Lemma 3, p. 16 (PDF 18) — conditional scolding versus monetary incentives
ProvedLeaderStyle.WageFloor.lemma_3incentive-contractsleadershipmoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-floor
Conditional scolding is strictly cheaper than pure monetary incentives exactly when
When (U) holds, the wage floor is strictly above the worker's reservation utility: . The condition captures the rent that can absorb the worker's disutility from scolding.
Formalization Note The equivalence also holds for competitive wage-setting, where both sides are false. The rent and welfare clauses of the printed lemma are outside this item.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LeaderStyle_WageFloor_Model
Formal statement
namespace LeaderStyle.WageFloor
theorem lemma_3 (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) :
(Prefers P .U .none ↔ condU P) ∧
(condU P → P.ur < P.wf) := by sorry
end LeaderStyle.WageFloor
Source
Dur, Kvaløy & Schöttner, Leadership Styles and Labor-Market Conditions, CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 278 (26 Feb 2021), p. 16 (PDF 18), Lemma 3, p. 16 (PDF 18)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.