Proof of Proposition 5, Step 1, pp. 41–42 — i = s is an equilibrium iff r ≤ min(π(a) − π(a^s_N), (1 − δ)(γ(π(a) − π(a^s_N)) + b))
ProvedReviewBlackmail.SemiDec.step1_settleequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail
In the semi-decentralized game with genuine reviews kept, under the standing assumptions, settling () is an equilibrium response to a ransom demand — no deviation to doing nothing or to the mechanism is profitable when the market believes the seller settles — if and only if
This is the first of the three equilibrium conditions from which the equilibrium ransom of Proposition 5 is derived.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_SemiDec_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
theorem step1_settle (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (r : ℝ) :
M.IsEq .s r ↔
r ≤ min (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 0 1 .N))
((1 - M.δ) * (M.γ * (M.fut M.a - M.fut (M.post 0 1 .N)) + M.b)) := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.SemiDec
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), pp. 41–42, Proof of Proposition 5, Step 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.