Corollary 1 (ii), p. 13 — there are c_l ≤ û ≤ c_h with α* = α̲ for c ≤ c_l or c ≥ c_h and α* = ᾱ for c_l < c < c_h
ProvedInfoBargaining.Uniform.corollary1_ii_threshold_costbargaininginformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1thresholduniform-prior
Under the uniform prior (mean ) and the linear information cost, fix the buyer's bargaining power . There exist thresholds such that for every seller cost , with the set of optimal information levels:
- if or , minimal information is optimal: ;
- if or , it is the only optimum: ;
- if , maximal information is the only optimum: .
The buyer gathers information only when the seller's cost lies in an intermediate range around the prior mean, where trade is most uncertain. The jumps of at and drive Proposition 2 (ii) and (iii).
Formalization Note " for or " is items 1 and 2: at a threshold both corners can be optimal and the paper selects . When the buyer never gathers information, is allowed. Restricted to the uniform prior.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Uniform_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Uniform
theorem corollary1_ii_threshold_cost (M : Model) (θb : ℝ) (hθb : θb ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) :
∃ cl ch : ℝ, cl ≤ 1 / 2 ∧ 1 / 2 ≤ ch ∧
∀ c ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1,
((c ≤ cl ∨ ch ≤ c) → M.αlo ∈ M.optSet θb c) ∧
((c < cl ∨ ch < c) → M.optSet θb c = {M.αlo}) ∧
(cl < c ∧ c < ch → M.optSet θb c = {M.αhi}) := by sorry
end InfoBargaining.Uniform
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 13, Corollary 1 (ii); proof p. 30
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.