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Inventory and Supply Chain

Newsvendor and base-stock models, (s, S) policies, multi-echelon systems, and supply chain contracts.

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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems IV: The (Q, r) Cost Is Flatter in the Order Quantity than the EOQ CostResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard replenishment rule of inventory theory: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, order a fixed order quantity QQQ. It is used in practice and taught in every operations management course, usually after the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) model, which is the same system with a constant demand stream.

Practitioners and textbooks rely on a robustness property of the EOQ: its cost is very insensitive to the choice of order quantity. If the order quantity is off by a factor α\alphaα, the cost rises only by the factor 12(α+1/α)\tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)21​(α+1/α); ordering 50% too much costs about 8% extra. The insensitivity of the stochastic (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) system to its control parameters had been observed numerically (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978), but, as Zheng notes, no analytical result on it was known.

Timeline:

  • 1963: Hadley and Whitin derive the (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost for Poisson demand.
  • 1986: Zipkin proves that the average backorders of a (Q,r)(Q,r)(Q,r) policy are jointly convex in (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) under continuous demand (Zipkin 1986).
  • 1992: Zheng derives simple optimality conditions for the continuous (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) model and compares it with the EOQ model under the same cost structure. One of the results is that the stochastic cost curve is flatter in the order quantity than the EOQ curve (Zheng 1992). This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Demands arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L>0L>0; all stockouts are backordered. Each order costs K>0K>0K>0; holding costs accrue at rate h>0h>0h>0 per unit in stock and penalty costs at rate p>0p>0p>0 per unit backordered. The leadtime demand D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 has distribution μ\muμ with finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL.

The inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = E\big[h(y-D)^+ + p(D-y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ,Q>0.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}, \qquad Q>0.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​,Q>0.

For fixed Q>0Q>0Q>0 let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be a reorder point minimizing c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅), and let

C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q)), \qquad H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q>0), \quad H(0) = G(y^0).C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).

CCC is the cost of the order quantity QQQ when the reorder point is always chosen optimally for it. An optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ minimizes CCC over Q>0Q>0Q>0, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^* = C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗).

The EOQ model is the same system with the constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y-\lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L-y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, CdC_dCd​ are the objects above at GdG_dGd​, with optimum Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ and Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

C(αQ∗)C∗≤12(α+1α)∀α>0.\frac{C(\alpha Q^*)}{C^*} \le \frac12\left(\alpha + \frac1\alpha\right) \qquad \forall \alpha>0.C∗C(αQ∗)​≤21​(α+α1​)∀α>0.

The goal holds for every demand distribution satisfying the standing assumptions and every optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗. Both regimes, α<1\alpha<1α<1 and α>1\alpha>1α>1, are included.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Eq. (7): ∫r(Q)r(Q)+QG=∫0QH\int_{r(Q)}^{r(Q)+Q} G = \int_0^Q H∫r(Q)r(Q)+Q​G=∫0Q​H, hence C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y)dy)/QC(Q) = \big(\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)dy\big)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  2. Lemma 4: HHH is increasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  3. Eq. (8): an optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗ exists, and Q>0Q>0Q>0 is optimal iff H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q) = C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q).
  4. Eq. (18): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, with rd(Q)=λL−hh+pQr_d(Q) = \lambda L - \frac{h}{h+p}Qrd​(Q)=λL−h+ph​Q.
  5. Lemma 7: H0(Q)≤Hd(Q)≤H(Q)H_0(Q) \le H_d(Q) \le H(Q)H0​(Q)≤Hd​(Q)≤H(Q) and A(Q)≤Ad(Q)A(Q)\le A_d(Q)A(Q)≤Ad​(Q), where H0=H−G(y0)H_0 = H - G(y^0)H0​=H−G(y0) and A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QHA(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q HA(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H.
  6. Eqs. (26)–(27): H(αQ)≤αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\le \alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≤αH(Q) for α>1\alpha>1α>1 and H(αQ)≥αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\ge\alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≥αH(Q) for 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1.
  7. Lemma 9: ∫QαQH(y) dy≤α2−12 QH(Q)\int_Q^{\alpha Q} H(y)\,dy \le \frac{\alpha^2-1}{2}\,Q H(Q)∫QαQ​H(y)dy≤2α2−1​QH(Q) for all α>0\alpha>0α>0, Q>0Q>0Q>0.

Significance

In the EOQ model the relative cost of a scaled order quantity is exactly Cd(αQd∗)/Cd∗=12(α+1/α)C_d(\alpha Q^*_d)/C^*_d = \tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)Cd​(αQd∗​)/Cd∗​=21​(α+1/α) (Eq. (25) of the paper). Theorem 4 shows that the stochastic system is at least as forgiving. The bound holds for every leadtime-demand distribution with a unique newsvendor minimizer, and it does not depend on the parameters KKK, hhh, ppp, λ\lambdaλ or LLL. Because the reorder point is re-optimized for each quantity, the bound applies to the practical question of how much a misestimated lot size costs when the safety stock is set correctly.

Together with the other results of the paper (the 1/81/81/8 bound for the EOQ heuristic and the bounds between Q∗Q^*Q∗ and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​, which are separate missions of this series), it gives a closed-form account of why the EOQ is a good heuristic for stochastic systems.

The result has a complete published proof. It has not been machine-checked. The work that remains is a formal proof for general distributions: the paper differentiates GGG and r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) twice, and a formal proof has to replace those derivatives with arguments that need no density.

Difficulty

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is defined through an inner minimization over the reorder point, so its shape in QQQ is controlled by the implicitly defined function H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q) = G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q)) rather than by GGG directly. The obvious approach would bound C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) with the reorder point fixed at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗). That approach is the wrong comparison: it bounds a larger quantity, and the resulting bound depends on the distribution.

The paper's proof uses three properties of HHH: that it is convex, that its slope never exceeds the EOQ slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p), and that it dominates HdH_dHd​. The paper obtains these from the derivatives r′(Q)r'(Q)r′(Q) and H′(Q)H'(Q)H′(Q) under a smooth demand distribution. Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is only an argmin and HHH need not be differentiable, so none of these three properties can be read off a derivative formula; the asymptotic slope in particular depends on the finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL and on the behaviour of GGG at ±∞\pm\infty±∞.

Formalization scope

The mission is set in Lean 4 with Mathlib. All objects are real valued.

  • Model. The structure QRModel bundles λ,L,K,h,p>0\lambda, L, K, h, p>0λ,L,K,h,p>0, a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb{R}R with integrable identity, ∫x dμ=λL\int x\,d\mu = \lambda L∫xdμ=λL, D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 almost surely, and the unique-minimizer hypothesis on GGG. K>0K>0K>0 is implicit in the paper and made explicit here. No density is assumed; deterministic and discrete demands are allowed, and the paper's own numerical study uses Poisson demand.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, H0H_0H0​, CCC and AAA are defined for an arbitrary cost rate and instantiated at GGG and at GdG_dGd​. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers; they are never defined by the equation G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q), which is a lemma of the paper. H(0)=G(y0)H(0) = G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0). Values at Q<0Q<0Q<0 (and of ccc, CCC at Q≤0Q\le 0Q≤0) are junk, and every statement restricts to Q>0Q>0Q>0 or Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0.
  • Readings of informal words. "Increasing" in Lemma 4 is strict on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), since the proof shows H′>0H'>0H′>0. "Asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" is stated as H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q\to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q2)−H(Q1)≤hph+p(Q2−Q1)H(Q_2)-H(Q_1)\le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q_2-Q_1)H(Q2​)−H(Q1​)≤h+php​(Q2​−Q1​) for 0≤Q1≤Q20\le Q_1\le Q_20≤Q1​≤Q2​. The chord bound is the derivative-free form of H′≤hp/(h+p)H'\le hp/(h+p)H′≤hp/(h+p) that the proofs of Lemmas 7–9 use. "The optimal order quantity" is IsOptQty Q, meaning Q>0Q>0Q>0 and C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q)\le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q'>0Q′>0. Its existence is asserted in the Eq. (8) milestone, so the goal is not vacuous. "∀α>0\forall\alpha>0∀α>0" is a real α>0\alpha>0α>0 with real division 1/α1/\alpha1/α. In Lemma 9 the integral ∫QαQ\int_Q^{\alpha Q}∫QαQ​ is oriented, as on the page.
  • Ruling out trivializations. C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) re-optimizes the reorder point for αQ∗\alpha Q^*αQ∗; holding it at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗) would be a different theorem. C∗>0C^*>0C∗>0 is a consequence of the model, not a hypothesis.

A complete development needs the following:

  • integrability and continuity of GGG;
  • existence of the optimal reorder point;
  • convexity of HHH;
  • the asymptotics G−Gd→0G - G_d\to 0G−Gd​→0 at ±∞\pm\infty±∞;
  • Jensen's inequality Gd≤GG_d\le GGd​≤G (Eq. (22));
  • existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗.

These facts about newsvendor cost functions are reusable in the other missions of this series. Contributions of any of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • P. H. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • H. M. Wagner, M. O'Hagan and B. Lundh, An Empirical Study of Exactly and Approximately Optimal Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(7):690–723, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.7.690
  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information II: With Zero Set-up Cost the Myopic Base-Stock Policy Is Optimal When Myopic Levels Are NondecreasingResearch Paper

Motivation

Many firms learn about demand before it has to be served: customers place orders days or weeks ahead of the date they want delivery. Gallego and Özer (Management Science 47(10), 2001) model this advance demand information in a periodic-review inventory system and ask how the optimal replenishment policy should use it. Classical inventory theory (Arrow, Harris and Marschak 1951; Scarf 1959; Veinott 1965, 1966; Iglehart 1963) assumes that nothing about future demand is known when an order is placed. With advance orders the state of the system is no longer a single number, and it is not a priori clear whether the familiar policy structures survive.

This mission covers the paper's zero set-up cost case (Section 5). The companion mission Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information I covers the positive set-up cost case and its (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies.

Setting

Time is divided into periods t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T. The supply lead time is an integer L≥0L \ge 0L≥0, and the information horizon is NNN. In period ttt customers place orders Dt=(Dt,t,…,Dt,t+N)D_t = (D_{t,t}, \dots, D_{t,t+N})Dt​=(Dt,t​,…,Dt,t+N​), where Dt,s≥0D_{t,s} \ge 0Dt,s​≥0 is demand placed in period ttt for delivery in period sss. Throughout, N>L+1N > L + 1N>L+1; write M=N−L−1≥1M = N - L - 1 \ge 1M=N−L−1≥1.

At the start of period ttt the decision maker knows two things. The first is the modified inventory position xtx_txt​: on-hand stock plus outstanding orders minus backorders, net of the demand already observed for the protection period t,…,t+Lt, \dots, t+Lt,…,t+L. The second is the vector

ot=(ot,t+L+1,…,ot,t+N−1)∈RMo_t = (o_{t,t+L+1}, \dots, o_{t,t+N-1}) \in \mathbb{R}^Mot​=(ot,t+L+1​,…,ot,t+N−1​)∈RM

of demands already observed for periods beyond the protection period. The decision maker raises the position to y≥xty \ge x_ty≥xt​ at zero fixed cost, the demand vector DtD_tDt​ is realised, and the state moves to

xt+1=y−∑k=0L+1Dt,t+k−ot,t+L+1,ot+1,s=ot,s+Dt,s (s=t+L+2,…,t+N),x_{t+1} = y - \sum_{k=0}^{L+1} D_{t,t+k} - o_{t,t+L+1}, \qquad o_{t+1,s} = o_{t,s} + D_{t,s}\ (s = t+L+2, \dots, t+N),xt+1​=y−k=0∑L+1​Dt,t+k​−ot,t+L+1​,ot+1,s​=ot,s​+Dt,s​ (s=t+L+2,…,t+N),

with ot,t+N=0o_{t,t+N} = 0ot,t+N​=0.

Costs enter through a single-period cost Gt:R→RG_t : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}Gt​:R→R (holding, backorder and linear ordering cost, charged against the demand over the protection period) and one-period discount factors αt+1>0\alpha_{t+1} > 0αt+1​>0. The optimal cost-to-go JtJ_tJt​ and the cost VtV_tVt​ of ordering up to yyy satisfy

Jt(x,o)=min⁡y≥xVt(y,o),Vt(y,o)=Gt(y)+αt+1 E Jt+1(xt+1,ot+1),JT+1≡0,J_t(x, o) = \min_{y \ge x} V_t(y, o), \qquad V_t(y, o) = G_t(y) + \alpha_{t+1}\,\mathbb{E}\,J_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, o_{t+1}), \qquad J_{T+1} \equiv 0,Jt​(x,o)=y≥xmin​Vt​(y,o),Vt​(y,o)=Gt​(y)+αt+1​EJt+1​(xt+1​,ot+1​),JT+1​≡0,

where the expectation is over DtD_tDt​. The base-stock level in period ttt is the smallest minimizer

yt(o)=min⁡{y:Vt(y,o)=min⁡xVt(x,o)},y_t(o) = \min\{y : V_t(y, o) = \min_x V_t(x, o)\},yt​(o)=min{y:Vt​(y,o)=xmin​Vt​(x,o)},

and the myopic level is the smallest minimizer of the single-period cost,

ytm=min⁡{y:Gt(y)=min⁡xGt(x)}.y^m_t = \min\{y : G_t(y) = \min_x G_t(x)\}.ytm​=min{y:Gt​(y)=xmin​Gt​(x)}.

A function f(x,θ)f(x, \theta)f(x,θ) has decreasing differences if f(x1,θ)−f(x2,θ)≤f(x1,θ′)−f(x2,θ′)f(x_1, \theta) - f(x_2, \theta) \le f(x_1, \theta') - f(x_2, \theta')f(x1​,θ)−f(x2​,θ)≤f(x1​,θ′)−f(x2​,θ′) whenever x1≥x2x_1 \ge x_2x1​≥x2​ and θ≥θ′\theta \ge \theta'θ≥θ′ componentwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 1352)

If t↦ytmt \mapsto y^m_tt↦ytm​ is nondecreasing on {1,…,T}\{1, \dots, T\}{1,…,T}, then for every period ttt and every observed-demand vector o≥0o \ge 0o≥0,

yt(o)=ytm.y_t(o) = y^m_t .yt​(o)=ytm​.

The optimal order-up-to level then ignores all advance information beyond the protection period. A second item states the paper's stationary special case: if Gt=GG_t = GGt​=G for all ttt, the smallest minimizer ymy^mym of GGG is the optimal base-stock level in every period.

Milestones: Theorem 4 (p. 1351)

For every period ttt and every fixed oto_tot​:

  1. Vt(⋅,ot)V_t(\cdot, o_t)Vt​(⋅,ot​) is convex and Vt(x,ot)→∞V_t(x, o_t) \to \inftyVt​(x,ot​)→∞ as ∣x∣→∞|x| \to \infty∣x∣→∞;
  2. yt(ot)y_t(o_t)yt​(ot​) exists and Jt(x,ot)=Vt(max⁡(yt(ot),x),ot)J_t(x, o_t) = V_t(\max(y_t(o_t), x), o_t)Jt​(x,ot​)=Vt​(max(yt​(ot​),x),ot​): a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal;
  3. Jt(⋅,ot)J_t(\cdot, o_t)Jt​(⋅,ot​) is nondecreasing and convex;
  4. Vt(x,o)V_t(x, o)Vt​(x,o) has decreasing differences in (x,o)(x, o)(x,o);
  5. Jt(x,o)J_t(x, o)Jt​(x,o) has decreasing differences in (x,o)(x, o)(x,o);
  6. yt(o)y_t(o)yt​(o) is nondecreasing in ooo.

Parts 1–3 are what the goal's proof uses. Parts 4–6 are the paper's second zero set-up result, monotonicity of the base-stock level in observed demand.

Significance

The theorem identifies when advance demand information beyond the protection period can be ignored. When the myopic levels do not decrease over time, which includes stationary costs and ramping-up demand, the (1+M)(1 + M)(1+M)-dimensional dynamic program collapses to a sequence of one-dimensional newsvendor-type problems. That is both a computational simplification and a managerial statement: information about demand after the protection period does not change the order. Theorem 4, Part 5 gives the complementary monotone comparative statics. When the myopic condition fails, more observed demand never lowers the order-up-to level.

The results are proved in the paper, with the proofs in Appendix B. No machine-checked version exists. This mission produces a formal account of the finite-horizon recursion with a multi-dimensional information state, and checks the base-stock and myopic-optimality arguments against it.

Difficulty

The obvious induction carries convexity of Jt+1J_{t+1}Jt+1​ backward, but here the future cost is evaluated at a random next state (xt+1,ot+1)(x_{t+1}, o_{t+1})(xt+1​,ot+1​) whose first coordinate depends on the current observed demand ot,t+L+1o_{t,t+L+1}ot,t+L+1​. Showing that the base-stock level does not depend on oto_tot​ therefore needs more than convexity. It needs to know where Jt+1(⋅,ot+1)J_{t+1}(\cdot, o_{t+1})Jt+1​(⋅,ot+1​) is flat, uniformly in the random ot+1o_{t+1}ot+1​, and that the next position cannot exceed the current order-up-to level. The latter holds only on the reachable states, where observed demands are nonnegative. For a sufficiently negative ot,t+L+1o_{t,t+L+1}ot,t+L+1​ the next period starts above its myopic level whatever is ordered now, and the conclusion fails. On the analytic side, every infimum and expectation in the recursion must be shown to be finite and attained before the order-theoretic argument can start.

Formalization scope

The model is parametrised by LLL and M≥1M \ge 1M≥1, with N=L+M+1N = L + M + 1N=L+M+1. The demand vector is a function on {0,…,N}\{0, \dots, N\}{0,…,N} and ooo a function on {0,…,M−1}\{0, \dots, M-1\}{0,…,M−1}, ordered componentwise. JtJ_tJt​ is defined by backward recursion with Jt≡0J_t \equiv 0Jt​≡0 for t>Tt > Tt>T. The minimum over y≥xy \ge xy≥x is a real infimum and the expectation a Bochner integral against the law μt\mu_tμt​ of DtD_tDt​. Attainment and finiteness are consequences proved in the theorems, not assumptions. Base-stock and myopic levels are characterised as smallest minimizers (IsLeast), never through sInf.

The single-period cost GtG_tGt​ is a primitive rather than being assembled from ctc_tct​, gtg_tgt​ and the lead-time demand; the paper's GtG_tGt​ has the assumed properties, so the theorems cover the paper's model. Hypotheses the paper uses without stating, all placed on primitives and labelled in the statements:

  • nonnegative demands, Dt,s≥0D_{t,s} \ge 0Dt,s​≥0 almost surely;
  • coercivity of GtG_tGt​ (the paper states it for G~t\tilde G_tG~t​ only);
  • αt+1>0\alpha_{t+1} > 0αt+1​>0;
  • finiteness of the expectation in (9), guaranteed by linear growth of GtG_tGt​ and finite first moments of DtD_tDt​. This covers piecewise-linear holding and backorder costs with any finite-mean demand (including the paper's Poisson example), but excludes superlinear costs;
  • in the goal, o≥0o \ge 0o≥0, the set of reachable states.

The goal cannot be trivialised: the hypotheses are satisfied by concrete instances (for example Gt(y)=∣y∣G_t(y) = |y|Gt​(y)=∣y∣ with any finite-mean nonnegative demand), and the conclusion identifies the base-stock level exactly rather than asserting that some minimizer exists.

Out of scope: the reduction of the control problem to the functional equation (Appendix A, Özer 2000), the infinite-horizon Theorem 6, and Lemma 5, whose proof argues on the integers and whose real-valued form with a unit forward difference is unverified. Contributions of general lemmas are welcome: convexity and attainment for inf⁡y≥x\inf_{y \ge x}infy≥x​ of a convex coercive function, and preservation of convexity and decreasing differences under expectation. All of them are reusable in other inventory models.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego, Ö. Özer, Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information, Management Science 47(10):1344–1360, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.10.1344.10261
  • A. F. Veinott, Optimal Policy for a Multi-Product, Dynamic, Nonstationary Inventory Problem, Management Science 12(3):206–222, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2):259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Optimality of Generalized (s, S) Policies: A Generalized (s, S) Policy Is Optimal in Every Period of the Finite-Horizon Inventory ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

In a periodic-review inventory system a manager observes the stock level before ordering, decides how much to order, and then faces random demand. When ordering costs a fixed setup charge plus a constant price per unit, Scarf (1960) proved that an (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is optimal in every period of a finite-horizon problem: order up to SSS when the stock falls below sss, otherwise order nothing. Real ordering costs are often not of this form. Quantity discounts, a choice between production facilities with different setup and marginal costs, or a supplier whose price schedule falls with volume all give an ordering cost that is concave and increasing but not "setup plus linear". Karlin had analysed the single-period problem with such costs; Porteus (1971) gave the first multiperiod result with random demand.

Timeline:

  • Scarf (1960): (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimality for setup-plus-linear ordering cost, via KKK-convexity of the expected cost-to-go.
  • Veinott (1966): an alternative proof of (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimality under different conditions (quasi-convex one-period costs).
  • Porteus (1971): for concave increasing ordering costs and demand with a one-sided Pólya density, a generalized (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is optimal in every period; when the cost is piecewise linear with rrr pieces it is an (s,S)r(s,S)_r(s,S)r​ policy with at most rrr reorder levels.

Setting

The ordering cost c:[0,∞)→Rc : [0,\infty) \to \mathbb Rc:[0,∞)→R is concave, nondecreasing, and c(0)=0c(0) = 0c(0)=0. For z>0z > 0z>0, C2(z)C_2(z)C2​(z) is the supporting line of ccc at zzz with the smallest intercept, written as a pair (slope, intercept) (κ,K)(\kappa, K)(κ,K). The set of slopes that occur is CCC, and KκK_\kappaKκ​ is the intercept belonging to slope κ∈C\kappa \in Cκ∈C, so c(z)=min⁡κ∈C{Kκ+κz}c(z) = \min_{\kappa \in C}\{K_\kappa + \kappa z\}c(z)=minκ∈C​{Kκ​+κz} for z>0z > 0z>0. The limits (c0,K0)=lim⁡z↓0C2(z)(c_0, K_0) = \lim_{z \downarrow 0} C_2(z)(c0​,K0​)=limz↓0​C2​(z) and (c∞,K∞)=lim⁡z→∞C2(z)(c_\infty, K_\infty) = \lim_{z\to\infty} C_2(z)(c∞​,K∞​)=limz→∞​C2​(z) are assumed to exist.

Demands in successive periods are i.i.d. with density φ\varphiφ. A function φ\varphiφ is PFnPF_nPFn​ if 0<∫φ<∞0 < \int\varphi < \infty0<∫φ<∞ and det⁡[φ(xi−tj)]i,j≤k≥0\det[\varphi(x_i - t_j)]_{i,j\le k} \ge 0det[φ(xi​−tj​)]i,j≤k​≥0 for all k≤nk \le nk≤n and increasing x1<⋯<xkx_1<\dots<x_kx1​<⋯<xk​, t1<⋯<tkt_1<\dots<t_kt1​<⋯<tk​; it is a one-sided Pólya density if it is PFnPF_nPFn​ for every nnn, integrates to 111 and vanishes on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0). Exponential and Erlang densities are examples.

With holding-and-shortage cost mmm (PF-integrable, bounded below), terminal cost f0f_0f0​, discount factor 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1, and convolution (f∗φ)(y)=∫f(y−x)φ(x) dx(f*\varphi)(y) = \int f(y-x)\varphi(x)\,dx(f∗φ)(y)=∫f(y−x)φ(x)dx, the value functions are

hn=m∗φ+α fn−1∗φ,fn(x)=inf⁡y≥x{c(y−x)+hn(y)},h_n = m * \varphi + \alpha\, f_{n-1} * \varphi, \qquad f_n(x) = \inf_{y \ge x}\{c(y-x) + h_n(y)\},hn​=m∗φ+αfn−1​∗φ,fn​(x)=y≥xinf​{c(y−x)+hn​(y)},

where nnn counts the periods remaining. Yn(x)Y_n(x)Yn​(x) is the set of minimizers S≥xS \ge xS≥x. A generalized (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is a function yyy with y(x)=xy(x) = xy(x)=x for x≥sx \ge sx≥s and y(z)≥y(x)≥S≥sy(z) \ge y(x) \ge S \ge sy(z)≥y(x)≥S≥s for z<x<sz < x < sz<x<s: no order above sss, and below sss an order-up-to level that is at least SSS and does not increase with the starting stock.

Two function classes carry the argument. fff is non-KKK-decreasing on XXX if f(x)≤f(y)+Kf(x) \le f(y) + Kf(x)≤f(y)+K for x≤yx \le yx≤y in XXX. For K≥0K \ge 0K≥0, Ca(K)C_a(K)Ca​(K) consists of the piecewise continuous, PF-integrable functions with f(x)→∞f(x)\to\inftyf(x)→∞ as ∣x∣→∞|x|\to\infty∣x∣→∞ that are nonincreasing on (−∞,a)(-\infty,a)(−∞,a) or (−∞,a](-\infty,a](−∞,a] and non-KKK-decreasing on the rest of the line. C(K)C(K)C(K) is its continuous part. With Gκn=κ⋅+hnG_{\kappa n} = \kappa\cdot + h_nGκn​=κ⋅+hn​, the assumptions A1–A5 of §VI tie mmm and f0f_0f0​ to c0c_0c0​, c∞c_\inftyc∞​ and the KκK_\kappaKκ​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

Under the standing assumptions and A1–A5, for every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 the convolution fn−1∗φf_{n-1}*\varphifn−1​∗φ exists and

∃ s,S, ∃ y generalized (s,S) policy:y(x)∈Yn(x)  ∀x∈R.\exists\, s, S,\ \exists\, y \text{ generalized } (s,S) \text{ policy}: \quad y(x) \in Y_n(x) \ \ \forall x \in \mathbb R.∃s,S, ∃y generalized (s,S) policy:y(x)∈Yn​(x)  ∀x∈R.

The statement fixes no numbers: sss and SSS depend on nnn and on the data.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 9: ⋃aCa(K)\bigcup_a C_a(K)⋃a​Ca​(K) equals the class of quasi-KKK-convex, piecewise continuous, PF-integrable functions tending to ∞\infty∞ as ∣x∣→∞|x| \to \infty∣x∣→∞.
  2. Lemma 1: every f∈C(K)f \in C(K)f∈C(K) has reals s≤Ss \le Ss≤S with SSS a global minimizer, f>f(S)+Kf > f(S) + Kf>f(S)+K on (−∞,s)(-\infty,s)(−∞,s), fff nonincreasing there, and fff non-KKK-decreasing on [s,∞)[s,\infty)[s,∞).
  3. Lemma 5: for continuous ggg, f(x)=∫0∞g(x−t)λe−λtdtf(x) = \int_0^\infty g(x-t)\lambda e^{-\lambda t}dtf(x)=∫0∞​g(x−t)λe−λtdt is C1C^1C1 with f′=λ(g−f)f' = \lambda(g-f)f′=λ(g−f).
  4. Lemma 6: g∗φg*\varphig∗φ is continuous and C1C^1C1 off a finite set for a one-sided Pólya φ\varphiφ.
  5. Lemma 10 and Theorem 1: f∈Ca(K)⇒f∗φ∈C(K)f \in C_a(K) \Rightarrow f*\varphi \in C(K)f∈Ca​(K)⇒f∗φ∈C(K), first for exponential φ\varphiφ, then for every one-sided Pólya density.
  6. Theorem 2: if every Gκn∈C(Kκ)G_{\kappa n} \in C(K_\kappa)Gκn​∈C(Kκ​) and every Yn(x)≠∅Y_n(x) \ne \emptysetYn​(x)=∅, a generalized (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is optimal in period nnn.
  7. Lemma 2: fn(x)≤fn(y)+c(y−x)f_n(x) \le f_n(y) + c(y-x)fn​(x)≤fn​(y)+c(y−x) for x≤yx \le yx≤y.
  8. Lemma 3: the inductive step producing the hypotheses of Theorem 2 from properties of fn−1f_{n-1}fn−1​.

Significance

The result extends (s,S)(s,S)(s,S)-type structure from setup-plus-linear to arbitrary concave increasing ordering costs, which covers quantity discounts and multi-facility production. When ccc is piecewise linear with rrr pieces, the optimal policy is an (s,S)r(s,S)_r(s,S)r​ policy described by at most rrr reorder points and order-up-to levels. That is a finite-dimensional family, which makes computing policies tractable. The class C(K)C(K)C(K) and its closure under Pólya convolution (Theorem 1) are statements about functions of one real variable, independent of the inventory model. Quasi-KKK-convexity extends both KKK-convexity and quasi-convexity (Lemma 8 of the paper).

The theorem is classical and proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known. Its appendix leaves several steps as "easily proved by contradiction", which a formal proof has to fill in. The platform has Bertsekas's KKK-convex (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) lemma (BertsekasDP.kconvex_sS_structure, a result about KKK-convex rather than C(K)C(K)C(K) functions), but no Pólya frequency functions, no quasi-KKK-convexity, and no concave-cost inventory model.

Difficulty

The obvious route copies Scarf: show that the cost-to-go is KKK-convex and that KKK-convexity survives taking expectations. With a concave ordering cost there is no single KKK, and the relevant functions GκnG_{\kappa n}Gκn​ are generally not KκK_\kappaKκ​-convex. The weaker property that does hold, membership in C(Kκ)C(K_\kappa)C(Kκ​), is not preserved by convolution with an arbitrary density. It is preserved by one-sided Pólya densities, and Theorem 1 is the step that shows this: exponential kernels come first (via the differential identity (23)), and the general case needs the Schoenberg representation of one-sided Pólya densities as limits of convolutions of exponentials. The second difficulty is combining the different slopes κ∈C\kappa \in Cκ∈C into one policy (Theorem 2). Separate (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) pairs for each κ\kappaκ do not by themselves give a monotone policy.

Formalization scope

All functions are ℝ → ℝ; the ordering cost is used only on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The demand density is a function, not a measure; convolution is the Lebesgue integral over R\mathbb RR. PFnPF_nPFn​ uses Matrix.det over Fin k. The value functions are defined by structural recursion on n:Nn : \mathbb Nn:N with f0f_0f0​ the terminal cost; hnh_nhn​ is used for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. Yn(x)Y_n(x)Yn​(x) is defined by the optimality inequality, never through the infimum. GκnG_{\kappa n}Gκn​ is defined by the paper's identity (7), κy+hn(y)\kappa y + h_n(y)κy+hn​(y). R−=(−∞,0)R^- = (-\infty,0)R−=(−∞,0) is open, and "increasing" is read as nondecreasing. Slopes in CCC are written κ\kappaκ to separate them from the cost function ccc.

Added hypotheses and conventions:

  • mmm piecewise continuous. The paper uses this without stating it (proof of Lemma 3). It is a hypothesis of Lemma 3 and Theorem 3.
  • Real-valued fnf_nfn​ in Lemma 2. Following the convention of §X, Lemma 2 assumes each infimum defining fnf_nfn​ is over a set bounded below.
  • Measurability of mmm and f0f_0f0​ (§X) is implied by their piecewise continuity and is not stated separately.

Lean returns 000 for an infimum over a set unbounded below and for the integral of a non-integrable function. The goal therefore concludes that fn−1∗φf_{n-1}*\varphifn−1​∗φ exists and that Yn(x)Y_n(x)Yn​(x) is nonempty (so the infimum is a minimum); it does not assume these. It also does not quantify over arbitrary functions satisfying a Bellman equation or over an arbitrary set-valued YYY. Everything is built from the data (c,m,φ,α,f0)(c, m, \varphi, \alpha, f_0)(c,m,φ,α,f0​). The class C(K)C(K)C(K) includes PF-integrability and coercivity, without which Lemma 1 fails.

Welcome contributions: Pólya frequency functions and the exponential special cases (the exponential density is PF∞PF_\inftyPF∞​), Leibniz-rule lemmas for exponential kernels, the theory of C(K)C(K)C(K) and quasi-KKK-convex functions (reusable for other inventory models), and a formal Schoenberg representation (Theorem 6 of the paper, cited there and needed for Theorem 1). Theorems 4 and 5 (nonstationary and partial-backlogging extensions) are not part of this mission.

Selected references

  • E. L. Porteus, On the Optimality of Generalized (s, S) Policies, Management Science 17(7):411–426, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.17.7.411
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., On the Optimality of (s, S) Inventory Policies: New Conditions and a New Proof, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 14(5):1067–1083, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1137/0114086
  • I. J. Schoenberg, On Pólya Frequency Functions I. The Totally Positive Functions and their Laplace Transforms, Journal d'Analyse Mathématique 1:331–374, 1951. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02790092
  • S. Karlin, Total Positivity, Volume 1, Stanford University Press, 1968.
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Optimal Policy for a Multi-Product, Dynamic, Nonstationary Inventory Problem: The Base Stock Ordering Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

An inventory manager who stocks many products, faces random demand and pays ordering, holding and shortage costs must decide each period how much of each product to order. In general the optimal decision depends on the whole state and is found by solving a dynamic programme, which becomes impractical as the number of products grows. Myopic (or base stock) policies avoid this: in each period they aim at a target level computed from that period's data alone. Knowing when such a policy is optimal over an infinite horizon tells a practitioner when the multi-period problem decouples into a sequence of one-period problems.

Arthur F. Veinott, Jr. gave such conditions in Optimal Policy for a Multi-Product, Dynamic, Nonstationary Inventory Problem (Management Science 12(3):206–222, 1965). Earlier results of this type were for a single product (the paper cites Karlin, Management Science 6(3), 1960, Bellman–Glicksberg–Gross, Management Science 2(1), 1955, Iglehart–Karlin 1962, and the Arrow–Karlin–Scarf volume of 1958); Veinott's model allows several products, several demand classes, costs and demand distributions that change over time, general ordering constraints and general stock dynamics (backlogging, lost sales, and mixtures), and it does not use the functional equation of dynamic programming. Instead, the proofs analyse the inventory process directly.

Setting

There are nnn products and mmm demand classes. Vectors are compared componentwise: u≤vu \le vu≤v means uj≤vju_j \le v_juj​≤vj​ for all jjj. In period i=1,2,…i = 1, 2, \dotsi=1,2,… the manager observes the inventory vector xi∈Xi⊆Rnx_i \in X_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nxi​∈Xi​⊆Rn (negative coordinates are backlogs) and orders up to a vector yi∈Yi⊆Rny_i \in Y_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nyi​∈Yi​⊆Rn, subject to yi≥qi(xi)y_i \ge q_i(x_i)yi​≥qi​(xi​), where qiq_iqi​ is a vector of extended-real functions (for instance qi(x)=xq_i(x) = xqi​(x)=x forbids disposal). A random demand vector DiD_iDi​ with law Φi\Phi_iΦi​ and values in a Borel set Di⊆Rm\mathfrak{D}_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^mDi​⊆Rm then occurs, and the next inventory vector is xi+1=si(yi,Di)∈Xi+1x_{i+1} = s_i(y_i, D_i) \in X_{i+1}xi+1​=si​(yi​,Di​)∈Xi+1​. The demands D1,D2,…D_1, D_2, \dotsD1​,D2​,… are independent. Ordering yi−xiy_i - x_iyi​−xi​ costs ci⋅(yi−xi)c_i \cdot (y_i - x_i)ci​⋅(yi​−xi​), the holding and shortage cost is gi(yi,Di)g_i(y_i, D_i)gi​(yi​,Di​), and αi≥0\alpha_i \ge 0αi​≥0 is the discount factor of period iii.

Regrouping the ordering costs gives the one-period cost

Wi(y,t)=ci y+gi(y,t)−αi ci+1 si(y,t),Gi(y)=∫DiWi(y,t) dΦi(t),W_i(y,t) = c_i\, y + g_i(y,t) - \alpha_i\, c_{i+1}\, s_i(y,t), \qquad G_i(y) = \int_{\mathfrak{D}_i} W_i(y,t)\, d\Phi_i(t),Wi​(y,t)=ci​y+gi​(y,t)−αi​ci+1​si​(y,t),Gi​(y)=∫Di​​Wi​(y,t)dΦi​(t),

with discount weights β1=1\beta_1 = 1β1​=1 and βi=α1⋯αi−1\beta_i = \alpha_1 \cdots \alpha_{i-1}βi​=α1​⋯αi−1​. The integrals are assumed finite, and Gi≥γiG_i \ge \gamma_iGi​≥γi​ with ∑i∣βiγi∣<∞\sum_i |\beta_i \gamma_i| < \infty∑i​∣βi​γi​∣<∞. An ordering policy Yˉ\bar YYˉ chooses yiy_iyi​ as a Borel function of the past; it is feasible if yi∈Yiy_i \in Y_iyi​∈Yi​ and yi≥qi(xi)y_i \ge q_i(x_i)yi​≥qi​(xi​) for every possible history. Its cost is

f(x1∣Yˉ)=∑i=1∞βi E Gi(yi)∈(−∞,+∞],f(x_1 \mid \bar Y) = \sum_{i=1}^\infty \beta_i\, E\, G_i(y_i) \in (-\infty, +\infty],f(x1​∣Yˉ)=i=1∑∞​βi​EGi​(yi​)∈(−∞,+∞],

and a feasible policy of least cost is optimal.

Let yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ minimize GiG_iGi​ over YiY_iYi​. When yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ is not attainable from xxx, the minimal feasible level wi(x)w_i(x)wi​(x) is the least element of Yi∩{y:y≥qi(x), y≥yˉi}Y_i \cap \{y : y \ge q_i(x),\ y \ge \bar y_i\}Yi​∩{y:y≥qi​(x), y≥yˉ​i​}. The base stock ordering policy orders up to yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ if qi(xi)≤yˉiq_i(x_i) \le \bar y_iqi​(xi​)≤yˉ​i​ and up to wi(xi)w_i(x_i)wi​(xi​) otherwise.

Formalization targets

The hypotheses are: (3a) yˉi∈Yi\bar y_i \in Y_iyˉ​i​∈Yi​ minimizes GiG_iGi​ over YiY_iYi​; (3b) qi+1(si(yˉi,t))≤yˉi+1q_{i+1}(s_i(\bar y_i, t)) \le \bar y_{i+1}qi+1​(si​(yˉ​i​,t))≤yˉ​i+1​ for t∈Dit \in \mathfrak{D}_it∈Di​; (3c) YiY_iYi​ is closed and linearly ordered by ≤\le≤; (3d) GiG_iGi​ and si(⋅,t)s_i(\cdot, t)si​(⋅,t) are nondecreasing on {y∈Yi:y≥yˉi}\{y \in Y_i : y \ge \bar y_i\}{y∈Yi​:y≥yˉ​i​}, and qiq_iqi​ is nondecreasing where qi(x)≰yˉiq_i(x) \not\le \bar y_iqi​(x)≤yˉ​i​.

Goal: Theorem 3.2

Under (3a)–(3d), the base stock ordering policy

Yˉi∗(Hi∗)={yˉi,qi(xi∗)≤yˉi,wi(xi∗),qi(xi∗)≰yˉi\bar Y_i^*(H_i^*) = \begin{cases} \bar y_i, & q_i(x_i^*) \le \bar y_i, \\ w_i(x_i^*), & q_i(x_i^*) \not\le \bar y_i \end{cases}Yˉi∗​(Hi∗​)={yˉ​i​,wi​(xi∗​),​qi​(xi∗​)≤yˉ​i​,qi​(xi∗​)≤yˉ​i​​

is feasible and optimal: f(x1∣Yˉ∗)≤f(x1∣Yˉ)f(x_1 \mid \bar Y^*) \le f(x_1 \mid \bar Y)f(x1​∣Yˉ∗)≤f(x1​∣Yˉ) for every feasible Yˉ\bar YYˉ.

Milestones

  1. A nonempty, closed, linearly ordered, bounded-below subset of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn has a least element (p. 212); hence wi(x)w_i(x)wi​(x) exists and equals yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ when qi(x)≤yˉiq_i(x) \le \bar y_iqi​(x)≤yˉ​i​.
  2. wiw_iwi​ is nondecreasing where qi(x)≰yˉiq_i(x) \not\le \bar y_iqi​(x)≤yˉ​i​ (p. 214).
  3. Once qk(xk∗)≤yˉkq_k(x_k^*) \le \bar y_kqk​(xk∗​)≤yˉ​k​, the base stock policy orders up to yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ for all i≥ki \ge ki≥k.
  4. Theorem 3.1: under (3a) and (3b), if q1(x1)≤yˉ1q_1(x_1) \le \bar y_1q1​(x1​)≤yˉ​1​, ordering up to yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ in every period is optimal, with cost ∑iβiGi(yˉi)\sum_i \beta_i G_i(\bar y_i)∑i​βi​Gi​(yˉ​i​).
  5. The coupling (3.1): before the first period TTT with qT(xT∗)≤yˉTq_T(x_T^*) \le \bar y_TqT​(xT∗​)≤yˉ​T​,
yˉi<yi∗=wi(xi∗)≤wi(xi)≤yi.\bar y_i < y_i^* = w_i(x_i^*) \le w_i(x_i) \le y_i.yˉ​i​<yi∗​=wi​(xi∗​)≤wi​(xi​)≤yi​.
  1. Pathwise dominance: Gi(yi∗)≤Gi(yi)G_i(y_i^*) \le G_i(y_i)Gi​(yi∗​)≤Gi​(yi​) for every iii and every possible demand path.
  2. The reduction behind (2.3): E Wi(yi,Di)=E Gi(yi)E\, W_i(y_i, D_i) = E\, G_i(y_i)EWi​(yi​,Di​)=EGi​(yi​), by independence of yiy_iyi​ and DiD_iDi​.

Significance

The theorem shows that under (3a)–(3d) the infinite-horizon, nonstationary, multi-product problem is solved by one-period optimization: compute yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ from GiG_iGi​ alone, and when it is unreachable order the least feasible amount. No value function is computed. It covers backlogging and lost sales, products stocked in fixed proportions, and time-varying cost and demand data, and Theorem 3.1 alone settles the frequent case in which the initial stock is small.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge it has not been machine-checked: this mission produces a Lean model of a general stochastic, infinite-horizon, multi-product inventory problem (feasible policies, the expected discounted cost with +∞+\infty+∞ allowed), and a checked proof that a myopic policy is optimal in it. The model and its cost are reusable for other base stock and myopic optimality results.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would compare the base stock policy with an arbitrary policy period by period using (3a) alone. That fails once yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ is unreachable. The base stock policy then holds less stock than yˉi\bar y_iyˉ​i​ would require, and it has to be shown that no other policy can reach a lower-cost level later. The proof couples the two trajectories along every demand path, using the monotonicity in (3d) and the linear order of YiY_iYi​ from (3c), until the base stock level becomes attainable, after which (3b) keeps it attainable. The formal difficulties are:

  • the existence and monotonicity of the least element wi(x)w_i(x)wi​(x) in a closed chain of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn;
  • the measurability of the base stock policy, which is part of its feasibility;
  • the passage from pathwise dominance to the expected discounted cost when the cost may be +∞+\infty+∞.

Formalization scope

Periods are 0-based in Lean (Lean period kkk is the paper's period k+1k+1k+1). Vectors are Fin n → ℝ with the product order; qiq_iqi​ takes values in Fin n → EReal. Policies are functions of the past demands. The paper shows on p. 219 that this loses no generality once x1x_1x1​ is fixed. The cost is excess, a [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued series of lower Lebesgue integrals of βi(Gi(yi)−γi)\beta_i(G_i(y_i) - \gamma_i)βi​(Gi​(yi​)−γi​), plus the finite real ∑iβiγi\sum_i \beta_i\gamma_i∑i​βi​γi​, taken in EReal. A divergent series therefore gives +∞+\infty+∞ and never the junk value 000. "Minimal element" is IsLeast. The GiG_iGi​ in the statements is the integral of WiW_iWi​ built from the data, and the policy in the goal is constructed from yˉ\bar yyˉ​, qqq, www and sss. Neither is an arbitrary object satisfying the conclusion. The goal concludes optimality, which includes feasibility: a pathwise or conditional statement would not be the theorem.

Hypotheses added relative to the page, each used by the paper without being stated:

  • Order feasibility: from every x∈Xix \in X_ix∈Xi​ some y∈Yiy \in Y_iy∈Yi​ with y≥qi(x)y \ge q_i(x)y≥qi​(x) exists (p. 212 asserts the set defining wi(x)w_i(x)wi​(x) has a minimal element, which needs it nonempty). The least-element lemma likewise assumes AAA nonempty.
  • (3d)'s qqq-clause in one-sided form: if x≤x′x \le x'x≤x′ in XiX_iXi​ and qi(x)≰yˉiq_i(x) \not\le \bar y_iqi​(x)≤yˉ​i​, then qi(x)≤qi(x′)q_i(x) \le q_i(x')qi​(x)≤qi​(x′). This is the form the proof on p. 214 uses; monotonicity on the region {qi(x)≰yˉi}\{q_i(x) \not\le \bar y_i\}{qi​(x)≤yˉ​i​} alone admits a counterexample to Theorem 3.2.
  • Integrability of Wi(yi,Di)W_i(y_i, D_i)Wi​(yi​,Di​) in the milestone EWi=EGiE W_i = E G_iEWi​=EGi​.
  • Borel measurability of qiq_iqi​ on all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn rather than on XiX_iXi​ (a harmless strengthening).

A complete development needs: least elements of closed chains in Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn; measurability of the least-element selection x↦wi(x)x \mapsto w_i(x)x↦wi​(x); a Fubini/independence argument for E Wi(yi,Di)=E Gi(yi)E\,W_i(y_i,D_i)=E\,G_i(y_i)EWi​(yi​,Di​)=EGi​(yi​); and monotone summation of lower integrals. The least-element lemma and the cost encoding are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative arguments.

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott, Jr., Optimal Policy for a Multi-Product, Dynamic, Nonstationary Inventory Problem, Management Science 12(3):206–222, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg, O. Gross, On the Optimal Inventory Equation, Management Science 2(1):83–104, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • S. Karlin, Dynamic Inventory Policy with Varying Stochastic Demands, Management Science 6(3):231–258, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.231
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing in Unreliable Newsvendor Networks 1: The Risk-Neutral Flexibility Premium Is Nonnegative for Every ReliabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that sells several products must decide, before demand is known, how much production capacity to build and of what kind. Dedicated capacity makes one product; flexible capacity makes any of them. The classic argument for flexibility is demand pooling: capacity that can follow demand to whichever product needs it wastes less than capacity locked to one product (Fine and Freund 1990; Van Mieghem 1998).

When capacity itself is unreliable, as with a supplier that may fail to deliver, a plant that may be disrupted, or a batch that may be rejected, flexibility has a second face. A single flexible resource concentrates the firm's supply in one place, so one failure removes all of it, whereas several dedicated resources rarely fail together. This resource-aggregation effect works against flexibility. Tomlin and Wang (2005) set up a newsvendor network in which both effects are present and ask when a firm should pay more for flexible capacity than for dedicated capacity. Their first answer (Proposition 1) is that a risk-neutral firm facing equal reliabilities and costs never loses by choosing flexibility, whatever the joint distribution of demand. This mission formalizes that answer.

Setting

There are NNN products with a common unit contribution margin p>0p>0p>0. The demand vector X~=(X~1,…,X~N)\tilde X=(\tilde X_1,\dots,\tilde X_N)X~=(X~1​,…,X~N​) is random, nonnegative and integrable; its total is X~N+1=X~1+⋯+X~N\tilde X_{N+1}=\tilde X_1+\dots+\tilde X_NX~N+1​=X~1​+⋯+X~N​.

Two networks are compared. In the dedicated network SD, resource n∈{1,…,N}n\in\{1,\dots,N\}n∈{1,…,N} makes only product nnn and has marginal total cost c>0c>0c>0. In the flexible network SF, a single resource, labelled N+1N+1N+1, makes every product and has marginal total cost cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​.

Every resource jjj is unreliable with a Bernoulli yield Y~j∈{0,1}\tilde Y_j\in\{0,1\}Y~j​∈{0,1}, P(Y~j=1)=θ\mathbb P(\tilde Y_j=1)=\thetaP(Y~j​=1)=θ. The common reliability is θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1], the yields are mutually independent, and they are independent of demand. Investing Kj≥0K_j\ge 0Kj​≥0 in resource jjj delivers capacity Y~jKj\tilde Y_jK_jY~j​Kj​ and costs (λ+(1−λ)Y~j)cjKj(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\tilde Y_j)c_jK_j(λ+(1−λ)Y~j​)cj​Kj​: the firm pays the committed cost λcj\lambda c_jλcj​ per unit ordered and a further (1−λ)cj(1-\lambda)c_j(1−λ)cj​ per unit delivered, with λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1].

The realized profits are

WSD(K)=∑n=1N(−(λ+(1−λ)Y~n)cKn+pmin⁡{X~n,Y~nKn}),W^{SD}(K)=\sum_{n=1}^N\Big(-(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\tilde Y_n)cK_n+p\min\{\tilde X_n,\tilde Y_nK_n\}\Big),WSD(K)=n=1∑N​(−(λ+(1−λ)Y~n​)cKn​+pmin{X~n​,Y~n​Kn​}), WSF(KN+1)=−(λ+(1−λ)Y~N+1)cN+1KN+1+pmin⁡{X~N+1,Y~N+1KN+1},W^{SF}(K_{N+1})=-(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\tilde Y_{N+1})c_{N+1}K_{N+1}+p\min\{\tilde X_{N+1},\tilde Y_{N+1}K_{N+1}\},WSF(KN+1​)=−(λ+(1−λ)Y~N+1​)cN+1​KN+1​+pmin{X~N+1​,Y~N+1​KN+1​},

and a risk-neutral firm maximizes the expected profit VRNSD(K)=E[WSD(K)]V^{SD}_{RN}(K)=\mathbb E[W^{SD}(K)]VRNSD​(K)=E[WSD(K)] or VRNSF(KN+1)=E[WSF(KN+1)]V^{SF}_{RN}(K_{N+1})=\mathbb E[W^{SF}(K_{N+1})]VRNSF​(KN+1​)=E[WSF(KN+1​)] over nonnegative investments. Let VSD,∗V^{SD,*}VSD,∗ and VSF,∗V^{SF,*}VSF,∗ be the optimal values. SF is (weakly) preferred if VSF,∗≥VSD,∗V^{SF,*}\ge V^{SD,*}VSF,∗≥VSD,∗.

The indifference cost cN+1Ic^I_{N+1}cN+1I​ is a value of cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​ at which VSF,∗=VSD,∗V^{SF,*}=V^{SD,*}VSF,∗=VSD,∗, and the flexibility premium is Δ=(cN+1I−c)/c\Delta=(c^I_{N+1}-c)/cΔ=(cN+1I​−c)/c. The firm prefers SF as long as cN+1≤(1+Δ)cc_{N+1}\le(1+\Delta)ccN+1​≤(1+Δ)c.

The α\alphaα-expected shortfall of a random variable ZZZ is, for α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) and the lower quantile x(α)=inf⁡{x:P(Z≤x)≥α}x_{(\alpha)}=\inf\{x:\mathbb P(Z\le x)\ge\alpha\}x(α)​=inf{x:P(Z≤x)≥α},

ESα(Z)=−1α(E[Z1{Z≤x(α)}]+x(α)(α−P(Z≤x(α)))).ES_\alpha(Z)=-\frac1\alpha\Big(\mathbb E\big[Z\mathbf 1\{Z\le x_{(\alpha)}\}\big]+x_{(\alpha)}\big(\alpha-\mathbb P(Z\le x_{(\alpha)})\big)\Big).ESα​(Z)=−α1​(E[Z1{Z≤x(α)​}]+x(α)​(α−P(Z≤x(α)​))).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

For any demand random vector X~\tilde XX~:

  1. ΔRN≥0\Delta_{RN}\ge 0ΔRN​≥0 for all 0≤θ≤10\le\theta\le 10≤θ≤1, that is, SF is preferred whenever cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c;
0≤θ≤λcp−(1−λ)c ⟹ ΔRN=0;0\le\theta\le\frac{\lambda c}{p-(1-\lambda)c}\ \Longrightarrow\ \Delta_{RN}=0;0≤θ≤p−(1−λ)cλc​ ⟹ ΔRN​=0;
  1. ΔRN=0\Delta_{RN}=0ΔRN​=0 if ρX=1\rho_X=\mathbf 1ρX​=1, i.e. all pairwise demand correlations equal 111.

No distributional form of demand is fixed and no constant is hard-coded beyond the paper's threshold.

Milestones

  • (9): the closed form of VRNSFV^{SF}_{RN}VRNSF​.
  • (10)–(11), (12)–(13): the optimal investments are critical fractiles
FXN+1(KN+1∗)=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)cN+1θp,FXn(Kn∗)=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)cθp,F_{X_{N+1}}(K^*_{N+1})=1-\frac{(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\theta)c_{N+1}}{\theta p},\qquad F_{X_n}(K^*_n)=1-\frac{(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\theta)c}{\theta p},FXN+1​​(KN+1∗​)=1−θp(λ+(1−λ)θ)cN+1​​,FXn​​(Kn∗​)=1−θp(λ+(1−λ)θ)c​,

and the optimal values are θp\theta pθp times partial expectations of demand.

  • (A-1) in expected-shortfall form: with α=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)c/(θp)∈(0,1)\alpha=1-(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\theta)c/(\theta p)\in(0,1)α=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)c/(θp)∈(0,1),
VSF,∗≥VSD,∗ at cN+1=c  ⟺  α(∑nESα(X~n)−ESα(∑nX~n))≥0.V^{SF,*}\ge V^{SD,*}\ \text{at}\ c_{N+1}=c\iff \alpha\Big(\sum_n ES_\alpha(\tilde X_n)-ES_\alpha\Big(\sum_n\tilde X_n\Big)\Big)\ge 0 .VSF,∗≥VSD,∗ at cN+1​=c⟺α(n∑​ESα​(X~n​)−ESα​(n∑​X~n​))≥0.
  • Subadditivity of ESαES_\alphaESα​ (Acerbi and Tasche 2002).
  • The positivity threshold of part 2: investing is worthwhile iff θ>λc/(p−(1−λ)c)\theta>\lambda c/(p-(1-\lambda)c)θ>λc/(p−(1−λ)c).
  • Correlation 111 implies X~n=aX~1+b\tilde X_n=a\tilde X_1+bX~n​=aX~1​+b with a>0a>0a>0, and ESα(aX+b)=aESα(X)−bES_\alpha(aX+b)=aES_\alpha(X)-bESα​(aX+b)=aESα​(X)−b.

Significance

Proposition 1 separates the two effects of flexibility under unreliable supply. It shows that for a risk-neutral firm the demand-pooling benefit together with an upside effect of aggregation (one flexible resource succeeds more often than all dedicated ones together) always outweighs the downside aggregation risk. Even with no pooling benefit at all (perfectly correlated demand) the firm is indifferent, not averse. The later results of the paper (loss aversion, CVaR, dual sourcing) are measured against this baseline: a negative premium can appear only once the firm is risk-averse. The expected-shortfall form links newsvendor optimal values to a coherent risk measure, a connection that recurs in inventory risk analysis.

The result is proved in the paper, with a proof that cites Acerbi and Tasche (2002) for two properties of expected shortfall. No machine-checked version exists. A formalization adds three things: a proof for general demand distributions (the paper assumes a joint density and uses the continuous form of expected shortfall); a Lean development of Acerbi–Tasche expected shortfall for general integrable random variables, including subadditivity and affine equivariance; and a reusable model of newsvendor networks with Bernoulli yields and committed costs.

Difficulty

The newsvendor steps (9)–(13) are single-variable concave optimization, but they must be done without a density: the distribution function of total demand may have atoms and flat pieces, so the critical fractile need not be attained or may be attained on an interval, and optimal values must be expressed through lower quantiles. Subadditivity of expected shortfall is the heart of part 1 and is not elementary in the general (atomic) case, which is exactly why the correction term x(α)(α−P(Z≤x(α)))x_{(\alpha)}(\alpha-\mathbb P(Z\le x_{(\alpha)}))x(α)​(α−P(Z≤x(α)​)) appears. Part 3 requires identifying correlation 111 with almost-sure positive affine dependence, which rests on the equality case of the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality in L2L^2L2, and then handling nonnegativity constraints on the investments that the affine change of variables may violate. The obvious shortcut of computing everything from densities is not available, because the goal is stated for every demand vector and part 3 is incompatible with a joint density when N≥2N\ge 2N≥2.

Formalization scope

Randomness lives on one probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega,\mu)(Ω,μ); demand is X : Ω → Fin N → ℝ and yields are Y : Ω → Fin (N + 1) → ℝ, where dedicated resource nnn is Fin.castSucc n and the flexible resource N+1N+1N+1 is Fin.last N. Expectations are Bochner integrals and probabilities are μ.real. The standing assumptions are: p>0p>0p>0, c>0c>0c>0, λ,θ∈[0,1]\lambda,\theta\in[0,1]λ,θ∈[0,1]; demands measurable, almost surely nonnegative and integrable (integrability is needed for expected shortfall and makes every profit integrable); yields measurable, {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}-valued almost surely with P(Y~j=1)=θ\mathbb P(\tilde Y_j=1)=\thetaP(Y~j​=1)=θ, mutually independent, and independent of demand (the paper states the last in Appendix E). The paper's joint density of demand is deliberately not assumed.

The premium Δ\DeltaΔ and the indifference cost are not defined as real numbers, because Definition 1's indifference cost need not exist or be unique (for θ\thetaθ below the threshold both optimal values are 000 for every cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​ near ccc). "Δ≥0\Delta\ge 0Δ≥0" is encoded as "SF is weakly preferred for every cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c", and "Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0" as "SF and SD are each weakly preferred to the other at cN+1=cc_{N+1}=ccN+1​=c". Weak preference VSF,∗≥VSD,∗V^{SF,*}\ge V^{SD,*}VSF,∗≥VSD,∗ is stated as: every nonnegative SD investment is matched by some nonnegative SF investment; no real supremum is taken. Quantiles F−1F^{-1}F−1 in (10) and (12) appear only as parameters with the hypothesis F(K∗)=F(K^*)=F(K∗)= fractile. Part 3 adds square integrability and positive variances, the conditions under which correlation coefficients exist; the threshold milestone adds almost surely positive demand and N≥1N\ge 1N≥1 for its "if" direction. When p≤(1−λ)cp\le(1-\lambda)cp≤(1−λ)c the Lean value of the threshold is ≤0\le 0≤0, so part 2 then covers only θ=0\theta=0θ=0, where it is true.

A formalization that assumed a joint density, took Δ\DeltaΔ as a free real satisfying Definition 1, or defined optimal values as real suprema over all of RN\mathbb R^NRN would make parts of the goal vacuous or trivial; each is ruled out above.

Needed infrastructure: single-variable newsvendor optimality for general distributions; the Acerbi–Tasche expected shortfall with subadditivity and affine equivariance; the equality case of Cauchy–Schwarz for correlation. The expected-shortfall and correlation lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission, and contributions of them are especially welcome. Out of scope: the loss-averse and CVaR analyses (Propositions 2–3, §3.2–3.3), the perfect-reliability result (Proposition 4, a separate mission), the dual-sourcing networks (§4) and all numerical results.

Selected references

  • B. Tomlin and Y. Wang, On the value of mix flexibility and dual sourcing in unreliable newsvendor networks, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(1):37–57, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1040.0063
  • C. Acerbi and D. Tasche, On the coherence of expected shortfall, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1487–1503, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00283-2
  • C. H. Fine and R. M. Freund, Optimal investment in product-flexible manufacturing capacity, Management Science 36(4):449–466, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.4.449
  • J. A. Van Mieghem, Investment strategies for flexible resources, Management Science 44(8):1071–1078, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing in Unreliable Newsvendor Networks 2: Under Perfect Reliability the Flexibility Premium Is Nonnegative for Every Nondecreasing UtilityResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that makes several products must decide, before demand is known, how much capacity to buy. It can buy dedicated capacity, one resource per product, or a single flexible resource that can make every product. Flexible capacity pools demand: a surplus of one product's demand can be served by capacity that would otherwise sit idle. A common intuition in the operations literature holds that a flexible strategy is preferable to a dedicated one when the unit costs are equal, and much of that literature therefore assumes the flexible resource costs more (for example Van Mieghem 1998).

Tomlin and Wang (2005) examine when this intuition is valid for firms that are not risk neutral and whose resources may fail. Their answer has two halves. A risk-neutral firm always values flexibility, whatever the reliability of its resources (their Proposition 1). A firm with perfectly reliable resources also always values flexibility, whatever its attitude to risk, as long as it prefers more wealth to less (their Proposition 4). When neither condition holds, dedicated capacity can be strictly preferred (their Remark 1 and numerical study). This mission formalizes the second half.

Setting

There are NNN products with a common contribution margin p>0p>0p>0. The random demand vector is X~=(X~1,…,X~N)\tilde X=(\tilde X_1,\dots,\tilde X_N)X~=(X~1​,…,X~N​), nonnegative, with an arbitrary joint distribution on a probability space. The firm has initial wealth w0w_0w0​.

  • In the dedicated network SD, the firm invests Kn≥0K_n\ge 0Kn​≥0 in a resource that can make only product nnn, at marginal total cost c>0c>0c>0 per unit. With perfectly reliable resources the whole investment is delivered, and the terminal wealth is
wSD(K)=w0+p∑n=1Nmin⁡{X~n,Kn}−c∑n=1NKn.w^{SD}(K)=w_0+p\sum_{n=1}^N\min\{\tilde X_n,K_n\}-c\sum_{n=1}^N K_n .wSD(K)=w0​+pn=1∑N​min{X~n​,Kn​}−cn=1∑N​Kn​.
  • In the flexible network SF, the firm invests KN+1≥0K_{N+1}\ge0KN+1​≥0 in one resource that can make every product, at marginal total cost cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​, and the terminal wealth is
wSF(KN+1)=w0+pmin⁡{∑n=1NX~n,KN+1}−cN+1KN+1.w^{SF}(K_{N+1})=w_0+p\min\Big\{\sum_{n=1}^N\tilde X_n,K_{N+1}\Big\}-c_{N+1}K_{N+1}.wSF(KN+1​)=w0​+pmin{n=1∑N​X~n​,KN+1​}−cN+1​KN+1​.

The firm chooses its investment to maximize one of three objectives of terminal wealth WWW, with profit W~=W−w0\tilde W=W-w_0W~=W−w0​:

  1. an expected utility E[u(W)]E[u(W)]E[u(W)], where uuu ranges over U1U_1U1​, the set of utility functions that are nondecreasing in wealth;
  2. the loss-averse objective VLA=w0+E[W~+−βW~−]V_{LA}=w_0+E[\tilde W^+-\beta\tilde W^-]VLA​=w0​+E[W~+−βW~−] with β≥1\beta\ge 1β≥1;
  3. the CVaR objective VCVaRη=w0+max⁡v{v+1ηE[min⁡{W~−v,0}]}V_{CVaR_\eta}=w_0+\max_v\{v+\tfrac1\eta E[\min\{\tilde W-v,0\}]\}VCVaRη​​=w0​+maxv​{v+η1​E[min{W~−v,0}]} with η∈(0,1]\eta\in(0,1]η∈(0,1], the mean of the left η\etaη-tail of wealth.

SF is (weakly) preferred when its optimal objective value is at least that of SD. The flexibility premium is Δ=(cN+1I−c)/c\Delta=(c^I_{N+1}-c)/cΔ=(cN+1I​−c)/c, where the indifference cost cN+1Ic^I_{N+1}cN+1I​ is a flexible cost at which the firm is indifferent between the networks; the firm prefers SF as long as cN+1≤(1+Δ)cc_{N+1}\le(1+\Delta)ccN+1​≤(1+Δ)c.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

With perfectly reliable resources and any demand distribution, Δ≥0\Delta\ge 0Δ≥0 for every u∈U1u\in U_1u∈U1​, for the loss-averse objective and for the CVaR objective. In the formalization: for every cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c,

∀K≥0 ∃KN+1≥0:VSD(K)≤VSF(KN+1)\forall K\ge 0\ \exists K_{N+1}\ge 0:\quad \mathcal V^{SD}(K)\le\mathcal V^{SF}(K_{N+1})∀K≥0 ∃KN+1​≥0:VSD(K)≤VSF(KN+1​)

for V\mathcal VV each expected utility with uuu nondecreasing, and the loss-averse objective; for CVaR the same with the threshold vvv quantified jointly with the investment.

Milestones

  1. (A-4)–(A-6): at equal cost, investing ∑nKn\sum_nK_n∑n​Kn​ in the flexible resource gives a terminal wealth at least that of SD, for every demand realization.
  2. The SF wealth first-order stochastically dominates the SD wealth: FWSF≤FWSDF_{W^{SF}}\le F_{W^{SD}}FWSF​≤FWSD​.
  3. E[u(wSD(K))]≤E[u(wSF(∑nKn))]E[u(w^{SD}(K))]\le E[u(w^{SF}(\sum_nK_n))]E[u(wSD(K))]≤E[u(wSF(∑n​Kn​))] for every nondecreasing uuu.
  4. The loss-averse objective is the expected utility of a nondecreasing piecewise-linear utility with breakpoint w0w_0w0​.
  5. The CVaR comparison VCVaRSD(K)≤VCVaRSF(∑nKn)V^{SD}_{CVaR}(K)\le V^{SF}_{CVaR}(\sum_nK_n)VCVaRSD​(K)≤VCVaRSF​(∑n​Kn​).

Significance

Proposition 4 shows that the intuition "flexibility is worth at least as much as dedicated capacity at the same price" survives any monotone risk attitude and any demand distribution, provided supply is reliable. Combined with Proposition 1 it isolates the interaction of risk aversion and unreliable supply as the only source of a negative flexibility premium, which is the paper's Remark 1 and the organizing message of its numerical study. The result requires no concavity, differentiability or distributional assumption, so it applies to the loss-averse and CVaR objectives used throughout the paper.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix A); no machine-checked version is known. A formalization produces a reusable statement of the model, a pathwise pooling inequality, and the passage from a pathwise comparison of two random variables on one probability space to comparisons of expected utilities and of CVaR, which recurs in capacity-pooling and inventory-pooling arguments.

Difficulty

The pathwise inequality is elementary. The work lies in the passage from it to the objectives. The paper cites Levy (1992) for both the expected-utility and the CVaR comparison; the first holds for every nondecreasing uuu, including discontinuous ones, and the second concerns a maximum over a real threshold that is not a priori attained. A formal proof must also make sure every expectation involved is a genuine integral: the utility is arbitrary, so the expected utility is finite only because, for a fixed nonnegative investment and nonnegative demand, both wealths are confined to a bounded interval. Finally, "Δ≥0\Delta\ge 0Δ≥0" is a statement about optimal values, and the optimal SD investment need not exist; the argument has to be run for every SD investment, not for an optimal one.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace MixFlex.Reliable. The probability space is (Ω, μ) with IsProbabilityMeasure μ; demand is a measurable X : Ω → Fin N → ℝ with each coordinate almost surely nonnegative, and no density, independence or integrability is assumed. Expectations are Bochner integrals. Perfect reliability (θ=1\theta=1θ=1) is built into the wealths (A-4)–(A-5), so the committed-cost fraction λ\lambdaλ does not appear. Standing parameters: p>0p>0p>0, c>0c>0c>0, β≥1\beta\ge 1β≥1, 0<η≤10<\eta\le10<η≤1, w0w_0w0​ arbitrary. The requirements p,c>0p,c>0p,c>0 and nonnegative, measurable demand are made explicit; the page treats them as part of the model.

The premium Δ\DeltaΔ and the indifference cost are not defined as real numbers, since the indifference cost need not be unique. "Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0" is encoded as "SF is weakly preferred for every cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c", and "weakly preferred" as "every nonnegative SD investment is matched or beaten by a nonnegative SF investment", with no real suprema. For CVaR the maximum in (8) over the investment and the threshold is encoded in the same matching form. The milestones compare the objectives at the flexible cost ccc, as (A-5) is printed.

A formalization in which the expected utility of a non-integrable wealth defaults to zero, or in which η=0\eta=0η=0 makes the CVaR bracket w0+vw_0+vw0​+v, would make the comparisons meaningless; the statements exclude both (K≥0K\ge0K≥0 with nonnegative demand bounds the wealths; η>0\eta>0η>0). "Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0" is also not trivially true: for a flexible cost above ccc SF can be strictly worse.

Out of scope: Propositions 1–3 and 5–8 (Proposition 1 is the companion mission on the risk-neutral premium), Remark 1's negative-premium claim and the numerical study. Welcome contributions: a general lemma that an almost-sure inequality between bounded random variables transfers to expected utilities of monotone functions, and a proof of the CVaR bracket comparison.

Selected references

  • B. Tomlin, Y. Wang, On the value of mix flexibility and dual sourcing in unreliable newsvendor networks, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(1):37–57, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1040.0063
  • H. Levy, Stochastic dominance and expected utility: survey and analysis, Management Science 38(4):555–593, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.4.555
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • J. A. Van Mieghem, Investment strategies for flexible resources, Management Science 44(8):1071–1078, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns: A Coordinating Target Rebate Helps the Retailer, and the Manufacturer iff Coordinated Effort Is at Least Twice Decentralized EffortResearch Paper

Motivation

A false failure return is a product returned by a consumer as defective although it has no functional or cosmetic defect; managers attribute such returns to installation difficulties, a mismatch with the consumer's preferences, and remorse. Ferguson, Guide and Souza report (pp. 376–377) that false failures account for up to 80% of Hewlett-Packard's inkjet printer returns, roughly 5% of sales, and that the per-unit cost of a false failure return to computer manufacturers is around 25% of the product's price. The manufacturer absorbs most of that cost, while the retailer is the party able to prevent the returns in the short term, by spending time with customers before the sale and supporting them after it. The retailer bears the cost of that effort but captures only part of its benefit, so without an incentive it exerts too little.

The paper (Ferguson, Guide & Souza, MSOM 2006) models this as a single-period manufacturer–retailer problem with non-contractible retailer effort, and asks which contracts restore the supply chain's optimal effort and who gains from them. It belongs to the literature on supply chain coordination with contracts (Cachon 2003) and on channel rebates with sales effort (Taylor 2002); its object is a target rebate, a payment to the retailer for every false failure return below a target.

Setting

A manufacturer with unit cost ccc sells to a retailer at wholesale price www, who sells at retail price ppp. Avoiding one false failure return is worth

Mm=m+δm(w−c) to the manufacturer,Rr=r+δr(p−w) to the retailer,M_m = m + \delta_m(w - c) \ \text{to the manufacturer},\qquad R_r = r + \delta_r(p - w)\ \text{to the retailer},Mm​=m+δm​(w−c) to the manufacturer,Rr​=r+δr​(p−w) to the retailer,

where mmm and rrr are the parties' return-processing costs and δm\delta_mδm​, δr\delta_rδr​ are the unit sale impacts of avoiding the return (p. 381). Both are assumed positive.

The retailer chooses an effort ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 at cost aρ2/2a\rho^2/2aρ2/2, a>0a > 0a>0. At effort ρ\rhoρ the number of false failures is a nonnegative random variable X(ρ)X(\rho)X(ρ) with mean β/ρ\beta/\rhoβ/ρ, where β>0\beta > 0β>0 is the expected number at the minimum effort ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1. The coordinated supply chain earns

Π(ρ)=(Mm+Rr) β(1−1ρ)−aρ22,\Pi(\rho) = (M_m + R_r)\,\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big) - \frac{a\rho^2}{2},Π(ρ)=(Mm​+Rr​)β(1−ρ1​)−2aρ2​,

maximized at the coordinated effort ρC=[(Mm+Rr)β/a]1/3\rho^C = [(M_m + R_r)\beta/a]^{1/3}ρC=[(Mm​+Rr​)β/a]1/3. Without a contract the retailer earns πR(ρ)=−aρ2/2+Rrβ(1−1/ρ)\pi_R(\rho) = -a\rho^2/2 + R_r\beta(1 - 1/\rho)πR​(ρ)=−aρ2/2+Rr​β(1−1/ρ) and chooses the decentralized effort ρD=max⁡{(Rrβ/a)1/3,1}\rho^D = \max\{(R_r\beta/a)^{1/3}, 1\}ρD=max{(Rr​β/a)1/3,1}; the manufacturer then earns πM(ρD)=Mmβ(1−1/ρD)\pi_M(\rho^D) = M_m\beta(1 - 1/\rho^D)πM​(ρD)=Mm​β(1−1/ρD).

Under a target rebate contract (u,T)(u, T)(u,T) the retailer receives uuu for every false failure below the target TTT, so the profits become

πR(ρ∣T,u)=u E{[T−X(ρ)]+}−aρ22+Rrβ(1−1ρ),πM(ρ∣T,u)=Mmβ(1−1ρ)−u E{[T−X(ρ)]+}.\pi_R(\rho \mid T, u) = u\,E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\} - \frac{a\rho^2}{2} + R_r\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big),\qquad \pi_M(\rho \mid T, u) = M_m\beta\Big(1 - \frac1\rho\Big) - u\,E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\}.πR​(ρ∣T,u)=uE{[T−X(ρ)]+}−2aρ2​+Rr​β(1−ρ1​),πM​(ρ∣T,u)=Mm​β(1−ρ1​)−uE{[T−X(ρ)]+}.

The contract coordinates the supply chain when ρC\rho^CρC maximizes πR(⋅∣T,u)\pi_R(\cdot \mid T, u)πR​(⋅∣T,u) over ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1. In the uniform case of §3.1, X(ρ)∼Uniform(0,2β/ρ)X(\rho) \sim \mathrm{Uniform}(0, 2\beta/\rho)X(ρ)∼Uniform(0,2β/ρ), and the contract must satisfy T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 383)

Assume a,β,Mm,Rr>0a, \beta, M_m, R_r > 0a,β,Mm​,Rr​>0 and (Mm+Rr)β>a(M_m + R_r)\beta > a(Mm​+Rr​)β>a, and let X(ρ)X(\rho)X(ρ) be uniform. For every coordinating contract (u,T)(u, T)(u,T) with u>0u > 0u>0, 0<T<2β/ρC0 < T < 2\beta/\rho^C0<T<2β/ρC,

πR(ρC∣T,u)≥πR(ρD)and(πM(ρC∣T,u)≥πM(ρD)  ⟺  ρC≥2ρD).\pi_R(\rho^C \mid T, u) \ge \pi_R(\rho^D) \qquad\text{and}\qquad \Big(\pi_M(\rho^C \mid T, u) \ge \pi_M(\rho^D) \iff \rho^C \ge 2\rho^D\Big).πR​(ρC∣T,u)≥πR​(ρD)and(πM​(ρC∣T,u)≥πM​(ρD)⟺ρC≥2ρD).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's §3–§3.1 and the appendix proof, in attack order: concavity of Π\PiΠ and optimality of ρC\rho^CρC (Eqs. (1)–(2)); ρC>1\rho^C > 1ρC>1 in the interesting case; optimality of ρD\rho^DρD (Eqs. (3)–(4)); ρC≥ρD\rho^C \ge \rho^DρC≥ρD; Proposition 1 (concavity of the retailer's rebate profit when ∂2F(x∣ρ)/∂ρ2≤0\partial^2 F(x\mid\rho)/\partial\rho^2 \le 0∂2F(x∣ρ)/∂ρ2≤0); its uniform instance; the uniform closed form (8); the first-order condition (9); the coordinating target (10) together with the admissibility condition u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​; the manufacturer's profit Mmβ(ρC−2)/ρCM_m\beta(\rho^C - 2)/\rho^CMm​β(ρC−2)/ρC under a coordinating contract (25); the retailer's profit (27); and the retailer's gain in the two cases ρD>1\rho^D > 1ρD>1 (30) and ρD=1\rho^D = 1ρD=1 (31).

Significance

The result divides the effect of the contract between the two parties. The retailer is always at least as well off as without a contract; the manufacturer, who pays the rebate, gains exactly when the supply chain's optimal effort is at least twice what the retailer would exert alone. When ρD>1\rho^D > 1ρD>1 this is equivalent to Mm≥7RrM_m \ge 7R_rMm​≥7Rr​ (p. 383), so a target rebate pays for the manufacturer only when its own stake in avoiding a false failure dwarfs the retailer's. The companion result (10) shows that for every rebate u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​ exactly one admissible coordinating target exists, and none for u≤Mmu \le M_mu≤Mm​: a coordinating rebate is always larger than the manufacturer's own cost of a return.

The results are proved in the paper by calculus and algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof that we know of, and nothing on Prove2Me models non-contractible effort or target rebates. The mission produces a checked version of the paper's model with the expectation taken as a genuine integral against the uniform law, a formal notion of coordination as the retailer's optimization, and statements that make explicit which hypotheses each step of the appendix uses. The definitions of effort-dependent profits and coordination are reusable for other effort-inducing contracts in the same paper and in the sales-effort literature.

Difficulty

The algebra of the appendix is short once the first-order condition (9) holds at ρC\rho^CρC. The substance is getting there. Coordination is defined by optimality of ρC\rho^CρC for the retailer's profit, and that profit involves the expectation E{[T−X(ρ)]+}E\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\}E{[T−X(ρ)]+}, which is piecewise in ρ\rhoρ: it equals T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β only while T≤2β/ρT \le 2\beta/\rhoT≤2β/ρ, and T−β/ρT - \beta/\rhoT−β/ρ beyond. Deriving (9) requires showing that ρC\rho^CρC is an interior maximizer, that the expectation is differentiable there with the closed-form derivative, and that the side condition T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC keeps ρC\rho^CρC in the closed-form region. The converse direction of (10), that the formula for TTT produces a coordinating contract, needs concavity of the piecewise profit on all of ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1, which is where Proposition 1 enters.

Replacing the expectation by the global formula T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β is the tempting shortcut and it changes the problem: for ρ>2β/T\rho > 2\beta/Tρ>2β/T the formula exceeds the true expectation, and the retailer's maximizer, hence the meaning of "coordinates", changes with it.

Formalization scope

All parameters are real numbers, bundled in a structure Params; MmM_mMm​ and RrR_rRr​ are Params.Mm and Params.Rr. Effort ranges over ρ≥1\rho \ge 1ρ≥1 (Set.Ici 1); statements the paper makes for every positive effort (concavity of Π\PiΠ, the closed form (8)) are stated on ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0. Cube roots are Real.rpow with exponent 1/31/31/3 on positive bases. The uniform law is Lebesgue measure conditioned on [0,2β/ρ][0, 2\beta/\rho][0,2β/ρ], and the expectation is the Bochner integral against it. Coordination is IsMaxOn of the retailer's profit on Set.Ici 1 at ρC\rho^CρC.

Three conventions differ from the printed text, each recorded in the item's formalization note:

  1. The interesting case is printed as (m+r)β>a(m + r)\beta > a(m+r)β>a; the condition equivalent to the stated consequence ρC>1\rho^C > 1ρC>1, which the proof uses, is (Mm+Rr)β>a(M_m + R_r)\beta > a(Mm​+Rr​)β>a. The formalization uses the latter.
  2. The printed evaluation EX{[T−X(ρ)]+}=u∫0T(T−x)(ρ/2β) dxE_X\{[T - X(\rho)]^+\} = u\int_0^T (T - x)(\rho/2\beta)\,dxEX​{[T−X(ρ)]+}=u∫0T​(T−x)(ρ/2β)dx carries a stray factor uuu; the expectation is T2ρ/4βT^2\rho/4\betaT2ρ/4β.
  3. Proposition 1 is stated for an arbitrary family of probability laws on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) whose distribution functions are C2C^2C2 in ρ\rhoρ with nonpositive second derivative for x∈[0,T]x \in [0,T]x∈[0,T]; the paper's further assumptions on FFF (differentiable, strictly increasing in xxx, mean β/ρ\beta/\rhoβ/ρ) are not imposed.

The side condition T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC of §3.1 is a hypothesis of the goal and of the appendix milestones; without it a coordinating contract with u=Mmu = M_mu=Mm​ exists and the "if" direction fails. The unused page assertion δr<δm<1\delta_r < \delta_m < 1δr​<δm​<1 is not imposed.

The goal is not trivialized by its coordination hypothesis: coordination is the retailer's optimization over the true profit, and milestone (10) shows that coordinating contracts with T<2β/ρCT < 2\beta/\rho^CT<2β/ρC exist for every u>Mmu > M_mu>Mm​, so the hypotheses are satisfiable (Example 1 of the paper, p. 384, is an instance). The retailer half of the goal is comparatively short under this definition of coordination; that is a property of the paper's theorem, not of the encoding. The manufacturer half needs (8), (9) and (25).

The development needs only Mathlib: real calculus (derivatives, concavity, Real.rpow) and Lebesgue integration against a conditioned Lebesgue measure. The model definitions (effort-dependent profits, coordination as the retailer's optimization) are reusable for the paper's other effort-inducing contracts. Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on expectations of [T−X]+[T - X]^+[T−X]+ under uniform laws.

Selected references

  • M. Ferguson, V. D. R. Guide Jr., G. C. Souza, Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 8(4):376–393, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1060.0112
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, Elsevier, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8):992–1007, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
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Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 1: Under Production Diseconomy the Retailer Earns More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers hold point-of-sale data that their suppliers cannot observe, and large retailers sell access to it through data-sharing programs (Costco's CRX, Walmart's Retail Link and similar programs). When one retailer carries the substitutable products of two competing manufacturers, sharing its demand information is a strategic decision: a manufacturer who knows the demand signal sets his wholesale price in response to it, which changes the retailer's margin and the rival manufacturer's order uncertainty. Whether the retailer should sell the information, to how many manufacturers, and by which protocol, is the question of Shang, Ha and Tong (Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016).

The paper belongs to the information-sharing literature of Li (2002), Li and Zhang (2008) and Ha, Tong and Zhang (2011), which studies competing supply chains or a single chain. The common-retailer structure differs: the retailer can price-discriminate between the manufacturers through the order in which she offers the information.

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{1,2}i \in \{1, 2\}i∈{1,2} sell substitutable products through one retailer. The demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition, and θ\thetaθ is a random shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY that is unbiased, E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ, and has linear expectation: E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY for a weight β\betaβ (in the paper β=tσ2/(1+tσ2)\beta = t\sigma^2/(1+t\sigma^2)β=tσ2/(1+tσ2), with ttt the signal accuracy). The retailing cost is zero, and manufacturer iii produces qqq units at cost bq+cdq2bq + c_d q^2bq+cd​q2 with b,cd>0b, c_d > 0b,cd​>0: a production diseconomy.

The game has four stages.

  1. The retailer and the manufacturers contract on information sharing, which fixes each manufacturer's status Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U} (informed or uninformed).
  2. The retailer observes YYY and discloses it truthfully to the informed manufacturers.
  3. The manufacturers set wholesale prices wiw_iwi​ simultaneously, an informed one as a function of YYY. The retailer then sets retail prices.
  4. Demand realizes and payoffs are received.

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game. Its equilibrium ex ante profits are πM(n)\pi_M(n)πM​(n), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1) for the manufacturers and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, where nnn is the number of informed manufacturers. They define a payoff table for the contracting stage.

Two contracting protocols are compared.

  • Concurrent contracting: the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment TTT, and they accept or reject simultaneously; a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium is the outcome, and the retailer chooses TTT.
  • Sequential contracting: the retailer offers one manufacturer TfT_fTf​, he accepts or rejects, then the retailer offers the other TsT_sTs​, and he decides having observed the first decision. The retailer cannot commit to Ts=TfT_s = T_fTs​=Tf​, and the solution is subgame perfect equilibrium.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0, cd>0c_d > 0cd​>0 and every signal model, the pricing stage has an equilibrium; for every pricing equilibrium, both contracting games have equilibria; and for every concurrent outcome and every sequential subgame-perfect equilibrium (either first mover),

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^{C} \le \Pi_R^{S}, \qquad \Pi_M^{S} \le \Pi_M^{C},ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

with both inequalities strict when cd>(2−1)/(1+ϕ)c_d > (\sqrt2 - 1)/(1+\phi)cd​>(2​−1)/(1+ϕ). Here ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The paper's word "higher" is read as ≥\ge≥ because for small cdc_dcd​ neither protocol sells information and all profits coincide.

Milestones

  1. §4.1, Eq. (1): the retailer's best response p^i=12(a+βY+wi)\hat p_i = \frac12(a + \beta Y + w_i)p^​i​=21​(a+βY+wi​) and the resulting demand.
  2. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists, is unique, and is linear in YYY.
  3. §4.2: the closed forms of the seven ex ante profits.
  4. Lemma 3: πM(2)>πMI(1)>πM(0)>πMU(1)\pi_M(2) > \pi_M^I(1) > \pi_M(0) > \pi_M^U(1)πM​(2)>πMI​(1)>πM​(0)>πMU​(1), πR(0)>πR(1)>πR(2)\pi_R(0) > \pi_R(1) > \pi_R(2)πR​(0)>πR​(1)>πR​(2), πR(1)−πR(2)>πR(0)−πR(1)\pi_R(1) - \pi_R(2) > \pi_R(0) - \pi_R(1)πR​(1)−πR​(2)>πR​(0)−πR​(1).
  5. Proposition 1(b): without contracting, no information is shared.
  6. Propositions 2 and 3: thresholds cdCc_d^CcdC​ and cdS1,cdS2c_d^{S1}, c_d^{S2}cdS1​,cdS2​, depending only on ϕ\phiϕ, at which the number of informed manufacturers changes under each protocol.
  7. Proposition 4(a): cdS1<cdC<cdS2c_d^{S1} < c_d^C < c_d^{S2}cdS1​<cdC​<cdS2​.

Significance

The result. Proposition 4(d) says that the order of the offers transfers surplus: selling information one manufacturer at a time lets the retailer exploit the manufacturers' fear of being the only uninformed firm, which raises her profit and lowers theirs. Propositions 2 and 3 show that concurrent contracting shares with both manufacturers or with neither, while sequential contracting can end with only one informed manufacturer. Together they give a complete map of the equilibrium sharing decisions in (cd,ϕ)(c_d, \phi)(cd​,ϕ) (Figure 1 of the paper).

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it can be shown" and "straightforward" steps: Lemma 3's proof is omitted, and so is the convexity of the function whose root is cdS2c_d^{S2}cdS2​. No part of the paper has a machine-checked proof. A complete formalization would check every such step and make the equilibrium notions precise, in particular the Pareto selection and the tie-breaking at the thresholds, where the retailer is exactly indifferent.

Difficulty

Most of the work is in the contracting stage, not the algebra. The pricing stage must be solved over all square-integrable strategies measurable in the signal. Uniqueness is then almost sure and rests on the linear-expectation identities E[θY]=σ2E[\theta Y] = \sigma^2E[θY]=σ2 and E[Y2]=σ2/βE[Y^2] = \sigma^2/\betaE[Y2]=σ2/β. The concurrent game has multiple equilibria for intermediate payments, and the retailer's optimum lies at a payment where two equilibria coexist. The sequential game is a three-stage game with a continuum of offers: at each threshold the retailer is indifferent, and an SPE exists only if acceptance at indifference is chosen correctly. The threshold cdS2c_d^{S2}cdS2​ has no closed form; it is the root of a convex rational function of cdc_dcd​.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace InfoSharing.Diseconomy. Conventions:

  • The probability space carries θ\thetaθ and YYY in L2L^2L2, with the two conditional-expectation identities holding almost everywhere. β\betaβ is a parameter fixed by E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY; Ericson's formula for β\betaβ is not formalized.
  • Wholesale strategies are measurable, square-integrable functions of the signal value, and constants for an uninformed manufacturer. A pricing equilibrium is ex ante optimality over such strategies, which is equivalent to the paper's conditional optimization. The retailer's rule must be a best response at every wholesale-price pair.
  • The payoff table is produced by an arbitrary pricing-equilibrium family, not by the §4.2 closed forms. A formalization that takes the closed forms as the definition of the profits would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out.
  • Payments are nonnegative, only pure strategies are used in the contracting games, and the concurrent outcome selects, among Pareto-optimal equilibria, the one best for the retailer.
  • Threshold statements use two clauses: the printed value is attained on the closed region, and it is the only value on the region's interior. The thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ.
  • Demands may be negative (θ is unbounded), as in the paper's formulas.

A complete development needs:

  • the conditional-expectation algebra behind Lemma 1 and §4.2;
  • rational-function inequalities for Lemma 3;
  • a case analysis of the two contracting games.

The model layer is shared with the companion mission on production economy.

Selected references

  • G. Shang, A. Y. Ha, S. Tong, Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • W. A. Ericson, A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969.
  • L. Li, Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
  • L. Li, H. Zhang, Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination, Management Science 54(8):1467–1481, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0851
  • A. Y. Ha, S. Tong, H. Zhang, Sharing imperfect demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies, Management Science 57(3):566–581, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1295
  • X. Vives, Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999.
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Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies I: The Renewal Closed Form for the Discounted Cost of a Stationary (s, S) PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

The periodic-review inventory problem with a fixed ordering cost is one of the basic models of operations research. A firm reviews its stock once per period, may order at a cost KKK per order plus a unit cost, and then faces a random demand; unmet demand is backlogged. Scarf (1960) and Iglehart (1963) showed that for this model an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is optimal: order up to SSS whenever the stock falls below sss, and otherwise do nothing. That result tells a manager what shape a good policy has, but not which pair (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) to use.

Veinott and Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies (Management Science 11 (1965) 525–552), gave the first practical algorithm for computing an optimal pair when demand is discrete. The algorithm rests on a closed form, their Eq. (11), for the discounted cost of an arbitrary stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy, obtained by a renewal argument in their Section 3. The same closed form, in the undiscounted limit, is the classical expression of the long-run average cost of an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy used throughout inventory theory textbooks.

Timeline:

  • 1958: Arrow, Karlin and Scarf collect the early dynamic inventory models.
  • 1960: Scarf proves optimality of (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies in the finite-horizon model via KKK-convexity.
  • 1963: Iglehart extends optimality to the infinite-horizon model.
  • 1965: Veinott and Wagner derive the renewal closed form (10)–(11) and the bounds and search procedure built on it.

Setting

Demands ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1, \xi_2, \dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… are independent random variables on {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} with common distribution φ\varphiφ, φ(k)=Pr⁡(ξt=k)\varphi(k) = \Pr(\xi_t = k)φ(k)=Pr(ξt​=k). Write φi\varphi^iφi for the iii-fold convolution of φ\varphiφ (φ0\varphi^0φ0 is the point mass at 000) and Φi(k)=∑t=0kφi(t)\Phi^i(k) = \sum_{t=0}^{k}\varphi^i(t)Φi(k)=∑t=0k​φi(t) for its distribution function, so Φ0≡1\Phi^0 \equiv 1Φ0≡1.

In period ttt the stock before ordering is Xt∈ZX_t \in \mathbb ZXt​∈Z and the stock after ordering is Yt≥XtY_t \ge X_tYt​≥Xt​; then Xt+1=Yt−ξtX_{t+1} = Y_t - \xi_tXt+1​=Yt​−ξt​. With the unit purchase cost eliminated as in the paper's Eq. (2), the cost of period ttt is Kδ(Yt−Xt)+Gα(Yt)K\delta(Y_t - X_t) + G_\alpha(Y_t)Kδ(Yt​−Xt​)+Gα​(Yt​), where K≥0K \ge 0K≥0 is the set-up cost, δ(0)=0\delta(0) = 0δ(0)=0, δ(z)=1\delta(z) = 1δ(z)=1 for z>0z > 0z>0, and Gα:Z→RG_\alpha : \mathbb Z \to \mathbb RGα​:Z→R is the one-period cost. Period ttt is discounted by αt−1\alpha^{t-1}αt−1 with 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1.

A stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy, for integers s≤Ss \le Ss≤S, sets Yt=SY_t = SYt​=S if Xt<sX_t < sXt​<s and Yt=XtY_t = X_tYt​=Xt​ otherwise. Its total expected discounted cost from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x is

f(x∣s,S)=∑t=1∞αt−1E[Kδ(Yt−Xt)+Gα(Yt)],f(x \mid s, S) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \alpha^{t-1} E\bigl[K\delta(Y_t - X_t) + G_\alpha(Y_t)\bigr],f(x∣s,S)=t=1∑∞​αt−1E[Kδ(Yt​−Xt​)+Gα​(Yt​)],

and its equivalent cost per period is aα(x∣s,S)=(1−α)f(x∣s,S)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S) = (1 - \alpha) f(x \mid s, S)aα​(x∣s,S)=(1−α)f(x∣s,S).

The renewal quantities are

mα(k)=∑i=1∞αiφi(k),Mα(k)=∑i=1∞αiΦi(k),m_\alpha(k) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\alpha^i\varphi^i(k), \qquad M_\alpha(k) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\alpha^i\Phi^i(k),mα​(k)=i=1∑∞​αiφi(k),Mα​(k)=i=1∑∞​αiΦi(k),

the latter being the discount renewal function,

Lα(x,d)=Gα(x)+∑i=1∞∑k=0dαiGα(x−k)φi(k),rα(d)=∑i=1∞αi[Φi−1(d)−Φi(d)].L_\alpha(x, d) = G_\alpha(x) + \sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\sum_{k=0}^{d}\alpha^i G_\alpha(x - k)\varphi^i(k), \qquad r_\alpha(d) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\alpha^i\bigl[\Phi^{i-1}(d) - \Phi^i(d)\bigr].Lα​(x,d)=Gα​(x)+i=1∑∞​k=0∑d​αiGα​(x−k)φi(k),rα​(d)=i=1∑∞​αi[Φi−1(d)−Φi(d)].

If T(d)T(d)T(d) is the first period in which cumulative demand exceeds ddd, then Lα(x,d)L_\alpha(x, d)Lα​(x,d) is the expected discounted one-period cost over periods 1,…,T(d)1, \dots, T(d)1,…,T(d) from stock xxx without ordering, and rα(d)=E[αT(d)]r_\alpha(d) = E[\alpha^{T(d)}]rα​(d)=E[αT(d)].

Formalization targets

Goal: Eq. (11)

With D=S−sD = S - sD=S−s,

aα(x∣s,S)={Lα(S,D)+K1+Mα(D)x<s,(1−α)Lα(x,x−s)+Lα(S,D)+K1+Mα(D) rα(x−s)x≥s.a_\alpha(x \mid s, S) = \begin{cases} \dfrac{L_\alpha(S, D) + K}{1 + M_\alpha(D)} & x < s, \\[2ex] (1 - \alpha)L_\alpha(x, x - s) + \dfrac{L_\alpha(S, D) + K}{1 + M_\alpha(D)}\, r_\alpha(x - s) & x \ge s. \end{cases}aα​(x∣s,S)=⎩⎨⎧​1+Mα​(D)Lα​(S,D)+K​(1−α)Lα​(x,x−s)+1+Mα​(D)Lα​(S,D)+K​rα​(x−s)​x<s,x≥s.​

Milestones

  1. Appendix §1: Mα(k)<∞M_\alpha(k) < \inftyMα​(k)<∞ for 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1 with αφ(0)<1\alpha\varphi(0) < 1αφ(0)<1.
  2. Eq. (8): Lα(x,d)=Gα(x)+∑j=0dGα(x−j)mα(j)L_\alpha(x, d) = G_\alpha(x) + \sum_{j=0}^{d} G_\alpha(x - j)m_\alpha(j)Lα​(x,d)=Gα​(x)+∑j=0d​Gα​(x−j)mα​(j).
  3. Eq. (9): rα(d)=α−(1−α)Mα(d)r_\alpha(d) = \alpha - (1 - \alpha)M_\alpha(d)rα​(d)=α−(1−α)Mα​(d).
  4. The renewal equation f(S)=Lα(S,D)+Krα(D)+f(S)rα(D)f(S) = L_\alpha(S, D) + Kr_\alpha(D) + f(S)r_\alpha(D)f(S)=Lα​(S,D)+Krα​(D)+f(S)rα​(D).
  5. f(x)=K+f(S)f(x) = K + f(S)f(x)=K+f(S) for x<sx < sx<s.
  6. f(x)=Lα(x,x−s)+Krα(x−s)+f(S)rα(x−s)f(x) = L_\alpha(x, x - s) + Kr_\alpha(x - s) + f(S)r_\alpha(x - s)f(x)=Lα​(x,x−s)+Krα​(x−s)+f(S)rα​(x−s) for x≥sx \ge sx≥s.
  7. Eq. (10): the closed form of fff with denominator 1−rα(D)1 - r_\alpha(D)1−rα​(D).

Significance

Eq. (11) turns the cost of an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy, an infinite series over the trajectories of a controlled Markov chain, into a finite expression in GαG_\alphaGα​, KKK and the renewal sequence mαm_\alphamα​, which the paper computes by a one-line recursion. Everything in the paper's Section 4 builds on it: the search for an optimal pair minimizes aα(⋅∣s,S)a_\alpha(\cdot \mid s, S)aα​(⋅∣s,S) over a finite box, and the undiscounted limit α→1\alpha \to 1α→1 gives the long-run average cost (L1(S,D)+K)/(1+M1(D))(L_1(S, D) + K)/(1 + M_1(D))(L1​(S,D)+K)/(1+M1​(D)).

The result is classical and proved in the paper. What this mission adds is a machine-checked derivation from the definition of the policy's expected cost, including the renewal step, which the paper states in one sentence ("a renewal of the process takes place"). It also produces a reusable Lean layer: discrete convolution powers, the discount renewal function, and the law of an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S)-controlled inventory chain. To the best of our knowledge none of these is formalized in Mathlib or on the platform.

Difficulty

The paper's argument conditions on the random time T(D)T(D)T(D) at which the process renews and uses the strong Markov property at that time. In the formalization, fff is defined as a sum over periods of expectations under the law of XtX_tXt​. Relating that sum to one that splits at the random time T(D)T(D)T(D) requires either a stopping-time decomposition of the chain or an explicit accounting of the law of XtX_tXt​ before and after the first order. Neither is a direct computation. A second difficulty is the interchange of the infinite sum over periods with the sum over states y∈Zy \in \mathbb Zy∈Z, which has infinitely many states reachable (demand is unbounded below). The renewal equation (milestone 4) alone does not determine f(S)f(S)f(S) without the fact that rα(D)<1r_\alpha(D) < 1rα​(D)<1 for α<1\alpha < 1α<1, which comes from (9).

Formalization scope

  • Namespace VeinottWagnerSS.RenewalCost. Stock levels are integers, demands natural numbers; x−sx - sx−s and D=S−sD = S - sD=S−s enter LαL_\alphaLα​, MαM_\alphaMα​, rαr_\alpharα​ through Int.toNat, which is exact because the statements assume s≤xs \le xs≤x or s≤Ss \le Ss≤S.
  • Reduced model. The primitives are GαG_\alphaGα​, KKK, α\alphaα and φ\varphiφ, as in the paper's Eq. (2): the unit purchase cost is set to 000 and the holding–penalty cost is replaced by GαG_\alphaGα​.
  • Demand is a real function φ:N→R\varphi : \mathbb N \to \mathbb Rφ:N→R, non-negative and summing to 111.
  • The cost fff is the expected discounted cost of the controlled chain: the law of XtX_tXt​ is built recursively from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x and the transition Pr⁡(Xt+1=z∣Xt=y)=φ(Y(y)−z)\Pr(X_{t+1} = z \mid X_t = y) = \varphi(Y(y) - z)Pr(Xt+1​=z∣Xt​=y)=φ(Y(y)−z). It is not defined by (10) or by the renewal equations, and not as the solution of a fixed-point equation. A formalization in which any of milestones 4–7 or the goal holds by definition is ruled out.
  • Series are real tsums. LαL_\alphaLα​ is defined by the series (7) and rαr_\alpharα​ by the first line of (9), i.e. through the law Pr⁡[T(d)=i]=Φi−1(d)−Φi(d)\Pr[T(d) = i] = \Phi^{i-1}(d) - \Phi^i(d)Pr[T(d)=i]=Φi−1(d)−Φi(d); the paper's derivations of these series from T(d)T(d)T(d) are not formalized. For α<1\alpha < 1α<1 all series converge for every GαG_\alphaGα​, because after period 111 the stock after ordering lies in the finite set {S}∪[s,max⁡(x,S)]\{S\} \cup [s, \max(x, S)]{S}∪[s,max(x,S)].
  • Hypotheses. Milestones 1–3 assume 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1 and αφ(0)<1\alpha\varphi(0) < 1αφ(0)<1, the paper's standing assumption on p. 533. Milestones 4–7 and the goal assume 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1, K≥0K \ge 0K≥0 and s≤Ss \le Ss≤S. The paper's standing assumptions that GαG_\alphaGα​ is convex and tends to +∞+\infty+∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞ are not imposed: the statements hold for every GαG_\alphaGα​ when α<1\alpha < 1α<1, and the paper's derivation does not use them. This is a disclosed generalization.
  • Printed slips. None found in the formalized statements.
  • Not formalized: the recursion (A1) for mαm_\alphamα​, the limit (12) as α→1\alpha \to 1α→1, and the stationary analysis (13)–(20).

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas on discrete renewal sequences and convolution powers, and a first-passage decomposition for integer-valued Markov chains, which is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott Jr. and H. M. Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(5), 525–552, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.5.525
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2), 259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
  • K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

Motivation

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this decision for thousands of items. The practical rule used everywhere is the order-up-to (base-stock) rule: bring the inventory position up to a fixed target level whenever it falls below it, and order nothing otherwise. Chapter 2 of the book justifies this rule for a single item with linear costs, following the dynamic-programming argument of Karlin and Scarf, and the rest of the book takes the rule as given.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak posed the periodic-review inventory problem as a dynamic program in 1951 (Econometrica). Bellman, Glicksberg and Gross showed in 1955 that with linear ordering cost and convex expected holding and shortage costs the optimal policy has a critical-number form (Management Science). Karlin and Scarf (1958) extended the analysis to a positive lead time, the setting of the book's Theorems 1–3. Veinott (1965) gave conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal in multi-product, nonstationary models (Management Science).

Setting

One item is stocked at one location. At the start of each period the inventory position yyy is observed and a quantity u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 is ordered; with lead time one period it arrives at the start of the next period. Demand in each period is independent of other periods and has a density ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) that is positive and continuous. Unmet demand is backordered. Costs are linear: ccc per unit ordered, hhh per unit on hand at the end of a period, bbb per unit backordered at the end of a period, and future costs are discounted by α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1). The one-period cost is

L(y)={h∫0y(y−x)g(x) dx+b∫y∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y>0,b∫0∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y≤0.L(y) = \begin{cases} h\displaystyle\int_0^y (y-x)g(x)\,dx + b\int_y^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y > 0,\\[1mm] b\displaystyle\int_0^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y \le 0. \end{cases}L(y)=⎩⎨⎧​h∫0y​(y−x)g(x)dx+b∫y∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,b∫0∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,​y>0,y≤0.​

The book assumes throughout that b>1−αα cb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\,cb>α1−α​c: the backorder cost outweighs the saving from deferring a purchase.

The nnn-period value functions are f1=Lf_1 = Lf1​=L and, for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2,

fn(y)=min⁡u≥0{c u+L(y)+α∫0∞fn−1(y+u−x) g(x) dx}.f_n(y) = \min_{u \ge 0}\Big\{ c\,u + L(y) + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}(y+u-x)\,g(x)\,dx \Big\}.fn​(y)=u≥0min​{cu+L(y)+α∫0∞​fn−1​(y+u−x)g(x)dx}.

An order uuu is optimal at yyy if it attains this minimum over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0. The order-up-to rule with level sss orders u(y)=max⁡{0,s−y}u(y) = \max\{0, s-y\}u(y)=max{0,s−y}. The marginal function of eq. (2.8) is Fn(w)=c+α∫0∞fn′(w−x) g(x) dxF_n(w) = c + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_n'(w-x)\,g(x)\,dxFn​(w)=c+α∫0∞​fn′​(w−x)g(x)dx. In Lean these are Model, Model.L, Model.f, Model.IsOptimalOrder, Model.IsOrderUpToOptimal and Model.F in the namespace ServiceParts.BaseStock.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18) in its nnn-period form

For every horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, either there is a real level sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ with

un∗(y)=max⁡{0, sn∗−y} optimal for every y,u_n^*(y) = \max\{0,\ s_n^* - y\} \ \text{optimal for every } y,un∗​(y)=max{0, sn∗​−y} optimal for every y,

or ordering nothing is optimal for every yyy (level −∞-\infty−∞); and there is N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 such that the level is real for all n≥Nn \ge Nn≥N. No value of sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is fixed: the goal asserts the shape of the optimal policy only.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. LLL is convex (p. 21).
  2. Every fnf_nfn​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, is convex (p. 19, property (c)).
  3. Every fnf_nfn​ is differentiable with −(c+b)≤fn′≤h/(1−α)-(c+b) \le f_n' \le h/(1-\alpha)−(c+b)≤fn′​≤h/(1−α) (p. 20).
  4. Property (b): given an optimal real level sss for horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, fn′=−c+L′f_n' = -c + L'fn′​=−c+L′ below sss and fn′=L′+α∫0∞fn−1′(⋅−x)g(x) dxf_n' = L' + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}'(\cdot - x)g(x)\,dxfn′​=L′+α∫0∞​fn−1′​(⋅−x)g(x)dx from sss on (p. 19).
  5. Given such a level, Fn(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0F_n(w) \to (1-\alpha)c - b\alpha < 0Fn​(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0 as w→−∞w \to -\inftyw→−∞ (p. 19).
  6. Property (a): optimal real levels are nondecreasing in the horizon, sn∗≤sn+1∗s_n^* \le s_{n+1}^*sn∗​≤sn+1∗​ (p. 18).

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-dimensional control problem, a choice of order quantity for every possible inventory position, to one number per period. Every later chapter of the book (Palm's theorem for (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) policies, METRIC-type stock level optimization, allocation in multi-echelon systems) parameterizes policies by such stock levels; this is where the book justifies that parameterization.

The result is classical and proved in many texts. On Prove2Me the mission produces a machine-checked finite-horizon version with a continuous demand density, including the calculus the proof needs: convexity of an expected cost defined by integrals against a density, differentiation under the integral sign in the recursion, and the one-sided behaviour of the value function at the order-up-to level. Existing platform results on base-stock optimality (Veinott's multi-product model, advance demand information) use different models and different arguments; none covers this recursion.

Difficulty

The argument is an induction on nnn whose hypothesis carries convexity, the derivative formula (b), and bounds on fn′f_n'fn′​. The delicate step is the existence of a finite root of FnF_nFn​: its limit at −∞-\infty−∞ depends on whether the previous level was finite. For n=1n = 1n=1 nothing is ordered and the limit is c−bαc - b\alphac−bα, which the assumption b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c does not make negative. The book's base case ("left to the reader") therefore fails when c>αbc > \alpha bc>αb: with α=12\alpha = \tfrac12α=21​, c=1c = 1c=1, b=32b = \tfrac32b=23​ the two-period problem never orders. The goal is corrected accordingly.

Two properties the book's induction also carries are not usable as printed. Property (d), fn′≤fn−1′f_n' \le f_{n-1}'fn′​≤fn−1′​, is false: for large yyy, fn′(y)f_n'(y)fn′​(y) approaches h(1+α+⋯+αn−1)h(1 + \alpha + \dots + \alpha^{n-1})h(1+α+⋯+αn−1), which increases with nnn. The second-derivative clause of property (c) fails at y=0y = 0y=0 whenever g(0+)>0g(0^+) > 0g(0+)>0. A solver cannot follow the printed induction step for step; property (a), which the book derives from (d), is true and is a milestone in its own right.

Formalization scope

  • Horizon. The book states Theorem 2 for "the optimal policy" without a horizon. Its proof is an induction on a finite horizon, and the passage n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ is left as a conjecture (p. 21). The goal is the finite-horizon theorem; no infinite-horizon value function is constructed.
  • Lead time. The proof sets τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 "to simplify notation"; so does the formalization. Theorem 1 (dependence on the inventory position only) and Theorem 3 (general τ\tauτ, whose level equation is the conjectured infinite-horizon one) are not stated.
  • Level −∞-\infty−∞. The goal allows "never order" as the order-up-to rule with level −∞-\infty−∞ and adds eventual finiteness; see Difficulty.
  • Added hypotheses. c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, h>0h > 0h>0 (the book uses lim⁡w→∞fn′(w−x)>0\lim_{w\to\infty} f_n'(w - x) > 0limw→∞​fn′​(w−x)>0), 0<α0 < \alpha0<α (the book divides by α\alphaα), and a finite mean ∫0∞x g(x) dx<∞\int_0^\infty x\,g(x)\,dx < \infty∫0∞​xg(x)dx<∞ (without it LLL is infinite). All are fields of Model, together with positivity and continuity of ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), ∫0∞g=1\int_0^\infty g = 1∫0∞​g=1, and b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c.
  • Minimum and derivatives. fnf_nfn​ is defined with the infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 of a nonnegative quantity; optimality is always against every u′≥0u' \ge 0u′≥0. Statements about fn′f_n'fn′​ assert differentiability (Differentiable, HasDerivAt) and do not read deriv as evidence of it.
  • Levels. The book's sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is "the unique solution of (2.6)"; milestones take any real level at which the order-up-to rule is optimal.

A recursion in which ordering is restricted to order-up-to rules, or in which fnf_nfn​ is defined through sn∗s_n^*sn∗​, would make the goal a tautology; here fnf_nfn​ is defined by minimization over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 and optimality is checked against all orders.

Needed infrastructure: convexity and differentiation of parametric integrals against a density on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and minimization of a differentiable convex function over a half-line. Both are reusable for the other stochastic inventory missions on the platform. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI).
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris and J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906814
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains V: Marginal Allocation and Risk PoolingTextbook

Motivation

Service parts networks (spare parts for aircraft, military systems, industrial equipment) hold stock at several echelons: a depot, intermediate stocking facilities, and bases or warehouses that face demand. Two questions recur in their planning. First, how should a given amount of stock be split among locations whose expected costs are convex in the stock they hold? Second, does adding an echelon, a depot that pools the demand of several warehouses, raise or lower the stock the system needs?

Chapter 7 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879), treats both. For the second it follows Eppen and Schrage (1981, reference [78] of the book): with normal demands, a depot that places orders every period and allocates stock so that all warehouses face the same stockout probability reduces the choice of system stock to a single critical-fractile equation. For the first, the chapter's multi-echelon pooling model (Section 7.3) evaluates nested cost functions of the form "holding and shortage cost plus the minimum over allocations of a sum of convex costs", and its appendix (Section 7.4) gives the marginal allocation algorithm AllocOpt that computes these minima exactly for every stock level at once.

Marginal analysis for separable convex resource allocation is classical (Fox, Management Science, 1966); the monograph of Ibaraki and Katoh (MIT Press, 1988) surveys it.

Setting

Allocation data (Section 7.4). There is a set M={1,…,Mˉ}M = \{1, \dots, \bar M\}M={1,…,Mˉ} of locations and an augmented set M0={0}∪MM_0 = \{0\} \cup MM0​={0}∪M. Each location m∈M0m \in M_0m∈M0​ has integer gridpoints 0=r0m<r1m<⋯<rn(m)m0 = r^m_0 < r^m_1 < \dots < r^m_{n(m)}0=r0m​<r1m​<⋯<rn(m)m​. For m∈Mm \in Mm∈M, the value cnmc^m_ncnm​ of a convex function is given at each gridpoint. The slopes (7.19) are c^nm=(cn+1m−cnm)/(rn+1m−rnm)\hat c^m_n = (c^m_{n+1} - c^m_n)/(r^m_{n+1} - r^m_n)c^nm​=(cn+1m​−cnm​)/(rn+1m​−rnm​) for n<n(m)n < n(m)n<n(m), and c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ repeats the last one. The piecewise linear approximation C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ of (7.20)–(7.21) interpolates the values cnmc^m_ncnm​ at the gridpoints and continues with slope c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ beyond the last one. A convex function fff on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ is also given.

The allocation optimization (7.22) asks, for each n∈N0={0,…,n(0)}n \in N_0 = \{0, \dots, n(0)\}n∈N0​={0,…,n(0)}, for

cn0=f(rn0)+min⁡{∑m∈MC~m(rm):rm≥0 integer, ∑m∈Mrm=rn0}.c^0_n = f(r^0_n) + \min\Bigl\{ \sum_{m \in M} \tilde C_m(r_m) : r_m \ge 0 \text{ integer},\ \sum_{m \in M} r_m = r^0_n \Bigr\}.cn0​=f(rn0​)+min{m∈M∑​C~m​(rm​):rm​≥0 integer, m∈M∑​rm​=rn0​}.

Algorithm AllocOpt (Definition 4) keeps a current gridpoint index n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) and allocation r∗(m)r^*(m)r∗(m) per location. For each increment rn0−rn−10r^0_n - r^0_{n-1}rn0​−rn−10​ of the target, it repeatedly gives units to a location m∗m^*m∗ whose current slope c^n∗(m∗)m∗\hat c^{m^*}_{n^*(m^*)}c^n∗(m∗)m∗​ is minimal, up to that location's next gridpoint, and records the accumulated cost.

Pooling system (Section 7.2.1). One depot supplies mmm warehouses. The demand djtd_{jt}djt​ at warehouse jjj in period ttt is normal with mean μj\mu_jμj​ and variance σj2\sigma_j^2σj2​, independent across periods and warehouses. The supplier-to-depot lead time is DDD periods, the depot-to-warehouse lead time AAA periods, and holding and backorder costs h,bh, bh,b are equal at all warehouses. Positions IjI_jIj​ are in balance when Φ((Ij−Aμj)/(A σj))\Phi((I_j - A\mu_j)/(\sqrt A\,\sigma_j))Φ((Ij​−Aμj​)/(A​σj​)) is the same for all jjj. For system inventory position sss, with Y0Y_0Y0​ the system demand over DDD periods and YjY_jYj​ the demand at jjj over the next A+1A + 1A+1 periods, the balanced allocation gives each warehouse a share proportional to σj\sigma_jσj​, and zjz_jzj​ is its end-of-period net inventory.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (correctness)

For every tie-breaking rule in its arg min steps, AllocOpt returns values cn0c^0_ncn0​ that satisfy (7.22) for every n∈N0n \in N_0n∈N0​: some feasible integer allocation attains cn0−f(rn0)c^0_n - f(r^0_n)cn0​−f(rn0​), and no feasible integer allocation does better.

Milestones

  1. Slope monotonicity (p. 178): c^nm≥c^n−1m\hat c^m_n \ge \hat c^m_{n-1}c^nm​≥c^n−1m​ for 0<n≤n(m)0 < n \le n(m)0<n≤n(m).
  2. Convexity of C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (proof of Proposition 2, p. 179).
  3. Remark 2 (p. 179): with the inner loop run only while the current slope is ≤0\le 0≤0, AllocOpt solves (7.22) with ∑mrm≤rn0\sum_m r_m \le r^0_n∑m​rm​≤rn0​.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 152): if the positions are in balance and
∑jdj,t−1≥max⁡i{∑j≠idj,t+D−1+di,t+D−1(1−∑jσjσi)},\sum_{j} d_{j,t-1} \ge \max_{i} \Bigl\{ \sum_{j \ne i} d_{j,t+D-1} + d_{i,t+D-1}\Bigl(1 - \frac{\sum_j \sigma_j}{\sigma_i}\Bigr)\Bigr\},j∑​dj,t−1​≥imax​{j=i∑​dj,t+D−1​+di,t+D−1​(1−σi​∑j​σj​​)},

then a nonnegative allocation of the arriving ∑jdj,t−1\sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​dj,t−1​ units restores balance. 5. Net inventory law (pp. 156–157): zjz_jzj​ is normal with mean (s−(D+A+1)∑iμi) σj/∑iσi(s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i)\,\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i(s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​)σj​/∑i​σi​ and variance (A+1)σj2+(σj/∑iσi)2D∑iσi2(A + 1)\sigma_j^2 + (\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i)^2 D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)σj2​+(σj​/∑i​σi​)2D∑i​σi2​. 6. Critical fractile (pp. 157–158): sss minimizes ∑jE[h(zj)++b(zj)−]\sum_j E[h (z_j)^+ + b (z_j)^-]∑j​E[h(zj​)++b(zj​)−] if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h), where

z=s−(D+A+1)∑iμi[(A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2]1/2.z = \frac{s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i}{\bigl[(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2\bigr]^{1/2}}.z=[(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​]1/2s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​​.

Significance

The goal certifies an algorithm that the chapter uses as a subroutine three times: in the pool cost (7.14), the subsystem cost (7.15) and the system cost (7.17), and hence in the claim of Section 7.3 that the system-wide cost function can be computed in time nlog⁡nn \log nnlogn in the number of locations. Because AllocOpt produces the whole vector (cn0)n∈N0(c^0_n)_{n \in N_0}(cn0​)n∈N0​​ in one pass, its correctness gives the nested value functions at every gridpoint of the next echelon, which is what allows the recursion up the echelons. The Eppen–Schrage milestones give the classical quantitative form of risk pooling: the system stock is set by one critical fractile, and the standard deviation term (A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​ is what the book compares with the single-warehouse and the decentralized systems.

On formalization: the book states Proposition 2 with a two-sentence argument and Remark 2 without proof. The Eppen–Schrage computations are displayed derivations. None of these results has a machine-checked proof on the platform. A verified AllocOpt, stated for an explicit algorithm rather than for an abstract greedy procedure, is reusable for any separable convex integer allocation with a sum constraint.

Difficulty

The usual greedy exchange argument assumes that units are allocated one at a time. AllocOpt allocates in blocks, up to the next gridpoint of the chosen location, and it carries its state across successive targets rn−10→rn0r^0_{n-1} \to r^0_nrn−10​→rn0​ without restarting. The proof must therefore show that the state after each outer step is itself an optimal allocation for the current target, and that block moves never step past a breakpoint where the arg min would change. The slopes can be negative, and the equality constraint forces allocation even when every marginal cost is positive. Remark 2 needs an additional argument: under the inequality constraint the loop may stop before uuu reaches zero, and that point is optimal only because the slopes are nondecreasing.

For the pooling results, the balanced allocation mixes the depot-lead-time demand Y0Y_0Y0​ of all warehouses with the local demand YjY_jYj​, and the Gaussian law of zjz_jzj​ rests on the independence of disjoint blocks of periods. The fractile statement requires strict monotonicity of each warehouse's expected cost derivative in sss, not only a first-order condition.

Formalization scope

  • Indices and types. Locations of MMM are Fin Mbar; gridpoints are integers, values and slopes real numbers; allocations are functions Fin Mbar → ℕ. The standing assumptions of Section 7.4 form the predicate WellFormed: Mˉ≥1\bar M \ge 1Mˉ≥1, n(m)≥1n(m) \ge 1n(m)≥1 for m∈Mm \in Mm∈M (a slope (7.19) needs two gridpoints), gridpoints starting at 000 and strictly increasing at every location of M0M_0M0​, each cnmc^m_ncnm​ the value of a function convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and fff convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞).
  • The minimum in (7.22) is stated as attainment plus a lower bound over the finite, nonempty set of feasible integer allocations, never as an unconstrained infimum.
  • Ties. The book's arg min fixes no tie-breaking rule. Results are stated for every selection rule that returns a minimizing location.
  • Termination. AllocOpt is a total Lean function. The inner loop is given more passes than it can use, so it always exits through its own condition.
  • Not stated. The operation count of Proposition 2, O((1+log⁡2Mˉ)∑m∈M0n(m))O((1 + \log_2 \bar M)\sum_{m \in M_0} n(m))O((1+log2​Mˉ)∑m∈M0​​n(m)), and Proposition 1 and Remark 1 (p. 177) are operation counts with no machine model and are left out.
  • Corrections. The first expected-cost display on p. 157 has + b∫−∞0z dFzj(z)+\,b\int_{-\infty}^0 z\,dF_{z_j}(z)+b∫−∞0​zdFzj​​(z), which is negative. The formalization uses b E[(zj)−]b\,E[(z_j)^-]bE[(zj​)−], as in the book's next display.
  • Pinnings. Lemma 3 is deterministic: the demands are arbitrary reals, and "in balance following the allocation" means that some xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 with ∑jxj=∑jdj,t−1\sum_j x_j = \sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​xj​=∑j​dj,t−1​ exists. The critical-fractile milestone is the characterization "minimizer if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h)" of the book's "can be found by setting".
  • Trivialization ruled out. The allocation problem (7.22) is defined independently of the algorithm, as a minimum over explicit integer allocations, and the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are built from the data by (7.19)–(7.21). Neither (7.22) nor the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are defined as, or required to agree with, what AllocOpt returns.
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the invariants of AllocOpt, in particular that after each outer step the allocation r∗r^*r∗ is feasible for rn0r^0_nrn0​ with cost zzz and all slopes to the left of n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) are at most those to the right. Also Gaussian sum lemmas over finite index sets and a general newsvendor first-order characterization.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • G. D. Eppen and L. Schrage, "Centralized ordering policies in a multi-warehouse system with lead times and random demand", in L. B. Schwarz (ed.), Multi-Level Production/Inventory Control Systems: Theory and Practice, Studies in the Management Sciences, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 51–67.
  • G. D. Eppen, "Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem", Management Science 25(5), 1979, 498–501. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
  • B. Fox, "Discrete optimization via marginal analysis", Management Science 13(3), 1966, 210–216. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.13.3.210
  • T. Ibaraki and N. Katoh, Resource Allocation Problems: Algorithmic Approaches, MIT Press, 1988.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems: Algorithm OPT Returns an Optimal Reorder Point and Order QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

(r, Q) policies are the standard replenishment rule for a single item under continuous review: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, an order of size QQQ is placed. They are known to be optimal in the classical models with Poisson or compound renewal demand, constant or exogenous lead times and full backlogging, and they are used widely in practice and in multi-item and multi-echelon systems where they are applied item by item.

For decades, computing an optimal pair (r,Q)(r, Q)(r,Q) exactly was not routine. The textbook treatment of Hadley and Whitin (1963) gives approximations; as Browne and Zipkin (1991) put it, "until recently, there was no reliable, straightforward method for computing an optimal (r, Q) policy, even in the simple case of Poisson demand processes." Many heuristics were proposed (surveyed by Lee and Nahmias, 1989); the only exact procedure in circulation was in Zipkin's classnotes, based on a result of Sahin (1982).

Federgruen and Zheng (1992) give a short exact algorithm, Algorithm OPT, whose work is linear in the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗. It rests only on the form of the cost, not on a particular demand model.

Setting

Inventory positions are integers (demand arrives unit by unit). A fixed cost κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 is charged per order, and G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R is the expected holding and backlogging cost rate as a function of the inventory position yyy. In all the models of the paper the long-run average cost of the (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) policy, for an integer rrr and an integer Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1, has the form

C(r,Q)=[κ+∑y=r+1r+QG(y)]/Q.(1)C(r,Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{y=r+1}^{r+Q}G(y)\Big]\Big/Q. \tag{1}C(r,Q)=[κ+y=r+1∑r+Q​G(y)]/Q.(1)

The paper's standing assumptions on GGG are:

  1. −G-G−G is unimodal: there is an integer mmm with GGG nonincreasing on {y≤m}\{y\le m\}{y≤m} and nondecreasing on {y≥m}\{y\ge m\}{y≥m} (flat stretches allowed);
  2. lim⁡∣y∣→∞G(y)=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G(y)=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G(y)=∞.

The sequence yQy_QyQ​. Let y1y_1y1​ be an integer minimizing GGG. Given y1,…,yQy_1,\dots,y_Qy1​,…,yQ​, let L(Q)=min⁡{y1,…,yQ}L(Q)=\min\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}L(Q)=min{y1​,…,yQ​} and R(Q)=max⁡{y1,…,yQ}R(Q)=\max\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}R(Q)=max{y1​,…,yQ​}, and set

yQ+1={L(Q)−1if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),R(Q)+1otherwise.y_{Q+1}=\begin{cases}L(Q)-1 & \text{if } G(L(Q)-1)\le G(R(Q)+1),\\ R(Q)+1 & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}yQ+1​={L(Q)−1R(Q)+1​if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),otherwise.​

So the window [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] grows by one point at a time towards the smaller neighbouring value, ties going left. Write r∗(Q)r^*(Q)r∗(Q) for an optimal reorder point for a given QQQ, and

C∗(Q)=[κ+∑i=1QG(yi)]/Q.C^*(Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{i=1}^{Q}G(y_i)\Big]\Big/Q .C∗(Q)=[κ+i=1∑Q​G(yi​)]/Q.

Algorithm OPT, Step 1. Variables S,Q,C∗,r,RS,Q,C^*,r,RS,Q,C∗,r,R start at S=κ+G(y1)S=\kappa+G(y_1)S=κ+G(y1​), Q=1Q=1Q=1, C∗=SC^*=SC∗=S, r=y1−1r=y_1-1r=y1​−1, R=y1+1R=y_1+1R=y1​+1. Each pass compares G(r)G(r)G(r) and G(R)G(R)G(R); on the smaller side (left on ties) it stops if C∗C^*C∗ is at most that value, and otherwise adds the value to SSS and moves rrr one step left or RRR one step right; then Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1 and C∗:=S/QC^*:=S/QC∗:=S/Q. The output is the final (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Under the standing assumptions, Step 1 of Algorithm OPT, started from any global minimizer y1y_1y1​ of GGG, stops after finitely many passes, and its output (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) satisfies Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 and

C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.C(r,Q)\le C(r',Q')\qquad\text{for all integers } r' \text{ and all integers } Q'\ge 1 .C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.

The goal fixes no constants and no demand model: it is a statement about every GGG satisfying the standing assumptions.

Milestones, in proof order

  • §2, p. 811: {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​} is the contiguous block [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] of QQQ integers and carries the QQQ smallest values of GGG.
  • Figure 1 (p. 809): yQ+1y_{Q+1}yQ+1​ has the least GGG-value outside the window; in particular G(y1)≤G(y2)≤⋯G(y_1)\le G(y_2)\le\cdotsG(y1​)≤G(y2​)≤⋯.
  • Lemma 1: L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point for QQQ.
  • Corollary 1: r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q)r^*(Q)-1\le r^*(Q+1)\le r^*(Q)r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q).
  • Display before (6): min⁡rC(r,Q)=C∗(Q)\min_r C(r,Q)=C^*(Q)minr​C(r,Q)=C∗(Q).
  • (6): C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1)]/(Q+1)C^*(Q+1)=[QC^*(Q)+G(y_{Q+1})]/(Q+1)C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1​)]/(Q+1), and C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q)C^*(Q+1)<C^*(Q)C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q) iff G(yQ+1)<C∗(Q)G(y_{Q+1})<C^*(Q)G(yQ+1​)<C∗(Q).
  • Lemma 2: the smallest qqq with C∗(q)≤G(yq+1)C^*(q)\le G(y_{q+1})C∗(q)≤G(yq+1​) exists and is an optimal order size.
  • Step 1 tracks the sequence: from the state (κ+∑i≤QG(yi), Q, C∗(Q), L(Q)−1, R(Q)+1)(\kappa+\sum_{i\le Q}G(y_i),\,Q,\,C^*(Q),\,L(Q)-1,\,R(Q)+1)(κ+∑i≤Q​G(yi​),Q,C∗(Q),L(Q)−1,R(Q)+1) one pass stops with (L(Q)−1,Q)(L(Q)-1,Q)(L(Q)−1,Q) exactly when C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1)C^*(Q)\le G(y_{Q+1})C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1​) and otherwise moves to the same state for Q+1Q+1Q+1.

Significance

The result turns the joint minimization of (1) over (r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1(r,Q)\in\mathbb Z\times\mathbb Z_{\ge1}(r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1​, an unbounded two-dimensional integer problem, into a single scan whose length is Q∗Q^*Q∗ plus the distance to the minimizer of GGG. Because it uses only the form (1) and the unimodality of −G-G−G, it applies at once to Poisson and compound Poisson demand, to stochastic lead times with an equilibrium lead-time demand, and to cost structures with stockout penalties; the paper also notes extensions to (r,nQ)(r,nQ)(r,nQ) policies. Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 additionally give the structure of the optimal reorder point as a function of QQQ.

The result has been proved on paper since 1992. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the algorithm's correctness for general GGG under exactly the paper's hypotheses. The platform already has the linear-cost special case of the underlying lemmas for one discrete demand model (InventoryControl.rq_discrete_recursion, rq_discrete_joint_optimal), but with C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) and Q∗Q^*Q∗ given as hypotheses and no algorithm; nothing on the platform states the algorithm or treats general unimodal −G-G−G.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: for fixed QQQ the sum in (1) should cover the QQQ smallest values of GGG, and the greedy window collects exactly those. Both halves need care on the integers with flat stretches of GGG: "the QQQ smallest values" is ambiguous under ties, and the claim that a greedy window holds them relies on y1y_1y1​ being a global minimizer together with the unimodality of −G-G−G, not on convexity.

The stopping rule is the second point. Lemma 2 looks like a first-order condition, but C∗(⋅)C^*(\cdot)C∗(⋅) need not be convex; optimality of the first stopping qqq for all larger QQQ uses that the values G(yi)G(y_i)G(yi​) are nondecreasing along the sequence, which the paper uses without stating. Termination of the algorithm is not discussed on the page; it needs G→∞G\to\inftyG→∞, and fails for constant GGG.

Finally, the goal is about an imperative loop. Connecting its five variables to yQy_QyQ​, C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) and L(Q)L(Q)L(Q) is an invariant argument that has to match the tie-breaking and the non-strict stopping tests exactly.

Formalization scope

  • Types. G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R, κ∈R\kappa\in\mathbb Rκ∈R with κ>0\kappa>0κ>0, reorder points in Z\mathbb ZZ, order quantities in N\mathbb NN with Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 required wherever a cost appears. Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 makes C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0, so optimality is always quantified over Q′≥1Q'\ge1Q′≥1 and the goal asserts that the returned QQQ is ≥1\ge1≥1.
  • Assumptions. "−G-G−G unimodal" is NegUnimodal G: ∃m\exists m∃m, GGG antitone on (−∞,m](-\infty,m](−∞,m] and monotone on [m,∞)[m,\infty)[m,∞). "lim⁡∣y∣→∞G=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G=∞" is Coercive G: G→+∞G\to+\inftyG→+∞ along atBot and atTop. Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn ℤ is not used: over Z\mathbb ZZ-weights it holds for every function.
  • The sequence. L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q) are defined by recursion on the window, and yyy is 1-based with an unused value at index 0; that L,RL,RL,R are the minimum and maximum of {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​}, as the paper defines them, is the first milestone.
  • The algorithm. Step 1 is transcribed literally, including G(r)≤G(R)G(r)\le G(R)G(r)≤G(R) → left and the non-strict tests C∗≤G(r)C^*\le G(r)C∗≤G(r), C∗≤G(R)C^*\le G(R)C∗≤G(R); GGG is evaluated directly instead of through the ΔG\Delta GΔG bookkeeping. The loop runs with a pass budget and returns nothing when the budget runs out; the goal states that for every large enough budget it returns an optimal pair.
  • Step 0 is not formalized. It scans L=0,1,…L=0,1,\dotsL=0,1,… for the first LLL with ΔG(L)≥0\Delta G(L)\ge0ΔG(L)≥0, under the paper's simplification y1>0y_1>0y1​>0; under unimodality alone it can stop on a plateau before the minimum. The goal starts Step 1 from a given global minimizer y1y_1y1​, which is the paper's own §2 setup and matches its p. 812 remark that Step 0 may be replaced by a bisection search.
  • Not formalized: Theorem 1's second sentence (the operation count), the derivations of (1) for specific demand models, and (5).
  • Corrected slips. The printed proof of Lemma 2 writes C(Q)−C(Q∗)C(Q)-C(Q^*)C(Q)−C(Q∗) with C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) inside the bracket; the correct identity has C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q)-C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗) and C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q∗). Lemma 2's "Q∗Q^*Q∗" is formalized as existence of the smallest qqq with the property plus its optimality, since minimizers need not be unique; likewise "r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1r^*(Q)=L(Q)-1r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1" means L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point.
  • Ruled out. Defining the algorithm's output as an argmin of CCC, or by searching for Lemma 2's qqq, would make the goal trivial; the algorithm is defined by its steps. A statement of the form "if the run returns a pair, it is optimal" would be vacuous for a loop that never stops; termination is part of the goal.

Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas on windows of unimodal integer sequences, which are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • S. Browne and P. Zipkin, Inventory Models with Continuous, Stochastic Demands, Annals of Applied Probability 1(3):419–435, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177005875
  • H. L. Lee and S. Nahmias, Single-Product, Single-Location Models, in Handbooks in OR & MS vol. 4, 1993 (cited by the paper as a 1989 working paper).
  • I. Sahin, On the Objective Function Behavior in (s, S) Inventory Models, Operations Research 30(4):709–724, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.709
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem: The Two-Echelon Optimal Cost Splits into the Isolated Installation-1 Cost Plus a Function of Echelon StockResearch Paper

Motivation

Most physical supply chains hold stock at several levels: a factory warehouse feeds a regional depot, which feeds a retail outlet. Each level orders from the one above it, and a shortage upstream delays replenishment downstream. Optimizing such a multi-echelon system by dynamic programming looks hopeless, because the state is a vector of stock levels and stock in transit at every installation, and the value function of a two-installation system with a two-period shipping lag already depends on three continuous variables.

Andrew J. Clark and Herbert Scarf (Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960) showed that for a serial system this curse of dimensionality disappears. Working with echelon stock (the stock at a level plus everything below it or in transit to a lower level), the optimal system cost separates into the cost of the lowest installation, optimized as if it stood alone, plus a function of echelon stock only. The result is the foundation of multi-echelon inventory theory: the echelon base-stock policies used in practice, the stationary analyses of Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) and Chen and Zheng (1994), and textbook treatments (Zipkin, Foundations of Inventory Management, 2000; Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory) all descend from it.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) and Arrow, Karlin and Scarf (1958) set up periodic-review inventory models with discounted costs. Karlin and Scarf (1958) treated a single installation with a delivery lag, reducing it to a problem without lag (the paper's facts 1–3). Clark and Scarf (1960) proved the decomposition for serial systems with linear shipping costs and a setup cost permitted only at the top. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) extended it to infinite horizons and Chen and Zheng (1994) gave a lower-bound proof that reaches more general structures.

Setting

Two installations are in series. Customer demand occurs only at installation 1; its demand in each period is non-negative with density φ\varphiφ on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), independent across periods, and excess demand is backlogged. Installation 2 ships to installation 1 with a two-period lead time at unit cost c1≥0c_1\ge0c1​≥0. The system orders z≥0z\ge0z≥0 units from outside at cost c(z)=K+czc(z)=K+czc(z)=K+cz for z>0z>0z>0 and c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0 (eq. (5)); these arrive at installation 2 one period later. Costs nnn periods ahead are discounted by αn\alpha^nαn, α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0.

The state at the start of a period is (x1,w1,x2)(x_1,w_1,x_2)(x1​,w1​,x2​): x1x_1x1​ is the stock on hand at installation 1, w1w_1w1​ the stock that reaches installation 1 next period, and x2x_2x2​ the echelon-2 stock (on hand at both installations plus in transit), so x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​. Installation 1 pays the expected holding and shortage cost (1),

L(x)={hx+p∫x∞(t−x)φ(t) dt,x>0,p∫0∞(t−x)φ(t) dt,x≤0,L(x)=\begin{cases}hx+p\int_x^\infty(t-x)\varphi(t)\,dt,&x>0,\\ p\int_0^\infty(t-x)\varphi(t)\,dt,&x\le0,\end{cases}L(x)={hx+p∫x∞​(t−x)φ(t)dt,p∫0∞​(t−x)φ(t)dt,​x>0,x≤0,​

and echelon 2 pays a natural one-period cost L~(x2)\tilde L(x_2)L~(x2​) (Assumption 3).

With nnn periods remaining, the optimal system cost Cn(x1,w1,x2)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​) satisfies, with C0≡0C_0\equiv0C0​≡0,

Cn(x1,w1,x2)=min⁡x1+w1≤y≤x20≤z{c(z)+c1(y−x1−w1)+L~(x2)+L(x1)+α∫0∞Cn−1(x1+w1−t, y−x1−w1, x2+z−t)φ(t) dt}(14)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)=\min_{\substack{x_1+w_1\le y\le x_2\\0\le z}}\Big\{c(z)+c_1(y-x_1-w_1)+\tilde L(x_2)+L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty C_{n-1}(x_1+w_1-t,\,y-x_1-w_1,\,x_2+z-t)\varphi(t)\,dt\Big\}\qquad(14)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​)=x1​+w1​≤y≤x2​0≤z​min​{c(z)+c1​(y−x1​−w1​)+L~(x2​)+L(x1​)+α∫0∞​Cn−1​(x1​+w1​−t,y−x1​−w1​,x2​+z−t)φ(t)dt}(14)

where yyy is installation 1's target (stock on hand plus in transit after shipping). Installation 1 in isolation, buying at unit cost c1c_1c1​ with a two-period lag, has optimal cost C^n(x1,w1)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)C^n​(x1​,w1​), C^0≡0\hat C_0\equiv0C^0​≡0:

C^n(x1,w1)=min⁡y≥x1+w1{c1(y−x1−w1)+L(x1)+α∫0∞C^n−1(x1+w1−t, y−x1−w1)φ(t) dt}.(15)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)=\min_{y\ge x_1+w_1}\Big\{c_1(y-x_1-w_1)+L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty\hat C_{n-1}(x_1+w_1-t,\,y-x_1-w_1)\varphi(t)\,dt\Big\}.\qquad(15)C^n​(x1​,w1​)=y≥x1​+w1​min​{c1​(y−x1​−w1​)+L(x1​)+α∫0∞​C^n−1​(x1​+w1​−t,y−x1​−w1​)φ(t)dt}.(15)

In Lean these are ClarkScarf.Serial.Model.sysCost and isoCost; the expressions in braces are sysObj and isoObj, indexed by nnn for the problem with n+1n+1n+1 periods remaining.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 482)

There are functions gng_ngn​ with g1=L~g_1=\tilde Lg1​=L~ such that, for all n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​,

Cn(x1,w1,x2)=C^n(x1,w1)+gn(x2),(16)C_n(x_1,w_1,x_2)=\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)+g_n(x_2),\qquad(16)Cn​(x1​,w1​,x2​)=C^n​(x1​,w1​)+gn​(x2​),(16)

and installation 1 acts optimally by aiming at an isolated-optimal target y^\hat yy^​ and taking min⁡(x2,y^)\min(x_2,\hat y)min(x2​,y^​), as much as installation 2 can supply. The goal fixes no form for gng_ngn​ and needs no critical numbers.

Milestones

  1. Convexity of y↦α∫ ⁣ ⁣∫L(y−t1−t2)φ(t1)φ(t2)y\mapsto\alpha\int\!\!\int L(y-t_1-t_2)\varphi(t_1)\varphi(t_2)y↦α∫∫L(y−t1​−t2​)φ(t1​)φ(t2​) (§2 item 2, p. 478).
  2. The isolated decomposition C^n(x1,w1)=L(x1)+α∫0∞L(x1+w1−t)φ(t) dt+fn(x1+w1)\hat C_n(x_1,w_1)=L(x_1)+\alpha\int_0^\infty L(x_1+w_1-t)\varphi(t)\,dt+f_n(x_1+w_1)C^n​(x1​,w1​)=L(x1​)+α∫0∞​L(x1​+w1​−t)φ(t)dt+fn​(x1​+w1​) for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, with fnf_nfn​ of (7) (p. 480).
  3. Convexity of every fnf_nfn​ (§2 item 3, p. 478).
  4. Eqs. (18)–(19) (p. 483): the system cost when echelon-2 stock is above or below the isolated critical number xˉn\bar x_nxˉn​.
  5. Eqs. (21)–(25) (pp. 483–484): the shortfall cost Λn\Lambda_nΛn​ depends on x2x_2x2​ alone,
Λn(x2)=c1(x2−xˉn)+α2∫0∞ ⁣ ⁣∫0∞[L(x2−t−y)−L(xˉn−t−y)]φ(t)φ(y) dy dt+α∫0∞[fn−1(x2−t)−fn−1(xˉn−t)]φ(t) dt.\Lambda_n(x_2)=c_1(x_2-\bar x_n)+\alpha^2\int_0^\infty\!\!\int_0^\infty[L(x_2-t-y)-L(\bar x_n-t-y)]\varphi(t)\varphi(y)\,dy\,dt+\alpha\int_0^\infty[f_{n-1}(x_2-t)-f_{n-1}(\bar x_n-t)]\varphi(t)\,dt.Λn​(x2​)=c1​(x2​−xˉn​)+α2∫0∞​∫0∞​[L(x2​−t−y)−L(xˉn​−t−y)]φ(t)φ(y)dydt+α∫0∞​[fn−1​(x2​−t)−fn−1​(xˉn​−t)]φ(t)dt.
  1. Theorem 2 (p. 484), the explicit form: given critical numbers, gng_ngn​ is computed by (26), gn(x2)=min⁡z≥0{c(z)+L~(x2)+Λn(x2)+α∫gn−1(x2+z−t)φ(t) dt}g_n(x_2)=\min_{z\ge0}\{c(z)+\tilde L(x_2)+\Lambda_n(x_2)+\alpha\int g_{n-1}(x_2+z-t)\varphi(t)\,dt\}gn​(x2​)=minz≥0​{c(z)+L~(x2​)+Λn​(x2​)+α∫gn−1​(x2​+z−t)φ(t)dt}.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 replaces one three-dimensional dynamic program by two one-dimensional ones. Installation 1 solves its own problem (15), whose solution is a critical-number policy, and echelon 2 solves a single-installation problem in x2x_2x2​ with one-period cost L~+Λn\tilde L+\Lambda_nL~+Λn​. When L~\tilde LL~ is convex the augmented cost is convex (the paper remarks this for Expression (10)), so the echelon-2 policy is of (S,s)(S,s)(S,s) type by Scarf's theorem, and the whole system runs on echelon base-stock rules. Every later serial-system result, finite or infinite horizon, uses this decomposition or its proof idea, and the "induced penalty" Λn\Lambda_nΛn​ is the prototype of the penalty functions used in the multi-echelon literature.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and proved, but no machine-checked version exists. The published platform items on Clark–Scarf are a stationary single-period decomposition with normal demand and a disproved infinite-horizon base-stock recursion, neither of which is this finite-horizon dynamic program. A formal development produces the value functions (14)–(15) with real infima and set integrals, the measurability and integrability of value functions defined by infima, the convexity propagation through the recursion (7), and the decomposition itself, which are reusable for any finite-horizon inventory recursion with lead times.

Difficulty

The obvious induction on nnn substitutes (16) into (14) and separates the minimizations over yyy and zzz. The separation is immediate; the hard step is that the constrained minimum over x1+w1≤y≤x2x_1+w_1\le y\le x_2x1​+w1​≤y≤x2​ differs from the unconstrained one by an amount that a priori depends on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​). Showing that it depends on x2x_2x2​ alone is the content of Theorem 1; nothing in the separation step itself rules out a dependence on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​). On the measure-theoretic side, every value function is defined by an infimum over an uncountable set and then integrated against φ\varphiφ. Its measurability and integrability are not automatic, and they must be established before any identity between integrals can be manipulated.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in ClarkScarf.Serial, one definition file Def_ClarkScarf_Serial_Model and seven theorem files. Conventions committed to:

  • The model is a structure Model whose fields carry the data and the standing hypotheses: h,p,α,c1,K,c≥0h,p,\alpha,c_1,K,c\ge0h,p,α,c1​,K,c≥0; φ≥0\varphi\ge0φ≥0 with ∫0∞φ=1\int_0^\infty\varphi=1∫0∞​φ=1; and two additions the page leaves implicit, disclosed in each statement: a finite demand mean (otherwise (1) is infinite for x≤0x\le0x≤0) and L~\tilde LL~ non-negative, continuous and of at most linear growth (Assumption 3 leaves L~\tilde LL~ unspecified; these make every expectation in (14) finite and measurable). No discount bound α<1\alpha<1α<1, no convexity of L~\tilde LL~, no K=0K=0K=0 and no sign condition on w1w_1w1​ is assumed.
  • Expectations are set integrals ∫(0,∞)F(t)φ(t) dt\int_{(0,\infty)}F(t)\varphi(t)\,dt∫(0,∞)​F(t)φ(t)dt; "Min" is a real infimum over a nonempty feasible set of a non-negative objective.
  • Every statement about CnC_nCn​ is restricted to the state domain x1+w1≤x2x_1+w_1\le x_2x1​+w1​≤x2​; outside it the feasible set of (14) is empty.
  • The horizon index counts periods remaining, C0≡C^0≡0C_0\equiv\hat C_0\equiv0C0​≡C^0​≡0, and fn≡0f_n\equiv0fn​≡0 for n≤2n\le2n≤2.

A formalization in which the feasible set of (14) is empty, in which the expectations are junk zeros of non-integrable integrands, or in which gng_ngn​ may depend on (x1,w1)(x_1,w_1)(x1​,w1​) would make (16) trivial; the domain restriction, the integrability conditions and the order ∃g ∀x1,w1,x2\exists g\,\forall x_1,w_1,x_2∃g∀x1​,w1​,x2​ rule these out. A sorry-free check (not part of the mission) verifies C1=L(x1)+L~(x2)C_1=L(x_1)+\tilde L(x_2)C1​=L(x1​)+L~(x2​) and C^1=L(x1)\hat C_1=L(x_1)C^1​=L(x1​) and exhibits a model with exponential demand satisfying all hypotheses.

Needed infrastructure: Fubini-type rearrangement of iterated set integrals against a density, integrability of functions of linear growth against a finite-mean density, convexity preserved under infimal projection u↦inf⁡y≥uu\mapsto\inf_{y\ge u}u↦infy≥u​ and under convolution with a density, and measurability of infimum-defined functions. Contributions of these general lemmas, of the base cases n=1,2n=1,2n=1,2, and of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory Models of the Arrow-Harris-Marschak Type with Time Lag, in Arrow, Karlin, Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958.
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4):818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower Bounds for Multi-Echelon Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 40(11):1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information 1: Centralizing Demand Information Does Not Eliminate the Bullwhip EffectResearch Paper

Motivation

The bullwhip effect is the observation that the variability of orders increases as one moves up a supply chain, from the retailer towards the manufacturer and its suppliers. It was documented in industry and in classroom experiments such as the Beer Game (Sterman 1989), and analysed by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997), who named demand forecasting, lead times, batch ordering, rationing and price variations as its main causes. A remedy often proposed is to centralize demand information: give every stage of the chain the customer demand data, so that no stage forecasts from the distorted orders of its downstream neighbour.

Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) quantified the effect for a retailer that forecasts with a moving average and orders with an order-up-to policy. They gave an explicit lower bound on the ratio of the order variance to the demand variance in terms of the lead time, the forecasting window and the demand autocorrelation. They then showed that in a multistage chain with fully centralized demand information this ratio still grows with the total lead time upstream of each stage. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3.1 of the paper, together with the single-stage analysis it rests on.

Setting

Time is indexed by the integers. The customer demands DtD_tDt​ seen by the retailer follow the AR(1) model

Dt=μ+ρDt−1+ϵt,(1)D_t = \mu + \rho D_{t-1} + \epsilon_t, \tag{1}Dt​=μ+ρDt−1​+ϵt​,(1)

where μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, ∣ρ∣<1|\rho| < 1∣ρ∣<1, and the errors ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ are independent and identically distributed from a symmetric distribution with mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. The demand is in steady state, so that E(Dt)=μ/(1−ρ)E(D_t) = \mu/(1-\rho)E(Dt​)=μ/(1−ρ) and Var(D)=Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D) = \mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(D)=Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) for every ttt.

The retailer does not know the demand process. With a window of p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 past observations it forms the moving-average estimates

D^tL=L ∑i=1pDt−ip,et=Dt−D^t1,σ^etL=CL,ρ∑i=1pet−i2p,\hat D^L_t = L\,\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat D^1_t, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C_{L,\rho}\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p e_{t-i}^2}{p}},D^tL​=Lp∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,et​=Dt​−D^t1​,σ^etL​=CL,ρ​p∑i=1p​et−i2​​​,

where LLL is the lead-time parameter (L=1L = 1L=1 means an order placed at the end of period ttt arrives at the start of period t+1t+1t+1) and CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ is a constant the paper leaves unspecified. The order-up-to point is yt=D^tL+z σ^etLy_t = \hat D^L_t + z\,\hat\sigma^L_{et}yt​=D^tL​+zσ^etL​ for a safety factor zzz, and the order placed in period ttt is qt=yt−yt−1+Dt−1q_t = y_t - y_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt​=yt​−yt−1​+Dt−1​. It may be negative: excess inventory is returned without cost.

In the multistage chain with centralized information, stages k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,… (stage 111 is the retailer) all observe DtD_tDt​ and use the same estimate D^t=∑i=1pDt−i/p\hat D_t = \sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}/pD^t​=∑i=1p​Dt−i​/p. Stage kkk has lead time LkL_kLk​ and safety factor zkz_kzk​ and uses the order-up-to point ytk=LkD^t+zkσ^etLky^k_t = L_k\hat D_t + z_k\hat\sigma^{L_k}_{et}ytk​=Lk​D^t​+zk​σ^etLk​​. Following the paper's sequence of events, stage 111 orders qt1=yt1−yt−11+Dt−1q^1_t = y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt1​=yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​, and stage k≥2k \ge 2k≥2, receiving qtk−1q^{k-1}_tqtk−1​, orders qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 441)

For every stage k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every period ttt,

Var(qtk)Var(D)≥1+(2∑i=1kLip+2(∑i=1kLi)2p2)(1−ρp),\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q^k_t)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2\sum_{i=1}^k L_i}{p} + \frac{2\left(\sum_{i=1}^k L_i\right)^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p),Var(D)Var(qtk​)​≥1+​p2∑i=1k​Li​​+p22(∑i=1k​Li​)2​​(1−ρp),

with equality when z1=⋯=zk=0z_1 = \dots = z_k = 0z1​=⋯=zk​=0. The bound holds for every choice of the constants CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ and of the safety factors.

Milestones (p. 438)

  1. The AR(1) moments Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) and Cov(Dt−1,Dt−p−1)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, D_{t-p-1}) = \rho^p\sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Cov(Dt−1​,Dt−p−1​)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2).
  2. Eq. (4): qt=(1+L/p)Dt−1−(L/p)Dt−p−1+z(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L)q_t = (1 + L/p)D_{t-1} - (L/p)D_{t-p-1} + z(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})qt​=(1+L/p)Dt−1​−(L/p)Dt−p−1​+z(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​) for every outcome.
  3. Lemma 2.1: Cov(Dt−i,σ^etL)=0\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-i}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) = 0Cov(Dt−i​,σ^etL​)=0 for i=1,…,pi = 1, \dots, pi=1,…,p.
  4. The variance identity after Eq. (4):
Var(qt)=[1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+2Lp)Cov(Dt−1,σ^etL)+z2 Var(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L).\mathrm{Var}(q_t) = \left[1 + \left(\tfrac{2L}{p} + \tfrac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p)\right]\mathrm{Var}(D) + 2z\left(1+\tfrac{2L}{p}\right)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) + z^2\,\mathrm{Var}(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1}).Var(qt​)=[1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+p2L​)Cov(Dt−1​,σ^etL​)+z2Var(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​).
  1. Theorem 2.2, the single-stage case:
Var(q)Var(D)≥1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp),(5)\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2L}{p} + \frac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p), \tag{5}Var(D)Var(q)​≥1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp),(5)

with equality when z=0z = 0z=0.

Significance

Theorem 2.2 shows that forecasting with a positive lead time is enough to make orders more variable than demand, even for independent demands (ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0). It also says how the effect depends on each parameter: the bound decreases in the window ppp and increases in the lead time LLL. Theorem 3.1 is the paper's answer to the centralization remedy. When every stage sees the true customer demand and uses the same forecast and the same policy, the variability of orders at stage kkk is still bounded below by the single-stage expression with the cumulative lead time ∑i≤kLi\sum_{i\le k}L_i∑i≤k​Li​. Centralization reduces the bullwhip effect but does not remove it. The decentralized comparison (Theorem 3.2, where the bound becomes multiplicative across stages) is a separate mission in this series.

On the formalization side, the Gaussian special case of the single-stage results is on the platform. Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory states Theorem 2.2, Lemma 2.1, Eq. (4) and the AR(1) moments for normally distributed errors, as the items SupplyChainTheory.bullwhip_signal_processing, bullwhip_lemma_13_1, bullwhip_order_identity and ar1_moments. This mission states them under the paper's weaker hypothesis of a symmetric error distribution. The multistage Theorem 3.1 has no machine-checked counterpart. The paper proves only Theorem 2.2 in print. For the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 it refers to Ryan (1997) and to a working paper, so a formalization supplies arguments the published article does not contain.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is routine. The difficulty is Lemma 2.1 and the covariances like it. The estimate σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ is a square root of a quadratic form in past demands, so its covariance with a demand cannot be computed from second moments. Under Gaussian errors one can appeal to properties of Gaussian vectors. With only a symmetric error law, every distributional fact has to come from the symmetry of the errors and from the representation of the steady-state demand as an infinite series in past errors.

The printed derivation also moves faster than a proof. Expanding Var(qt)\mathrm{Var}(q_t)Var(qt​) from Eq. (4) produces the cross terms Cov(Dt−1,σ^e,t−1L)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})Cov(Dt−1​,σ^e,t−1L​) and Cov(Dt−p−1,σ^etL)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-p-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et})Cov(Dt−p−1​,σ^etL​), which lie outside the lags 1,…,p1, \dots, p1,…,p of Lemma 2.1. The display after Eq. (4) does not account for them. A complete proof of milestone 4 must show that these terms vanish too. For the chain, the stage orders are defined by a recursion across stages, and the variance of qtkq^k_tqtk​ involves the estimates σ^etLi\hat\sigma^{L_i}_{et}σ^etLi​​ of all stages i≤ki \le ki≤k.

Formalization scope

Random variables are real functions on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), and time is Z\mathbb ZZ, so that Dt−p−1D_{t-p-1}Dt−p−1​ exists for every ttt. Variance and covariance are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance and ProbabilityTheory.covariance. The demand structure ChenBullwhip.Centralized.AR1Demand records (1) for every outcome and the paper's error hypotheses: independence, identical distribution, symmetry, mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. It adds four disclosed conditions:

  1. σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, since the results divide by Var(D)\mathrm{Var}(D)Var(D);
  2. square integrability of errors and demands, since Mathlib's variance of a non-square-integrable function is 000;
  3. a steady-state condition: every DtD_tDt​ is square integrable with the law of D0D_0D0​, which is the stationary solution the paper's moment formulas presuppose;
  4. p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 in every result.

The published Gaussian structure SupplyChainTheory.AR1Demand satisfies these conditions, so this mission generalizes the Snyder–Shen items rather than referencing them. The constants CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ are free real parameters, and in the chain CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ is C(Lk)C(L_k)C(Lk​) for an arbitrary function CCC. Lead times are natural numbers, L=0L = 0L=0 included. Sums ∑i=1p\sum_{i=1}^p∑i=1p​ and ∑i=1k\sum_{i=1}^k∑i=1k​ run over {1,…,p}\{1,\dots,p\}{1,…,p} and {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k}, and stages are numbered from 111. The order recursion qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​ is read from the paper's sequence of events, because the paper prints no formula for qtkq^k_tqtk​.

The orders are computed from the demands through the definitions above. They are never arbitrary random variables with assumed moments. "Tight" is formalized as equality, and orders are never truncated at zero. Without the steady-state condition, a process started from an arbitrary D0D_0D0​ satisfies (1) but has time-dependent moments, and the results fail; with σ=0\sigma = 0σ=0 the ratio form would be false. Both cases are excluded by the structure, not by vacuous hypotheses. The structure is satisfiable: i.i.d. standard Gaussian demands on Z→R\mathbb Z \to \mathbb RZ→R form an instance.

A complete development needs: the L2L^2L2 series representation of a stationary AR(1) process; distributional symmetry facts for i.i.d. sequences with a symmetric law; and covariance bookkeeping for finite linear combinations. The first two are reusable for any linear time-series model with symmetric innovations. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas about stationary AR(1) processes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan, D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information, Management Science 46(3):436–443, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, Management Science 43(4):546–558, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • J. D. Sterman, Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment, Management Science 35(3):321–339, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.321
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • J. K. Ryan, Analysis of Inventory Models with Limited Demand Information, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1997 (cited by the paper for the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1).
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 1: Revenue Sharing at w = φc Coordinates the Channel and Gives the Retailer the Share φ of Its Optimal ProfitResearch Paper

Why revenue sharing

A supplier who sells to an independent retailer through a plain per-unit wholesale price faces double marginalization: the retailer orders less than the quantity that maximizes the profit of the supply chain as a whole, because each unit costs him the wholesale price rather than the production cost. Supply chain contracting studies payment schemes under which the retailer's own optimum coincides with the system optimum. Such a scheme is said to coordinate the channel. The usual examples are buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985), quantity-flexibility contracts (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) and quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987).

Cachon and Lariviere study revenue sharing, in which the retailer pays a low wholesale price and also hands over a fixed fraction of his revenue. The scheme was common in video-cassette rental in the late 1990s, where it let rental chains stock far more copies of new releases. This mission formalizes the paper's single-retailer result: revenue sharing coordinates the channel, and the supplier can choose any split of the channel's maximal profit. It also includes the three further results of the paper that use the same argument.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000. Its results are unnumbered, so every item cites a section, a displayed equation and a printed page. The 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material.

Setting

A supplier sells to one retailer, who orders q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 units before a selling season. The retailer's expected revenue is a function R(q)R(q)R(q) of the quantity alone. Leftover units have zero salvage value, and the supplier produces each unit at cost c>0c > 0c>0. The paper's standing assumptions (Sec. 1, p. 5) are:

  • RRR is strictly concave and differentiable for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, with marginal revenue R′(q)R'(q)R′(q);
  • the product is viable: R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c;
  • a finite quantity is optimal: R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c.

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} has two terms. The retailer pays the wholesale price w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 per unit, and he keeps the share ϕ\phiϕ of the revenue and transfers (1−ϕ)R(q)(1-\phi)R(q)(1−ϕ)R(q) to the supplier. The case ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the plain wholesale-price contract. The profits of the supply chain, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.\Pi(q) = R(q) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q) = \phi R(q) - qw,\qquad \pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)R(q) + qw - qc .Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr​(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.

The integrated channel quantity qIq_IqI​ is the maximizer of Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0. In Lean these objects are RevShareCoord.Single.Model (fields R, R', c and the three assumptions) and its functions Pi, retailerProfit and supplierProfit.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing coordinates the channel (Sec. 2.2, p. 6)

Let ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1] and w(ϕ)=ϕcw(\phi) = \phi cw(ϕ)=ϕc. Then

qI=arg max⁡q≥0 πr(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr(qI)=ϕ Π(qI),πs(qI)=(1−ϕ) Π(qI).q_I = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{q\ge 0}\ \pi_r(q) \ \text{(uniquely)},\qquad w(\phi)\le c,\qquad \pi_r(q_I) = \phi\,\Pi(q_I),\qquad \pi_s(q_I) = (1-\phi)\,\Pi(q_I).qI​=q≥0argmax​ πr​(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr​(qI​)=ϕΠ(qI​),πs​(qI​)=(1−ϕ)Π(qI​).

The statement fixes no revenue function and no share. It holds for every model and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], which is what "the supplier can take any share of the channel profit" means.

Milestones on the way

  1. Eq. (1), p. 6. qIq_IqI​ exists, is unique and positive, and is the only positive root of R′(qI)=cR'(q_I) = cR′(qI​)=c.
  2. Retailer's first-order condition, p. 6. If R′(0)>w/ϕR'(0) > w/\phiR′(0)>w/ϕ, an order q^≥0\hat q \ge 0q^​≥0 is optimal for the retailer exactly when q^>0\hat q > 0q^​>0 and ϕR′(q^)=w\phi R'(\hat q) = wϕR′(q^​)=w. The retailer has at most one optimal order.
  3. Profit identities, p. 6. Under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, πr(q)=ϕΠ(q)\pi_r(q) = \phi\Pi(q)πr​(q)=ϕΠ(q) and πs(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q)\pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)\Pi(q)πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q) at every qqq.
  4. Heterogeneous retailers, p. 7. Given ccc and ϕ\phiϕ, a single wholesale price, chosen before the revenue function, coordinates every retailer of the model.

Further results on the same argument

  1. Buy-back equivalence, Sec. 2.3, p. 9. Take the fixed-price newsvendor and the buy-back contract b∗=p(1−ϕ)b^* = p(1-\phi)b∗=p(1−ϕ), wb∗=p(1−ϕ)+ϕcw_b^* = p(1-\phi)+\phi cwb∗​=p(1−ϕ)+ϕc. It gives the retailer and the supplier the same realized profits as {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, for every order and every demand realization.
  2. Endogenous price, Sec. 3.1 and footnote 3, p. 11. Let revenue Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) be any function of quantity and price, with costs linear in quantity. Then πr(q,p)=ϕ Π(q,p)\pi_r(q,p) = \phi\,\Pi(q,p)πr​(q,p)=ϕΠ(q,p) under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi,\phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, and the integrated optimum (qI,pI)(q_I,p_I)(qI​,pI​), assumed unique, is the retailer's unique optimum.

Significance

The result separates coordination from profit division. A contract family coordinates for every value of a parameter, and that parameter then moves profit between the firms without changing the quantity, so the contract terms can be settled by bargaining power alone. The heterogeneous-retailer milestone gives the practical advantage over quantity discounts: the coordinating terms do not depend on the retailer's demand, so one price list serves retailers who face different markets. The Sec. 2.3 equivalence shows that, in the fixed-price newsvendor, buy-backs are a special case of revenue sharing. The Sec. 3.1 statement shows that revenue sharing still coordinates when the retailer also sets the price, a setting in which Emmons and Gilbert (1998) showed buy-backs fail.

All of these results are proved in the paper, and none is open. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the single-retailer theory for a general strictly concave revenue function. A related newsvendor version is already formalized on the platform: SupplyChainTheory.revenue_sharing_coordinates, from Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, Thm 14.6. That version has a newsvendor revenue with salvage values and goodwill costs, and it concludes the optimality of three profits, not the ϕ\phiϕ-split of this paper. It is a different statement, so it is not reused here.

Difficulty

The algebra is short. The identity πr=ϕΠ\pi_r = \phi\Piπr​=ϕΠ under w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc is a single line, and it is a milestone, not the goal. The work lies in the optimization claims over a half-line with only one-sided information at 000. The integrated optimum must be shown to exist. R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c gives only an eventual bound on the derivative, so the existence argument needs the continuity of a concave function and its supergradient inequality. It must also be shown positive, which uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c as a one-sided derivative. Its uniqueness rests on strict concavity. The retailer's first-order condition needs the same machinery for ϕR−wq\phi R - wqϕR−wq, including the observation that the boundary point 000 is never optimal. A stationary point of πr\pi_rπr​ is not enough. The goal asserts that qIq_IqI​ is the unique maximizer over all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

Formalization scope

  • Quantities, prices and shares are real numbers. RRR and R′R'R′ are functions R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R, constrained only on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Differentiability is HasDerivWithinAt R (R' q) (Set.Ici 0) q for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, so it is one-sided at 000. Strict concavity is StrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0) R.
  • R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c is encoded as "R′(Q)<cR'(Q) < cR′(Q)<c for some Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0". For a decreasing R′R'R′ this is equivalent, and it allows R′→−∞R' \to -\inftyR′→−∞.
  • "Optimal" means IsMaxOn over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (over [0,∞)×P[0,\infty)\times P[0,∞)×P in Sec. 3.1), and "unique" means every other maximizer equals it.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is not displayed in the paper. It is read off the sequence of events of Sec. 1.
  • The goal and the first-order condition take ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1]. At ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer's profit is identically zero and qIq_IqI​ is not the unique optimum. The profit identities and the buy-back identities hold for all real parameters and are stated that way.
  • Corrected slips. (a) Eq. (1) is introduced with "R′(0)≥cR'(0) \ge cR′(0)≥c". This contradicts the standing assumption R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c: with equality, qI=0q_I = 0qI​=0 is not positive. The statement uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c. (b) The display πr(qI)=ϕR(qI)−qIc=ϕΠ(qI)\pi_r(q_I) = \phi R(q_I) - q_I c = \phi\Pi(q_I)πr​(qI​)=ϕR(qI​)−qI​c=ϕΠ(qI​) has a wrong middle term, which should read ϕR(qI)−qIϕc\phi R(q_I) - q_I\phi cϕR(qI​)−qI​ϕc. The outer equality is stated.
  • The first-order-condition milestone adds the converse direction and uniqueness to the paper's "must satisfy". It does not claim that an optimum exists, which may fail when w/ϕ<cw/\phi < cw/ϕ<c.
  • Sec. 3.1 is stated in the generality of footnote 3: an arbitrary revenue function Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) and a set PPP of admissible prices, with the integrated optimum's uniqueness as a hypothesis, as the paper assumes it. The paper's monotonicity of F(x,p)F(x,p)F(x,p) in ppp is unused and omitted.
  • Sec. 2.3 is formalized pathwise. The expected-profit equations (2)–(4) are not part of the mission.
  • A goal that only asserts πr(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕ Π(q)\pi_r(\phi, \phi c, q) = \phi\,\Pi(q)πr​(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕΠ(q) would be an unfolding of definitions. The goal therefore carries the argmax-and-uniqueness claim, which needs strict concavity and the model's assumptions.
  • Needed infrastructure: first-order conditions for concave functions on a closed half-line with one-sided derivatives, and existence of maximizers from an eventual derivative bound. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of that general kind are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • K. S. Moorthy, Managing channel profits: Comment, Marketing Science 6(4):375–379, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.6.4.375
  • A. A. Tsay, W. S. Lovejoy, Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 1(2):89–111, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1.2.89
  • H. Emmons, S. M. Gilbert, Note: The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science 44(2):276–283, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under which a retailer pays a per-unit wholesale price and keeps only a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of its revenue, the rest going to the supplier. The contracts were made prominent by the video rental industry around 1998, where studios lowered tape prices in exchange for a share of rental income.

With a single retailer, revenue sharing at the wholesale price ϕc\phi cϕc coordinates the channel and splits its profit in the proportion ϕ\phiϕ. This mission formalizes the extension in Section 3.2 of the paper to competing retailers: several locations whose revenues depend on each other's stock, so that one retailer's order lowers the others' revenue. Competition creates externalities the single-retailer argument does not have, and the question is whether revenue sharing still coordinates, and at what prices. Section 4.1.2 then works out a Cournot example in closed form, measuring how far the supplier's own optimal wholesale price leaves the channel from the integrated profit.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000; the published version (Management Science 51(1), 2005) renumbers and revises the results. The working paper numbers no theorem, so results are cited by section, displayed equation and page.

Setting

A single supplier sells one product through nnn locations i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, each run by an independent retailer. A stocking profile is qˉ=(q1,…,qn)\bar q = (q_1,\dots,q_n)qˉ​=(q1​,…,qn​), and the revenue at location iii is Ri(qˉ)R_i(\bar q)Ri​(qˉ​), which may depend on every location's quantity. The system revenue is R(qˉ)=∑iRi(qˉ)R(\bar q) = \sum_i R_i(\bar q)R(qˉ​)=∑i​Ri​(qˉ​), every unit costs the supplier c>0c > 0c>0, and the integrated system profit is

Π(qˉ)=R(qˉ)−c∑i=1nqi.\Pi(\bar q) = R(\bar q) - c\sum_{i=1}^n q_i .Π(qˉ​)=R(qˉ​)−ci=1∑n​qi​.

Write Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj(qˉ)/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j(\bar q)/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​(qˉ​)/∂qi​: the superscript is the variable differentiated, the subscript the revenue function. The paper assumes that each RiR_iRi​ is continuous, that ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0 for j≠ij \ne ij=i (locations are substitutes), and that RiR_iRi​ is unimodal in qiq_iqi​. The system-optimal profile qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I has positive entries and solves the first-order system

Rii(qˉI)+∑j≠iRji(qˉI)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)R_i^i(\bar q^I) + \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I) = c, \qquad i = 1,\dots,n. \tag{6}Rii​(qˉ​I)+j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)

Under a revenue-sharing contract (ϕ,wi)(\phi, w_i)(ϕ,wi​) retailer iii earns πri(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi(qˉ)−wiqi\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \phi R_i(\bar q) - w_i q_iπri​​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi​(qˉ​)−wi​qi​ and the supplier earns πs(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i((1−ϕ)Ri(qˉ)+wiqi)−c∑iqi\pi_s(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \sum_i\big((1-\phi)R_i(\bar q) + w_i q_i\big) - c\sum_i q_iπs​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i​((1−ϕ)Ri​(qˉ​)+wi​qi​)−c∑i​qi​; the wholesale-price contract is ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, with profits written πri(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\bar w)πri​​(qˉ​,wˉ) and πs(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_s(\bar q,\bar w)πs​(qˉ​,wˉ). A Nash equilibrium in order quantities is a profile qˉ≥0\bar q \ge 0qˉ​≥0 from which no retailer gains by changing its own quantity to any x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The coordinating wholesale prices are

wiI=c−∑j≠iRji(qˉI).w_i^I = c - \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I).wiI​=c−j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I).

The Cournot example (7) is Ri(qˉ)=qi(1−qi−β∑j≠iqj)R_i(\bar q) = q_i\big(1 - q_i - \beta\sum_{j\ne i} q_j\big)Ri​(qˉ​)=qi​(1−qi​−β∑j=i​qj​) with 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing supports qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

For ϕ∈[0,1]\phi\in[0,1]ϕ∈[0,1] and wi(ϕ)=ϕwiIw_i(\phi) = \phi w_i^Iwi​(ϕ)=ϕwiI​:

qˉI is a Nash equilibrium,πri(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕ πri(qˉI,wˉI),πs(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉI)+ϕ πs(qˉI,wˉI).\bar q^I \text{ is a Nash equilibrium},\quad \pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = \phi\,\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I),\quad \pi_s(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = (1-\phi)\Pi(\bar q^I) + \phi\,\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I).qˉ​I is a Nash equilibrium,πri​​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕπri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI),πs​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉ​I)+ϕπs​(qˉ​I,wˉI).

Wholesale-price contracts (Sec. 3.2, pp. 13–14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies Rii(qˉN)=wiR_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_iRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​ (Eq. (8)), so marginal-cost pricing does not support qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I when a location imposes a negative externality; the prices wˉI\bar w^IwˉI make qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I an equilibrium; wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c when cross-effects are nonpositive; and wˉI\bar w^IwˉI supports exactly the split πs(qˉI,wˉI)=∑iqiI∑j≠i(−Rji(qˉI))\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) = \sum_i q_i^I\sum_{j\ne i}(-R_j^i(\bar q^I))πs​(qˉ​I,wˉI)=∑i​qiI​∑j=i​(−Rji​(qˉ​I)).

Revenue sharing (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies ϕRii(qˉN)=wi(ϕ)\phi R_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_i(\phi)ϕRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​(ϕ); the two profit identities hold for every ϕ\phiϕ; and πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0.

The Cournot example (Sec. 4.1.2, pp. 19–20)

At a common price w<1w<1w<1 the unique equilibrium is qiN=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1))q_i^N = (1-w)/(2+\beta(n-1))qiN​=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1)); the integrated optimum is qiI=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))q_i^I = (1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))qiI​=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)); the coordinating price wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))w^I = c + \beta(n-1)(1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)) increases in β\betaβ and nnn; the supplier's optimal price is w∗=(1+c)/2w^* = (1+c)/2w∗=(1+c)/2; and the efficiency at w∗w^*w∗ is

Π(qˉN(w∗))Π(qˉI)=1−1(2+β(n−1))2.\frac{\Pi(\bar q^N(w^*))}{\Pi(\bar q^I)} = 1 - \frac{1}{(2+\beta(n-1))^2}.Π(qˉ​I)Π(qˉ​N(w∗))​=1−(2+β(n−1))21​.

Significance

The goal shows that the single-retailer coordination result survives competition, with one change: the coordinating price must charge each retailer for the externality it imposes on the others, so it depends on every location's revenue function, and wiIw^I_iwiI​ exceeds the production cost. The supplier's profit then moves along a line between what wholesale prices alone give her and the whole system profit, which is how revenue sharing provides a profit split that linear prices cannot. The Cournot results make the comparison quantitative: when retailers compete intensely, the supplier's own optimal wholesale price already achieves most of the integrated profit, so revenue sharing, which has administrative costs, is less attractive.

No machine-checked proof of these results is known. The mission produces a reusable formal description of an nnn-player quantity game under per-retailer linear contracts, equilibrium conditions for it, and a fully worked Cournot instance, including a uniqueness claim for equilibria among all (not only symmetric) profiles.

Difficulty

The equilibrium claims are global: a retailer must not gain from any nonnegative deviation, not only from small ones. A first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I does not give this by itself. The page assumes RiR_iRi​ unimodal in qiq_iqi​, but unimodality does not survive subtracting the linear purchase cost, so the first-order condition is not sufficient under that assumption alone; the formalization uses concavity in the own quantity, under which it is. The participation claim πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 is stated on the page without proof and needs a bound on the revenue of a location that stocks nothing.

In the Cournot example, uniqueness of the equilibrium must exclude asymmetric profiles and profiles where some retailers stock nothing, and the supplier's optimal price must be compared against every equilibrium at every price, including prices at which the retailers order nothing.

Formalization scope

Locations are Fin n; a profile is Fin n → ℝ; revenues are R : Fin n → (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ, and dR i j q is Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​/∂qi​, given as a partial derivative at every profile with all entries positive. A deviation of retailer iii to xxx is Function.update q i x, and Nash equilibria quantify over all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The standing assumptions of Section 3.2 are fields of the structure Model: c>0c > 0c>0; continuity of RiR_iRi​ on the nonnegative orthant; the partial derivatives; ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0, encoded as "RiiR_i^iRii​ does not increase in qjq_jqj​"; and concavity of RiR_iRi​ in qiq_iqi​, which is the formalization's reading of "unimodal in qiq_iqi​". The paper's assumption that marginal revenue eventually falls below every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 is used only for existence of an equilibrium, which is not formalized, and is omitted.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  • qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I is taken as any positive solution of (6); its optimality for Π\PiΠ is not used.
  • "qˉ∗\bar q^*qˉ​∗ is a Nash equilibrium" (p. 13) is read as qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I.
  • In ϕ(Ri(qˉI)−qiIwi)\phi(R_i(\bar q^I) - q_i^I w_i)ϕ(Ri​(qˉ​I)−qiI​wi​) (p. 14), wiw_iwi​ is read as wiIw_i^IwiI​.
  • "Rii(qˉI)>cR_i^i(\bar q^I) > cRii​(qˉ​I)>c" needs a negative externality ∑j≠iRji(qˉI)<0\sum_{j\ne i}R_j^i(\bar q^I) < 0∑j=i​Rji​(qˉ​I)<0, which is assumed.
  • "Rji(qˉ)≤0R_j^i(\bar q) \le 0Rji​(qˉ​)≤0" is not a standing assumption, so it is a hypothesis of wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c, and strictness needs some strictly negative cross-effect.
  • πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 assumes nonnegative revenue at a location that stocks nothing.
  • In the Cournot example the implicit w<1w < 1w<1 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 are hypotheses; all retailers pay a common price; "increasing" is strict exactly where it holds (n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 for β\betaβ, β>0\beta > 0β>0 for nnn).

A formalization that defines "the prices coordinate" as "the prices satisfy the first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I" restates (6) and is ruled out: every equilibrium claim here is the game-theoretic statement about unilateral deviations. Contributions welcome: proofs of the equilibrium lemmas from concavity and the derivative, the Cournot uniqueness argument, and a general existence theorem for the quantity game.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991 (Theorem 1.2, existence of pure-strategy equilibria).
  • F. Bernstein, A. Federgruen, Pricing and Replenishment Strategies in a Distribution System with Competing Retailers, Operations Research 51(3):409–426, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.3.409.14957
  • J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.
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Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 3: The Optimal Wholesale-Price Contract with R′(q) = 1 − q^α Has Efficiency (2+α)/(1+α)^((1+α)/α)Research Paper

Motivation

A supplier who sells to a retailer at a per-unit wholesale price above her own production cost induces the retailer to order less than an integrated firm would. This effect, double marginalization, goes back to Spengler (1950) and is the standard benchmark against which supply chain contracts are judged: a contract coordinates the channel if it makes the decentralized decisions coincide with the integrated optimum. Revenue-sharing contracts, as used in the video-rental industry, coordinate the channel; the plain wholesale-price contract does not. Whether a supplier should bother with the administrative cost of revenue sharing depends on how much the wholesale-price contract actually loses and how much of the remaining profit the supplier keeps.

Cachon and Lariviere answer that question for a retailer whose revenue depends only on the quantity ordered, in Section 4.1.1 of their working paper Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations (June 2000; the 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material). They show that the answer is governed by the curvature of the marginal revenue curve, and they compute it exactly for a one-parameter family. The source is the June 2000 working paper, whose results are unnumbered; every item cites its section, page and display.

Setting

A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0 and sells to a single retailer. The retailer's expected revenue from qqq units is R(q)R(q)R(q), where R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0, RRR is strictly concave and differentiable on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with derivative R′R'R′ (the marginal revenue), R′R'R′ is differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with derivative R′′R''R′′, the product is viable (R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c), and a finite quantity is optimal (R′(q)<cR'(q) < cR′(q)<c for some qqq). The supply chain profit is Π(q)=R(q)−qc\Pi(q) = R(q) - qcΠ(q)=R(q)−qc; the integrated quantity qIq_IqI​ maximizes Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0.

Under a wholesale-price contract with price www, the retailer orders qqq to maximize R(q)−wqR(q) - wqR(q)−wq. Each order q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 is induced by exactly one price, w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q), so the supplier can be thought of as choosing qqq. Her profit, the retailer's profit, and their sum are then

πs(q)=q (R′(q)−c),πr(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs(q)+πr(q)=Π(q).\pi_s(q) = q\,(R'(q) - c), \qquad \pi_r(q) = R(q) - qR'(q), \qquad \pi_s(q) + \pi_r(q) = \Pi(q).πs​(q)=q(R′(q)−c),πr​(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs​(q)+πr​(q)=Π(q).

Following the paper, q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q)q \mapsto R'(q) + qR''(q)q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q) is assumed decreasing, which makes πs\pi_sπs​ unimodal. The supplier's optimal quantity to induce q∗q^*q∗ maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, and w(q∗)w(q^*)w(q∗) is her optimal wholesale price. The efficiency of the contract and the supplier's profit share are

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)andπs(q∗)Π(q∗).\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \frac{\pi_s(q^*)}{\Pi(q^*)} .Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​andΠ(q∗)πs​(q∗)​.

In the α-family, R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1)R(q) = q - q^{\alpha+1}/(\alpha+1)R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1) for α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], so R′(q)=1−qαR'(q) = 1 - q^\alphaR′(q)=1−qα: marginal revenue is convex for α<1\alpha < 1α<1, linear for α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and concave for α>1\alpha > 1α>1.

Formalization targets

Goal: the α-family

For α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1, the quantities q∗=(1−c1+α)1/αq^* = \left(\frac{1-c}{1+\alpha}\right)^{1/\alpha}q∗=(1+α1−c​)1/α and qI=(1−c)1/αq_I = (1-c)^{1/\alpha}qI​=(1−c)1/α are the unique maximizers of πs\pi_sπs​ and Π\PiΠ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the profit share is (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α), and

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)=2+α(1+α)1+αα,\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} = \frac{2+\alpha}{(1+\alpha)^{\frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}}},Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​=(1+α)α1+α​2+α​,

a quantity that does not depend on ccc, is strictly increasing in α\alphaα, tends to 2/e2/e2/e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ and to 111 as α→∞\alpha \to \inftyα→∞.

Milestones for a general revenue function

  1. The price w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q) makes qqq the retailer's unique optimum (Eq. (9)).
  2. 0<q∗<qI0 < q^* < q_I0<q∗<qI​.
  3. w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗)w(q^*) = c - q^*R''(q^*)w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗), and w(q∗)>cw(q^*) > cw(q∗)>c.
  4. The profit share is at most (at least) 2/32/32/3 when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  5. 2q∗≤qI2q^* \le q_I2q∗≤qI​ (≥qI\ge q_I≥qI​) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  6. Π(qI)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI(R′(z)−c) dz\Pi(q_I) - \Pi(q^*) = \int_{q^*}^{q_I}(R'(z) - c)\,dzΠ(qI​)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI​​(R′(z)−c)dz is at least (at most) 12πs(q∗)\tfrac12\pi_s(q^*)21​πs​(q∗) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).

Milestones for the α-family

  1. The closed forms of q∗q^*q∗, qIq_IqI​, πr(q∗)\pi_r(q^*)πr​(q∗), πs(q∗)\pi_s(q^*)πs​(q∗) and Π(qI)\Pi(q_I)Π(qI​).
  2. E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/αE(\alpha) = (2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α is strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with limits 2/e2/e2/e and 111.

Significance

The general milestones turn the paper's area argument (the triangle under the tangent to marginal revenue at q∗q^*q∗) into three comparisons: convex marginal revenue makes the wholesale-price contract worse for the chain and leaves the supplier at most two thirds of a smaller pie, concave marginal revenue the opposite. The α-family makes the trade-off exact: efficiency never falls below 2/e≈0.7362/e \approx 0.7362/e≈0.736, while the supplier's share (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α) moves much faster than efficiency, which is the paper's argument for why revenue sharing is most attractive when marginal revenue is convex.

These results are proved on paper but, to our knowledge, not machine-checked anywhere; Mathlib has no supply chain contract theory. The formalization provides a reusable single-retailer wholesale-price model, a checked version of the convex/concave tangent comparisons, and a corrected statement of the α-family's monotonicity (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The general comparisons are short on paper but rest on a picture: they need the first-order condition at an interior maximizer, the tangent-line inequality for a convex or concave derivative, and the fundamental theorem of calculus for a function whose derivative is known only on a half-line and one-sided at 000. Strictness needs a strictly positive integrand on a nondegenerate interval.

The α-family is where the analysis is not routine. The closed forms involve real powers with exponents 1/α1/\alpha1/α and (1+α)/α(1+\alpha)/\alpha(1+α)/α, which must be combined carefully. The limit (1+α)1/α→e(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha} \to e(1+α)1/α→e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ is classical, but the monotonicity of log⁡(2+α)−1+ααlog⁡(1+α)\log(2+\alpha) - \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}\log(1+\alpha)log(2+α)−α1+α​log(1+α) on all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) is not a one-line derivative sign check: the derivative mixes log⁡(1+α)/α2\log(1+\alpha)/\alpha^2log(1+α)/α2 with rational terms, and its sign has to be established uniformly near 000 and near ∞\infty∞.

Formalization scope

Quantities and prices are real numbers. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over all admissible quantities (IsMaxOn on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), or on [0,1][0,1][0,1] in the α-family, as the page restricts), never a root of a first-order condition. The derivative R′R'R′ of the general model is linked to RRR by a one-sided derivative hypothesis on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); R′′R''R′′ is required only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), since for α<1\alpha < 1α<1 it blows up at 000. In the α-family the marginal revenue is deriv of RRR, not a separate function, and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 is assumed (implicit on the page: c>0c > 0c>0 and R′(0)=1>cR'(0) = 1 > cR′(0)=1>c). Efficiency and profit share are real divisions; their denominators are positive at the optimal quantities.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items:

  • R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0 is added to the model. It is implicit in the paper's area reading of the retailer's profit, and the 2/32/32/3 comparison fails without it.
  • The paper states the curvature comparisons strictly ("less (more) than 2/3rds", "q∗>qI/2q^* > q_I/2q∗>qI​/2 (<qI/2< q_I/2<qI​/2)", "more (less) than 50%") under convexity (concavity). Linear marginal revenue is both and gives equality, so each item states the weak inequality under convexity or concavity and the strict one under strict convexity or concavity.
  • Printed slip. The page says "Efficiency is a decreasing function of α, i.e., efficiency improves as the marginal revenue curve becomes more concave". EEE is in fact strictly increasing (E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358E(0^+) = 2/e \approx 0.7358E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358, E(1)=0.75E(1) = 0.75E(1)=0.75, E(10)≈0.858E(10) \approx 0.858E(10)≈0.858), as the second half of the sentence and the two limits say. The Lean states the increasing form; the milestone text is kept verbatim. The numerical gloss "2/e≈0.732/e \approx 0.732/e≈0.73" is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the efficiency in the goal is the ratio of profits computed from RRR at the maximizers, not a definition equal to (2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α(2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α, and the maximizers are characterized as unique argmaxes rather than assumed.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the general tangent comparisons, which are reusable for any concave revenue model; the real-analysis lemmas on (1+α)1/α(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha}(1+α)1/α; and the α-family closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4):347–352, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
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