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Proposition 1, p. 1347 — without commitment the EM underproduces, Q*_NC < Q*_CC, and expected system profit is strictly suboptimal

Proved
TsayQF.NoCommit.proposition_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

double-marginalizationnewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Consider the supply chain of Tsay (1999): a retailer and a manufacturer (EM) with retail price ppp, transfer price ccc, production cost mmm, salvage value uuu and goodwill loss sss satisfying

p>c>m>0,u<m,s≥0.p > c > m > 0,\qquad u < m,\qquad s \ge 0 .p>c>m>0,u<m,s≥0.

Market demand is X=μ+εX = \mu + \varepsilonX=μ+ε, where the signal μ\muμ has a differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function Θ\ThetaΘ and finite variance, and ε∼N(0,σε2)\varepsilon \sim N(0,\sigma_\varepsilon^2)ε∼N(0,σε2​), σε≥0\sigma_\varepsilon \ge 0σε​≥0, is independent of μ\muμ. Let zε=Φ−1((p+s−c)/(p+s−u))z_\varepsilon = \Phi^{-1}\big((p+s-c)/(p+s-u)\big)zε​=Φ−1((p+s−c)/(p+s−u)).

The retailer's forecast carries no commitment: the EM produces QQQ before μ\muμ is observed, and the retailer then buys min⁡[μ+zεσε,Q]\min[\mu + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilon, Q]min[μ+zε​σε​,Q]. Let QNC∗Q^*_{NC}QNC∗​ be any production maximizing the EM's expected profit πEM,NC\pi_{EM,NC}πEM,NC​, and QCC∗Q^*_{CC}QCC∗​ any production maximizing the central planner's expected profit ΠCC\Pi_{CC}ΠCC​. Then, for every such transfer price ccc,

QNC∗<QCC∗andπR,NC(QNC∗)+πEM,NC(QNC∗)<ΠCC(QCC∗).Q^*_{NC} < Q^*_{CC} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \pi_{R,NC}(Q^*_{NC}) + \pi_{EM,NC}(Q^*_{NC}) < \Pi_{CC}(Q^*_{CC}).QNC∗​<QCC∗​andπR,NC​(QNC∗​)+πEM,NC​(QNC∗​)<ΠCC​(QCC∗​).

That is, the EM underproduces relative to the optimal centralized solution, and the expected total system profit is strictly suboptimal.

This is the inefficiency result that motivates contracts beyond a linear transfer price, such as the quantity flexibility contract.

Formalization Note The two productions are stated as arbitrary maximizers of the respective expected profits over R\mathbb RR; the milestones show that maximizers exist and equal Θ−1((c−m)/(c−u))+zεσε\Theta^{-1}((c-m)/(c-u)) + z_\varepsilon\sigma_\varepsilonΘ−1((c−m)/(c−u))+zε​σε​ and F−1((p+s−m)/(p+s−u))F^{-1}((p+s-m)/(p+s-u))F−1((p+s−m)/(p+s−u)). zεz_\varepsilonzε​ is a real zzz with the hypothesis Φ(z)=(p+s−c)/(p+s−u)\Phi(z) = (p+s-c)/(p+s-u)Φ(z)=(p+s−c)/(p+s−u). Finite variance of μ\muμ (the paper's "variance σμ2\sigma_\mu^2σμ2​") makes every expectation integrable. The case σε=0\sigma_\varepsilon = 0σε​=0 is included. The error stays normal, as in §3.3 (footnote 5 remarks normality is not needed).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_NoCommit_Model
open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
open scoped NNReal
Formal statement
namespace TsayQF.NoCommit

theorem proposition_1 (D : Data) (ν : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    (hΘ : StrictMono (cdf ν)) (hΘd : Differentiable ℝ (cdf ν)) (hν : MemLp id 2 ν)
    (v : ℝ≥0) (z : ℝ) (hz : cdf (gaussianReal 0 1) z = kR D) (Qnc Qcc : ℝ)
    (hnc : IsMaxOn (emProfit D ν v z) Set.univ Qnc)
    (hcc : IsMaxOn (ccProfit D ν v) Set.univ Qcc) :
    Qnc < Qcc ∧ systemProfit D ν v z Qnc < ccProfit D ν v Qcc := by sorry

end TsayQF.NoCommit
Source
Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management Science 45(10) (1999), p. 1347, Proposition 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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