holmes, Advance-purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity, American Economic Review 83(1), 1993. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117500
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XIII: AuctionsTextbook

When is the auctioneer's revenue acceptable?

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is the textbook mechanism for selling several objects at once: bidders report valuations for bundles, the auctioneer computes the welfare-maximizing allocation, and each winner pays the externality it imposes on the others. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy and the outcome is efficient. Yet Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) catalogued its practical defects: revenue can be zero when the objects are valuable, revenue can fall when bidders or bids are added, losing bidders can profit by colluding, and a bidder can profit from false identities. Chapter 15 of Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory (2019) reproduces those examples and then gives the cooperative-game answer to when they cannot occur: the VCG payoff vector should lie in the core, the set of outcomes no coalition of auctioneer and bidders can improve upon, and it does so for every set of participants exactly when the coalitional value function is bidder-submodular. This mission formalizes that characterization, Theorem 15.3, together with the lemma and theorem leading to it.

Setting

Players are the auctioneer 000 and bidders 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n. A coalitional value function VVV assigns to each coalition TTT the value it can create by trading among themselves: 000 if the auctioneer, who owns the objects, is not in TTT, and otherwise the optimal value of the auctioneer's allocation problem among the bidders of TTT, each bidder receiving at most one bundle and bundles disjoint (capValue). Two properties of VVV are all the theory uses: coalitions without the auctioneer are worthless, and adding players never lowers the value (IsCoalitionalValue).

A payoff vector π\piπ gives each player a payoff. It lies in the core of the game on a coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0 (InCore V S π) if the payoffs of SSS sum to V(S)V(S)V(S) and no sub-coalition T⊆ST \subseteq ST⊆S is paid less than V(T)V(T)V(T). The VCG payoff vector πˉ(S)\bar\pi(S)πˉ(S) (vcgPayoff) pays each bidder kkk its marginal contribution V(S)−V(S∖k)V(S) - V(S \setminus k)V(S)−V(S∖k), which is its valuation minus its VCG payment, and the auctioneer the remainder. A core vector is bidder dominant (BidderDominant) if every bidder weakly prefers it to every other core vector. VVV is bidder-submodular (BidderSubmodular) if each bidder's marginal contribution weakly decreases as the coalition grows.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15.3

For a coalitional value function VVV, the following are equivalent: (i) VVV is bidder-submodular; (ii) for every coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0 the core equals ΠS={π:∑k∈Sπk=V(S), 0≤πk≤πˉk(S) ∀k∈S∖0}\Pi_S = \{\pi : \sum_{k \in S}\pi_k = V(S),\ 0 \le \pi_k \le \bar\pi_k(S)\ \forall k \in S \setminus 0\}ΠS​={π:∑k∈S​πk​=V(S), 0≤πk​≤πˉk​(S) ∀k∈S∖0}; (iii) for every coalition S∋0S \ni 0S∋0, πˉ(S)\bar\pi(S)πˉ(S) lies in the core of SSS. This is vcg_core_characterization.

Supporting targets

That the combinatorial auction's VVV is a coalitional value function; Lemma 15.1, the core is nonempty and each bidder's VCG payoff is the largest it receives at any core point; Theorem 15.2, the VCG vector is the bidder-dominant core point when it is in the core, and otherwise no bidder-dominant point exists and the auctioneer's VCG payoff is below every core payoff.

The English auction of Sect. 15.2, presented as a primal-dual interpretation of a linear program, and the combinatorial allocation problem of Sect. 15.3 carry no numbered results and are not targets.

Significance

Theorem 15.3 is the criterion an auction designer can check before running a VCG auction: when the bidders' valuations make VVV bidder-submodular (for instance when objects are substitutes), the VCG outcome is a competitive outcome, its revenue meets the core benchmark, and none of the defects of Sect. 15.4.2 can arise; when they do not, Theorem 15.2 says the auctioneer's revenue is strictly below every competitive outcome. The result underlies the ascending package auctions proposed as VCG alternatives and the procurement auctions used in supply chains, such as the combinatorial reverse auctions of the chapter's case study.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The book proves all three. The formal treatment of the core and of marginal-contribution vectors is reusable for the cooperative-game models of cost allocation in supply chains.

Difficulty

The theorems are combinatorial statements about a function on finite sets, and the difficulty is entirely in the bookkeeping of coalitions. Lemma 15.1 needs the explicit core vector of its proof to be verified against every sub-coalition, which splits into cases on whether the sub-coalition contains the auctioneer and the distinguished bidder. The implication (i) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (ii) telescopes marginal contributions along a chain of coalitions between a sub-coalition and SSS, and the chain has to be built and its sum computed. The implication (iii) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (i) is the delicate one: a failure of submodularity is a pair of nested coalitions, and the proof needs to extract from it a single-element step at which a bidder's marginal contribution increases, then show the two-bidder sub-coalition blocks the VCG vector. The obvious idea, that submodularity can be checked only on single-element extensions, is correct but must itself be proved.

Formalization scope

Coalitions are finite sets of Fin (n+1) and payoff vectors are functions on all players; the core and ΠS\Pi_SΠS​ constrain only the players of SSS, so vectors differing outside SSS are interchangeable. The core's budget equation sums over all players of the coalition, including the auctioneer, which is what the book's proofs use although its displayed definition sums over the bidders. The theorems take VVV as any function with the two properties, and the auction's VVV is shown to have them; the VCG vector is defined by the formulas (15.23) and (15.24) rather than through the payment rule, whose equivalence is the book's derivation. Bidder-submodularity is stated for S⊆S′S \subseteq S'S⊆S′ rather than proper inclusion, which changes nothing.

The definition module is shared by all five items. The single-item English auction as a primal-dual algorithm and the condition on individual preferences (substitutes) that implies bidder-submodularity are natural extensions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 15. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • L. M. Ausubel and P. Milgrom, The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction, in Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002
  • S. de Vries and R. V. Vohra, Combinatorial auctions: a survey, INFORMS Journal on Computing 15(3), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1), 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
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