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Inventory and Supply Chain

Newsvendor and base-stock models, (s, S) policies, multi-echelon systems, and supply chain contracts.

79 missions

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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains II: The Single-Unit Single-Customer DecompositionTextbook

Motivation

A base-stock (order-up-to) policy orders, in every period, exactly enough to bring the inventory position (stock on hand plus stock on order minus backorders) up to a target level. It is the policy used in practice for repairable and consumable service parts, and the analysis of every later chapter of Muckstadt's book assumes it. Its optimality is therefore a foundational question, and there are three classical ways to prove it.

  • 1960, Clark and Scarf proved optimality of echelon base-stock policies for finite-horizon serial systems by dynamic programming, decomposing the cost into one term per echelon (Management Science 6(4)).
  • 1984, Federgruen and Zipkin gave a lower-bound argument for the infinite-horizon average-cost case (Operations Research 32(4)); Chen and Song (2001) used it for Markov-modulated demand (Operations Research 49(2)).
  • 2008, Muharremoglu and Tsitsiklis introduced the single-unit single-customer approach: every unit of stock is paired with one future customer, and the inventory problem splits into countably many independent two-action problems (Operations Research 56(5)).

This mission formalizes the third approach, in the finite-horizon single-location form presented in Section 2.2.1 of Muckstadt (2005).

Setting

A single item is reviewed in periods n=1,…,Nn = 1, \dots, Nn=1,…,N. An exogenous, time-homogeneous Markov chain sns_nsn​ on a finite set Σ\SigmaΣ is observed at the start of period nnn; given sn=ss_n = ssn​=s, the demand Dn∈{0,1,2,… }D_n \in \{0,1,2,\dots\}Dn​∈{0,1,2,…} has law κ(s,⋅)\kappa(s,\cdot)κ(s,⋅) and is independent of sn+1s_{n+1}sn+1​. Excess demand is backordered.

Every unit of demand is a customer, and customers are indexed in arrival order, the v0v_0v0​ initially waiting customers first. A customer's distance is 000 once served, 111 while waiting, and 2,3,…2, 3, \dots2,3,… for future customers in the order they will arrive. Units are indexed by location: 000 (used), 111 (on hand), 2,…,m2, \dots, m2,…,m (in transit) and m+1m+1m+1 (at the supplier, which holds countably many units). The state is

xn=(sn,(z1n,y1n),(z2n,y2n),…),x_n = \big(s_n, (z_{1n}, y_{1n}), (z_{2n}, y_{2n}), \dots\big),xn​=(sn​,(z1n​,y1n​),(z2n​,y2n​),…),

with zjnz_{jn}zjn​ the location of unit jjj and yjny_{jn}yjn​ the distance of customer jjj. In period nnn: units in transit move one location closer and the released units move from m+1m+1m+1 to mmm (so an order is on hand m−1m-1m−1 periods later); the demand DnD_nDn​ brings the customers at distances 2,…,Dn+12, \dots, D_n+12,…,Dn​+1 to distance 111 and moves the others DnD_nDn​ steps closer; units on hand serve waiting customers, lowest indices first; then hhh is charged per unit on hand and bbb per waiting customer, with 0<h<b0 < h < b0<h<b. The criterion is the expected cost over the NNN periods, discounted by α∈(0,1]\alpha \in (0,1]α∈(0,1].

A policy for the whole system S\mathcal SS chooses a finite set of units at the supplier to release. It is monotone if it releases lower-indexed units first, and committed if unit jjj only ever serves customer jjj. The subsystem Sw\mathcal S_wSw​ is unit www with customer www under commitment, with state xnw=(sn,zwn,ywn)x^w_n = (s_n, z_{wn}, y_{wn})xnw​=(sn​,zwn​,ywn​) and actions Release and Hold. The set Rn∗(s,y)R^*_n(s,y)Rn∗​(s,y) contains the optimal actions of a subsystem whose unit is at the supplier and whose customer is at distance yyy, and the critical distance is

y∗(n,s)=max⁡{ y:Rn∗(s,y)∋Release }.y^*(n,s) = \max\{\, y : R^*_n(s,y) \ni \mathit{Release} \,\}.y∗(n,s)=max{y:Rn∗​(s,y)∋Release}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 29)

Every policy that, in each period nnn and Markov state sns_nsn​, releases the lowest-indexed units at the supplier to raise the inventory position to

y∗(n,sn)−1y^*(n, s_n) - 1y∗(n,sn​)−1

is optimal for S\mathcal SS among all policies, from every starting state. Such a policy exists. The levels are not fixed numbers but the critical distances of the single-unit problem, so the goal asserts the structure of an optimal policy and identifies its levels, without committing to any constant.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 26): some monotone policy is optimal, every monotone policy is committed, and so some committed policy is optimal.
  2. Theorem 4 (p. 27): the optimal cost of S\mathcal SS is the sum over www of the optimal costs of Sw\mathcal S_wSw​,
V1S(s,x1)=∑wV1(s,(zw1,yw1)),V^{\mathcal S}_1(s, x_1) = \sum_{w} V_1\big(s, (z_{w1}, y_{w1})\big),V1S​(s,x1​)=w∑​V1​(s,(zw1​,yw1​)),

and managing every subsystem independently and optimally is optimal for S\mathcal SS. 3. Lemma 2 (p. 28): Rn∗(s,y+1)={Release}R^*_n(s, y+1) = \{\mathit{Release}\}Rn∗​(s,y+1)={Release} implies Release∈Rn∗(s,y)\mathit{Release} \in R^*_n(s, y)Release∈Rn∗​(s,y). 4. Section 2.2.1.2.2 (p. 29): the critical distance policy, release if and only if y≤y∗(n,s)y \le y^*(n,s)y≤y∗(n,s), is optimal for every subsystem.

Significance

The result shows that under Markov-modulated demand a single-location system is optimally run by a state-dependent base-stock policy. The same unit–customer argument gives echelon base-stock optimality in serial systems with noncrossing stochastic lead times (Sections 2.2.2–2.2.3). The decomposition also yields the levels themselves: they are the critical distances of a two-action problem, which can be solved one customer at a time.

The theorems are proved in the literature (Muharremoglu and Tsitsiklis 2008) and in the book. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of any base-stock optimality theorem exists, by dynamic programming or by decomposition. The book's proof is informal in three places a formalization has to settle:

  • Lemma 1 is asserted as "clearly" true;
  • Lemma 2's proof by contradiction covers only uniquely optimal releases, while the critical distance policy also needs the case of ties;
  • the passage from the subsystem policy to the inventory position (Theorem 5) is an "intuitive argument".

A formal development makes each of these precise.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says that costs are linear, so the cost of S\mathcal SS is the sum of unit–customer costs and everything decouples. That is only half of Theorem 4. The pairing of unit jjj with customer jjj holds only under monotone policies, and a general policy for S\mathcal SS observes the whole infinite state xnx_nxn​, not just xnwx^w_nxnw​. The lower bound therefore needs Lemma 1 together with the fact that extra information about the demand history does not help a Markov decision problem. The upper bound needs the lowest-index matching to cost no more than committed matching.

The second difficulty is that the threshold structure is not the obvious consequence of Lemma 2. The set of distances at which releasing is optimal must be shown to be an initial segment {1,…,y∗}\{1, \dots, y^*\}{1,…,y∗} when ties are allowed. Unbounded demand makes that set possibly unbounded (it is, in the last m−1m-1m−1 periods). Finally, the release decisions of the subsystems must be counted to recover an inventory position, which uses the invariant that future customers occupy consecutive distances.

Formalization scope

Everything is in the namespace ServiceParts.UnitDecomp, with three definition files.

Model. Model bundles the chain, the demand law, mmm, hhh, bbb and α\alphaα with the standing assumptions 1≤m1 \le m1≤m, 0<h<b0 < h < b0<h<b, 0<α≤10 < \alpha \le 10<α≤1, together with the per-unit and per-customer motions and a generic finite-horizon expected-cost recursion. Costs are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

Subsystem. Subsystem defines a subsystem, its optimal cost, Rn∗R^*_nRn∗​, y∗(n,s)y^*(n,s)y∗(n,s) and the critical distance policy.

System. System defines S\mathcal SS with lowest-index matching, its policies (finite release sets), monotone and committed policies, starting states, the inventory position and the order-up-to release.

Conventions and pinnings:

  • Indexing. Units and customers are indexed from 000; Lean index jjj is the book's j+1j+1j+1.
  • Policy class. Policies are Markov: functions of the period, the Markov state and the configuration, as on p. 25.
  • Optimality. Optimal means attaining the infimum over all policies for S\mathcal SS. Restricting the class to monotone or base-stock policies would make Theorem 5 circular and is ruled out.
  • Starting states. The book's "any starting state x1x_1x1​" is the configuration built on pp. 23–24 from v0v_0v0​ and the stock at locations 1,…,m1, \dots, m1,…,m. For arbitrarily labelled states Theorem 4 is false.
  • Critical distance. y∗(n,s)y^*(n,s)y∗(n,s) is a supremum in N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞}. Where it is ∞\infty∞ (a released unit cannot arrive before the horizon), Theorem 5 leaves the policy free.
  • Distance 0. Lemma 2 and the optimality of RnR_nRn​ are stated for customers at distance at least 1. At distance 0 with the unit at the supplier (a configuration committed policies never reach), both are false as printed.

Corrections to the book:

  • h>0h > 0h>0 is added. With h=0h = 0h=0 an optimal policy with finite orders need not exist, so Theorem 5 fails.
  • Chain structure is pinned. The chain's ergodicity is unused on a finite horizon and omitted. The conditional independence of DnD_nDn​ and sn+1s_{n+1}sn+1​ given sns_nsn​ is added as a reading of "given sns_nsn​, the distribution of DnD_nDn​ is known".
  • Vacuous corner. If some state's demand has infinite mean, every policy may cost ∞\infty∞ and the optimality statements hold vacuously.

Out of scope: stochastic noncrossing lead times (Section 2.2.2), serial systems (Section 2.2.3; compare the disproved platform statement SupplyChainTheory.clark_scarf_sequential), and continuous review (Section 2.2.4, which the book calls intuitive).

Proofs of any milestone are welcome. A reusable by-product would be a general lemma that Markov policies are optimal among history-dependent ones for finite-horizon problems with countable randomness and costs in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Section 2.2, pp. 22–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • A. Muharremoglu and J. N. Tsitsiklis, A single-unit decomposition approach to multiechelon inventory systems, Operations Research 56(5), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0620
  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem, Management Science 6(4), 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational issues in an infinite-horizon, multiechelon inventory model, Operations Research 32(4), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • F. Chen and J.-S. Song, Optimal policies for multiechelon inventory problems with Markov-modulated demand, Operations Research 49(2), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.2.226.13528
8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains III: Palm's Theorem for (s–1, s) PoliciesTextbook

Motivation

Service parts (spare engines, avionics modules, repairable components) are usually managed one unit at a time: whenever a customer order removes a unit from stock, a replacement is ordered at once, from a repair shop or an outside supplier. This is the (s–1, s) policy, under which the inventory position (on hand plus on order minus backorders) stays constant at the stock level sss. Every performance measure of such a system (fill rate, expected backorders, availability) is a function of one random variable: the number of units in resupply, i.e. ordered but not yet returned. Chapter 3 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005) computes its distribution, and the rest of the book (the METRIC-type multi-echelon models of Chapters 4 and 5, the stock-level optimization of Section 3.4) is built on that computation.

Timeline. C. Palm (1938) showed, in the setting of telephone traffic, that in an infinite-server system with Poisson arrivals the number of busy servers has, in steady state, a Poisson law whose mean is the arrival rate times the mean service time, whatever the service-time distribution. Feeney and Sherbrooke (1966) carried the result to (s–1, s) inventory systems with compound Poisson demand, and treated the lost-sales case. Sherbrooke's METRIC model (1968) made the Poisson law of units in resupply the basis of multi-echelon spare-parts planning.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location. Customer orders arrive at epochs T0<T1<⋯T_0 < T_1 < \cdotsT0​<T1​<⋯ of a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, started empty at time 000: the interarrival times AkA_kAk​ are independent and exponential with rate λ\lambdaλ, and Tk=A0+⋯+AkT_k = A_0 + \cdots + A_kTk​=A0​+⋯+Ak​. The kkk-th order triggers a resupply order with resupply time Lk≥0L_k \ge 0Lk​≥0. The resupply times are independent and identically distributed, independent of the arrival process, with a density ggg, distribution function G(u)=P[L≤u]G(u) = P[L \le u]G(u)=P[L≤u] and finite mean

τˉ=E[L]=∫0∞[1−G(u)] du.\bar\tau = E[L] = \int_0^\infty [1 - G(u)]\,du .τˉ=E[L]=∫0∞​[1−G(u)]du.

With backorders allowed, the number of units in resupply at time ttt is

X(t)=#{k:Tk≤t<Tk+Lk},X(t) = \#\{k : T_k \le t < T_k + L_k\},X(t)=#{k:Tk​≤t<Tk​+Lk​},

and N(t)=#{k:Tk≤t}N(t) = \#\{k : T_k \le t\}N(t)=#{k:Tk​≤t} counts the orders placed in [0,t][0,t][0,t]. On-hand stock and backorders at time ttt are (s−X(t))+(s - X(t))^+(s−X(t))+ and (X(t)−s)+(X(t) - s)^+(X(t)−s)+.

In the compound Poisson version the kkk-th order asks for Xk≥1X_k \ge 1Xk​≥1 units, the sizes are i.i.d. with uj=P[Xk=j]u_j = P[X_k = j]uj​=P[Xk​=j], independent of arrivals and resupply times, and all units of one order share its resupply time LkL_kLk​. The units in resupply are Y(t)=∑k:Tk≤t<Tk+LkXkY(t) = \sum_{k : T_k \le t < T_k + L_k} X_kY(t)=∑k:Tk​≤t<Tk​+Lk​​Xk​. Writing un(y)u^{(y)}_nun(y)​ for the probability that yyy orders ask for nnn units in total, the compound Poisson probabilities with parameter μ\muμ are

p(n∣μ)=∑y=0nμye−μy! un(y).p(n \mid \mu) = \sum_{y=0}^{n} \frac{\mu^y e^{-\mu}}{y!}\,u^{(y)}_n .p(n∣μ)=y=0∑n​y!μye−μ​un(y)​.

In the lost-sales version an order that finds no stock on hand is lost, so at most sss units are ever in resupply.

Formalization targets

Goal: Palm's theorem (Theorem 6, p. 39)

For every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0,

lim⁡t→∞P[X(t)=x]=e−λτˉ(λτˉ)xx!.\lim_{t\to\infty} P[X(t) = x] = e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}\frac{(\lambda\bar\tau)^x}{x!}.t→∞lim​P[X(t)=x]=e−λτˉx!(λτˉ)x​.

The resupply-time law enters only through its mean. This is the statement the book's proof establishes and every later chapter uses.

The proof's milestones (pp. 38–41)

  1. Eq. (3.5): P[N(t)=n]=e−λt(λt)n/n!P[N(t) = n] = e^{-\lambda t}(\lambda t)^n/n!P[N(t)=n]=e−λt(λt)n/n!.
  2. Eq. (3.3): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the epochs (T0,…,Tn−1)(T_0, \dots, T_{n-1})(T0​,…,Tn−1​) have density n!/tnn!/t^nn!/tn on 0<t1<⋯<tn<t0 < t_1 < \cdots < t_n < t0<t1​<⋯<tn​<t.
  3. Eq. (3.7): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, X(t)X(t)X(t) is binomial with parameters nnn and p=1t∫0t[1−G(u)] dup = \frac1t\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,dup=t1​∫0t​[1−G(u)]du.
  4. Eq. (3.8): for every t>0t > 0t>0, X(t)X(t)X(t) is Poisson with mean λ∫0t[1−G(u)] du\lambda\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,duλ∫0t​[1−G(u)]du.
  5. Eq. (3.10): ∫0t[1−G(u)] du→τˉ\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,du \to \bar\tau∫0t​[1−G(u)]du→τˉ.

Extensions in Section 3.1

  1. Theorem 7 (pp. 43–44): with compound Poisson demand, lim⁡t→∞P[Y(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉ)\lim_{t\to\infty}P[Y(t) = n] = p(n \mid \lambda\bar\tau)limt→∞​P[Y(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉ).
  2. Theorem 8 (p. 44): in the lost-sales system with exponential resupply times of rate β\betaβ, the probability vectors solving the balance equations are exactly the truncated Poisson law πx∝(λ/β)x/x!\pi_x \propto (\lambda/\beta)^x/x!πx​∝(λ/β)x/x!, 0≤x≤s0 \le x \le s0≤x≤s.
  3. Theorem 9 (pp. 46–47): for a due-date delay T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, the units in resupply that have been there for at least TTT satisfy lim⁡t→∞P[YT(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉα)\lim_{t\to\infty}P[Y_T(t) = n] = p(n \mid \lambda\bar\tau\alpha)limt→∞​P[YT​(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉα) with α=1τˉ∫T∞[1−G(t)] dt\alpha = \frac1{\bar\tau}\int_T^\infty[1-G(t)]\,dtα=τˉ1​∫T∞​[1−G(t)]dt.

Significance

The result. Palm's theorem turns an infinite-dimensional object (the whole resupply-time distribution) into one number, τˉ\bar\tauτˉ. This insensitivity is what makes spare-parts planning computable: the expected backorders at stock level sss are ∑x>s(x−s) p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_{x > s}(x - s)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x>s​(x−s)p(x∣λτˉ), the fill rate is P[X≤s−1]P[X \le s - 1]P[X≤s−1], and both can be optimized over sss with only the demand rate and mean repair time as data. Theorem 7 extends this to batch demand, Theorem 9 to systems allowed a response time, and Theorem 8 gives the exact law when shortages are lost instead of backordered.

Formalizing it. All of these results are classical and proved. None of them is formalized on the platform, and Mathlib has Poisson and exponential distributions but no Poisson process, no thinning theorem and no infinite-server queue. The mission produces a Poisson arrival stream built from i.i.d. exponential gaps, the conditional-uniformity property of its epochs, independent thinning, and the M/G/∞ transient law, all reusable in queueing and inventory missions.

Difficulty

The algebra of the proof (summing the binomial against the Poisson law of N(t)N(t)N(t)) is short. The work is in the probabilistic step the book treats in a sentence: that, given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the nnn orders behave like independent uniform epochs, each of which independently is still in resupply at time ttt with the same probability ppp. This needs the joint law of the partial sums of exponential variables (Eq. (3.3)), and then a symmetrization argument, since the epochs are ordered while the resupply times are attached to order indices. The naive route of computing P[X(t)=x]P[X(t) = x]P[X(t)=x] by conditioning on individual epochs does not go through without that exchangeability step. The limit t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ is then elementary; stating a stationary version directly is not a substitute, since the book's "steady state" is exactly this limit.

Formalization scope

The model is a structure on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P): exponential interarrival times with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, nonnegative resupply times with a density and an integrable first coordinate, and mutual independence of the whole family. Orders are indexed from 000, so the book's X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are T0,…,Tn−1T_0, \dots, T_{n-1}T0​,…,Tn−1​. Counts are cardinalities of sets of order indices, with value 000 on the probability-zero event where infinitely many orders fall in a bounded interval.

Commitments and pinnings:

  • "Steady state probability" (Theorems 6, 7, 9) is lim⁡t→∞P[⋅(t)=x]\lim_{t\to\infty}P[\cdot(t) = x]limt→∞​P[⋅(t)=x] for the system empty at time 000, which is what the proofs compute via (3.8)–(3.11).
  • Independence of resupply times from arrivals is not written in Theorem 6 but is used on p. 40; it is part of the model.
  • The stock level sss does not enter the backorder model; it matters only in Theorem 8.
  • Theorem 8 is stated algebraically: a vector on {0,…,s}\{0, \dots, s\}{0,…,s} solves the balance equations (3.26), (3.25) for 0<j<s0 < j < s0<j<s and (3.32), and sums to one, if and only if it is the truncated Poisson law. The book obtains these equations by letting t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ in the forward equations under the unproved assumption Pj′(t)→0P_j'(t) \to 0Pj′​(t)→0. The book writes (3.25) "for 0≤j≤s0 \le j \le s0≤j≤s", which at j=sj = sj=s contradicts its own (3.32); the boundary equation (3.32) is used. The sentence on p. 46 extending Theorem 8 to arbitrary resupply densities is asserted without proof and is not stated.
  • Theorem 7 identifies the limit law by its probabilities (3.22)–(3.23); its mean λτˉuˉ\lambda\bar\tau\bar uλτˉuˉ is a property of that law. Theorem 9 is stated for compound demand as the book states it, although the book's proof covers only the Poisson case.

A model in which X(t)X(t)X(t) is postulated through its law, or in which resupply times may depend on the arrival epochs, makes the goal empty or false; here X(t)X(t)X(t) is computed from the primitive arrival and resupply times, whose joint law is fully specified.

Welcome contributions: a general Poisson-process library (construction from exponential gaps, Poisson marginals, order-statistics property), independent thinning, and proofs of the milestones in the listed order.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • C. Palm, "Analysis of the Erlang traffic formula for busy-signal arrangements", Ericsson Technics 5, 1938, 39–58.
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, "The (s–1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand", Management Science 12(5), 1966, 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
  • C. C. Sherbrooke, "METRIC: A multi-echelon technique for recoverable item control", Operations Research 16(1), 1968, 122–141. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.16.1.122
  • S. M. Ross, Stochastic Processes, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1996, Section 2.3 (conditional distribution of arrival times) and Section 2.4 (the M/G/∞ queue).
12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains V: Marginal Allocation and Risk PoolingTextbook

Motivation

Service parts networks (spare parts for aircraft, military systems, industrial equipment) hold stock at several echelons: a depot, intermediate stocking facilities, and bases or warehouses that face demand. Two questions recur in their planning. First, how should a given amount of stock be split among locations whose expected costs are convex in the stock they hold? Second, does adding an echelon, a depot that pools the demand of several warehouses, raise or lower the stock the system needs?

Chapter 7 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879), treats both. For the second it follows Eppen and Schrage (1981, reference [78] of the book): with normal demands, a depot that places orders every period and allocates stock so that all warehouses face the same stockout probability reduces the choice of system stock to a single critical-fractile equation. For the first, the chapter's multi-echelon pooling model (Section 7.3) evaluates nested cost functions of the form "holding and shortage cost plus the minimum over allocations of a sum of convex costs", and its appendix (Section 7.4) gives the marginal allocation algorithm AllocOpt that computes these minima exactly for every stock level at once.

Marginal analysis for separable convex resource allocation is classical (Fox, Management Science, 1966); the monograph of Ibaraki and Katoh (MIT Press, 1988) surveys it.

Setting

Allocation data (Section 7.4). There is a set M={1,…,Mˉ}M = \{1, \dots, \bar M\}M={1,…,Mˉ} of locations and an augmented set M0={0}∪MM_0 = \{0\} \cup MM0​={0}∪M. Each location m∈M0m \in M_0m∈M0​ has integer gridpoints 0=r0m<r1m<⋯<rn(m)m0 = r^m_0 < r^m_1 < \dots < r^m_{n(m)}0=r0m​<r1m​<⋯<rn(m)m​. For m∈Mm \in Mm∈M, the value cnmc^m_ncnm​ of a convex function is given at each gridpoint. The slopes (7.19) are c^nm=(cn+1m−cnm)/(rn+1m−rnm)\hat c^m_n = (c^m_{n+1} - c^m_n)/(r^m_{n+1} - r^m_n)c^nm​=(cn+1m​−cnm​)/(rn+1m​−rnm​) for n<n(m)n < n(m)n<n(m), and c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ repeats the last one. The piecewise linear approximation C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ of (7.20)–(7.21) interpolates the values cnmc^m_ncnm​ at the gridpoints and continues with slope c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ beyond the last one. A convex function fff on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ is also given.

The allocation optimization (7.22) asks, for each n∈N0={0,…,n(0)}n \in N_0 = \{0, \dots, n(0)\}n∈N0​={0,…,n(0)}, for

cn0=f(rn0)+min⁡{∑m∈MC~m(rm):rm≥0 integer, ∑m∈Mrm=rn0}.c^0_n = f(r^0_n) + \min\Bigl\{ \sum_{m \in M} \tilde C_m(r_m) : r_m \ge 0 \text{ integer},\ \sum_{m \in M} r_m = r^0_n \Bigr\}.cn0​=f(rn0​)+min{m∈M∑​C~m​(rm​):rm​≥0 integer, m∈M∑​rm​=rn0​}.

Algorithm AllocOpt (Definition 4) keeps a current gridpoint index n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) and allocation r∗(m)r^*(m)r∗(m) per location. For each increment rn0−rn−10r^0_n - r^0_{n-1}rn0​−rn−10​ of the target, it repeatedly gives units to a location m∗m^*m∗ whose current slope c^n∗(m∗)m∗\hat c^{m^*}_{n^*(m^*)}c^n∗(m∗)m∗​ is minimal, up to that location's next gridpoint, and records the accumulated cost.

Pooling system (Section 7.2.1). One depot supplies mmm warehouses. The demand djtd_{jt}djt​ at warehouse jjj in period ttt is normal with mean μj\mu_jμj​ and variance σj2\sigma_j^2σj2​, independent across periods and warehouses. The supplier-to-depot lead time is DDD periods, the depot-to-warehouse lead time AAA periods, and holding and backorder costs h,bh, bh,b are equal at all warehouses. Positions IjI_jIj​ are in balance when Φ((Ij−Aμj)/(A σj))\Phi((I_j - A\mu_j)/(\sqrt A\,\sigma_j))Φ((Ij​−Aμj​)/(A​σj​)) is the same for all jjj. For system inventory position sss, with Y0Y_0Y0​ the system demand over DDD periods and YjY_jYj​ the demand at jjj over the next A+1A + 1A+1 periods, the balanced allocation gives each warehouse a share proportional to σj\sigma_jσj​, and zjz_jzj​ is its end-of-period net inventory.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (correctness)

For every tie-breaking rule in its arg min steps, AllocOpt returns values cn0c^0_ncn0​ that satisfy (7.22) for every n∈N0n \in N_0n∈N0​: some feasible integer allocation attains cn0−f(rn0)c^0_n - f(r^0_n)cn0​−f(rn0​), and no feasible integer allocation does better.

Milestones

  1. Slope monotonicity (p. 178): c^nm≥c^n−1m\hat c^m_n \ge \hat c^m_{n-1}c^nm​≥c^n−1m​ for 0<n≤n(m)0 < n \le n(m)0<n≤n(m).
  2. Convexity of C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (proof of Proposition 2, p. 179).
  3. Remark 2 (p. 179): with the inner loop run only while the current slope is ≤0\le 0≤0, AllocOpt solves (7.22) with ∑mrm≤rn0\sum_m r_m \le r^0_n∑m​rm​≤rn0​.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 152): if the positions are in balance and
∑jdj,t−1≥max⁡i{∑j≠idj,t+D−1+di,t+D−1(1−∑jσjσi)},\sum_{j} d_{j,t-1} \ge \max_{i} \Bigl\{ \sum_{j \ne i} d_{j,t+D-1} + d_{i,t+D-1}\Bigl(1 - \frac{\sum_j \sigma_j}{\sigma_i}\Bigr)\Bigr\},j∑​dj,t−1​≥imax​{j=i∑​dj,t+D−1​+di,t+D−1​(1−σi​∑j​σj​​)},

then a nonnegative allocation of the arriving ∑jdj,t−1\sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​dj,t−1​ units restores balance. 5. Net inventory law (pp. 156–157): zjz_jzj​ is normal with mean (s−(D+A+1)∑iμi) σj/∑iσi(s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i)\,\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i(s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​)σj​/∑i​σi​ and variance (A+1)σj2+(σj/∑iσi)2D∑iσi2(A + 1)\sigma_j^2 + (\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i)^2 D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)σj2​+(σj​/∑i​σi​)2D∑i​σi2​. 6. Critical fractile (pp. 157–158): sss minimizes ∑jE[h(zj)++b(zj)−]\sum_j E[h (z_j)^+ + b (z_j)^-]∑j​E[h(zj​)++b(zj​)−] if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h), where

z=s−(D+A+1)∑iμi[(A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2]1/2.z = \frac{s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i}{\bigl[(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2\bigr]^{1/2}}.z=[(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​]1/2s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​​.

Significance

The goal certifies an algorithm that the chapter uses as a subroutine three times: in the pool cost (7.14), the subsystem cost (7.15) and the system cost (7.17), and hence in the claim of Section 7.3 that the system-wide cost function can be computed in time nlog⁡nn \log nnlogn in the number of locations. Because AllocOpt produces the whole vector (cn0)n∈N0(c^0_n)_{n \in N_0}(cn0​)n∈N0​​ in one pass, its correctness gives the nested value functions at every gridpoint of the next echelon, which is what allows the recursion up the echelons. The Eppen–Schrage milestones give the classical quantitative form of risk pooling: the system stock is set by one critical fractile, and the standard deviation term (A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​ is what the book compares with the single-warehouse and the decentralized systems.

On formalization: the book states Proposition 2 with a two-sentence argument and Remark 2 without proof. The Eppen–Schrage computations are displayed derivations. None of these results has a machine-checked proof on the platform. A verified AllocOpt, stated for an explicit algorithm rather than for an abstract greedy procedure, is reusable for any separable convex integer allocation with a sum constraint.

Difficulty

The usual greedy exchange argument assumes that units are allocated one at a time. AllocOpt allocates in blocks, up to the next gridpoint of the chosen location, and it carries its state across successive targets rn−10→rn0r^0_{n-1} \to r^0_nrn−10​→rn0​ without restarting. The proof must therefore show that the state after each outer step is itself an optimal allocation for the current target, and that block moves never step past a breakpoint where the arg min would change. The slopes can be negative, and the equality constraint forces allocation even when every marginal cost is positive. Remark 2 needs an additional argument: under the inequality constraint the loop may stop before uuu reaches zero, and that point is optimal only because the slopes are nondecreasing.

For the pooling results, the balanced allocation mixes the depot-lead-time demand Y0Y_0Y0​ of all warehouses with the local demand YjY_jYj​, and the Gaussian law of zjz_jzj​ rests on the independence of disjoint blocks of periods. The fractile statement requires strict monotonicity of each warehouse's expected cost derivative in sss, not only a first-order condition.

Formalization scope

  • Indices and types. Locations of MMM are Fin Mbar; gridpoints are integers, values and slopes real numbers; allocations are functions Fin Mbar → ℕ. The standing assumptions of Section 7.4 form the predicate WellFormed: Mˉ≥1\bar M \ge 1Mˉ≥1, n(m)≥1n(m) \ge 1n(m)≥1 for m∈Mm \in Mm∈M (a slope (7.19) needs two gridpoints), gridpoints starting at 000 and strictly increasing at every location of M0M_0M0​, each cnmc^m_ncnm​ the value of a function convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and fff convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞).
  • The minimum in (7.22) is stated as attainment plus a lower bound over the finite, nonempty set of feasible integer allocations, never as an unconstrained infimum.
  • Ties. The book's arg min fixes no tie-breaking rule. Results are stated for every selection rule that returns a minimizing location.
  • Termination. AllocOpt is a total Lean function. The inner loop is given more passes than it can use, so it always exits through its own condition.
  • Not stated. The operation count of Proposition 2, O((1+log⁡2Mˉ)∑m∈M0n(m))O((1 + \log_2 \bar M)\sum_{m \in M_0} n(m))O((1+log2​Mˉ)∑m∈M0​​n(m)), and Proposition 1 and Remark 1 (p. 177) are operation counts with no machine model and are left out.
  • Corrections. The first expected-cost display on p. 157 has + b∫−∞0z dFzj(z)+\,b\int_{-\infty}^0 z\,dF_{z_j}(z)+b∫−∞0​zdFzj​​(z), which is negative. The formalization uses b E[(zj)−]b\,E[(z_j)^-]bE[(zj​)−], as in the book's next display.
  • Pinnings. Lemma 3 is deterministic: the demands are arbitrary reals, and "in balance following the allocation" means that some xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 with ∑jxj=∑jdj,t−1\sum_j x_j = \sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​xj​=∑j​dj,t−1​ exists. The critical-fractile milestone is the characterization "minimizer if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h)" of the book's "can be found by setting".
  • Trivialization ruled out. The allocation problem (7.22) is defined independently of the algorithm, as a minimum over explicit integer allocations, and the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are built from the data by (7.19)–(7.21). Neither (7.22) nor the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are defined as, or required to agree with, what AllocOpt returns.
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the invariants of AllocOpt, in particular that after each outer step the allocation r∗r^*r∗ is feasible for rn0r^0_nrn0​ with cost zzz and all slopes to the left of n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) are at most those to the right. Also Gaussian sum lemmas over finite index sets and a general newsvendor first-order characterization.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • G. D. Eppen and L. Schrage, "Centralized ordering policies in a multi-warehouse system with lead times and random demand", in L. B. Schwarz (ed.), Multi-Level Production/Inventory Control Systems: Theory and Practice, Studies in the Management Sciences, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 51–67.
  • G. D. Eppen, "Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem", Management Science 25(5), 1979, 498–501. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
  • B. Fox, "Discrete optimization via marginal analysis", Management Science 13(3), 1966, 210–216. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.13.3.210
  • T. Ibaraki and N. Katoh, Resource Allocation Problems: Algorithmic Approaches, MIT Press, 1988.
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Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VI: The Shortfall Distribution of Capacity-Limited SystemsTextbook

Motivation

Service parts supply chains are often limited by a capacitated resource, such as a production line or a repair shop, instead of by lead times alone. Once capacity binds, the classical tools for setting stock levels (Palm's theorem and the Poisson distribution of units in resupply) no longer apply, and the quantity that determines how much stock is needed is the shortfall: the amount by which the end-of-period inventory falls below its target because capacity was insufficient. Chapter 8 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) builds its tactical planning models for capacity-limited systems on the distribution of this random variable, and on a continuous-time repair queue in which item counts are geometric.

The shortfall recursion is the Lindley recursion of queueing theory (Lindley 1952), so its stationary law is the law of the maximum of a random walk with negative drift. The exponential tail of that maximum goes back to Cramér's work on ruin probabilities; for capacitated production–inventory systems it was stated by Glasserman (1997), whose theorem the book quotes as Theorem 11. Glasserman and Tayur (1995) used the shortfall to optimize base-stock levels in multi-echelon capacitated systems, and Roundy and Muckstadt (2000) studied the mass-exponential approximation that the theorem motivates.

Setting

A single item is produced in periods n=1,2,…n = 1, 2, \dotsn=1,2,… of an infinite horizon; at most ccc units can be produced per period. The demand of period nnn is DnD_nDn​; the demands are nonnegative, independent and identically distributed, with generic demand DDD and E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c (the standing assumption of Section 8.1.1).

Under the modified (s−1,s)(s-1, s)(s−1,s) policy with target level sss, the facility observes DnD_nDn​ and produces min⁡{c,s−In−1+Dn}\min\{c, s - I_{n-1} + D_n\}min{c,s−In−1​+Dn​} units, where InI_nIn​ is the end-of-period net inventory and I0=sI_0 = sI0​=s. The shortfall Vn=s−InV_n = s - I_nVn​=s−In​ satisfies V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 and

Vn=[Vn−1+Dn−c]+.(8.1)V_n = \left[V_{n-1} + D_n - c\right]^+ . \tag{8.1}Vn​=[Vn−1​+Dn​−c]+.(8.1)

With the random walk Sn=∑k=1n(Dk−c)S_n = \sum_{k=1}^{n} (D_k - c)Sn​=∑k=1n​(Dk​−c) (S0=0S_0 = 0S0​=0), the stationary shortfall is

V=sup⁡n≥0Sn.V = \sup_{n \ge 0} S_n .V=n≥0sup​Sn​.

A law on R\mathbb RR is lattice if it is concentrated on a progression a+dZa + d\mathbb Za+dZ with d>0d > 0d>0.

In the discrete case (ccc and DDD integer valued) (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) is a Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} with transition probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​ (p. 185). In the repair model of Section 8.3.1, reparable units of item iii arrive at rate λi\lambda_iλi​, λ=∑iλi\lambda = \sum_i \lambda_iλ=∑i​λi​, a single exponential server repairs at rate μ>λ\mu > \lambdaμ>λ, NNN is the number of units in repair and NiN_iNi​ the number of item-iii units, and ηi=λi/(μ−λ+λi)\eta_i = \lambda_i/(\mu - \lambda + \lambda_i)ηi​=λi​/(μ−λ+λi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11, corrected (p. 191)

Assume E[eαD]<∞E[e^{\alpha D}] < \inftyE[eαD]<∞ for all α<δ\alpha < \deltaα<δ, with δ>0\delta > 0δ>0; P[D>c]>0P[D > c] > 0P[D>c]>0; the law of DDD is non-lattice; and E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 has a root in (0,δ)(0, \delta)(0,δ). Then there are β>0\beta > 0β>0 and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 with

P{V>v}βe−αv→1(v→∞),α the unique positive root of E[e−α(c−D)]=1.\frac{P\{V > v\}}{\beta e^{-\alpha v}} \to 1 \quad (v \to \infty), \qquad \alpha \text{ the unique positive root of } E\left[e^{-\alpha(c - D)}\right] = 1 .βe−αvP{V>v}​→1(v→∞),α the unique positive root of E[e−α(c−D)]=1.

The constant β\betaβ is left unspecified, as in the book.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Eq. (8.1): under the modified policy, s−In=Vns - I_n = V_ns−In​=Vn​ for every nnn, independently of sss.
  2. Section 8.1.1: V<∞V < \inftyV<∞ almost surely, P{Vn>v}→P{V>v}P\{V_n > v\} \to P\{V > v\}P{Vn​>v}→P{V>v} for every vvv, and the law of VVV is stationary for (8.1).
  3. Eq. (8.2): for v>0v > 0v>0, P{Vn>v}=P{Dn>v+c}+ED[1(d≤v+c) P{Vn−1>v+c−d}]P\{V_n > v\} = P\{D_n > v + c\} + E_D[1(d \le v + c)\, P\{V_{n-1} > v + c - d\}]P{Vn​>v}=P{Dn​>v+c}+ED​[1(d≤v+c)P{Vn−1​>v+c−d}].
  4. Theorem 11, second sentence: E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 has at most one positive root.
  5. Section 8.1.2: with integer demand, (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) is a Markov chain with transition probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​.
  6. Section 8.1.2: πi=lim⁡nP{Vn=i}\pi_i = \lim_n P\{V_n = i\}πi​=limn​P{Vn​=i} exists and solves πP=π\pi\mathcal P = \piπP=π, ∑iπi=1\sum_i \pi_i = 1∑i​πi​=1, πi≥0\pi_i \ge 0πi​≥0.
  7. Section 8.3.1: if NNN is geometric with parameter λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ and NiN_iNi​ given N=jN = jN=j is binomial(j,λi/λ)(j, \lambda_i/\lambda)(j,λi​/λ), then P[Ni=j]=(1−ηi)ηijP[N_i = j] = (1 - \eta_i)\eta_i^jP[Ni​=j]=(1−ηi​)ηij​.
  8. Section 8.3.1: ∑j>spi(j)=ηis+1\sum_{j > s} p_i(j) = \eta_i^{s+1}∑j>s​pi​(j)=ηis+1​, and the smallest cost-minimising stock level is the smallest sss with ηis+1≤hi/(hi+b)\eta_i^{s+1} \le h_i/(h_i + b)ηis+1​≤hi​/(hi​+b).

Significance

The exponential tail is the justification the book gives for approximating the shortfall by a mass-exponential law (an atom at zero plus an exponential tail), from which target stock levels and fill rates are computed in closed form. The decay rate α\alphaα depends only on the demand law and the capacity, so the theorem also says how the stock needed for a given service level grows as utilization approaches one. The discrete-chain milestones justify the exact computation of the shortfall distribution behind the book's Table 8.1 and Figures 8.3–8.8. The geometric law of NiN_iNi​ reduces the multi-item repair problem to independent newsvendor problems with an explicit solution.

The asymptotics of the random-walk maximum are proved in the literature (Cramér–Lundberg theory, Feller Vol. II, XII.5; Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, XIII.5); no machine-checked proof is known to exist. Mathlib has neither the Lindley recursion, nor ladder-height decompositions, nor the key renewal theorem for non-lattice laws. The printed Theorem 11 is not correct as stated (see Formalization scope), so the mission also records a corrected statement.

Difficulty

The central step of the goal is the passage from the random walk to an exact asymptotic. An exponential change of measure (Esscher tilt) with the root α\alphaα turns P{V>v}P\{V > v\}P{V>v} into an expectation under a law with positive drift, but it only yields the upper bound P{V>v}≤e−αvP\{V > v\} \le e^{-\alpha v}P{V>v}≤e−αv (Lundberg's inequality); it does not show that eαvP{V>v}e^{\alpha v}P\{V > v\}eαvP{V>v} converges, nor that the limit is positive. Convergence needs a renewal theorem for the overshoot of the tilted walk, which fails for lattice laws. That is why the non-lattice hypothesis cannot be dropped. For the milestones, the existence of the stationary law needs the reversal argument that identifies the law of VnV_nVn​ with that of max⁡k≤nSk\max_{k \le n} S_kmaxk≤n​Sk​, plus the strong law of large numbers to show V<∞V < \inftyV<∞ from E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Demands are real, nonnegative, measurable, i.i.d. (iIndepFun plus IdentDistrib with D1D_1D1​), integrable, with E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c; these are fields of ShortfallModel. Periods are numbered from 111 as in the book (demand 0 is an unused i.i.d. copy). The discrete case is a separate structure with N\mathbb NN-valued demand and capacity.
  • Stationary shortfall. The book's "stationary distribution ... Let VVV represent this random variable" is pinned to V=sup⁡n≥0SnV = \sup_{n \ge 0} S_nV=supn≥0​Sn​, taken in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞] and converted to a real number; milestone 2 proves that it is the limit law of VnV_nVn​ from V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 and a stationary law of (8.1). The discrete πi\pi_iπi​ is pinned to lim⁡nP{Vn=i}\lim_n P\{V_n = i\}limn​P{Vn​=i}.
  • Corrections to Theorem 11. The printed theorem is false. For integer demand P{V>v}P\{V > v\}P{V>v} is a step function, and no βe−αv\beta e^{-\alpha v}βe−αv is asymptotic to it. If E[eαD]E[e^{\alpha D}]E[eαD] is finite only for α<δ\alpha < \deltaα<δ, the equation E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 may have no root in (0,δ)(0,\delta)(0,δ). The goal therefore adds two labelled hypotheses: a non-lattice demand law, and a root in (0,δ)(0, \delta)(0,δ). The mass-exponential demand of Section 8.1.3 (an atom at 000 plus a density) is non-lattice. The approximation β≈e−2(.583)(c−E(D))/σ\beta \approx e^{-2(.583)(c-E(D))/\sigma}β≈e−2(.583)(c−E(D))/σ is not stated.
  • Repair model. The M/M/1 queue is not built. The geometric law of NNN (asserted on p. 202) and the binomial split of NNN (quoted from Chapter 3) enter milestone 7 as hypotheses, exactly as the page's proof uses them. The stability condition λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ, not written on the page, is a hypothesis. "The optimal sis_isi​" is read as the smallest minimiser of the cost.
  • Ruled out. Stating Theorem 11 with α\alphaα or β\betaβ allowed to depend on vvv, with β=0\beta = 0β=0 (the ratio would be a division by zero, which Lean evaluates to 000), or for a VVV postulated to have an exponential tail proves nothing. Here β,α\beta, \alphaβ,α are quantified before vvv, both are asserted positive, and VVV is constructed from the demands.
  • Not formalized. The mass-exponential approximations (8.3)–(8.4), the Roundy–Muckstadt refinement, the fill-rate formula η(s)\eta(s)η(s) (a definition, whose steady-state identity needs uniform integrability the book does not discuss), the random-capacity chain on p. 186, and the monotonicity of sis_isi​ in μ\muμ.
  • Reusable infrastructure. Welcome: the Lindley recursion and its reversal identity, the Loynes existence theorem, Lundberg's inequality, and a non-lattice renewal theorem. All of these are needed well beyond this mission, in queueing (GI/G/1 waiting times) and ruin theory.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • P. Glasserman, Bounds and asymptotics for planning critical safety stocks, Operations Research 45(2), 244–257, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.2.244
  • P. Glasserman and S. Tayur, Sensitivity analysis for base-stock levels in multiechelon production-inventory systems, Management Science 41(2), 263–281, 1995 (the book's reference [97]). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.2.263
  • R. O. Roundy and J. A. Muckstadt, Heuristic computation of periodic-review base stock inventory policies, Management Science 46(1), 104–109, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.1.104.15131
  • D. V. Lindley, The theory of queues with a single server, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 48(2), 277–289, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100027638
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971, Chapter XII.
  • S. Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, Chapter XIII. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97236
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Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
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Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains IV: Backorder Convexity and Everett's TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Service parts (spares for aircraft, machines, and networks) are typically managed item by item with a one-for-one replenishment policy, the (s−1,s)(s-1, s)(s−1,s) policy: every unit withdrawn to meet a demand triggers an order for one replacement, so the inventory position stays at the stock level sss. A firm stocking thousands of such items at one location has to choose all the stock levels together, trading a budget on inventory investment against a service measure. Chapter 3 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) sets up the three standard service measures (fill rate, ready rate, expected backorders), shows which of them have the convexity that optimization needs, and solves two multi-item stocking problems: minimum expected backorders under an investment budget, by Lagrangian relaxation justified by Everett's theorem, and maximum average fill rate, by a greedy marginal-analysis rule.

The Lagrangian method goes back to Everett (Operations Research 1963); the search for the multiplier in one-constraint problems of this kind is Fox and Landi (Operations Research 1970); the compound Poisson (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) model is Feeney and Sherbrooke (Management Science 1966). The same separable Lagrangian structure underlies the multi-echelon METRIC-type models later in the book.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location, demand not met from stock is backordered, and customer orders arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. An order is for jjj units with probability uju_juj​, where u0=0u_0 = 0u0​=0 and the mean order size uˉ=∑jjuj\bar u = \sum_j j u_juˉ=∑j​juj​ is finite (compound Poisson demand; simple Poisson demand is u1=1u_1 = 1u1​=1). Resupply times have mean τˉ>0\bar\tau > 0τˉ>0. The steady-state probability that xxx units are in resupply is

p(0∣λτˉ)=e−λτˉ,p(x∣λτˉ)=∑j≥1e−λτˉ(λτˉ)jj! ux(j)(x≥1),p(0 \mid \lambda\bar\tau) = e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}, \qquad p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau) = \sum_{j \ge 1} e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}\frac{(\lambda\bar\tau)^j}{j!}\,u^{(j)}_x \quad (x \ge 1),p(0∣λτˉ)=e−λτˉ,p(x∣λτˉ)=j≥1∑​e−λτˉj!(λτˉ)j​ux(j)​(x≥1),

where ux(j)u^{(j)}_xux(j)​ is the probability that jjj orders total xxx units. In this mission p(⋅∣λτˉ)p(\cdot \mid \lambda\bar\tau)p(⋅∣λτˉ) is the definition of the model, not a consequence of Palm's theorem. The mean lead-time demand is μ=λτˉuˉ\mu = \lambda\bar\tau\bar uμ=λτˉuˉ, and the book also writes p(x∣μ)p(x \mid \mu)p(x∣μ).

For a stock level s∈{0,1,2,… }s \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}s∈{0,1,2,…}:

  • the ready rate is R(s)=∑x≤sp(x∣λτˉ)R(s) = \sum_{x \le s} p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)R(s)=∑x≤s​p(x∣λτˉ);
  • the expected backorders are B(s)=∑x>s(x−s) p(x∣λτˉ)B(s) = \sum_{x > s}(x - s)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)B(s)=∑x>s​(x−s)p(x∣λτˉ);
  • the expected on-hand inventory is ∑x≤s(s−x) p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_{x \le s}(s - x)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x≤s​(s−x)p(x∣λτˉ);
  • under simple Poisson demand the fill rate is F(s)=∑x<sp(x∣λτˉ)F(s) = \sum_{x < s} p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)F(s)=∑x<s​p(x∣λτˉ).

Forward differences are Δf(s)=f(s+1)−f(s)\Delta f(s) = f(s+1) - f(s)Δf(s)=f(s+1)−f(s) and Δ2f(s)=Δf(s+1)−Δf(s)\Delta^2 f(s) = \Delta f(s+1) - \Delta f(s)Δ2f(s)=Δf(s+1)−Δf(s); discrete convexity means Δ2f≥0\Delta^2 f \ge 0Δ2f≥0.

With nnn items, unit costs ci>0c_i > 0ci​>0 and budget bbb, Problem 4 (3.40) is

min⁡∑iBi(si)s.t.∑ici [si−μi+Bi(si)]≤b,si∈{0,1,… }.\min \sum_i B_i(s_i) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_i c_i\,[s_i - \mu_i + B_i(s_i)] \le b,\quad s_i \in \{0,1,\dots\}.mini∑​Bi​(si​)s.t.i∑​ci​[si​−μi​+Bi​(si​)]≤b,si​∈{0,1,…}.

For a multiplier θ>0\theta > 0θ>0, the item-wise criterion defines si∗(θ)s_i^*(\theta)si∗​(θ) as the least sss with ∑x≤sp(x∣μi)≥1/(1+θci)\sum_{x \le s} p(x \mid \mu_i) \ge 1/(1 + \theta c_i)∑x≤s​p(x∣μi​)≥1/(1+θci​), and C(θ)=∑ici [si∗(θ)−μi+Bi(si∗(θ))]C(\theta) = \sum_i c_i\,[s_i^*(\theta) - \mu_i + B_i(s_i^*(\theta))]C(θ)=∑i​ci​[si∗​(θ)−μi​+Bi​(si∗​(θ))].

Formalization targets

Goal: the Lagrangian stock levels solve Problem 4

For every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0, each si∗(θ)s_i^*(\theta)si∗​(θ) exists and

∑ici [si−μi+Bi(si)]≤C(θ) ⟹ ∑iBi(si∗(θ))≤∑iBi(si)\sum_i c_i\,[s_i - \mu_i + B_i(s_i)] \le C(\theta) \ \Longrightarrow\ \sum_i B_i(s_i^*(\theta)) \le \sum_i B_i(s_i)i∑​ci​[si​−μi​+Bi​(si​)]≤C(θ) ⟹ i∑​Bi​(si∗​(θ))≤i∑​Bi​(si​)

for every vector sss of nonnegative integer stock levels. That is, s∗(θ)s^*(\theta)s∗(θ) is optimal for Problem 4 at budget b=C(θ)b = C(\theta)b=C(θ). This is what the book asserts by combining Theorem 10 (p. 57, with the remark on p. 58) and the criterion of p. 61, and it is the basis of its bisection algorithm (p. 63). The goal fixes no numerical constant.

Milestones

  1. Section 3.3, p. 53: ΔF(s)=p(s∣λτˉ)\Delta F(s) = p(s \mid \lambda\bar\tau)ΔF(s)=p(s∣λτˉ) and Δ2F(s)=p(s∣λτˉ) (λτˉ/(s+1)−1)\Delta^2 F(s) = p(s \mid \lambda\bar\tau)\,(\lambda\bar\tau/(s+1) - 1)Δ2F(s)=p(s∣λτˉ)(λτˉ/(s+1)−1), so under simple Poisson demand FFF is discretely concave exactly on s≥⌊λτˉ⌋s \ge \lfloor\lambda\bar\tau\rfloors≥⌊λτˉ⌋ (resp. s≥λτˉ−1s \ge \lambda\bar\tau - 1s≥λτˉ−1 for integer λτˉ\lambda\bar\tauλτˉ).
  2. Section 3.3, p. 55: ΔB(s)=−(1−R(s))\Delta B(s) = -(1 - R(s))ΔB(s)=−(1−R(s)) and Δ2B(s)=p(s+1∣λτˉ)\Delta^2 B(s) = p(s+1 \mid \lambda\bar\tau)Δ2B(s)=p(s+1∣λτˉ).
  3. Theorem 10 (Everett), p. 57.
  4. Section 3.4.2, p. 60: E[On-hand]=s−λτˉuˉ+B(s)E[\text{On-hand}] = s - \lambda\bar\tau\bar u + B(s)E[On-hand]=s−λτˉuˉ+B(s).
  5. Section 3.4.2, p. 61: the least sss with R(s)≥1/(1+θc)R(s) \ge 1/(1+\theta c)R(s)≥1/(1+θc) minimizes f(s)=(1+θc)B(s)+θcsf(s) = (1 + \theta c)B(s) + \theta c sf(s)=(1+θc)B(s)+θcs.
  6. Section 3.4.2, p. 61: s∗(θ)s^*(\theta)s∗(θ) and C(θ)C(\theta)C(θ) are nonincreasing in θ\thetaθ.
  7. Section 3.4.2, p. 63: at θmax⁡=max⁡ici−1(1/p(0∣μi)−1)\theta_{\max} = \max_i c_i^{-1}(1/p(0 \mid \mu_i) - 1)θmax​=maxi​ci−1​(1/p(0∣μi​)−1) every si∗(θmax⁡)=0s_i^*(\theta_{\max}) = 0si∗​(θmax​)=0.
  8. Section 3.4.3, p. 65: every solution produced by the greedy marginal-analysis rule for Problem 5 (3.41), maximum average fill rate subject to ∑icisi≤b\sum_i c_i s_i \le b∑i​ci​si​≤b and si≥⌊λiτˉi⌋s_i \ge \lfloor\lambda_i\bar\tau_i\rfloorsi​≥⌊λi​τˉi​⌋, is optimal at the budget it uses.

Significance

The goal reduces a coupled integer program over thousands of items to one scalar search: for a fixed multiplier each item is solved by a single scan of its distribution function, and each multiplier yields a point on the exact efficient frontier of expected backorders against investment. Milestone 8 does the same for fill rates on the region where they are concave, and milestone 1 explains why that region, s≥⌊λτˉ⌋s \ge \lfloor\lambda\bar\tau\rfloors≥⌊λτˉ⌋, is imposed in practice. Milestone 4 is the identity that turns an investment budget into the constraint of Problem 4.

All results are proved in the book (Theorem 10 with a complete proof; the others by short derivations, the greedy optimality by a sketch). None of them is formalized, as far as the platform shows: there is no Everett-type Lagrangian sufficiency theorem, no compound Poisson backorder function, and no discrete marginal-analysis optimality result. The mission produces a reusable layer for later chapters: the compound Poisson steady-state law with its backorder function, and the Lagrangian machinery the book reuses for multi-echelon systems.

Difficulty

The algebra of first differences is elementary; the difficulties are elsewhere. B(s)B(s)B(s) is an infinite series whose convergence rests on the finiteness of the mean order size, and exchanging the difference with the sum, and identifying ∑xx p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_x x\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x​xp(x∣λτˉ) with λτˉuˉ\lambda\bar\tau\bar uλτˉuˉ, requires manipulating a doubly infinite sum over order counts and convolution powers. Existence of s∗(θ)s^*(\theta)s∗(θ) requires that the compound Poisson probabilities sum to one. For milestone 8 the obvious argument ("greedy is optimal for concave separable objectives") fails for knapsack constraints with unequal costs at arbitrary budgets; it holds only at the budgets the greedy run generates, and only on the region where every FiF_iFi​ is concave; dropping the floor constraints si≥⌊λiτˉi⌋s_i \ge \lfloor\lambda_i\bar\tau_i\rfloorsi​≥⌊λi​τˉi​⌋ makes it false.

Formalization scope

Stock levels are natural numbers; probabilities, rates, costs and multipliers are reals. The compound Poisson law is a structure with fields λ,τˉ>0\lambda, \bar\tau > 0λ,τˉ>0, an order-size distribution uuu with u0=0u_0 = 0u0​=0, uj≥0u_j \ge 0uj​≥0, ∑juj=1\sum_j u_j = 1∑j​uj​=1, and summable jujj u_jjuj​ (the finite mean is added: without it BBB is infinite). Expected on-hand inventory is the finite sum E[(s−X)+]E[(s - X)^+]E[(s−X)+]. Items are indexed by an arbitrary finite type (nonempty where a maximum over items is taken).

Pinnings and deviations, each stated in the item's Formalization Note:

  • θ>0\theta > 0θ>0 and c>0c > 0c>0. The book allows θ≥0\theta \ge 0θ≥0 in (3.38); at θ=0\theta = 0θ=0 the threshold 111 is never reached and f=Bf = Bf=B has no minimizer.
  • Theorem 10 without convexity and for an arbitrary set SSS: the book assumes f,gf, gf,g convex, but its proof does not use it and the applications are to integer vectors (labelled generalization).
  • BBB's identities for compound Poisson demand. The book derives them under simple Poisson demand and uses them for compound demand on p. 61; strict convexity and strict decrease are stated only for simple Poisson demand, as in the book.
  • Optimality is always against every feasible vector, never an infimum; the greedy procedure is a relation on sequences, covering every tie-breaking rule.
  • Problem 5 keeps the constraints si≥⌊λiτˉi⌋s_i \ge \lfloor\lambda_i\bar\tau_i\rfloorsi​≥⌊λi​τˉi​⌋.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal is stated for the book's own backorder function BBB built from the compound Poisson law, not for an arbitrary convex function nor for a BBB defined through its differences.

Welcome contributions: summability and normalization lemmas for the compound Poisson law, a general discrete Lagrangian lemma for separable objectives, and proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 3, pp. 47–65. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • H. Everett III, Generalized Lagrange multiplier method for solving problems of optimum allocation of resources, Operations Research 11(3):399–417, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.3.399
  • B. L. Fox and D. M. Landi, Searching for the multiplier in one-constraint optimization problems, Operations Research 18(2):253–262, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.18.2.253
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, The (s−1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand, Management Science 12(5):391–411, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VII: Palm's Theorem for Nonstationary DemandTextbook

Motivation

Spare-parts inventory models for repairable items rest on Palm's theorem: if demands arrive as a Poisson process with constant rate λ\lambdaλ and each demanded unit spends an independent, identically distributed resupply time with mean τˉ\bar\tauτˉ in the pipeline, the number of units in resupply is Poisson with mean λτˉ\lambda\bar\tauλτˉ in steady state. Stock levels, backorders and fill rates are all computed from that distribution.

Both assumptions fail in practice. Military flying programmes ramp up and down within weeks, repair shops close for periods, and commercial parts distribution centres see demand that varies by day of the week. Chapter 9 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) extends Palm's theorem to a nonstationary Poisson demand process with time-dependent resupply-time distributions, gives the compound (multi-unit order) version, and uses the result to compute, at any time ttt, the distribution of units in repair at the depot of a two-echelon system.

Timeline: Palm (1938) proved the stationary result for telephone traffic; Feeney and Sherbrooke (1966) extended it to compound Poisson demand; Hillestad and Carrillo (RAND, 1980) and Crawford (RAND, 1981) developed the time-dependent extensions, summarized by Carrillo (RAND, 1989). The chapter presents these results.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location, and every demand is for one unit.

  • Demand rate λ(s)≥0\lambda(s) \ge 0λ(s)≥0, integrable on bounded intervals, with mean function m(t)=∫0tλ(s) dsm(t) = \int_0^t \lambda(s)\,dsm(t)=∫0t​λ(s)ds.
  • Demand process: a nonstationary Poisson process with mean function mmm, with N(0)=0N(0) = 0N(0)=0. N(t)N(t)N(t) counts demands in [0,t][0,t][0,t] and T0<T1<⋯T_0 < T_1 < \cdotsT0​<T1​<⋯ are the demand epochs.
  • Resupply times: a unit demanded at time sss is resupplied within www time units with probability Gs(w)G_s(w)Gs​(w). Resupply times are nonnegative, have finite expectations, are independent from unit to unit, and are independent of the demand process.
  • X(t)X(t)X(t) is the number of units in resupply at time ttt: demands in [0,t][0,t][0,t] whose resupply is not complete at ttt.

The mean of X(t)X(t)X(t) is

α(t)=∫0t(1−Gs(t−s))λ(s) ds.\alpha(t) = \int_0^t \bigl(1 - G_s(t-s)\bigr)\lambda(s)\,ds.α(t)=∫0t​(1−Gs​(t−s))λ(s)ds.

In the compound version (Section 9.2), orders arrive as above and each order is for Q≥1Q \ge 1Q≥1 units, with a time-stationary law uj=P(Q=j)u_j = P(Q = j)uj​=P(Q=j). All units of an order share its resupply time, Y(t)Y(t)Y(t) counts units demanded in [0,t][0,t][0,t], and uk(n)u^{(n)}_kuk(n)​ is the nnn-fold convolution of (uj)(u_j)(uj​).

In the two-echelon version (Section 9.3), base iii has failure rate λi\lambda_iλi​. A failure is repaired at the base with probability rir_iri​ and at the depot otherwise. Depot repair of a failure occurring at time uuu takes a deterministic time D(u)D(u)D(u) with D(t)+t≥D(s)+sD(t) + t \ge D(s) + sD(t)+t≥D(s)+s for s<ts < ts<t (no crossing). Write t~=inf⁡{u≥0:D(u)+u>t}\tilde t = \inf\{u \ge 0 : D(u) + u > t\}t~=inf{u≥0:D(u)+u>t}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 13 (p. 216)

For every t≥0t \ge 0t≥0,

P{X(t)=k}=e−α(t)α(t)kk!,k=0,1,2,…P\{X(t) = k\} = e^{-\alpha(t)}\frac{\alpha(t)^k}{k!}, \qquad k = 0,1,2,\dotsP{X(t)=k}=e−α(t)k!α(t)k​,k=0,1,2,…

This is an exact statement at each finite time, not a limit. With constant λ\lambdaλ and Gs=GG_s = GGs​=G it reduces to the finite-time step of Palm's theorem.

Milestones

  1. E[N(t)]=m(t)E[N(t)] = m(t)E[N(t)]=m(t) (Section 9.1, p. 216).
  2. Theorem 12 (p. 216): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the epochs T0,…,Tn−1T_0, \dots, T_{n-1}T0​,…,Tn−1​ are distributed as the order statistics of nnn i.i.d. variables with distribution function F(x)=m(x)/m(t)F(x) = m(x)/m(t)F(x)=m(x)/m(t) on [0,t)[0,t)[0,t).
  3. The binomial step of the proof of Theorem 13 (pp. 216–217): P{X(t)=k∣N(t)=n}=(nk)pk(1−p)n−kP\{X(t) = k \mid N(t) = n\} = \binom nk p^k(1-p)^{n-k}P{X(t)=k∣N(t)=n}=(kn​)pk(1−p)n−k, with p=∫0t(1−Gs(t−s))λ(s)/m(t) dsp = \int_0^t (1 - G_s(t-s))\lambda(s)/m(t)\,dsp=∫0t​(1−Gs​(t−s))λ(s)/m(t)ds.
  4. Section 9.2 (p. 218): E[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q]E[Y(t)] = m(t)E[Q]E[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q] and Var⁡[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q2]\operatorname{Var}[Y(t)] = m(t)E[Q^2]Var[Y(t)]=m(t)E[Q2].
  5. Theorem 14 (p. 218): P[X(t)=k]=∑n≥1uk(n)e−α(t)α(t)n/n!P[X(t) = k] = \sum_{n\ge1} u^{(n)}_k e^{-\alpha(t)}\alpha(t)^n/n!P[X(t)=k]=∑n≥1​uk(n)​e−α(t)α(t)n/n! for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, and e−α(t)e^{-\alpha(t)}e−α(t) at k=0k = 0k=0.
  6. Section 9.3.2 (p. 221): P{X0(t)=k}=e−m0(t~,t)m0(t~,t)k/k!P\{X_0(t) = k\} = e^{-m_0(\tilde t,t)} m_0(\tilde t,t)^k/k!P{X0​(t)=k}=e−m0​(t~,t)m0​(t~,t)k/k! with m0(t~,t)=∫t~t∑iλi(u)(1−ri) dum_0(\tilde t,t) = \int_{\tilde t}^t \sum_i \lambda_i(u)(1-r_i)\,dum0​(t~,t)=∫t~t​∑i​λi​(u)(1−ri​)du.

A plain supporting item states that N(t)N(t)N(t) is Poisson with mean m(t)m(t)m(t), the factor the proof of Theorem 13 uses.

Significance

Theorem 13 gives the full distribution of the pipeline at every instant. Time-dependent expected backorders, ∑x>s(t)(x−s(t))P{X(t)=x}\sum_{x > s(t)} (x - s(t)) P\{X(t) = x\}∑x>s(t)​(x−s(t))P{X(t)=x}, and fill rates P{X(t)<s(t)}P\{X(t) < s(t)\}P{X(t)<s(t)} follow from it, so stock levels can be planned against a surge or a repair outage without a steady-state approximation. Theorem 14 does the same for multi-unit orders. The depot result feeds the base-level convolution of Section 9.3.3, which in turn gives time-dependent performance measures for a two-echelon system.

These results are proved in the literature, and the chapter reproduces the proofs of Theorems 13 and 14. It cites Theorem 12 without proof ("similar to the one given in Chapter 3"). No machine-checked version of any of them is known, and neither Mathlib nor this platform has a Poisson process, stationary or not, a thinning theorem, or an order-statistics theorem. The formal content of this mission therefore includes the construction and the first distributional facts of the nonstationary Poisson process.

Difficulty

The algebra of the proof is a Poisson mixture of binomials and is short. The difficulty is Theorem 12 and its use. The obvious argument treats "the nnn demands in [0,t][0,t][0,t]" as nnn independent draws from FFF and assigns each an independent resupply time with law GdrawG_{\text{draw}}Gdraw​. Making this rigorous requires identifying the conditional joint law of the epochs given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n. The resupply time of the jjj-th demand is not independent of its epoch: its law depends on the epoch. So it must be shown that, after conditioning, the marks attached to sorted epochs behave like marks attached to unsorted i.i.d. draws. The book's constant-rate argument (Chapter 3) uses the uniform density n!/tnn!/t^nn!/tn on the simplex. Here the density involves λ\lambdaλ, which may vanish on intervals, and mmm need not be invertible.

Formalization scope

  • Demand process. The nonstationary Poisson process is constructed, not postulated. With i.i.d. exponential(1) gaps and unit-rate points Γk=A0+⋯+Ak\Gamma_k = A_0 + \cdots + A_kΓk​=A0​+⋯+Ak​, the kkk-th demand occurs at Tk=inf⁡{s≥0:m(s)≥Γk}T_k = \inf\{s \ge 0 : m(s) \ge \Gamma_k\}Tk​=inf{s≥0:m(s)≥Γk​}, and N(t)=#{k:Γk≤m(t)}N(t) = \#\{k : \Gamma_k \le m(t)\}N(t)=#{k:Γk​≤m(t)}.
  • Resupply times. Resupply times are ρ(Tk,Uk)\rho(T_k, U_k)ρ(Tk​,Uk​) for a jointly measurable ρ≥0\rho \ge 0ρ≥0 and i.i.d. marks UkU_kUk​ independent of the gaps, with Gs(w)=ν{ρ(s,⋅)≤w}G_s(w) = \nu\{\rho(s,\cdot) \le w\}Gs​(w)=ν{ρ(s,⋅)≤w}. Every measurable family GsG_sGs​ arises this way, and joint measurability makes α(t)\alpha(t)α(t) a genuine integral. Independence of resupply times from the demand process is not written in Theorem 12 or 13 but is used in the proof; it is part of the model.
  • Pinnings and conventions.
    • "λ\lambdaλ integrable" is read as integrable on bounded intervals.
    • Time is t≥0t \ge 0t≥0.
    • Theorem 12 assumes m(t)>0m(t) > 0m(t)>0, since FFF is 0/00/00/0 otherwise, and sets F=0F = 0F=0 on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0).
    • Conditional probabilities are written as joint probabilities.
    • E[Y(t)]E[Y(t)]E[Y(t)] is stated in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the variance identity assumes E[Q2]<∞E[Q^2] < \inftyE[Q2]<∞.
    • t~\tilde tt~ is an infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0, and D≥0D \ge 0D≥0.
    • Counts are cardinalities, and are 000 on the null event where they would be infinite.
  • Corrections. Theorem 14's printed sum starts at n=1n = 1n=1, which gives P[X(t)=0]=0P[X(t) = 0] = 0P[X(t)=0]=0. The statement keeps the book's formula for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and adds P[X(t)=0]=e−α(t)P[X(t) = 0] = e^{-\alpha(t)}P[X(t)=0]=e−α(t). The depot's Poisson demand stream with rate ∑iλi(1−ri)\sum_i \lambda_i(1-r_i)∑i​λi​(1−ri​) is generated from the bases' processes and independent repair-location choices, not assumed.
  • Not stated.
    • Eqs. (9.1)–(9.2), the FCFS depot backorders owed to base iii: the derivation on p. 221 is informal, and (9.1) prints the exponent s0(t−1)s_0(t-1)s0​(t−1) for s0(t)−1s_0(t)-1s0​(t)−1.
    • The base analysis of Section 9.3.3.
    • The compound law of Y(t)Y(t)Y(t) on p. 217, which has the same n=0n = 0n=0 omission.
  • Trivialization ruled out. X(t)X(t)X(t) is computed from the demand epochs and resupply times, not defined by its law, and resupply times cannot depend on the demand epochs except through the prescribed GsG_sGs​. Either shortcut would make the goal empty or false.
  • Infrastructure. The time-changed Poisson construction, its count law, the order-statistics property and marked thinning are reusable well beyond this chapter: in queueing (Mt/Gt/∞M_t/G_t/\inftyMt​/Gt​/∞), in reliability, and in the stationary Palm mission of this series. Contributions of these general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 9, pp. 215–222. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • C. Palm, "Analysis of the Erlang traffic formulae for busy-signal arrangements", Ericsson Technics 5, 1938, 39–58.
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, "The (s−1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand", Management Science 12(5), 1966, 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
  • R. J. Hillestad and M. J. Carrillo, Models and techniques for recoverable item stockage when demand and the repair processes are nonstationary — Part I: Performance measurement, Report N-1482-AF, RAND Corporation, 1980.
  • G. B. Crawford, Palm's theorem for nonstationary processes, Report R-2750-RC, RAND Corporation, 1981.
  • M. J. Carrillo, Generalizations of Palm's theorem and Dyna-METRIC's demand and pipeline variability, Report R-3698-AF, RAND Corporation, 1989.
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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems: Algorithm OPT Returns an Optimal Reorder Point and Order QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

(r, Q) policies are the standard replenishment rule for a single item under continuous review: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, an order of size QQQ is placed. They are known to be optimal in the classical models with Poisson or compound renewal demand, constant or exogenous lead times and full backlogging, and they are used widely in practice and in multi-item and multi-echelon systems where they are applied item by item.

For decades, computing an optimal pair (r,Q)(r, Q)(r,Q) exactly was not routine. The textbook treatment of Hadley and Whitin (1963) gives approximations; as Browne and Zipkin (1991) put it, "until recently, there was no reliable, straightforward method for computing an optimal (r, Q) policy, even in the simple case of Poisson demand processes." Many heuristics were proposed (surveyed by Lee and Nahmias, 1989); the only exact procedure in circulation was in Zipkin's classnotes, based on a result of Sahin (1982).

Federgruen and Zheng (1992) give a short exact algorithm, Algorithm OPT, whose work is linear in the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗. It rests only on the form of the cost, not on a particular demand model.

Setting

Inventory positions are integers (demand arrives unit by unit). A fixed cost κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 is charged per order, and G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R is the expected holding and backlogging cost rate as a function of the inventory position yyy. In all the models of the paper the long-run average cost of the (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) policy, for an integer rrr and an integer Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1, has the form

C(r,Q)=[κ+∑y=r+1r+QG(y)]/Q.(1)C(r,Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{y=r+1}^{r+Q}G(y)\Big]\Big/Q. \tag{1}C(r,Q)=[κ+y=r+1∑r+Q​G(y)]/Q.(1)

The paper's standing assumptions on GGG are:

  1. −G-G−G is unimodal: there is an integer mmm with GGG nonincreasing on {y≤m}\{y\le m\}{y≤m} and nondecreasing on {y≥m}\{y\ge m\}{y≥m} (flat stretches allowed);
  2. lim⁡∣y∣→∞G(y)=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G(y)=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G(y)=∞.

The sequence yQy_QyQ​. Let y1y_1y1​ be an integer minimizing GGG. Given y1,…,yQy_1,\dots,y_Qy1​,…,yQ​, let L(Q)=min⁡{y1,…,yQ}L(Q)=\min\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}L(Q)=min{y1​,…,yQ​} and R(Q)=max⁡{y1,…,yQ}R(Q)=\max\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}R(Q)=max{y1​,…,yQ​}, and set

yQ+1={L(Q)−1if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),R(Q)+1otherwise.y_{Q+1}=\begin{cases}L(Q)-1 & \text{if } G(L(Q)-1)\le G(R(Q)+1),\\ R(Q)+1 & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}yQ+1​={L(Q)−1R(Q)+1​if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),otherwise.​

So the window [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] grows by one point at a time towards the smaller neighbouring value, ties going left. Write r∗(Q)r^*(Q)r∗(Q) for an optimal reorder point for a given QQQ, and

C∗(Q)=[κ+∑i=1QG(yi)]/Q.C^*(Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{i=1}^{Q}G(y_i)\Big]\Big/Q .C∗(Q)=[κ+i=1∑Q​G(yi​)]/Q.

Algorithm OPT, Step 1. Variables S,Q,C∗,r,RS,Q,C^*,r,RS,Q,C∗,r,R start at S=κ+G(y1)S=\kappa+G(y_1)S=κ+G(y1​), Q=1Q=1Q=1, C∗=SC^*=SC∗=S, r=y1−1r=y_1-1r=y1​−1, R=y1+1R=y_1+1R=y1​+1. Each pass compares G(r)G(r)G(r) and G(R)G(R)G(R); on the smaller side (left on ties) it stops if C∗C^*C∗ is at most that value, and otherwise adds the value to SSS and moves rrr one step left or RRR one step right; then Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1 and C∗:=S/QC^*:=S/QC∗:=S/Q. The output is the final (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Under the standing assumptions, Step 1 of Algorithm OPT, started from any global minimizer y1y_1y1​ of GGG, stops after finitely many passes, and its output (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) satisfies Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 and

C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.C(r,Q)\le C(r',Q')\qquad\text{for all integers } r' \text{ and all integers } Q'\ge 1 .C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.

The goal fixes no constants and no demand model: it is a statement about every GGG satisfying the standing assumptions.

Milestones, in proof order

  • §2, p. 811: {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​} is the contiguous block [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] of QQQ integers and carries the QQQ smallest values of GGG.
  • Figure 1 (p. 809): yQ+1y_{Q+1}yQ+1​ has the least GGG-value outside the window; in particular G(y1)≤G(y2)≤⋯G(y_1)\le G(y_2)\le\cdotsG(y1​)≤G(y2​)≤⋯.
  • Lemma 1: L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point for QQQ.
  • Corollary 1: r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q)r^*(Q)-1\le r^*(Q+1)\le r^*(Q)r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q).
  • Display before (6): min⁡rC(r,Q)=C∗(Q)\min_r C(r,Q)=C^*(Q)minr​C(r,Q)=C∗(Q).
  • (6): C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1)]/(Q+1)C^*(Q+1)=[QC^*(Q)+G(y_{Q+1})]/(Q+1)C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1​)]/(Q+1), and C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q)C^*(Q+1)<C^*(Q)C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q) iff G(yQ+1)<C∗(Q)G(y_{Q+1})<C^*(Q)G(yQ+1​)<C∗(Q).
  • Lemma 2: the smallest qqq with C∗(q)≤G(yq+1)C^*(q)\le G(y_{q+1})C∗(q)≤G(yq+1​) exists and is an optimal order size.
  • Step 1 tracks the sequence: from the state (κ+∑i≤QG(yi), Q, C∗(Q), L(Q)−1, R(Q)+1)(\kappa+\sum_{i\le Q}G(y_i),\,Q,\,C^*(Q),\,L(Q)-1,\,R(Q)+1)(κ+∑i≤Q​G(yi​),Q,C∗(Q),L(Q)−1,R(Q)+1) one pass stops with (L(Q)−1,Q)(L(Q)-1,Q)(L(Q)−1,Q) exactly when C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1)C^*(Q)\le G(y_{Q+1})C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1​) and otherwise moves to the same state for Q+1Q+1Q+1.

Significance

The result turns the joint minimization of (1) over (r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1(r,Q)\in\mathbb Z\times\mathbb Z_{\ge1}(r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1​, an unbounded two-dimensional integer problem, into a single scan whose length is Q∗Q^*Q∗ plus the distance to the minimizer of GGG. Because it uses only the form (1) and the unimodality of −G-G−G, it applies at once to Poisson and compound Poisson demand, to stochastic lead times with an equilibrium lead-time demand, and to cost structures with stockout penalties; the paper also notes extensions to (r,nQ)(r,nQ)(r,nQ) policies. Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 additionally give the structure of the optimal reorder point as a function of QQQ.

The result has been proved on paper since 1992. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the algorithm's correctness for general GGG under exactly the paper's hypotheses. The platform already has the linear-cost special case of the underlying lemmas for one discrete demand model (InventoryControl.rq_discrete_recursion, rq_discrete_joint_optimal), but with C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) and Q∗Q^*Q∗ given as hypotheses and no algorithm; nothing on the platform states the algorithm or treats general unimodal −G-G−G.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: for fixed QQQ the sum in (1) should cover the QQQ smallest values of GGG, and the greedy window collects exactly those. Both halves need care on the integers with flat stretches of GGG: "the QQQ smallest values" is ambiguous under ties, and the claim that a greedy window holds them relies on y1y_1y1​ being a global minimizer together with the unimodality of −G-G−G, not on convexity.

The stopping rule is the second point. Lemma 2 looks like a first-order condition, but C∗(⋅)C^*(\cdot)C∗(⋅) need not be convex; optimality of the first stopping qqq for all larger QQQ uses that the values G(yi)G(y_i)G(yi​) are nondecreasing along the sequence, which the paper uses without stating. Termination of the algorithm is not discussed on the page; it needs G→∞G\to\inftyG→∞, and fails for constant GGG.

Finally, the goal is about an imperative loop. Connecting its five variables to yQy_QyQ​, C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) and L(Q)L(Q)L(Q) is an invariant argument that has to match the tie-breaking and the non-strict stopping tests exactly.

Formalization scope

  • Types. G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R, κ∈R\kappa\in\mathbb Rκ∈R with κ>0\kappa>0κ>0, reorder points in Z\mathbb ZZ, order quantities in N\mathbb NN with Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 required wherever a cost appears. Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 makes C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0, so optimality is always quantified over Q′≥1Q'\ge1Q′≥1 and the goal asserts that the returned QQQ is ≥1\ge1≥1.
  • Assumptions. "−G-G−G unimodal" is NegUnimodal G: ∃m\exists m∃m, GGG antitone on (−∞,m](-\infty,m](−∞,m] and monotone on [m,∞)[m,\infty)[m,∞). "lim⁡∣y∣→∞G=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G=∞" is Coercive G: G→+∞G\to+\inftyG→+∞ along atBot and atTop. Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn ℤ is not used: over Z\mathbb ZZ-weights it holds for every function.
  • The sequence. L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q) are defined by recursion on the window, and yyy is 1-based with an unused value at index 0; that L,RL,RL,R are the minimum and maximum of {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​}, as the paper defines them, is the first milestone.
  • The algorithm. Step 1 is transcribed literally, including G(r)≤G(R)G(r)\le G(R)G(r)≤G(R) → left and the non-strict tests C∗≤G(r)C^*\le G(r)C∗≤G(r), C∗≤G(R)C^*\le G(R)C∗≤G(R); GGG is evaluated directly instead of through the ΔG\Delta GΔG bookkeeping. The loop runs with a pass budget and returns nothing when the budget runs out; the goal states that for every large enough budget it returns an optimal pair.
  • Step 0 is not formalized. It scans L=0,1,…L=0,1,\dotsL=0,1,… for the first LLL with ΔG(L)≥0\Delta G(L)\ge0ΔG(L)≥0, under the paper's simplification y1>0y_1>0y1​>0; under unimodality alone it can stop on a plateau before the minimum. The goal starts Step 1 from a given global minimizer y1y_1y1​, which is the paper's own §2 setup and matches its p. 812 remark that Step 0 may be replaced by a bisection search.
  • Not formalized: Theorem 1's second sentence (the operation count), the derivations of (1) for specific demand models, and (5).
  • Corrected slips. The printed proof of Lemma 2 writes C(Q)−C(Q∗)C(Q)-C(Q^*)C(Q)−C(Q∗) with C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) inside the bracket; the correct identity has C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q)-C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗) and C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q∗). Lemma 2's "Q∗Q^*Q∗" is formalized as existence of the smallest qqq with the property plus its optimality, since minimizers need not be unique; likewise "r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1r^*(Q)=L(Q)-1r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1" means L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point.
  • Ruled out. Defining the algorithm's output as an argmin of CCC, or by searching for Lemma 2's qqq, would make the goal trivial; the algorithm is defined by its steps. A statement of the form "if the run returns a pair, it is optimal" would be vacuous for a loop that never stops; termination is part of the goal.

Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas on windows of unimodal integer sequences, which are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • S. Browne and P. Zipkin, Inventory Models with Continuous, Stochastic Demands, Annals of Applied Probability 1(3):419–435, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177005875
  • H. L. Lee and S. Nahmias, Single-Product, Single-Location Models, in Handbooks in OR & MS vol. 4, 1993 (cited by the paper as a 1989 working paper).
  • I. Sahin, On the Objective Function Behavior in (s, S) Inventory Models, Operations Research 30(4):709–724, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.709
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem: The Two-Echelon Optimal Cost Splits into the Isolated Installation-1 Cost Plus a Function of Echelon StockResearch Paper

Motivation

Most physical supply chains hold stock at several levels: a factory warehouse feeds a regional depot, which feeds a retail outlet. Each level orders from the one above it, and a shortage upstream delays replenishment downstream. Optimizing such a multi-echelon system by dynamic programming looks hopeless, because the state is a vector of stock levels and stock in transit at every installation, and the value function of a two-installation system with a two-period shipping lag already depends on three continuous variables.

Andrew J. Clark and Herbert Scarf (Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960) showed that for a serial system this curse of dimensionality disappears. Working with echelon stock (the stock at a level plus everything below it or in transit to a lower level), the optimal system cost separates into the cost of the lowest installation, optimized as if it stood alone, plus a function of echelon stock only. The result is the foundation of multi-echelon inventory theory: the echelon base-stock policies used in practice, the stationary analyses of Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) and Chen and Zheng (1994), and textbook treatments (Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, 2000; Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory) all descend from it.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) and Arrow, Karlin and Scarf (1958) set up periodic-review inventory models with discounted costs. Karlin and Scarf (1958) treated a single installation with a delivery lag, reducing it to a problem without lag (the paper's facts 1–3). Clark and Scarf (1960) proved the decomposition for serial systems with linear shipping costs and a setup cost permitted only at the top. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) extended it to infinite horizons and Chen and Zheng (1994) gave a lower-bound proof that reaches more general structures.

Setting

Two installations are in series. Customer demand occurs only at installation 1; its demand in each period is non-negative with density φ\varphiφ on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), independent across periods, and excess demand is backlogged. Installation 2 ships to installation 1 with a two-period lead time at unit cost c1≥0c_1\ge0c1​≥0. The system orders z≥0z\ge0z≥0 units from outside at cost c(z)=K+czc(z)=K+czc(z)=K+cz for z>0z>0z>0 and c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0 (eq. (5)); these arrive at installation 2 one period later. Costs nnn periods ahead are discounted by αn\alpha^nαn, α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0.

The state at the start of a period is (x1,w1,x2)(x_1,w_1,x_2)(x1​,w1​,x2​): x1x_1x1​ is the stock on hand at installation 1, w1w_1w1​ the stock that reaches installation 1 next period, and x2x_2x2​ the echelon-2 stock (on hand at both installations plus in transit), so x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​. Installation 1 pays the expected holding and shortage cost (1),

L(x)={hx+p∫x∞(t−x)φ(t) dt,x>0,p∫0∞(t−x)φ(t) dt,x≤0,L(x)=\begin{cases}hx+p\int_x^\infty(t-x)\varphi(t)\,dt,&x>0,\\ p\int_0^\infty(t-x)\varphi(t)\,dt,&x\le0,\end{cases}L(x)={hx+p∫x∞​(t−x)φ(t)dt,p∫0∞​(t−x)φ(t)dt,​x>0,x≤0,​

and echelon 2 pays a natural one-period cost L~(x2)\tilde L(x_2)L~(x2​) (Assumption 3).

With nnn periods remaining, the optimal system cost Cn(x1,w1,x2)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​) satisfies, with C0≡0C_0\equiv0C0​≡0,

Cn(x1,w1,x2)=min⁡x1+w1≤y≤x20≤z{c(z)+c1(y−x1−w1)+L~(x2)+L(x1)+α∫0∞Cn−1(x1+w1−t, y−x1−w1, x2+z−t)φ(t) dt}(14)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)=\min_{\substack{x_1+w_1\le y\le x_2\\0\le z}}\Big\{c(z)+c_1(y-x_1-w_1)+\tilde L(x_2)+L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty C_{n-1}(x_1+w_1-t,\,y-x_1-w_1,\,x_2+z-t)\varphi(t)\,dt\Big\}\qquad(14)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​)=x1​+w1​≤y≤x2​0≤z​min​{c(z)+c1​(y−x1​−w1​)+L~(x2​)+L(x1​)+α∫0∞​Cn−1​(x1​+w1​−t,y−x1​−w1​,x2​+z−t)φ(t)dt}(14)

where yyy is installation 1's target (stock on hand plus in transit after shipping). Installation 1 in isolation, buying at unit cost c1c_1c1​ with a two-period lag, has optimal cost C^n(x1,w1)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)C^n​(x1​,w1​), C^0≡0\hat C_0\equiv0C^0​≡0:

C^n(x1,w1)=min⁡y≥x1+w1{c1(y−x1−w1)+L(x1)+α∫0∞C^n−1(x1+w1−t, y−x1−w1)φ(t) dt}.(15)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)=\min_{y\ge x_1+w_1}\Big\{c_1(y-x_1-w_1)+L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty\hat C_{n-1}(x_1+w_1-t,\,y-x_1-w_1)\varphi(t)\,dt\Big\}.\qquad(15)C^n​(x1​,w1​)=y≥x1​+w1​min​{c1​(y−x1​−w1​)+L(x1​)+α∫0∞​C^n−1​(x1​+w1​−t,y−x1​−w1​)φ(t)dt}.(15)

In Lean these are ClarkScarf.Serial.Model.sysCost and isoCost; the expressions in braces are sysObj and isoObj, indexed by nnn for the problem with n+1n+1n+1 periods remaining.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 482)

There are functions gng_ngn​ with g1=L~g_1=\tilde Lg1​=L~ such that, for all n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​,

Cn(x1,w1,x2)=C^n(x1,w1)+gn(x2),(16)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)=\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)+g_n(x_2),\qquad(16)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​)=C^n​(x1​,w1​)+gn​(x2​),(16)

and installation 1 acts optimally by aiming at an isolated-optimal target y^\hat yy^​ and taking min⁡(x2,y^)\min(x_2,\hat y)min(x2​,y^​), as much as installation 2 can supply. The goal fixes no form for gng_ngn​ and needs no critical numbers.

Milestones

  1. Convexity of y↦α∫ ⁣ ⁣∫L(y−t1−t2)φ(t1)φ(t2)y\mapsto\alpha\int\!\!\int L(y-t_1-t_2)\varphi(t_1)\varphi(t_2)y↦α∫∫L(y−t1​−t2​)φ(t1​)φ(t2​) (§2 item 2, p. 478).
  2. The isolated decomposition C^n(x1,w1)=L(x1)+α∫0∞L(x1+w1−t)φ(t) dt+fn(x1+w1)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)=L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty L(x_1+w_1-t)\varphi(t)\,dt+f_n(x_1+w_1)C^n​(x1​,w1​)=L(x1​)+α∫0∞​L(x1​+w1​−t)φ(t)dt+fn​(x1​+w1​) for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, with fnf_nfn​ of (7) (p. 480).
  3. Convexity of every fnf_nfn​ (§2 item 3, p. 478).
  4. Eqs. (18)–(19) (p. 483): the system cost when echelon-2 stock is above or below the isolated critical number xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​.
  5. Eqs. (21)–(25) (pp. 483–484): the shortfall cost Λn\Lambda_nΛn​ depends on x2x_2x2​ alone,
Λn(x2)=c1(x2−xˉn)+α2∫0∞ ⁣ ⁣∫0∞[L(x2−t−y)−L(xˉn−t−y)]φ(t)φ(y) dy dt+α∫0∞[fn−1(x2−t)−fn−1(xˉn−t)]φ(t) dt.\Lambda_n(x_2)=c_1(x_2-\bar x_n)+\alpha^2\int_0^\infty\!\!\int_0^\infty[L(x_2-t-y)-L(\bar x_n-t-y)]\varphi(t)\varphi(y)\,dy\,dt+\alpha\int_0^\infty[f_{n-1}(x_2-t)-f_{n-1}(\bar x_n-t)]\varphi(t)\,dt.Λn​(x2​)=c1​(x2​−xˉn​)+α2∫0∞​∫0∞​[L(x2​−t−y)−L(xˉn​−t−y)]φ(t)φ(y)dydt+α∫0∞​[fn−1​(x2​−t)−fn−1​(xˉn​−t)]φ(t)dt.
  1. Theorem 2 (p. 484), the explicit form: given critical numbers, gng_ngn​ is computed by (26), gn(x2)=min⁡z≥0{c(z)+L~(x2)+Λn(x2)+α∫gn−1(x2+z−t)φ(t) dt}g_n(x_2)=\min_{z\ge0}\{c(z)+\tilde L(x_2)+\Lambda_n(x_2)+\alpha\int g_{n-1}(x_2+z-t)\varphi(t)\,dt\}gn​(x2​)=minz≥0​{c(z)+L~(x2​)+Λn​(x2​)+α∫gn−1​(x2​+z−t)φ(t)dt}.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 replaces one three-dimensional dynamic program by two one-dimensional ones. Installation 1 solves its own problem (15), whose solution is a critical-number policy, and echelon 2 solves a single-installation problem in x2x_2x2​ with one-period cost L~+Λn\tilde L+\Lambda_nL~+Λn​. When L~\tilde LL~ is convex the augmented cost is convex (the paper remarks this for Expression (10)), so the echelon-2 policy is of (S,s)(S,s)(S,s) type by Scarf's theorem, and the whole system runs on echelon base-stock rules. Every later serial-system result, finite or infinite horizon, uses this decomposition or its proof idea, and the "induced penalty" Λn\Lambda_nΛn​ is the prototype of the penalty functions used in the multi-echelon literature.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and proved, but no machine-checked version exists. The published platform items on Clark–Scarf are a stationary single-period decomposition with normal demand and a disproved infinite-horizon base-stock recursion, neither of which is this finite-horizon dynamic program. A formal development produces the value functions (14)–(15) with real infima and set integrals, the measurability and integrability of value functions defined by infima, the convexity propagation through the recursion (7), and the decomposition itself, which are reusable for any finite-horizon inventory recursion with lead times.

Difficulty

The obvious induction on nnn substitutes (16) into (14) and separates the minimizations over yyy and zzz. The separation is immediate; the hard step is that the constrained minimum over x1+w1≤y≤x2x_1+w_1\le y\le x_2x1​+w1​≤y≤x2​ differs from the unconstrained one by an amount that a priori depends on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​). Showing that it depends on x2x_2x2​ alone is the content of Theorem 1; nothing in the separation step itself rules out a dependence on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​). On the measure-theoretic side, every value function is defined by an infimum over an uncountable set and then integrated against φ\varphiφ. Its measurability and integrability are not automatic, and they must be established before any identity between integrals can be manipulated.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in ClarkScarf.Serial, one definition file Def_ClarkScarf_Serial_Model and seven theorem files. Conventions committed to:

  • The model is a structure Model whose fields carry the data and the standing hypotheses: h,p,α,c1,K,c≥0h,p,\alpha,c_1,K,c\ge0h,p,α,c1​,K,c≥0; φ≥0\varphi\ge0φ≥0 with ∫0∞φ=1\int_0^\infty\varphi=1∫0∞​φ=1; and two additions the page leaves implicit, disclosed in each statement: a finite demand mean (otherwise (1) is infinite for x≤0x\le0x≤0) and L~\tilde LL~ non-negative, continuous and of at most linear growth (Assumption 3 leaves L~\tilde LL~ unspecified; these make every expectation in (14) finite and measurable). No discount bound α<1\alpha<1α<1, no convexity of L~\tilde LL~, no K=0K=0K=0 and no sign condition on w1w_1w1​ is assumed.
  • Expectations are set integrals ∫(0,∞)F(t)φ(t) dt\int_{(0,\infty)}F(t)\varphi(t)\,dt∫(0,∞)​F(t)φ(t)dt; "Min" is a real infimum over a nonempty feasible set of a non-negative objective.
  • Every statement about CnC_nCn​ is restricted to the state domain x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​; outside it the feasible set of (14) is empty.
  • The horizon index counts periods remaining, C0≡C^0≡0C_0\equiv\hat C_0\equiv0C0​≡C^0​≡0, and fn≡0f_n\equiv0fn​≡0 for n≤2n\le2n≤2.

A formalization in which the feasible set of (14) is empty, in which the expectations are junk zeros of non-integrable integrands, or in which gng_ngn​ may depend on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​) would make (16) trivial; the domain restriction, the integrability conditions and the order ∃g ∀x1,w1,x2\exists g\,\forall x_1,w_1,x_2∃g∀x1​,w1​,x2​ rule these out. A sorry-free check (not part of the mission) verifies C1=L(x1)+L~(x2)C_1=L(x_1)+\tilde L(x_2)C1​=L(x1​)+L~(x2​) and C^1=L(x1)\hat C_1=L(x_1)C^1​=L(x1​) and exhibits a model with exponential demand satisfying all hypotheses.

Needed infrastructure: Fubini-type rearrangement of iterated set integrals against a density, integrability of functions of linear growth against a finite-mean density, convexity preserved under infimal projection u↦inf⁡y≥uu\mapsto\inf_{y\ge u}u↦infy≥u​ and under convolution with a density, and measurability of infimum-defined functions. Contributions of these general lemmas, of the base cases n=1,2n=1,2n=1,2, and of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory Models of the Arrow-Harris-Marschak Type with Time Lag, in Arrow, Karlin, Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958.
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4):818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower Bounds for Multi-Echelon Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 40(11):1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information 1: Centralizing Demand Information Does Not Eliminate the Bullwhip EffectResearch Paper

Motivation

The bullwhip effect is the observation that the variability of orders increases as one moves up a supply chain, from the retailer towards the manufacturer and its suppliers. It was documented in industry and in classroom experiments such as the Beer Game (Sterman 1989), and analysed by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997), who named demand forecasting, lead times, batch ordering, rationing and price variations as its main causes. A remedy often proposed is to centralize demand information: give every stage of the chain the customer demand data, so that no stage forecasts from the distorted orders of its downstream neighbour.

Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) quantified the effect for a retailer that forecasts with a moving average and orders with an order-up-to policy. They gave an explicit lower bound on the ratio of the order variance to the demand variance in terms of the lead time, the forecasting window and the demand autocorrelation. They then showed that in a multistage chain with fully centralized demand information this ratio still grows with the total lead time upstream of each stage. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3.1 of the paper, together with the single-stage analysis it rests on.

Setting

Time is indexed by the integers. The customer demands DtD_tDt​ seen by the retailer follow the AR(1) model

Dt=μ+ρDt−1+ϵt,(1)D_t = \mu + \rho D_{t-1} + \epsilon_t, \tag{1}Dt​=μ+ρDt−1​+ϵt​,(1)

where μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, ∣ρ∣<1|\rho| < 1∣ρ∣<1, and the errors ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ are independent and identically distributed from a symmetric distribution with mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. The demand is in steady state, so that E(Dt)=μ/(1−ρ)E(D_t) = \mu/(1-\rho)E(Dt​)=μ/(1−ρ) and Var(D)=Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D) = \mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(D)=Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) for every ttt.

The retailer does not know the demand process. With a window of p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 past observations it forms the moving-average estimates

D^tL=L ∑i=1pDt−ip,et=Dt−D^t1,σ^etL=CL,ρ∑i=1pet−i2p,\hat D^L_t = L\,\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat D^1_t, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C_{L,\rho}\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p e_{t-i}^2}{p}},D^tL​=Lp∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,et​=Dt​−D^t1​,σ^etL​=CL,ρ​p∑i=1p​et−i2​​​,

where LLL is the lead-time parameter (L=1L = 1L=1 means an order placed at the end of period ttt arrives at the start of period t+1t+1t+1) and CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ is a constant the paper leaves unspecified. The order-up-to point is yt=D^tL+z σ^etLy_t = \hat D^L_t + z\,\hat\sigma^L_{et}yt​=D^tL​+zσ^etL​ for a safety factor zzz, and the order placed in period ttt is qt=yt−yt−1+Dt−1q_t = y_t - y_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt​=yt​−yt−1​+Dt−1​. It may be negative: excess inventory is returned without cost.

In the multistage chain with centralized information, stages k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,… (stage 111 is the retailer) all observe DtD_tDt​ and use the same estimate D^t=∑i=1pDt−i/p\hat D_t = \sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}/pD^t​=∑i=1p​Dt−i​/p. Stage kkk has lead time LkL_kLk​ and safety factor zkz_kzk​ and uses the order-up-to point ytk=LkD^t+zkσ^etLky^k_t = L_k\hat D_t + z_k\hat\sigma^{L_k}_{et}ytk​=Lk​D^t​+zk​σ^etLk​​. Following the paper's sequence of events, stage 111 orders qt1=yt1−yt−11+Dt−1q^1_t = y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt1​=yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​, and stage k≥2k \ge 2k≥2, receiving qtk−1q^{k-1}_tqtk−1​, orders qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 441)

For every stage k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every period ttt,

Var(qtk)Var(D)≥1+(2∑i=1kLip+2(∑i=1kLi)2p2)(1−ρp),\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q^k_t)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2\sum_{i=1}^k L_i}{p} + \frac{2\left(\sum_{i=1}^k L_i\right)^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p),Var(D)Var(qtk​)​≥1+​p2∑i=1k​Li​​+p22(∑i=1k​Li​)2​​(1−ρp),

with equality when z1=⋯=zk=0z_1 = \dots = z_k = 0z1​=⋯=zk​=0. The bound holds for every choice of the constants CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ and of the safety factors.

Milestones (p. 438)

  1. The AR(1) moments Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) and Cov(Dt−1,Dt−p−1)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, D_{t-p-1}) = \rho^p\sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Cov(Dt−1​,Dt−p−1​)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2).
  2. Eq. (4): qt=(1+L/p)Dt−1−(L/p)Dt−p−1+z(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L)q_t = (1 + L/p)D_{t-1} - (L/p)D_{t-p-1} + z(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})qt​=(1+L/p)Dt−1​−(L/p)Dt−p−1​+z(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​) for every outcome.
  3. Lemma 2.1: Cov(Dt−i,σ^etL)=0\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-i}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) = 0Cov(Dt−i​,σ^etL​)=0 for i=1,…,pi = 1, \dots, pi=1,…,p.
  4. The variance identity after Eq. (4):
Var(qt)=[1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+2Lp)Cov(Dt−1,σ^etL)+z2 Var(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L).\mathrm{Var}(q_t) = \left[1 + \left(\tfrac{2L}{p} + \tfrac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p)\right]\mathrm{Var}(D) + 2z\left(1+\tfrac{2L}{p}\right)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) + z^2\,\mathrm{Var}(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1}).Var(qt​)=[1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+p2L​)Cov(Dt−1​,σ^etL​)+z2Var(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​).
  1. Theorem 2.2, the single-stage case:
Var(q)Var(D)≥1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp),(5)\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2L}{p} + \frac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p), \tag{5}Var(D)Var(q)​≥1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp),(5)

with equality when z=0z = 0z=0.

Significance

Theorem 2.2 shows that forecasting with a positive lead time is enough to make orders more variable than demand, even for independent demands (ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0). It also says how the effect depends on each parameter: the bound decreases in the window ppp and increases in the lead time LLL. Theorem 3.1 is the paper's answer to the centralization remedy. When every stage sees the true customer demand and uses the same forecast and the same policy, the variability of orders at stage kkk is still bounded below by the single-stage expression with the cumulative lead time ∑i≤kLi\sum_{i\le k}L_i∑i≤k​Li​. Centralization reduces the bullwhip effect but does not remove it. The decentralized comparison (Theorem 3.2, where the bound becomes multiplicative across stages) is a separate mission in this series.

On the formalization side, the Gaussian special case of the single-stage results is on the platform. Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory states Theorem 2.2, Lemma 2.1, Eq. (4) and the AR(1) moments for normally distributed errors, as the items SupplyChainTheory.bullwhip_signal_processing, bullwhip_lemma_13_1, bullwhip_order_identity and ar1_moments. This mission states them under the paper's weaker hypothesis of a symmetric error distribution. The multistage Theorem 3.1 has no machine-checked counterpart. The paper proves only Theorem 2.2 in print. For the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 it refers to Ryan (1997) and to a working paper, so a formalization supplies arguments the published article does not contain.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is routine. The difficulty is Lemma 2.1 and the covariances like it. The estimate σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ is a square root of a quadratic form in past demands, so its covariance with a demand cannot be computed from second moments. Under Gaussian errors one can appeal to properties of Gaussian vectors. With only a symmetric error law, every distributional fact has to come from the symmetry of the errors and from the representation of the steady-state demand as an infinite series in past errors.

The printed derivation also moves faster than a proof. Expanding Var(qt)\mathrm{Var}(q_t)Var(qt​) from Eq. (4) produces the cross terms Cov(Dt−1,σ^e,t−1L)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})Cov(Dt−1​,σ^e,t−1L​) and Cov(Dt−p−1,σ^etL)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-p-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et})Cov(Dt−p−1​,σ^etL​), which lie outside the lags 1,…,p1, \dots, p1,…,p of Lemma 2.1. The display after Eq. (4) does not account for them. A complete proof of milestone 4 must show that these terms vanish too. For the chain, the stage orders are defined by a recursion across stages, and the variance of qtkq^k_tqtk​ involves the estimates σ^etLi\hat\sigma^{L_i}_{et}σ^etLi​​ of all stages i≤ki \le ki≤k.

Formalization scope

Random variables are real functions on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), and time is Z\mathbb ZZ, so that Dt−p−1D_{t-p-1}Dt−p−1​ exists for every ttt. Variance and covariance are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance and ProbabilityTheory.covariance. The demand structure ChenBullwhip.Centralized.AR1Demand records (1) for every outcome and the paper's error hypotheses: independence, identical distribution, symmetry, mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. It adds four disclosed conditions:

  1. σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, since the results divide by Var(D)\mathrm{Var}(D)Var(D);
  2. square integrability of errors and demands, since Mathlib's variance of a non-square-integrable function is 000;
  3. a steady-state condition: every DtD_tDt​ is square integrable with the law of D0D_0D0​, which is the stationary solution the paper's moment formulas presuppose;
  4. p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 in every result.

The published Gaussian structure SupplyChainTheory.AR1Demand satisfies these conditions, so this mission generalizes the Snyder–Shen items rather than referencing them. The constants CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ are free real parameters, and in the chain CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ is C(Lk)C(L_k)C(Lk​) for an arbitrary function CCC. Lead times are natural numbers, L=0L = 0L=0 included. Sums ∑i=1p\sum_{i=1}^p∑i=1p​ and ∑i=1k\sum_{i=1}^k∑i=1k​ run over {1,…,p}\{1,\dots,p\}{1,…,p} and {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k}, and stages are numbered from 111. The order recursion qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​ is read from the paper's sequence of events, because the paper prints no formula for qtkq^k_tqtk​.

The orders are computed from the demands through the definitions above. They are never arbitrary random variables with assumed moments. "Tight" is formalized as equality, and orders are never truncated at zero. Without the steady-state condition, a process started from an arbitrary D0D_0D0​ satisfies (1) but has time-dependent moments, and the results fail; with σ=0\sigma = 0σ=0 the ratio form would be false. Both cases are excluded by the structure, not by vacuous hypotheses. The structure is satisfiable: i.i.d. standard Gaussian demands on Z→R\mathbb Z \to \mathbb RZ→R form an instance.

A complete development needs: the L2L^2L2 series representation of a stationary AR(1) process; distributional symmetry facts for i.i.d. sequences with a symmetric law; and covariance bookkeeping for finite linear combinations. The first two are reusable for any linear time-series model with symmetric innovations. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas about stationary AR(1) processes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan, D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information, Management Science 46(3):436–443, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, Management Science 43(4):546–558, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • J. D. Sterman, Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment, Management Science 35(3):321–339, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.321
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • J. K. Ryan, Analysis of Inventory Models with Limited Demand Information, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1997 (cited by the paper for the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1).
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands I. The Average-Cost Criterion: With Finite Storage a Modified Base-Stock Policy Is Strongly Average-Cost OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that makes one product to stock faces random demand, can produce at most bbb units per period, and can store at most UUU units. The classical result without the production limit is that a base-stock policy is optimal: raise inventory to a fixed level yˉ\bar yyˉ​ each period. With a production limit, the natural modification is to produce up to yˉ\bar yyˉ​ when that is possible and to produce at full capacity otherwise. Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) proved that this modified base-stock (critical-number) policy is optimal under the long-run average-cost criterion, for discrete demand with a general convex cost. Production-capacity models of this type are standard in operations management texts, and the result underlies the computational and comparative-static work that followed, starting with Part II of the same paper, which treats discounted costs.

Timeline.

  • 1950s–60s: optimality of base-stock (critical-number) policies for uncapacitated periodic-review models; see Heyman and Sobel's Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II (1984).
  • 1986: Federgruen and Zipkin, Part I (average cost, MOR 11(2):193–207) and Part II (discounted cost, MOR 11(2):208–215) establish the capacitated case. Part I handles the unbounded state space with a general average-cost theory for countable-state Markov decision processes by Federgruen, Schweitzer and Tijms (1983).

Setting

Time is divided into periods t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,…. The demands D0,D1,…D_0, D_1, \dotsD0​,D1​,… are independent copies of a random variable DDD with values in {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} and probability mass function p(j)p(j)p(j); write μ=E(D)\mu = E(D)μ=E(D) and P(j)=Pr⁡{D≤j}P(j) = \Pr\{D \le j\}P(j)=Pr{D≤j}. At the start of period ttt the inventory is an integer xtx_txt​ (negative values are backorders). The decision maker raises it to

yt∈Y(xt)={y∈Z:xt≤y≤xt+b, y≤U},y_t \in Y(x_t) = \{y \in \mathbb Z : x_t \le y \le x_t + b,\ y \le U\},yt​∈Y(xt​)={y∈Z:xt​≤y≤xt​+b, y≤U},

pays the expected one-period cost G(yt)G(y_t)G(yt​), and demand is subtracted: xt+1=yt−Dtx_{t+1} = y_t - D_txt+1​=yt​−Dt​. The order cost per unit is set to zero, as in the paper; this loses no generality because every policy with finite average cost has the same average order cost.

The standing assumptions are: G≥0G \ge 0G≥0 is convex and G(y)→∞G(y) \to \inftyG(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞ (Assumption 1); the characteristic function of DDD is analytic at the origin (Assumption 2), and 0<μ0 < \mu0<μ; G(y)≤A+B∣y∣ρG(y) \le A + B|y|^\rhoG(y)≤A+B∣y∣ρ for some positive integer ρ\rhoρ (Assumption 3); b>μb > \mub>μ and P(b)<1P(b) < 1P(b)<1 (Assumption 4). The smallest global minimizer of GGG is yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞, and U≥yˉ∞U \ge \bar y^\inftyU≥yˉ​∞.

A Markov policy is a sequence π=(π0,π1,… )\pi = (\pi_0, \pi_1, \dots)π=(π0​,π1​,…) of maps with πt(x)∈Y(x)\pi_t(x) \in Y(x)πt​(x)∈Y(x). The critical-number policy with critical number yˉ\bar yyˉ​ is δ[yˉ](x)=max⁡(x,min⁡(yˉ,x+b))\delta[\bar y](x) = \max(x, \min(\bar y, x + b))δ[yˉ​](x)=max(x,min(yˉ​,x+b)). A stationary policy δ\deltaδ is strongly optimal with average cost ggg if, from every initial state x≤Ux \le Ux≤U, its average cost t−1E{∑i<tG(yi)}t^{-1}E\{\sum_{i<t} G(y_i)\}t−1E{∑i<t​G(yi​)} converges to ggg, while every Markov policy has lim-inf average cost at least ggg from every initial state.

The analysis uses the operators Rv(y)=G(y)+E v(y−D)Rv(y) = G(y) + E\,v(y - D)Rv(y)=G(y)+Ev(y−D) and Sv(x)=min⁡y∈Y(x)Rv(y)Sv(x) = \min_{y \in Y(x)} Rv(y)Sv(x)=miny∈Y(x)​Rv(y), and the optimality equation

g+v(x)=Sv(x),x≤U.(6)g + v(x) = Sv(x),\qquad x \le U. \tag{6}g+v(x)=Sv(x),x≤U.(6)

For an interval ι=[l,u]\iota = [l, u]ι=[l,u], Hιv(x)H_\iota v(x)Hι​v(x) is the largest expected sum of v(yt)v(y_t)v(yt​), over policies forced to produce at capacity below lll and to produce nothing above uuu, until the inventory first returns to ι\iotaι.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 202)

There exist g∗g^*g∗, v∗v^*v∗ and y∗≥yˉ∞y^* \ge \bar y^\inftyy∗≥yˉ​∞ such that (g∗,v∗)(g^*, v^*)(g∗,v∗) solves (6), v∗v^*v∗ is convex with global minimizer y∗y^*y∗, and

δ∗=δ[y∗] is strongly optimal with average cost g∗.\delta^* = \delta[y^*] \text{ is strongly optimal with average cost } g^*.δ∗=δ[y∗] is strongly optimal with average cost g∗.

The y∗y^*y∗ in the optimality claim is the minimizer constructed in part (a).

Milestones

  • Lemma 2(a)–(c) (pp. 196–197): a normal-tail inequality and two series estimates.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 198): if v(x)=O(∣x∣q)v(x) = O(|x|^q)v(x)=O(∣x∣q) then Hιv(x)=O(∣x∣q+3)H_\iota v(x) = O(|x|^{q+3})Hι​v(x)=O(∣x∣q+3).
  • Corollary 1 (p. 200): Hι1=O(∣x∣3)H_\iota 1 = O(|x|^3)Hι​1=O(∣x∣3) and HιG=O(∣x∣ρ+3)H_\iota G = O(|x|^{\rho+3})Hι​G=O(∣x∣ρ+3), both finite.
  • Corollary 2 (p. 201): (t+1)−1P[δ0t]⋯P[δtt](Hι1+HιG)(x)→0(t+1)^{-1}P[\delta_{0t}]\cdots P[\delta_{tt}](H_\iota 1 + H_\iota G)(x) \to 0(t+1)−1P[δ0t​]⋯P[δtt​](Hι​1+Hι​G)(x)→0.
  • Lemma 4 (p. 201): reachability of every state in [L,U−D−][L, U - D_-][L,U−D−​] under some policy that produces at capacity below LLL.
  • Lemma 5 (p. 202): SSS and QQQ preserve the class VVV of convex functions of growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3) that are nonincreasing below yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 reduces an infinite-state average-cost control problem to a one-parameter search over critical numbers. The paper then evaluates the average cost of δ[yˉ]\delta[\bar y]δ[yˉ​] by a renewal formula, proves it convex in yˉ\bar yyˉ​ (Theorem 2), and in §5 extends optimality to unlimited storage. The strong form of optimality matters: it compares with every Markov policy from every starting state, and it compares lim-infs, not only lim-sups.

Formalizing it. The theorem has a published proof, but no machine-checked one, and its proof relies on external results that are themselves unformalized: the countable-state average-cost theory of Federgruen, Schweitzer and Tijms, a fixed-point theorem on a compact convex subset of a product space, and a large-deviation estimate quoted from Feller. A formal development produces reusable infrastructure: expected first-passage sums for integer-valued random walks with a reflecting control, polynomial moment bounds for them, and the convexity-preservation argument for capacitated value iteration.

Difficulty

The state space is unbounded below, so the finite-state theory of average-cost Markov decision processes does not apply, and the one-period cost is unbounded. The obvious approach, letting the discount factor tend to one in the discounted problem, needs uniform bounds on relative value functions. Those bounds come from the expected cost until the inventory returns to a fixed interval, and with capacity limits that expectation must be controlled with growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3) uniformly over a class of policies. This is the content of Lemma 3, whose proof combines a large-deviation estimate for the demand sums with a renewal-type recursion. A second obstacle is strong optimality: comparing with policies whose lim-inf average cost is smaller requires that the relative value function grows sublinearly along every admissible trajectory (Corollary 2).

Formalization scope

All objects are in the namespace FedergruenZipkin.AvgCost, defined in one file. States x,yx, yx,y and the capacity UUU are integers; demands are natural numbers with a real probability mass function p; bbb is a positive natural number. Convexity on Z\mathbb ZZ is the second-difference inequality. Expectations of a real function are series ∑jp(j) v(y−j)\sum_j p(j)\,v(y-j)∑j​p(j)v(y−j); expected policy costs and hitting sums are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued and need no integrability side condition. Feasibility and all properties of value functions are required only on states x≤Ux \le Ux≤U, which are the only states visited. Assumption 2 is stated literally, as real-analyticity of θ↦∑jp(j)eiθj\theta \mapsto \sum_j p(j)e^{i\theta j}θ↦∑j​p(j)eiθj at 000. The order cost is zero, as in the paper. yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞ is a parameter characterised as the least minimizer of GGG, not an infimum.

"Strongly optimal" has no displayed definition in the paper; it is read from eq. (7) in the proof of Theorem 1(b): convergence of the average cost of δ∗\delta^*δ∗ to g∗g^*g∗ from every state, together with a lim-inf lower bound for every Markov (memoryless, possibly nonstationary) policy from every state. The class is neither widened to history-dependent policies nor narrowed to stationary ones. The goal additionally records that E v∗(y−D)E\,v^*(y-D)Ev∗(y−D) converges, that v∗v^*v∗ has growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3), and that g∗≥0g^* \ge 0g∗≥0; all three follow from the paper's proof.

A trivializing reading is ruled out: the existence of ggg, vvv and y∗y^*y∗ is one existential, so y∗y^*y∗ cannot be decoupled from the solution of (6), and strong optimality includes the convergence of δ∗\delta^*δ∗'s own average cost to g∗g^*g∗, so g=0g = 0g=0 does not satisfy it vacuously.

Not posed: Lemma 1 (quoted from Feller, and replaceable by a Chernoff bound); the renewal formulas (10)–(11) and Theorem 2; and §5 (unlimited storage). Useful contributions include a formal theory of expected hitting sums for skip-free-upward random walks, and a proof of Lemma 3 by any route.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands I. The Average-Cost Criterion, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(2):193–207, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.2.193
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands II. The Discounted-Cost Criterion, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(2):208–215, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.2.208
  • A. Federgruen, P. J. Schweitzer and H. C. Tijms, Denumerable Undiscounted Semi-Markov Decision Processes with Unbounded Rewards, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(2):298–314, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.2.298
  • D. P. Heyman and M. J. Sobel, Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II, McGraw-Hill, 1984.
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971.
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Inventory Control Models 2: The Triple-Balancing Policy Costs at Most Three Times the Optimum for Stochastic Lot-SizingResearch Paper

Motivation

Periodic-review inventory control with a fixed ordering cost is one of the oldest problems in operations research. A firm reviews its stock at the beginning of each of TTT periods, decides whether to place an order, pays a fixed cost KKK for every order it places, and pays holding costs on leftover stock and penalties on unmet (backlogged) demand. When demand is random and correlated across periods, and the firm's forecast evolves as information arrives, the optimal policy solves a dynamic program over the whole information state. That program is intractable in general, and in practice firms use heuristics with no performance guarantee.

Levi, Pál, Roundy and Shmoys (Math. Oper. Res. 32(2), 2007) gave policies with worst-case guarantees for these models, using a "marginal cost accounting" scheme that charges each unit's holding cost to the period in which it was ordered. For the model with fixed ordering costs, the stochastic lot-sizing problem, they assume that the demand of each period is known at the beginning of that period (make-to-order systems, or settings where the short-term forecast is accurate), while demand further ahead stays random and arbitrarily correlated. Under this assumption they define the triple-balancing policy and prove it costs at most three times the optimum in expectation.

Timeline:

  • Scarf (1960) proved that (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies are optimal for independent demands with fixed costs; with correlated demand the optimal policy is a state-dependent (st(ft),St(ft))(s_t(f_t), S_t(f_t))(st​(ft​),St​(ft​)) rule that is hard to compute.
  • Levi, Pál, Roundy and Shmoys (2007) gave the dual-balancing 2-approximation for the model without fixed costs (§4) and the triple-balancing 3-approximation for the stochastic lot-sizing problem (§6, Theorem 6.1), both for arbitrarily correlated demand.

Setting

There are periods t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T on a probability space (Ω,F,μ)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mu)(Ω,F,μ) with a filtration (Ft)(\mathcal F_t)(Ft​): Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ is the information available at the beginning of period ttt. The data are a fixed ordering cost K≥0K\ge0K≥0, per-unit holding costs ht≥0h_t\ge0ht​≥0, per-unit backlogging penalties pt≥0p_t\ge0pt​≥0, an initial inventory level x1∈Rx_1\in\mathbb Rx1​∈R, and nonnegative demands DtD_tDt​. The per-unit ordering cost is zero, the lead time is zero and there is no discounting. The defining assumption is that DtD_tDt​ is Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable: the demand of a period is known when the period begins. For every period sss there is a conditional joint distribution IsI_sIs​ of the demands given Fs\mathcal F_sFs​, under which every conditional mean E[Dt∣fs]E[D_t\mid f_s]E[Dt​∣fs​] is finite.

A feasible policy is an order process Q=(Qt)Q=(Q_t)Q=(Qt​) with Qt≥0Q_t\ge0Qt​≥0 and QtQ_tQt​ determined by Ft\mathcal F_tFt​. Its inventory levels are xt=x1+∑j<t(Qj−Dj)x_t=x_1+\sum_{j<t}(Q_j-D_j)xt​=x1​+∑j<t​(Qj​−Dj​) before ordering and yt=xt+Qty_t=x_t+Q_tyt​=xt​+Qt​ after ordering, and its cost is

C(Q)=∑t=1T(K 1(Qt>0)+ht(yt−Dt)++pt(Dt−yt)+).\mathcal C(Q)=\sum_{t=1}^T\Bigl(K\,\mathbb 1(Q_t>0)+h_t(y_t-D_t)^++p_t(D_t-y_t)^+\Bigr).C(Q)=t=1∑T​(K1(Qt​>0)+ht​(yt​−Dt​)++pt​(Dt​−yt​)+).

The triple-balancing policy TB uses two rules. Let s∗s^*s∗ be the last period before sss in which TB ordered (s∗=0s^*=0s∗=0 if none). Rule 1: TB orders in period sss if and only if, without an order in sss, the accumulated backlogging cost over (s∗,s](s^*,s](s∗,s] would exceed KKK. Rule 2: when it orders in s<Ts<Ts<T, it orders

qsB=max⁡{q≥0: E[HsB(q)∣fs]≤K},HsB(q)=∑j=sThj(q−(D[s,j]−xs)+)+,q_s^B=\max\{q\ge0:\ E[H_s^B(q)\mid f_s]\le K\},\qquad H_s^B(q)=\sum_{j=s}^T h_j\bigl(q-(D_{[s,j]}-x_s)^+\bigr)^+,qsB​=max{q≥0: E[HsB​(q)∣fs​]≤K},HsB​(q)=j=s∑T​hj​(q−(D[s,j]​−xs​)+)+,

the largest quantity whose expected marginal holding cost over [s,T][s,T][s,T] is at most KKK. When it orders in period TTT, it orders exactly enough to clear the backorders and meet DTD_TDT​. Let NNN be the number of orders TB places.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.1

For every instance, the triple-balancing policy TB and every feasible policy PPP satisfy

E[C(TB)]≤3 E[C(P)].E[\mathcal C(TB)]\le 3\,E[\mathcal C(P)].E[C(TB)]≤3E[C(P)].

The constant 3 is the paper's. The statement leaves the demand law, the information structure and the cost data unrestricted beyond the standing assumptions above.

Milestones

  1. §6.1, Rule 2 observation. In a period where TB orders, Ds≤ysTBD_s\le y_s^{TB}Ds​≤ysTB​: no backorders remain at the end of the period.
  2. Lemma 6.1. K⋅E[N]≤E[C(P)]K\cdot E[N]\le E[\mathcal C(P)]K⋅E[N]≤E[C(P)] for every feasible PPP.
  3. Lemma 6.2. E[C(TB)]≤E[C(P)]+2K⋅E[N]E[\mathcal C(TB)]\le E[\mathcal C(P)]+2K\cdot E[N]E[C(TB)]≤E[C(P)]+2K⋅E[N] for every feasible PPP.

Two non-milestone theorems show that the setting is not empty. A conditional demand law exists whenever demands are integrable, and a triple-balancing policy exists when hT>0h_T>0hT​>0.

Significance

The theorem gives a policy that can be computed online and comes with a worst-case expected-cost guarantee that does not depend on the demand distribution, the horizon or the cost data. In this setting the optimal policy is not computable in general, and the previously used heuristics have no such bound. The two lemmas separate a lower bound on every policy, in terms of TB's own number of orders, from an upper bound on TB's cost. The authors' subsequent work extends the balancing template to capacitated and multi-echelon models (§7 of the paper).

The result is proved in the paper. As far as we know, no machine-checked version exists of this theorem, of the balancing argument, or of a stochastic inventory model with correlated demand and evolving information. A formalization would check the argument, which is terse in places: the printed proof of Lemma 6.2 indexes its final sum loosely and must handle the event N=0N=0N=0. It would also produce reusable infrastructure for policies adapted to a filtration, for regular conditional distributions of future demand, and for cost accounting over random intervals between orders.

Difficulty

The costs of TB and of an arbitrary policy cannot be compared period by period, because the two policies order at different, random times that depend on the evolving information. Any comparison has to be made over intervals whose endpoints are stopping times determined by TB, conditioned on the information at their start. At such a time the other policy may hold more or less stock than TB, and the bound must hold in both cases. Bounding each policy's cost on its own does not work: the guarantee rests on a coupling between when TB orders and what every other policy must pay over the same random stretch of time. The formal side adds a second difficulty. Rule 2 is defined through a conditional expectation viewed as a function of the order quantity, so it needs a regular conditional distribution and a measurable selection of the maximizer.

Formalization scope

  • Periods are natural numbers 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T, demands and orders are real-valued, and data at indices outside 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T are unused.
  • Information is a MeasureTheory.Filtration ℕ. A policy is feasible when it is nonnegative and adapted, and "DtD_tDt​ known at the start of period ttt" means DtD_tDt​ is Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable.
  • The conditional distributions IsI_sIs​ are model data: Markov kernels to demand paths that are Fs\mathcal F_sFs​-measurable regular conditional distributions of the demand path. At every outcome they make DsD_sDs​ deterministic, demands nonnegative and the conditional means E[Dt∣fs]E[D_t\mid f_s]E[Dt​∣fs​] finite.
  • Expected costs, E[N]E[N]E[N] and the conditional expectation in Rule 2 are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Lemma 6.2 is stated additively, E[C(TB)]≤E[C(P)]+2K E[N]E[\mathcal C(TB)]\le E[\mathcal C(P)]+2K\,E[N]E[C(TB)]≤E[C(P)]+2KE[N], which is the paper's inequality whenever the expectations are finite.
  • The comparison policy is an arbitrary feasible policy, not an optimal one. The paper's proofs use only feasibility, and this form implies the paper's whenever an optimum exists, without any existence hypothesis.
  • TB is the predicate "feasible and satisfies Rules 1 and 2 at every period and outcome". The rules determine the policy uniquely. Rule 1 uses a strict "exceeds KKK", and the period-TTT order is DT−xTD_T-x_TDT​−xT​.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Junk conditional expectations cannot make Rule 2 hold for every qqq, because it uses kernel integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Infinite expected costs cannot be read as 000. The policy class is not empty, because a separate theorem gives existence under hT>0h_T>0hT​>0 (without some positive holding cost on [s,T][s,T][s,T] the maximum in Rule 2 does not exist).

Contributions welcome: proofs of the existence theorems (measurable selection of qsBq_s^BqsB​, versions of regular conditional distributions), the stopping-time decomposition of the cost over TB's order intervals, and Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2.

Selected references

  • R. Levi, M. Pál, R. O. Roundy, D. B. Shmoys, Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Inventory Control Models, Mathematics of Operations Research 32(2):284–302, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0205
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 1: Revenue Sharing at w = φc Coordinates the Channel and Gives the Retailer the Share φ of Its Optimal ProfitResearch Paper

Why revenue sharing

A supplier who sells to an independent retailer through a plain per-unit wholesale price faces double marginalization: the retailer orders less than the quantity that maximizes the profit of the supply chain as a whole, because each unit costs him the wholesale price rather than the production cost. Supply chain contracting studies payment schemes under which the retailer's own optimum coincides with the system optimum. Such a scheme is said to coordinate the channel. The usual examples are buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985), quantity-flexibility contracts (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) and quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987).

Cachon and Lariviere study revenue sharing, in which the retailer pays a low wholesale price and also hands over a fixed fraction of his revenue. The scheme was common in video-cassette rental in the late 1990s, where it let rental chains stock far more copies of new releases. This mission formalizes the paper's single-retailer result: revenue sharing coordinates the channel, and the supplier can choose any split of the channel's maximal profit. It also includes the three further results of the paper that use the same argument.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000. Its results are unnumbered, so every item cites a section, a displayed equation and a printed page. The 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material.

Setting

A supplier sells to one retailer, who orders q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 units before a selling season. The retailer's expected revenue is a function R(q)R(q)R(q) of the quantity alone. Leftover units have zero salvage value, and the supplier produces each unit at cost c>0c > 0c>0. The paper's standing assumptions (Sec. 1, p. 5) are:

  • RRR is strictly concave and differentiable for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, with marginal revenue R′(q)R'(q)R′(q);
  • the product is viable: R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c;
  • a finite quantity is optimal: R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c.

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} has two terms. The retailer pays the wholesale price w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 per unit, and he keeps the share ϕ\phiϕ of the revenue and transfers (1−ϕ)R(q)(1-\phi)R(q)(1−ϕ)R(q) to the supplier. The case ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the plain wholesale-price contract. The profits of the supply chain, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.\Pi(q) = R(q) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q) = \phi R(q) - qw,\qquad \pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)R(q) + qw - qc .Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr​(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.

The integrated channel quantity qIq_IqI​ is the maximizer of Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0. In Lean these objects are RevShareCoord.Single.Model (fields R, R', c and the three assumptions) and its functions Pi, retailerProfit and supplierProfit.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing coordinates the channel (Sec. 2.2, p. 6)

Let ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1] and w(ϕ)=ϕcw(\phi) = \phi cw(ϕ)=ϕc. Then

qI=arg max⁡q≥0 πr(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr(qI)=ϕ Π(qI),πs(qI)=(1−ϕ) Π(qI).q_I = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{q\ge 0}\ \pi_r(q) \ \text{(uniquely)},\qquad w(\phi)\le c,\qquad \pi_r(q_I) = \phi\,\Pi(q_I),\qquad \pi_s(q_I) = (1-\phi)\,\Pi(q_I).qI​=q≥0argmax​ πr​(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr​(qI​)=ϕΠ(qI​),πs​(qI​)=(1−ϕ)Π(qI​).

The statement fixes no revenue function and no share. It holds for every model and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], which is what "the supplier can take any share of the channel profit" means.

Milestones on the way

  1. Eq. (1), p. 6. qIq_IqI​ exists, is unique and positive, and is the only positive root of R′(qI)=cR'(q_I) = cR′(qI​)=c.
  2. Retailer's first-order condition, p. 6. If R′(0)>w/ϕR'(0) > w/\phiR′(0)>w/ϕ, an order q^≥0\hat q \ge 0q^​≥0 is optimal for the retailer exactly when q^>0\hat q > 0q^​>0 and ϕR′(q^)=w\phi R'(\hat q) = wϕR′(q^​)=w. The retailer has at most one optimal order.
  3. Profit identities, p. 6. Under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, πr(q)=ϕΠ(q)\pi_r(q) = \phi\Pi(q)πr​(q)=ϕΠ(q) and πs(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q)\pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)\Pi(q)πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q) at every qqq.
  4. Heterogeneous retailers, p. 7. Given ccc and ϕ\phiϕ, a single wholesale price, chosen before the revenue function, coordinates every retailer of the model.

Further results on the same argument

  1. Buy-back equivalence, Sec. 2.3, p. 9. Take the fixed-price newsvendor and the buy-back contract b∗=p(1−ϕ)b^* = p(1-\phi)b∗=p(1−ϕ), wb∗=p(1−ϕ)+ϕcw_b^* = p(1-\phi)+\phi cwb∗​=p(1−ϕ)+ϕc. It gives the retailer and the supplier the same realized profits as {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, for every order and every demand realization.
  2. Endogenous price, Sec. 3.1 and footnote 3, p. 11. Let revenue Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) be any function of quantity and price, with costs linear in quantity. Then πr(q,p)=ϕ Π(q,p)\pi_r(q,p) = \phi\,\Pi(q,p)πr​(q,p)=ϕΠ(q,p) under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi,\phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, and the integrated optimum (qI,pI)(q_I,p_I)(qI​,pI​), assumed unique, is the retailer's unique optimum.

Significance

The result separates coordination from profit division. A contract family coordinates for every value of a parameter, and that parameter then moves profit between the firms without changing the quantity, so the contract terms can be settled by bargaining power alone. The heterogeneous-retailer milestone gives the practical advantage over quantity discounts: the coordinating terms do not depend on the retailer's demand, so one price list serves retailers who face different markets. The Sec. 2.3 equivalence shows that, in the fixed-price newsvendor, buy-backs are a special case of revenue sharing. The Sec. 3.1 statement shows that revenue sharing still coordinates when the retailer also sets the price, a setting in which Emmons and Gilbert (1998) showed buy-backs fail.

All of these results are proved in the paper, and none is open. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the single-retailer theory for a general strictly concave revenue function. A related newsvendor version is already formalized on the platform: SupplyChainTheory.revenue_sharing_coordinates, from Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, Thm 14.6. That version has a newsvendor revenue with salvage values and goodwill costs, and it concludes the optimality of three profits, not the ϕ\phiϕ-split of this paper. It is a different statement, so it is not reused here.

Difficulty

The algebra is short. The identity πr=ϕΠ\pi_r = \phi\Piπr​=ϕΠ under w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc is a single line, and it is a milestone, not the goal. The work lies in the optimization claims over a half-line with only one-sided information at 000. The integrated optimum must be shown to exist. R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c gives only an eventual bound on the derivative, so the existence argument needs the continuity of a concave function and its supergradient inequality. It must also be shown positive, which uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c as a one-sided derivative. Its uniqueness rests on strict concavity. The retailer's first-order condition needs the same machinery for ϕR−wq\phi R - wqϕR−wq, including the observation that the boundary point 000 is never optimal. A stationary point of πr\pi_rπr​ is not enough. The goal asserts that qIq_IqI​ is the unique maximizer over all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

Formalization scope

  • Quantities, prices and shares are real numbers. RRR and R′R'R′ are functions R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R, constrained only on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Differentiability is HasDerivWithinAt R (R' q) (Set.Ici 0) q for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, so it is one-sided at 000. Strict concavity is StrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0) R.
  • R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c is encoded as "R′(Q)<cR'(Q) < cR′(Q)<c for some Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0". For a decreasing R′R'R′ this is equivalent, and it allows R′→−∞R' \to -\inftyR′→−∞.
  • "Optimal" means IsMaxOn over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (over [0,∞)×P[0,\infty)\times P[0,∞)×P in Sec. 3.1), and "unique" means every other maximizer equals it.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is not displayed in the paper. It is read off the sequence of events of Sec. 1.
  • The goal and the first-order condition take ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1]. At ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer's profit is identically zero and qIq_IqI​ is not the unique optimum. The profit identities and the buy-back identities hold for all real parameters and are stated that way.
  • Corrected slips. (a) Eq. (1) is introduced with "R′(0)≥cR'(0) \ge cR′(0)≥c". This contradicts the standing assumption R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c: with equality, qI=0q_I = 0qI​=0 is not positive. The statement uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c. (b) The display πr(qI)=ϕR(qI)−qIc=ϕΠ(qI)\pi_r(q_I) = \phi R(q_I) - q_I c = \phi\Pi(q_I)πr​(qI​)=ϕR(qI​)−qI​c=ϕΠ(qI​) has a wrong middle term, which should read ϕR(qI)−qIϕc\phi R(q_I) - q_I\phi cϕR(qI​)−qI​ϕc. The outer equality is stated.
  • The first-order-condition milestone adds the converse direction and uniqueness to the paper's "must satisfy". It does not claim that an optimum exists, which may fail when w/ϕ<cw/\phi < cw/ϕ<c.
  • Sec. 3.1 is stated in the generality of footnote 3: an arbitrary revenue function Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) and a set PPP of admissible prices, with the integrated optimum's uniqueness as a hypothesis, as the paper assumes it. The paper's monotonicity of F(x,p)F(x,p)F(x,p) in ppp is unused and omitted.
  • Sec. 2.3 is formalized pathwise. The expected-profit equations (2)–(4) are not part of the mission.
  • A goal that only asserts πr(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕ Π(q)\pi_r(\phi, \phi c, q) = \phi\,\Pi(q)πr​(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕΠ(q) would be an unfolding of definitions. The goal therefore carries the argmax-and-uniqueness claim, which needs strict concavity and the model's assumptions.
  • Needed infrastructure: first-order conditions for concave functions on a closed half-line with one-sided derivatives, and existence of maximizers from an eventual derivative bound. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of that general kind are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • K. S. Moorthy, Managing channel profits: Comment, Marketing Science 6(4):375–379, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.6.4.375
  • A. A. Tsay, W. S. Lovejoy, Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 1(2):89–111, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1.2.89
  • H. Emmons, S. M. Gilbert, Note: The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science 44(2):276–283, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under which a retailer pays a per-unit wholesale price and keeps only a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of its revenue, the rest going to the supplier. The contracts were made prominent by the video rental industry around 1998, where studios lowered tape prices in exchange for a share of rental income.

With a single retailer, revenue sharing at the wholesale price ϕc\phi cϕc coordinates the channel and splits its profit in the proportion ϕ\phiϕ. This mission formalizes the extension in Section 3.2 of the paper to competing retailers: several locations whose revenues depend on each other's stock, so that one retailer's order lowers the others' revenue. Competition creates externalities the single-retailer argument does not have, and the question is whether revenue sharing still coordinates, and at what prices. Section 4.1.2 then works out a Cournot example in closed form, measuring how far the supplier's own optimal wholesale price leaves the channel from the integrated profit.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000; the published version (Management Science 51(1), 2005) renumbers and revises the results. The working paper numbers no theorem, so results are cited by section, displayed equation and page.

Setting

A single supplier sells one product through nnn locations i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, each run by an independent retailer. A stocking profile is qˉ=(q1,…,qn)\bar q = (q_1,\dots,q_n)qˉ​=(q1​,…,qn​), and the revenue at location iii is Ri(qˉ)R_i(\bar q)Ri​(qˉ​), which may depend on every location's quantity. The system revenue is R(qˉ)=∑iRi(qˉ)R(\bar q) = \sum_i R_i(\bar q)R(qˉ​)=∑i​Ri​(qˉ​), every unit costs the supplier c>0c > 0c>0, and the integrated system profit is

Π(qˉ)=R(qˉ)−c∑i=1nqi.\Pi(\bar q) = R(\bar q) - c\sum_{i=1}^n q_i .Π(qˉ​)=R(qˉ​)−ci=1∑n​qi​.

Write Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj(qˉ)/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j(\bar q)/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​(qˉ​)/∂qi​: the superscript is the variable differentiated, the subscript the revenue function. The paper assumes that each RiR_iRi​ is continuous, that ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0 for j≠ij \ne ij=i (locations are substitutes), and that RiR_iRi​ is unimodal in qiq_iqi​. The system-optimal profile qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I has positive entries and solves the first-order system

Rii(qˉI)+∑j≠iRji(qˉI)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)R_i^i(\bar q^I) + \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I) = c, \qquad i = 1,\dots,n. \tag{6}Rii​(qˉ​I)+j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)

Under a revenue-sharing contract (ϕ,wi)(\phi, w_i)(ϕ,wi​) retailer iii earns πri(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi(qˉ)−wiqi\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \phi R_i(\bar q) - w_i q_iπri​​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi​(qˉ​)−wi​qi​ and the supplier earns πs(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i((1−ϕ)Ri(qˉ)+wiqi)−c∑iqi\pi_s(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \sum_i\big((1-\phi)R_i(\bar q) + w_i q_i\big) - c\sum_i q_iπs​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i​((1−ϕ)Ri​(qˉ​)+wi​qi​)−c∑i​qi​; the wholesale-price contract is ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, with profits written πri(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\bar w)πri​​(qˉ​,wˉ) and πs(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_s(\bar q,\bar w)πs​(qˉ​,wˉ). A Nash equilibrium in order quantities is a profile qˉ≥0\bar q \ge 0qˉ​≥0 from which no retailer gains by changing its own quantity to any x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The coordinating wholesale prices are

wiI=c−∑j≠iRji(qˉI).w_i^I = c - \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I).wiI​=c−j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I).

The Cournot example (7) is Ri(qˉ)=qi(1−qi−β∑j≠iqj)R_i(\bar q) = q_i\big(1 - q_i - \beta\sum_{j\ne i} q_j\big)Ri​(qˉ​)=qi​(1−qi​−β∑j=i​qj​) with 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing supports qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

For ϕ∈[0,1]\phi\in[0,1]ϕ∈[0,1] and wi(ϕ)=ϕwiIw_i(\phi) = \phi w_i^Iwi​(ϕ)=ϕwiI​:

qˉI is a Nash equilibrium,πri(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕ πri(qˉI,wˉI),πs(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉI)+ϕ πs(qˉI,wˉI).\bar q^I \text{ is a Nash equilibrium},\quad \pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = \phi\,\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I),\quad \pi_s(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = (1-\phi)\Pi(\bar q^I) + \phi\,\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I).qˉ​I is a Nash equilibrium,πri​​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕπri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI),πs​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉ​I)+ϕπs​(qˉ​I,wˉI).

Wholesale-price contracts (Sec. 3.2, pp. 13–14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies Rii(qˉN)=wiR_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_iRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​ (Eq. (8)), so marginal-cost pricing does not support qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I when a location imposes a negative externality; the prices wˉI\bar w^IwˉI make qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I an equilibrium; wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c when cross-effects are nonpositive; and wˉI\bar w^IwˉI supports exactly the split πs(qˉI,wˉI)=∑iqiI∑j≠i(−Rji(qˉI))\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) = \sum_i q_i^I\sum_{j\ne i}(-R_j^i(\bar q^I))πs​(qˉ​I,wˉI)=∑i​qiI​∑j=i​(−Rji​(qˉ​I)).

Revenue sharing (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies ϕRii(qˉN)=wi(ϕ)\phi R_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_i(\phi)ϕRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​(ϕ); the two profit identities hold for every ϕ\phiϕ; and πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0.

The Cournot example (Sec. 4.1.2, pp. 19–20)

At a common price w<1w<1w<1 the unique equilibrium is qiN=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1))q_i^N = (1-w)/(2+\beta(n-1))qiN​=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1)); the integrated optimum is qiI=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))q_i^I = (1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))qiI​=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)); the coordinating price wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))w^I = c + \beta(n-1)(1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)) increases in β\betaβ and nnn; the supplier's optimal price is w∗=(1+c)/2w^* = (1+c)/2w∗=(1+c)/2; and the efficiency at w∗w^*w∗ is

Π(qˉN(w∗))Π(qˉI)=1−1(2+β(n−1))2.\frac{\Pi(\bar q^N(w^*))}{\Pi(\bar q^I)} = 1 - \frac{1}{(2+\beta(n-1))^2}.Π(qˉ​I)Π(qˉ​N(w∗))​=1−(2+β(n−1))21​.

Significance

The goal shows that the single-retailer coordination result survives competition, with one change: the coordinating price must charge each retailer for the externality it imposes on the others, so it depends on every location's revenue function, and wiIw^I_iwiI​ exceeds the production cost. The supplier's profit then moves along a line between what wholesale prices alone give her and the whole system profit, which is how revenue sharing provides a profit split that linear prices cannot. The Cournot results make the comparison quantitative: when retailers compete intensely, the supplier's own optimal wholesale price already achieves most of the integrated profit, so revenue sharing, which has administrative costs, is less attractive.

No machine-checked proof of these results is known. The mission produces a reusable formal description of an nnn-player quantity game under per-retailer linear contracts, equilibrium conditions for it, and a fully worked Cournot instance, including a uniqueness claim for equilibria among all (not only symmetric) profiles.

Difficulty

The equilibrium claims are global: a retailer must not gain from any nonnegative deviation, not only from small ones. A first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I does not give this by itself. The page assumes RiR_iRi​ unimodal in qiq_iqi​, but unimodality does not survive subtracting the linear purchase cost, so the first-order condition is not sufficient under that assumption alone; the formalization uses concavity in the own quantity, under which it is. The participation claim πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 is stated on the page without proof and needs a bound on the revenue of a location that stocks nothing.

In the Cournot example, uniqueness of the equilibrium must exclude asymmetric profiles and profiles where some retailers stock nothing, and the supplier's optimal price must be compared against every equilibrium at every price, including prices at which the retailers order nothing.

Formalization scope

Locations are Fin n; a profile is Fin n → ℝ; revenues are R : Fin n → (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ, and dR i j q is Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​/∂qi​, given as a partial derivative at every profile with all entries positive. A deviation of retailer iii to xxx is Function.update q i x, and Nash equilibria quantify over all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The standing assumptions of Section 3.2 are fields of the structure Model: c>0c > 0c>0; continuity of RiR_iRi​ on the nonnegative orthant; the partial derivatives; ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0, encoded as "RiiR_i^iRii​ does not increase in qjq_jqj​"; and concavity of RiR_iRi​ in qiq_iqi​, which is the formalization's reading of "unimodal in qiq_iqi​". The paper's assumption that marginal revenue eventually falls below every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 is used only for existence of an equilibrium, which is not formalized, and is omitted.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  • qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I is taken as any positive solution of (6); its optimality for Π\PiΠ is not used.
  • "qˉ∗\bar q^*qˉ​∗ is a Nash equilibrium" (p. 13) is read as qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I.
  • In ϕ(Ri(qˉI)−qiIwi)\phi(R_i(\bar q^I) - q_i^I w_i)ϕ(Ri​(qˉ​I)−qiI​wi​) (p. 14), wiw_iwi​ is read as wiIw_i^IwiI​.
  • "Rii(qˉI)>cR_i^i(\bar q^I) > cRii​(qˉ​I)>c" needs a negative externality ∑j≠iRji(qˉI)<0\sum_{j\ne i}R_j^i(\bar q^I) < 0∑j=i​Rji​(qˉ​I)<0, which is assumed.
  • "Rji(qˉ)≤0R_j^i(\bar q) \le 0Rji​(qˉ​)≤0" is not a standing assumption, so it is a hypothesis of wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c, and strictness needs some strictly negative cross-effect.
  • πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 assumes nonnegative revenue at a location that stocks nothing.
  • In the Cournot example the implicit w<1w < 1w<1 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 are hypotheses; all retailers pay a common price; "increasing" is strict exactly where it holds (n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 for β\betaβ, β>0\beta > 0β>0 for nnn).

A formalization that defines "the prices coordinate" as "the prices satisfy the first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I" restates (6) and is ruled out: every equilibrium claim here is the game-theoretic statement about unilateral deviations. Contributions welcome: proofs of the equilibrium lemmas from concavity and the derivative, the Cournot uniqueness argument, and a general existence theorem for the quantity game.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991 (Theorem 1.2, existence of pure-strategy equilibria).
  • F. Bernstein, A. Federgruen, Pricing and Replenishment Strategies in a Distribution System with Competing Retailers, Operations Research 51(3):409–426, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.3.409.14957
  • J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 4: With Retailer Effort, the Supplier Prefers the Wholesale-Price Contract Exactly When τ > 1/√2Research Paper

Motivation

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} lets a supplier charge a retailer a wholesale price www per unit and, in addition, collect the share 1−ϕ1 - \phi1−ϕ of the retailer's revenue. The video-rental industry adopted such contracts at scale in the late 1990s, and Cachon and Lariviere showed that in a broad class of models they coordinate the supply chain: the retailer's privately optimal decisions coincide with those that maximize total channel profit, and the profit can be split arbitrarily between the firms (missions 1 and 2 of this series).

The same authors also studied where revenue sharing breaks down. The most practically relevant limitation is retailer effort: shelf space, service, store cleanliness and promotion raise demand, cost the retailer money, and cannot be written into a contract. Once the retailer gives away part of its revenue, it earns only a share of the return on its effort while still paying the whole cost. This mission formalizes Section 4.2 of the authors' working paper, which shows that revenue sharing then cannot coordinate the channel while leaving the supplier any profit, and, in an explicit linear-demand example, determines exactly when the supplier is better off with the plain wholesale-price contract.

The source is the June 2000 working paper (Cachon and Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations), whose results are displayed claims inside numbered sections rather than numbered theorems; the milestones cite section, printed page and display. The published version appeared in Management Science 51(1), 2005.

Setting

General model (Sec. 4.2.1). A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0. The retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 after observing the contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w}. Expected revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e) is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in eee and concave in qqq; effort costs the retailer g(e)g(e)g(e), where ggg is continuous, increasing, differentiable and convex with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0. The profits of the integrated channel, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).\Pi(q, e) = R(q, e) - g(e) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q, e) = \phi R(q, e) - g(e) - qw,\qquad (1-\phi)R(q, e) + q(w - c).Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr​(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).

The integrated solution (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) maximizes Π\PiΠ over q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0.

Linear example (Sec. 4.2.2). Inverse demand is P(q,e)=1−q+2τeP(q, e) = 1 - q + 2\tau eP(q,e)=1−q+2τe with an effort-impact parameter τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0, revenue is R(q,e)=qP(q,e)R(q, e) = qP(q, e)R(q,e)=qP(q,e) and effort costs g(e)=e2g(e) = e^2g(e)=e2. For a share ϕ\phiϕ the supplier's profit when the retailer responds optimally to {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} is πs(w,ϕ)\pi_s(w, \phi)πs​(w,ϕ), and the supplier's optimal profit is

V(ϕ)=sup⁡w≥0πs(w,ϕ).V(\phi) = \sup_{w \ge 0} \pi_s(w, \phi).V(ϕ)=w≥0sup​πs​(w,ϕ).

The share ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the wholesale-price contract.

Formalization targets

Goal: the supplier's choice of contract

For 0≤τ<10 \le \tau < 10≤τ<1, 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], the supremum defining V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is attained at the price w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))w(\phi) = \phi\big((1-\tau^2)\phi + c(1-\phi\tau^2)\big)/\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)), and

V(ϕ)=(1−c)24(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)).V(\phi) = \frac{(1 - c)^2}{4\big(1 + \phi(1 - 2\tau^2)\big)} .V(ϕ)=4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))(1−c)2​.

Consequently VVV is strictly increasing on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​ (the wholesale-price contract is the supplier's unique best share), constant if τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, and strictly decreasing if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​, with V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4V(\phi) \to (1-c)^2/4V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4 as ϕ→0+\phi \to 0^+ϕ→0+.

Milestones

  1. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: with w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc and ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1 the retailer's optimal effort at qIq_IqI​ is below eIe_IeI​.
  2. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: if (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) is optimal for the retailer, then ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, w=cw = cw=c, and the supplier earns nothing.
  3. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 23: the retailer's unique optimal effort at quantity qqq is e(q)=ϕτqe(q) = \phi\tau qe(q)=ϕτq.
  4. Sec. 4.2.2, pp. 23–24: the retailer's reduced profit q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w]q[\phi - q(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2) - w]q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w], its unique joint optimum (q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ)))\big(q(w,\phi), e(q(w,\phi))\big)(q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ))) with q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))q(w, \phi) = (\phi - w)/(2(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)) for w<ϕw < \phiw<ϕ and 000 otherwise, and the optimal profit (ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))(\phi - w)^2/(4(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))(ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)).
  5. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: the integrated retail price pI=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2))p_I = (1 + c(1-2\tau^2))/(2(1-\tau^2))pI​=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2)), increasing in ccc if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ and decreasing if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​.
  6. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(⋅,ϕ)\pi_s(\cdot, \phi)πs​(⋅,ϕ) is strictly concave where the retailer orders, and w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) is its unique maximizer over w≥0w \ge 0w≥0.
  7. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)))\pi_s(w(\phi), \phi) = (1-c)^2/\big(4(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2))\big)πs​(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))).

Significance

The general result (milestones 1–2) is a clean impossibility statement: with non-contractible effort, the only contract in the revenue-sharing family that coordinates the channel is the wholesale-price contract at marginal cost, which leaves the supplier zero profit. It marks the boundary of the coordination results of the earlier sections, and contrasts with the price-dependent newsvendor, where revenue sharing does coordinate price and quantity because the cost of expanding demand is captured in the revenue function and shared by both firms.

The example turns the impossibility into a design rule. Because coordination is out of reach, the supplier compares contracts by her own profit, and the threshold τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​ separates two regimes: when effort matters a lot she should leave the retailer all revenue and charge only a wholesale price ("a smaller share of a larger pie"); when it matters little she should take as much revenue as possible. The same threshold governs the counterintuitive comparative static that the integrated channel's retail price falls as production cost rises.

All results are proved on paper in the source. None has a machine-checked proof; this mission produces the first. The example is a fully explicit two-stage optimization problem, so the formal development also yields a verified computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium with moral hazard that other contract-design missions can reuse.

Difficulty

The individual calculations are elementary, and the work lies in getting the optimization statements right. The page solves the retailer's problem sequentially (effort first, then quantity) and writes the supplier's objective by substituting closed forms. A faithful proof must instead show that these closed forms are global optima over the constrained domains: the retailer optimizes jointly over the quadrant q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0, the corner q=0q = 0q=0 is optimal whenever w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, and the supplier's objective is a quadratic on w≤ϕw \le \phiw≤ϕ glued to the zero function on w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, which is not concave on all of w≥0w \ge 0w≥0. The first-order-condition argument of the general model similarly needs an interior integrated optimum and a strictly positive marginal effect of effort, which "strictly increasing in eee" alone does not provide.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The general model is a structure RevShareCoord.Effort.Model carrying RRR, its partial derivatives, ggg, g′g'g′ and ccc; derivatives are one-sided within [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and joint differentiability of RRR is replaced by its partial derivatives and joint continuity. The example lives in RevShareCoord.Effort.Linear. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over the whole admissible set (q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0 for the retailer, w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 for the supplier), and the supplier's value V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is defined as the supremum of her attainable profits, not by the printed formula.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • τ<1\tau < 1τ<1 instead of τ∈[0,1]\tau \in [0, 1]τ∈[0,1]: at τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 the integrated problem is unbounded and pIp_IpI​ divides by zero. The page's "jointly concave in qqq and τ\tauτ" is read as qqq and eee.
  • 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1: c>0c > 0c>0 is the standing assumption of Sec. 1, and c<1c < 1c<1 is needed for a positive integrated quantity.
  • ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1] in the example: at ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer keeps no revenue and q(w,ϕ)q(w, \phi)q(w,ϕ) divides by zero. The page's optimal share "ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0" for τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ is stated as strict decrease on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] with the limit at 0+0^+0+.
  • The printed second derivative −(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 - \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2) has a sign slip in the numerator; the Lean states −(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2).
  • "Otherwise decreasing" fails at τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, where VVV and pIp_IpI​ are constant; the trichotomy is stated.
  • In the general model, the integrated optimum is interior, ∂R/∂e>0\partial R/\partial e > 0∂R/∂e>0 at it, and, for milestone 1, πr(qI,⋅)\pi_r(q_I, \cdot)πr​(qI​,⋅) is strictly concave in eee (the page asserts this but it does not follow from the assumptions).

Plugging the printed w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) into πs\pi_sπs​ and comparing across ϕ\phiϕ would turn the dichotomy into a statement about an arbitrary price schedule; the goal instead asserts that w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) attains the supremum over all w≥0w \ge 0w≥0, with the retailer best-responding jointly in (q,e)(q, e)(q,e).

No external library beyond Mathlib's real analysis and convexity is needed. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, reusable lemmas on maximizing strictly concave quadratics over orthants, and a generalization of milestone 2 to non-interior optima.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • S. Desiraju, S. Moorthy, Managing a Distribution Channel under Asymmetric Information with Performance Requirements, Management Science 43(12), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1628
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 3: The Optimal Wholesale-Price Contract with R′(q) = 1 − q^α Has Efficiency (2+α)/(1+α)^((1+α)/α)Research Paper

Motivation

A supplier who sells to a retailer at a per-unit wholesale price above her own production cost induces the retailer to order less than an integrated firm would. This effect, double marginalization, goes back to Spengler (1950) and is the standard benchmark against which supply chain contracts are judged: a contract coordinates the channel if it makes the decentralized decisions coincide with the integrated optimum. Revenue-sharing contracts, as used in the video-rental industry, coordinate the channel; the plain wholesale-price contract does not. Whether a supplier should bother with the administrative cost of revenue sharing depends on how much the wholesale-price contract actually loses and how much of the remaining profit the supplier keeps.

Cachon and Lariviere answer that question for a retailer whose revenue depends only on the quantity ordered, in Section 4.1.1 of their working paper Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations (June 2000; the 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material). They show that the answer is governed by the curvature of the marginal revenue curve, and they compute it exactly for a one-parameter family. The source is the June 2000 working paper, whose results are unnumbered; every item cites its section, page and display.

Setting

A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0 and sells to a single retailer. The retailer's expected revenue from qqq units is R(q)R(q)R(q), where R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0, RRR is strictly concave and differentiable on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with derivative R′R'R′ (the marginal revenue), R′R'R′ is differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with derivative R′′R''R′′, the product is viable (R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c), and a finite quantity is optimal (R′(q)<cR'(q) < cR′(q)<c for some qqq). The supply chain profit is Π(q)=R(q)−qc\Pi(q) = R(q) - qcΠ(q)=R(q)−qc; the integrated quantity qIq_IqI​ maximizes Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0.

Under a wholesale-price contract with price www, the retailer orders qqq to maximize R(q)−wqR(q) - wqR(q)−wq. Each order q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 is induced by exactly one price, w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q), so the supplier can be thought of as choosing qqq. Her profit, the retailer's profit, and their sum are then

πs(q)=q (R′(q)−c),πr(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs(q)+πr(q)=Π(q).\pi_s(q) = q\,(R'(q) - c), \qquad \pi_r(q) = R(q) - qR'(q), \qquad \pi_s(q) + \pi_r(q) = \Pi(q).πs​(q)=q(R′(q)−c),πr​(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs​(q)+πr​(q)=Π(q).

Following the paper, q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q)q \mapsto R'(q) + qR''(q)q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q) is assumed decreasing, which makes πs\pi_sπs​ unimodal. The supplier's optimal quantity to induce q∗q^*q∗ maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, and w(q∗)w(q^*)w(q∗) is her optimal wholesale price. The efficiency of the contract and the supplier's profit share are

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)andπs(q∗)Π(q∗).\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \frac{\pi_s(q^*)}{\Pi(q^*)} .Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​andΠ(q∗)πs​(q∗)​.

In the α-family, R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1)R(q) = q - q^{\alpha+1}/(\alpha+1)R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1) for α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], so R′(q)=1−qαR'(q) = 1 - q^\alphaR′(q)=1−qα: marginal revenue is convex for α<1\alpha < 1α<1, linear for α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and concave for α>1\alpha > 1α>1.

Formalization targets

Goal: the α-family

For α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1, the quantities q∗=(1−c1+α)1/αq^* = \left(\frac{1-c}{1+\alpha}\right)^{1/\alpha}q∗=(1+α1−c​)1/α and qI=(1−c)1/αq_I = (1-c)^{1/\alpha}qI​=(1−c)1/α are the unique maximizers of πs\pi_sπs​ and Π\PiΠ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the profit share is (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α), and

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)=2+α(1+α)1+αα,\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} = \frac{2+\alpha}{(1+\alpha)^{\frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}}},Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​=(1+α)α1+α​2+α​,

a quantity that does not depend on ccc, is strictly increasing in α\alphaα, tends to 2/e2/e2/e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ and to 111 as α→∞\alpha \to \inftyα→∞.

Milestones for a general revenue function

  1. The price w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q) makes qqq the retailer's unique optimum (Eq. (9)).
  2. 0<q∗<qI0 < q^* < q_I0<q∗<qI​.
  3. w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗)w(q^*) = c - q^*R''(q^*)w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗), and w(q∗)>cw(q^*) > cw(q∗)>c.
  4. The profit share is at most (at least) 2/32/32/3 when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  5. 2q∗≤qI2q^* \le q_I2q∗≤qI​ (≥qI\ge q_I≥qI​) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  6. Π(qI)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI(R′(z)−c) dz\Pi(q_I) - \Pi(q^*) = \int_{q^*}^{q_I}(R'(z) - c)\,dzΠ(qI​)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI​​(R′(z)−c)dz is at least (at most) 12πs(q∗)\tfrac12\pi_s(q^*)21​πs​(q∗) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).

Milestones for the α-family

  1. The closed forms of q∗q^*q∗, qIq_IqI​, πr(q∗)\pi_r(q^*)πr​(q∗), πs(q∗)\pi_s(q^*)πs​(q∗) and Π(qI)\Pi(q_I)Π(qI​).
  2. E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/αE(\alpha) = (2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α is strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with limits 2/e2/e2/e and 111.

Significance

The general milestones turn the paper's area argument (the triangle under the tangent to marginal revenue at q∗q^*q∗) into three comparisons: convex marginal revenue makes the wholesale-price contract worse for the chain and leaves the supplier at most two thirds of a smaller pie, concave marginal revenue the opposite. The α-family makes the trade-off exact: efficiency never falls below 2/e≈0.7362/e \approx 0.7362/e≈0.736, while the supplier's share (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α) moves much faster than efficiency, which is the paper's argument for why revenue sharing is most attractive when marginal revenue is convex.

These results are proved on paper but, to our knowledge, not machine-checked anywhere; Mathlib has no supply chain contract theory. The formalization provides a reusable single-retailer wholesale-price model, a checked version of the convex/concave tangent comparisons, and a corrected statement of the α-family's monotonicity (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The general comparisons are short on paper but rest on a picture: they need the first-order condition at an interior maximizer, the tangent-line inequality for a convex or concave derivative, and the fundamental theorem of calculus for a function whose derivative is known only on a half-line and one-sided at 000. Strictness needs a strictly positive integrand on a nondegenerate interval.

The α-family is where the analysis is not routine. The closed forms involve real powers with exponents 1/α1/\alpha1/α and (1+α)/α(1+\alpha)/\alpha(1+α)/α, which must be combined carefully. The limit (1+α)1/α→e(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha} \to e(1+α)1/α→e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ is classical, but the monotonicity of log⁡(2+α)−1+ααlog⁡(1+α)\log(2+\alpha) - \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}\log(1+\alpha)log(2+α)−α1+α​log(1+α) on all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) is not a one-line derivative sign check: the derivative mixes log⁡(1+α)/α2\log(1+\alpha)/\alpha^2log(1+α)/α2 with rational terms, and its sign has to be established uniformly near 000 and near ∞\infty∞.

Formalization scope

Quantities and prices are real numbers. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over all admissible quantities (IsMaxOn on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), or on [0,1][0,1][0,1] in the α-family, as the page restricts), never a root of a first-order condition. The derivative R′R'R′ of the general model is linked to RRR by a one-sided derivative hypothesis on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); R′′R''R′′ is required only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), since for α<1\alpha < 1α<1 it blows up at 000. In the α-family the marginal revenue is deriv of RRR, not a separate function, and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 is assumed (implicit on the page: c>0c > 0c>0 and R′(0)=1>cR'(0) = 1 > cR′(0)=1>c). Efficiency and profit share are real divisions; their denominators are positive at the optimal quantities.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items:

  • R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0 is added to the model. It is implicit in the paper's area reading of the retailer's profit, and the 2/32/32/3 comparison fails without it.
  • The paper states the curvature comparisons strictly ("less (more) than 2/3rds", "q∗>qI/2q^* > q_I/2q∗>qI​/2 (<qI/2< q_I/2<qI​/2)", "more (less) than 50%") under convexity (concavity). Linear marginal revenue is both and gives equality, so each item states the weak inequality under convexity or concavity and the strict one under strict convexity or concavity.
  • Printed slip. The page says "Efficiency is a decreasing function of α, i.e., efficiency improves as the marginal revenue curve becomes more concave". EEE is in fact strictly increasing (E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358E(0^+) = 2/e \approx 0.7358E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358, E(1)=0.75E(1) = 0.75E(1)=0.75, E(10)≈0.858E(10) \approx 0.858E(10)≈0.858), as the second half of the sentence and the two limits say. The Lean states the increasing form; the milestone text is kept verbatim. The numerical gloss "2/e≈0.732/e \approx 0.732/e≈0.73" is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the efficiency in the goal is the ratio of profits computed from RRR at the maximizers, not a definition equal to (2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α(2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α, and the maximizers are characterized as unique argmaxes rather than assumed.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the general tangent comparisons, which are reusable for any concave revenue model; the real-analysis lemmas on (1+α)1/α(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha}(1+α)1/α; and the α-family closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4):347–352, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information 2: Without Shared Demand Information the Bullwhip Bound Is MultiplicativeResearch Paper

Motivation

The bullwhip effect is the observation that the variability of orders grows as one moves up a supply chain, from the retailer to the wholesaler, the distributor and the factory, even when customer demand is stable. It was documented in industry practice by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (Management Science, 1997), who identified demand forecasting as one of its main causes. Amplified order variability raises the safety stock, capacity and transportation costs of every upstream firm, so the question of how large the effect is, and what reduces it, is central to supply chain management.

Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (Management Science 46(3), 2000) quantified the effect for a retailer that forecasts with a moving average and follows an order-up-to policy. Their §3 asks whether sharing customer demand information with every stage removes the effect. Theorem 3.1 (the companion mission of this series) shows that it does not; Theorem 3.2, the goal of this mission, gives the lower bound for the chain in which no demand information is shared.

Setting

Time is indexed by the integers t∈Zt \in \mathbb Zt∈Z. The retailer faces i.i.d. demand

Dt=μ+ϵt,D_t = \mu + \epsilon_t,Dt​=μ+ϵt​,

where the error terms ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ are independent and identically distributed from a symmetric distribution with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0.

Single-stage policy (§2). With p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 observations, a lead time LLL, a safety factor zzz and a constant CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​, the retailer forms the moving-average estimates

D^tL=L ∑i=1pDt−ip,σ^etL=CL,ρ∑i=1pet−i2p,et=Dt−D^t1,\hat D^L_t = L\,\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C_{L,\rho}\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p e_{t-i}^2}{p}}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat D^1_t,D^tL​=Lp∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,σ^etL​=CL,ρ​p∑i=1p​et−i2​​​,et​=Dt​−D^t1​,

raises its inventory position to the order-up-to point yt=D^tL+zσ^etLy_t = \hat D^L_t + z\hat\sigma^L_{et}yt​=D^tL​+zσ^etL​, and so orders qt=yt−yt−1+Dt−1q_t = y_t - y_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt​=yt​−yt−1​+Dt−1​. Orders may be negative: excess inventory is returned without cost.

Decentralized chain (§3). Stages k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,… form a serial chain; stage 1 is the retailer, and LkL_kLk​ is the lead time between stages kkk and k+1k+1k+1. No stage sees customer demand except the retailer. Stage kkk forecasts from the orders it receives,

D^t(1)=∑i=1pDt−ip,D^t(k)=∑j=0p−1qt−jk−1p(k≥2),\hat D^{(1)}_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad \hat D^{(k)}_t = \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{p-1} q^{k-1}_{t-j}}{p} \quad (k \ge 2),D^t(1)​=p∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,D^t(k)​=p∑j=0p−1​qt−jk−1​​(k≥2),

uses the order-up-to point ytk=LkD^t(k)y^k_t = L_k\hat D^{(k)}_tytk​=Lk​D^t(k)​, and orders

qt1=yt1−yt−11+Dt−1,qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1(k≥2).q^1_t = y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}, \qquad q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_t \quad (k \ge 2).qt1​=yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​,qtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​(k≥2).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (Eq. (7))

For every stage k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every period ttt,

Var⁡(qtk)Var⁡(Dt)  ≥  ∏i=1k(1+2Lip+2Li2p2).\frac{\operatorname{Var}(q^k_t)}{\operatorname{Var}(D_t)} \;\ge\; \prod_{i=1}^{k}\left(1 + \frac{2L_i}{p} + \frac{2L_i^2}{p^2}\right).Var(Dt​)Var(qtk​)​≥i=1∏k​(1+p2Li​​+p22Li2​​).

The bound is the paper's, with its explicit constants. The paper asserts no tightness for this theorem, and none is claimed.

Milestone: Eq. (6)

For the single-stage policy with any safety factor zzz and any constant CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​,

Var⁡(qt)Var⁡(Dt)  ≥  1+2Lp+2L2p2.\frac{\operatorname{Var}(q_t)}{\operatorname{Var}(D_t)} \;\ge\; 1 + \frac{2L}{p} + \frac{2L^2}{p^2}.Var(Dt​)Var(qt​)​≥1+p2L​+p22L2​.

This is the i.i.d. case ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0 of the paper's Theorem 2.2. With z=0z = 0z=0 and L=L1L = L_1L=L1​ the single-stage orders are the stage-1 orders of the chain, so Eq. (6) contains the case k=1k = 1k=1 of the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 is half of the paper's comparison between centralized and decentralized information. When demand information is shared, the amplification from the retailer to stage kkk in the i.i.d. case equals 1+2(∑i≤kLi)/p+2(∑i≤kLi)2/p21 + 2(\sum_{i\le k}L_i)/p + 2(\sum_{i\le k}L_i)^2/p^21+2(∑i≤k​Li​)/p+2(∑i≤k​Li​)2/p2 (Eq. (8)), which grows additively in the lead times. Without sharing, the lower bound (7) is a product over stages and grows multiplicatively. The paper concludes that centralizing demand information "can significantly reduce the bullwhip effect", and that the gap widens as one moves up the chain. Eq. (6) is the single-stage statement that forecasting with a moving average alone already amplifies variability, by a factor depending only on the ratio L/pL/pL/p.

Formalizing it. The paper gives no proof of Theorem 3.2; it refers to Ryan (1997, PhD thesis) and to Chen et al. (1998). A machine-checked proof would therefore supply the first self-contained, verified argument for the multiplicative bound. The Gaussian special case of Eq. (6) is already formalized on Prove2Me, in the Snyder–Shen chapter on the bullwhip effect (SupplyChainTheory.bullwhip_signal_processing at ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0); that statement assumes Gaussian errors, whereas this mission assumes only symmetry, mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. Neither the multistage bound nor the symmetric-error version of Eq. (6) has a formal proof.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is induction on the stage: treat the orders of stage k−1k-1k−1 as the demand of stage kkk and apply the single-stage bound. That step fails, because the single-stage bound is a statement about i.i.d. demand, and the orders reaching stage k≥2k \ge 2k≥2 are not i.i.d.: they are autocorrelated, and stage kkk's moving average of those orders interacts with the correlation in a way that can raise or lower the variance. Whether the product bound survives depends on controlling that interaction at every stage. For Eq. (6), the safety-stock term zσ^etLz\hat\sigma^L_{et}zσ^etL​ is a nonlinear function of the demands, and only symmetry of the errors, not normality, is available to control its interaction with the linear part of the order.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace ChenBullwhip.Decentralized.

  • IIDDemand P is the demand model on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P): a constant mu, sigma > 0, and errors eps : ℤ → Ω → ℝ that are measurable, mutually independent (iIndepFun), identically distributed, symmetric (eps t and -eps t have the same law), in L2L^2L2, with mean 000 and variance sigma ^ 2. Demand is D t = mu + eps t. Variances are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance.
  • SingleStage defines D^tL\hat D^L_tD^tL​, ete_tet​, σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​, yty_tyt​ and qtq_tqt​ of §2; CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ is a free real parameter, as the paper does not fix it.
  • Chain defines the forecasts D^t(k)\hat D^{(k)}_tD^t(k)​ and the orders qtkq^k_tqtk​ by recursion on the stage, with the convention qt0=Dt−1q^0_t = D_{t-1}qt0​=Dt−1​, so that stage 1 orders yt1−yt−11+Dt−1y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​. The recursion qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​ is not printed in the paper; it is the §2.2 order identity applied to a stage whose incoming demand is qtk−1q^{k-1}_tqtk−1​, as the sequence of events on p. 440 describes.

Disclosed hypotheses not on the page: p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 (a moving average needs an observation), σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0 (the paper divides by Var⁡(D)=σ2\operatorname{Var}(D) = \sigma^2Var(D)=σ2), and square-integrable errors (Mathlib's variance is 000 off L2L^2L2). The paper's model (1) asks μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0; since μ\muμ affects no variance, no sign condition is imposed. Lead times are natural numbers. The statements hold in every period ttt, with no stationarity hypothesis.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: the orders are computed from the demands, not posited processes with a given covariance; the variances are genuine because every random variable involved is square integrable; and the ratio's denominator is σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0.

A complete development needs variance and covariance calculus for finite linear combinations of independent L2L^2L2 variables, and, for Eq. (6), the vanishing of the covariance between an odd and an even function of a symmetric random vector. Both are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of either target, and general lemmas on variances of linear filters of i.i.d. sequences, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan, D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information, Management Science 46(3):436–443, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, Management Science 43(4):546–558, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • J. K. Ryan, Analysis of Inventory Models with Limited Demand Information, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13 (formalized on Prove2Me as SupplyChainTheory.*).
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Inventory Control Models 1: The Dual-Balancing Policy Costs at Most Twice the OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Periodic-review inventory control with backorders is one of the basic models of operations research: in each period a manager decides how much to order, orders arrive after a lead time, unmet demand is backlogged at a penalty, and stock left over is charged a holding cost. When demands in different periods are independent, dynamic programming yields an optimal base-stock policy and computing it is tractable. In practice demands are correlated and forecasts evolve over time, for example under the martingale model of forecast evolution (Heath and Jackson, 1994, doi:10.1080/07408179408966604). The dynamic program then has to range over all possible information states, whose number is typically exponential in the input (Zipkin, 2000), so optimal policies are out of reach and the heuristics in use came without performance guarantees.

Levi, Pál, Roundy and Shmoys (Math. Oper. Res. 32(2):284–302, 2007) gave the first policy for this model with a worst-case guarantee that holds for arbitrary correlated, nonstationary demand distributions: the dual-balancing policy costs at most twice the optimum in expectation. The analysis rests on a marginal cost accounting that charges each order, at the time it is placed, all the holding cost its units will ever incur. This mission formalizes that guarantee.

Setting

There are TTT periods t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T and a known lead time L≥0L \ge 0L≥0: an order placed in period ttt arrives in period t+Lt + Lt+L. Period ttt has a per-unit holding cost ht≥0h_t \ge 0ht​≥0 and a per-unit backlogging penalty pt≥0p_t \ge 0pt​≥0. Ordering costs are zero (ct=0c_t = 0ct​=0), which is the standing assumption of the paper's §4. The initial data are the net inventory ni0ni_0ni0​ and the pipeline orders q1−L,…,q0≥0q_{1-L}, \dots, q_0 \ge 0q1−L​,…,q0​≥0.

Demands D1,…,DTD_1, \dots, D_TD1​,…,DT​ are nonnegative random variables on a probability space with a filtration (Ft)(\mathcal F_t)(Ft​); Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ is the information at the beginning of period ttt, and DtD_tDt​ is Ft+1\mathcal F_{t+1}Ft+1​-measurable. A feasible policy PPP places orders QtP≥0Q^P_t \ge 0QtP​≥0 that are Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable. Write D[s,t]=∑j=stDjD_{[s,t]} = \sum_{j=s}^t D_jD[s,t]​=∑j=st​Dj​ (with Dj=0D_j = 0Dj​=0 for j≤0j \le 0j≤0), Xt=ni0+∑j=1−Lt−1Qj−D[1,t−1]X_t = ni_0 + \sum_{j=1-L}^{t-1} Q_j - D_{[1,t-1]}Xt​=ni0​+∑j=1−Lt−1​Qj​−D[1,t−1]​ for the inventory position before ordering and Yt=Xt+QtY_t = X_t + Q_tYt​=Xt​+Qt​ after ordering.

The marginal holding cost of period ttt is the holding cost that the units ordered in ttt incur until the end of the horizon, and the marginal backlogging cost is the penalty incurred one lead time later:

HtP=∑j=t+LThj (QtP−(D[t,j]−XtP)+)+,ΠtP=pt+L (D[t,t+L]−YtP)+.H^P_t = \sum_{j=t+L}^{T} h_j\,\bigl(Q^P_t - (D_{[t,j]} - X^P_t)^+\bigr)^+, \qquad \Pi^P_t = p_{t+L}\,\bigl(D_{[t,t+L]} - Y^P_t\bigr)^+ .HtP​=j=t+L∑T​hj​(QtP​−(D[t,j]​−XtP​)+)+,ΠtP​=pt+L​(D[t,t+L]​−YtP​)+.

The cost of PPP is C(P)=∑t=1T−L(HtP+ΠtP)\mathcal C(P) = \sum_{t=1}^{T-L}(H^P_t + \Pi^P_t)C(P)=∑t=1T−L​(HtP​+ΠtP​); by Eq. (3) it differs from the total holding and backlogging cost only by a policy-independent nonnegative term.

A dual-balancing policy BBB orders nothing after period T−LT - LT−L, and in each period t≤T−Lt \le T - Lt≤T−L orders the quantity that balances the two conditional expected marginal costs:

E[HtB∣Ft]=E[ΠtB∣Ft]almost surely.E\bigl[H^B_t \mid \mathcal F_t\bigr] = E\bigl[\Pi^B_t \mid \mathcal F_t\bigr] \quad\text{almost surely.}E[HtB​∣Ft​]=E[ΠtB​∣Ft​]almost surely.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

For every dual-balancing policy BBB and every feasible policy PPP,

E[C(B)]  ≤  2 E[C(P)].E[\mathcal C(B)] \;\le\; 2\,E[\mathcal C(P)] .E[C(B)]≤2E[C(P)].

The paper writes P=OPTP = OPTP=OPT; quantifying over all feasible PPP is the same statement whenever an optimum exists and needs no existence assumption.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4.1. E[C(B)]=2∑t=1T−LE[Zt]E[\mathcal C(B)] = 2\sum_{t=1}^{T-L}E[Z_t]E[C(B)]=2∑t=1T−L​E[Zt​] with Zt=E[HtB∣Ft]Z_t = E[H^B_t \mid \mathcal F_t]Zt​=E[HtB​∣Ft​].
  2. Lemma 4.2. With TH={t:YtB<YtP}\mathcal T_H = \{t : Y^B_t < Y^P_t\}TH​={t:YtB​<YtP​}, ∑t∈THHtB≤∑t=1T−LHtP\sum_{t\in\mathcal T_H} H^B_t \le \sum_{t=1}^{T-L} H^P_t∑t∈TH​​HtB​≤∑t=1T−L​HtP​ on every realization.
  3. Lemma 4.3. With TΠ={t:YtB≥YtP}\mathcal T_\Pi = \{t : Y^B_t \ge Y^P_t\}TΠ​={t:YtB​≥YtP​}, ∑t∈TΠΠtB≤∑t=1T−LΠtP\sum_{t\in\mathcal T_\Pi} \Pi^B_t \le \sum_{t=1}^{T-L} \Pi^P_t∑t∈TΠ​​ΠtB​≤∑t=1T−L​ΠtP​ on every realization.

Two further items are not milestones. Eq. (3) states that, along every realization, the period-by-period holding and backlogging cost equals ∑t=1−L0Πt+H(−∞,0]+∑t=1T−L(Ht+Πt)\sum_{t=1-L}^{0}\Pi_t + H_{(-\infty,0]} + \sum_{t=1}^{T-L}(H_t + \Pi_t)∑t=1−L0​Πt​+H(−∞,0]​+∑t=1T−L​(Ht​+Πt​), which is why the cost of Eq. (4) is the right objective. The other states that a dual-balancing policy exists when hT>0h_T > 0hT​>0 and the demands are integrable, so the goal is not about an empty class.

Significance

The theorem gives a policy that is computable period by period, by a one-dimensional search, with a factor-two guarantee that holds for every joint demand distribution, including correlated, nonstationary and forecast-driven ones, where the optimal policy cannot be computed. The constant is tight: the paper exhibits instances where the ratio tends to two. The second mission of this series treats the stochastic lot-sizing problem of the same paper, which uses the same marginal cost accounting.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. Formalizing it produces a reusable model of the periodic-review backlogging system with lead times and adapted policies, a verified marginal cost identity, and a formal approximation guarantee for a stochastic inventory policy. The pathwise comparison lemmas are stated for arbitrary pairs of order sequences and so apply to other balancing-type policies.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt compares the two policies period by period. That fails: in a given period the dual-balancing policy may hold far more or far less inventory than the comparison policy, and neither the holding nor the backlogging cost of one period is bounded by the comparator's cost in that period. The comparison only works after re-charging holding costs to the period in which the units were ordered, which requires the identity Eq. (3) to be established exactly, including the pipeline units, the initial stock and the lead-time shift. The probabilistic step then needs the random index sets TH\mathcal T_HTH​ and TΠ\mathcal T_\PiTΠ​ to be determined by the information of period ttt, so that conditioning on Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ commutes with the indicators; this is where the nonanticipativity of both policies enters. The existence of a balancing quantity needs a measurable selection from conditional laws, and it fails without a positive late holding cost.

Formalization scope

  • Periods are integers (ℤ). Orders and demands are functions ℤ → Ω → ℝ; only periods 1,…,T1, \dots, T1,…,T are read, and the pipeline qtq_tqt​ is substituted for t≤0t \le 0t≤0.
  • Ordering costs are ct=0c_t = 0ct​=0 and there is no discounting, as in the paper's §4; the reduction of §4.6 from general instances is not formalized. The lead time LLL is general.
  • Information is an arbitrary Filtration ℤ to which demands are adapted with a one-period lag; the paper's information vectors are a special case, and randomized policies are covered when their randomness is part of the information.
  • Expected costs are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so an infinite expected cost is never read as 000.
  • The balancing condition carries integrability of HtBH^B_tHtB​ and ΠtB\Pi^B_tΠtB​, so a conditional expectation of a non-integrable cost (which Mathlib sets to 000) cannot satisfy it vacuously. The existence item rules out an empty policy class.
  • Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 are pathwise and do not use the balancing rule. The comparator totals are the marginal totals of Eq. (4), which is the stronger reading.
  • Eq. (2) prints Xt+LX_{t+L}Xt+L​ and its restatement on p. 292 prints ptp_tpt​; both are typos, and the formalization uses XtX_tXt​ and pt+Lp_{t+L}pt+L​.

A complete development needs finite-sum manipulations for Eq. (3) and Lemma 4.2, conditional expectation (tower property, pulling out bounded Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable factors) for Lemma 4.1 and the goal, and regular conditional distributions with a measurable selection for the existence item. Theorem 4.2 (the randomized policy for integer demands) is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • R. Levi, M. Pál, R. O. Roundy, D. B. Shmoys, Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Inventory Control Models, Mathematics of Operations Research 32(2):284–302, 2007. doi:10.1287/moor.1060.0205
  • D. C. Heath, P. L. Jackson, Modeling the evolution of demand forecasts with application to safety stock analysis in production/distribution systems, IIE Transactions 26(3):17–30, 1994. doi:10.1080/07408179408966604
  • P. H. Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, McGraw-Hill, 2000. ISBN 978-0-256-11379-7.
6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from Machine Learning: The L2-Regularized Feature-Based Newsvendor Rule Generalizes with a Bound Free of the Number of FeaturesResearch Paper

Motivation

The newsvendor problem is the basic model of inventory under uncertain demand. A decision maker orders qqq units before demand DDD is observed, and pays a unit backordering cost bbb for each unit of unmet demand and a unit holding cost hhh for each unit left over. When the demand distribution is known, the optimal order is a quantile of it. In practice the distribution is unknown and the decision maker holds historical data, often including features: observable covariates such as the day of the week, the weather or a recent sales trend, recorded alongside each past demand.

Rudin and Vahn (MIT Sloan Working Paper 5036-13, version of February 6, 2014, from MIT DSpace; published as Ban and Rudin, Operations Research 67(1), 2019, doi:10.1287/opre.2018.1757) propose to learn the order quantity directly as a linear function of the features, by minimizing the empirical newsvendor cost over the training data, with or without a regularization penalty. Their question is the one any data-driven decision rule must answer: how much worse can the learned rule do on new data than it did on the data it was fitted to? When the number of features ppp is comparable to the sample size nnn ("big data"), a bound that grows with ppp says nothing, and the paper's Theorem 2 gives one for the regularized rule that does not depend on ppp.

This mission formalizes that bound, Theorem 2 of the working paper, together with the results its proof is assembled from. All page and result numbers refer to the 2014 working paper, not to the published article.

Setting

Cost. For an order qqq and a demand ddd, the newsvendor cost is

C(q;d)=b (d−q)++h (q−d)+,b,h>0.C(q;d)=b\,(d-q)^+ + h\,(q-d)^+ ,\qquad b,h>0 .C(q;d)=b(d−q)++h(q−d)+,b,h>0.

Write b∨h=max⁡(b,h)b\vee h=\max(b,h)b∨h=max(b,h).

Data. A data point is a pair z=(x,d)z=(x,d)z=(x,d) of a feature vector x∈Rpx\in\mathbb R^px∈Rp and a demand d∈Rd\in\mathbb Rd∈R. Features lie in a domain X\mathcal XX inside the ball ∥x∥22≤Xmax⁡2\|x\|_2^2\le X_{\max}^2∥x∥22​≤Xmax2​, and demands lie in D=[0,Dˉ]\mathcal D=[0,\bar D]D=[0,Dˉ]. A sample Sn={(xi,di)}i=1nS_n=\{(x_i,d_i)\}_{i=1}^nSn​={(xi​,di​)}i=1n​ consists of nnn independent draws from an unknown probability distribution μ\muμ concentrated on X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D.

Rules and risks. A vector q∈Rpq\in\mathbb R^pq∈Rp defines the linear decision rule q(x)=q⊤xq(x)=q^\top xq(x)=q⊤x. Its true risk and empirical risk are

Rtrue(q)=E(x,d)∼μ[C(q⊤x;d)],R^(q;Sn)=1n∑i=1nC(q⊤xi;di).R_{true}(q)=\mathbb E_{(x,d)\sim\mu}\bigl[C(q^\top x;d)\bigr],\qquad \hat R(q;S_n)=\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n C(q^\top x_i;d_i).Rtrue​(q)=E(x,d)∼μ​[C(q⊤x;d)],R^(q;Sn​)=n1​i=1∑n​C(q⊤xi​;di​).

The regularized algorithm (NV-reg). For a parameter λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, the rule q^=q^(Sn)\hat q=\hat q(S_n)q^​=q^​(Sn​) minimizes

R^(q;Sn)+λ∥q∥22over q∈Rp.\hat R(q;S_n)+\lambda\|q\|_2^2\qquad\text{over } q\in\mathbb R^p .R^(q;Sn​)+λ∥q∥22​over q∈Rp.

The objective is strictly convex, so the minimizer is unique. Following Appendix B of the paper, the rules the algorithm outputs on samples from X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D are assumed to map X\mathcal XX into D\mathcal DD (the paper's Q⊂DX\mathcal Q\subset\mathcal D^{\mathcal X}Q⊂DX): the learned order quantity is never negative and never exceeds the demand cap.

Uniform stability. An algorithm is uniformly stable with parameter αn\alpha_nαn​ if removing one observation from any sample changes the loss of its output at any test point by at most αn\alpha_nαn​ (Bousquet and Elisseeff's Definition 6, the paper's Definition 1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 9)

For every δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1) and n≥1n\ge1n≥1, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ over SnS_nSn​,

∣Rtrue(q^)−R^(q^;Sn)∣≤(b∨h)2Xmax⁡2nλ+(2(b∨h)2Xmax⁡2λ+(b∨h)Dˉ)ln⁡(2/δ)2n.|R_{true}(\hat q)-\hat R(\hat q;S_n)|\le\frac{(b\vee h)^2X_{\max}^2}{n\lambda}+\Bigl(\frac{2(b\vee h)^2X_{\max}^2}{\lambda}+(b\vee h)\bar D\Bigr)\sqrt{\frac{\ln(2/\delta)}{2n}} .∣Rtrue​(q^​)−R^(q^​;Sn​)∣≤nλ(b∨h)2Xmax2​​+(λ2(b∨h)2Xmax2​​+(b∨h)Dˉ)2nln(2/δ)​​.

The dimension ppp appears nowhere in the bound.

Milestones, in the order of the proof (p. 32)

  1. Lemma 5 (p. 28). For q,d∈[0,Dˉ]q,d\in[0,\bar D]q,d∈[0,Dˉ], ∣C(q;d)∣≤(b∨h)Dˉ|C(q;d)|\le(b\vee h)\bar D∣C(q;d)∣≤(b∨h)Dˉ, and the bound is attained.
  2. Display (31) (p. 31). CCC is convex in its first argument and (b∨h)(b\vee h)(b∨h)-Lipschitz in it, i.e. (b∨h)(b\vee h)(b∨h)-admissible in the sense of Definition 2.
  3. Theorem 5 (p. 31), Bousquet and Elisseeff's Theorem 22: regularization in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space with a σ\sigmaσ-admissible loss and kernel bound κ2\kappa^2κ2 has uniform stability σ2κ2/(2λn)\sigma^2\kappa^2/(2\lambda n)σ2κ2/(2λn). This is an existing platform statement, referenced rather than restated.
  4. Theorem 4 (p. 30). (NV-reg) is uniformly stable with parameter αnr=(b∨h)2Xmax⁡2/(2nλ)\alpha_n^r=(b\vee h)^2X_{\max}^2/(2n\lambda)αnr​=(b∨h)2Xmax2​/(2nλ).
  5. Theorem 6 (p. 31). Any algorithm with uniform stability αn\alpha_nαn​ and loss in [0,M][0,M][0,M] satisfies, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,
∣Rtrue(A,Sn)−R^(A,Sn)∣≤2αn+(4nαn+M)ln⁡(2/δ)2n.|R_{true}(A,S_n)-\hat R(A,S_n)|\le2\alpha_n+(4n\alpha_n+M)\sqrt{\frac{\ln(2/\delta)}{2n}} .∣Rtrue​(A,Sn​)−R^(A,Sn​)∣≤2αn​+(4nαn​+M)2nln(2/δ)​​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 bounds the generalization gap of the regularized feature-based newsvendor rule at rate O(1/n)O(1/\sqrt n)O(1/n​) with constants that depend on the costs, the demand cap, the feature radius and λ\lambdaλ, but not on the number of features. It gives a theoretical basis for regularizing when p/np/np/n is not small, and it indicates how to scale λ\lambdaλ with the feature radius. The companion bound for the unregularized rule (Theorem 1) grows linearly in ppp.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, but its proof is short and relies on cited results: Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are stated with references to Bousquet and Elisseeff and no proof of their own, and the paper's Theorem 6 is a two-sided variant of Bousquet and Elisseeff's Theorem 12 that is only sketched. None of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked two-sided stability-to-generalization theorem for general algorithms (reusable for any stable learner), a checked stability bound for a regularized piecewise-linear loss, and the newsvendor bound itself, with the constants the proof actually supports.

Difficulty

The bound is not a uniform-convergence argument: the class of linear rules on Rp\mathbb R^pRp has complexity growing with ppp, so any bound that holds simultaneously for all rules in the class depends on ppp. The bound must exploit the specific rule produced by the algorithm. The two analytic steps that carry this are the stability of the regularized minimizer, which needs a strong-convexity comparison between the full and the leave-one-out objective, and a concentration inequality of bounded-differences type for a function of the whole sample whose differences are controlled only through stability.

The leave-one-out comparison is a known pitfall. If the leave-one-out problem is run literally on n−1n-1n−1 points it carries the weight 1/(n−1)1/(n-1)1/(n−1), and the comparison argument then gives twice the constant of Theorem 4. The stated constant holds for the leave-one-out objective that keeps the weight 1/n1/n1/n, which is the form of Theorem 5.

Formalization scope

Representation. Features are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p), rules are vectors acting by the inner product, and data points live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p) × ℝ. The cost is the published newsboy loss with overage cost hhh and underage cost bbb; the empirical and true risks are the published empirical and generalization errors, and the (NV-reg) objective and its 1/n1/n1/n-weighted leave-one-out version are the published regularized objectives of Bousquet and Elisseeff. The regularizer is λ∥q∥22\lambda\|q\|_2^2λ∥q∥22​ (the display prints both λ∥q∥22\lambda\|q\|_2^2λ∥q∥22​ and λ∥q∥2\lambda\|q\|_2λ∥q∥2​; the text calls the problem a quadratic program). "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" is stated as: the event on which the gap exceeds the bound has measure at most δ\deltaδ under the product measure μn\mu^nμn.

Standing assumptions and pinned hypotheses.

  1. b,h,λ>0b,h,\lambda>0b,h,λ>0, Xmax⁡,Dˉ≥0X_{\max},\bar D\ge0Xmax​,Dˉ≥0, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1).
  2. μ\muμ is a probability measure giving full mass to X×[0,Dˉ]\mathcal X\times[0,\bar D]X×[0,Dˉ], with ∥x∥22≤Xmax⁡2\|x\|_2^2\le X_{\max}^2∥x∥22​≤Xmax2​ on X\mathcal XX (§3, p. 9; the page writes the ball as ∥x∥22≤Xmax⁡\|x\|_2^2\le X_{\max}∥x∥22​≤Xmax​, while Theorem 2's "Xmax⁡2X_{\max}^2Xmax2​ as the largest possible value of ∥x∥22\|x\|_2^2∥x∥22​" and Theorem 5's note fix the reading).
  3. The algorithm is any map Sn↦q^(Sn)S_n\mapsto\hat q(S_n)Sn​↦q^​(Sn​) whose value minimizes the (NV-reg) objective, measurable in SnS_nSn​ (Appendix B: "all functions are measurable").
  4. The range assumption of Appendix B: for samples from X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D, q^⊤x∈[0,Dˉ]\hat q^\top x\in[0,\bar D]q^​⊤x∈[0,Dˉ] for x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X.
  5. The last constant is (b∨h)Dˉ(b\vee h)\bar D(b∨h)Dˉ, the loss bound MMM from Lemma 5 that the proof feeds into Theorem 6; display (6) prints Dˉ\bar DDˉ there.
  6. The convention that all sets are countable, and the intercept convention x1=1x^1=1x1=1, are not imposed.

Trivializing formalization ruled out. The range assumption is quantified only over feature vectors in X\mathcal XX and over samples drawn from X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D; stated over the whole ball ∥x∥2≤Xmax⁡\|x\|_2\le X_{\max}∥x∥2​≤Xmax​, it would force q^=0\hat q=0q^​=0 (both q^⊤x\hat q^\top xq^​⊤x and q^⊤(−x)\hat q^\top(-x)q^​⊤(−x) would lie in [0,Dˉ][0,\bar D][0,Dˉ]) and the goal would be nearly empty.

What is needed and reusable. McDiarmid's two-sided bounded-differences inequality under product measures; integrability of bounded measurable losses; existence and properties of minimizers of strongly convex objectives on Rp\mathbb R^pRp; the comparison argument behind Theorem 5. Theorem 6 is stated for an arbitrary data space and hypothesis space and is reusable for any uniformly stable algorithm. Contributions to the Theorem 5 reference and to McDiarmid's inequality benefit other missions as well.

Selected references

  • C. Rudin and G.-Y. Vahn, The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from Machine Learning, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 5036-13, version of February 6, 2014 (MIT DSpace). The version formalized here.
  • G.-Y. Ban and C. Rudin, The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from Machine Learning, Operations Research 67(1):90–108, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1757
  • O. Bousquet and A. Elisseeff, Stability and Generalization, Journal of Machine Learning Research 2:499–526, 2002. https://jmlr.org/papers/v2/bousquet02a.html
  • C. McDiarmid, On the method of bounded differences, Surveys in Combinatorics, London Math. Soc. Lecture Note Series 141, 148–188, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107359949.008
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Optimality of Order-up-to Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems: Ordering Up to the Newsvendor Level for Penalty b + τh Is Asymptotically Optimal as b → ∞Research Paper

Motivation

Periodic-review inventory systems face a simple choice each period: how much to order before the next demand is known. When unmet demand is lost, the order can affect the stock available several periods later without preserving a backlog that records earlier shortages. This makes the optimal policy difficult to describe when replenishment takes time. An order-up-to policy offers a practical rule: order enough to bring the inventory position to a fixed level. Huh, Janakiraman, Muckstadt and Rusmevichientong ask when that simple rule performs as well as the best admissible lost-sales policy as the penalty for a lost unit grows. Their working paper, pp. 3–4 and 17–18, proves asymptotic optimality for a particular level obtained from a related backorder system.

The motivating costs are concrete. A lost sale may represent an expedited service part or a missed sale whose cost is much larger than one period of holding inventory. The paper's central comparison concerns the high-penalty regime while holding the demand law, lead time and holding rate fixed. The fixed-level policy can be computed from the distribution of demand over the lead time plus the order period; it does not require solving the full lost-sales control problem. The paper also supplies a finite-penalty bound, which this mission retains as a milestone. Huh et al., pp. 3–4, 17–18.

Setting

Let D1,D2,…D_1,D_2,\ldotsD1​,D2​,… be independent, identically distributed nonnegative demands with finite positive mean. An order takes a fixed integer lead time τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 to arrive. At the start of period ttt, the order placed τ\tauτ periods earlier arrives; then a new order is placed, and demand DtD_tDt​ is observed. Unmet demand is lost. At period end, each unit remaining on hand incurs holding cost h>0h>0h>0, and each lost unit incurs penalty b>0b>0b>0. The inventory position counts on-hand units and outstanding orders. An order-up-to-SSS policy raises this position to S≥0S\ge0S≥0 whenever possible.

Write CL,S(h,b)C^{\mathcal L,S}(h,b)CL,S(h,b) for the long-run average cost of that policy and CL∗(h,b)C^{\mathcal L*}(h,b)CL∗(h,b) for the infimum over admissible policies. The corresponding backorder system retains unmet demand as negative net inventory and charges bbb per backordered unit per period. For an order-up-to level SSS, its stationary average cost is

CB,S(h,b)=hE[(S−D)+]+bE[(D−S)+],D=∑i=1τ+1Di.C^{\mathcal B,S}(h,b)=h\mathbb E[(S-\mathbf D)^+]+b\mathbb E[(\mathbf D-S)^+],\qquad \mathbf D=\sum_{i=1}^{\tau+1}D_i.CB,S(h,b)=hE[(S−D)+]+bE[(D−S)+],D=i=1∑τ+1​Di​.

The newsvendor level SB∗(h,b)S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b)SB∗(h,b) is the smallest nonnegative SSS with Pr⁡(D≤S)≥b/(b+h)\Pr(\mathbf D\le S)\ge b/(b+h)Pr(D≤S)≥b/(b+h); it attains the best backorder order-up-to cost CB∗(h,b)C^{\mathcal B*}(h,b)CB∗(h,b). The paper's Assumption 1 concerns this lead-time demand D\mathbf DD: if mD(t)=E[D−t∣D>t]m_{\mathbf D}(t)=\mathbb E[\mathbf D-t\mid\mathbf D>t]mD​(t)=E[D−t∣D>t] when the conditioning event has positive probability and zero otherwise, then mD(t)/t→0m_{\mathbf D}(t)/t\to0mD​(t)/t→0 as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞. Huh et al., pp. 3–4, 9, 11–12.

Formalization targets

Asymptotically optimal order-up-to level

Fix hhh, τ\tauτ and the demand law satisfying Assumption 1. Set Sb+τh=SB∗(h,b+τh)S_{b+\tau h}=S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b+\tau h)Sb+τh​=SB∗(h,b+τh). The goal is the equivalent multiplicative form of Theorem 15(b): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, all sufficiently large bbb satisfy

inf⁡S≥0CL,S(h,b)≤CL,Sb+τh(h,b)≤(1+ε)CL∗(h,b).\inf_{S\ge0}C^{\mathcal L,S}(h,b)\le C^{\mathcal L,S_{b+\tau h}}(h,b)\le(1+\varepsilon)C^{\mathcal L*}(h,b).S≥0inf​CL,S(h,b)≤CL,Sb+τh​(h,b)≤(1+ε)CL∗(h,b).

The infimum over order-up-to levels captures the paper's best such policy. The right-hand comparator remains the infimum over all admissible lost-sales policies. The multiplicative form also covers an almost-surely constant demand law, where both costs can be zero and a literal ratio would be undefined. Huh et al., Theorem 15(b), p. 17.

Explicit finite-penalty bound

Theorem 15(a) is a milestone. With S′=SB∗(h,b/(τ+1))S'=S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b/(\tau+1))S′=SB∗(h,b/(τ+1)) and ψ(S′;h,q)=qE[(D−S′)+]/(hE[(S′−D)+])\psi(S';h,q)=q\mathbb E[(\mathbf D-S')^+]/(h\mathbb E[(S'-\mathbf D)^+])ψ(S′;h,q)=qE[(D−S′)+]/(hE[(S′−D)+]), its factor is

1+νbψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))1+ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1)),νb=(b+τh)(τ+1)b.\frac{1+\nu_b\psi(S';h,b/(\tau+1))}{1+\psi(S';h,b/(\tau+1))},\qquad \nu_b=\frac{(b+\tau h)(\tau+1)}{b}.1+ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))1+νb​ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))​,νb​=b(b+τh)(τ+1)​.

The milestone states the bound where the expected holding quantity in ψ\psiψ is positive. Earlier milestones state the pathwise comparison of the systems, the two-sided average-cost comparison with penalties b/(τ+1)b/(\tau+1)b/(τ+1) and b+τhb+\tau hb+τh, the lower bound on unrestricted lost-sales optimal cost, the newsvendor formula, and the backorder sensitivity results used by the theorem. Huh et al., Lemmas 5, 9, 13 and Theorems 6, 15, pp. 11–18.

Significance

The theorem gives a specific computable stock level whose relative cost loss vanishes in the high-penalty regime. It addresses the gap between a tractable backorder benchmark and the more difficult lost-sales control problem. The finite-penalty factor states how the comparison depends on lead time, holding cost, penalty and the shortage-to-holding ratio; the asymptotic statement alone would not quantify that dependence. The paper establishes these mathematical results; the mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the stated Lean targets. Huh et al., pp. 17–18.

Formalizing the result would also supply reusable infrastructure for coupled inventory systems: measurable demand-path laws, pathwise recursions with delayed delivery, extended nonnegative long-run costs, and a clean comparison between an explicit policy and the infimum over unrestricted policies. The backorder newsvendor and mean-residual-life components can be reused beyond this particular lost-sales model.

Difficulty

The backorder system has a closed stationary cost formula, while a lost-sales order-up-to process generally cannot be replaced directly by that formula. The paper notes that its on-hand inventory distribution need not converge from every starting state, even under a fixed order-up-to policy. One must therefore justify the long-run comparison without assuming stationarity from an arbitrary start. A second difficulty is the benchmark: comparing only against other order-up-to policies is too weak to establish Theorem 15, because the goal uses the optimal cost over all admissible lost-sales policies. Huh et al., pp. 14–16, 18.

Formalization scope

Lean reuses the published CappedBaseStock lost-sales model. Its demands are nonnegative and i.i.d. with finite positive mean; τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 and h,b>0h,b>0h,b>0. Period zero in Lean is period one in the paper. Both coupled processes start with zero on-hand stock and an empty pipeline. Inventory XtX_tXt​ is read immediately after delivery, before current demand. Lost-sales costs lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and use the limsup of expected Cesàro averages; the backorder closed form uses real Bochner expectations under finite-mean demand. The paper's stationary lost-sales cost and this Cesàro cost are identified using its long-run results, but those convergence results are outside this proposal. Huh et al., pp. 14–16.

The paper prints nonnegative rates in Theorem 15, while its displayed newsvendor fraction and shortage-to-holding ratios require positive denominators. Theorem 6(a) therefore states the ratio limit for nonconstant demand laws. The main theorem uses a multiplicative limit bound that also covers constant demand, where the printed ratio is undefined.

The quantity CL∗C^{\mathcal L*}CL∗ is an infimum over measurable, history-dependent policies with private randomization; no attaining policy is assumed. The backorder optimum is an infimum over nonnegative order-up-to levels. Assumption 1 is imposed on the sum of τ+1\tau+1τ+1 demands, and the limit b→∞b\to\inftyb→∞ is expressed by a positive threshold uniform over all parameter records with the fixed lead time and holding rate. The mission excludes a restricted policy comparator, a fixed penalty, a one-period lead-time specialization, and Assumption 1 on single-period demand. Solvers may contribute proofs of any milestone, along with finite-mean and measurability lemmas needed to connect the model to the backorder benchmarks.

Selected references

  • W. T. Huh, G. Janakiraman, J. A. Muckstadt and P. Rusmevichientong, Asymptotic Optimality of Order-up-to Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems, working paper, December 4, 2006; published in Management Science 55(3), 2009. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0945.
  • G. Janakiraman, S. Seshadri and G. Shanthikumar, A Comparison of the Optimal Costs of Two Canonical Inventory Systems, working paper, Stern School of Business, New York University, 2005; bound quoted in Huh et al., §5, p. 13. Quoted source.
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