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p. 24, proof of Lemma 6 — if the blocks are unequal, i′ puts probability 0 on the strategies matching maximum-probability blocks

Proved
FixpNash.Blocks.matching_prob_zero_of_max_block

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymatching-penniesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let players i,i′i,i'i,i′ of a finite game form a block matching-pennies pair (block map β:Si→Si′\beta:S_i\to S_{i'}β:Si​→Si′​, first term μ\muμ, constant MMM, parameter nnn; see the definition item), and let xxx be a mixed Nash equilibrium. Write bk(x)=∑j:β(j)=kxi(j)b_k(x)=\sum_{j:\beta(j)=k}x_i(j)bk​(x)=∑j:β(j)=k​xi​(j) for the total probability of block kkk. Suppose that the block probabilities are not all equal, and let k∈Si′k\in S_{i'}k∈Si′​ be a strategy of i′i'i′ whose block has maximum total probability:

∃ k1,k2: bk1(x)≠bk2(x),bk′(x)≤bk(x)  for all k′.\exists\,k_1,k_2:\ b_{k_1}(x)\ne b_{k_2}(x),\qquad b_{k'}(x)\le b_k(x)\ \text{ for all }k' .∃k1​,k2​: bk1​​(x)=bk2​​(x),bk′​(x)≤bk​(x)  for all k′.

Then

xi′(k)=0.x_{i'}(k)=0 .xi′​(k)=0.

In the paper's words: if RRR is the set of blocks of maximum probability, the strategies of i′i'i′ corresponding to blocks in RRR have probability 000, because otherwise i′i'i′ could improve its expected payoff. This is the first step of the proof of Lemma 6, part 1.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_Blocks_Form
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.Blocks

/-- Proof of Lemma 6, p. 24: if a Nash equilibrium `x` gives unequal total probability to
some blocks of player `i`, then every strategy `k` of `i'` whose block has maximum total
probability gets probability `0` in `x`. -/
theorem matching_prob_zero_of_max_block {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ k, Fintype (S k)] [∀ k, DecidableEq (S k)]
    (u : ι → (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (i i' : ι) (β : S i → S i')
    (μ : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (M : ℝ) (n : ℕ) (hG : IsBlockPair u i i' β μ M n)
    (x : ∀ k, S k → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedNash u x)
    (hunequal : ∃ k₁ k₂ : S i', blockProb β x k₁ ≠ blockProb β x k₂)
    (k : S i') (hk : ∀ k' : S i', blockProb β x k' ≤ blockProb β x k) :
    x i' k = 0 := by sorry

end FixpNash.Blocks
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), proof of Lemma 6, part 1, p. 24
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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