(32), p. 39 — the Logit diversion ratio is Σ_{k≠j} e^{−tᵏ}/(e^z + Σ_{k≠j} e^{−tᵏ}), independent of tʲ, and equals Σ_{k≠j}∂nᵏ/∂tʲ over −∂nʲ/∂tʲ
ProvedNetFeePlatform.InteropFee.diversion_logitConsider platforms with Logit demand , outside-option weight , and assume that or . Fix a platform and a net-fee profile . Then the diversion ratio satisfies:
- the closed form
which does not involve ; 2. the defining property of the diversion ratio (p. 25): as a function of platform 's own net fee , with the other fees fixed, the total rival demand has derivative at
Independence from is what makes the condition of Appendix E.1.3 automatic under Logit demand, so that the first-order condition characterizes best responses.
Formalization Note The Logit own-fee derivative is used to write the right-hand side of part 2. The hypothesis " or " rules out the degenerate single platform without outside option, where .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NetFeePlatform_Competition_Setting
namespace NetFeePlatform.InteropFee
theorem diversion_logit {J : ℕ} (w : ℝ) (hw : 0 ≤ w) (hJ : 0 < w ∨ 2 ≤ J)
(t : Fin J → ℝ) (j : Fin J) :
NetFeePlatform.Competition.diversion w t j = (∑ k ∈ Finset.univ.erase j, Real.exp (-t k)) /
(w + ∑ k ∈ Finset.univ.erase j, Real.exp (-t k)) ∧
HasDerivAt (fun s => ∑ k ∈ Finset.univ.erase j, NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand w (Function.update t j s) k)
(NetFeePlatform.Competition.diversion w t j * (NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand w t j * (1 - NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand w t j))) (t j) := by sorry
end NetFeePlatform.InteropFee
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.