Lemma 4, PDF p. 15 — in {A,BC}, L^(BC) = r(α+s₃)/(1−2α), rα/k, 2rα/(1−α) on Ω^(BC)_1, Ω^(BC)_2, Ω^(BC)_3
ProvedEndogMerger.SymLoyal.lemma_4capacityloyal-customersmergerp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-competition
Consider the small merger structure with , and , and let , , be the Table A1 lower bound of price support, firm profit and merged-entity profit. With :
- on :
- on : , , ;
- on : , , .
The lemma resolves the maximum in Table A1's small-merger column; region is the only place where a small firm gains from the small merger.
Formalization Note and are added as in Lemma 5. is the closed form from the proof of Lemma 4. Part 1 implicitly contains on , so that lies in Table A1's first row.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Setting import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Regions
Formal statement
namespace EndogMerger.SymLoyal
theorem lemma_4 (α k r : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα3 : α < 1 / 3) (hαk : α < k)
(hk : k < 1 - 2 * α) (hr : 0 < r) :
(OmegaBC₁ α k →
LBC α k r = r * (α + s3 α k) / (1 - 2 * α) ∧
piBCA α k r = r * (α + s3 α k) ∧
piBC α k r = 2 * r * (α + s3 α k) * k / (1 - 2 * α)) ∧
(OmegaBC₂ α k →
LBC α k r = r * α / k ∧
piBCA α k r = r * α * (1 - 2 * α) / k ∧
piBC α k r = 2 * r * α) ∧
(OmegaBC₃ α k →
LBC α k r = 2 * r * α / (1 - α) ∧
piBCA α k r = 2 * r * α * (1 - 2 * α) / (1 - α) ∧
piBC α k r = 2 * r * α) := by sorry
end EndogMerger.SymLoyal
Source
Wang, Wu, Tang & Dai, Endogenous merger decisions among competitors: impact of limited capacity and loyal segments, Management Science (2024), accepted manuscript, PDF p. 15, Lemma 4 and footnote 13; proof PDF p. 47
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.