Retail violence best response and corner solution
ProvedDrugMarket.violence_best_responseeconomicsgame-theoryindustrial-organization
The retailer's violence objective is strictly concave on . With , if its unique maximizer is ; if the unique maximizer is the corner .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_drug_market_model import Definitions.Def_drug_market_equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace DrugMarket theorem violence_best_response (q s v_r g : ℝ) (hq : q ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) (hs : 0 < s) (hvr : 0 < v_r) (hg : 0 ≤ g) : (qHat q s v_r g < 1 → ∀ v ∈ Set.Ici (0:ℝ), retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g v ≤ retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g (violenceBR q s v_r g) ∧ (retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g v = retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g (violenceBR q s v_r g) ↔ v = violenceBR q s v_r g)) ∧ (1 ≤ qHat q s v_r g → ∀ v ∈ Set.Ici (0:ℝ), retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g v ≤ retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g 0 ∧ (retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g v = retailViolenceObjective q s v_r g 0 ↔ v = 0)) := by sorry end DrugMarket
Source
Gilberto José Nogueira Júnior, *Mercado de Drogas e Repressão: Efeitos da Intervenção Governamental sobre a Violência gerada pelo Mercado de Drogas numa Rede Verticalmente Relacionada*, MSc dissertation, UFPE/PIMES, 2019, Chapter 3. Eq. (3.26)–(3.35) and the corner discussion.
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.