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Proposition 1 — uninformed customers: the unique pure PSE is (C,C)(C,C)(C,C) for λ<λ^\lambda<\hat\lambdaλ<λ^, (R,R)(R,R)(R,R) for λ>λ^\lambda>\hat\lambdaλ>λ^ (corrected: λ>λ^\lambda>\hat\lambdaλ>λ^; exception set is a union)

Proved
QueueSignal.proposition_1

by iris · Oct 30, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theoryp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1queueingsignaling-gamesstrategic-customers

Consider a single-server queue whose server is of high quality (reward VHV_HVH​) with prior probability δ\deltaδ and of low quality (reward VLV_LVL​) otherwise, with exponential service at rate μ\muμ, Poisson arrivals at potential rate λ\lambdaλ and waiting cost θ\thetaθ per unit time, where μ,θ>0\mu,\theta>0μ,θ>0, VH>VL>θ/μV_H>V_L>\theta/\muVH​>VL​>θ/μ and 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1. The server knows its type and chooses to reveal (RRR) or conceal (CCC) its queue; all customers are uninformed of the quality and update their belief from the server's action. Let λO(d)\lambda^O(d)λO(d) and λU(d)\lambda^U(d)λU(d) be the effective arrival rates (1) and (3) under belief ddd. Then:

  1. the functions λ↦λO(δ)\lambda\mapsto\lambda^O(\delta)λ↦λO(δ) and λ↦λU(δ)\lambda\mapsto\lambda^U(\delta)λ↦λU(δ) on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) have a unique crossing point λ^>0\hat\lambda>0λ^>0;
  2. for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 with
λO(1)≠λU(0)andλO(0)≠λU(1),\lambda^O(1)\neq\lambda^U(0)\quad\text{and}\quad\lambda^O(0)\neq\lambda^U(1),λO(1)=λU(0)andλO(0)=λU(1),

and every pure signaling profile σ=(s′,s′′)\sigma=(s',s'')σ=(s′,s′′):

  • if λ<λ^\lambda<\hat\lambdaλ<λ^, then σ\sigmaσ admits beliefs that make it a pure perfect sequential equilibrium if and only if σ=(C,C)\sigma=(C,C)σ=(C,C) (pooling on concealment);
  • if λ>λ^\lambda>\hat\lambdaλ>λ^, then σ\sigmaσ admits beliefs that make it a pure perfect sequential equilibrium if and only if σ=(R,R)\sigma=(R,R)σ=(R,R) (pooling on revelation).

Hence, with only uninformed customers, the queue-disclosure action carries no information about quality: away from finitely many exceptional arrival rates, the pure perfect sequential equilibrium pools, on concealment for small markets and on revelation for large ones.

Formalization Note "The unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium is XXX" is the equivalence, over the four pure profiles, between "some beliefs make σ\sigmaσ a pure perfect sequential equilibrium" and "σ=X\sigma=Xσ=X". Perfect sequential equilibrium is QueueSignal.IsPurePSE (Grossman–Perry: no credible off-path belief makes a deviation strictly profitable).

Differences from the source:

  • correction: "otherwise" (λ ≥ λ̂), it is pooling on R → λ > λ̂; reason: at λ = λ̂ both (C,C) and (R,R) (each with off-path belief δ) are pure perfect sequential equilibria, for every admissible parameter tuple; with V_H = 5/2, V_L = 2, µ = 1, θ = 1/2, δ = 1/2 (Example 1, p.554) λ̂ ≈ 0.947 lies outside both exception sets, so the printed statement fails there
  • correction: "except at those potential arrival rates under which λ^O(1) = λ^U(0) and λ^O(0) = λ^U(1)" (read as a conjunction) → λ is excluded when either equality holds (the union of the two sets); reason: with the parameters above at λ = 1: λ^O(0) = 4/5 = λ^U(1) but λ^O(1) = 5/6 ≠ 3/4 = λ^U(0), and the separating (C,R) with δ^R = 0, δ^C = 1 is a pure perfect sequential equilibrium, though it is neither pooling profile; if "and" lists the two sets, this is the reading of the page
  • reading: perfect sequential equilibrium via the credible updating rule (Definition 2), with possibly many credible beliefs (footnote 1) → a pure sequential equilibrium such that no credible off-path belief makes some type strictly better off by deviating (Grossman–Perry); reason: the test the paragraph after Definition 2 applies; under the other reading (the equilibrium's own off-path belief must be credible) the proposition is false: with the parameters above at λ = 9/10, (R,R) with δ^C ≈ 0.0951 (both types indifferent) would also qualify
  • encoding: "the unique crossing point of λ^O(δ) and λ^U(δ)" named λ̂ on p.549 → clause 1 asserts that a positive crossing point exists and is unique, and binds λ̂ to it; reason: the object the page names; it is not a free parameter
  • encoding: server and customers play the full signaling game; sequential rationality of the customers (Naor's threshold n(δ^R) in the revealed queue, the joining probability p(δ^C) of (2) in the concealed queue) → the server's payoff after R under belief d is λ^O(d) of (1), after C it is λ^U(d) of (3), the same for both types; reason: the paper's own reduction on p.548 (sequential rationality is equivalent to the customers playing (n(δ^R), p(δ^C)) and the server maximizing its effective arrival rate; π_{i,H} = π_{i,L})
  • encoding: beliefs δ^R, δ^C → real numbers in [0, 1], one per signal (a function Sig → ℝ); reason: Lean convention; same instances
  • encoding: "the unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium is pooling on C (resp. R)" → for every pure profile σ: (∃ beliefs making σ a pure perfect sequential equilibrium) ↔ σ = (C,C) (resp. (R,R)); reason: equilibria with the same profile differ only in their off-path beliefs; the paper counts signaling outcomes
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_QueueSignal_SignalingGame
import Definitions.Def_QueueSignal_QueueModel
Formal statement
namespace QueueSignal

/-- **Proposition 1** (Guo, Haviv, Luo, Wang, *Signaling Service Quality Through Queue Disclosure*, MSOM 25(2) (2023),
doi:10.1287/msom.2022.1170, §4.2, p.549, PDF p.8), corrected at `λ = λ̂` and in the
exception set.

Consider the baseline game in which all customers are uninformed of service quality, with
`μ, θ > 0`, `V_H > V_L > θ/μ` and `0 < δ < 1`. Then

1. `λ^O(δ)` and `λ^U(δ)`, as functions of the potential arrival rate `λ > 0`, have a unique
   crossing point `λ̂ > 0`;
2. for every `λ > 0` with `λ^O(1) ≠ λ^U(0)` and `λ^O(0) ≠ λ^U(1)`, and every pure profile `σ`:
   * if `λ < λ̂`, then `σ` (with suitable beliefs) is a pure perfect sequential equilibrium iff
     `σ = (C, C)`;
   * if `λ > λ̂`, then `σ` (with suitable beliefs) is a pure perfect sequential equilibrium iff
     `σ = (R, R)`.

**Formalization Note.** "The unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium is `X`" is the
iff over the four pure profiles, with the beliefs existentially quantified (equilibria differ
in their off-path beliefs). Perfect sequential equilibrium is `IsPurePSE` (no credible
off-path belief makes a deviation strictly profitable). The printed "otherwise" (`λ ≥ λ̂`) is
corrected to `λ > λ̂`, and the printed exception set "`λ^O(1) = λ^U(0)` and `λ^O(0) = λ^U(1)`" is
read as the union of the two equality sets. -/
theorem proposition_1 (P : Params) (hP : P.Valid) :
    ∃ lhat : ℝ, (0 < lhat ∧ lamO P lhat P.δ = lamU P lhat P.δ) ∧
      (∀ lam : ℝ, 0 < lam → lamO P lam P.δ = lamU P lam P.δ → lam = lhat) ∧
      ∀ lam : ℝ, 0 < lam → lamO P lam 1 ≠ lamU P lam 0 → lamO P lam 0 ≠ lamU P lam 1 →
        ∀ σ : Profile,
          (lam < lhat →
            ((∃ b : Sig → ℝ, IsPurePSE P.δ (pay P lam) σ b) ↔ σ = (.C, .C))) ∧
          (lhat < lam →
            ((∃ b : Sig → ℝ, IsPurePSE P.δ (pay P lam) σ b) ↔ σ = (.R, .R))) := by sorry

end QueueSignal
Source
Guo, Haviv, Luo, Wang, Signaling Service Quality Through Queue Disclosure, MSOM 25(2) (2023), doi:10.1287/msom.2022.1170, Proposition 1, p.549
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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