Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Proposition 1, PDF p. 19 (printed p. 13) — near μ = 0, network effects raise each firm's demand, price and profit and lower its singlehomers

Proved
Multihoming.Local.proposition1_weak_network_effects

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticshotellingmultihomingnetwork-effectsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Consider the Hotelling duopoly with network effects of strength μ\muμ, mismatch cost t>0t>0t>0 and exclusive features e0,e1e_0,e_1e0​,e1​ of the two goods, at the candidate partial-multihoming prices piMp_i^MpiM​ of (16). Write xi(μ)x_i(\mu)xi​(μ) for the total demand of good iii (the multihoming demand (14) at those prices), si(μ)=1−xj(μ)s_i(\mu)=1-x_j(\mu)si​(μ)=1−xj​(μ) for its singlehomers, and πi(μ)=piM(μ) xi(μ)\pi_i(\mu)=p_i^M(\mu)\,x_i(\mu)πi​(μ)=piM​(μ)xi​(μ) for firm iii's profit.

Assume partial multihoming at μ=0\mu=0μ=0, that is

e0<2t,e1<2t,2t<e0+e1.e_0<2t,\qquad e_1<2t,\qquad 2t<e_0+e_1 .e0​<2t,e1​<2t,2t<e0​+e1​.

Then there is δ\deltaδ with 0<δ<t0<\delta<t0<δ<t such that, on [0,δ][0,\delta][0,δ] and for each i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1},

  1. the total demand xi(μ)x_i(\mu)xi​(μ) is strictly increasing in μ\muμ;
  2. the number of singlehomers si(μ)s_i(\mu)si​(μ) is strictly decreasing in μ\muμ;
  3. the price piM(μ)p_i^M(\mu)piM​(μ) is strictly increasing in μ\muμ;
  4. the profit πi(μ)\pi_i(\mu)πi​(μ) is strictly increasing in μ\muμ.

The firms may be asymmetric (e0≠e1e_0\ne e_1e0​=e1​). In contrast with full singlehoming, where prices and profits strictly fall in μ\muμ, weak network effects benefit both firms once some consumers multihome.

Formalization Note "Assume partial multihoming" is pinned as the three inequalities above: at μ=0\mu=0μ=0 the closed forms (19)–(20) give s0=(2t−e1)/(2t)s_0=(2t-e_1)/(2t)s0​=(2t−e1​)/(2t), s1=(2t−e0)/(2t)s_1=(2t-e_0)/(2t)s1​=(2t−e0​)/(2t) and m=(e0+e1−2t)/(2t)m=(e_0+e_1-2t)/(2t)m=(e0​+e1​−2t)/(2t), so these are exactly the conditions under which both groups of singlehomers and the multihomers are positive. (The page names only one condition 2t−ei>02t-e_i>02t−ei​>0; both firms' conditions are needed.) "In the neighborhood of μ=0\mu=0μ=0" is read as strict monotonicity on [0,δ][0,\delta][0,δ] for some δ>0\delta>0δ>0; it is one-sided because μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0, and δ<t\delta<tδ<t keeps Assumption 1 (i), μ<t\mu<tμ<t. Assumption 1 (ii)–(iii) (coverage and positive shares in the full game) are not used and not assumed. Demand is the multihoming demand (14) at the candidate prices (16), not a closed form.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_Multihoming_Local_Model
Formal statement
namespace Multihoming.Local

/-- Proposition 1, PDF p. 19: under partial multihoming at `μ = 0` (`e₀, e₁ < 2t < e₀ + e₁`),
there is `δ ∈ (0, t)` such that on `[0, δ]` each good's total demand, price and profit at the
candidate prices (16) strictly increase in `μ`, and each good's singlehomers strictly decrease. -/
theorem proposition1_weak_network_effects (t e0 e1 : ℝ) (ht : 0 < t)
    (h0 : e0 < 2 * t) (h1 : e1 < 2 * t) (hpm : 2 * t < e0 + e1) :
    ∃ δ, 0 < δ ∧ δ < t ∧
      (StrictMonoOn (fun μ => outM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
        StrictMonoOn (fun μ => outM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) ∧
      (StrictAntiOn (fun μ => singleM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
        StrictAntiOn (fun μ => singleM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) ∧
      (StrictMonoOn (fun μ => priceM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
        StrictMonoOn (fun μ => priceM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) ∧
      (StrictMonoOn (fun μ => profitM t μ e0 e1) (Set.Icc 0 δ) ∧
        StrictMonoOn (fun μ => profitM t μ e1 e0) (Set.Icc 0 δ)) := by sorry

end Multihoming.Local
Source
Foros, Kind & Stähler, Endogenous multihoming and network effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or both?, SNF Working Paper No. 16/21 (NHH Bergen, December 2021; Management Science DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.00613), PDF p. 19 (printed p. 13), Proposition 1; argument PDF pp. 18–19, (21), (22), footnote 15
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me