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The retarget always passes the permitted-transition check

Proved
BitcoinPow.nextWork_permitted

by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetconsensusdifficultyformal-verificationproof-of-work

For every height hhh divisible by 201620162016, every last word coldc_{\text{old}}cold​ whose decoded value is at most powLimit=2224−1\mathrm{powLimit} = 2^{224} - 1powLimit=2224−1, and all block times tlast,tfirst∈Zt_{\text{last}}, t_{\text{first}} \in \mathbb Ztlast​,tfirst​∈Z,

permittedTransition(h, cold, calculateNextWork(cold,tlast,tfirst))=true.\mathrm{permittedTransition}\big(h,\ c_{\text{old}},\ \mathrm{calculateNextWork}(c_{\text{old}}, t_{\text{last}}, t_{\text{first}})\big) = \mathtt{true}.permittedTransition(h, cold​, calculateNextWork(cold​,tlast​,tfirst​))=true.

Here calculateNextWork is the mainnet CalculateNextWorkRequired: decode, multiply by the clamped elapsed time inside 256 bits, divide by TTT, cap, re-encode. permittedTransition is the mainnet PermittedDifficultyTransition: the decoded new word must lie between the re-encoded caps of cold⋅(T/4)/Tc_{\text{old}} \cdot (T/4) / Tcold​⋅(T/4)/T and cold⋅4T/Tc_{\text{old}} \cdot 4T / Tcold​⋅4T/T.

The hypothesis on coldc_{\text{old}}cold​ holds for every word DeriveTarget accepts, hence for every block on a valid chain; under it none of the three 256-bit products wraps. The statement is the consistency of the two functions: a header carrying the required nBits is never rejected by the cheap header-chain check, whatever the timestamps.

Formalization Note. The proof reduces to the monotonicity of the rounding map setCompact∘getCompact\mathrm{setCompact} \circ \mathrm{getCompact}setCompact∘getCompact and to the ordering of the three capped quotients; no assumption that coldc_{\text{old}}cold​ is itself a GetCompact output is made.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinPow
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinPow.nextWork_permitted (height : Nat) (lastBits : BitVec 32) (lastTime firstTime : Int)
    (hh : height % BitcoinPow.difficultyAdjustmentInterval = 0)
    (hold : BitcoinPow.setCompact lastBits ≤ BitcoinPow.powLimit) :
    BitcoinPow.permittedTransition height lastBits
      (BitcoinPow.calculateNextWork lastBits lastTime firstTime) = true := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: GetNextWorkRequired (lines 14-48), CalculateNextWorkRequired (50-85), PermittedDifficultyTransition (89-136), DeriveTarget (146-159), CheckProofOfWorkImpl (161-171), src/pow.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/pow.cpp; arith_uint256::SetCompact (176-194), GetCompact (196-216), base_uint::operator<<= (15-30), operator*=(uint32_t) (49-59), operator/= (77-104), bits() (205-218), src/arith_uint256.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/arith_uint256.cpp; CMainParams powLimit, nPowTargetTimespan, nPowTargetSpacing, fPowAllowMinDifficultyBlocks, fPowNoRetargeting, enforce_BIP94, src/kernel/chainparams.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/kernel/chainparams.cpp
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Statement. For every natural number hhh ("height"), every 32-bit word ccc ("lastBits"), and all integers tℓt_\elltℓ​ ("lastTime") and tft_ftf​ ("firstTime"), if

  • (H1) h mod 2016=0h \bmod 2016 = 0hmod2016=0 (where 2016=⌊1209600/600⌋2016 = \lfloor 1209600/600 \rfloor2016=⌊1209600/600⌋; this includes h=0h = 0h=0), and
  • (H2) S(c)≤2224−1S(c) \le 2^{224} - 1S(c)≤2224−1 (non-strict), where SSS is the "setCompact" decoding defined below,

then the Boolean

permittedTransition(h, c, calculateNextWork(c,tℓ,tf))\mathrm{permittedTransition}\big(h,\ c,\ \mathrm{calculateNextWork}(c, t_\ell, t_f)\big)permittedTransition(h, c, calculateNextWork(c,tℓ​,tf​))

equals true. Unfolded (using H1 to select the retarget branch of permittedTransition\mathrm{permittedTransition}permittedTransition), the conclusion is the pair of non-strict inequalities

minimum≤S(calculateNextWork(c,tℓ,tf))≤maximum,\mathrm{minimum} \le S\big(\mathrm{calculateNextWork}(c, t_\ell, t_f)\big) \le \mathrm{maximum},minimum≤S(calculateNextWork(c,tℓ​,tf​))≤maximum,

literally asserted as ¬[maximum<observed]∧¬[minimum>observed]\neg[\mathrm{maximum} < \mathrm{observed}] \wedge \neg[\mathrm{minimum} > \mathrm{observed}]¬[maximum<observed]∧¬[minimum>observed] with observed=S(calculateNextWork(c,tℓ,tf))\mathrm{observed} = S(\mathrm{calculateNextWork}(c, t_\ell, t_f))observed=S(calculateNextWork(c,tℓ​,tf​)), where

L0=⌊(S(c)⋅4838400) mod 22561209600⌋,L={2224−1if 2224−1<L0L0otherwise,maximum=S(G(L)),L_0 = \Big\lfloor \frac{(S(c) \cdot 4838400) \bmod 2^{256}}{1209600} \Big\rfloor,\quad L = \begin{cases} 2^{224}-1 & \text{if } 2^{224}-1 < L_0 \\ L_0 & \text{otherwise}\end{cases},\quad \mathrm{maximum} = S(G(L)),L0​=⌊1209600(S(c)⋅4838400)mod2256​⌋,L={2224−1L0​​if 2224−1<L0​otherwise​,maximum=S(G(L)), ℓ0=⌊(S(c)⋅302400) mod 22561209600⌋,ℓ={2224−1if 2224−1<ℓ0ℓ0otherwise,minimum=S(G(ℓ)),\ell_0 = \Big\lfloor \frac{(S(c) \cdot 302400) \bmod 2^{256}}{1209600} \Big\rfloor,\quad \ell = \begin{cases} 2^{224}-1 & \text{if } 2^{224}-1 < \ell_0 \\ \ell_0 & \text{otherwise}\end{cases},\quad \mathrm{minimum} = S(G(\ell)),ℓ0​=⌊1209600(S(c)⋅302400)mod2256​⌋,ℓ={2224−1ℓ0​​if 2224−1<ℓ0​otherwise​,minimum=S(G(ℓ)),

with 4838400=1209600⋅44838400 = 1209600 \cdot 44838400=1209600⋅4 and 302400=⌊1209600/4⌋302400 = \lfloor 1209600/4 \rfloor302400=⌊1209600/4⌋.

The value being tested. calculateNextWork(c,tℓ,tf)\mathrm{calculateNextWork}(c, t_\ell, t_f)calculateNextWork(c,tℓ​,tf​) is the 32-bit word G(b3)G(b_3)G(b3​) where: τ\tauτ is the natural number equal to clampTimespan(tℓ−tf)\mathrm{clampTimespan}(t_\ell - t_f)clampTimespan(tℓ​−tf​), i.e. 302400302400302400 if tℓ−tf<302400t_\ell - t_f < 302400tℓ​−tf​<302400, 483840048384004838400 if tℓ−tf>4838400t_\ell - t_f > 4838400tℓ​−tf​>4838400, and tℓ−tft_\ell - t_ftℓ​−tf​ otherwise (the integer-to-natural conversion applied here is the identity since the clamp is positive); b1=(S(c)⋅τ) mod 2256b_1 = (S(c) \cdot \tau) \bmod 2^{256}b1​=(S(c)⋅τ)mod2256; b2=⌊b1/1209600⌋b_2 = \lfloor b_1 / 1209600 \rfloorb2​=⌊b1​/1209600⌋; b3=2224−1b_3 = 2^{224}-1b3​=2224−1 if 2224−1<b22^{224}-1 < b_22224−1<b2​, else b2b_2b2​.

The decoding SSS and encoding GGG. For a 32-bit word ddd with top byte s=⌊d/224⌋s = \lfloor d/2^{24} \rfloors=⌊d/224⌋ and low 23 bits m=d mod 223m = d \bmod 2^{23}m=dmod223, S(d)=⌊m/2563−s⌋S(d) = \lfloor m/256^{3-s} \rfloorS(d)=⌊m/2563−s⌋ if s≤3s \le 3s≤3 and S(d)=(m⋅256s−3) mod 2256S(d) = (m \cdot 256^{s-3}) \bmod 2^{256}S(d)=(m⋅256s−3)mod2256 if s>3s > 3s>3 (bit 23 of ddd is ignored). For a natural number xxx, G(x)G(x)G(x) is computed by: β(x)=0\beta(x) = 0β(x)=0 if x=0x = 0x=0, else ⌊log⁡2x⌋+1\lfloor \log_2 x \rfloor + 1⌊log2​x⌋+1; n=⌊(β(x)+7)/8⌋n = \lfloor (\beta(x)+7)/8 \rfloorn=⌊(β(x)+7)/8⌋; k=((x mod 264)⋅28(3−n)) mod 232k = ((x \bmod 2^{64}) \cdot 2^{8(3-n)}) \bmod 2^{32}k=((xmod264)⋅28(3−n))mod232 if n≤3n \le 3n≤3, else k=(⌊x/28(n−3)⌋ mod 264) mod 232k = (\lfloor x/2^{8(n-3)} \rfloor \bmod 2^{64}) \bmod 2^{32}k=(⌊x/28(n−3)⌋mod264)mod232; a=[(k AND 223)≠0]a = [(k \text{ AND } 2^{23}) \ne 0]a=[(k AND 223)=0]; k′=⌊k/256⌋k' = \lfloor k/256 \rfloork′=⌊k/256⌋, n′=n+1n' = n+1n′=n+1 if aaa, else k′=kk' = kk′=k, n′=nn' = nn′=n; G(x)=(k′ OR (n′⋅224)) mod 232G(x) = (k' \text{ OR } (n' \cdot 2^{24})) \bmod 2^{32}G(x)=(k′ OR (n′⋅224))mod232 as a 32-bit word.

Binders and hypotheses. Four universally quantified variables: hhh over all natural numbers, ccc over all 32-bit words, tℓt_\elltℓ​ and tft_ftf​ over all integers. Two hypotheses, H1 and H2. Note what is not assumed: no relation between hhh and the times tℓ,tft_\ell, t_ftℓ​,tf​; no condition that ccc's "negative" bit 23 is clear or that its "overflow" flag is false (H2 only bounds the decoded value S(c)S(c)S(c), which ignores bit 23 and is already reduced modulo 22562^{256}2256); S(c)=0S(c) = 0S(c)=0 is allowed by H2 (then observed=minimum=maximum=0\mathrm{observed} = \mathrm{minimum} = \mathrm{maximum} = 0observed=minimum=maximum=0); and tℓ−tft_\ell - t_ftℓ​−tf​ may be negative, zero, or arbitrarily large. The conclusion is a single Boolean equality; it is an implication, not an equivalence, and nothing is asserted when h mod 2016≠0h \bmod 2016 \ne 0hmod2016=0 or when S(c)>2224−1S(c) > 2^{224}-1S(c)>2224−1. The height passed to permittedTransition\mathrm{permittedTransition}permittedTransition is hhh itself (not h+1h+1h+1), and the old word is ccc while the new word is the output of calculateNextWork\mathrm{calculateNextWork}calculateNextWork on the same ccc.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 26, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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