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§4.1, p. 10, (3) — the quantity subgame given (w, u): q^U_R(w,u) and q^U_M(w,u)

Proved
QualityEncroach.Uniform.quantity_subgame

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

dual-channelencroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Let k>0k>0k>0, c≥0c\ge0c≥0, a wholesale price www and a quality u>0u>0u>0 be given, and write qˉ=1−cu−ku\bar q=1-\tfrac cu-kuqˉ​=1−uc​−ku.

  1. For every order 0≤qR≤qˉ0\le q_R\le\bar q0≤qR​≤qˉ​, the retailer's profit when the manufacturer replies with qMU(qR,w,u)q^U_M(q_R,w,u)qMU​(qR​,w,u) equals
−12uqR2+(12u+12ku2+c2−w)qR.-\tfrac12 u q_R^2+\big(\tfrac12u+\tfrac12ku^2+\tfrac c2-w\big)q_R .−21​uqR2​+(21​u+21​ku2+2c​−w)qR​.
  1. This quadratic in qRq_RqR​ is maximized over all reals at
qRU(w,u)=12−wu+ku2+c2u.q^U_R(w,u)=\frac12-\frac wu+\frac{ku}{2}+\frac{c}{2u}.qRU​(w,u)=21​−uw​+2ku​+2uc​.
  1. If 0≤qRU(w,u)≤qˉ0\le q^U_R(w,u)\le\bar q0≤qRU​(w,u)≤qˉ​, the manufacturer's reply to it is
qMU(qRU(w,u),w,u)=qMU(w,u)=14+w2u−3ku4−3c4u.q^U_M(q^U_R(w,u),w,u)=q^U_M(w,u)=\frac14+\frac{w}{2u}-\frac{3ku}{4}-\frac{3c}{4u}.qMU​(qRU​(w,u),w,u)=qMU​(w,u)=41​+2uw​−43ku​−4u3c​.

In this region, qRU(w,u)q^U_R(w,u)qRU​(w,u) maximizes the retailer's payoff over every nonnegative order, including orders above qˉ\bar qqˉ​ for which the manufacturer sells nothing directly.

Together these give equation (3), the solution of the quantity competition subgame for given www and uuu.

Formalization Note. The paper derives (3) "assuming qR≤1−c/u−kuq_R\le 1-c/u-kuqR​≤1−c/u−ku"; that assumption is a hypothesis of parts 1 and 3, not dropped.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Uniform_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.Uniform

/-- §4.1, p. 10, (3): the quantity subgame for given `(w, u)`, `u > 0`.
(a) For `0 ≤ q_R ≤ 1 − c/u − ku`, the retailer's profit when the manufacturer replies with
`q^U_M(q_R, w, u)` is `−½ u q_R² + (½u + ½ku² + c/2 − w) q_R`.
(b) This quadratic is maximized at `q^U_R(w, u) = 1/2 − w/u + ku/2 + c/(2u)`.
(c) If `0 ≤ q^U_R(w, u) ≤ 1 − c/u − ku`, the manufacturer's reply to it is
`q^U_M(w, u) = 1/4 + w/(2u) − 3ku/4 − 3c/(4u)`, and this retailer order is
optimal among all nonnegative orders, including those outside the region of the quadratic. -/
theorem quantity_subgame (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (w u : ℝ) (hu : 0 < u) :
    (∀ qR : ℝ, 0 ≤ qR → qR ≤ 1 - c / u - k * u →
        retailerPayoff ⟨w, u, qR, qUM_br k c qR w u⟩ =
          -(1 / 2) * u * qR ^ 2 + ((1 / 2) * u + (1 / 2) * k * u ^ 2 + c / 2 - w) * qR) ∧
    (∀ q : ℝ, -(1 / 2) * u * q ^ 2 + ((1 / 2) * u + (1 / 2) * k * u ^ 2 + c / 2 - w) * q ≤
        -(1 / 2) * u * qUR k c w u ^ 2 +
          ((1 / 2) * u + (1 / 2) * k * u ^ 2 + c / 2 - w) * qUR k c w u) ∧
    (0 ≤ qUR k c w u → qUR k c w u ≤ 1 - c / u - k * u →
        qUM_br k c (qUR k c w u) w u = qUM k c w u ∧
        ∀ qR : ℝ, 0 ≤ qR →
          retailerPayoff ⟨w, u, qR, qUM_br k c qR w u⟩ ≤
            retailerPayoff ⟨w, u, qUR k c w u, qUM k c w u⟩) := by sorry

end QualityEncroach.Uniform
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 10, §4.1, equation (3) and the two displays before it
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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