Corollary 5.2 — at a mixed Nash equilibrium of a harmonic game every player is indifferent among all pure strategies
ProvedHarmonicGames.UniformMixed.corollary_5_2game-theoryharmonic-gamesmixed-nash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a finite game with players , nonempty finite strategy sets and utilities , and suppose is a harmonic game, . Let be a mixed strategy profile. Then is a mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 5.1.1) if and only if
where is the mixed extension (34) and the payoff (35) of the pure strategy against .
Unlike general games, where equilibrium indifference holds only on the support of each mixed strategy, in a harmonic game each player is indifferent among all of its pure strategies at any mixed equilibrium.
Formalization Note The mixed extension is AGT.expectedPayoff; the payoff (35) and Definition 5.1.1 (with pure deviations) are from the mission's definition file.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Decomposition_Games import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_GenericPure_Games import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_UniformMixed_Mixed
Formal statement
namespace HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
/-- **Corollary 5.2** (p. 26): in a harmonic game `u ∈ H ⊕ N`, a mixed strategy profile
`x ∈ ∏_m ΔE^m` is a mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 5.1.1) if and only if
`u^m(x^m, x^{-m}) = u^m(p^m, x^{-m})` for all `p^m ∈ E^m` and all `m` (42), with `u^m(x)`
the mixed extension (34) and `u^m(p^m, x^{-m})` the payoff (35). -/
theorem corollary_5_2 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
[∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
(u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hu : u ∈ HarmonicGames.GenericPure.harmonicGames E) (x : ∀ m, E m → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x) :
IsMixedNashEquilibrium (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x ↔
∀ (m : ι) (a : E m), AGT.expectedPayoff (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x m = mixedVsPure (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x m a := by sorry
end HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
Source
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, p. 26, Corollary 5.2, (42)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.