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Theorem 2 — random rescaling turns a UT, EPIR α-approximation for welfare into E[RS] ≥ W(N)/(12α(L+1)), L = ⌈log₂(6αn)⌉

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MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement.theorem_2

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designmoney-burningp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let n≥2n\ge2n≥2 agents have valuations in domains ViV_iVi​ of nonnegative valuations on a nonempty finite outcome set OOO, each closed under multiplication by every real s>0s>0s>0. Let 1≤α≤n1\le\alpha\le n1≤α≤n. Let MMM be a randomized mechanism with seed r∼μr\sim\mur∼μ that is universally truthful, ex-post individually rational and has nonnegative payments on these domains, and is an α\alphaα-approximation for welfare: for every admissible profile vvv,

Er[∑ivi(or(v))]≥W(N)α,W(N)=max⁡o∈O∑ivi(o).\mathbb E_r\Big[\sum_{i}v_i\big(o^r(v)\big)\Big]\ge\frac{W(N)}{\alpha},\qquad W(N)=\max_{o\in O}\sum_iv_i(o).Er​[i∑​vi​(or(v))]≥αW(N)​,W(N)=o∈Omax​i∑​vi​(o).

Let M~\widetilde MM be the random-rescaling mechanism with L=⌈log⁡2(6αn)⌉L=\lceil\log_2(6\alpha n)\rceilL=⌈log2​(6αn)⌉, ρ=1+1/L\rho=1+1/Lρ=1+1/L: independent levels KiK_iKi​ with Pr⁡[Ki=k]=2−(k+1)\Pr[K_i=k]=2^{-(k+1)}Pr[Ki​=k]=2−(k+1) for k<Lk<Lk<L and 2−L2^{-L}2−L for k=Lk=Lk=L, scales si=ρKis_i=\rho^{K_i}si​=ρKi​, one run of MMM on (sivi)i(s_iv_i)_i(si​vi​)i​, and payments pi/sip_i/s_ipi​/si​. Then

  1. M~\widetilde MM is universally truthful (every pair of a scaling vector and a seed of MMM gives a truthful deterministic mechanism);
  2. M~\widetilde MM is ex-post individually rational and has nonnegative payments, for every such pair;
  3. for every admissible profile vvv,
E[∑i(vi(o)−p~i)]≥W(N)12α(L+1);\mathbb E\Big[\sum_i\big(v_i(o)-\tilde p_i\big)\Big]\ge\frac{W(N)}{12\alpha(L+1)};E[i∑​(vi​(o)−p~​i​)]≥12α(L+1)W(N)​;
  1. L≤⌈log⁡2(6n2)⌉L\le\lceil\log_2(6n^2)\rceilL≤⌈log2​(6n2)⌉, so the surplus approximation factor 12α(L+1)12\alpha(L+1)12α(L+1) is O(αlog⁡n)O(\alpha\log n)O(αlogn).

This is the paper's black-box reduction from welfare to residual surplus; the constant is the one its proof establishes, and the last clause is the step from it to the printed O(αlog⁡n)O(\alpha\log n)O(αlogn).

Formalization Note The expectation in 3 is a finite sum over level vectors KKK of the Bochner integral over r∼μr\sim\mur∼μ. Measurability of MMM in its seed at admissible profiles is assumed so that expectations are defined; with finitely many outcomes this makes every integrand bounded and integrable. The sentence on invoking MMM once and computational efficiency has no cost model in the paper and is not a Lean clause: the single invocation is the explicit construction.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: agents N = {1,…,n} with n ≥ 2, nonnegative valuations on a nonempty finite outcome set O → Fin n with 2 ≤ n, real-valued functions O → ℝ with pointwise nonnegativity carried by the domain, Fintype O, Nonempty O, DecidableEq O; reason: relabeling and decidable finite membership change no instance
  • encoding: a randomized mechanism with internal random seed r drawn independently of the reports → a seed-indexed family (o^r, p^r) on a measurable space with a probability measure μ, measurable in r at admissible profiles; reason: the expectations of §2 require measurability; it excludes no mechanism with finitely many outcomes whose randomness is a random variable
  • encoding: UT, EPIR and nonnegative payments of M and of the converted mechanism (EPIR and payments for every (o,p) in the support) → AGT.MechIncentiveCompatible, AGT.IndividuallyRational and AGT.NoPositiveTransfers for every seed; reason: §2 defines UT seedwise, and the proof (PDF 10–11) uses and proves EPIR and nonnegative payments seedwise
  • encoding: scalable valuation domains of valuations O → ℝ≥0 → IsScalableDomain V: every member pointwise nonnegative, s • u ∈ V i for every real s > 0; reason: this is the definition on PDF 8; all reports and deviations lie in V
  • reading: can be converted into a mechanism with the same properties and surplus approximation factor O(α log n) → the explicit random-rescaling mechanism of PDF 10 is UT, EPIR, has nonnegative payments and E[RS] ≥ W(N)/(12α(L+1)), and L ≤ ⌈log₂(6n²)⌉; reason: the theorem refers to that construction; the explicit constant is the proof's (PDF 12) and implies the printed O(α log n); "the same properties" are the three the proof establishes
  • reading: the reduction invokes the starting mechanism once and preserves computational efficiency whenever scaled valuations can be accessed efficiently → no Lean clause; the construction calls M once on the scaled profile; reason: the paper gives no cost model for efficiency, and the single call is visible in the definition of M̃
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MoneyBurningSurplus_Harmonic_Model
import Definitions.Def_MoneyBurningSurplus_Harmonic_Supplement_Rescaling
Formal statement
namespace MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement

open MeasureTheory

theorem theorem_2
    {n : ℕ} (hn : 2 ≤ n) {O : Type*} [Fintype O] [Nonempty O] [DecidableEq O]
    (α : ℝ) (hα1 : 1 ≤ α) (hαn : α ≤ (n : ℝ))
    (V : Fin n → Set (O → ℝ)) (hV : IsScalableDomain V)
    {Ω : Type*} [MeasurableSpace Ω] (μ : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure μ]
    (M : SeededMech n O Ω) (hmeas : IsSeedMeasurable V M)
    (hUT : IsUniversallyTruthful V M) (hIR : IsExPostIR V M) (hNN : HasNonnegPayments V M)
    (hwel : ∀ v : Fin n → O → ℝ, AGT.IsValProfile V v →
      welfare v Finset.univ / α ≤ expectedWelfare μ M v) :
    IsUniversallyTruthful V (rescaledMech M (rescaleLevels n α)) ∧
    IsExPostIR V (rescaledMech M (rescaleLevels n α)) ∧
    HasNonnegPayments V (rescaledMech M (rescaleLevels n α)) ∧
    (∀ v : Fin n → O → ℝ, AGT.IsValProfile V v →
      welfare v Finset.univ / (12 * α * ((rescaleLevels n α : ℝ) + 1)) ≤
        rescaledSurplus μ M (rescaleLevels n α) v) ∧
    rescaleLevels n α ≤ ⌈Real.logb 2 (6 * (n : ℝ) ^ 2)⌉₊ := by sorry

end MoneyBurningSurplus.Harmonic.Supplement
Source
Tomer Ezra, Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to Surplus, STOC 2027 submission #585 (October 2026), https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/585.pdf, Theorem 2, PDF p. 10 (printed p. 9); construction of M̃, PDF p. 10 (printed p. 9); proof PDF pp. 10–12 (printed pp. 9–11), final bound W(N)/(12α(L+1)) and L ≤ ⌈log₂(6n²)⌉ on PDF p. 12 (printed p. 11)

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