Proposition 1, p. 10 — both firms find knowledge sharing privately profitable iff V − I ≥ |π_F − π_A|
ProvedAlliancePortfolio.Sharing.proposition_1Consider a single alliance between firms and with alliance value , ex post outside options and satisfying , and total knowledge-sharing cost , each firm paying . Firm 's Nash-bargaining payoff is , and knowledge sharing is privately profitable for when .
Then knowledge sharing is privately profitable for both firms if and only if
The result says that value creation (, the efficiency condition) is not enough: shifts in bargaining positions caused by knowledge sharing, measured by , can lead to underinvestment.
Formalization Note Proposition 1 also says knowledge sharing "is efficient when "; that sentence is the paper's definition of efficiency and is not part of the formal statement. The paper writes "only when"; the constraint-level statement is an equivalence, because the paper rewrites the two constraints (2) equivalently as (3) and (4) on p. 9. The standing assumptions and of §2 are kept as hypotheses.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Supermodularity_Cooperative_ShapleyValue import Definitions.Def_AlliancePortfolio_Sharing_Model
namespace AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
theorem proposition_1 (V I πF πA : ℝ) (hI : 0 < I) (hV : πF + πA ≤ V) :
SingleFeasible V I πF πA ↔ |πF - πA| ≤ V - I := by sorry
end AlliancePortfolio.Sharing
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.