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Lemma 6 (p. 24) — block matching pennies: equal block probabilities and full support for i′ in every Nash equilibrium

Proved
FixpNash.Blocks.lemma_6

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymatching-penniesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let GGG be a finite game with a pair of players i≠i′i\neq i'i=i′ such that the pure strategies of iii are partitioned into blocks, the blocks are in one-to-one correspondence with the pure strategies of i′i'i′ (via a surjective map β:Si→Si′\beta:S_i\to S_{i'}β:Si​→Si′​ sending a strategy to the strategy of i′i'i′ that its block corresponds to), and the payoffs of i,i′i,i'i,i′ have the form

ui(s)=μ(s)+M⋅[β(si)=si′],ui′(s)=−M⋅[si′=β(si)],u_i(s)=\mu(s)+M\cdot[\beta(s_i)=s_{i'}],\qquad u_{i'}(s)=-M\cdot[s_{i'}=\beta(s_i)],ui​(s)=μ(s)+M⋅[β(si​)=si′​],ui′​(s)=−M⋅[si′​=β(si​)],

where μ\muμ does not depend on si′s_{i'}si′​, M>6nmax⁡s∣μ(s)∣M>6n\max_s|\mu(s)|M>6nmaxs​∣μ(s)∣, and i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies. Then every mixed Nash equilibrium xxx of GGG has the following properties.

  1. The total probability allocated to the strategies in each block of player iii is the same for all the blocks: ∑j:β(j)=kxi(j)=∑j:β(j)=k′xi(j)\sum_{j:\beta(j)=k}x_i(j)=\sum_{j:\beta(j)=k'}x_i(j)∑j:β(j)=k​xi​(j)=∑j:β(j)=k′​xi​(j) for all k,k′∈Si′k,k'\in S_{i'}k,k′∈Si′​.
  2. All strategies of player i′i'i′ have nonzero probability: xi′(k)≠0x_{i'}(k)\neq 0xi′​(k)=0 for all k∈Si′k\in S_{i'}k∈Si′​.

In the reduction of Section 3 of Etessami and Yannakakis (Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 4), which encodes the gates of an arithmetic circuit into a game, this lemma is what forces every unprimed player to divide its probability evenly among its blocks, so that the probabilities inside a block can encode the value of a circuit gate.

Formalization Note. The game is the agt_games vocabulary (finite players and strategy types, real payoffs, AGT.IsMixedNash with deviations to arbitrary mixed strategies). The hypothesis "the payoffs of i,i′i,i'i,i′ are of the form given above" is the predicate FixpNash.Blocks.IsBlockPair; it includes the bound "i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies", which the paper's proof uses ("since i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies", p. 24), and the condition that μ\muμ does not depend on si′s_{i'}si′​, which the proof does not use. "Nonzero probability" is stated as xi′(k)≠0x_{i'}(k)\neq 0xi′​(k)=0, equivalent to xi′(k)>0x_{i'}(k)>0xi′​(k)>0 for a probability vector.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_Blocks_Form
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.Blocks

/-- Lemma 6 (Etessami–Yannakakis, p. 24): if the players `i, i'` of a finite game form a
block matching-pennies pair of the form given on pp. 23–24, then every Nash equilibrium
`x` satisfies
1. the total probability allocated to the strategies in each block of player `i` is the
   same for all the blocks;
2. all strategies of player `i'` have nonzero probability. -/
theorem lemma_6 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ k, Fintype (S k)] [∀ k, DecidableEq (S k)]
    (u : ι → (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (i i' : ι) (β : S i → S i')
    (μ : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (M : ℝ) (n : ℕ) (hG : IsBlockPair u i i' β μ M n)
    (x : ∀ k, S k → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedNash u x) :
    (∀ k k' : S i', blockProb β x k = blockProb β x k') ∧ (∀ k : S i', x i' k ≠ 0) := by sorry

end FixpNash.Blocks
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), Lemma 6, p. 24 (payoff form pp. 23–24)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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