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Theorem 1, p. 17 — for a single firm the GDPR raises profit and welfare, and raises consumer surplus iff v < 2ℳ√(1−δ)/(𝒵√ℱ)

Proved
RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm.theorem_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

consumer-surplusgdprp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1privacywelfare-comparison

Let c>0c>0c>0, δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1) and v>0v>0v>0, and put

Z=2c+δ,M=4c2(1−δ)+cδ(4−3δ)+δ2,F=4c2(1−δ)+4cδ(1−δ)+δ2,τ=2M1−δZF.\mathcal Z = 2c+\delta,\quad \mathcal M = 4c^2(1-\delta)+c\delta(4-3\delta)+\delta^2,\quad \mathcal F = 4c^2(1-\delta)+4c\delta(1-\delta)+\delta^2,\quad \tau = \frac{2\mathcal M\sqrt{1-\delta}}{\mathcal Z\sqrt{\mathcal F}} .Z=2c+δ,M=4c2(1−δ)+cδ(4−3δ)+δ2,F=4c2(1−δ)+4cδ(1−δ)+δ2,τ=ZF​2M1−δ​​.

The single-firm game has a subgame-perfect equilibrium under the R\mathbb RR mode (before the GDPR) and under the C\mathbb CC mode (the GDPR). For every equilibrium of the R\mathbb RR mode and every equilibrium of the C\mathbb CC mode:

  1. if v<τv < \tauv<τ, the consumer surplus is strictly higher under the GDPR;
  2. if v>τv > \tauv>τ, the consumer surplus is strictly lower under the GDPR;
  3. the firm's profit is strictly higher under the GDPR;
  4. social welfare, the firm's profit plus the consumer surplus, is strictly higher under the GDPR.

The GDPR thus always benefits the firm and society in the single-firm setting, while its effect on consumers reverses at the valuation τ\tauτ: below it the direct privacy effect dominates, above it the higher price under the GDPR does.

Formalization Note All four comparisons are between on-path outcomes of subgame-perfect profiles of the game defined in the model file, with prices over all of R\mathbb RR and every off-path subgame specified. The paper's "always increases" for profit and welfare is stated strictly. The hypothesis v>0v>0v>0 is implicit in the paper: at v≤0v\le0v≤0 nothing is sold and every outcome is 000.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RetailPrivacy_SingleFirm_Model
Formal statement
namespace RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm

theorem theorem_1 (c δ v : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hδ0 : 0 < δ) (hδ1 : δ < 1) (hv : 0 < v) :
    (∃ P : Profile, IsSPE .R v c δ P) ∧
    (∃ P : Profile, IsSPE .C v c δ P) ∧
    ∀ PR PC : Profile, IsSPE .R v c δ PR → IsSPE .C v c δ PC →
      (v < 2 * Mc c δ * Real.sqrt (1 - δ) / (Zc c δ * Real.sqrt (Fc c δ)) →
        eqCS v δ PR < eqCS v δ PC) ∧
      (2 * Mc c δ * Real.sqrt (1 - δ) / (Zc c δ * Real.sqrt (Fc c δ)) < v →
        eqCS v δ PC < eqCS v δ PR) ∧
      eqProfit v c δ PR < eqProfit v c δ PC ∧
      eqWelfare v c δ PR < eqWelfare v c δ PC := by sorry

end RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm
Source
Xu, Wang & Zhang, Consumer Privacy in Online Retail Supply Chains, author manuscript (Management Science, forthcoming; version of November 2024), p. 17, Theorem 1; proof pp. ec23–ec24
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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