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Proof of Theorem 4, PDF p. 6 — with w₁ = s₂, w₂ = s₁ on speeds s₁ ≤ s₂ ≤ φs₁, the stated mixed profile is a Nash equilibrium

Proved
WorstCaseEq.Speeds.instance_isNash

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

golden-ratiomixed-strategiesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Let 0<s1≤s2≤φs10<s_1\le s_2\le\varphi s_10<s1​≤s2​≤φs1​, where φ=(1+5)/2\varphi=(1+\sqrt5)/2φ=(1+5​)/2. Consider two links with speeds s1,s2s_1,s_2s1​,s2​ and two agents with traffic w1=s2w_1=s_2w1​=s2​ and w2=s1w_2=s_1w2​=s1​, with no other traffic on the links. Let agent iii choose link 1 with probability pi1p_i^1pi1​ and link 2 with probability pi2=1−pi1p_i^2=1-p_i^1pi2​=1−pi1​, where

p11=s12s2(s1+s2),p21=1−s22s1(s1+s2).p_1^1=\frac{s_1^2}{s_2(s_1+s_2)},\qquad p_2^1=1-\frac{s_2^2}{s_1(s_1+s_2)} .p11​=s2​(s1​+s2​)s12​​,p21​=1−s1​(s1​+s2​)s22​​.

Then this mixed profile is a Nash equilibrium: both p1p_1p1​ and p2p_2p2​ are probability distributions, and neither agent can lower its expected delay by changing its strategy unilaterally.

This is the equilibrium whose social cost gives the lower bound of Theorem 4.

Formalization Note The paper's agents 1, 2 and links 1, 2 are 0, 1; the weight vector is ![s₂, s₁] and the speed vector ![s₁, s₂]. The speeds enter only through the hypotheses; s2>0s_2>0s2​>0 follows from 0<s1≤s20<s_1\le s_20<s1​≤s2​.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_WorstCaseEq_Speeds_Model
Formal statement
namespace WorstCaseEq.Speeds

theorem instance_isNash (s₁ s₂ : ℝ) (h₁ : 0 < s₁) (h₁₂ : s₁ ≤ s₂)
    (hφ : s₂ ≤ Real.goldenRatio * s₁) :
    IsNash (instWeights s₁ s₂) (speeds s₁ s₂) (instProfile s₁ s₂) := by sorry

end WorstCaseEq.Speeds
Source
Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria (journal version, 2009), PDF p. 6, proof of Theorem 4
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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