Section 2, p. 5 — a valuable positive-budget player rules out zero equilibrium
ProvedLiquidPoA.Kelly.kelly_zero_not_eqbudgetskelly-mechanismliquid-welfarep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchyresource-allocation
If an admissible Kelly game has a player with positive budget and , the all-zero signal vector is not an equilibrium:
A sufficiently small positive signal obtains the resource at a payment below both the budget and the player's gain in value. This identifies when the zero profile can matter in the full price-of-anarchy goal.
Formalization Note The value condition makes precise the paper's phrase “valuation function that takes positive values”; a positive constant valuation alone would not give a profitable deviation.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_LiquidPoA_Kelly_Setting
Formal statement
namespace LiquidPoA.Kelly
/-- Section 2, pp. 5–6: a player with positive budget and genuinely increasing value rules out zero equilibrium. -/
theorem kelly_zero_not_eq {n : ℕ} (G : RAGame n)
(hG : G.IsAdmissible) (i : Fin n)
(hc : 0 < G.c i) (hv : G.v i 0 < G.v i 1) :
¬ IsEquilibrium (kelly n) G 0 := by sorry
end LiquidPoA.Kelly
Source
Caragiannis, Voudouris, The efficiency of resource allocation mechanisms for budget-constrained users, arXiv:1707.03551v3, p. 5, paragraph preceding the definition of X_n
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.