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§3.2, p. 996 — the retailer's profit is (p+u−s)Γ(Q₁) − u(Γ(T)+T[1−Φ(T)]) if T < τ₀ and (p−s)Γ(Q₀) if T ≥ τ₀

Proved
ChannelRebate.Quantity.sec32_retailer_optimal_profit

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

channel-rebatenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain-contracts

In the setting of Lemma 1 (0<c<w<p0<c<w<p0<c<w<p, s<cs<cs<c, u>0u>0u>0, Q0,Q1>0Q_0, Q_1 > 0Q0​,Q1​>0 with Φ(Q0)=(p−w)/(p−s)\Phi(Q_0) = (p-w)/(p-s)Φ(Q0​)=(p−w)/(p−s) and Φ(Q1)=(p+u−w)/(p+u−s)\Phi(Q_1) = (p+u-w)/(p+u-s)Φ(Q1​)=(p+u−w)/(p+u−s)), let τ0∈[Q0,Q1]\tau_0 \in [Q_0,Q_1]τ0​∈[Q0​,Q1​] satisfy r(Q0∣τ0)=r(Q1∣τ0)r(Q_0\mid\tau_0) = r(Q_1\mid\tau_0)r(Q0​∣τ0​)=r(Q1​∣τ0​), and let T≥0T \ge 0T≥0. Then the retailer's optimal profit under the target rebate (w,u,T)(w,u,T)(w,u,T) is

r={(p+u−s)Γ(Q1)−u(Γ(T)+T[1−Φ(T)])T<τ0,(p−s)Γ(Q0)T≥τ0.r = \begin{cases} (p+u-s)\Gamma(Q_1) - u\big(\Gamma(T) + T[1-\Phi(T)]\big) & T < \tau_0,\\ (p-s)\Gamma(Q_0) & T \ge \tau_0. \end{cases}r={(p+u−s)Γ(Q1​)−u(Γ(T)+T[1−Φ(T)])(p−s)Γ(Q0​)​T<τ0​,T≥τ0​.​

Precisely: if T<τ0T < \tau_0T<τ0​, then Q1Q_1Q1​ is an optimal order and r(Q1∣T)r(Q_1\mid T)r(Q1​∣T) equals the first expression; if T≥τ0T \ge \tau_0T≥τ0​, then Q0Q_0Q0​ is an optimal order and r(Q0∣T)r(Q_0\mid T)r(Q0​∣T) equals the second.

This closed form is what turns the coordination requirement of Theorem 1 into the scalar equation (1) for the target.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting
open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity

/-- Taylor (2002), §3.2, display on p. 996. The retailer's profit under a target rebate is
`(p + u − s)Γ(Q₁) − u(Γ(T) + T[1 − Φ(T)])` if `T < τ₀` and `(p − s)Γ(Q₀)` if `T ≥ τ₀`,
attained at the optimal order `Q₁`, respectively `Q₀`. -/
theorem sec32_retailer_optimal_profit (p c s w u : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
    (hsc : s < c) (hu : 0 < u) (D : Demand)
    (Q0 : ℝ) (hQ0 : 0 < Q0) (hΦ0 : Phi D Q0 = (p - w) / (p - s))
    (Q1 : ℝ) (hQ1 : 0 < Q1) (hΦ1 : Phi D Q1 = (p + u - w) / (p + u - s))
    (τ0 : ℝ) (hτ0 : τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1)
    (hf0 : retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0)
    (T : ℝ) (hT : 0 ≤ T) :
    (T < τ0 → IsOptimalOrder (retailerProfit p s w u T D) Q1 ∧
      retailerProfit p s w u T D Q1 =
        (p + u - s) * Gam D Q1 - u * (Gam D T + T * (1 - Phi D T))) ∧
    (τ0 ≤ T → IsOptimalOrder (retailerProfit p s w u T D) Q0 ∧
      retailerProfit p s w u T D Q0 = (p - s) * Gam D Q0) := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 996, §3.2 (display of the retailer profit under a target rebate)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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