p. 4, (ii) — at an interior efficient point the payoff gradients are linearly dependent
ProvedDubey1986.Inefficiency.eff_interior_mem_Estarfirst-order-conditionsgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pareto-efficiency
Let , , let be open, and let be a game. If is an efficient point of and every lies in the interior of , then
that is, the derivatives are linearly dependent.
This is step (ii) of the proof, the necessary condition for Pareto optimality pointed out by Smale; together with (i) it places interior efficient Nash equilibria in .
Formalization Note The interiority of every is the standing case assumption of the first part of the proof (p. 3). Only this direction of the Appendix's characterization is used and stated.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Dubey1986_Inefficiency_Setting import Definitions.Def_Dubey1986_Inefficiency_Derivative
Formal statement
namespace Dubey1986.Inefficiency
theorem eff_interior_mem_Estar {n : ℕ} (hn : 2 ≤ n) (k : Fin n → ℕ) (hk : ∀ i, 1 ≤ k i)
(V : ∀ i, Set (Fin (k i) → ℝ)) (hVo : ∀ i, IsOpen (V i))
(hSV : ∀ i, simplex (k i) ⊆ V i) (u : Fin n → Strat k → ℝ) (hu : IsGame V u)
(s : Strat k) (hint : ∀ i, s i ∈ interior (simplex (k i))) (hs : s ∈ EffSet u) :
Dmap u s ∈ Estar k := by sorry
end Dubey1986.Inefficiency
Source
Dubey, Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria, IIASA WP-83-74 (July 1983), p. 4, display (ii) (under the case assumption of p. 3, Proof, first sentence)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.