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Lemma 1, p. 995 — τ₀ ∈ (Q₀, Q₁) exists uniquely; the retailer orders Q₁ if T < τ₀, Q₀ if T > τ₀, either if T = τ₀

Proved
ChannelRebate.Quantity.lemma1_optimal_order

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

channel-rebatenewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain-contracts

In the setting of the mission, let 0<c<w<p0<c<w<p0<c<w<p, s<cs<cs<c, u>0u>0u>0, and let Q0,Q1>0Q_0, Q_1 > 0Q0​,Q1​>0 satisfy

Φ(Q0)=p−wp−s,Φ(Q1)=p+u−wp+u−s.\Phi(Q_0) = \frac{p-w}{p-s}, \qquad \Phi(Q_1) = \frac{p+u-w}{p+u-s}.Φ(Q0​)=p−sp−w​,Φ(Q1​)=p+u−sp+u−w​.

For a target TTT put f0(T)=r(Q0∣T)−r(Q1∣T)f_0(T) = r(Q_0\mid T) - r(Q_1\mid T)f0​(T)=r(Q0​∣T)−r(Q1​∣T). Then:

  1. (a) there is exactly one τ0∈[Q0,Q1]\tau_0 \in [Q_0,Q_1]τ0​∈[Q0​,Q1​] with f0(τ0)=0f_0(\tau_0) = 0f0​(τ0​)=0, and it lies in the open interval (Q0,Q1)(Q_0,Q_1)(Q0​,Q1​);
  2. (b) for every target T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, the set of the retailer's optimal orders under the target rebate (w,u,T)(w,u,T)(w,u,T) is
arg⁡max⁡Q≥0r(Q∣T)={{Q1}T<τ0,{Q0}T>τ0,{Q0,Q1}T=τ0.\arg\max_{Q\ge 0} r(Q\mid T) = \begin{cases} \{Q_1\} & T < \tau_0,\\ \{Q_0\} & T > \tau_0,\\ \{Q_0, Q_1\} & T = \tau_0. \end{cases}argQ≥0max​r(Q∣T)=⎩⎨⎧​{Q1​}{Q0​}{Q0​,Q1​}​T<τ0​,T>τ0​,T=τ0​.​

The lemma says the retailer either ignores the rebate and orders the wholesale newsvendor quantity, or "goes for" it and orders the newsvendor quantity at the effective price p+up+up+u, switching at the threshold τ0\tau_0τ0​.

Formalization Note τ0\tau_0τ0​ is not a function of the data: part (b) holds for every τ0∈[Q0,Q1]\tau_0 \in [Q_0,Q_1]τ0​∈[Q0​,Q1​] solving f0(τ0)=0f_0(\tau_0)=0f0​(τ0​)=0, which part (a) shows to be unique. The optimal-order claims are equalities of sets of maximizers over Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting
open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity

/-- Taylor (2002), Lemma 1, p. 995. With `Q₀ = Φ⁻¹((p − w)/(p − s))`,
`Q₁ = Φ⁻¹((p + u − w)/(p + u − s))` and `f₀(T) = r(Q₀|T) − r(Q₁|T)` on `T ∈ [Q₀, Q₁]`:
(a) the root `τ₀` of `f₀` on `[Q₀, Q₁]` exists, is unique and lies in `(Q₀, Q₁)`;
(b) the retailer's optimal order set is `{Q₁}` if `T < τ₀`, `{Q₀}` if `T > τ₀`, and
`{Q₀, Q₁}` if `T = τ₀`. -/
theorem lemma1_optimal_order (p c s w u : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
    (hsc : s < c) (hu : 0 < u) (D : Demand)
    (Q0 : ℝ) (hQ0 : 0 < Q0) (hΦ0 : Phi D Q0 = (p - w) / (p - s))
    (Q1 : ℝ) (hQ1 : 0 < Q1) (hΦ1 : Phi D Q1 = (p + u - w) / (p + u - s)) :
    -- (a)
    (∃! τ0 : ℝ, τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1 ∧
        retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0) ∧
    (∀ τ0 : ℝ, τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1 →
        retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0 →
        τ0 ∈ Set.Ioo Q0 Q1) ∧
    -- (b)
    (∀ τ0 : ℝ, τ0 ∈ Set.Icc Q0 Q1 →
      retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q0 - retailerProfit p s w u τ0 D Q1 = 0 →
      ∀ T : ℝ, 0 ≤ T →
        (T < τ0 → optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u T D) = {Q1}) ∧
        (τ0 < T → optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u T D) = {Q0}) ∧
        (T = τ0 → optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s w u T D) = {Q0, Q1})) := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 995, Lemma 1 (with the definitions of Q₁, f₀, τ₀ preceding it); proof p. 1005
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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