A posted uniform price dominates every differentiated policy for affiliated exchangeable PMFs
ProvedMinBuying.pmf_policy_dominationmin-buyingmtp2operations-researchpricingprobability
Let be a probability mass function on nonnegative real-valued item valuations. If its law is exchangeable and its real-valued mass function is MTP2, then every feasible differentiated price vector is weakly dominated in expected revenue by a uniform price equal to one of its coordinates . No finite-support or optimal-price-attainment assumption is required. In notation,
The witness is one of the original posted prices, which permits transfer through a coarsening at finitely many thresholds.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_MinBuying_Symmetry
Formal statement
namespace MinBuying
theorem pmf_policy_domination (n : ℕ) (hn : 0 < n) (w : PMF (Valuations n))
(hμ : ValidLaw w.toMeasure) (hex : Exchangeable w.toMeasure)
(hmtp : MTP2 (fun v => (w v).toReal)) (p : Prices n) (hp : FeasiblePrices p) :
∃ i : Fin n, Revenue w.toMeasure p ≤ uniformRevenue w.toMeasure (p i) := by
sorry
end MinBuying
Source
Titing Cui, Michael L. Hamilton, Jourdain Lamperski, and Kasra Ganjizadeh Tari, Unit-Demand Pricing for Min-Buying Customers, September 27, 2026 manuscript, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5178133 . Theorem 2 and its proof, ec2–ec3, specialized to the PMF alternative of affiliation. The exact posted-price witness is retained for the finite-coarsening transfer.