§3.3 Benchmark, p. 11 — transparent selling earns at most 2·max{vH − cH, vL − cL}, attained at pH = vH or pL = vL
ProvedDynOpaque.TwoPeriod.benchmark_transparentopaque-sellingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1transparent-selling
Assume , , , . A transparent policy sells one version in both periods at prices ; customers buy in period iff . Then:
- every transparent policy earns at most
- selling at price in both periods earns ;
- selling at price in both periods earns .
Hence the optimal transparent policy sells when and when . This is the benchmark against which the probabilistic selling policy is compared in Proposition 1.
Formalization Note The bound in item 1 uses (so the bound is nonnegative, covering prices at which nobody buys).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DynOpaque_TwoPeriod_Model
Formal statement
namespace DynOpaque.TwoPeriod
/-- §3.3 Benchmark, p. 11: every transparent policy earns at most
`2 max{vH − cH, vL − cL}`; selling `H` at `vH` in both periods earns `2(vH − cH)`, selling `L` at
`vL` in both periods earns `2(vL − cL)`. -/
theorem benchmark_transparent (vH vL cH cL α : ℝ) (hS : Standing vH vL cH cL α) :
(∀ (m : Version) (q₁ q₂ : ℝ),
transparentProfit vH vL cH cL m q₁ q₂ ≤ 2 * max (vH - cH) (vL - cL)) ∧
transparentProfit vH vL cH cL Version.H vH vH = 2 * (vH - cH) ∧
transparentProfit vH vL cH cL Version.L vL vL = 2 * (vL - cL) := by sorry
end DynOpaque.TwoPeriod
Source
Huang and Yin, Dynamic Probabilistic Selling When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations, SSRN manuscript 3627927, p. 11, §3.3 Benchmark
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.