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Theorem 2 — under independence, the price of separation of Min-Pay is ∣K∣|K|∣K∣

Proved
MultitaskContracts.theorem_2

by iris · Nov 9, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

contract-theorymultitask-contractsp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-separation

Let KKK be a finite nonempty set of tasks, and consider all instances on KKK with independent tasks: arbitrary (heterogeneous) costs ck>0c_k>0ck​>0 and success probabilities 0≤qk<pk≤10\le q_k<p_k\le10≤qk​<pk​≤1, with PS(Y)=∏k∈Y∩Spk∏k∈Y∖Sqk∏k∈S∖Y(1−pk)∏k∉S∪Y(1−qk)P_S(Y)=\prod_{k\in Y\cap S}p_k\prod_{k\in Y\setminus S}q_k\prod_{k\in S\setminus Y}(1-p_k)\prod_{k\notin S\cup Y}(1-q_k)PS​(Y)=∏k∈Y∩S​pk​∏k∈Y∖S​qk​∏k∈S∖Y​(1−pk​)∏k∈/S∪Y​(1−qk​). Then the price of separation of Min-Pay over this class is exactly the number of tasks:

PoSepMinPay(independent instances on K)=sup⁡IOPTMinPaySep(I)OPTMinPayBun(I)=∣K∣.\mathrm{PoSep}_{\mathrm{MinPay}}(\text{independent instances on }K)=\sup_{I}\frac{\mathrm{OPT}^{\mathrm{Sep}}_{\mathrm{MinPay}}(I)}{\mathrm{OPT}^{\mathrm{Bun}}_{\mathrm{MinPay}}(I)}=|K|.PoSepMinPay​(independent instances on K)=Isup​OPTMinPayBun​(I)OPTMinPaySep​(I)​=∣K∣.

That is, OPTMinPaySep≤∣K∣⋅OPTMinPayBun\mathrm{OPT}^{\mathrm{Sep}}_{\mathrm{MinPay}}\le|K|\cdot\mathrm{OPT}^{\mathrm{Bun}}_{\mathrm{MinPay}}OPTMinPaySep​≤∣K∣⋅OPTMinPayBun​ for every independent instance, and the ratio comes arbitrarily close to ∣K∣|K|∣K∣.

Bundling the tasks into one contract can thus lower the principal's expected payment by a factor linear in the number of tasks, and never by more.

Formalization Note The supremum is not attained when ∣K∣≥2|K|\ge2∣K∣≥2.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a finite set of tasks K → K nonempty; reason: for K = ∅ both optima are 0 and Definition 1 leaves the ratio 0/0 undefined (it defines only ∞/∞)
  • encoding: optima defined by min (∞ if infeasible) and the limit (6), ratio with ∞/∞ := 1, supremum → values, ratio (sepRatio) and supremum in ℝ≥0∞, with Min-Pay the infimum over budgets B ≥ 0; reason: same values; the limit of the antitone function B ↦ OPT_FixedBudget(B) is its infimum
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_bundle
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_separable
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_priceOfSeparation
import Definitions.Def_MultitaskContracts_Instance_IsIndependent

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace MultitaskContracts

open scoped ENNReal

/-- **Theorem 2** (§4.1.3, p.15, PDF 17). Under independence, the price of separation of Min-Pay,
as defined in Definition 1, is `|K|`: for every finite nonempty set of tasks `K`,
`sup_I OPT^Sep_MinPay(I)/OPT^Bun_MinPay(I) = |K|`, the supremum over all instances on `K` with
independent tasks (heterogeneous `c_k > 0`, `0 ≤ q_k < p_k ≤ 1`).
E. Saig, I. Talgam-Cohen, Y. Tolkowsky, *Multitask Contracts: Realizing the Value of Bundling*,
STOC 2027 submission (held version, sha256 e991a51a…), Theorem 2, p.15.

**Formalization Note.** `K` is nonempty (for `K = ∅` both optima are `0` and Definition 1's ratio
`0/0` is undefined). Optima, the ratio and the supremum are in `ℝ≥0∞` (Definition 1's `∞/∞ := 1`
via `sepRatio`). The supremum is not attained for `|K| ≥ 2`. -/
theorem theorem_2 (K : Type*) [Fintype K] [DecidableEq K] [Nonempty K] :
    priceOfSeparation (fun I T => I.optMinPay T) {I : Instance K | I.IsIndependent} =
      (Fintype.card K : ℝ≥0∞) := by sorry

end MultitaskContracts
Source
Saig, Talgam-Cohen, Tolkowsky, Multitask Contracts: Realizing the Value of Bundling, STOC 2027 submission (held version, sha256 e991a51a…), Theorem 2, §4.1.3, p.15 (PDF p.17)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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