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r.h.s. of (A.2): the head's conditional expectation under β∗\beta^*β∗ factorizes over the independent components

Proved
IncentivesInTeams.Conglomerate.cond_expectation_factorizes

by mikedeng1 · Sep 26, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

conditional-expectationindependencep2o-batch-p100ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1team-theory

Consider a conglomerate model whose component weights are probability weights, a joint strategy β∗\beta^*β∗ and a value y0=(z0,m)y_0 = (z_0, m)y0​=(z0​,m) of the head's information. Suppose the event {s:y0∗(s)=y0}\{s : y_0^*(s) = y_0\}{s:y0∗​(s)=y0​} has positive probability under the product law, where y0∗y_0^*y0∗​ is the head's information under β∗\beta^*β∗. Then for every subunit jjj

E[vj[δj∗(yj∗(s)),δ0∗(y0∗(s));sj] ∣ y0∗(s)=y0]=hj(y0),E\big[v_j[\delta_j^*(y_j^*(s)), \delta_0^*(y_0^*(s)); s_j] \,\big|\, y_0^*(s) = y_0\big] = h_j(y_0),E[vj​[δj∗​(yj∗​(s)),δ0∗​(y0∗​(s));sj​]​y0∗​(s)=y0​]=hj​(y0​),

and for the head's component

E[v0[δ0∗(y0∗(s)),s0] ∣ y0∗(s)=y0]=h0(y0),E\big[v_0[\delta_0^*(y_0^*(s)), s_0] \,\big|\, y_0^*(s) = y_0\big] = h_0(y_0),E[v0​[δ0∗​(y0∗​(s)),s0​]​y0∗​(s)=y0​]=h0​(y0​),

where the left-hand sides are the conditional expectations of (3.3) (elementary conditional averages under the product law) and hjh_jhj​, h0h_0h0​ are the factors of CiIIC_i^{II}CiII​ defined in the model file: hjh_jhj​ conditions only subunit jjj's state on its own message mjm_jmj​, and h0h_0h0​ conditions only the head's state on ζ0∗(s0)=z0\zeta_0^*(s_0) = z_0ζ0∗​(s0​)=z0​.

This is the formal content of the paper's chain for the right-hand side of (A.2), whose last step "follows by the independence of the distributions of sks_ksk​ and sjs_jsj​, k≠jk \ne jk=j". It shows that the factorized compensation CiIIC_i^{II}CiII​ of the mission equals the paper's (3.3) wherever (3.3) is defined.

Formalization Note. Positive probability of the conditioning event is the condition under which the elementary conditional expectation of (3.3) is defined; on a null event the Lean quotient is 000 and the identity is not claimed. The head's component is included as the paper's bracket "[the proof for j=0j = 0j=0 is strictly analogous]" indicates.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_IncentivesInTeams_Conglomerate_Model
Formal statement
namespace IncentivesInTeams.Conglomerate

theorem cond_expectation_factorizes {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S₀ : Type*} [Fintype S₀] {S : ι → Type*}
    [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] {Z₀ : Type*} {Z M₀ M : ι → Type*} {D₀ : Type*} {D : ι → Type*}
    (T : Model S₀ S Z₀ Z M₀ M D₀ D) (hT : T.WeightsOK)
    (βs : JointStrategy S₀ S Z₀ Z M₀ M D₀ D) (y₀ : Z₀ × ∀ k, M k)
    (hpos : 0 < T.expect (Set.indicator {s | βs.headInfo s = y₀} (fun _ => (1 : ℝ)))) :
    (∀ j, T.literalSubCondExp βs j y₀ = T.subFactor βs j y₀) ∧
      T.literalHeadCondExp βs y₀ = T.headFactor βs y₀ := by sorry

end IncentivesInTeams.Conglomerate
Source
Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41(4), 1973, p. 630, Appendix, proof of THEOREM 1, the r.h.s. (A.2) chain (with (3.3), p. 624)
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Setting. ι\iotaι is a finite set of subunits. S0S_0S0​ and each SkS_kSk​ are finite. A state is s=(s0,(sk)k)s=(s_0,(s_k)_k)s=(s0​,(sk​)k​).

A joint strategy β∗\beta^*β∗ has:

  • head functions ζ0∗:S0→Z0\zeta^*_0:S_0\to Z_0ζ0∗​:S0​→Z0​, γ0k∗:Z0→M0k\gamma_0^{k*}:Z_0\to M_{0k}γ0k∗​:Z0​→M0k​ and δ0∗:Z0×∏kMk→D0\delta^*_0:Z_0\times\prod_kM_k\to D_0δ0∗​:Z0​×∏k​Mk​→D0​;
  • subunit functions ζk∗:Sk→Zk\zeta^*_k:S_k\to Z_kζk∗​:Sk​→Zk​, γk∗:Zk×M0k→Mk\gamma^*_k:Z_k\times M_{0k}\to M_kγk∗​:Zk​×M0k​→Mk​ and δk∗:Zk×M0k→Dk\delta^*_k:Z_k\times M_{0k}\to D_kδk∗​:Zk​×M0k​→Dk​.

Its information maps are

yk(s)=(ζk∗(sk),γ0k∗(ζ0∗(s0))),y0(s)=(ζ0∗(s0),(γk∗(yk(s)))k).y_k(s)=(\zeta^*_k(s_k),\gamma_0^{k*}(\zeta^*_0(s_0))),\qquad y_0(s)=\big(\zeta^*_0(s_0),(\gamma^*_k(y_k(s)))_k\big).yk​(s)=(ζk∗​(sk​),γ0k∗​(ζ0∗​(s0​))),y0​(s)=(ζ0∗​(s0​),(γk∗​(yk​(s)))k​).

The model supplies:

  • weights P0P_0P0​ and PkP_kPk​, assumed here to be probability weights (nonnegative, each summing to 111), with product P(s)=P0(s0)∏kPk(sk)P(s)=P_0(s_0)\prod_kP_k(s_k)P(s)=P0​(s0​)∏k​Pk​(sk​);
  • payoffs v0:D0×S0→Rv_0:D_0\times S_0\to\mathbb Rv0​:D0​×S0​→R and vk:Dk×D0×Sk→Rv_k:D_k\times D_0\times S_k\to\mathbb Rvk​:Dk​×D0​×Sk​→R.

For real weights www, cavg⁡w(E,X)=∑EwX/∑Ew\operatorname{cavg}_w(E,X)=\sum_{E}wX\big/\sum_E wcavgw​(E,X)=∑E​wX/∑E​w, with value 000 when the denominator is 000.

Theorem. Fix β∗\beta^*β∗ and a value yˉ=(z0,m)∈Z0×∏kMk\bar y=(z_0,m)\in Z_0\times\prod_kM_kyˉ​=(z0​,m)∈Z0​×∏k​Mk​. Assume

∑s: y0(s)=yˉP(s)>0.\sum_{s:\,y_0(s)=\bar y}P(s)>0.s:y0​(s)=yˉ​∑​P(s)>0.

Then, for every j∈ιj\in\iotaj∈ι,

cavg⁡P({s:y0(s)=yˉ}, s↦vj(δj∗(yj(s)),δ0∗(y0(s)),sj))=cavg⁡Pj({t∈Sj:γj∗(ζj∗(t),γ0j∗(z0))=mj}, t↦vj(δj∗(ζj∗(t),γ0j∗(z0)),δ0∗(yˉ),t)).\operatorname{cavg}_P\Big(\{s:y_0(s)=\bar y\},\ s\mapsto v_j\big(\delta^*_j(y_j(s)),\delta^*_0(y_0(s)),s_j\big)\Big)=\operatorname{cavg}_{P_j}\Big(\{t\in S_j:\gamma^*_j(\zeta^*_j(t),\gamma_0^{j*}(z_0))=m_j\},\ t\mapsto v_j\big(\delta^*_j(\zeta^*_j(t),\gamma_0^{j*}(z_0)),\delta^*_0(\bar y),t\big)\Big).cavgP​({s:y0​(s)=yˉ​}, s↦vj​(δj∗​(yj​(s)),δ0∗​(y0​(s)),sj​))=cavgPj​​({t∈Sj​:γj∗​(ζj∗​(t),γ0j∗​(z0​))=mj​}, t↦vj​(δj∗​(ζj∗​(t),γ0j∗​(z0​)),δ0∗​(yˉ​),t)).

Also,

cavg⁡P({s:y0(s)=yˉ}, s↦v0(δ0∗(y0(s)),s0))=cavg⁡P0({t∈S0:ζ0∗(t)=z0}, t↦v0(δ0∗(yˉ),t)).\operatorname{cavg}_P\Big(\{s:y_0(s)=\bar y\},\ s\mapsto v_0(\delta^*_0(y_0(s)),s_0)\Big)=\operatorname{cavg}_{P_0}\Big(\{t\in S_0:\zeta^*_0(t)=z_0\},\ t\mapsto v_0(\delta^*_0(\bar y),t)\Big).cavgP​({s:y0​(s)=yˉ​}, s↦v0​(δ0∗​(y0​(s)),s0​))=cavgP0​​({t∈S0​:ζ0∗​(t)=z0​}, t↦v0​(δ0∗​(yˉ​),t)).

No strategy-set membership is assumed.

Degenerate cases. The weight hypothesis forces S0S_0S0​ and every SkS_kSk​ to be nonempty. The positivity hypothesis is false, so the statement is vacuous, whenever yˉ\bar yyˉ​ is attained by no state of positive weight. If ι\iotaι is empty, the first claim is vacuous and only the head identity is asserted.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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