Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

THEOREM 1 — Blackwell's sufficient condition for approachability

Proved
VectorPayoffs.Convex.theorem1

by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

approachabilityp2o-batch-p200ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1repeated-gamesvector-payoffs

Let S⊆RNS\subseteq\mathbb R^NS⊆RN be closed. Suppose that for every x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S there is p(x)∈Pp(x)\in Pp(x)∈P such that, for a point y∈Sy\in Sy∈S closest to xxx, the hyperplane through yyy perpendicular to the segment xyxyxy separates xxx from R(p(x))R(p(x))R(p(x)):

⟨x−y,  w−y⟩≤0for all w∈R(p(x)).\langle x-y,\;w-y\rangle\le 0\qquad\text{for all }w\in R(p(x)).⟨x−y,w−y⟩≤0for all w∈R(p(x)).

Then SSS is approachable with every strategy fff of I satisfying

fn(x1,…,xn)=p(xˉn)whenever n>0 and xˉn=1n∑i=1nxi∉S,f_n(x_1,\dots,x_n)=p(\bar x_n)\quad\text{whenever }n>0\text{ and }\bar x_n=\tfrac1n\textstyle\sum_{i=1}^n x_i\notin S,fn​(x1​,…,xn​)=p(xˉn​)whenever n>0 and xˉn​=n1​∑i=1n​xi​∈/S,

fnf_nfn​ being arbitrary if n=0n=0n=0 or xˉn∈S\bar x_n\in Sxˉn​∈S.

This is the paper's sufficient condition for approachability; together with the minimax theorem it yields the characterization of approachable convex sets (THEOREM 3).

Formalization Note "The closest point" is read as some closest point yyy (for non-convex SSS it need not be unique) and "separates" as weak separation (closed half-space). The map ppp is not assumed measurable; the conclusion is about every (measurable) strategy fff that agrees with p(xˉn)p(\bar x_n)p(xˉn​) off SSS.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_VectorPayoffs_Convex_Game

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace VectorPayoffs.Convex

/-- Blackwell (1956), §2, p. 3, THEOREM 1: if every `x ∉ S` admits `p(x) ∈ P` such that the
hyperplane through a closest point `y ∈ S` perpendicular to `xy` separates `x` from `R(p(x))`,
then `S` is approachable with any strategy playing `p(x̄ₙ)` whenever `n > 0` and `x̄ₙ ∉ S`. -/
theorem theorem1 {N r s : ℕ} (G : Game N r s) (S : Set (E N)) (hS : IsClosed S)
    (p : E N → Fin r → ℝ)
    (hsep : ∀ x ∉ S, p x ∈ stdSimplex ℝ (Fin r) ∧ G.BlackwellCondition S (p x) x)
    (f : Strategy N r)
    (hf : ∀ n, 1 ≤ n → ∀ h : Fin n → E N, avgHist h ∉ S → f.toFun n h = p (avgHist h)) :
    G.ApproachableWith S f := by sorry

end VectorPayoffs.Convex
Source
Blackwell, An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs, Pacific J. Math. 6(1), 1956, p. 3, THEOREM 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Sep 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me