Lemma 2 — one voter, three alternatives: strategy-proof implies fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship.lemma_2dictatorshipp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness
Consider a strict committee with a single individual and three alternatives, with . If is strategy-proof, then
This is the base case of the paper's induction on the number of individuals for three alternatives.
Formalization Note One individual is Fintype.card ι = 1, three alternatives Fintype.card A = 3. The hypothesis is kept as printed; holds automatically and is not stated.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Dictatorship_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship
open AGT
/-- **Lemma 2** (Satterthwaite, p. 15). For a strict committee with one individual and three
alternatives, and `1 ≤ p ≤ 3`, a strategy-proof strict voting procedure is either fully
dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding. -/
theorem lemma_2 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
(hn : Fintype.card ι = 1) (hm : Fintype.card A = 3)
(f : (ι → A → A → Prop) → A) (hp : 1 ≤ (range f).ncard)
(hsp : IncentiveCompatible f) :
FullyDictatorial f ∨ StrongAltExcluding f := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Lemma 2, p. 15
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.