(56), p. 32 (PDF 34) — clamped effort minimizes net effort cost
ProvedHedgeContract.OPE.eq_56convex-optimizationdynamic-contractingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1principal-agentstochastic-control
Let and . For every sensitivity , the clamped response in equation (56) belongs to and satisfies
Thus the formula defining really gives the manager's constrained best response; later results may use the same response without reintroducing the minimization problem.
Formalization Note. The endpoint cases agree because .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_HedgeContract_OPE_Model set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace HedgeContract.OPE
open MeasureTheory Filter Topology
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
/-- Equation (56): the clamped effort is a minimizer of the net effort cost. -/
theorem eq_56 (P : Params) (Z : ℝ) (hκ : 0 < P.κ) (hA : P.Alo ≤ P.Ahi) :
Astar P Z ∈ Set.Icc P.Alo P.Ahi ∧
∀ A ∈ Set.Icc P.Alo P.Ahi,
h P (Astar P Z) - Z * Astar P Z ≤ h P A - Z * A := by sorry
end HedgeContract.OPE
Source
Huang, Ju & Xing, Optimal Contracting with Unobservable Managerial Hedging, working paper (Nov. 14, 2017), p. 32 (PDF 34), §6.6, equation (56)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.