Proposition 1, p. 1347 — without commitment the EM underproduces, Q*_NC < Q*_CC, and expected system profit is strictly suboptimal
ProvedTsayQF.NoCommit.proposition_1Consider the supply chain of Tsay (1999): a retailer and a manufacturer (EM) with retail price , transfer price , production cost , salvage value and goodwill loss satisfying
Market demand is , where the signal has a differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function and finite variance, and , , is independent of . Let .
The retailer's forecast carries no commitment: the EM produces before is observed, and the retailer then buys . Let be any production maximizing the EM's expected profit , and any production maximizing the central planner's expected profit . Then, for every such transfer price ,
That is, the EM underproduces relative to the optimal centralized solution, and the expected total system profit is strictly suboptimal.
This is the inefficiency result that motivates contracts beyond a linear transfer price, such as the quantity flexibility contract.
Formalization Note The two productions are stated as arbitrary maximizers of the respective expected profits over ; the milestones show that maximizers exist and equal and . is a real with the hypothesis . Finite variance of (the paper's "variance ") makes every expectation integrable. The case is included. The error stays normal, as in §3.3 (footnote 5 remarks normality is not needed).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_NoCommit_Model open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory open scoped NNReal
namespace TsayQF.NoCommit
theorem proposition_1 (D : Data) (ν : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
(hΘ : StrictMono (cdf ν)) (hΘd : Differentiable ℝ (cdf ν)) (hν : MemLp id 2 ν)
(v : ℝ≥0) (z : ℝ) (hz : cdf (gaussianReal 0 1) z = kR D) (Qnc Qcc : ℝ)
(hnc : IsMaxOn (emProfit D ν v z) Set.univ Qnc)
(hcc : IsMaxOn (ccProfit D ν v) Set.univ Qcc) :
Qnc < Qcc ∧ systemProfit D ν v z Qnc < ccProfit D ν v Qcc := by sorry
end TsayQF.NoCommit
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.