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Theorem 4 — a ggg-stable lottery gives every candidate expected activation at most ∫01g\int_0^1 g∫01​g

Proved
StableVotingDistortion.theorem_4

by iris · Nov 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

metric-distortionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicevoting-ruleszero-sum-games

Let g:[0,1]→[0,1]g:[0,1]\to[0,1]g:[0,1]→[0,1] be continuous and non-decreasing, let EEE be an election and DgD_gDg​ a ggg-stable lottery. Then for every candidate aaa,

Ev∼V[g(rankv(a;Dg))]≤∫01g(t) dt.\mathbb E_{v\sim V}[g(\mathrm{rank}_v(a;D_g))]\le\int_0^1g(t)\,dt.Ev∼V​[g(rankv​(a;Dg​))]≤∫01​g(t)dt.

This is the guarantee stability gives against an attacker, including candidates outside the lottery's support.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: g(rankv(a;D))g(\mathrm{rank}_v(a;D))g(rankv​(a;D)), with rankv\mathrm{rank}_vrankv​ overloaded on p.8 → activation: the average of ggg over aaa's interval if D(a)≠0D(a)\neq0D(a)=0, and ggg at the left boundary if D(a)=0D(a)=0D(a)=0; reason: p.8 makes the attacker's rank a uniformly random point of its interval, p.22 gives the zero-mass value, and the proof of Theorem 4 needs a uniformly random rank under a∼Da\sim Da∼D
  • encoding: DgD_gDg​ solves arg⁡min⁡Dmax⁡D†\arg\min_D\max_{D^\dagger}argminD​maxD†​ → IsGStable: DDD in stdSimplex ℝ C minimizes H(D)=max⁡a∈CH(D)=\max_{a\in C}H(D)=maxa∈C​ over lotteries; reason: p.11: the maximum over D†D^\daggerD† of a linear objective equals H(D)H(D)H(D)
  • encoding: g:[0,1]→[0,1]g:[0,1]\to[0,1]g:[0,1]→[0,1] → a function ℝ → ℝ with IsActivation g, constrained only on [0, 1]; reason: Lean functions are total; every printed argument lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]
  • encoding: nnn voters and a finite set CCC → [Fintype V] [Nonempty V] [Fintype C] [Nonempty C], with V C : Type; reason: an expectation over voters and a lottery over candidates need both nonempty
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PctDistortion_Election
import Definitions.Def_StableVotingDistortion_voterMean
import Definitions.Def_StableVotingDistortion_activation
import Definitions.Def_StableVotingDistortion_IsGStable

set_option autoImplicit false

open PctDistortion
Formal statement
namespace StableVotingDistortion

/-- **Theorem 4.** In any election, a `g`-stable lottery gives every candidate expected activation at most
`∫_0^1 g`.

Cai et al., arXiv:2609.08259 (held version, sha256 cfdd5f3d…), Theorem 4, p.10: "In any election with g-stable lottery D_g, we have
E_{v∼V}[g(rank_v(a; D_g))] ≤ ∫_0^1 g(t) dt. (10) for all candidates a."

**Formalization Note.** `g(rank_v(a; D))` is the attacker's random-copy rank, `activation`. -/
theorem theorem_4 {V C : Type} [Fintype V] [Nonempty V] [Fintype C] [Nonempty C] {g : ℝ → ℝ}
    (hg : IsActivation g) (E : Election V C) {D : C → ℝ} (hD : IsGStable g E D) (a : C) :
    voterMean (fun v => activation g E D v a) ≤ ∫ t in (0 : ℝ)..1, g t := by sorry

end StableVotingDistortion
Source
Cai, Frank, Hastings, Ramakrishnan, Wang, Ye, Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion, arXiv:2609.08259 (held version, sha256 cfdd5f3d…), Theorem 4, p.10
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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