Appendix A, proof of Proposition 1, (31)–(32), p. 24 (PDF 25) — the equilibrium price and the manager's demand
ProvedKyleProduction.Monopoly.price_demandkyle-modellinear-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let , and let the players use the trading-stage equilibrium strategies at . Then for every realization the price of the firm's stock is
and the manager's demand is
The price puts weight one half on the realized firm value, and the insider buys exactly when demand exceeds its posterior mean.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KyleProduction_Monopoly_Model
Formal statement
namespace KyleProduction.Monopoly
theorem price_demand (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) (q : ℝ) (hq : 0 < q) (a u : ℝ) :
price (eqStrat P q) (orderFlow (eqStrat P q) q (a, u)) =
1 / 2 * q * ((postMean P - q) + (a - q) + 1 / P.Su * kappa P * u) ∧
demand (eqStrat P q) (firmValue q a) =
-(Real.sqrt P.Su / Real.sqrt (postVar P)) * (postMean P - q) +
Real.sqrt P.Su / Real.sqrt (postVar P) * (a - q) := by sorry
end KyleProduction.Monopoly
Source
Chen and Jorgensen, Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation, SSRN 2358668 (version of February 2016), p. 24 (PDF 25), Appendix A, proof of Proposition 1, (31)–(32)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.