Sequential closedness of the countering correspondence
ProvedNash1950.Countering.counters_of_tendstobest-responseclosed-graphgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be sequences of mixed-strategy profiles in a finite game, converging respectively to and . If counters at every index, then counters :
This is Nash's explicit sequential formulation of the closed-graph property.
Formalization Note. Convergence uses the product topology on the finite product of real strategy vectors. The sequence index is to distinguish it from the number of players. Each is explicitly a mixed profile; each is one by the definition of countering.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_Nash1950_Countering_Setting open Filter
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem counters_of_tendsto {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
∀ (P Q : ℕ → ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (P₀ Q₀ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ),
(∀ k, AGT.IsMixedProfile (P k)) →
Tendsto P atTop (nhds P₀) → Tendsto Q atTop (nhds Q₀) →
(∀ k, Counters u (P k) (Q k)) → Counters u P₀ Q₀ := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶3, sentences 3–4 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.