Lemma 2 — characterization of feasible direct mechanisms
ProvedMyersonAuction.Optimal.lemma_2auctionsmechanism-designoptimal-auctionsp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
A direct mechanism is feasible if and only if its interim win probability is weakly increasing in each bidder’s report, the interim utility satisfies the envelope formula, every lowest type has nonnegative utility, and the allocation probabilities satisfy the single-object constraint:
This characterization replaces the incentive inequalities by monotonicity and an integral identity.
Formalization Note Both sides require integrability of the mechanism and its report sections. The type estimates range only over .
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_MyersonAuction_Optimal_Mechanism noncomputable section
Formal statement
namespace MyersonAuction.Optimal
theorem lemma_2 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
(E : Environment ι) (p x : Outcome ι) :
Feasible E p x ↔
WellDefined E p x ∧ ProbabilityCondition E p ∧
MonotoneQ E p ∧ EnvelopeAndBaseIR E p x := by sorry
end MyersonAuction.Optimal
Source
Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Math. Oper. Res. 6(1) (1981), p. 63, Lemma 2, eqs. (4.2)–(4.4)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.