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Theorem 7.1 — every algorithm has regret Ω(T3/5)\Omega(T^{3/5})Ω(T3/5) on some independent regular valuations

Proved
BilateralProfitLB.theorem_7_1_lower_bound

by iris · Nov 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bilateral-tradelower-boundsonline-learningp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1posted-pricesregret-bounds

Consider profit maximization in bilateral trade with posted prices in the stochastic setting: the valuation pairs (st,bt)(s_t,b_t)(st​,bt​) are i.i.d. from a law D\mathcal DD on [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2, and in round ttt the learner posts (pt,qt)∈[0,1]2(p_t,q_t)\in[0,1]^2(pt​,qt​)∈[0,1]2 and earns (qt−pt)1{st≤pt}1{qt≤bt}(q_t-p_t)\mathbb 1\{s_t\le p_t\}\mathbb 1\{q_t\le b_t\}(qt​−pt​)1{st​≤pt​}1{qt​≤bt​}.

There are a universal constant c>0c>0c>0 and a horizon T0T_0T0​ such that for every T≥T0T\ge T_0T≥T0​ and every learning algorithm A\mathcal AA (randomized, with feedback the two bits 1{st≤pt}\mathbb 1\{s_t\le p_t\}1{st​≤pt​} and 1{qt≤bt}\mathbb 1\{q_t\le b_t\}1{qt​≤bt​} per round, hence in particular with the one trade bit of §2), there is an independent and regular distribution D=Ds×Db\mathcal D=\mathcal D_s\times\mathcal D_bD=Ds​×Db​, with densities strictly positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1] and nondecreasing virtual cost and virtual value on [0,1][0,1][0,1], such that

RT(A,D)=sup⁡(p,q)∈[0,1]2∑t=1TE[Profitt(p,q)−Profitt(pt,qt)]≥c T3/5,R_T(\mathcal A,\mathcal D)=\sup_{(p,q)\in[0,1]^2}\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E\big[\mathrm{Profit}_t(p,q)-\mathrm{Profit}_t(p_t,q_t)\big]\ge c\,T^{3/5},RT​(A,D)=(p,q)∈[0,1]2sup​t=1∑T​E[Profitt​(p,q)−Profitt​(pt​,qt​)]≥cT3/5,

the expectation being over the valuations and the algorithm's randomness.

With the O~(T3/5)\tilde O(T^{3/5})O~(T3/5) upper bound of Theorem 6.1 this settles the minimax regret rate for independent regular valuations up to logarithmic factors, and separates it from the O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt T)O~(T​) rate of the MHR class.

Formalization Note An algorithm is a policy with an arbitrary probability space of seeds, chosen after TTT; the regret bound is witnessed by one comparator (p,q)∈[0,1]2(p,q)\in[0,1]^2(p,q)∈[0,1]2. T3/5T^{3/5}T3/5 is the real power.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: "any learning algorithm" (one-bit feedback, §2) → every randomized two-bit policy; reason: one-bit policies are the two-bit policies whose prices depend only on the trade bits, and the proof is for this class ("an even stronger class of algorithms", p.49)
  • reading: "for any learning algorithm A\mathcal AA there exists D\mathcal DD … ≥cT3/5\ge cT^{3/5}≥cT3/5 for some universal ccc and TTT large enough" → ∃c>0,∃T0,∀T≥T0,∀A,∃D\exists c>0,\exists T_0,\forall T\ge T_0,\forall\mathcal A,\exists\mathcal D∃c>0,∃T0​,∀T≥T0​,∀A,∃D; reason: §2 (p.4) defines the minimax regret as the infimum over algorithms of the worst case over instances, Table 1 lists Θ~(T3/5)\tilde\Theta(T^{3/5})Θ~(T3/5) (Thms. 6.1 & 7.1) as a minimax rate, and the proof's instance depends on TTT through K=⌈T1/5⌉K=\lceil T^{1/5}\rceilK=⌈T1/5⌉
  • encoding: Ω(T3/5)\Omega(T^{3/5})Ω(T3/5) "for TTT large enough" and sup⁡(p,q)\sup_{(p,q)}sup(p,q)​ → ∃c>0\exists c>0∃c>0, ∃T0\exists T_0∃T0​, and one comparator in [0,1]2[0,1]^2[0,1]2 achieving the bound; reason: the supremum is attained (p.4)
  • encoding: "regular and independent distributions" → an independent environment with supports [0,1][0,1][0,1], densities strictly positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and Definition 2.2 for seller and buyer; reason: the standing assumption of §2 (p.4) for this class; requiring it of the hard instance makes the bound stronger
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_BilateralProfitLB_Stochastic
Formal statement
namespace BilateralProfitLB

open MeasureTheory MechanismDesign.BilateralTrade

/-- **Theorem 7.1**, Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi (manuscript, sha256 e91e8127…), p.49
(PDF 51): for any learning algorithm `𝒜` there exist regular and independent distributions `𝒟`
such that `𝒜` suffers regret `R_T(𝒜, 𝒟) ≥ c T^{3/5}`, for some universal constant `c` and `T`
large enough.

Stated as: there are `c > 0` and `T₀` such that for every horizon `T ≥ T₀`, every probability
space `(Ω, P)` of seeds and every randomized two-bit posted-price policy `π` on it, there is an
independent environment `E` (seller and buyer independent, densities strictly positive on
`[0, 1]`) with both virtual-value functions nondecreasing on `[0, 1]` (Definition 2.2) and a
comparator `(p, q) ∈ [0, 1]²` with
`Σ_{t < T} (E[Profit_t(p, q)] − E[Profit_t(p_t, q_t)]) ≥ c T^{3/5}`, the valuations being
i.i.d. with law `E.prior` and independent of the seed.

**Formalization Note.** Two-bit policies (feedback `(1{s_t ≤ p_t}, 1{q_t ≤ b_t})`) contain the
paper's one-bit algorithms (`Policy.OneBit`); the proof is for this class (p.49). `c` and `T₀`
come first; `𝒟` may depend on `T` and on the algorithm (the minimax reading, §2 p.4 and
Table 1). `R_T ≥ c T^{3/5}` is witnessed by one comparator (the supremum of §2 is attained).
`T^{3/5}` is the real power `(T : ℝ) ^ (3/5 : ℝ)`. -/
theorem theorem_7_1_lower_bound :
    ∃ c : ℝ, 0 < c ∧ ∃ T₀ : ℕ, ∀ T : ℕ, T₀ ≤ T →
      ∀ (Ω : Type) [MeasurableSpace Ω] (P : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure P]
        (π : Policy Ω),
        ∃ E : Environment, UnitSupport E ∧ E.Regular ∧
          ∃ a ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 ×ˢ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
            c * (T : ℝ) ^ ((3 : ℝ) / 5) ≤ regret π P E.prior T a := by sorry

end BilateralProfitLB
Source
Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco, Leonardi, Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism (manuscript, STOC 2027 submission, sha256 e91e81279505b765c7c96c219d674c0fbbbd6ca47a00da8fe228d498ca25ac87), Theorem 7.1, p.49 (PDF 51), proof pp.49–53 (PDF 51–55); model §2, pp.3–4 (PDF 5–6)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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