App. A.2.1, p. 3352 — at the uniform optimum CS^U = 8v²/U², DS_j^U = v²(2b+3θj−θ−j)²/(2U²), and SW^U
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.uniform_surplusconsumer-surplusp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1two-sided-marketswelfare
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1, and write . At every maximizer of the uniform-pricing profit, the buyer surplus, the surplus of type- sellers and the total welfare, defined by the integrals of App. A.2.1, equal
These are the uniform-pricing levels compared in the proof of Proposition 2.
Formalization Note. The surpluses are defined as interval integrals at an arbitrary allocation; evaluating them at the optimum is the content of this statement. The paper writes the seller sum as ; it is .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem uniform_surplus (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ x : ℝ × ℝ, IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x →
buyerSurplusU v b θH θL x = 8 * v ^ 2 / Uden b θH θL ^ 2 ∧
sellerSurplusU θH θH θL x = v ^ 2 * (2 * b + 3 * θH - θL) ^ 2 / (2 * Uden b θH θL ^ 2) ∧
sellerSurplusU θL θH θL x = v ^ 2 * (2 * b + 3 * θL - θH) ^ 2 / (2 * Uden b θH θL ^ 2) ∧
welfareU v b θH θL x =
v ^ 2 * (24 - (2 * b + 3 * θH - θL) * (2 * b - θH + 3 * θL)) / Uden b θH θL ^ 2 := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3352, App. A.2.1 (displays CS^U, DS^U_j, SW^U)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.